Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 5th, 2026

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Let's talk about Chinese interests.

We're sailing through international waters, so we're not going through any waters that belong to countries in the Indo-Pacific, including China.

What do you see China's interest being in this thing? When they complain about our country's passage, what do you see? How do you read this politically?

[Ryan Baerg]

Mr. Chair, China's interest in this is the fundamental position on Taiwan, since the establishment of our diplomatic relations in 1970, via joint communiqué. That's when we established our one China policy. I think that's the important piece here.

It's very similar to the majority of countries around the world in terms of how they approach and engage with China. Basically, our one China policy “has recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, noting”—and this is the important part—“but not endorsing or challenging” the Chinese government’s position on Taiwan.

The Chinese government has a very clear position on Taiwan. We note it, as do a lot of—I'd say, most—countries in the world, but we haven't agreed to it. I guess I'd classify that as what we call strategic ambiguity. That has allowed us to maintain official relations with China and at the same time have unofficial relations with Taiwan. Our relations with Taiwan are deep across many areas. It allows us to basically agree to disagree.

The cases of the strait transits are another example of that. We'll disagree with positions. The major and colleagues here have talked about our view in terms of international waterways. The Chinese position is different. They will démarche us. They'll give their position, we'll give our position and we'll move on.

I think the most important thing to the Chinese now is that we.... They understand that we'll agree to disagree. They just want us to reaffirm our commitment to our one China policy—and we do that. We've been reaffirming our position since 1970. Then we move on and we're able to have relations with China and we're able to have unofficial relations with Taiwan.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

We go next to Monsieur Guilbeault.

You have five minutes.

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Before I begin, I would like to acknowledge Mr. Chong's statement today.

I think all members on this side of the room agree with you. The safety of Canadians and members of Parliament is an absolutely critical issue for all governments.

I'd like to ask you a question that may seem a bit philosophical to begin with, but it has very concrete implications.

On the question of diplomacy, there are different schools of thought. There are schools that say we should work less with governments that are different from us and have values that differ from ours. At the opposite end of the spectrum, there are other schools of thought that say no, on the contrary, we have to work with them.

I'll give you a few examples of situations I've experienced. At COP15 in 2022, Canada hosted the United Nations. Canada had to do that hand in hand with China, a country with which, at the time, it had virtually no diplomatic relations any longer. However, we managed to make a deal that's been internationally acclaimed as a historic success.

Mr. Laporte, in your opinion—I believe MGen Morehen already talked about this—can we sit down with these people even though we don't agree on everything?

Can we also work with governments like that on issues where we can find common ground?

I'd like to hear your comments on that.

[Eric Laporte]

Thank you for the question. It's a very good question. It's a bit philosophical, yes. That said, it's also based on elements of real life.

We can look at efforts that have been made to work with certain countries to move them in a certain direction. We can look at Russia, for example. Considering the current situation with the war in Ukraine, we can say that it likely hasn't worked. There are other examples where it has worked. There can be a middle ground.

Since last year, with regard to China, the government has wanted to recognize that relations were quite strained owing to the two Michaels affair. It made things harder for us, and it was complicated to have relations and discussions on very important issues. We saw the same thing happen with India.

Therefore, this government has really made the decision to co-operate when it's in our interest to do so and wherever it's possible to co-operate. However, we recognize that we will continue to have our differences. I think that with China, certain differences will persist.

I don't have a precise answer, but, in my opinion, we're living in a world where we have to try to talk to all the players, to see where there are common areas on which we can work together. However, we need to be clear about our interests. We need to draw a line.

[Steven Guilbeault, Liberal, Laurier—Sainte-Marie, QC]

That somewhat applies to certain things that we're doing but are not common knowledge. For example, there's an environmental co-operation council with China that celebrated its 30th anniversary last year. Together, Canada and China are developing public policy on environmental protection that, over the past 30 years, China has tended to implement, whether on water, climate or biodiversity. Against all odds, the co-operation council has continued to work together for the past 30 years.

This is one example among others that shows that, despite the differences we may have on certain subjects, there are situations where we're all in the same boat. We're not going to solve the climate issue without talking to China. We're not going to solve the biodiversity issue without talking to China. In fact, Canada and China co-chair the Nature Champions Network, an international committee devoted to implementing the goals of COP15.

So that's more or less what you're telling us. There are cases where it will be difficult. I have participated in meetings where, for example, in 2022, I told my Chinese counterparts that we were very concerned about the rising tension in the Taiwan Strait. As a number of you mentioned, we agreed to disagree. However, at least we can talk to each other even if we don't agree.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Give a very short response, if necessary.

[Ryan Baerg]

I can respond briefly. Thank you.

I know the honourable member has great experience on some of those files that he spoke about, and I also believe that that's a great example of where we were able to work with China, even when we disagreed on a whole lot of things. We'll continue to disagree on many areas, but having the lines of communication open has been a clear priority as we move forward.

I'll just give a couple of examples. In December, we held consular consultations. Those haven't happened in the past eight, I believe, years. If we want to protect our citizens and if we want to have those discussions, even on areas that we disagree on, it's important that we have the tables to get together with the Chinese to talk through these things. We do see some progress. Sometimes we will continue to agree to disagree, but having those channels of communication allows us a means to raise our concerns, understand each other's positions better and hopefully find some common ground out of it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Brunelle‑Duceppe, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would appreciate it if you could give me another 20 seconds, because Mr. Guilbeault spoke about Michael Chong's statement, and I also want to say that we support Mr. Chong's statement. I myself am subject to sanctions, because I've been vice-chair of the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development since 2019. I think we all agree around the table about Michael Chong's statement today.

I'd like to know if the government is committed to planning other operations similar to what the Canadian Armed Forces did in the Taiwan Strait.

[MGen Travis Morehen]

As a continuance of our Indo-Pacific strategy, the Royal Canadian Navy will continue to exercise through collaboration, representing Canada's desire for a peaceful and stable region. With regard to the other activities that we do in the region, I'd like to highlight a recent exercise with Australia, Exercise Talisman Sabre, where we had our largest participation of Canadian Armed Forces under Op Horizon, which was 600 CAF members through all domains. We will continue to operate through the Indo-Pacific strategy. As mentioned before, if we need to transit between operation areas in the north and south, we will likely continue to use the Taiwan Strait as the venue.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Laporte, Mr. Guilbeault said that we can indeed discuss certain topics whenever we're able to do so. However, should we refrain from having discussions and taking measures that would offend the Chinese Communist Party?

Take, for example, the public statement by the ambassador, or rather the representative of Taiwan in Canada, very recently, yesterday or the day before, in which he denounced the fact that Canada had had a trade agreement with Taiwan on the table since April and that all that was left to do was sign it. That trade agreement was set aside, essentially to keep from offending Beijing, it seems.

Don't you think that's a mistake, if we want to continue supporting Taiwan and its autonomy and if an agreement was all set to go? Are we stopping ourselves from entering into that agreement so as not to offend Beijing? If so, don't you think that's ill advised?

[Eric Laporte]

I can turn it over to my counterpart Ryan Baerg, who is more up to date on the facts.

[Ryan Baerg]

It will always be a balancing act, and I think the most important thing is that we'll have to move forward with Canadian national and economic interests at heart. As I mentioned, we have deep ties with Taiwan. The core of those ties is economic, people-to-people ties, and I believe that will continue.

As I mentioned, we will agree to disagree on the situation of Taiwan. China will push back on any and all engagement with Taiwan at all levels of provincial, municipal and federal governments when collaborating in virtually any areas, because that's their position, and it's always been like that.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Why hasn't this agreement been signed, when everything was ready? Global Affairs Canada had checked it, all the legal aspects had even been checked. All that was left to do was sign. There was the election, Mr. Carney came in and, suddenly, no one talked about it anymore, when everything was set up.

[Ryan Baerg]

I can tell you that the co-operation with Taiwan continues on the economic files. I know that there was an arrangement. I'll clarify, as well, that it's not a free trade agreement. We have unofficial ties with Taiwan. The trade co-operation framework arrangement is a non-binding arrangement to begin with—it's not an official free trade agreement—and it sets out broad trade and economic principles to facilitate this trade policy engagement with Taiwan.

My understanding is that, essentially yes, this arrangement has been agreed to and discussions are under way to consider next steps.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you.

We'll next go to MP Rood.

You have five minutes.

[Lianne Rood, Conservative, Middlesex—London, ON]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you all for being here today on this very important topic.

To Global Affairs, I'm wondering if the Prime Minister's decision to stall or to ignore a Taiwan trade agreement has been influenced by concerns about retaliation from Beijing, including risks to Canada's naval transit and operational posture in the Taiwan Strait.

[Ryan Baerg]

I can't really speculate in terms of exact considerations taking place at the ministerial or prime ministerial level. I think that the Prime Minister has been very clear in terms of our desire to diversify our markets, and I think Taiwan is an important economic market for us. That's why we were engaged in terms of seeking this framework arrangement with Taiwan, but we collaborate with them and have an S and T agreement with them. We have arrangements around foreign investment, etc.

Discussions are taking place, but I can't really speculate in terms of a timeline on those or when that will come through. Obviously, the Prime Minister has been very focused on some very big challenges in our relationship with China. That was clear with his visit to China and what he was able to accomplish out of that. Is that part of the considerations? I can't really speak to that.

[Lianne Rood, Conservative, Middlesex—London, ON]

Has the department provided a formal risk assessment? Would the department recommend moving forward with the Taiwan agreement?

[Ryan Baerg]

I think that would fall in the area of advice to ministers, so I don't think I'm able to speak to that.

[Lianne Rood, Conservative, Middlesex—London, ON]

Thank you for your answer.

In your department's official threat and stability assessments, is Taiwan regarded as a more stable, rules-based, democratic and reliable partner for trade and regional security co-operation than the People's Republic of China?

[Ryan Baerg]

I think we've been clear. Taiwan is a vibrant democracy. It would be fair to say that we probably see eye to eye with them on a lot more issues than others perhaps. It's been a very strong economic partner for us, with unofficial ties, and I think it will continue to be so.

[Lianne Rood, Conservative, Middlesex—London, ON]

Why is the government hesitating to deepen economic ties with Taiwan while still expecting the navy to keep defending freedom of navigation in the same region?

[Ryan Baerg]

I think that we can do two things at once. We can have diplomatic relations with China, and we have since 1970, when we established diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China. We can also have unofficial relations with Taiwan. I think that we can continue to do so.