Procedure and House Affairs Committee on March 2nd, 2023

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for being with us today and for providing the information they are able to provide. I understand full well that, given security issues, we can't publicly discuss things that we do not have clearance for.

My first question is for Monsieur Vigneault. I'd like to know a bit about the tools that CSIS has for disrupting foreign interference. The Rosenberg report that was released this week says that one of the options CSIS has is to engage with diplomats who may try to interfere in our elections. If a foreign official were trying to interfere in our election, does CSIS have the tools in its mandate to address that?

[David Vigneault]

The CSIS Act provides a number of tools for CSIS to investigate foreign interference activities, including when it comes to diplomats posted here in Canada. As an intelligence service, our professionals are looking at the best way possible to get intelligence, using all the techniques that are available to it. When we do face questions or situations where there's a specific threat activity, we also use, have used and will continue to use our threat reduction measures mandate to engage in those activities.

We will often work with partners; we will not work in isolation. These issues are very complex, and you do not want to take an action and have unintended consequences, so we work in partnerships. In this case, when it comes to diplomats, we'd likely be working with Global Affairs Canada, GAC, to do so.

I can assure the committee, as I said in my opening remarks, that CSIS and our partners at this table take any allegations of foreign interference extremely seriously. We investigate these allegations, and we use all the tools at our disposal to try to better understand and characterize these activities and reduce the threat where possible.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Thank you very much.

CSIS has the ability to share information with the RCMP for it to launch an investigation. Is that correct?

[David Vigneault]

Yes. Actually, over the years since the inception of CSIS in 1984, we have developed, between CSIS and the RCMP, very elaborate processes to share information. I think the committee has heard some of the challenges that exist in using intelligence and passing it on to law enforcement agencies or investigative bodies. Intelligence is not a question of evidence, so the RCMP in a specific case needs to determine how to use the information and further its own investigation.

It is a complex process. The two organizations, working with the Department of Justice, continue to work on this issue. The notion of using intelligence to pursue law enforcement matters continues to be a challenge on which a number of organizations are actively working, but we do have robust processes with the RCMP and with other law enforcement and investigative bodies to do such an exchange.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Mr. Vigneault, I'm sure you're aware that yesterday the deputy minister of public safety confirmed that there are no investigations under way looking into allegations of foreign interference from the last election. Based on your previous response that information is shared, what they have in front of them is that they do not have any active investigations.

I'd like to talk a bit about the briefings next. You mentioned that you do participate in briefings of the panel. Do you personally do that briefing, or does somebody else on your team do it or do it along with you?

[David Vigneault]

Normally I'm the one who would be doing these briefings. There may have been one or two that my colleague, the deputy director of operations, may have undertaken, but normally it would be me briefing the panel directly.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

From what I understand, based on those briefings, there have been no incidents of interference that have threatened the integrity of the election. Is that correct?

[David Vigneault]

It's indeed the conclusion that the panel has taken.

They received a lot of information, a lot of briefings. I can tell you, having been part of the discussions, that the panel challenged us on our information to get a better understanding. The panel members wanted to better understand what we had, and it was a very robust exchange.

The panel came to the conclusion in 2019 and for the election in 2021 that, indeed, the information did not reach that threshold. Based on my information and my experience, for what it's worth, I would say that I concur with that conclusion.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

That's perfect.

I have only about 30 seconds left. You mentioned that you cannot comment on media reports that may or may not have come from CSIS and on leaks and so on. As you probably know, my son is an intelligence officer in the Canadian Armed Forces, and I take the issue of security and national security extremely seriously.

Could you explain quickly what a leak could mean to the intelligence sharing of the Five Eyes and what would happen if we were to have leaks of top secret information?

[David Vigneault]

Very quickly, I would say that the bread and butter of an intelligence organization is the ability to collect secrets, keep secrets and use those secrets with the appropriate people. When that ability is threatened, it undermines the confidence of our partners domestically and internationally. This is something we take very seriously, and I would say it's also about the ability to protect our people and our sources, people who put their lives at risk to protect Canada.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

Would you say that—

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you. I'm sorry. You're out of time.

[Sherry Romanado, Liberal, Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC]

—letting information like this out would put our members of the Canadian Armed Forces at risk?

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

If you can give a quick answer, I would take it.

[David Vigneault]

For any information that is disclosed in an unauthorized way, you do not know the consequences. You cannot foresee the consequences down the road, so I think it's a very serious matter—

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you. I have to end your time there. I'd just like to keep it tight.

Ms. Normandin, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I thank the witnesses for joining us.

You just mentioned the hypothesis that leaks at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, led to the Global News article. If so, these leaks would be subject to very severe penalties. On the other hand, this raises the possibility that the people who potentially leaked that information were dissatisfied with the way certain information within CSIS was handled and taken seriously by the government.

I wonder if it is possible to determine whether there was any internal conflict in the way interference issues were handled. Did it create tensions within CSIS?

[David Vigneault]

Madam Chair, in an intelligence agency where professionals like ours work, there are always points of view. I can tell you that the discussions are very serious.

On the other hand, I would like to reassure the committee that the issues specifically related to interference are among the most important issues we discuss. That is something my colleague the director of operations and I discuss very seriously with all of our people. I don't think there's a problem in that respect.

I should also say that there are measures within CSIS for people to raise issues in a structured way if they are not satisfied. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency also has a complaint process specifically designed to deal with classified information. There are forums for people to raise these issues.

Concerning the possibility of tension about this within the service, I have to tell you that it is not an issue of concern.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

I would like to come back to the issue of the donations that were made to the Pierre Elliott Trudeau Foundation. When the Chinese Communist Party sends money, we can assume it is not written on the back of the check that it is an attempt to interfere.

I would like to know who has the final say in determining whether an action is indeed an attempt to interfere. Is it CSIS, or are there other entities that may have a say in qualifying the action taken?

[David Vigneault]

This is an important and rather complex issue. The specific case that you raise, to my knowledge, involves an independent foundation that is not part of the government apparatus. So it's not something that would be of direct concern to CSIS.

That said, if we learned that a foreign entity was interfering through various means and targeting people inside or outside of government, we would have the authority to investigate that directly.

To answer the question more specifically, CSIS does not necessarily have the final say. Indeed, depending on the scenario, other agencies and organizations may be involved. However, in my experience, these issues are discussed with CSIS, which always has a say.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Vigneault, in your opening remarks, you mentioned that, where appropriate, one of the roles of CSIS is to take action to reduce the threat.

Can you tell us who decides when it is appropriate? Can anyone else have a say in when it is appropriate to take action to counter interference?

[David Vigneault]

If I recall correctly, it was through legislative changes in 2018 that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was given the authority to take action to mitigate threats. This is evolving, and ministerial guidance frames how the service can use this power.

As I mentioned earlier, we don't generally work in a vacuum. We work with partners to fully understand the context in which such actions are taken and their potential impact. It's about making sure that we're taking the most specific action possible to mitigate those threats, but without creating additional problems. It would therefore be rare for the service to take such action without consulting its partners. That said, this is ultimately within the powers vested in the director of the service.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

During the previous hour, we welcomed the Chief Electoral Officer and the Commissioner of Canada Elections. While there seems to be a lot of information sharing between the two, there doesn't seem to be a truly strong apparatus that can take concrete action in the event of interference in the context of an election.

I'd like to hear your views on election interference, since the Prime Minister seems to have brushed aside the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's recommendation to withdraw a candidate. More to the point, is there a strong arm that can take concrete action to prevent threats?

[David Vigneault]

In my opening remarks, I mentioned the complexity of foreign interference. I think the committee is now seeing what we have noticed over the last few years, which is that the nature of foreign interference is changing and is becoming more sophisticated. Some countries, some actors, are not doing today what they did 10 years ago, because they have learned. They understand how we work. They understand the powers we have and what we can do. So there is a need to protect some information to prevent these actors from adapting to our measures.

In this case, I would say that the powers of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the commissioner are all complementary. Is there a way to improve the toolbox? That's one of the things we're definitely going to look at, and hopefully get some recommendations from this committee on that. People are working very well together, but, as with any issue, there is obviously room for improvement.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.