Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 5th, 2026

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Good afternoon. I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 21 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Tuesday, September 23, 2025, the committee is studying the operation of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Taiwan Strait.

I would like to welcome our witnesses. From the Department of National Defence, we have Major-General Travis Morehen, director general, international security policy. From the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, we have Eric Laporte, executive director, regional security and defence relations division; and Ryan Baerg, executive director, greater China political and coordination division.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with rounds of questions from members.

I now invite Major-General Travis Morehen to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

[Major-General Travis Morehen, Director General, International Security Policy, Department of National Defence]

Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today.

The Indo-Pacific region is at the epicentre of a generational global shift. Developments in this region will shape Canada’s security, prosperity, values and economic future for decades to come.

A strong defence presence in the Indo-Pacific positions Canada as a reliable, long-term security partner and helps create the stable conditions—open sea lanes, predictable rules and regional security—that underpin shared prosperity.

Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy advances our national interests by contributing to a more secure, prosperous, inclusive and sustainable region, while strengthening Canada’s national and economic security at home.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

My apologies, Major-General, but I would like to have a quick pause, because one of the members, Mr. Aboultaif, is not receiving any audio.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Please continue.

[MGen Travis Morehen]

Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy advances our national interests by contributing to a more secure, prosperous, inclusive and sustainable region, while strengthening Canada’s national and economic security at home.

Through this strategy, Canada has increased its defence presence in the region, allowing for more engagement, co-operation and collaboration with allies and partners.

As regional tensions continue to rise we remain committed to a sustained defence presence to ensure Canada remains a reliable, credible and trusted partner on regional defence and security on an enduring basis.

Under Operation Horizon, we've increased Canadian Forces' participation in regional and multinational exercises and activities, and tailored defence training to strengthen our collective resilience and interoperability.

Through Operation Neon, Canada, alongside regional partners and allies, contributes to monitoring and upholding UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. We deploy three Royal Canadian Navy ships to the Indo-Pacific annually, increasing opportunities to work with allies and partner nations and enhancing military co-operation, including port visits.

Our Royal Canadian Navy ships conduct various activities, such as multilateral maritime co-operation activities as well as exercises with our partners in the region, such as the U.S., Australia, Japan and the Philippines.

During these deployments, the Royal Canadian Navy also conducts routine transits through the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan Strait is indispensable to the security and prosperity of the international community. It is one of the busiest global shipping routes, carrying over 20% of global maritime trade each year. More than a thousand commercial vessels cross the strait each week.

It is therefore in the interest of all sides to maintain the peaceful and accessible nature of this waterway. From an operational perspective, sailing through the Taiwan Strait is almost always the most practical and efficient route for our ships to move between ports in the region.

These transits are conducted in full accordance with international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS, and in the waters beyond territorial seas where high seas navigation rights apply.

Since 2018, well before the implementation of our Indo-Pacific strategy, we've conducted 13 Taiwan Strait transits, including under Operation Projection, the predecessor to the current Operation Horizon, as Canada regularized its presence in the Indo-Pacific.

Since the launch of the IPS in November 2022, we have conducted seven such transits, with the most recent one occurring in September 2025 in company with a ship from the Royal Australian Navy. These activities reaffirm Canada's commitment to peace and stability, to upholding international law including UNCLOS and to opposing unilateral actions that threaten the status quo across the Taiwan Strait alongside our allies and partners.

Additionally, they offer significant opportunities to build trust, advance defence initiatives and deliver tangible results with key regional partners. Canada's approach is aligned with our closest partners and allies. The navies of Australia, France, Japan, New Zealand, the U.K. and the U.S. also transit this strait. We continue to conduct these transits in full accordance with Canada's one China policy. As an active defence and security partner in the Indo-Pacific, our key focus will remain the delivery of such meaningful defence contributions on an enduring basis.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

Thank you very much for your remarks.

I will now open the floor for questions, beginning with member of Parliament Michael Chong.

You have six minutes.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing today.

I have a couple of quick questions to start. When the U.S. Navy transits through the Taiwan Strait, they call that operation a “freedom of navigation operation”.

Does the Government of Canada use similar nomenclature? Why or why not?

[Eric Laporte, Executive Director, Regional Security and Defence Relations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

The member is correct in highlighting that the U.S. Navy uses the terminology “freedom of navigation operations”, FONOPs, for some of its operations in the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere in the world. Those are based on sort of challenging baselines and challenging territorial claims but also on prior notifications.

The Canadian navy's operations, as General Morehen mentioned, are all always under international law and UNCLOS. We do not conduct FONOPs per se. The only instance where we will push back against another country is on the prior notification for transits, but we do not conduct FONOPs, as in the case of the U.S. Navy.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Thank you for that answer.

When the Canadian navy frigate HMCS Ottawa transited through the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan's foreign ministry welcomed the transit and indicated that it was a demonstration of Canada's firm position that the Taiwan Strait is international water. At the same time, the People's Liberation Army released a statement accusing Canada of undermining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

When Canadian naval vessels have transited through the Taiwan Strait, have they ever been met with activity from vessels that would be considered dangerous or unsafe?

[MGen Travis Morehen]

In the 13 transits, we have had no unprofessional or unsafe interactions with elements of the Taiwanese navy or the PLA navy.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

That's helpful.

You mentioned in your opening remarks that Canada has increased its defence presence in the Indo-Pacific region. You mentioned as well that three Royal Canadian Navy ships are sent to the Indo-Pacific region annually.

Can you tell us exactly how we have increased our defence presence? Have we gone from one navy frigate to three frigates a year? What specifically have we done to increase our military presence in the Indo-Pacific region?

[MGen Travis Morehen]

We've gone to a more regularized three Canadian warships in the Indo-Pacific region as a means to demonstrate that Canada is a reliable and stable partner in the region. We have Euro-Atlantic interests, Arctic interests and Indo-Pacific interests. Those ships are a demonstration of Canada's resolve in the region.

We also have other activities, multinational maritime co-operation activities, that we conduct with other navies. We also have, indeed, spare-time training activities with our allies. We also have co-operation and training activities with other nations. I can get into a lot of detail if you wish, Chair, but it's the conglomeration of these activities, senior leaders' engagements and port visits that allows defence diplomacy to take place. It's not just the ships. There are air activities and there are ground activities through additional exercises.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Thank you.

When we transit through straits like the Taiwan Strait, is the government of the PRC notified in advance of the transit, or is this considered international waters such that no notification is necessary?

[MGen Travis Morehen]

In accordance with our interpretation of UNCLOS and international law, we don't provide notification. This is also for reasons of operational security. Because we deem these to be international waters, we don't advise them of our transits ahead of time.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

The Indo-Pacific strategy identifies the PRC as a disruptive power in the Indo-Pacific region. I believe that's the terminology. Can you tell us what sorts of disruptions you're seeing from a defence point of view from the PRC in the region?

[MGen Travis Morehen]

The PLA has sought to modernize its capabilities and improve its proficiencies across all warfare domains to become a joint force capable of the full spectrum of operations through air, maritime, nuclear space, counterspace, electronic warfare and cyberspace operations. We believe that they have set a modernization milestone for the PLA military to be ready for any actions required or demanded by that government. All open-source indications show a positive trend to be able to achieve this goal.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills North, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ahmed Hussen]

We next go to MP Rob Oliphant.

You have six minutes.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Chong. Those were good questions that got me thinking, too, so they were helpful as well as the answers.

Leading off from some of those questions, beauty is in the eye of the beholder, and the advancement of peace and security through a variety of ways is sometimes perceived differently by different partners. I believe strongly that the Department of National Defence, CAF and Global Affairs are genuinely concerned about peace and maintaining stability to ensure transit, trade and all of those things as well as keeping the status quo. That's not always perceived that way by everyone.

I want to talk about that difference of perception that the People's Republic of China has with respect to our engagement either in the South China Sea or transiting through the Taiwan Strait and our goals.

Are there things from the foreign policy standpoint that we can do to show that what we are doing is, indeed, absolutely within the one China policy and promotes peace and stability in the region? I follow up on that because Mr. Chong was asking whether we give advance notice. Because we deem them to be international waters, we take the route you said.

What can we do to ensure that this is seen as a positive enhancement for our bilateral relationship with China as well as for peace and stability in the region? It's a long question, and you can riff off it how you want.

[Eric Laporte]

Maybe I can start and I'll let my colleagues jump in.

There are, as was highlighted, a lot of activities that DND and CAF are doing in the region. A lot of it is defence diplomacy, a lot of it is exercise training, co-operation with partners and allies, and then there are a number of other things that are not so much in the military sphere but things like co-operating with partners on things like the dark vessel detection program.

All of that is intended to help build maritime awareness, domain awareness, pictures and understanding, and that is also helpful for all countries to understand what movements are happening and what things are happening. We don't give advance notification to China for transiting the Taiwan Strait because, again, under UNCLOS that is not required, and is not a requirement for us.

When our ships are transiting they will be followed, when our ships or aircraft are doing activities they will be followed. There are at least the interactions of being able to see each other in action and have lines of communications that are then allowed to grow, and to be able to explain each other's positions.

Certainly, when we do transits, and General Morehen is often on the receiving end of this, the Chinese embassy here, for example, will démarche us or our embassy in Beijing. At least we can have those frank discussions, which allow us to explain our position and allows the exchange of information.

[MGen Travis Morehen]

Maybe just a follow-up, Mr. Chair, is that I would describe our defence military-to-military relations with China as positive but limited.

The recent engagement was with the commander of the Royal Canadian Navy in the spring of 2024. He went to a Western Pacific Naval Symposium, a multinational forum in China, where he met with his counterpart.

Since then, the minister went to the Shangri-La Dialogue in the May afterwards, and my predecessor and I went to the Xiangshan Forum in China in September. We've met with our colleagues from the Office for International Military Cooperation at the major-general rank, so that we can have dialogues to understand where we have frictions and how we communicate displeasure with each other's actions.

In my interactions with the Office for International Military Cooperation, plus the defence attachés here, they've always been courteous and respectful interactions. They allow us to have those frank discussions where they can express their displeasure as we can express our displeasure with their actions.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Thank you.

I will regret asking this question, but in terms of defence procurement, in terms of what you need to do your work—we're not the defence committee, we're the foreign affairs committee—is there a message you want to give us as parliamentarians with respect to your capacity, your capability, to do this to engage peacefully?

Our goal in foreign affairs is to make sure we have peace in our world. Are there things that would be helpful for you to procure that you think we should be doing?

[MGen Travis Morehen]

I'll defer that overall to my minister. Certainly the acquisition of the 12 submarines and the 15 River class destroyers goes a long way to enabling us to extend our influence in the maritime domain, not only in the Indo-Pacific, but also in the Euro-Atlantic and in our north.

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Something I need to explain to my constituents is that we procure for our military to ensure peace. They don't always get it.

[MGen Travis Morehen]

I would suggest that all of us in uniform want peace.

It's the last thing that we want to....