Evidence of meeting #56 for Procedure and House Affairs in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was interference.
A video is available from Parliament.
Liberal
Mark Gerretsen Liberal Kingston and the Islands, ON
Thank you.
Madam Chair, I won't direct this comment to the witnesses, because they do an incredible job of being non-partisan. I would just say, in conclusion, that perhaps it would be beneficial for us to reflect on the fact that the Conservatives voted against Bill C-76 when it came before the House of Commons and gave those powers to the commissioner to be able to do this incredible work on our behalf today.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger
Thank you. That was very appreciated.
On behalf of PROC committee members, I would like to thank both of you for your time today. I will echo the comments of members and thank you and your teams for the service you provide.
With that, we wish you a good day. If there is any information outstanding that you would like to provide the committee or need to provide, please share it with the clerk. We'll make sure all members have it.
With that, committee members, we will suspend and really quickly switch over to the next panel so that we can continue with this exciting day.
Thank you.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger
Good morning, everyone.
I would like to welcome our witnesses from the second panel.
From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have David Vigneault, director, and Michelle Tessier, deputy director of operations.
We also have Caroline Xavier, chief of the Communications Security Establishment.
Finally, we have Michael Duheme, deputy commissioner of federal policing for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
We're going to be together until noon, but we may need a little more time.
I understand that Mr. Vigneault will be making the opening remarks for CSIS.
David Vigneault Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Members of the committee, thank you very much for welcoming us this morning.
I would like to thank you for inviting CSIS and our colleagues to appear on foreign interference threats to Canada's democratic institutions.
CSIS continues to view hostile activities by foreign-state actors as the most significant threat to Canada's national security community. Foreign interference, in our democratic institutions in particular, undermines Canadian society. Foreign-state actors who engage in these deceptive, covert and hostile activities seek to weaken trust in our fundamental institutions and processes, threaten communities, sow division and, ultimately, influence policy.
As a CSIS official recently told this committee, foreign interference can take multiple forms. For instance, threat actors may aggressively threaten or coerce their targets into acting in a certain way. This is unfortunately a common activity impacting Canada's diverse communities and can involve threats to them or their family outside Canada.
Threat actors may also cultivate relationships with targets to manipulate them into providing favours and valuable information, or may conduct corrupt or illicit financing activities. It is also important to note that threat actors may use others as proxies to conduct these activities on their behalf.
These are just a few of the techniques that foreign state-actors employ to influence public discourse, the behaviour of individual Canadians and even our democratic processes to their advantage.
We have also observed them deploy cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns and espionage to these ends. Foreign interference is therefore a complex and enduring threat to Canada's sovereignty. I can assure you that CSIS takes all allegations of foreign interference very seriously and uses its authority under the CSIS Act to investigate, provide advice to government and, where appropriate, take measures to reduce the threat. Building resilience to foreign interference is one way to mitigate its corrosive effects.
CSIS has spoken publicly in a variety of forums to warn Canadians about these threats and techniques and to inform them of ways they can protect themselves. We have also provided defensive briefings to elected officials from all orders of government across Canada. Perhaps most central to these efforts is our engagement with Canadian communities. We have been clear that the principal threat to Canada comes from the People's Republic of China but, to be clear, the threat comes not from the Chinese people but rather from the Chinese Communist Party and the Government of China. Indeed, we are keenly aware that Chinese communities are often the primary victims of PRC foreign interference efforts in Canada.
Therefore, we continue to invest significant efforts in building relationships with individuals, communities and community leaders to establish and sustain trust, and to offer our support and partnership in their protection. Furthermore, these efforts are not limited to Chinese-Canadian communities.
I would like to conclude by stating that CSIS takes allegations of unauthorized release of classified information very seriously. Compromises of this kind can reveal sensitive sources, methodologies and techniques to Canada's adversaries. They are listening. This can subsequently threaten the integrity of our operations and even the physical safety and security of human sources and employees. Ultimately such releases can hinder our ability to protect Canadians. Therefore, I would like to remind the committee that, just as with other recent appearances in front of PROC and other committees here, we are limited in what we can say in an unclassified setting. CSIS cannot publicly comment and in fact is prohibited from publicly commenting on operational matters and classified information in order to protect the safety and security of Canadians. Nonetheless, I welcome this opportunity for a frank and transparent discussion, to the extent possible, on the foreign interference threats that Canada faces.
We'd be happy to answer your questions.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Bardish Chagger
Thank you so much, Mr. Vigneault.
We will start with our six-minute rounds.
We will start with Mr. Cooper, followed by Mrs. Romanado.
It will then be Ms. Normandin's turn.
I would remind everyone that comments should go through the chair, and there should be one voice being heard at a time.
Mr. Cooper, you have six minutes.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Thank you to the witnesses.
I would like to just express and associate myself with the remarks of Mr. Vigneault in saying that the interference we see and the threat posed by the Beijing communist party has nothing to do with Chinese Canadians, who are victims of the regime and its interference activities. It's very important that we keep that in mind at all times during our deliberations on this matter.
Mr. Vigneault, how many times did CSIS brief the Prime Minister regarding Beijing's interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I have been the director of CSIS since 2017. I have had many opportunities to brief the Prime Minister, cabinet and different ministers on the subject of national security, including specifically on foreign interference. I would not have a specific breakdown of the number of times since 2017, but this has been a topic of ongoing briefings.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Will you undertake to provide the committee with a list of all the dates when CSIS briefed the Prime Minister in regard to interference activities by Beijing related to the 2019 and 2021 elections?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I understand that the national security intelligence adviser was asked a similar request yesterday. My reaction to this would probably be to work with the Privy Council Office to have a consolidated response to the committee.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Will you also undertake to do the same with respect to a list of all the dates that CSIS briefed any minister, PMO staff, ministers' office staff or security-cleared Liberal Party staff related to Beijing's interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I think, as just mentioned, we will endeavour to collect as much of that information as possible and, barring any specific national security considerations, we will endeavour to provide as much as possible to the committee.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Consistent with or in addition to that, will you undertake to provide a list of all individuals who were present at these briefings to the degree that this is possible?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I will probably have to defer.... To the extent to which we know, we will provide the information, barring any other national security considerations.
We'll probably have to also rely on the Privy Council Office for some of the attendants of these briefings. That consolidated piece will, hopefully, answer many of these questions.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Thank you very much.
On February 24, 2023, Sam Cooper of Global News reported that three weeks before the 2019 election, CSIS officials gave an urgent briefing to senior aides in the Prime Minister's Office warning them that a Liberal candidate, who is a sitting Liberal MP, had received assistance from Beijing's Toronto consulate in his nomination campaign.
What are the names of the PMO aides who were briefed?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
As I just indicated, we'll have to review the list and the dates of such briefings.
It is important to remind this committee that I do not take the premise of the question at face value. I need to be able to provide information respecting the proper classification of the information. The spirit of that question will be answered through the consolidated response.
Conservative
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
I mean specifically in relation to the 2019 circumstances surrounding a Liberal candidate and Beijing's consulate in Toronto assisting him in his nomination campaign.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
On that question, I think it's important to put it in context. The information that is in the public domain may or may not be coming from the service or from other agencies.
Information has indeed been reported by media. It is not because the information is in the media that I'm at liberty to confirm or deny the specific nature of classified information. Along these lines, I will not be able to provide a specific answer to that allegation.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
I understand that you're not able to provide a specific answer at this time. Again, would you undertake to go back and provide this committee with any date or dates that the Prime Minister was briefed on this matter?
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
I will be able to provide a consolidated response from the PCO of dates when the subject of foreign interference was discussed. However, I am not at liberty to disclose information, directly or indirectly, that would provide classified information in a public setting. There will be a limit to the specificity of the topic discussed, but as I said, it is important that people understand that foreign interference was indeed briefed on regularly.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
The same would apply to Liberal Party staff or other officials who may have been briefed. If you could, please undertake that, if they were briefed, and come back to this committee, having regard for what you previously said unless it doesn't apply in that case.
Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service
In the spirit of these hearings, we will absolutely endeavour to provide the most consolidated and thorough response possible to the committee.
Liberal