Evidence of meeting #14 for Public Safety and National Security in the 45th Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was c-12.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos
I'm sorry, Mr. Ramsay, I hate to break your stride, but we're going to have to move on to the next person.
Mrs. DeBellefeuille, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.
Bloc
Claude DeBellefeuille Bloc Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Dufresne, for the sake of clarity, could you send committee members the specific amendments you would like to see made to Bill C‑12, a bit like you did for Bill C‑8?
That would make our work and that of the House staff easier, because, as you saw, we don't have a lot of time to think about the amendments we would like to submit.
Do you have time to do that?
Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Offices of the Information and Privacy Commissioners of Canada
We will be pleased to send that to you.
Bloc
Claude DeBellefeuille Bloc Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC
Okay, thank you very much.
Mr. Huebert, let's continue our very interesting discussion on the Canadian Coast Guard.
There's a lot of talk about the Arctic, but, as you said, a lot of things transit through the south and then move north. I'm a member from southern Quebec and, yes, I see a lot of gun and tobacco smuggling, as well as human trafficking, in the corner of Akwesasne and Lake St. Francis, in the St. Lawrence Seaway and near New York State. We can see that it's a hub.
Do you think the Canadian Coast Guard should also deploy personnel there, in collaboration with the RCMP's marine units, to ensure the security of the maritime borders in this sensitive area of Quebec, which has been very busy for many years?
Do you also believe that we shouldn't put all our resources in the Arctic and keep some for southern Quebec?
Professor, Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, As an Individual
Well, your question ties very nicely into the question from your colleague beforehand, and that is this question: How do we actually have the enforcement, now that we're giving the Coast Guard a greater security capability? The Coast Guard has, in fact, done exactly what you've called for, on the Great Lakes. We operate with the Americans. There is a good relationship on it. However, both you and your colleague hit the point, and that is this: Do we have enough capability to allow the Coast Guard to function on a day-to-day basis? You're absolutely right that the focus right now has been towards the north, but that doesn't take away from the fact that the Coast Guard is heavily involved on both the east and west coasts, but also on the Great Lakes, and, in fact, could deal with some of the issues that you are raising.
It comes down to these questions: Do they have the infrastructure and people, and are there enough RCMP to integrate with them? Presumably, this renewed focus, with Bill C-12, with the move to DND, will allow the Coast Guard to do it, but as part of that strategic overview, I'd say it is so important that we now consider what we're giving the Coast Guard the ability to do.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos
Thank you very much for that exchange.
Mr. Au, you have the floor for five minutes.
Conservative
Chak Au Conservative Richmond Centre—Marpole, BC
Thank you very much.
From what I read and the presentation you made, I have great concern about Arctic security. In particular, the question is whether or not we have the capacity to determine the risk. Because of the time, I just want to ask all of my questions all at once.
The first question is this: According to your assessment, what is the risk level? Is it high, moderate or small? Second, where and what is the weakest link in Arctic security? Third, in terms of Bill C-12, what is one thing that's been left unattended or unaddressed for Arctic security?
Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual
I'll go back to Bill C-12 and to where the conversation has perhaps deviated. What it specifies in proposed section 41.1 is that the Coast Guard “may collect, analyze and disclose information or intelligence.” We're talking about law enforcement. I don't see this as being within the span of Bill C-12.
In answering your second question first, the gap right now is information sharing. We have silos between departments and agencies and in levels of government, and we have an inability to ingest information provided by community subject matter experts. The Coast Guard is already present in our Arctic waters and in our Arctic skies. It is already seeing things that could be fed into a more robust intelligence picture.
What I see Bill C-12 doing with the amendments to the Oceans Act is actually allowing for harmonization and better consolidation of existing efforts. When I look at this, it's about understanding patterns of vessels of interest.
We often get caught up in sovereignty issues with big commercial vessels that may be passing through and exercising an impermissible right of transit passage, according to Canada's laws. I think there are a lot of smaller vessels that we have an ability to detect using different systems, but we don't have the ability to pull that all together, so it's about respecting the existing mandates of CBSA and the RCMP in terms of enforcement. Of course, CBSA is limited to ports of entry, and the RCMP has the prerogative to do investigations and apprehensions in our internal and territorial waters. It's being very precise here that the Coast Guard is just another component of this.
What Bill C-12 does very well is to provide that ability for them to share information in a more timely way, at the speed of relevance, to allow for that more robust common operating picture. To me, that's a critical enabler to everything that flows from it.
Conservative
Chak Au Conservative Richmond Centre—Marpole, BC
How about my third question? What's being left unattended?
Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual
I think there are the follow-up pieces. This provides those tools to move towards, in a way, that legislative top cover. Now it makes sure that the different departments and agencies have the systems to be able to share that information, and where there are chain of custody issues—for example, for law enforcement pieces—those are protected. At the same time, it makes sure that the systems can speak to each other.
Here's where I think we're talking about a budget for building new capabilities, equipment or kit. I think a lot of the immediate-term investments can actually come by just making sure systems talk to one another and by getting our different information systems speaking.
Conservative
Chak Au Conservative Richmond Centre—Marpole, BC
In that case, are you sure that Bill C-12 would make that work?
Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual
I think it creates the enabling conditions for that to occur. My expectation from this piece of legislation is that it's necessary. It's the first step. Building forward, then, that becomes articulated in policies and programs that will allow for the implementation piece
Some of the conversation here is helpful in saying that, by having the Coast Guard move under the responsibility of the Minister of National Defence while retaining its identity as a civilian operating agency, there are opportunities for the synchronization, harmonization and leveraging of resources, where all the work done by Defence Research and Development Canada and by the Department of National Defence for systems could also be shared with the Coast Guard in a more agile way.
Conservative
Chak Au Conservative Richmond Centre—Marpole, BC
Okay.
My other question is for Professor Huebert.
What is our capacity, right now, to prevent infiltration by foreign countries, through the Arctic, into Canada? What has been the impact on the diaspora communities in Canada? Do you have any comments?
Professor, Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, As an Individual
That's one of the critical questions.
You asked Dr. Lackenbauer what he saw as one of the major threats. When I listened to the head of CSIS just recently make his comments in terms of the infiltration that we are in fact seeing in the north, he specifically named some of the concerns he had with both Russia and China. This is one of the problems we face in really coming to terms with how bad or how understated this threat is. We, on the outside, don't have access to the actual information. In other words, the head of CSIS has a much better understanding in terms of what's actually happening.
When he made his comments—last week, I believe—he publicly talked about the involvement of foreign states. Then I think back to what the Hogue report said in terms of the efforts at political interference. Joining those two dots together suggests, to me at least, that we are seeing increasing activity on the part of our adversaries. To what degree are we seeing that? Unfortunately, I can't answer your question. I just don't have access to that level of knowledge.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos
Thank you very much for that exchange, Mr. Au.
Ms. Acan, you have the floor for five minutes.
Liberal
Sima Acan Liberal Oakville West, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It's really nice to see you again today, Professor Huebert.
Yesterday, we were discussing the comparison between the F-35 and the Gripen. The comparison on my side was the procurement and operational costs of those two fighter jets.
As the world is quickly moving to uncrewed aerial systems, a discussion was opened today in which the F-35 question came out. It just came to me that those drones have combat abilities along with the investigation and search abilities, so I believe you'll agree with me that those are going to be a good addition, along with the helicopters, to support our Coast Guard.
That was my comment on that.
My question will be for both you and Professor Lackenbauer, and it is going to be on strategic alignment with the allies.
In part 4 of Bill C-12, the Oceans Act would allow for the Canadian Coast Guard to participate in maritime security patrols. This includes border monitoring and surveillance operations, as well as intelligence collection and analysis.
Given that engaging the Coast Guard in security and intelligence roles is consistent with the activities of Five Eyes partners, including the United States, how would this formal legislative mechanism improve bilateral co-operation and intelligence sharing against transnational maritime threats?
Professor, Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, As an Individual
It's nice to see you again, two days in a row.
Thank you very much for your observation.
What Bill C-12 is going to do, since it consolidates and enables, as Dr. Lackenbauer says, the Coast Guard to focus on this.... We already have very good co-operation, particularly with the Americans and their coast guard. Our Coast Guard and the Americans in Alaska are almost joined at the hip, one could almost say, and they have been able to avoid all the political uncertainty that Trump has introduced at this point.
This particular piece of legislation consolidates the ability of the Coast Guard, then, to engage. It in fact sets up the mandate, and I suspect what you'll be seeing is further development, particularly with the Americans, in terms of how the various sharing of information on a security level is able to be done.
If Bill C-12 is properly implemented—and now we get back to the issue of implementation—obviously one of the things we want to be doing with the Americans and the three other members of the Five Eyes is considering how, in fact, we can share even more sensitive security information that may have beforehand had nation-only qualifications. I think it opens up the door for very good co-operation.
Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual
I thank you for the question as well.
I think there's a real opportunity space here. As Dr. Huebert mentioned, we have very long-standing relationships, including information sharing and cross training, with the U.S. Coast Guard Arctic District, formerly District 17, and, again, well-established ways of sharing information through the Five Eyes. By creating the conditions for the Coast Guard to feed into that Canadian picture, by extension, it can feed outward to our allies. There's a real opportunity space with the Royal Danish Navy to also be working on consolidating that common operating picture in the Davis Strait and the Labrador Sea.
Within NORAD, giving the Coast Guard a mechanism to share its information lawfully with the navy and the Canadian Armed Forces more generally supports the maritime watch mission for North America. By extension, within NATO, with its increasing attentiveness to the Arctic and Canada's now very clear support for NATO speaking to Arctic issues, this is a real opportunity space to leverage all of the instruments of our national power and awareness to be able to contribute to that, and our allies will be very grateful.
Liberal
Sima Acan Liberal Oakville West, ON
Thank you very much to both of you.
Again, this question can be answered by both of you.
Are there any best practices or lessons learned from international partners where coast guards have been granted similar authorities, such as conducting security patrols or collecting, analyzing and sharing intelligence? If so, how did these measures improve maritime security in their jurisdictions?
Can we start with you, Professor Lackenbauer?
Professor, Canada Research Chair in the Study of the Canadian North, Trent University, As an Individual
There are, again, different arrangements. Certainly, within the United States context, its coast guard plays a very direct role in law enforcement. Under 14 USC 522, the U.S. Coast Guard is empowered to enforce federal laws on the high seas and within U.S. waters to deal with things like drug trafficking, illegal immigration and environmental violations. I don't envisage Canada going that far with our Coast Guard, but I think we can learn from some of its best practices what elements of that work.
I certainly don't think we will extend to some of their practices on the high seas outside of our internal waters or territorial seas. That said, I think looking at the kinds of tools it has and the kinds of training and capabilities it has developed to enforce U.S. laws is something we can look to.
If we look more broadly to what our Nordic allies are doing to integrate their coast guards into their total defence and comprehensive security postures in their countries, that is also something that encourages us to tighten those ties with our Nordic allies, not only to learn from them but also to share some of our best practices.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos
I'm sorry, but that's all the time we have to continue this great conversation.
Mr. Dufresne, Mr. Chénier, Mr. Huebert and Mr. Lackenbauer, thank you for your participation today. Have a good day.
We will suspend the meeting for a few minutes, after which we will begin the second hour.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos
I call the meeting back to order.
We'll begin this second hour of the meeting by welcoming our two guests: Brian Sauvé, president of the National Police Federation, and Mark Weber, national president of the Customs and Immigration Union.
Mr. Sauvé, you have five minutes for your opening remarks.
Brian Sauvé President, National Police Federation
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Good afternoon. Thank you for the invitation. My name is Brian Sauvé. I am president of the National Police Federation, the union representing about 20,000 members of the RCMP across Canada and internationally. Our members work tirelessly to combat some of Canada's most pressing public safety challenges, including transnational organized crime, cyber-threats, financial crime, illicit drug trafficking, human smuggling and all forms of cross-border criminal activity.
Bill C-12 arrives at a pivotal time, as communities face escalating harms that demand a strong response from law enforcement. The NPF supports the overarching purpose of the bill, which seeks to strengthen Canada's border security. We also endorse the legislation's objectives of combatting transnational organized crime, illegal fentanyl trafficking and illicit financial activities. However, while legislative change is important, it will not by itself produce the comprehensive results Canadians expect. In order to achieve success, the bill must be accompanied by three main things: adequate personnel and resources, efficient procurement and operational tools, and stronger organized Canada-U.S. and cross-jurisdictional information sharing.
Today I'd like to focus on three key points from Bill C-12. The first is information sharing and intelligence coordination. In today's complex threat environment, effective information sharing among law enforcement agencies is one of the most powerful tools for keeping communities safe. Bill C-12 provides RCMP members with clearer authority to share and receive operational intelligence with domestic and international partners. One provision that the NPF fully supports is the collection and sharing of sex offender travel information through the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, aligning Canada with U.S. practices. In 2022 alone, Canada received 149 notifications of sex offender travel from the U.S., which allowed our members to act proactively to protect communities and prevent harm before it occurs.
Bill C-12 also formally recognizes the Canadian Coast Guard's security and intelligence functions. This will allow the RCMP's marine security enforcement teams to gain easier and timely access to legally supported intelligence and provide better situational awareness.
The next point is on the trafficking of illicit substances and guns. Illicit drug and firearm trafficking continues to threaten public safety and fuel organized crime across Canada. The opioid crisis and the proliferation of fentanyl have devastated communities while traffickers exploit border gaps to move drugs and precursor chemicals into the country. Bill C-12's measures to fast-track the scheduling of fentanyl and its precursors are essential, giving law enforcement the tools to quickly intercept these substances earlier. However, stronger domestic tracking and restored Canada Post authorities are needed to close loopholes and protect communities.
The last area is money laundering. While the legislation takes important steps to combat financial crime by strengthening Canada's anti-money laundering framework and increasing penalties to up to $20 million for serious violations, it does not consider that the expanded data flow will be effective only if RCMP financial crime units are adequately resourced with staffing, training and technology to analyze and act on this new intelligence.
Bill C-12 is a step in the right direction. While the government's recent commitment to hire 1,000 new personnel to address public safety concerns is positive, it is only a start. To fully meet Canada's public safety needs, all 1,000 new hires must be fully sworn members of the RCMP, supported by a comprehensive multi-year staffing plan. Modern tools and technologies are also essential. Investments in drones, helicopters and remotely piloted aircraft systems along the Canada-U.S. border are critical to enhance surveillance, detection and rapid response, directly supporting Bill C-12's initiatives.
While the NPF strongly encourages the swift passage of Bill C-12, we are disappointed that some provisions of the former Bill C-2, such as amendments to the Canada Post Corporation Act and lawful access provisions, were removed. Without the ability to proactively detain suspicious letter mail, RCMP members face significant barriers to intercepting illegal drugs. It is also long overdue for Canada to implement a lawful access regime on par with our comparable jurisdictions.
Legislative reform, modern tools and adequate resourcing must work hand in hand. Only through this comprehensive approach can we effectively meet the evolving public safety challenges that Canadians face today.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Jean-Yves Duclos
That is much appreciated. Thank you, Mr. Sauvé.
Mr. Weber, you have five minutes, please.
Mark Weber National President, Customs and Immigration Union
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to appear as a witness as part of your study on Bill C-12.
As national president of the Customs and Immigration Union, I am happy to be here today to represent Canada's border personnel.
Per its name, Bill C-12 proposes a number of measures intended to strengthen Canada's border and immigration system. On paper, some of these measures are certainly positive. A prime example of this is language in the Customs Act that would see commercial operators needing to provide border officers with access to facilities for both import and export inspections. The export aspect is currently lacking in the act, and this is a commendable addition.
In practice, the reality is that despite already having these powers for import inspections, the Canada Border Services Agency is rarely able to conduct these inspections when it comes to certain modes, such as rail operations, due to a now well-established lack of staffing and a lack of facilities as well.
While the federal government has made it clear that hiring 1,000 additional officers was a priority and one that we very much welcome as an initial step, Bill C-12 therefore highlights once again how crucial adequate staffing is to a secure and well-functioning border.
Adequate staffing also needs to be the cornerstone of well-oiled, secure and fair immigration processes, including refugee claims. While Bill C-12 seeks to speed up the refugee claim process to address lengthy processing times and backlogs, it is worth pointing out that without the sustained understaffing our border system has experienced for many years, these lengthy processing times and backlogs, and therefore the pressure to seek efficiencies, would likely be far less considerable.
This is especially important in light of how CBSA has been managing the border for most of its history. Efficiencies, as implemented by CBSA management, almost always result in a degradation of the security and integrity of our border processes. We've seen it with traveller operations, where people seeking entry to Canada do so now through automated machines with no real interaction with officers.
Outside of Bill C-12, we're already seeing it in some circumstances with refugee claim processing itself, where the agency's simplified intake process, which is known as the one-touch process, means that claimants now spend significantly less time meaningfully interacting with officers, with the result of reduced security for the sake of expediency.
Interactions between officers and anyone who seeks to enter the country, be they travellers or refugee claimants, is a key component of border security. These interactions result in better intelligence and allow officers to recognize patterns and flags that would otherwise be missed, ensuring that any potential problem is detected early on and will not put further stress on the system at a later date.
Crucially, experienced officers have the training necessary to navigate complex processes efficiently without compromising security, yet, too often, CBSA prefers to push out experienced officers, as it is currently in the process of doing with nearly 200 officers who cannot carry a firearm, eroding both its institutional memory and its ability to maintain a direct contact with the people transiting through our borders.
The conclusion here is clear. Ensuring the security and integrity of our border and associated processes starts with an adequate human presence. Without this—the human element—no bill can hope to truly solve border issues in the long term.
I thank you, and I do look forward to your questions.