Mr. Chair, I welcome your generosity.
For the viewing public who may just be tuning in here, I'll say that the amendment adds the line, “That meetings on this study occur at every second meeting of the committee, allowing time for the continuation of the committee's other work”.
Why do I think this amendment is important? We certainly have before us here at the health committee a number of different topics that require discussion. Of course, the HIV issue is very important. I was noticing, in terms of the work of the health committee, that there are many different studies currently open that have not yet been reported on, with two exceptions. You've done studies on breast cancer screening guidelines and on women's health. Both of those studies have resulted in reports. The first report was on the breast cancer study, and the second report was on women's health.
However, there are many other studies open that have not yet led to a report. Although it's not obligatory for committees to table reports in response to their studies, generally it's been the common practice—on every committee that I have been a part of—that when you start a study, you gather information. The goal of gathering that information is to turn the information that you've gathered into some kind of output, which is to report to the House as a whole and provide all members of Parliament with an opportunity to benefit from the work that's been done by the committee.
That's the purpose of having committees that specialize in particular topics. You have a small group of members of Parliament who become specialists in a particular subject matter. They come to understand big issues in that subject matter, and they report to Parliament as a whole. This is a process that then triggers the government to provide a response and can trigger debate in the House. That's the reason we have parliamentary committees. It's not just so that, for their own sakes, members of Parliament can become experts in particular topics. Rather, it's so that they can use that expertise to provide information and feedback to Parliament as a whole.
You've done that thus far in this Parliament with reports on breast cancer screening and on women's health. However, there are outstanding matters on which the committee has sought briefs, conducted studies and gathered information, and has not yet then reported back to the House. I'm just making note of this.
I'm not including in the course of the studies.... Of course, you have studied legislation as well. You've looked at divisions of Bill C-15, and you've looked at Bill C-234. It appears the study on Bill C-224 is still going on as well, on the natural health products. In some cases, studies on legislation or estimates have been completed. In one case, there's work outstanding to be done on legislation.
I'm talking about how there are other areas that the committee needs to look at. That's why this amendment is important for striking a balance between seizing hold of new subject matter and also creating space in which the committee can have a look at the existing studies that are ongoing.
One example of an area of study that is still outstanding with the committee is antimicrobial resistance. This is an interesting area of study. The last meeting on this occurred on February 3, 2026. There have been 27 witnesses and 11 briefs gathered as part of that study. That's an example of an outstanding study. It's outstanding in the sense that it hasn't been completed yet. It may be an outstanding study in both senses. I don't know since I wasn't involved in that particular study. However, this study has been ongoing and has not yet led to a report to the House, so it's an example of something that is still open.
I understand the impulse for committees to say that they should study something new because there's this new, urgent issue that's grabbing our attention. I think that is a legitimate impulse when there are always a lot of very real issues that come up on the table, but I think committees do have to balance that impulse to grab hold of the latest, newest issue with the value of completing work that has begun. If you never complete the work that has begun, then you essentially end up never reporting on anything. You start all these important studies, but you don't end up reporting on them.
As a practice of good committee management, yes, having multiple items on the table can make sense. However, you do want to have a plan that involves not just starting work but also completing work, as you move through planning your calendar.
I noted the antimicrobial resistance study. I also note that this committee has done a lot of work on the impact of immigration policy on health care. That's an issue where there has been a lot of engagement—54 different witnesses have been heard so far on that study, and 24 briefs have been submitted. There has been a large amount of engagement from witnesses and from members of the public, who have been providing their input and feedback. That's a study that has stretched through the fall of last year and has continued into February of this year, with the last meeting taking place on February 12. Again, it doesn't appear that there was anything tabled in the House that came out of that work on immigration. I'm not sure if it's a matter of hearing more witnesses on that or just proceeding to consider a report.
In any event, the principle of this amendment—to have the new study take up every second meeting while still allowing space for the continuation of other work—does seem like a sensible way to proceed, taking into consideration the outstanding study on the impact of immigration policy on health care, as well as the outstanding study on antimicrobial resistance work and research.
It appears that, looking at your website again, on the study of Canada's pharmaceutical sovereignty, there were 21 witnesses heard, and there were 35 briefs. The last meeting of that.... I guess, technically, we're in that space now because it says the last meeting on this was May 7, and I believe this meeting is formally the continuation of that meeting. That's another study that is ongoing.
Then I know this committee has considered studying the opioid crisis in Canada, which is, I think, always a worthy issue to study. I know there's a study on that listed on your website, but it says that no meetings have taken place on that yet.
Not including legislation, those are four examples of studies that the committee has already begun working on.
Of course, there's also the issue of PrescribeIT. I don't know if PrescribeIT has been mentioned at all recently in this committee or if I'm the first one to bring it up, but the PrescribeIT situation is something that this committee has been interested in, in the past, and has requested documents on. Again, this is another example, alongside the others I've highlighted: antimicrobial resistance, the impact of immigration policy on health care, pharmaceutical sovereignty, the opioid crisis and PrescribeIT. These are all examples of issues the committee has undertaken work on up until now.
The introduction of another study concept on top of these existing ones and the desire to have that new study should be understood and respected, but also balanced against the need for the committee to continue its work, including on all of these matters I've mentioned, from antimicrobial resistance to PrescribeIT.
The work on PrescribeIT should involve hearing from the minister. Perhaps the minister could appear on multiple topics at once. That is not always ideal, but it's something that certainly happens at other committees. As part of its work on PrescribeIT, I suspect this committee would be very interested in hearing from Mr. Michael Green. The issue with this program is that, over 10 years, the government has put hundreds of millions of dollars into it and it has not delivered results, and now the government is quietly moving to shelve it. We definitely need to get to the bottom of what happened there.
We probably have, in my view, some systematic problems when it comes to IT procurement, and IT procurement as it relates to health. This is an issue I worked on a lot during my time in the last Parliament, serving on the government operations committee. We looked at the ArriveCAN app. What we realized in the process was that a lot of people paid a lot of attention to ArriveCAN, what it was and the fact that the app was annoying. This app cost tens of millions of dollars, when it probably could have been built for tens of thousands of dollars.
The larger question, as it relates to this—PrescribeIT and other IT projects—is how the government goes about buying technology for deployment as part of its other systems. Does it have effective systems or not?
What we identified at the government operations committee is that the government often uses something called staff augmentation firms. Staff augmentation firms are the middlemen. They could be middle persons, but in the cases we dealt with, they were the middlemen of IT procurement. That is, instead of the government specifically finding the people who have the skills to do the work and hiring those people to do the work, it hired often small firms that acted as middlemen or brokers. They would then go out and find people who had the capacity to do the work.
These middle companies would specialize in being able to access government procurement. Their business wasn't in doing the work, but in knowing how to get contracts. You'd then have these middle companies that became very well connected and very effective at acquiring government contracts, and that knew the extremely complex—even Byzantine—rules for getting government contracts. They would get those contracts, and once they acquired them, the middle companies would go on LinkedIn or wherever and find the resources, the people who could actually do the work.
The government would contract the in-between company, which would then hire someone else to do the work, and then the company in the middle would really make a killing financially. All it did was know how to access a government contract, and then it went out and found someone else to do the work. It collected a very substantial premium in the middle.
This is what happened with ArriveCAN. This is what has happened in a number of other cases. It wasn't just an ArriveCAN issue. It was a systemic issue with IT procurement. Basically, to get back to the fundamental question, why can't the Government of Canada effectively identify the resources it needs to do the work?
Ideally, for some of these projects anyway, you'd have people inside of government who can do this work. If you don't have people inside of government who can do this work, then maybe you have to contract out one step, where people inside government go out and find someone or some company that has the ability to do the work.
What was happening in practice wasn't the internal completion of the work on these IT projects, nor was it the government going out and finding people who could do the work and contracting them to do that work. We saw, effectively, a two-step procurement process—two steps at least—where the government would hire someone to hire someone else.
I compared this flawed procurement structure to this: If Mr. Mazier hired me to paint his fence for $100, and then I hired Dr. Strauss to paint the same fence for $50, and I made $50 for having facilitated the transaction. At some point, someone would say, “How come this middle person is making so much for facilitating the transaction? Why can't the person who needs the work done”—in this case, Mr. Mazier—“simply directly hire Dr. Strauss to paint his fence?”
If this happens once or twice, okay, but the fact that this was a structural issue within government and that there have been literally hundreds of companies involved in “IT staff augmentation”, as they call this.... I think when we last looked at this, towards the end of the last Parliament, there were over 600 companies that were involved just in the issue of staff augmentation.
To get to the bottom of what has happened on some of these IT projects that cost huge amounts of money but didn't work, didn't have the uptake, weren't effective and were eventually shelved, I think we have to look at the procurement process.
I see there's been a desire to have the health minister come in on this whole discussion. I think that would be very valuable, but also it may be valuable to hear what the procurement ministers over time have had to say on this issue. What we identified at the government operations committee when we were studying this issue of IT procurement was the fact that procurement ministers seem to see themselves as passengers within their own departments. They would say, “Well, we don't want to interfere in these decisions. We don't want to politicize these decisions.”
The effect of that argument, taken to the extent that they took it, was that essentially they didn't want to be accountable for anything and they didn't want to see themselves as having responsibility for doing anything. There is a point to be made in procurement ministers not being too involved in certain kinds of individual decisions, but they certainly have responsibility for the overall policy. When you have systemic policy problems around IT procurement, that's when you want to have a competent minister of procurement saying, “The system isn't working, and we probably need to revisit how the policies guide and impact procurement decisions.”
This whole area of IT procurement as it relates to health has played out here again. It was a major issue in the last Parliament, with discussions of ArriveCAN and some of the larger procurement structural problems and abuses that came out of that. It's interesting for me to see we have another..... It's in the area of health, and it's also another instance of an IT procurement problem. We have this case where, again, there's a desire on the part of government to deploy the newest, latest technology to make systems efficient and effective, and then we end up spending a whole bunch of money and shelving the whole thing.
This is a big problem. The specific issues around PrescribeIT are a big individual problem, but it's also a larger problem in terms of the capacity of government.
Look, technology changes fast. That has been true for a long time. Perhaps it has always been true, but especially now, with continuing advances in connectivity, AI and a whole bunch of other areas, it is inevitable that governments will have to respond to constantly shifting and changing realities as a result of new technology. There will be a certain inevitability to those pressures, but deploying new technology effectively can also be a way of improving the user experience. For people who are interacting with government, members of the public who are interacting with health care in various situations, the effective deployment of technology in those situations could be a real opportunity for improving people's well-being and the quality of service that they are encountering.
For us to be able to meet the pressures and the opportunities associated with rapid technological development, I think we need effective systems of IT procurement. With some of the work I've done in Parliament over the last few years, including involvement in the government operations committee and looking at IT procurement there, and some of the scandals in the last Parliament around ArriveCAN and other things, and now looking at the PrescribeIT situation, it suggests that there is a significant problem systematically in terms of the Government of Canada's ability to procure and deploy new technology to solve problems.
If you look across governments in Canada and around the world, there are some governments that are pushing this and have been more successful. I know that in my province of Alberta, there has been a real push to deploy technology to improve the effectiveness of government and to allow public service delivery to be augmented through the deployment of new technology. The local MLA here, who's a minister, Nate Glubish, has been very involved in this. I know, in fact, that the Government of Alberta is open to supporting the national government and the national interest on how to deploy technology in effective ways. As the federal government looks at this, I think it should also look at best practices in other jurisdictions.
It's clear we have a problem. Large amounts of money have been spent on these middlemen companies that are profiting off the Byzantine nature of the procurement system. They know how to manage the procurement system in order to get contracts, even if they don't know how to do the work. They get the contracts, and then they hire someone else to do the work. They cash in big time. In the meantime, when the work being done may not always be the best work, the government isn't making well-considered decisions, directly, on who the resources should be.
There are different terms that have been used for how these systems get broken along the way. One is that these middleman companies have done a kind of bait and switch. They will pitch a contract on the basis that a particular resource will do the actual development work on an app or on a piece of technology, and once they get the contract, they switch who is doing the work.
We've also had instances where.... Effectively, at the government operations committee, Kristian Firth, one of the principals at GC Strategies, admitted that they would manipulate numbers on résumés. He explained their process for getting a contract. Let's say the requirement for the IT procurement said that they had to have a certain minimum qualification. He would change the résumés to align with the minimum qualifications required by government. Then he would send these CVs back to the original resource and say that he had made these changes to imagine what their résumé would look like if it was compliant with the requirements of this application. He would ask if that was okay. In one case, he said they accidentally sent the wrong version of the résumé in for review.
These were the kinds of frankly flagrant abuses that were happening and that were admitted to at the government operations committee when we were undertaking this study of the broken system of IT procurement.
This is how we started, in the last Parliament, to reveal these problems. Now here we are. We're back here again talking about a problem of IT procurement. It's a significant issue in the system that led to.... In this case it didn't even lead to a usable outcome. At least in the case of ArriveCAN, there was work done that led to the production of an app. It was glitchy. It sent people into quarantine who weren't supposed to be in quarantine, but at the end of the day, at least the money spent led to the creation of an app.
PrescribeIT was never widely used. It never delivered on the promise that was expected and then it was quietly shelved. There are multiple different questions here. What happened in this specific case? Where did the money go? Who got it? How was it spent? Who were the different middle persons who got money in the contracting process? How much dd they make? I think those are some important questions that we should consider along the way.
I think the broader question is whether the Government of Canada possesses the capacity to do this kind of major IT procurement and complete the task such that, at the other end of it, we have a product that is usable, effective and improves the user experience.
In all of these different health areas that we're looking at as members of this committee, can we imagine an outcome in which the effective procurement of new technology leads to the deployment of solutions that actually make people's lives better? This is a basic question of state capacity on something that I think should be fundamental.
Lots of people in the world, in the private sector and other governments, are able to procure technology solutions to problems they face. Political parties can do it. Provincial governments can do it. Other governments can do it. When private sector companies need new systems, need tools to communicate or want to integrate emergent technology with existing systems, they have mechanisms for going out and finding the talent they need. They then compare different bids, identifying the specifications they want, getting the product, testing the product and then deploying it. This is how technology advances. Technology advances because institutions have the capacity to identify needs, procure that technology, drive the innovation and then deploy that technology.
It's not just about the existence of innovation. It's about the actual deployment of that innovation. There's a lot of technology that maybe exists but isn't deployed in particular situations. Therefore, you don't see the kind of improvement in efficiency that would otherwise result if that technology were deployed.
The vision behind the concept of PrescribeIT is that you can deploy that technology and it can be used for some purpose—