Thank you, Madam Chair.
I've been listening very intently to the debate on this amendment. I have a number of reflections to share. I think my colleagues have brought up some really important points.
We've heard from quite a number of witnesses that we're talking about highly sensitive intelligence information and data that go through a process of accumulation, validation and assessment. I think we've heard that it can be injurious to national security if it's disclosed. I share Ms. Romanado's position on the original motion and the amendment. The amendment keeps this section that relates to including documents that are related to national security, and I think that's problematic for a lot of reasons.
The other thing that strikes me about the public inquiry in general is that in my understanding, they take quite a long time on average. I don't know if members are comfortable with a two- to three-year process of some kind. That seems to be, in my understanding, what the standard is.
I know that recently there was an article by Wesley Wark, who recommended—in opposition to some others, who have called for a public inquiry—that it's not the best option. One reason is that it's quite lengthy. I think the other is that it encounters and runs into many of the same problems that PROC does, or other parliamentary committees do, in dealing with these highly sensitive and classified documents.
We've heard from every witness with expertise in this area that yes, we want to promote national security literacy and have more of the public be aware of the very real national security threats, which we all take seriously, but we can't do it in an irresponsible manner. We have to take these concerns about real threats and dangers in flippantly disclosing that information very seriously.
I certainly take them seriously. I think they can threaten relations with our international partners. I think they can cause harm to come to agents and others who are involved in the agencies that protect us every day. I wouldn't want to see any harm come to those individuals.
I would also say, based on my assessment of the amendment, that there seems to be quite a narrowing of what Mr. Julian had proposed. Beijing is not the only threat to our elections. We've heard that foreign interference is coming from a number of other countries. I know that our security agencies have specifically referenced, as I believe Mr. Rosenberg did in his report, Russia and Iran. I think there was some indication today with the CSIS director that there are others. If we're going to do something like this—which is important work—then there's no doubt we have to understand these threats.
Based on the facts in Mr. Rosenberg's report of all of the initiatives and things that the government has implemented since about 2018, I think our government has demonstrated very clearly that they have built up a robust ecosystem that approaches foreign election interference in a whole-of-government approach. I just don't think focusing on one set of allegations that have come through the media.... I think we've heard today that CSIS can neither confirm nor deny whether those are coming from CSIS or not.
I think it would do a disservice to the overall topic for us to narrow the scope down to focusing on one country, even though I recognize that all of our security agencies are resoundingly in agreement that Beijing presents the greatest threat. That doesn't mean that we shouldn't be preparing ourselves for others and understanding what those very real threats are.
I don't think I would support.... I'm sort of mulling this over as I read through it, but there are other aspects of this amendment that Mr. Cooper has put forward that I think narrow the scope significantly from what Mr. Julian proposed, and I'm not quite all that comfortable with them.
Referring to just the 2019 and 2021 federal elections seems to be a narrowing of the scope as well. Although Mr. Julian's original motion has reference to those two elections, it seems that it has a breadth that would include other elections as well. I think we ought to consider a timeline that goes back a little bit further than just the last two elections, although I can say with full confidence that the last two elections have had processes and many structures and mechanisms in place to protect against foreign interference. I think that this information is very clearly laid out in Morris Rosenberg's recent report, and I have an overview of it that I would like to share. Maybe I'll save that for a little bit later, but I think there's quite a lot of evidence, and I referenced this in my question to Mr. Morrison when he came before our committee today. Those are some of my comments.
There is another thing I wanted to say. I think we had this come up in our debate last night, and I find it a bit troubling. The very last section in the amendment suggests that there are numerous committees studying this topic. I think Mr. Fergus spoke to this quite eloquently, as he always does. I notice that in Mr. Cooper's amendment, what is added here at the end is that this inquiry does not impede or stop the committee's study on foreign election interference, including the production of documents and the calling of witnesses. I'm assuming that's referring to this committee. Now in this motion we want to set up another body, in a sense, or a public inquiry, and then still study it in this committee. We have numerous other committees studying this topic as well, so is Mr. Cooper's intention to have every committee in the House of Commons study this topic, or would a public inquiry, if we were to support that, which I've obviously suggested I'm not convinced is the way to go...?
The fact that these things are stuck in there made no sense to me. They're contradictory to having a more comprehensive public inquiry that would really do justice to this topic. I thought that was the initial intention of Mr. Julian at least, so that's a significant deviation as well.
For all of those reasons, I'm struggling to feel supportive of this particular amendment, although I'm considering all the arguments and points that are made by my colleagues. This is an important topic, so whatever we decide as a committee, I hope we get it right. I hope that we don't end up embroiled in these partisan quarrels and games that we seem to be playing—at least today, from what I'm seeing—and that we take this matter really seriously and take a comprehensive approach to this important topic. I hope we can find a way forward.
One other thing I wanted to bring up that I neglected to cover in my remarks just a minute ago is that I think there was, at least from the article that Wesley Wark produced.... Maybe I'll quote him instead of paraphrasing. He says:
Judicial inquiries are meant to be fact-finding exercises. The “facts” in the case of Chinese election interference are thin on the ground, subject to media interpretation, and political brinkmanship.
That's a direct quote.
For me, if a judicial inquiry is trying to find the facts—and we've heard from our intelligence experts that it actually takes expertise to interpret intelligence—are we certain that the fact-finding exercise of a public inquiry would actually be the right approach? Certainly it would depend upon who leads that process and whether they have the expertise, but from what Wesley Wark has said, he at least feels that the facts are slightly thin on the ground.
Maybe I'll wrap up there for now, but I certainly think the debate will continue. I hope we'll find some path forward that we can reach consensus on soon.
Thank you.