Justice Committee on Dec. 9th, 2025

[Andrew Lawton, Conservative, Elgin—St. Thomas—London South, ON]

Thank you.

We have raised in the course of our study of Bill C-9—a study that has been, sadly, shortchanged because of Liberal obstruction—that there are grave concerns with a number of sections of this bill, like how they will affect civil liberties and, in some cases, the very communities that the Liberal government claims it will protect.

There have been several concerns raised specifically about the section on hate symbols, and we will be discussing those more thoroughly when we get to the clause at hand. However, if we as a committee and as a Parliament are to enumerate hate symbols—symbols that have vile meaning, that carry a death toll and that often bring up a lot of trauma for various communities—we need to be thorough with it.

I am proposing the following amendment. I ask that Bill C-9, in clause 4, be amended by adding, after line 3 on page 2, the following:

(b.1) the communist symbol known as the hammer and sickle; or

I also ask to replace line 5 on page 2 with the following:

scribed in paragraph (a), (b) or (b.1) that it is likely to be

In layman's terms, this is adding the hammer and sickle, the Communist insignia, to the list of hate symbols. Communism has a death toll of 100 million people around the world. People have died as a result of the dangerous and harmful ideology perpetrated by it. A number of concerns have been raised by people who have lived under Communist rule in Cuba and in eastern Europe, people who see this as an incredible evil that needs to be stamped out.

The Soviet Union, under Joseph Stalin, from the 1920s to the 1950s, saw some of the worst mass repression and mass killings in history—from the great purge to gulag or forced-labour camps, collectivization and the terror famine—with a death toll of up to 27 million.

In China, under Mao Zedong, the Communist Party carried out massive repression, causing the deaths of tens of millions through executions, labour camps and man-made famines.

Cambodia, under the Khmer Rouge, from 1975 to 1979, saw one of the worst episodes of mass killing in the history of the 20th century, with up to two million people killed. That's around 25% of Cambodia's population.

If we are to describe what hate symbols are in law, we need to acknowledge the death toll of the hammer and sickle, so I move this amendment for consideration and ask that it be added to the list.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you, Mr. Lawton.

Is there anybody else?

Mr. Baber.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

I have to give it to my friend, Mr. Lawton. As some committee members have heard by now, I was born in the Soviet Union. I lived in the Soviet Union until 1989. Frankly, when I look at the hammer and sickle, I'm scared.

I appreciate Mr. Housefather's previous amendment. I appreciate his sentiment, as we both come from the same community, with family members who were deeply affected by the Holocaust. However, I can tell you that my family has also been significantly affected by Communism. Frankly, I do not see much of a distinction between the two. The hammer and sickle represented collective oppression.

If I could, I'll summon my thoughts here, because this is definitely interesting.

I'm not sure if Mr. Lawton mentioned that it is estimated that, subsequent to the world war, more than 20 million Soviet citizens were murdered by the Communist regime. It wasn't just confined to Jews; it was everyday people: Ukrainians, intelligentsia, anyone who had any type of microphone, press members and educators.

I view it as a hate symbol. I believe that it is a hate symbol because it drives the extreme of collectivist ideology where the state says, “Not my way or the highway, but my way or murder.”

I hope that all of my friends around the table will support this amendment.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you, Mr. Baber.

Is there any other discussion on that point?

Shall CPC-6 carry?

(Amendment negatived: nays 5; yeas 4)

Next we have CPC-7.

Mr. Brock.

[Larry Brock, Conservative, Brantford—Brant South—Six Nations, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

The majority of us, if not all, at this committee are lawyers. We can all think back to first-year law when we took statutory interpretation. The overriding rationale that I remember so long ago—several decades ago—was to always seek clarity when drafting laws. It's no more important when it comes to the Criminal Code of Canada.

In my view, after almost two decades of prosecuting and about 14 years of defending, as the Criminal Code currently exists, there are so many areas that really require significant editing. What I bring to the table as a parliamentarian now is the ability to ensure that there are no grey areas when it comes to statute interpretation and that we strive to look at the Criminal Code in terms of what's black and white.

What exists right now in Bill C-9, specifically proposed paragraph (2.2)(c), is worded as follows:

(c) a symbol that so nearly resembles a symbol described in paragraph (a) or (b) that it is likely to be confused with that symbol.

I don't know what that means. It is so vague. There is no definition section as to what a like symbol would mean. What does “likely to be confused with” mean? Would that be an objective standard? Would that be a subjective standard?

In terms of the rationale for the amendment I seek, it's to seek precision and clarity. To remove that type of language would go a long way.

Thank you, Chair. That's my explanation.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you, Mr. Brock. More than anything, you just reminded me of how old I am.

Mr. Baber, it's over to you.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

I remember being taught overbreadth by a former Liberal cabinet minister, Mr. Bentley. He taught me first-year criminal law, and he made criminal law come to life—for me, at least. Of course, as the chair knows, I did not become a criminal attorney; nonetheless, I appreciate Mr. Brock's input.

I'm looking at the section. If we could please read it, I would ask my Liberal colleagues to look at proposed paragraph 319(2.2)(c), which is what Mr. Brock's amendment is targeting. It reads:

(c) a symbol that so nearly resembles a symbol described in paragraph (a) or (b) that it is likely to be confused with that symbol.

My point is very simple: If it can be confused, it should not be criminal.

I'd like to offer an example. Some folks might say that if you take out the language inside the Canadian Tire triangle, it might resemble a symbol used by the Hamas terrorist organization. It sometimes uses a triangle to indicate who the next target ought to be—god forbid. I would say that I could probably get around that, because that might be incitement to violence. Isn't that right, Mr. Housefather? Ironically, you could probably say the Hamas triangle is incitement to violence, but I don't want to watch a Christmas commercial for Canadian Tire thinking it might be confused with the Hamas triangle.

This amendment is being made in good faith to try to not be overbroad. Again, if it is likely to be confused with the actual symbol, the word “confused” is not only confusing; it should allow for some degree of latitude and not be criminal. Maybe we ought to think about some first principles, as former labour minister Mr. Bentley would probably say. We're talking about criminal conduct, and we should be very clear not to criminalize conduct unless it is clear that it's criminal conduct.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Thank you, Mr. Baber.

Mr. Housefather.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I appreciate that, and I appreciate the last two Conservative amendments, which I think have been made in very good faith.

On the first one, just to be clear, we had no testimony to the effect that the hammer and sickle should be included. There are a number of others, like the Ku Klux Klan symbol. I think this has to go through a thought process if we are to add other symbols, rather than just picking one and not another. That's why I voted against that amendment.

This one is much more compelling in terms of the discussion about it. My issue is that I think it is trying to achieve the opposite. Here's what I think it's trying to achieve. There's a terrorist group that has their symbol, and then, because they know the law has prohibited the display of the symbol, they themselves distort the symbol by one tiny iota so they can argue that it wasn't the symbol. The point of this section, I believe, is to capture that.

I would like to ask a question of the officials who are here. Presumably, this was drafted by the Department of Justice. Can you explain the intention of this section?

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Please go ahead.

[Marianne Breese, Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice]

Thank you for the question.

Yes, I can confirm that the intention is to capture symbols that are defined in proposed paragraphs (a) and (b). These are symbols principally used by or associated with a listed entity: the Nazi hakenkreuz or Nazi double sig-rune. If there's a slight modification—for example, if the flag of a terrorist entity has a different colour background—or if it's displayed for the purpose of promoting hatred against an identifiable group, we're not precluded from using that offence to prosecute.

It's really, on a technical basis, about not excluding symbols that wilfully promote hatred.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Can I ask another question?

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Sure. Then I'll give the floor to Mr. Brock.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Just to clarify, the goal of the way this is worded by our experts—presumably at the Department of Justice—is not to catch a different symbol that is not included in paragraphs (a) and (b), but to take only the symbols in (a) and (b) when there is a deliberate attempt to distort a symbol in order to avoid or circumvent the law by the person using the symbol. It is not to catch a symbol inadvertently. Is that correct?

[Marianne Breese]

That is correct. It is to capture slight variations or modifications where otherwise that symbol.... It presupposes the definition of the symbols in paragraphs (a) and (b). It doesn't create new symbols.

Is that helpful? Does that respond to the question?

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Yes. Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Are you done, Mr. Housefather?

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Yes, thank you. I got my answer.

[Larry Brock, Conservative, Brantford—Brant South—Six Nations, ON]

Thank you, Ms. Breese, for that explanation.

I don't know if it satisfies my concerns. I know Mr. Housefather is concerned, but given the way you responded to his latter question about the slight modification, did you ever give some consideration to using that language—a slight or some type of modification to an existing symbol? I think it's more specific and might assist me as a prosecutor in making an argument to a judge. If I were a judge, it may give me some comfort knowing that it's a different standard I'm applying by taking a look at the real symbol and taking a look at the closely resembled symbol to see whether there was a slight modification.

I think that language might be better than the language “that so nearly resembles”, which I think opens up such a grey area that, should there be a prosecution, I can see most cases being dismissed, even on the W.(D.) standard that judges would apply in this particular case. It would leave them with reasonable doubt, not understanding and not appreciating a subjective analysis on that type of symbol versus an objective analysis.

I'm wondering if you would be amendable to tightening up the language to make it a little more specific for prosecutors and to assist judges in adjudicating.

[Marianne Breese]

Thank you for the comments.

I believe that's really a policy decision and not something I can speak to.

With respect to the drafting of this provision, as you pointed out, the objective you spoke to—using the words “nearly resembles” in conjunction with “likely to be confused with”—is the guidance provided in this legislation to narrow down the types of symbols that would be captured. That was the policy intent and the legal effect of that provision.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Are you done, Mr. Brock?

[Larry Brock, Conservative, Brantford—Brant South—Six Nations, ON]

Yes.

[The Chair, Liberal, James Maloney]

Mr. Baber had his hand up as well.

[Roman Baber, Conservative, York Centre, ON]

First, to Mr. Housefather's point, I think the real issue here—and this is also for Ms. Breese—is the intent of the display. It might nearly resemble something and not be exactly right, especially if you draw it and if you're not good at that. It would be slightly off. However, if the intent is a terrorist symbol, as we prescribe in this section, then it would be caught and would be indeed criminal conduct. That's the point: You don't need to be concerned with the fact that someone made a slight alteration.

You could think of an ISIS flag, which is a very good example. There are many variations of it depending on where you're situated geographically. Some versions of the ISIS flag have more letters than others. At the same time, if you're a law enforcement professional, when you look at an ISIS flag, I would hope you know whether it's an ISIS flag or not.

I'm not concerned with not being precise, because it goes to intent, whereas what this section is really doing, I think, is precisely what this section hopes not to do, which is to potentially criminalize behaviour inadvertently. What might happen here is this. If the intent is not there and the intent is only to draw something else, then you're now criminalizing non-criminal behaviour.

I think I'm right on this.

Ms. Breese, what do you think about what I just said?

[Marianne Breese]

I think you described well how a symbol is used within the hate propaganda offence, which is that the intent of the public display of the symbol is to promote hatred. In the reading of the offence, again, it would not expand the type of symbols captured; it would just specify....

Another way of seeing it would be that police officers on the ground would have to know, with great precision, that the symbols are caught by paragraphs (a) and (b), and that if they get that wrong, they are precluded from charges or going forward through prosecution.

That's the inverse. The question to committee would be, do you want that great precision to be on law enforcement?