Procedure and House Affairs Committee on March 2nd, 2023

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you.

Go ahead, Mr. Julian.

[Peter Julian, NDP, New Westminster—Burnaby, BC]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Thank you very much to our witnesses.

Monsieur Vigneault, I was tempted to ask the same question I asked yesterday about the articles by Robert Fife and Steven Chase in The Globe and Mail and by Sam Cooper at Global News and wondered if you could acknowledge if they were factual articles. I don't believe you are willing to do that. However, I do want to ask whether the concerns around multiple Liberal and Conservative candidates being involved in this and potentially being favoured by Beijing is something you can confirm. Were there multiple Liberal and Conservative candidates who were of concern?

[David Vigneault]

I think the member has had a preview of my answer. I will not be able to speak specifically about who may or may not have been the subject of interference.

What I can say, and what we have said publicly many times over the last number of years, is that the actors who are engaged in foreign interference against Canadians do so at all levels of government—at the federal, provincial and municipal levels—and they are doing it across party lines. The goal here for the country organizations that want to interfere is to favour their own interests. Therefore, whatever way they decide or determine that those interests will be pursued most effectively, they will engage. That's why we have seen foreign interference across party lines and across different levels of government.

[Peter Julian, NDP, New Westminster—Burnaby, BC]

Following up on Madam Romanado's question around foreign diplomats, when we have a case of a foreign diplomat who is involved in potentially provoking violations of our laws—in this case the Canada Elections Act—what steps can CSIS take in the case of that diplomat? What is open to the Canadian government as well?

[David Vigneault]

I'll structure my answer in two ways.

The first is what CSIS can do. We would investigate the information using all techniques to find out as much as possible about the interference of diplomats based in Canada. When we have that information, the service has the option of taking direct measures using our threat reduction mandate. In the case of a foreign diplomat, I do not foresee a scenario in which we would not engage GAC. Global Affairs Canada is the authority in Canada for ensuring the enforcement of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. They interact on a day-to-day basis with foreign diplomats. At that point, there are different tools at the disposal of the government through Global Affairs Canada to enforce the Vienna convention, up to and including declaring someone persona non grata from the country.

[Peter Julian, NDP, New Westminster—Burnaby, BC]

Thank you. That responds to my question.

You said something a few minutes ago that disturbed me. You said, “Intelligence is not a question of evidence”, making the distinction between intelligence you receive and evidence that the RCMP or the commissioner of elections can act on.

My question is this. How do you validate intelligence in that case, then, to ensure that you're moving from intelligence to actual evidence that is actionable?

[Michelle Tessier, Deputy Director, Operations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you for the question. I'll respond if that's okay.

We constantly work with our partners in law enforcement, as the director mentioned, and with the commissioner of Canada elections. We share that information and have those discussions. They are really the ultimate authority to know what could be of use to them.

The challenge for us, and the challenge in the system currently, is that we need to be able to protect our methods of operation. We need to be able to protect our human and technical sources and our employees. That sometimes poses challenges, as mentioned by the panel yesterday, in terms of converting intelligence into evidence. The decision over whether to use that information could belong to the public prosecutor's office and could belong, of course, to RCMP colleagues.

Perhaps I'll turn to my RCMP colleague to see if there's anything he wants to add from his perspective in terms of sharing information. I can say that it is a very close partnership. There are ongoing discussions, and we work quite closely with all agencies involved in trying to action that information.

[Peter Julian, NDP, New Westminster—Burnaby, BC]

Okay.

I'll move on to my next question, which is about diasporas.

You talked about measures to reduce the threat of foreign interference. What measures are you taking in relation to the Chinese, Russian and Iranian diasporas, among others?

[David Vigneault]

That is a very good question. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, this is something that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service focuses on a great deal.

Members of ethnocultural communities in Canada are often caught in this vice. These are the people who are the victims, the people who are pressured to practise this foreign interference.

To answer the question in a very concrete way, over the past year we have published a report on foreign interference, a guide in different Chinese dialects, Persian and Russian, to talk to members of these communities about foreign interference and to explain what they can do.

This is a very important issue that must be talked about publicly. We need to continue to do that. We encourage people to contact us, so that we can see what more we can do.

[The Chair, Liberal, Bardish Chagger]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Dancho, we will continue with you for five minutes. You have the floor.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being with us today.

The specific allegations reported in The Globe and Mail from CSIS documents note that Beijing was responsible for illegal cash donations, tax receipts and hiring campaign workers using illegal methods, as well as disinformation campaigns in the 2021 election. This information from CSIS would have been shared with our Five Eyes intelligence allies. Is that correct?

[David Vigneault]

As I mentioned earlier, I am not in a position to comment specifically on these allegations and on this information. What I can say, however, is that CSIS and our intelligence partners do indeed share information extensively with international partners. Foreign interference, among other threats, is a threat shared by many countries.

The PRC specifically and other countries are engaging in foreign interference in other countries. One of the advantages we have is the co-operation of a number of countries not only among the Five Eyes but more broadly in western Europe, in Asia and in the Middle East. We work very closely with these partners to share information, and that is one way to protect Canadians. They benefit from the enriched picture here.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

It was also reported that a consul general of Beijing took credit for the defeat of a Conservative MP in the 2021 election. Is that correct?

[David Vigneault]

I will unfortunately have to reiterate my answer. I cannot specifically confirm in this current setting some of the information in the public domain.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

This has been asked, but I'll ask it again. Was the Prime Minister briefed on any of this information, and if so, when would that have been? What would have been the dates?

[David Vigneault]

As I said in answer to your previous question, we endeavour to provide information, working with PCO, to this committee on what has been briefed and would have been briefed, but I'm not in a position to specifically answer the question.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Vigneault. I appreciate your service to this country, but I am surprised. Of course you were all aware that you were coming to this committee today, and I'm sure you all take very detailed notes in your calendars. I'm a bit surprised that that information is not readily available to committee members, since I'm sure you anticipated the questions on when the Prime Minister would or would not have been briefed by you or by others in CSIS. I would appreciate your providing that in short order to the committee. Thank you.

For the RCMP, has CSIS shared with you any of the information regarding election interference?

[Deputy Commissioner Michael Duheme, Deputy Commissioner, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police]

Any information would have been shared through the SITE committee. If it fell into the criminal space, the RCMP would investigate.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

You are not investigating. Is that correct?

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

We are not investigating any elements from the 2019 and 2021 elections. We did not receive any actionable intelligence that would warrant our initiating a criminal investigation.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

So no charges have been laid against anyone concerning any election interference. Is that correct?

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

No charges have been laid.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

No charges have been laid concerning the Beijing police stations illegally operating in Canada for the purpose of terrorizing Chinese Canadians. No charges have been laid in that regard either.

[D/Commr Michael Duheme]

No, but the RCMP has taken overt action at four specific sites, where we were present in uniform with marked vehicles, to demonstrate to the community that we're taking this seriously, and we've had a positive impact through the actions we have taken.

[Raquel Dancho, Conservative, Kildonan—St. Paul, MB]

With respect to that positive impact in particular, does that mean the operations out of those illegal Beijing police stations have ceased?