Transport Committee on Nov. 24th, 2020

[Jordan Bray-Stone]

We've been in touch with Transport Canada about this. We want to be consulted and given a chance to understand the steps they have gone through and the items they have reviewed or taken issue with. They've made it clear that they have held off on approving this aircraft, compared to the FAA. We'll be looking to really understand why and to get a more detailed explanation about those aspects.

Most of all, we're really looking for a commitment and an understanding of how there will be greater transparency going forward. There will be future events with aircraft. Our members shouldn't have to get on board planes wondering if they are safe, wondering whether a regulator is deciding to pull the plug based on industry pressure.

I think we have a good dialogue with Transport. We're going to pursue that and ask the questions that need to be asked on behalf of our members.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Bray-Stone.

Mr. Bachrach, you have time for a quick question.

[Taylor Bachrach, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Primeau, I thought I heard you say that given the safety concerns you have with the 737 Max 8, you would not get on board that aircraft.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Mr. Primeau, give a quick answer, please.

[Gilles Primeau]

Affirmative.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Primeau. Thank you, Mr. Bachrach.

We're now going to move on to our second round.

Mr. Kram, did you still want the floor? You switched with Ms. Kusie, so I'm just wondering if you're going to have the floor, or are you going to pass it on to Mr. Soroka?

[Michael Kram, Conservative, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Thank you, Chair.

I'd like to pass it on to either Mr. Soroka or Mr. Shipley. I'm not sure who's up next, but I'm sure one of them would be more than happy to take it.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

I have Mr. Soroka next on the list. Mr. Soroka, the floor is yours.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Perry, why should there be differences in the way an aircraft is certified in Canada from the way it is certified in the country of the manufacturer?

[Capt Tim Perry]

We don't know whether there should or shouldn't be differences. Our comments are directed at our own certifying authority. Without commenting on the process of the FAA or other authorities, it really does come down to the experience from our certification authority at Transport Canada, and I think that is borne out by experiences in certifying airplanes here.

I think it's fair for me to comment just on the Transport Canada process and our engagement with them at this point.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

When it comes to the role of ALPA in evaluating your process on certifying an airplane versus Transport Canada's certification, what do you see as the difference or the benefit?

[Capt Tim Perry]

I think our process focuses on the training. Line pilots who have experience operating these airplanes every day have a unique perspective on not just how the airplane is certified but also on the training that is recommended to the airlines. It's that training, that perspective, first and foremost, that is best evaluated by line pilots who do the job every day and understand best how effective that training may or may not be.

Of course, the aircraft design and operations team evaluates the information from a technical perspective, and we always think that having a safety organization such as ours with eyes on that aspect is beneficial in offering a different perspective, but it's primarily to accomplish a good evaluation of the training procedure.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Mr. Perry, have you been hearing any pilots expressing some concerns with the Max plane, finding some issues as they're having that nose drop? I know we've had some questions about the integrity or the design of the plane.

[Capt Tim Perry]

A lot of questions have been directed to our association about Boeing and Transport Canada, our regulator, and so far those recommendations and those concerns have been expressed and answers have been given to our satisfaction, both from a training and from a technical perspective, although I will say that we haven't received the final certification yet, so we will reserve our final judgment until that time.

[Gerald Soroka, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Mr. Primeau, I've an understanding that you're not getting results back from Boeing and that you have more questions than answers. Is this correct, and if so, why do you think this is?

[Gilles Primeau]

Yes, you're correct in your assessment.

Why is it? We might be the best to ask this question to Boeing. Why do they not even reply to an invitation to appear before this committee, for instance?

I extended an offer of technical help to them. I gave them lots of ideas. I even proposed a couple of design changes that could have vastly improved this aircraft. They're not collaborating with the Canadian government or this committee, so they will do so much less with an engineer, I guess.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Primeau.

We're now going to move on to Ms. Jaczek for five minutes.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

I would like to thank all of our witnesses today, of course including Mr. Njoroge and Mr. Moore in particular, for turning their personal tragedy into thinking deeply about the events that led to the Boeing Max 8 tragedy and giving us some really substantial recommendations as well.

In terms of what we've heard directly related to what we are studying, which is the Boeing Max 8 tragedy, Mr. Giguere, you've also alluded to the fact that we're going to see future changes to aircraft—new technology, and so on. You've also mentioned that Transport Canada—the director general and other officials—have reached out to your association to get you perhaps more involved than you have been previously.

Would you like to see this type of engagement formalized in some way, perhaps, for future certifications and validations going forward?

[Rob Giguere]

Yes, absolutely we would. We believe that this is something that should be ingrained and captured going forward.

We've been party to this recertification, which is encouraging. We think that the experience of front-line pilots in a certification process gives an independent analysis of those who are operating the aircraft and an opportunity for questions from people who are not formally in the process and who cannot be influenced.

As I stated earlier, pilots and crews who operate these aircraft in airlines take the seriousness of safety as the number one priority, and that is something that will never change. It's ingrained in pilots from day one, and it is something that strengthens the view that pilots should be involved in the process, particularly experienced line pilots who have real-life experience in operating the aircraft on a day-to-day basis.

[Helena Jaczek, Liberal, Markham—Stouffville, ON]

Thank you.

Now I'd like to turn to Mr. Bray-Stone.

Mr. Bray-Stone, you raised some issues that resonated with a lot of us. Just as your cabin crew are almost at the mercy of the certification process in trusting that Transport Canada has done due diligence, so are we as passengers also party to that trust.

You've raised a number of cases in which recommendations or changes were made following particular incidents that obviously could not be ignored, incidents that led to change. You've talked a little about being more involved with Transport Canada.

What would you like to see by way of your issues being part of the discussion as we think more broadly about certification of aircraft? What do you see as the role of CUPE in bringing your issues forward?

[Jordan Bray-Stone]

That's a good question.

Here is a good example of what we would like going forward. I heard our pilot representative colleagues mention an ongoing dialogue throughout this, with almost weekly meetings with Transport Canada. We've experienced that as well with Transport Canada, as cabin crew during COVID-19. We've had some excellent weekly—sometimes twice-weekly—briefings.

When aircraft are being certified or when another generation of an aircraft is coming out and being certified, there are going to be phases during the design in which the regulator is working with the manufacturer, and we should be receiving briefings. We should be being consulted as important stakeholders.

As I mentioned, an aircraft is full of thousands of systems, and they're all important. We can't forget about any part of the plane. In the past, that has happened. In the past, certain systems have been considered less important than others, and often that fact has come back to haunt us. That speaks at least a little bit to these two tragedies that we've been largely discussing today.

We'd be looking, then, for ongoing briefings and consultation as an important stakeholder for those areas of the plane and the systems and the safety products that we are expected to use to protect the public.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Bray-Stone, and thank you Ms. Jaczek.

I'm now going to go over to Mr. Barsalou-Duval for two and a half minutes.

[Xavier Barsalou-Duval, Bloc, Pierre-Boucher—Les Patriotes—Verchères, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My question is for Mr. Primeau.

Given the issues surrounding the 737 MAX 8 and the American certification process, it became apparent that the shortcomings of the process affected not only Americans, but people here as well.

Earlier this year, when he appeared before our committee, Mr. Turnbull, a senior official who works on aircraft certification, said that no issues were identified. That doesn't seem right to me. Later, we saw that some Transport Canada pilots reportedly sent notes in 2016 saying that they did in fact identify issues.

Yet there was no willingness, at least on the part of the government, to come clean. It seems that people wanted to say that the government had done nothing wrong and that everything was perfect, when this clearly wasn't the case.

For me, the 737 MAX 8 accident reveals one thing. This actually goes beyond the accident, but it reveals one thing. Our regulators potentially endangered the lives of pilots and passengers through complacency in terms of oversight. Do you agree with this? What do you have to say about this?

[Gilles Primeau]

That's a very difficult question. I'm not sure I would characterize complacency with the officers of Transport Canada. Even though I'd like them to give me feedback, I understand the legality aspect behind it.

What I am seeing, as a recurring pattern, is the airframer not providing sufficient answers. I'm aware that the victims have been requesting the release of data, and the FAA administrator has answered—the letter is public—stating “confidential proprietary data” four times. We could use a non-disclosure agreement so that professional people could look at the data and have an independent inquiry.

If Boeing didn't answer me, if Boeing didn't answer the Canadian government, and if Boeing or the FAA didn't provide proper answers to Transport Canada as they were trying to better this airplane before certifying it, it's not necessarily the fault of those who struggled. If they were empowered to say no—and for once the “no” would stand—and insist on getting a reply, maybe we would start changing the pattern.

[The Chair, Liberal, Vance Badawey]

Thank you, Mr. Primeau, and thank you, Mr. Barsalou-Duval.

I'm now going to go to our last speaker. Mr. Bachrach, you have the floor.