Procedure and House Affairs Committee on March 2nd, 2023

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

Our understanding is that they have ceased, and we're continuing our investigation. It is ongoing. Anytime a law enforcement liaison officer from an embassy comes up to us and is not pleased with the actions we have taken, that is a sign we have done our job, and we continue to do our job.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

I appreciate your work very much in that regard.

Yesterday, I believe the deputy minister of public safety shared with the committee that legislative changes would need to be made, or he implied that they would need to be made, for charges to be laid. Is that correct? Would legislative changes need to be made for the RCMP to lay charges?

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

When we talk about legislative changes, the RCMP operates in the criminal environment. This is the work that my colleague Michelle alluded to earlier with regard to the work we do with the service.

The service is in the intel business, but as the intel starts building toward a criminal offence, it's shifted to the RCMP. We work with the existing legislation we have under the Criminal Code.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you.

Would a change to the Criminal Code be needed to lay charges based on the evidence that you have concerning the police stations or election interference?

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

We always entertain new tools under the code.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Has the Minister of Public Safety or anybody from the government or the Prime Minister's Office been briefed that legislative changes would need to be made for charges to be laid?

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

They have not, to my knowledge.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

They have not on any of those briefings that happened.

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

I'm saying they have not, to my knowledge.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Okay, so the RCMP has not informed the Prime Minister or any of his cabinet that legislative changes are needed for charges to be laid.

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

The RCMP will go through Public Safety if we need changes to legislation.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Will you be pursuing any of those—

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you very much.

Thank you to everyone for your feedback.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

That's excellent.

This brings us to Mr. Fergus.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I thank the witnesses who are here today.

I am very pleased to see the coordination that exists between the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Communications Security Establishment and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. This coordination is very important to protect Canadians, and to allow Canada to play its role with its international allies.

Mr. Vigneault, I'd like to pick up on an answer you gave to Mr. Cooper about the allegations in the newspapers. If memory serves, you said that you did not want to confirm or deny the veracity of these allegations.

You said that these allegations “may or may not” have come from CSIS, and this leads me to a sensitive question. I know you can't comment about the specific case, so let me take this into a hypothetical range. With your knowledge of foreign interference and the different techniques that are used in foreign interference, is it possible, in your opinion, that unverified or unconfirmed leaks from secret sources that may or may not have come from official sources could in themselves represent a form of foreign interference?

[David Vigneault]

I'll start answering in French.

This is one of the key elements of this whole issue. Foreign interference is very complex and covers a whole spectrum of activities, from diplomats who will speak openly to advance their country's interests, which is perfectly acceptable, to a whole category of activities that fall into a grey area, because they are a little more veiled or because they will be carried out clandestinely later on, and then become foreign interference. The point is that it's very complex.

I will continue in English.

The United Front Work Department, the UFWD, is an organization of the Communist Party. It is as old as the Chinese Communist Party. Under Xi Jinping, this organization has been provided new budgets. The budget of the organization dedicated to engaging the Chinese abroad and interfering in other countries' internal affairs, which is done by the UFWD, is now bigger than their entire department of foreign affairs. The budget of an organization dedicated to foreign interference is now larger than the entire overt diplomatic work that the PRC is engaging in. It gives you a sense of how important this is. I will say very quickly that this is why the President of China, Xi Jinping, calls the UFWD one of its “magic weapons”.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Then it is not beyond reasonable to think that undermining democratic systems and democratic institutions could be a primary purpose of the UFWD.

[David Vigneault]

In terms of the foreign interference writ large carried out by the PRC and, as we have seen, by Russia, disinformation is one of the very specific tools being used. That is why, as an intelligence service, we have very rigorous processes to ingest information, challenge that information, validate it and assess it. That's how intelligence is then put together in the end.

I would invite everybody to be mindful of the fact that some of the information that may be in the public domain could be accurate and could be information that is part of that process, but it's still part of an evaluation and assessment process. This is why we are very concerned when we see this in the public domain, because you need to ensure experts are also able to assess the specific information.

[Greg Fergus, Liberal, Hull—Aylmer, QC]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Ms. Normandin, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Vigneault, I understand that you are not going to deny or confirm the information that was given to the Globe and Mail, but we still have information that officers from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, leaked information, perhaps out of dissatisfaction with the way the Prime Minister's Office handled this information.

We have a Prime Minister who is reputed to have brushed aside a recommendation to withdraw a candidate. We have a Prime Minister who almost says that those who suggest that a candidate might be on the payroll of the Chinese Communist Party are racists. This may give the impression that there is tension between the Prime Minister's Office and CSIS.

I would like to hear from you about the state of relations between your agency and the Prime Minister's Office: are they good?

[David Vigneault]

Thank you for this question, which has several parts.

I would quickly reiterate that CSIS is currently conducting an investigation with its partners into the source of this information, for the reasons I gave earlier. I repeat that the service operates within a democracy. So it's very clear that people have to be given the right to speak out, and there are ways to speak out. As I said in my reply to you earlier, there are ways for people to express their dissatisfaction.

With respect to the relationship with the Prime Minister's Office in general, our work is very clear. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act says that our job is to conduct investigations and inform the government. We have all the necessary means to do that job. I can say that the communication channels for CSIS to pass on all the required information are there, and they are open.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

I want to quickly touch on another topic, because I don't have much time left to speak.

Would a public registry of agents acting on behalf of countries that may be interfering be an interesting tool for CSIS?

[David Vigneault]

Yes. I had the opportunity to testify before another parliamentary committee with Minister Mendicino a few weeks ago. In response to that same question, I said I believed it was an important tool.

CSIS has been doing this for several years. We talk publicly about foreign interference. Every possible tool, including a registry, would be helpful. I just want people to understand that this tool would not solve all the problems, but I think it would allow for more transparency.