Mr. Chair, and ladies and gentlemen of the committee, let me start by thanking you for the invitation to discuss the modernization of the Official Languages Act with you. It is an honour and a privilege for me to be here with you today.
My name is Stéphanie Chouinard. I have been an Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston since 2017 and, since 2018, at Queen's University where I teach political science in both official languages.
The Royal Military College in Kingston and the one in Saint-Jean—I am not forgetting you, Mr. Rioux—are the only postsecondary institutions in the country that are subject to the Official Languages Act. This means that implementing the act is part of my daily life and I can see the successes, the occasional difficulties, and perhaps even certain failures in my place of work.
Nevertheless, the goal of my remarks today will not be to talk to you about the sometimes difficult relationship between the Canadian Armed Forces and their linguistic obligations. Rather, I will be talking to you about the way in which my research expertise can shed light on the possible reworking of the Official Languages Act.
My research expertise is in the relationship between the law and the minorities. I am a political scientist who specializes in language right, which is not as strange as it seems at first sight. I am basically interested in the impacts of language rights, both clear and hidden, from a sociopolitical perspective.
The major question that has guided my research in recent years is this: to what extent has the judicial system shown itself to be up to the task, or not up to it, of responding to complaints from minorities, especially the country's language minorities? What have been not only the advances, but also the limitations, of those language rights, including the Official Languages Act, in addressing the claims of Canadians who belong to official language minority communities?
In that context, I have studied the case law on language rights in Canada in depth, as well as its effect on public policy. One of my principal observations is that we are beginning to reach the end of the logical interpretation of the Canadian language rights system. That goes for the Official Languages Act as well as for sections 16 to 23 of the Charter.
Those legislative texts and the interpretations of them that judges have provided, as liberal and generous as they have been, no longer respond to the aspirations of the official language minorities in the country. Those aspirations not only include a request for autonomy and empowerment at community level, but also a profound desire to participate in the life of the state. While official language minority communities, especially francophone ones, have resolutely turned to the courts for justice in recent years, the Official Languages Act and the way the Federal Court interprets it have simply not met their expectations.
One of the reasons is certainly, as the Gascon decision has highlighted, the problem of the effective implementation of the Act, especially with regard to Part VII. Other reasons, in my view, are first, the notorious reluctance of the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages to go to court since Parliament gave it the power to do so in 1988, and second, that the mandate to hear those cases rests with the Federal Court.
I would therefore like to urge a revision of the mandate of the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, and the creation of an administrative tribunal tasked with hearing cases involving allegations that the act has not been complied with.
As you probably know, the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages has always lacked enforcement power. When it was created in 1969, the commissioner's position was seen like that of an ombudsman, with primarily the power of persuasion, just like the rest of the act at the time, in fact.
The first version of the act had no legal recourse. Parliament partially remedied that shortcoming in 1988. Bill C-72 still provided the commissioner with no power to issue orders. This means that the results of an investigation showing non-compliance with the Official Languages Act could be ignored, but it did guarantee the executive nature of some parts of the act. This executive nature was enhanced in 2005 with Bill S-3, but, as we now know, it did not have the desired effect.
From 1988, the ombudsman role for the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages became intermingled with a policing role, to some degree, and the Federal Court acquired the job of punishing non-compliance with the act. Although, from then on, some provisions of the Official Languages Act could result in legal proceedings once a complaint was submitted to the commissioner's office, that possibility has always been considered one of last resort.
In 1988, D'Iberville Fortier, the commissioner at the time, seemed to be very reluctant to go to the court route, a discretionary power that was after all not clearly defined in the act, and this tradition has continued to this day. The cases that the Office of the Commissioner decided to take to court itself are few and far between. It prefers to seek intervener status in cases brought by individuals or civil society groups before the Federal Court.
However, as early as 1988, people spoke up not only to make the entire Official Languages Act enforceable, but also to call for an administrative tribunal for language rights. This was the case with the Fédération des francophones hors Québec, now the FCFA. The federation is still calling for such a tribunal, according to the bill it published a few weeks ago.
The reasons are quite simple. It would be easier for Canadians to access such a tribunal than to access the Federal Court. There would be more sanctions for direct violations of the act than decisions based on fundamental legal principles, which are more common in the Federal Court. In my opinion, such an amendment would give renewed meaning to the Official Languages Act, both for Canadians and for the political institutions that must comply with it. Some could finally obtain orders for non-compliance with the act, and others would finally have a tangible incentive to commit to respecting official languages. These incentives clearly seem to be lacking in the current system, which advocates a carrot and stick approach, as evidenced by the many naughty students found year after year in the Office of the Commissioner's investigation reports, some of which were mentioned earlier.
There is already a language regime in the world with a commissioner's office and a language administrative tribunal. It's in Wales. Both entities were created by the Welsh Language Measure, a law passed in Cardiff in 2011 to replace the Welsh Language Board. The board was established in 2012 and the tribunal was established in 2015. I know that Commissioner Meri Huws was invited to testify before this committee a few days ago. I hope I am not breaking parliamentary decorum. We can mention a person who's not in the room, right?
Ms. Huws testified before you at the end of March. You specifically discussed the difference between her role and that of the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada, and the place of the language tribunal in Cardiff. I don't know whether the meeting with her gave you an idea, but I would like to invite you to take that model as a counter-example. The role of the Welsh Language Commissioner is both to investigate and to punish. Commissioner Huws is both judge and jury when she has to investigate complaints from the public.
The tribunal, on the other hand, has the role of hearing appeals against the Office of the Commissioner's decisions. Individuals or companies sanctioned by the commissioner for non-compliance with the status of the Welsh language can therefore appeal its decisions to the tribunal. In other words, the tribunal is not responsible for ensuring that violations of the Welsh Language Measure are punished, but rather for monitoring the actions of the office that is responsible for the punishment.
I would urge you not to emulate that example. Not only does it duplicate the role of the commissioner, a duplication that is already causing difficulties in Canada at this time, as we have seen over the past 30 years. It has also fostered conflict among parts of Welsh civil society towards the position of commissioner by implying, through the creation of the tribunal, that oversight of the office is necessary to avoid excesses. No officer of the Parliament of Canada is overseen in this way.
I think the Wales experience indicates that it would be wiser to let a tribunal, an entity considered neutral from the point of view of official languages, order sanctions following investigations by the Office of the Commissioner. As a result, the Commissioner of Official Languages of Canada would retain his role as ombudsman and investigator, and the punitive role would be assigned to the administrative tribunal set up to hear cases dealing with the various parts of the Official Languages Act that are binding. The Federal Court could certainly be given a role as a court of appeal for decisions of the administrative tribunal.
It goes without saying that the Office of the Commissioner's mandate should also be revised to specify when the Commissioner of Official Languages should take legal action and submit evidence in court, rather than leaving the decision to the discretion of the commissioner. A review of the Official Languages Act could therefore give new impetus to the Office of the Commissioner in its promotion and investigation roles, and impose a presence before the courts to ensure that its evidence and diverse knowledge of official languages, particularly with respect to recurring complaints and systemic problems, are useful to the proposed tribunal.
Thank you very much. I will give the floor to my colleague, Mr. Jedwab.