Public Safety Committee on June 2nd, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

All right.

In that case, we could follow the proposal put forward by Mrs. DeBellefeuille, namely that organizations such as the Canadian Bar Association that would like their briefs to be made available more quickly could send them directly to members of Parliament. Their email addresses are easily accessible on the House of Commons website. For their part, members of Parliament can use these briefs as they see fit.

Ideally, briefs should be submitted in both French and English. Of course, we cannot prevent an organization from sending a brief to a member of Parliament in only one of the two official languages, but it would be preferable for it to be in both languages. Members of Parliament, for their part, may act at their discretion.

Mrs. DeBellefeuille, you have the floor.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Thank you for taking the time to discuss this; it is, after all, a very important issue.

If everyone agrees, could you, in your capacity as committee chair, write to Mr. Lymburner at the translation bureau to tell him that this situation is unacceptable and that, when an important bill such as Bill C‑22 is being studied, members of Parliament expect priorities to be managed accordingly? It is not normal for the committee not to have the Canadian Bar Association's brief as part of the study of a bill that deals with lawful access. It makes no sense. That said, could you, as chair, file an official complaint? This situation is unacceptable. We need to speak up instead of just accepting it.

Earlier, I was a little taken aback when you said that we weren't the only ones and that we had to work within the limits we have. Personally, that's not what I want to hear from the chair of this committee. What I want is for the chair to stand up for us and tell the translation bureau that the committee is willing to do its job, but that we aren't being given the tools we need to do so. What I expect from the chair of this committee is not for him to give up, but rather for him to fight to secure these services.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

The chair will do both, Mrs. DeBellefeuille.

First, he will indeed convey the viewpoint you have just so clearly described and, in doing so, defend the committee's interests.

Second, the chair will provide clarification. A few minutes ago, I received more detailed information regarding the Canadian Bar Association's brief. This brief was reportedly submitted in its entirety on May 29. The number of pages it contained exceeded the number that had been communicated two weeks earlier. The final version, containing the correct number of pages, arrived on June 1. It is therefore understandable that, even with considerable resources, it's difficult to meet the committee's expectations and needs. This is in no way a criticism or reproach directed at anyone. It's a learning experience that is also important to understand in the context of the relationship between the committee and the House of Commons.

That being said, I will be more than happy to do as you have requested, Mrs. DeBellefeuille, and we will see how things proceed.

I now turn back to you, Mr. Housefather. You may finish your remarks. You were originally allotted five minutes.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I think I've probably used up the full five minutes. I'll give the remainder of my speaking time to Mr. Ramsay.

I fully understand Mrs. DeBellefeuille's position. That said, it's really important that we conduct clause-by-clause consideration of the bill. If someone has submitted a brief in both official languages, it shouldn't take that long to determine, just by looking at it, whether the translation is of sufficient quality or not. That's not the same as translating the entire brief. I certainly hope we can at least find a way.

For those who didn't hear that in English, if you have your brief and you want us to see it before, send it to us directly by email. It's [e-mail]. At least we'll have the choice to read it if you send it.

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

[Jacques Ramsay, Liberal, La Prairie—Atateken, QC]

Mr. Surgenor, I want to come back to something you said.

I would attribute it to your age. You look like a bright fellow, but it was quite naive. If you want to say that the challenges of law enforcement are the same today as they were a long time ago, when officers only had to look into the white pages to find information they needed, that is no longer the case. Police force chiefs from all over Canada spoke with one voice to say that they really needed a lawful access regime.

Ms. Saad, if I may, I'll speak to you in French.

You said that the resources were already available to police officers. You're right, but you may not have read the title of part 1 of the bill: It refers to timely access. That's what the police are telling us. Their investigations are stalling or not moving forward because they don't have enough time to access the information. There are too many barriers.

Timely access is what this bill is all about.

Mr. Hatfield, you said the government was installing microphones or spyware throughout people's homes. That's not the case, sir, based on the warning Mr. Baber mentioned. You know, the government needs a court order to obtain that information. We ask companies to retain information that isn't accessible to the government unless certain conditions are met and there's reason to believe that this information would lead to a conclusion resulting in a conviction. That's no small matter, Mr. Hatfield.

That's all I'm going to say because I think I've run out of time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

That is correct. Unfortunately, your flight of oratory must now come to an end.

Before we suspend the meeting, I would like to tell you that, on the point of privilege, I have contacted representatives from the three different parties and shared with them the observations I have gathered over the past few weeks. I find that there has been no violation of members' privilege, given the usual circumstances we have observed.

This brings me to thank you, distinguished witnesses, for your appearance. I wish you a good day.

For everyone else, we will suspend the session for a few moments.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Good afternoon again, everyone. We're ready to begin the second hour of our meeting.

I'll start by introducing the witnesses.

First, we have Mr. Khaled Alqazzaz from the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council, who is joining us by video conference.

Next, we have Mr. Tim McSorley, senior fellow at the Centre for Free Expression. He is here in person.

We also have Mr. Udbhav Tiwari from Signal, who is joining us by video conference.

I welcome to our distinguished witnesses and thank you for joining us.

Let's now move on to the presentations. You will each have five minutes to speak. Let's begin with Khaled Alqazzaz.

You have the floor, Mr. Alqazzaz.

[Khaled Alqazzaz, Executive Director, Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Assalamu alykum. Peace be with you. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today.

My name is Khaled Alqazzaz, and I am the executive director of the Canadian Muslim Public Affairs Council. CMPAC is a not-for-profit organization dedicated to advancing civil liberties, addressing systemic Islamophobia and ensuring that Muslim perspectives are represented in public policy.

CMPAC submits that Bill C-22 should be withdrawn. At a minimum, part 2 of the legislation, the supporting authorized access to information act, should be removed in its entirety, and the provisions in part 1 that lower the threshold for access to subscriber information should be amended.

For Muslim Canadians, surveillance powers carry a particular significance. Muslim communities have been disproportionately affected by national security and counterterrorism measures, particularly where expansive investigative authorities have operated with limited accountability and oversight. These experiences reinforce concerns that expanded surveillance powers disproportionately affect racialized and religious minority groups.

Privacy scholars and legal experts—in a joint letter sent to the Prime Minister by civil liberties organizations, refugee rights organizations, academics and digital rights organizations—concluded that, if adopted as is, “Bill C-22 will be the most expansive invasion of Canadian privacy rights in modern history, and will put the cybersecurity of everyone in Canada at unacceptable risk”.

The details of our submission will be shared with the committee right after this meeting. However, here is a summary of our main concerns.

Of particular concern is the creation of new production orders for subscriber information based on the lower standard of “reasonable grounds to suspect” versus “grounds to believe”.

Part 2 of the bill raises even greater difficulties. The SAAIA grants broad regulatory and ministerial powers to compel service providers to facilitate access to information and retain metadata. The practical effect would be to increase the state's ability to collect, organize and analyze information capable of revealing religious participation, political engagement, community relationships and patterns of association. When metadata is collected and retained on a broad scale, such information permits forms of associational surveillance capable of exposing lawful religious, charitable and advocacy activities.

The second part with regard to part 2 is that by authorizing the government to require all electronic service providers to modify their systems and develop technical capabilities that facilitate access to information, Bill C-22 risks creating vulnerabilities that could weaken the security of Canadians’ communications and personal information. Once vulnerabilities exist, they may be exploited not only by Canadian authorities but also by foreign governments, cybercriminals and other malicious actors.

Also, in part 2, the extensive reliance on secret orders is quite problematic. Powers exercised through confidential directives with limited transparency create obvious accountability deficits. Fundamental rights require meaningful oversight and transparency.

Now I'll leave you with two examples, one from our community.

Many members of the Muslim community across Canada are immigrants, refugees and individuals with family connections in countries characterized by weak rule of law, political instability or authoritarian governance. In such contexts, the low threshold of “reasonable grounds to suspect” for foreign entities to request personal data held in Canada, along with the lack of dual criminality provisions in changes to the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, can create serious risks, including transnational repression, intimidation of family members, travel restrictions or other forms of retaliation. These concerns are particularly significant where information may be requested or shared based on conduct that is not necessarily unlawful under Canadian law.

The second example is about concerns that extend beyond any single community and that could affect all Canadians, including members of Parliament who engage in international travel or diplomatic activities. Several MPs have already been investigated for potential foreign interference. By lowering the threshold to “reasonable grounds to suspect,” Bill C-22 would permit the collection of significant amounts of personal information. Such collection may impact suspected MPs and a broader circle of friends and family. This data can potentially be requested by foreign state agencies as part of an investigation, having direct and indirect impacts on the individuals investigated. While such measures may be justified in limited cases, their impact often extends beyond the individual under investigation.

Furthermore, as a result of the legislation, ESPs would face additional vulnerabilities, exposing them to higher risks of hacking and data breaches, impacting every citizen, activist and, potentially, senior politician and subjecting them to extortion and targeting.

To wrap up, expanded surveillance powers could disproportionately affect Muslim, racialized, indigenous and other marginalized communities. For this reason, CMPAC urges the withdrawal of Bill C-22 for review. Public safety is a legitimate objective, but measures pursued in its name must remain consistent with constitutional rights, fundamental freedoms and democratic accountability.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you very much, Mr. Alqazzaz.

Mr. McSorley, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Tim McSorley, Senior Fellow, Centre for Free Expression]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

On behalf of the Centre for Free Expression, I want to thank all of you for the opportunity to appear here today before you.

Bill C-22 poses a serious and unacceptable risk to the privacy right of Canadians—both as an individual right and a social right essential to participate meaningfully in democratic discourse. The Centre for Free Expression's work is premised on understanding that democracy is a regime founded on ongoing public discourse about what is legitimate and what is illegitimate in society—a discourse that is necessarily without any guarantor and without any end, and one we all have a right to participate in and to be informed by.

Privacy is fundamental for freedom of expression and democratic discourse, specifically what Neil Richards has termed “intellectual privacy”, which is the “protection from surveillance or interference when we are engaged in the process of generating ideas—thinking, reading,” and when we are discussing these with those close to us “before our ideas are ready for public consumption.” In our evolving digital world, much of our reading, thinking and private communications are mediated by electronic technologies that make possible unprecedented forms of surveillance by the state, digital platforms, marketers and even those in our social networks.

The right to privacy is recognized as a human right in international law that Canada has signed and ratified. It is enshrined in the United Nations' 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which Canada supported and endorsed. While Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not mention privacy specifically, our courts have made clear that section 8 protects privacy.

In R v. Spencer, Justice Cromwell wrote, for a unanimous Supreme Court, in paragraph 15, the following:

This Court has long emphasized the need for a purposive approach to s. 8 that emphasizes the protection of privacy as a prerequisite to individual security, self-fulfilment and autonomy as well as to the maintenance of a thriving democratic society....

Further, at paragraph 36, he wrote:

The nature of the privacy interest does not depend on whether, in the particular case, privacy shelters legal or illegal activity. The analysis turns on the privacy of the area or the thing being searched and the impact of the search on its target, not the legal or illegal nature of the items sought.

Finally, at paragraph 41, he wrote:

There is also a third conception of informational privacy...the understanding of privacy as anonymity. In my view, the concept of privacy potentially protected by s. 8 must include this understanding of privacy.

In R v. Marakah, Chief Justice McLachlin discussed the privacy implications of modern electronic communications. She wrote:

Preservation of a “zone of privacy” in which personal information is safe from state intrusion is the very purpose of s. 8 of the Charter [and] this zone of privacy extends beyond one's own mobile device; it can include the electronic conversations in which one shares private information with others. It is reasonable to expect these private interactions—and not just the contents of a particular cell phone at a particular point in time—to remain private.

Bill C-22 is the latest in a long string of proposals to undermine Canadians' right to privacy in the name of fighting crime and protecting national security. While all rights are weighed by our courts in light of these competing interests and priorities, the proponents of Bill C-22 have lost sight of the priority that our charter and courts have given to protecting expressive freedom, and hence to the privacy rights that help make political expression and democratic discourse possible.

Bill C-22 would also supercharge state surveillance by, first, establishing a new low threshold for production orders under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, so foreign entities could submit a request to the Minister of Justice for the production of transmission data or subscriber data in the possession or control of a person in Canada. To be granted, the request would only have to meet the low bar of “reasonable grounds to suspect”. There would be no dual criminality requirement, meaning the foreign offence need not also be an offence in Canada.

Second, it would create the framework for Canada to ratify the second additional protocol of the Budapest convention, a multilateral data-sharing treaty that attempts to expedite the speed and volume of data sharing among foreign law enforcement agencies at the expense of human rights.

Third, it would make possible a Canada-U.S. cross-border data-sharing agreement, which Canada is currently negotiating with the United States under the U.S. CLOUD Act. As the Citizen Lab's Kate Robertson wrote that this would mean “US surveillance activities covered by the agreement would no longer require oversight from Canadian authorities or judges, thus relinquishing a core element of Canada's sovereignty under international law.”

Finally, the supporting authorized access to information act, through both public regulations and secret orders, would allow the government to require the broadly defined category of “electronic service providers” to make wide-ranging and drastic modifications to their systems in order to facilitate access for law enforcement, threatening encryption. It will also require all ESPs to retain sensitive personal data about users for up to a year, without adequate safeguards to protect against security vulnerabilities that such orders will create. The new regime would also lack adequate accountability or transparency provisions.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you very much for those opening remarks.

I now give the floor to Mr. Tiwari, who is onscreen, for five minutes.

[Udbhav Tiwari, Vice-President, Strategy and Global Affairs, Signal]

Thank you, Chairperson and members of the committee.

I am Udbhav Tiwari, vice-president of strategy and global affairs at Signal.

Signal is a non-profit. We make the world's most widely used, truly private messaging app, and the encryption protocol we built, the Signal protocol, is the gold standard that much of the industry beyond us relies on. It is essential for providing the core infrastructure for the fundamental human right to privacy.

Those who depend on us and on this technology are regularly subjected to surveillance around the world. However, it is vital for us to recognize that it is because of how we operate, at the frontier of global cybersecurity, that we understand intimately how technical architecture protects human safety and how easily badly drafted laws can dismantle these critical protections.

In its current form, Bill C-22 would convert the everyday tools Canadians rely on into a sprawling, insecure surveillance apparatus. To be up front, Signal will not build infrastructure into our service, and we will also not build surveillance into our service. If we are ever forced to choose between betraying the people who rely on us and leaving a market, we will leave.

One fact shapes everything I will say: Signal collects almost no data about our users, by design. It is this property that leads us to enjoy the reputation we have, including among Canadians. Bill C-22 could force us to rewrite our code, dismantle our robust privacy architectures and design surveillance into our systems. Let me give you three concrete pictures of how chilling such a proposition is.

First is undermining encryption. Bill C-22 creates an open-ended power to compel a company to re-engineer its own service to enable government access. We have seen where this leads. We know it is never one device. Once you build a mechanism to break your own protections, that mechanism exists, and it can be identified and exploited by anyone with the time and resources to do so. As security experts have warned for over 30 years, there is no back door that only the good guys can walk through.

Second is deliberately engineering weaknesses. This is the provision that should alarm anyone who relies on the safety of private messaging and on technical services more broadly. The powers in this bill are broad enough to compel a service like Signal to sell out our users, to do things like silently create hidden accounts and slip them into private group conversations, to manufacture a participant the other members cannot see, and to do the same to other apps, services and infrastructure.

Third is forced metadata retention. As we've established, we built Signal to retain as close to no data as possible. This includes intimate metadata. Bill C-22 would let the government compel us to construct the very surveillance apparatus we have refused to build, in order to log who is talking to whom, when and from where, for up to a year. Do not let the word “metadata” reassure you. Metadata is the 2 a.m. phone call, the clinic you contacted, the lawyer you retained, the organizer you met and the journalist you trusted. In aggregate, it reveals as much, if not more, about individuals as content—often more. A mandate to retain it would build a goldmine of intimate data where none exists today, sitting ready for any foreign adversary or criminal who breaches it. Mathematics does not care about executive intent. A back door built for the good guys is simply a vulnerability waiting for the bad guys to find.

None of this is hypothetical. Australia passed a similar regime in 2018, which required over 150 amendments before it could pass, and Australia's own Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights found it incompatible with the rights to privacy and free expression. Under it, the definition of a “covered provider” stretched to fast food chains and shopping mall Wi-Fi. We've seen similar things play out with Apple and iCloud in the United Kingdom, and the Salt Typhoon hack in the United States as well, both of which have been covered in great detail by others testifying before this committee.

Let me end with what genuine reform of the law would require. To update this bill for the technical realities of our current era, part 2 of C-22 should be withdrawn. Its core defects cannot be repaired with targeted amendments.

If withdrawal is not politically feasible, as much as it is the right course of action, then the following safeguards should be considered non-negotiable for any amendments that improve these provisions.

The first is prior judicial authorization. Any order to alter a security system must be approved in advance by a court and not imposed—

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

I'm sorry, Mr. Tiwari. You'll need to speed up another 10 seconds. There will very likely be an opportunity for you to continue with MPs. I'm sorry to do that.

Let me turn the floor to MP Caputo for six minutes, please.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

You can use my time to finish up your opening statement, sir. Go ahead.

[Udbhav Tiwari]

Thank you. I'll be very quick.

Second is independent technical scrutiny. There must be expert independent assessments of feasibility and security before any obligations or orders under part 2 take effect.

Third, and finally, is a hard line on encryption and metadata. The law must prohibit degrading or bypassing encryption and prohibit forcing any provider to collect metadata that it does not already hold.

To repeat, Signal will not build surveillance into our service. If we are ever forced to choose between betraying the people who rely on us or leaving a market, we will leave, but Canada should not force anyone to make this choice. You cannot make Canadians safer by breaking the tools they rely on for protection from hackers, hostile nations and everyday transnational surveillance.

Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

Thank you very much.

One question I have is this. The government has called this bill “encryption-neutral”, whatever that means. I have no idea what that means. I think it's a little bit of a cute phrase to try to avoid the question. The minister himself has said that they will deal with encryption.

Is it even possible to have any amendment that might satisfy you, given how this process has gone? I'm sure you've been observing it. I'm sure you've seen the rushed nature of this process. The fact of the matter is that we probably need more time on this bill. It's not that we haven't spent substantial time. It's that we've crammed so many witnesses into a short period of time that I don't really feel that we heard adequately from witnesses.

Number one, would you agree with all of that? Number two, is there anything that could possibly satisfy you with respect to part 2 on your encryption concerns?

[Udbhav Tiwari]

Yes, I absolutely agree that the way part 2 is currently drafted is incompatible with the fundamental human right to privacy. It is why our primary recommendation is that it be scrapped entirely.

If it is not feasible to do so, we think that certain targeted changes should be the absolute foundation for any legislation that looks like part 2. Even those will not address all of our concerns and will in fact continue to leave various executive actions that could harm the privacy and security of everyday Canadians.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

Thank you.

For the other two witnesses, I did mention my view that this bill has been quite rushed. I'm not sure if either of you or all three of you were watching earlier, but we've just found out that briefs that were submitted in some cases over a week ago did not make it to committee, and amendments were due yesterday. It's really begging the question of, if we had an amendment or a proposed amendment, whether we could even debate it.

I'm just getting a sense from all of you, given all of that, whether this bill feels rushed.

I'll start with you, Mr. McSorley. Then we'll go to the two on video, please.

[Tim McSorley]

Thank you.

Yes, we agree that this process has felt rushed both in the number of days of study and the amount of time that the study has taken.

As well as being a senior fellow with the Centre for Free Expression, I'm also national coordinator with a coalition called the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group. We submitted a brief in English to the committee on Sunday, May 24. We've been told that it will be circulated—hopefully—on Friday.

We understand that it's later in the process and there is a strain on resources, so this isn't a criticism of the hard work that the staff are doing, but the speed at which the study has been progressing. From our experience—and I've been with ICLMG and doing this for 10 years—it's incredibly difficult to get a brief in on time for it to be translated in the amount of time that this study has been progressing. It has been much too short.

We have significant concerns and we have colleagues from other organizations whom we believe should be here today. The Citizen Lab and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association came out with an incredible 55-page analysis of this bill, yet it likely is much too late in the process and has come out after amendments were due. This is a grave concern of ours.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

Do either of you gentlemen on video have anything to add, in 30 seconds, please?

[Khaled Alqazzaz]

Thank you, MP Caputo.

Briefly, we actually looked into the amount of consultation, as one of our recommendations, and we do not feel that there was enough evidence put forward to demonstrate that there is a need for additional legislation or to go into this much detail. That's one point.

The second point is that we're making this contribution to note the impact on marginalized groups and racialized communities. We feel that even in that space, very little impact analysis or engagement was actually done on or with these different communities. As marginalized or vulnerable communities, we see or feel the impact much higher than others—

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Nicola, BC]

I'm sorry. I have to interrupt you there, sir. I do have to give notice of motion.

I'm giving notice of the following motion:

That, in relation to the ongoing study of Bill C-22, an Act respecting lawful access:

a) the study be extended to accommodate further examination of Part 2 of the bill which would enact the Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act, provided that the following witnesses appear separately, for at least one hour each:

i. the Minister of Industry, in relation to the impact on electronic service providers and their industry;

ii. the Minister responsible for Canada-U.S. Trade, in relation to trade and security implications raised by American lawmakers;

iii. the Secretary of State (Combatting Crime);

iv. the Privacy Commissioner;

b) the committee receive an additional eight hours of witness testimony, provided that the committee prioritize hearing the testimony of representatives from NordVPN, ProtonVPN, ExpressVPN, Windscribe, DuckDuckGO, Migrant Workers Alliance for Change, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, Canadian Anti-Monopoly Project, Canadian Council for Refugees, Migrant Justice Clinic, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants, Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, and the testimony of Glenn Greenwald, Safiyya Ahmad, Noura Aljizawi, Brent Arnold, Teresa Scassa, Jane Bailey, Colin Bennett, Ron Deibert, Lex Gill, Pantea Jafari, Michael Karanicolas, Shera Kelly, Kate Robertson, and Maria Vamvalis, in addition to additional testimony deemed relevant by the committee;

c) the Chair be authorized to seek additional meeting time to accommodate this testimony in a timely manner;

d) the Chair only be authorized to schedule a meeting for the purposes of clause-by-clause consideration of Part 2 of the bill after the witnesses listed in part a) have appeared, and the number of hours of testimony in part b) have been received.

That is my motion. Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Jean-Yves Duclos]

Thank you, MP Caputo, for this notice of motion.

Let me now turn to MP Powlowski for six minutes, please.

[Marcus Powlowski, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Rainy River, ON]

Mr. McSorley, you talked about the right to privacy and wanting to be able to read whatever you'd like before forming your opinion on something. My understanding of this law is that it specifically excludes access to content and information on a person's web browsing history and social media activity. I understand it would allow the government to access IP addresses, for example.

Could you lead me down your sequence of thinking as to how this violates your right to privacy? Can you give me concrete examples of how IP addresses and phone numbers are going to violate your right to privacy?

[Tim McSorley]

Thank you for the question. I think it is very important.

It's true that I mentioned what we read, but it's also who we communicate with and how we discuss things. It's about our private lives. Looking at Bill C-22, I think the issue goes much further than IP addresses and names. For example, the production order for subscriber information includes what kinds of services you were able to access from the service provider, when you accessed them and where you accessed them from. That goes much further than just an IP address and is revealing of an individual's—