Evidence of meeting #46 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was institutions.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

Members speaking

Before the committee

Martin-Brûlé  Full Professor, Bishop's University, As an Individual
Adam Chapnick  Professor, Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College, As an Individual
Jennifer Welsh  Director of the Max Bell School of Public Policy and Distinguished James McGill Professor, McGill University, As an Individual
Pouliot  Professor, Université de Montréal, As an Individual
Audet  Professor, Canadian Observatory on Crises and Humanitarian Action, Université du Québec à Montréal, As an Individual
Robert Wolfe  Professor Emeritus, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, As an Individual

Prof. Adam Chapnick

I agree with just about everything Dr. Welsh said. I would add an example of variable geometry in the north. We are co-operating with the Nordic countries in order to better position and defend our Arctic. We are buying equipment from Australia that will support us in terms of radar in the Arctic as well.

In a number of different places, we are working with others outside of some of the traditional partnerships and coalitions.

11:55 a.m.

Conservative

Ziad Aboultaif Conservative Edmonton Manning, AB

Thank you.

Does that mean leaving the current world we are in and heading toward a completely new strategy because the international institutions are not working as we speak?

11:55 a.m.

Director of the Max Bell School of Public Policy and Distinguished James McGill Professor, McGill University, As an Individual

Dr. Jennifer Welsh

I don't know if that's directed to me, but I would refer your committee to the G7 and the G20. In the case of the G7, that was an example of institutional innovation that arose because of the failure of international financial institutions to coordinate policy sufficiently. It's a nimble kind of innovation that we have seen, and it didn't mean leaving the World Bank, the IMF or the UN.

I think there could be other Gs that we might see. We have the Quad defence relationship, which actually doesn't include Canada. Some would say that it should. I don't think it's an either-or. I would refer you to the kind of innovation we've seen historically to give us good examples of where we need to go.

11:55 a.m.

Conservative

Ziad Aboultaif Conservative Edmonton Manning, AB

Dr. Chapnick, answer quickly, please.

Prof. Adam Chapnick

If we gave up some of the basics of the international institutions created after the Second World War, we would rebuild them anyway, because we'd need them, and when we rebuilt them, they wouldn't look as good to us as they do now. You can work beyond, but you keep what you have as well.

11:55 a.m.

Conservative

Ziad Aboultaif Conservative Edmonton Manning, AB

I have 30 seconds.

These types of initiatives need deep pockets. Do you think we have a deep enough pocket to be able to carry on this mission?

11:55 a.m.

Director of the Max Bell School of Public Policy and Distinguished James McGill Professor, McGill University, As an Individual

Dr. Jennifer Welsh

I think we do if we're strategic. We have cut our international assistance budget, but we still have $6 billion. If we are strategic about how we spend it and on what kinds of initiatives, we can make a difference. I personally regret that it was cut to the degree that it was. However, we have significant heft to bring, particularly if we work with others.

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Thank you very much.

We'll go next to MP Mona Fortier.

Mrs. Fortier, you have the floor for five minutes.

Mona Fortier Liberal Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

First, I'd like to thank the witnesses for being here today. This conversation is really important as we try to see if international institutions are effective, and how they can be more effective. We have covered different topics today.

Ms. Martin‑Brûlé, can you talk a little more about the language skills you mentioned earlier? I wonder just how we leverage language skills. We have two official languages in Canada. How do you think we should use this criterion or strength in our efforts?

Noon

Full Professor, Bishop's University, As an Individual

Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé

I think it's important to keep the policies bilingual. This summer, we saw withdrawals from certain bases, where the military would perhaps no longer be obligated to speak French and might only speak in English. I think that going in this direction is a mistake, because it is one of our assets, but, again, it is a strategic asset. Bilingualism should therefore not be abandoned. We must continue to insist on the importance of having bilingual international civil servants and military personnel, especially high-ranking officers.

In the longer term, we must also invest in the language training of our diplomats. I think Ulric Shannon, who is a diplomat, mentioned this a few years ago in a report: the ability to speak in French, English and other languages creates much stronger relationships and relationships of trust with our partners. It's a long-term investment, but I think that this type of investment has a lot of benefits.

The fact that Canada is bilingual in French and English gives us an extraordinary advantage on the ground, since many member states speak either French or English, but few speak both. We can therefore bridge the gap between several allies, better understand situations, speak the local language and understand the challenges and our influence.

More concretely, we must continue bilingual training and have the long-term will to invest in language training that allows us to better understand the situations we encounter.

Noon

Liberal

Mona Fortier Liberal Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester, ON

Thank you very much.

It is said that Canada is paying extra attention to economic security, supply chains and resilience in the face of economic coercion. You mentioned that a couple of times. Are the existing international institutions well equipped to meet these challenges, or in the current context, as I believe Ms. Walsh said earlier, should we expect to see new multilateral mechanisms emerge?

Ms. Walsh, please go first.

After that, I will go to Ms. Martin‑Brûlé and then Mr. Chapnick if we have enough time.

Noon

Director of the Max Bell School of Public Policy and Distinguished James McGill Professor, McGill University, As an Individual

Dr. Jennifer Welsh

Excuse me. Can you repeat the question about supply chains in particular? I didn't—

Noon

Liberal

Mona Fortier Liberal Ottawa—Vanier—Gloucester, ON

Based on what is happening now, is it time to create new multilateral mechanisms? You said we should learn from some of the events that are currently unfolding. I would like you to expand on new multilateral mechanisms.

Noon

Director of the Max Bell School of Public Policy and Distinguished James McGill Professor, McGill University, As an Individual

Dr. Jennifer Welsh

Yes. Thank you. I was slightly thrown off by the words “supply chain”, and I wanted to make sure that I was answering you correctly.

Yes, I do believe that we have the possibility at this moment. I would say that even in the sphere of security we should be thinking that way, because as much as I believe our involvement in the NATO alliance is hugely important, it's also clear that European security and transatlantic security may require some further forms of institutionalization, including bringing potentially Ukraine, Turkey and others into a security orbit. I don't think we should be restricting where we believe these new kinds of mechanisms might be useful.

I mentioned around trade that I certainly believe we may need beyond what we have globally for global migration. Global migration is one of the most difficult transnational problems we face. Do we need a ginger group of states to look beyond what we have in the particular confines of the refugee convention and perhaps to arrangements that can address some of the acute migration needs?

I certainly believe that we will need more coalitions and variable geometry around global health security, and pandemics in particular, because what we designed through the pandemic treaty—a slow, universal multilateral process—did not really address all of the issues we saw with COVID-19.

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Thank you very much.

Thank you to all the witnesses for their appearance before the committee.

We will now briefly suspend the meeting in order to prepare for the next hour of testimony.

Thank you very much.

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

I call this meeting back to order.

Before welcoming our witnesses to the second panel....

The clerk distributed, on October 23, two draft budgets for the following studies. For the study regarding the effectiveness of international institutions, we have a draft budget of $9,600. For the study regarding opportunities presented to Canada through a strengthened relationship with the European Union, we also have a draft budget of $9,600.

Is it the will of the committee to adopt these two budgets?

Some hon. members

Agreed.

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

I would now like to welcome our witnesses joining us for the second hour.

Appearing by video conference, we have François Audet, professor, Observatoire canadien sur les crises et l'action humanitaires, Université du Québec à Montréal.

We also have Vincent Pouliot, professor, Université de Montréal and Robert Wolfe, professor emeritus, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, by video conference.

Welcome. Up to five minutes will be given for your opening remarks, after which we will proceed with rounds of questions.

I now invite Professor Vincent Pouliot to deliver an opening statement of no more than five minutes.

Vincent Pouliot Professor, Université de Montréal, As an Individual

Thank you for your welcome.

As the topic of the meeting this morning is fairly broad, I would like to start by putting things into context and sharing a few remarks and thoughts based on my 25 years of work on international institutions. I will try to close with a few specific recommendations.

The first observation on context is that international institutions are facing growing challenges and politicization, not because they have become less effective, but because their mandate continues to expand. That is one contextual element that has to be kept in mind.

International institutions are taking on an expanded role. They are being called upon to expand their area of jurisdiction and scope of action. Our expectations have increased. We now expect them to be democratic, inclusive and transparent. Obviously, I support these values, but it's important to understand that this also increases the policy workload. International organizations were not designed for that. As such, a certain amount of adaptation work is necessary, and Canada should contribute to that work. However, that work cannot be done overnight. In a sense, that is an appeal to find space between cynical and idealized views of international institutions. I think the truth lives in the balance between the two.

My second introductory remark is that contrary to what we often hear in the media or even in some political speeches, in my opinion, the most pressing issue facing international organizations is not inefficiency or bureaucracy.

Obviously, the UN machinery, for example, could benefit from some improvements. This is probably the organization I know best. I don't want to say that some things cannot be improved. However, should Canada make reform of international institutions a priority now? I don't think so.

Instead, I think we need to look at member states and Canada's partners, who have a love-hate relationship with all international institutions. That is part and parcel of the international system. States created international institutions in order to use them and rely on them, and they have done that. That is to be expected. That's the name of the game, but quite often, states try to hinder the work of international organizations. As such, I think we need to use the right lens to examine this issue. In my opinion, we are better off thinking about the relationship between states when it comes to making international institutions more effective.

The third point I want to make is that, in my opinion, Canada's strongest asset in the incredibly turbulent world of today is constancy, consistency, predictability and reliability. I believe most of our partners are looking for a reliable partner.

The good news is that that does not cost much. A consistent and predictable partner is not something that requires billions of dollars in investment, far from it. Instead, it involves day-to-day action. I'm a big advocate for international law not being like an à la carte restaurant menu where people pick and choose what suits them. I believe that if the International Court of Justice renders a decision, regardless of whether Canada is comfortable or uncomfortable with that decision, supporting the court will serve our long-term interests. The same goes with the International Criminal Court. I'm just taking examples of international law.

I believe that Canada plays its role better when it agrees in principle with international institutions and not when it agrees “à la carte”. I know that à la carte or variable geometry multilateralism is quite popular these days. I understand its appeal, because it gives us an opportunity to directly approach the partners we already get along with. Yes, there's a certain appeal to that. However, I believe we have to look at the bigger picture. From Canada's perspective, the value of multilateralism lies in maintaining the stability of the system, rather than in the next decision that will be taken tomorrow. The system is more stable because it doesn't have many competing or fragmented institutions.

Take the example of artificial intelligence. China is trying to set up its own regional organization. The European Union has its own approach. The United States has its own approach. It would be a bad idea were Canada to decide to adopt an “à la carte” approach and choose the organization that best meets its needs. It's much better for Canada to prioritize a broader, inclusive process. This will take more time and will be more complicated. However, it will establish guidelines that are truly global in scope.

In closing, I will make two minor concrete points. We can discuss them during the question period if need be.

First, generally speaking, if we want to reform and make international institutions more effective, our top focus should be to improve the way existing institutions work rather than try to create new ones. That doesn't mean that we can't think outside the box every now and then. It's clear that this is feasible and that there are good reasons in its favour. However, the house is already standing. If we use the UN as a reference, most international organizations are around 80 years old. The house is showing its age. It needs maintenance and renovation. That is normal. However, in my opinion, that demands that Canada take action that may not be super visible to or applauded by everyone, but the action would nevertheless be substantive.

I will cite two of the ones that are of particular concern to me and which touch on issues where Canada can play a truly central role. The first is funding. We need to understand that the UN budget is shrinking. That's something our levels of government have not experienced, despite current austerity measures. The UN budget has been shrinking over the past few years, with less funding available every year. I'm not even talking about a reduction in real terms relative to inflation. I'm talking about a reduction in absolute terms. The regular UN budget is $3.2 billion. That's the combined budget of the three largest European soccer clubs. That will give members a rough idea. Obviously, there are also voluntary contributions, but the regular UN budget is already tight and further cuts will inevitably create problems.

In my opinion, Canada does indeed have a role to play here. Incidentally, this role perfectly resonates with the concerns of countries in the global south, which I think Canada should draw closer to. That is a major concern for countries in the global south. As such, long-term funding should be maintained by ensuring that, for instance, states stop withholding their mandatory contributions, or paying the contributions as late as possible or using the contributions for political leverage. Other modes of funding are needed. I think that is where we are in 2026. These issues need to be considered. It's not just a matter of increasing the budget. It's also a matter of making the budget more stable and sustainable to ensure the organization can take action on its own without relying on voluntary contributions from one year to another.

I have a second point, but I'll stop here, Mr. Chair, because my time is up.

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Thank you for your remarks.

I now call on Professor Audet to take the floor.

François Audet Professor, Canadian Observatory on Crises and Humanitarian Action, Université du Québec à Montréal, As an Individual

Good afternoon, members of the committee. Thank you for your invitation.

Greetings to my colleagues in the room.

My comments will be based on some 30 years of experience. I spent the first part of my career working for several international organizations, and now I study the governance of international organizations.

My argument is simple and echoes that of my colleague. To be effective, international organizations need trust, trust from governments like Canada's that fund them, trust from the partners that implement their programs and trust from the populations they serve. This trust is obviously based on results, and it is always by these results that effectiveness is measured. However, as Professor Pouliot said, it depends mainly on the decisions made by the member states. When states and populations trust international organizations, co‑operation becomes easier. This has been well demonstrated. This co‑operation enables international organizations to achieve better results, which in turn strengthens the trust they inspire.

As I often tell my students, to a large extent, we get the international organizations we deserve. Countries like Canada define their mandates, powers and budgets, but if their mandates are vague or contradictory, if their powers are discredited, or if their budgets are cut, it should come as no surprise that the results are different or even very negative.

However, as we know, organizations must answer to multiple governments. Consequently, priorities can often conflict. So, as Professor Pouliot said, any assessment of the situation must distinguish between management issues and the political or budgetary obstacles that may be imposed by certain members. The United States' disengagement in recent years from certain international organizations illustrates this distinction precisely. When a country as significant as the United States reduces its support and calls certain institutions into question, it undermines both their capacity to act and their credibility. Not all of the resulting difficulties can be attributed to administration or bureaucracy.

In my view, five priorities emerge from this context. The first is that Canada continues to demonstrate the usefulness of international organizations. Trust in them requires citizens to understand what international co‑operation is going to bring to them. The Government of Canada must explain why it supports an organization and what results it expects from that support. It must demonstrate how international organizations contribute, for example, to detecting epidemics, as we are currently seeing with Ebola in Africa, preventing conflict or coordinating disaster responses. Their effectiveness directly contributes to the collective security of Canadians. This is often very poorly understood.

The second priority is to continue funding what we're asking for. It sounds simple, but it doesn't happen often. When resources dwindle, programs are scaled back, and expertise is lost. It's the same for any federal government department. This decline in capacity can then be presented as evidence of inefficiency, justifying further cuts. It's a kind of vicious cycle. Canada must break this vicious cycle and ensure that the mandates it supports are aligned with the resources it is prepared to provide or mobilize from other partners in the international community to meet those needs.

The third priority is to deliver on our commitments and ensure continuity during a crisis. I think it's fair to say that we're in a crisis right now. We need predictable funding. This must allow for the maintenance of teams, information networks and staff safety features. Effectiveness depends on that continuity. Organizations, whether federal or international, must be able to plan their responses, retain staff and work sustainably with partners.

The fourth priority is to apply the same rules to everyone and protect safety through law. Trust also depends on a sense of fairness. Conversely, trust is weakened when the rules seem to vary depending on alliances or the short-term interests of powerful states, as was mentioned earlier. Canada must therefore support the consistent application of international law, even if that sometimes means criticizing one or more partners.

The fifth priority is to co‑operate where we can actually act. In Davos, the Prime Minister called on middle powers to work together on specific issues. That's exactly what an international organization is all about. Canada could give concrete expression to this call by, for example, bringing together partners to maintain essential services that are at risk of being eliminated because of budget cuts.

For example, in my field of humanitarian studies, I think that humanitarian monitoring and early warnings for epidemics, as we're seeing in Africa, are a good example of what Canada could do. When we lose our ability to document needs and identify worsening conditions, we intervene too late, and the human and financial consequences are much greater.

I'll end there. The five priorities I just mentioned were also included in a somewhat more comprehensive brief containing recommendations. They are based on shared responsibility. International organizations must improve their practices, but countries like Canada must give them realistic mandates. We must honour our own commitment. For Canada, this means supporting their effectiveness so that they can fully exercise their role as members, donors and partners. Trust is built through this commitment and the resources we provide them.

Thank you very much.

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Thank you for your opening remarks.

I now invite Professor Wolfe to take the floor.

Professor Robert Wolfe Professor Emeritus, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, As an Individual

Thank you very much for this invitation.

My focus is going to be narrower than that of all the speakers you've heard so far. I'm going to talk about the World Trade Organization and why strengthening it contributes to Canada's foreign policy priority of building a stable and prosperous world order.

We all know President Trump loves tariffs and does not love trade agreements. Last year, two European leaders called the WTO defunct and said it “hasn't worked for years”. In that famous Davos speech, Mark Carney said that the WTO was “greatly diminished”.

These perceptions are misleading. The WTO is the foundation of the trading system. Its fate matters enormously, not least for a small country like Canada. Countries do not automatically comply with any international obligation, and yet most WTO members do so much of the time. Observers have a natural tendency to look at breaches of the rules and ignore underlying compliance. The WTO secretariat estimates that 72% of all merchandise trade still takes place under the basic principle of countries treating their trading partners equally. This is known as the most favoured nation, or MFN, principle.

The purpose of the WTO is to reduce uncertainty and trade costs for importers and exporters. The WTO is not to blame for massive uncertainty in world trade. That's due to the geopolitical situation.

Reforms the WTO might need depend on its effectiveness in fulfilling three core functions.

First, it monitors the implementation of commitments and improves transparency on national trade policies. All of that is working well. WTO agreements are like the operating system for world trade. Its committees provide a forum for discussion of all the agreements, and those discussions are often based on notifications of new or changed trade measures. Thousands are submitted and published every year.

Second, it has a forum for settling legal disputes when they arise. This part of the system does need reform, but it's far from moribund. When countries cannot resolve conflict over the interpretation of the rules, they launch disputes. Rumours to the contrary notwithstanding, first-stage dispute panels still work. The problem is with appeals. The appellate body exists but is effectively defunct because of U.S. concerns. Some members appeal results anyway, which means rulings do not have to be implemented. Others use the interim mechanism of appealing by arbitration, which Canada helped create.

The third function is negotiating new agreements. WTO rules have not kept up with technological change and the evolution of complex global value chains. Observers will say that the WTO is ineffective because new negotiations involving the whole membership now seem impossible. Some say that 166 members cannot make decisions by consensus, but there will never be consensus to relax consensus. That's why members have tried to advance negotiations among smaller groups of countries in so-called plurilaterals. The results of some of these negotiations need consensus to be brought under the WTO umbrella. India, in particular, has created roadblocks to that consensus.

These institutional impediments to reform obscure the bigger problem. Capitals are distracted by events elsewhere. Bilateral negotiations and new strategic partnerships proliferate, but there's no alternative to the foundational role of the WTO in the trading system. If the WTO is allowed to fade away and world trade fragments into multiple small agreements, uncertainty and costs will rise for everyone. It won't be as instantaneous as closing the Strait of Hormuz, but it may be worse.

At the UN, in September, Canada co-sponsored the new Partners for Multilateralism coalition. This affirmed the need to uphold and enforce the rules essential to international order while renewing the multilateral system. One place to start is the WTO. We and other middle powers depend on the stability and predictability of the rules it provides. Dozens of reform proposals are on the table, but they are wish lists. Delegates are keeping the discussion alive, or treading water, until the politics allow genuine movement. Canada can help to ensure that the WTO does not sink while waiting.

Canada will likely make its own proposals. Officials in Geneva participate in country groups that meet informally on areas of possible agreement on institutional reform. Canada also supports informal dialogues on things like industrial policy and the environment. The Prime Minister and ministers are actively talking to their counterparts about trade. They should bring up the WTO. Canada can encourage other capitals to engage. For example, leaders could encourage India to be more accommodating of bringing plurilaterals under the WTO umbrella.

Thank you. I look forward to your questions.

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Thank you for your opening remarks, Mr. Wolfe.

We will now move on to the question period.

I'll begin with MP Philip Lawrence.

You have six minutes.

12:30 p.m.

Conservative

Philip Lawrence Conservative Northumberland—Clarke, ON

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My questions will primarily be for you, Mr. Audet.

You went through five priorities that you have for Canada in terms of building trust in the international organizations. While you were going through them, I don't think you said this directly, so I'd like to give you the opportunity to comment. It's that many of them appear at odds with the current fanciful term “variable geometry”.

I'm wondering if you could comment on that. Are suggestions for consistency of funding, consistency of support, at odds with variable geometry?