Evidence of meeting #46 for Foreign Affairs and International Development in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was institutions.

A recording is available from Parliament.

On the agenda

Members speaking

Before the committee

Martin-Brûlé  Full Professor, Bishop's University, As an Individual
Adam Chapnick  Professor, Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College, As an Individual
Jennifer Welsh  Director of the Max Bell School of Public Policy and Distinguished James McGill Professor, McGill University, As an Individual
Pouliot  Professor, Université de Montréal, As an Individual
Audet  Professor, Canadian Observatory on Crises and Humanitarian Action, Université du Québec à Montréal, As an Individual
Robert Wolfe  Professor Emeritus, School of Policy Studies, Queen's University, As an Individual

11 a.m.

Liberal

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

I call this meeting to order. Welcome to meeting number 46 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, October 21, 2026, the committee is meeting regarding its study on the effectiveness of international institutions.

The meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person and remotely using the Zoom application.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses for the first hour. We have, as an individual, Professor Adam Chapnick, professor of defence studies at the Royal Military College, who is appearing by video conference; Dr. Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, full professor, Bishop's University, who is appearing in person; and Dr. Jennifer M. Welsh, director of the Max Bell School of Public Policy and a distinguished James McGill professor, McGill University, who is joining us today by video conference.

Up to five minutes will be given for opening remarks, after which we will proceed with the rounds of questions from members.

I now invite Dr. Martin-Brûlé to deliver her remarks for no more than five minutes.

Thank you.

Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé Full Professor, Bishop's University, As an Individual

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for this invitation to contribute to your work on the effectiveness of international institutions and on Canada's role in strengthening them.

My more than 20 years of research on the peace operations carried out by the United Nations, or UN, especially on the African continent, including in Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan, to name but a few places, has allowed me to see the gaps that can exist between the decisions made in New York and their effects on the ground.

To strengthen the effectiveness of international institutions, Canada must use its strengths, namely the quality and expertise of its professionals and, above all, its ability to influence decisions where international standards are set.

Canada has considerable assets.

First, there is the professionalism of its diplomats, military personnel, police officers and experts, as well as its strengths in gender equality, civilian protection, diversity and climate security.

Then, in Africa, where most UN peace operations take place, Canada enjoys a historical positioning distinct from that of other European powers. This particularity, combined with a sensitivity to historical legacies and local realities, can facilitate communication, foster relationships of trust and pave the way for lasting partnerships.

Finally, a strategic advantage that is too often underestimated, which I recently highlighted in an op-ed published in La Presse, is our French and English bilingualism, which is both a cultural asset and an operational and diplomatic capability. It connects military and diplomatic communities, facilitates the flow of information and, above all, builds relationships of trust. This is why small deployments can have an influence that far exceeds their size. A few Canadian officers integrated into a mission can play a liaison role, contribute to decisions and maintain valuable institutional networks. This is therefore a form of soft power in uniform.

The withdrawal from several international missions announced by the Canadian government in July raises a fundamental question: Beyond the savings, are we sufficiently weighing the value of the relationships, knowledge and institutional influence that Canada risks losing?

In terms of normative influence, I would like to highlight the impact of initiatives like the Elsie initiative, which exemplify how Canada can help change international institutions. The Elsie initiative was launched in 2017. Its aim is to increase the significant participation of women soldiers and police officers in peace operations through three levers—which I may come back to later—including the creation of a fund and the implementation of institutional analysis methods. At the UN level, implementing the Elsie initiative resulted in the proportion of women staff officers and military observers rising from 11% in 2018 to 23% in 2025. This progress is collective. It cannot be solely attributed to Elsie, but it is a crucial lesson: Thanks to Elsie, Canada didn't just fund the change, it helped change the rules that make it possible.

This is my main recommendation: Canada should have an international normative influence strategy that is well developed, planned and coordinated across the government.

Beyond participating in international institutions, we must deliberately identify the bodies where rules are established, bring our expertise to bear in a concerted way and ensure that our efforts are sustained over the long term. Influence must be prepared, built, assessed and maintained. Several bodies that develop these normative rules come to mind, including the C34 committee, the Contingent-Owned Equipment Working Group, the special services of the Department of Peace Operations and the Fifth Committee. In short, these bodies illustrate different aspects of international influence and can help Canada define the rules, put them into practice, fund their application and guide these policies.

To this end, Canada has a huge territory and a relatively small population, but I think that making Canadian expertise an intentional lever of international influence should be a priority. Our international influence cannot rest on the number of people deployed. It must be grounded in the quality of our professionals, their skills and our ability to send them to strategic locations.

Several of our partners have interesting approaches. They include Germany, which has the Zentrum für Internationale Friedenseinsätze, or ZIF—which I could come back to later if there is a question period—Sweden, which relies on the Folke Bernadotte Academy and Switzerland, which also has a specialized pool of civilian experts that can be mobilized to international organizations. Canada could draw inspiration from these approaches by making greater use of its expertise, particularly its bilingualism, to help strengthen the capacities of other contributing countries.

We already have comparable mechanisms, notably programs for young professionals and Canadem, but we need to coordinate them better, build up the next generation and support international careers over the long term.

This also means acting more strategically ahead of international recruitment, determining the priority functions, identifying secondment opportunities and competitions, informing Canadian candidates, preparing them for the selection processes and offering them professional and language support.

I will conclude my remarks with six main recommendations.

First, we should define our priorities. Influence must be intentional, not the mere result of our presence.

Second, we should coordinate our expertise by forming interdepartmental teams consisting of diplomats, military personnel, police officers, technical experts and researchers to prepare our proposals, build coalitions and have more influence on international negotiations.

Third, we should develop our next generation of international talent by strengthening programs for young professionals, secondments and supporting Canadian candidates for key positions in international organizations.

Fourth, we should make language skills a strategic investment by developing the bilingualism and intercultural skills of our professionals by recognizing them as essential capacities for co-operation, trust and international influence.

Fifth, we should recognize the strategic value of our small deployments. Before reducing or withdrawing Canada's presence, we should assess the cost and the presence's operational, diplomatic and institutional contribution, as well as the possible consequences of withdrawing.

Sixth, we should measure our influence rather than just our presence by presenting an annual report to Parliament that addresses three questions: What standards has Canada helped to shape; what practices have changed; and what concrete results have these changes achieved?

For a medium power like Canada, relationships of trust, language skills, the expertise of its professionals and its institutional presence are strategic capabilities. The Elsie initiative shows that by combining research, expertise, diplomacy and targeted funding, Canada can help change practices and the rules that govern them.

Our influence doesn't just depend on how many people we deploy or how much money we invest; it depends on our ability to send our assets to the right place, at the right time, and over time. Canada doesn't need to be present everywhere to exert significant influence, but it needs to be where it counts—

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Pardon me. We are way over time.

Thank you very much.

I now invite Dr. Chapnick to deliver his remarks of no more than five minutes.

Professor Adam Chapnick Professor, Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College, As an Individual

Thank you for the opportunity to speak with this committee. It is an honour to contribute to this critical element of our liberal democracy. My comments will begin with historical context and conclude with a policy recommendation.

The end of the Second World War launched a series of international organizations—

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Professor, just a moment, please. Some members cannot hear you. We're going to resolve this technical issue.

Prof. Adam Chapnick

Okay. No problem.

Can you hear me now?

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Yes, absolutely. Please proceed.

Prof. Adam Chapnick

I will start over.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to speak with the committee. It is an honour to contribute to this critical element of our liberal democracy. My comments will begin with the historical context and conclude with a policy recommendation.

The end of the Second World War launched a series of international organizations and institutions that have persisted to this day. The intent at the time was twofold. The international security institutions, headlined by the United Nations Security Council, were meant to prevent a third world war. The international economic institutions—the International Monetary Fund or IMF, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or GATT, which later became the World Trade Organization—were all designed to encourage liberalized trade within a rules-based system, supervised for all intents and purposes by leading western liberal democracies.

This system of global governance was utterly consistent with Canadian national interests. Not only did we help design these institutions; three of our closest allies had vetoes on the Security Council. Canada and other wealthy countries had disproportionate voting power at the IMF and World Bank. The GATT promoted free trade within a rules-based liberal order, two ideas of critical importance to a trade-dependent middle-sized power like Canada.

To summarize the history, the system of global governance that emerged after the Second World War was built deliberately and intentionally by Canada and its western allies for their mutual benefit. The post-Second World War system never functioned exactly as envisioned. Its effectiveness waxed and mostly waned, based largely on the interests of the great powers—notably, the United States, Russia and China—in making them work.

Today, as the United States turns inward, Russia inexcusably violates the sovereignty of Ukraine on a daily basis, and China regularly exercises economic coercion to get its way in the world, much of that system of global governance is in disarray. The United Nations has been marginalized by the great power veto. The World Trade Organization's appellate body cannot function, because Democratic and Republican administrations have prevented the appointment of a quorum of judges.

In this context, Canada is left with three options. What Prime Minister Mark Carney calls “variable geometry” is an approach that suggests that since the system is broken, Canada should work around it. Ottawa should pursue “different coalitions for different issues, based on common values and interests”. It should develop a web of limited economic and security alliances and institutions to make up for the failures of the universal ones.

It's a practical, pragmatic approach, but in withdrawing its attention from the United Nations system, Ottawa makes it easier for Beijing to increase its influence and ultimately rebuild that system, stripped of its liberal democratic inclinations.

An alternative is for Ottawa to take a leadership role in advancing institutional reform. Since Canada benefits disproportionately from a universal system that privileges liberal democratic ideals, an aggressive commitment to reform would be understandable, but Ottawa is not nearly powerful enough to overcome the current institutional dysfunction alone, and any resources it dedicates to reform cannot be invested in building national resilience.

There is, I think, a middle way. Canada must build new relationships and alliances to make up for the failure of the old ones. It cannot count on the United Nations to maintain its security or the World Trade Organization to protect its economic interests, but it must also remain engaged in the traditional international system, no matter how flawed or dysfunctional. History suggests that the chaos of today will eventually at least somewhat subside. When it does, we must ensure that the system of global governance to which we return has not been infiltrated and compromised by the Chinese.

In sum, international institutions today are not at their best. Canada has no choice but to seek alternatives, but it must also defend the broken institutions from a hostile takeover.

Thank you.

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Thank you very much for your statement.

I now invite Dr. Welsh to deliver her remarks.

Dr. Jennifer Welsh Director of the Max Bell School of Public Policy and Distinguished James McGill Professor, McGill University, As an Individual

Hello. Good morning.

It's an honour to be with you and the committee this morning to contribute to your deliberations, which, as I understand it, are about the effectiveness of international institutions.

I want to start by reminding us all of what international institutions are. They are most simply arrangements that structure co-operation among sovereign states by establishing rules, procedures and expectations for how states interact. These arrangements vary in the degree of formality, ranging from informal understandings and norms, such as the institution of diplomatic immunity, to the formal international organizations, such as the UN, with established rules, administrative bodies and decision-making.

International institutions do not necessarily replace state sovereignty or operate independently of state interests. They create structured settings within which states pursue their goals and manage their interactions, even across time when governments change.

Why do these institutions matter for Canada? Professor Chapnick referred to this argument. Because our prosperity and security depend fundamentally on the broader global and institutional context, we've had a particular interest in building and sustaining an institutional architecture globally that will secure both our security and our economic objectives. The consequence of those realities is that we have relied upon international co-operation.

I want to stress to the committee that this has not been a naive or starry-eyed pursuit. It's been crucial to our success as a country. Given that Canada is not a major power, it has a continued interest in ensuring that any rules guiding these forms of international co-operation reflect the concerns of the many rather than the powerful few, minimize the capacity of the strong to coerce the weak, and have fair, transparent, rules-based mechanisms for resolving disputes.

Today, we face a fracturing multilateral system due to major powers' conflicting interests, lack of leadership from key players both regionally and globally, particular weaknesses in institutional enforcement and design, and continued under-representation of key states and non-state actors.

The past decade has brought to the surface the uncomfortable truth that core elements of the world's multilateral system are creaking and, in some cases, at risk of becoming obsolete. Added to this sentiment are questions about the legitimacy of a post-1945 architecture that does not adequately reflect the growing power and influence of non-western states, as well as simmering resentment about the alleged selectivity with which western states apply the core norms associated with that architecture.

One possible response to the fracturing multilateral system is for Canada to adopt a more transaction-based approach to international relations. We see some signs of this with the current government's approach to international trade in particular. As I suggested earlier, two Canadian realities—our relative power position and our globally facing economy and society—require ongoing commitment to multilateralism.

Then the key strategic question for Canada is whether it wishes to be a system maintainer or a system innovator. The latter calls for more proactive efforts to ensure that multilateralism better reflects changing power dynamics and emerging global challenges, including through the creation of new structures and processes, if necessary outside of well-established institutional frameworks. In short, it's still “a” rules-based order, not necessarily “the” rules-based order that we have all gotten used to.

However, there are two cautions.

First, variable geometry must be more than a slogan. It needs to be based on careful consideration of where and how coalitions can come together effectively in ways that complement and improve rather than undermine what I would call our legacy architecture.

Secondly, we need to be careful about how and with what criteria we evaluate the effectiveness of international institutions. The scapegoating of international institutions has become a well-trodden path for populist politicians around the world who want to deflect responsibility. Let's blame the WHO for all the problems of COVID. Let's blame the WTO for the loss of jobs in the heartland in the United States. Remember that international institutions are created by states. They do not sit above them or outside them and therefore reflect state interests and political dynamics. International institutions cannot eliminate those dynamics.

In my submission to you, I've left you some thoughts on questions to ask about the effectiveness of international institutions as you go through your deliberations. I will not summarize those now—I'd go over my five minutes—but I would say, most simply, ask whether a given institution makes a meaningful difference to international co-operation and helps address the problems it was created to solve. Simply establishing an institution, adopting rules or obtaining state compliance doesn't necessarily mean it's effective. We need to examine both institutional performance and an institution's actual contribution to important outcomes today.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions.

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Thank you very much for your statement.

I will now open the floor for questions by members, beginning with MP Philip Lawrence.

You have six minutes.

Philip Lawrence Conservative Northumberland—Clarke, ON

Thank you, Chair.

My questions will be for you, Dr. Chapnick.

In your opening remarks, you mentioned a middle way, differing from the PM's approach of variable geometry. Could you outline what different choices you would make if you were the prime minister?

Prof. Adam Chapnick

The only different choice I would make is that I would not decrease investment and confidence in Global Affairs Canada. I think there is still a role for our diplomats in these international institutions and preserving their future viability.

My sense is that Global Affairs has not been treated as part of the international and national security structures that are being promoted by this government. It was cut, when other parts were not cut as deeply or were augmented.

11:20 a.m.

Conservative

Philip Lawrence Conservative Northumberland—Clarke, ON

To clarify, your concern is the cuts that have been performed to GAC, as well as its removal from some of the other broader discussions?

Prof. Adam Chapnick

My concern, if you put those two together, is the decreased institutional capacity of GAC to do the grunt work necessary to keep some of these institutional organizations from falling into the hands of folks who would like to influence them differently, not through western liberal democratic ideals and norms.

11:20 a.m.

Conservative

Philip Lawrence Conservative Northumberland—Clarke, ON

Could you continue about what some of the consequences of the defanging of GAC would be?

Prof. Adam Chapnick

The assumption seems to be that if international organizations aren't working, we don't have to put any energy into them, because they aren't working and they will shrivel up and disappear.

I don't think some of our adversaries think the same way. I think they see opportunities. If the west decides not to pay attention to international institutions, they can replace western representatives with adversarial representatives who can then reshape those institutions for their means. The only way you can resist that is through a foreign service that has the people and the capabilities necessary to stand their ground. With our allies in the United States moving out, the last thing we should do is move out as well.

11:20 a.m.

Conservative

Philip Lawrence Conservative Northumberland—Clarke, ON

Would I be going too far to suggest that this government, by undermining the work of GAC, is in some ways allowing our enemies to gain a foothold in some of the international institutions, which will—maybe not immediately, but in the medium or perhaps long term—make the world a more dangerous place?

Prof. Adam Chapnick

To me, you are going slightly too far. I think the moves risk this happening. I think GAC could reorganize and put its emphasis in certain places, but it would certainly be easier if GAC was considered a full-fledged member of the revitalized international and national security apparatus this government is making.

I'm very comfortable with an increased emphasis on defence. I'm less comfortable that it comes at the expense of our diplomatic capacity.

11:20 a.m.

Conservative

Philip Lawrence Conservative Northumberland—Clarke, ON

Thank you very much. I think you've been very clear on that score about the potential risks of undermining GAC and the important work it does.

I want to change subjects. In previous writings, you were critical of past governments pursuing a seat on the Security Council. I'm wondering what your thoughts would be on the government's current pursuit of a seat on the human rights committee at the United Nations.

Prof. Adam Chapnick

My concerns with the Security Council are that, in the past, we have pursued a seat in a contested election, which means that we had to sell favours to our adversaries in order to win over our allies. I don't think we should ever do that. I think we should be constantly pursuing a seat on the Security Council in uncontested elections, so when there's only one other candidate from the western European and other group. That way, we are automatically elected and represent our allies without having to sell favours to adversaries.

It follows that I want us to be represented in every UN institution whenever we can. I just don't like competing against our friends to do so.

11:25 a.m.

Conservative

Philip Lawrence Conservative Northumberland—Clarke, ON

I share your concern, and I would call upon the government....

I'm wondering whether you would support being more transparent if, in fact, those favours are being traded back and forth. It seems like this is done in the shadows.

Could I have your comments on that, sir?

Prof. Adam Chapnick

I recognize the need for transparency in government, and governments have to be accountable. The messiness and sausage-making of diplomacy mean that some of these things have to be kept quiet in order to preserve the integrity and the word of a delegation. If part of the deal is not explaining the deal and we explain the deal, the deal is off.

I recognize the need for transparency, but in the case of side deals for elections, I don't think they can always be expressed to the Canadian public right away.

11:25 a.m.

Conservative

Philip Lawrence Conservative Northumberland—Clarke, ON

Thank you very much, Dr. Chapnick. I really enjoy your writings, and you're a real benefit to Canada.

The Chair Liberal Ahmed Hussen

Thank you very much.

We go next to MP Zuberi. You have six minutes.