Bill C-39 Committee on Nov. 2nd, 2026

[Mike Leonard]

We can't quantify that per se with any real numbers. However, I can say that, from what we hear internationally and also locally from our own members and the people they deal with from the customer-base perspective, even the hint of instability causes people to think about what they do with their cargo.

The challenge we have, of course, is that the U.S. west coast is physically proximate to Vancouver, so it becomes a logical destination point for cargo. As a result of that, anything that gets put down there takes jobs away from Canadian workers on this coast. More to the point, when companies, customers and shippers are diverting cargo to the U.S. that's destined for Canada, there's going to be an additional cost that will be borne by the consumer, because that cargo will likely be trucked up across the border into Canadian provinces and delivered accordingly.

It's a compounding effect of employment loss, additional costs for people who rely on the products they receive, and the uncertainty that gets created. It's a major issue.

[Mike Kelloway, Liberal, Sydney—Glace Bay, NS]

Thank you, Mr. Leonard.

I'm going to go to Ms. Peters.

Which proposed changes, Ms. Peters, are most significant for marine terminal operators? I think you talked a bit about it, but if you had to quantify, say, the top five, what would they be?

[Alicia Peters]

Is this for the bill overall or for the amendments that we're looking for?

[Mike Kelloway, Liberal, Sydney—Glace Bay, NS]

Let's do a bit of both. Let's start with the bill, and then we can move into some of the amendments you have.

[Alicia Peters]

Certainly, I would say that the port governance changes are really important for our sector. We are tenants, for the most part, of the port, so the governance provisions there and fee transparency are all very important. With regard to labour stability, many of our members are also members of BCMEA, so labour stability is absolutely critical, and supply chain resiliency is important as well.

There are many measures in that bill, and you'll know that there have been ongoing consultations for a number of years. This bill brings those consultations together into one place. It's something that industry has been waiting on for a long time. I think the goal to double non-U.S. trade in 10 years—now nine years—has really galvanized the industry. We're all ready to keep growing and to get busy.

[Mike Kelloway, Liberal, Sydney—Glace Bay, NS]

Thank you.

Mr. Lee, unfortunately I'm not going to have time to get to you. I'll defer to my next colleague.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Mr. Seeback.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Everybody here wants to see more supply chain stability. That's the goal. The question that I keep going back to is whether this legislation will actually accomplish that goal, and every union that's come here to testify at committee has said that it's going to do the exact opposite. In fact, they've now said they're going to set up a national war room to oppose any government intervention. I assume that means with respect to section 107.

I think we have to ask whether this is actually going to be the solution to the problem. We've talked about the industrial inquiry commission today because it made certain recommendations with respect to geographic certification. Actually, one of the key recommendations in that report was that, due to distrust found in parties, empowering the special mediator to compel evidence, attendance and responses is likely a desirable outcome for everyone involved.

The Liberals have created a special mediator, but the special mediator has absolutely no powers whatsoever, which is the exact opposite of what the commission recommended. Would you support amendments to the legislation that would give the special mediator the kinds of powers that the commission outlines—getting people into the room to bargain, compelling evidence, compelling documents and requiring responses, to try to create the environment where the parties can't just ignore each other?

You're familiar with the railroads. That's actually what happened in the rail disputes. They actually just didn't meet. If they bring in a special mediator under this bill, they can still not meet. If you gave the special mediator special powers, I think it would increase the likelihood of what everybody wants, the best deal at the table.

Mr. Lee, I'd love to hear your response to that, and Mr. Leonard's as well. Then we'll hear from Ms. Peters.

[Warren Lee]

Absolutely. I'll start.

We would absolutely support special mediator power, to your point. We don't know that negotiation isn't happening until after we find out that negotiation hasn't been happening. This is all time that's lost, and it has a huge economic impact for Canadians and for shippers.

The number one thing for us is section 107. We need to be proactive. The damage is inflicted at the first sense of labour stoppage. It's months ahead of time that we start to see defensive spending, planning to triage to new ports, warehousing, other modes of conveyance—you name it. There are all kinds of things that go into that planning before it's even started. Then, of course, there's the hangover effect when the engine has to kick in.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Are you saying that if the parties are actually bargaining, the chance of getting to that is reduced?

[Warren Lee]

Absolutely.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Mr. Leonard, what's your opinion of special powers for the special mediator as outlined in the “Report of the Industrial Inquiry Commission”?

[Mike Leonard]

On principle, yes, we support the notion of additional powers. There was a reference to this during the process of actually going through the inquiry commission itself, where the ILWU made a link between that and the ability to compel CEOs of our member companies to the bargaining table. That issue was squarely examined and dismissed by the inquiry commission in question as being irrelevant because the BCMEA is properly structured to carry out its responsibilities under the Canada Labour Code.

That said, every effort needs to be made, and every tool needs to be used to try to achieve negotiated agreements at the table. We need better tools to support meaningful bargaining and to reach durable agreements. We believe Bill C-39 provides some of those tools. The goal of the special mediator is to provide the parties with additional resources and a fresh perspective—essentially, to try to get to a different place. It adds additional pressure.

Yes, while the bill does not have those additional powers you're referring to—named in section 84 of the Labour Code—we can't dismiss or downplay the significance of the transparency effect with the issuance of a report. I think that has the ability to influence parties in terms of their motivations and how they conduct themselves at the table. I think it's a good first step.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Ms. Peters.

[Alicia Peters]

I would echo those comments, and we'd be happy to look at any amendments.

[Kyle Seeback, Conservative, Dufferin—Caledon, ON]

Great. Thank you. Those are my questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you, Mr. Seeback.

That brings us to the end of our first panel. Thank you to the witnesses. We appreciate you for taking the time to be here for your valuable contributions.

We'll have to suspend for a few minutes to get ready for the next panel.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Welcome back to meeting number six of the House of Commons Legislative Committee on Bill C-39.

I have a few comments for the benefit of witnesses and members.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking.

If you're on video conference, you have buttons in front of you to turn on and off your microphone.

You have interpretation in front of you with headsets. If you have any problems, just raise your hand and let me know.

You will be asked questions in English and French. All questions should be directed through the chair.

I want to welcome our second panel of witnesses today.

From Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec, we have Magali Picard, president; Jennifer Genest, adviser; and Renaud Plante, chief of staff.

From L'Union des producteurs agricoles, we have Martin Caron, president; David Tougas, coordinator, business economics; and Charles-Félix Ross, director general.

From the Western Grain Elevator Association, we are joined by Wade Sobkowich, executive director.

To you, sir, I should say “thank you”, because I paid my way through university working in grain elevators in Thunder Bay? I'm glad you're here. I worked for United Grain Growers for five years.

Each organization will be given up to five minutes for an opening statement, after which you will be asked questions from panel members.

We're starting with Madam Picard.

[Magali Picard, President, Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, everyone. My name is Magali Picard, and I am the president of the FTQ, the Fédération des travailleurs et travailleuses du Québec. The FTQ represents 600,000 workers in Quebec—tens of thousands of whom are subject to the Canada Labour Code.

I've decided to deliver remarks that are probably a little different from what we had planned. I was here to read you a speech, but I have decided to share our concerns with you instead.

First of all, I was part of the working committee set up by Minister Hajdu, comprising three management representatives and two union representatives. We did a good job, but we ran out of time. The bill has now been tabled. There are some positive aspects to this bill, but certain aspects are of great concern to us.

The goal presented to us is to reduce the percentage of cases in which problems arise—around 5%. Under the Canada Labour Code, 95% of collective agreements are settled with a handshake. How should we deal with disputes that arise in 5% of cases and recur from one round of bargaining to the next? For our part, what we told the minister—and what we are reiterating here today—is that it must be absolutely clear from the outset that, when bargaining, the parties must reach an agreement with one another. Let me explain why.

The moment the government—specifically the Minister of Labour—is given a tool that allows them to intervene, all parties, whether trade unions or employers, no longer negotiate in the same way. People sit back and do nothing, and do not dare move forward in the bargaining process, particularly in cases where there are ongoing disputes, because they know that, in the end, the minister will be able to intervene and the pressure will shift away from them.

I'll give you a concrete example. Let's say I'm bargaining in one of the sectors you know. We just heard people talk about trains, for instance. If I were the employer and knew that my bargaining was going poorly, would I be tempted to put more substantial offers on the table—knowing that, in the end, we might fail to reach an agreement and end up before an arbitrator?

If I'm representing the union—which I am—will I start making concessions at the bargaining table? Will I tell my members that the economic war is taking its toll and that they're being asked to consider this offer and accept it? Or will I take the position that we won't back down, that we won't give an inch and that we'll fight on, knowing that once the dispute is under way, the pressure will no longer be on me or the employer, but on the government and the minister of Labour?

We've seen this type of dispute before. I won't name any major companies, but everyone has travelled with Air Canada. Unfortunately, the company's CEO said that he had no plan to bring people back from abroad because he expected the government to invoke section 107 of the Canada Labour Code more quickly. I'm not making this up; that's how it happened.

When you enter into bargaining and know that you do not bear the burden of reaching an agreement in the end, your approach to bargaining will clearly be different. The danger is that the average percentage of cases involving disputes will rise from 5% to 7%, 10%, 15% or 20%. I understand that this bill is being proposed in good faith. The government's intention is to improve matters, eliminate disputes and find solutions—but what lies before us is dangerous, because it places political responsibility on collective bargaining.

In the brief you received, what we're telling you is that there are repercussions. I hear businesses talking about their reliability abroad, saying that the situation is difficult and that people want a reliable economy. However, this cannot be achieved at the expense of collective bargaining and workers.

In Quebec, a law was passed last April—Bill 14, which is very similar to what is being proposed here. One decision has been handed down so far, because the minister invoked the law once. The courts ruled that this law was inoperative, as it is contrary to our Constitution. So here we all are working on this, despite the existence of a court ruling already recognizing the right to strike in our Constitution and stating that what we are doing will not stand up in court.

So, what we are proposing, if you really want to improve things, is to entrust an independent body, such as the Canadian Industrial Relations Board—or CIRB—with the responsibility for determining whether there are economic repercussions that are too damaging for the country—when it comes to ports or railways, for example—and to consider how we can protect fundamental rights, such as the right to strike, while protecting businesses at the same time. Let's give that responsibility to an independent body, rather than to a minister who will have to decide either to go ahead—which will give unions the impression that employers have won yet again—or not to go ahead, which will give employers the impression that the unions won.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you.

[Magali Picard]

Can't we take politics out of this and hand this responsibility over to an impartial body?

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thanks very much.

Mr. Caron, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Martin Caron, General President, Union des producteurs agricoles]

Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen of the committee, thank you for giving us the opportunity to contribute to your consideration of Bill C‑39.

I am speaking today on behalf of the Union des producteurs agricoles, or UPA, which represents 42,000 agricultural producers in Quebec, as well as private forestry producers.

To be clear, we are in favour of better project coordination, more efficient processes and more effective supply chains. However, a fundamental question remains: What problems is this bill seeking to address? Is it the lack of resources within government departments or the protection rules themselves? If those rules are considered to be obstacles, then we are targeting the wrong issue. Why should safeguards be permanently weakened in the name of efficiency? What urgency justifies circumventing them?

For the UPA, efficiency must never take precedence over rigour, democracy, the environment or Canada's ability to produce its own food. Yet Bill C‑39 raises serious concerns in this regard. By making permanent powers that were presented as exceptional when the Building Canada Act was passed under closure, the government is crossing a major line. An exceptional measure responds to an exceptional situation. When it becomes permanent, it is no longer an exception—it is a new way of governing. We therefore call for the five-year limit under the current system to be maintained.

The proposed one-year time frame for obtaining federal approval must under no circumstances take precedence over seasonal studies, independent expert assessments and the evaluation of cumulative effects. The federal agencies responsible for assessment cannot simply validate developers' studies; they must be able to rely on independent experts. As for producers and other affected parties, such as the UPA, they must have access to documents in timely fashion and be given sufficient time to be genuinely consulted. Finally, federal coordination must be carried out in accordance with provincial regimes, particularly those that protect agricultural land and regulate private forests in Quebec.

By trying to move too quickly, we risk turning administrative streamlining into a democratic setback and making mistakes that undermine our rights and sacrifice our resources. What room is left for debate when speed becomes the priority?

We are also concerned about the provisions relating to regions of national interest. This mechanism creates a presumption in favour of certain projects and undermines case-by-case assessment. Yet the impacts on agricultural land and activities, water and ecosystems cannot be adequately assessed at the level of an entire region. They must be examined on a project-by-project basis, taking into account cumulative effects as well. That is why we are calling for the removal of this provision.

We support the development of strategic infrastructure and the improvement of trade corridors. Our sector depends on inputs arriving on time and on reliable transport networks to get products to market. However, there is a fundamental contradiction in seeking to strengthen Canada's economic security while undermining its capacity to produce its own food. Farmland is not vacant land awaiting development. Together with water, it constitutes a strategic asset—the foundation of our food security and the health of our ecosystems. Protecting these resources does not mean holding back development; it means preserving the conditions that make it possible.

With regard to part 3 of the bill, a last-resort mechanism may serve the national interest when a labour dispute has serious and disproportionate effects on the country as a whole. The 2019 propane crisis demonstrated the impact that a disruption to supply can have on agricultural businesses. However, this power must remain exceptional. It must be governed by rigorous criteria, be used only after all other remedies have been exhausted, and fully respect workers' rights. It must never become a shortcut for resolving labour disputes.

To conclude, our message is simple: yes to better coordination, yes to more efficient supply chains, but no to perpetuating the exceptional powers arising from the adoption of Bill C‑5, no to regions of national interest and no to measures that undermine rigorous project assessment and the protection of agricultural land and private forests.

If the government is seeking a permanent national interest, we already have one: food security in Canada. A country that can build faster but is unable to protect its ability to feed itself becomes poorer, not stronger.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Sobkowich.

[Wade Sobkowich, Executive Director, Western Grain Elevator Association]

Thank you for having me here today.

My name is Wade Sobkowich. I'm the executive director of the Western Grain Elevator Association, which represents Canada's six major grain-handling companies. Collectively, we handle 95% of western Canada's bulk grain exports.

Our comments will focus on labour and marine port governance issues in Bill C-39.

Grain exporters are captive to essential rail and port services. When they are disrupted, we have no viable alternatives. A work stoppage in a single bargaining unit can have the unique ability to bring grain export supply chains to a halt. Modernizing Canadian labour law would ensure that this does not occur. Bill C-39 is a step in the right direction.

We agree that the best agreements are found at the bargaining table, and we're encouraged by the fact that most happen there. The importance of this legislation is how it could deal with the extraordinary cases that could bring the national economy to its knees. Currently, when the process breaks down, the Canada Labour Code does not have effective tools.

The on-again, off-again nature of collective bargaining with the threat of a set strike or lockout means that shippers constantly face uncertain service in the months leading up to a possible disruption. This results in major costs, including lost sales, penalties due to slowdowns and demurrage or freight book costs. The early appointment of a special mediator to manage a bargaining process would be a major step forward. Moreover, the publication of the special mediator's report would be a powerful tool to show the minister and Canadians whether the parties were bargaining in good faith.

From our perspective, there should be fewer politics involved in the appointment of a special mediator. We recommend that the bill be amended so that negotiations that have reached day 75 of conciliation are automatically appointed a special mediator. When a strike or lockout does occur, getting transportation services back to work as quickly as possible is critical for grain shippers that have no other options.

Under Bill C-39, the minister could use section 107 only once a work stoppage is under way, but by then, the damage is done. Millions of dollars are lost before a single train or vessel stops. A legal framework that acts only after a shutdown would require Canadians to give that loss away. In exceptional circumstances, ordering the parties to remain at the bargaining table is entirely reasonable, and we strongly believe Bill C-39 needs to be amended to allow the minister to act in the national interest before a work stoppage begins.

I'd like to spend my remaining minutes on the questionable elements of Bill C-39 regarding the financial powers of marine port authorities.

Port authorities play three roles. They are landlord, regulator and developer. Inevitably, conflicts of interest arise, and we've seen ports acting as legislator, tax assessor and even competitor all at the same time. Bill C-39 would give an almost unfettered power to ports to charge all manner of fees, tariffs and rents, with limited direct oversight of the minister or Parliament.

We think this committee should be asking some very hard questions before agreeing to these provisions. For example, is it the government's intent to fund national infrastructure projects at the local port level? Is it the government's intent to allow port authorities to charge tariffs on goods? Should port tenants pay for infrastructure outside of a port? Should port authorities be able to increase rents and fees with no reasonable explanation or right of appeal? If not, what checks and balances are provided in Bill C-39 to stop such behaviour?

While Bill C-39 would introduce the ability to complain to the transportation agency regarding fees, it would have no meaningful measure of appeal on the fairness and reasonableness of port rent. Rent is by far the largest revenue generator for port authorities, and it's a major oversight not to include it as an appeal mechanism. We ask the committee to amend Bill C-39 to provide real recourse on all port charges, and to clear guardrails and oversight of them.

In conclusion, the Canadian grain sector is a major economic driver, contributing over $40 billion to Canada's annual GDP. As Canada works to diversify markets and attract investments, assigning additional costs to exports would place us at a global disadvantage competitively. Every avoidable disruption and unchecked cost impedes the ability of exporters in the grain sector to maximize the return of foreign dollars to the Canadian economy.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.