Bill C-22 (Historical)

An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts

This enactment establishes the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and sets out its composition and mandate. In addition, it establishes the Committee’s Secretariat, the role of which is to assist the Committee in fulfilling its mandate. It also makes consequential amendments to certain Acts.

Intimidation Campaign Against Members of Parliament

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons (Senate)]

Mr. Speaker, the member referenced that I was pining over the fact that the member for Carleton or the previous government had never done anything about this. However, that was just the context I was using to set the stage for telling members about all the things we did do, as well as all the things we have done since becoming elected, that Conservatives have routinely voted against, including this member.

Bill C-22 created NSICOP, which he now speaks so highly about. Conservatives voted against it. Bill C-59 created and established NSIRA. Conservatives voted against it. Bill C-76 limited foreign ability to influence elections through monetary contributions. Conservatives voted against it.

Conservatives have routinely voted against initiatives that the government has brought forward to combat foreign interference. The fact that the previous Conservative government did nothing is just the context to set in order to highlight everything that we have done.

Could the member share with the House why he and his colleagues voted against all those measures?

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons (Senate)]

Madam Speaker, let us just recap for a second.

In 2013, the Conservatives and the former democratic reform minister, the member for Carleton and Leader of the Opposition, received a report from CSIS saying that election interference was real and was going to continue. He did nothing for two years and literally sat on the report.

Later on, in 2017, after we came into government, we introduced Bill C-76, which limited funding from foreign actors. The Conservatives voted against it. We introduced Bill C-22 shortly before that, to create NSICOP. Conservatives would not even let it go to committee. They voted against it after the first or second reading.

I am wondering how the Conservatives can actually stand here and try to claim that they have any credibility on the issue of foreign interference, when they did nothing and routinely voted against every measure that we brought forward.

[Michael Wernick]

I'll try my best to reconstruct a chronology using Google. I may get some of the order wrong or whatever.

Yes, I was deputy clerk in 2015. I was appointed deputy clerk by Prime Minister Harper and stayed for the transition and the early days of Mr. Trudeau's mandate. He appointed me clerk in January of 2016, and I took on that role for the next three years.

There were quite a few things in play at the time.

A very early priority of the government, you may recall, was to create the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians to give a group of parliamentarians with appropriate security clearances a window into national security and intelligence issues. Bill C-22 was an early initiative by the government.

Also, then, there were a number of initiatives under way, so by the time we got to 2017, which I know is the period of interest here, there were quite a few things in play. Bill C-59, which was the comprehensive overhaul of national security legislation, would have been in play in late 2016 and early 2017. We were very concerned about disinformation issues. It's a matter of public record that Putin's Russia tried to disrupt the French election in May of 2017 and that they tried to disrupt the German election in September of 2017.

At the time, cybersecurity was a huge issue. Members who have been here long enough will remember Chinese cyber-attacks on the National Research Council that were called out by the Harper government—by Minister Baird—in early 2014. A personal focus for me very much was on cybersecurity: secure communications for the Prime Minister and secure communications for the cabinet, and investments in cybersecurity, which came to fruition in the 2018 budget.

I could go on, but that gives you some sense of what was going on at that time.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Mr. McGuinty, it is an absolute pleasure to have you here.

As you know, I was on the public safety committee when we studied Bill C-22, which created the committee. It was my amendment that brought you here. It was Matthew Dubé who reminded me of that in the last Parliament, that I was the one who brought in that amendment. I'm just sitting here so proud of the work that you and the other members of the committee have done and how important it is for you to share the report with all of us and with Canadians. Thank you for that.

When I was looking at the report, Mr. Van Popta was asking what the groups are, and you mentioned this earlier. They are a form of extremism that “encompasses xenophobic violence, anti-authority violence, gender-driven violence and 'other grievance-driven'”. Then it talks about CSIS saying that it's a common belief that “the success or survival of society/civilization cannot be separated from the need for ongoing violence against a perceived threatening group”. These are, for example, “the elite, visible minorities, religious groups, corporations, immigrants, capitalists, the government”.

I have noticed, over the last two years, certainly an increase in the tone of comments that I see online on posts that I make. I was really disturbed by the report when you mentioned how many Canadians.... The report that you mentioned from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue said that “Canadians are highly active across 6,600 identified right-wing extremist channels, pages, groups and accounts.” Since they tend to organize online, it means that these messages are spread more quickly.

I'm just wondering what your thoughts are on how this online presence is contributing. Maybe you can't comment on this, and that's okay if you can't. How does an online presence allow these messages from these IMVE groups to spread quickly?

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act

[Gagan Sikand, Liberal, Mississauga—Streetsville, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to add to the debate of Bill C-3 today.

An independent review and complaints mechanism for the Canada Border Services Agency would fill an important gap for our national security agencies. This is not a new issue for parliamentarians. Members will recall that similar legislation was introduced and debated in the last session, as Bill C-98. That bill received unanimous consent just eight months ago, and since that time our government has had the benefit of considering comments made on previous legislation. With its introduction as a new bill, it is reflective of many of the comments and recommendations previously made.

CBSA oversight is not a new idea. In fact, Bill S-205, introduced by former Senator Moore in the other place a few years ago, proposed a CBSA review body. That was, in part, in response to a previous call by senators to create an oversight body through the 2015 report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. Many parliamentarians, academics, experts and stakeholders have made similar calls over the years. That is largely because Canada is the only country among our closest allies not to have a dedicated review body for complaints regarding its border agency. Furthermore, the CBSA is the only organization within the public safety portfolio without such a body. Bill C-3 would change this environment.

Canadians need to be confident that their complaints are handled and addressed appropriately and independently. They deserve enhanced reporting on how border services operate, which the bill also proposes. To expand on that, under Bill C-3, the new body would be able to not only report on its finding but also make recommendations as it sees fit. Those reports would include the PCRC's findings and recommendations on everything from the CBSA's policies and procedures to its compliance with the law to the reasonableness of the use of its powers.

This is about accountability and transparency. To parse why this is so important, we must take a look at the rapidly-changing context of the CBSA.

On a daily basis, CBSA officers interact with thousands of Canadians and visitors to Canada at airports, land borders, crossing ports and other locations. To put that in numbers, that is 96 million interactions per year with travellers and $32 billion per year in duties and taxes, according to the 2017-18 statistics. That is 27.3 million cars, 34.5 million air passengers and 21.4 million commercial releases. All of that happens at 13 international airports, 117 land border crossings, 27 rail sites and beyond. This will only increase. That is why the government introduced a federal budget last year proposing investments of $1.25 billion for the CBSA to help modernize some of our ports of entry and our border operations. After all, we know that business at the border never stops and is growing year after year.

As hon. members know, ensuring that business continues while protecting Canadians requires CBSA officers to have the power to arrest, detain, search and seize, and the authority to use reasonable force when required. We know that Canada's over 14,000 CBSA officers are truly world class, providing consistent and fair treatment to travellers and traders.

However, as business grows along with demands for accountability, the CBSA cannot reasonably be expected to handle all the complaints on its own, nor should Canadians expect it would. Currently, complaints about conduct and the service provided by CBSA officers are handled internally. If an individual is dissatisfied with the results of an internal CBSA investigation, there is currently no mechanism for the public to request an independent review of these complaints. Bill C-3 would neatly remedy all of this. For example, such an individual would be able to ask the PCRC to review his or her complaint. At the conclusion of a PCRC investigation, the review body would be able to report on its findings and make recommendations as it sees fit. The president of the CBSA would be required to respond in writing to the PCRC's findings and recommendations.

The PCRC would also accept complaints about the conduct and service provided by CBSA employees from detainees held in CBSA facilities. These could include complaints related to treatment and conditions in detention.

On the rare occasion that there be a serious incident involving CBSA personnel, Bill C-3 would legislate a framework to not only handle and track such incidents, but also to publicly report on them. It would in fact create an obligation for the CBSA to notify local police and the PCRC of any serious incident involving the CBSA officers or employees. As I have noted, the legislation would also allow for the PCRC to review, on its own initiative or at least at the request of the minister, any non-national security activity of the CBSA.

National security activities would be reviewed by the new national security intelligence review committee, which is the National Security Intelligence Review Agency, or NSIRA. As colleagues know, the NSIRA is responsible for complaints and reviews relating to national security, including those relating to the RCMP and the CBSA. Members will see provisions in Bill C-3 that would facilitate information sharing and co-operation between the PCRC and NSIRA.

I would point out that the PCRC would not have the authority to review, uphold, amend or overturn enforcement, trade or national security decisions made with the CBSA, nor would it consider complaints that could be dealt with by other organizations, such as the Canadian Human Rights Commission, the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages or the Office of the Privacy Commission. What it would do is provide a reasonable, long-sought-after framework to build accountability in our public safety agencies and trust among Canadians.

As I close, I would like to point out that this is the latest in a line of recent measures to enhance accountability in our national security apparatus. The former Bill C-22 led to the creation of the now operational National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, which has a broad mandate to review national security and intelligence organizations.

The former Bill C-59 led to the creation of the NSIRA. NSIRA now has the authority to review any activity carried out by CSIS or the Communications Security Establishment and any national security or intelligence-related activity carried out by federal departments and agencies.

All of this amounts to unprecedented enhancements in our national security accountability, on top of the government's creation of a national security transparency commitment, which is all about integrating Canada's democratic values into our national security activities.

These measures build on the government's broad national security consultations in 2016, which sought to engage Canadians, stakeholders and subject matter experts on issues related to national security and the protection of rights and freedoms. In those consultations, four-fifths, or 81%, of online responses called for independent review mechanisms for departments and agencies that have national security responsibilities, including the CBSA.

This outline should provide some rationale for bipartisan support for Bill C-3 by parliamentarians, academics, experts and stakeholders alike and other Canadians. Our security and intelligence communities must keep pace with evolving threats to the safety and security of Canadians and with a rapidly changing border environment. They must do so in a way that safeguards our rights and freedoms, and the people's trust in how the government works. That is why I ask the House to join me in supporting Bill C-3 today.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Mr. Speaker, through you, I would like to welcome the hon. member for Skeena—Bulkley Valley to this place.

It is true that this legislation has been called for for a long time. After we were elected in 2015, we brought a robust number of bills to the public safety committee. The public safety minister at the time, Ralph Goodale, was introducing more legislation than was coming from any other department. He was fixing the previous national security framework in Bill C-59. We brought in Bill C-22 and we did introduce Bill C-98 to deal with the CBSA review agency. Unfortunately, the bill ran out of time in the Senate before it could be passed.

It is my hope that we can do this quickly and get it sent to committee and the Senate and finally get this review body in place.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Indigenous Services]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to rise today to speak to Bill C-3, which seeks to establish a new, independent public complaints and review body for the Canada Border Services Agency, or CBSA. This represents another step forward in the government's commitment to ensuring that all of its agencies and departments are accountable to Canadians.

As a member of the public safety committee during the last Parliament, I am quite proud to have participated in legislation that made remarkable change and took the number of measures we took to ensure greater accountability of our security agencies and departments.

Two years ago, our Bill C-22 received royal assent, establishing the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. That addressed a long-standing need for parliamentarians to review the Government of Canada's activities and operations in regard to national security and intelligence. It has been in operation for some time now and is a strong addition to our system of national security review and accountability. As members will know, the committee has the power to review activities across government, including the CBSA.

To complement that, our committee studied our national security framework, as well as Bill C-59, which allowed for the creation of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, or NSIRA. NSIRA is also authorized to conduct reviews of any national security or intelligence activity carried out by federal departments and agencies, including the CBSA. All of this is on top of existing review and oversight mechanisms in the public safety portfolio.

The Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP investigates complaints from the public about the conduct of members in the RCMP, for example, and does so in an open, independent and objective manner. The Office of the Correctional Investigator conducts independent, thorough and timely investigations about issues related to Correctional Service Canada.

Bill C-3 would fill a gap in the review of the activities of our public safety agencies. The existing Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, which is responsible for complaints against members of the RCMP, would see its name change to the public complaints and review commission and its mandate expanded to include the CBSA. It would be able to consider complaints against CBSA employee conduct or service, from foreign nationals, permanent residents and Canadian citizens, regardless of whether they are within or outside of Canada. Reviews of national security activities would be carried out by NSIRA.

Here is how it would work in practice. If an individual has a complaint unrelated to national security, she or he would be able to direct it either to the commission or to the CBSA. Both bodies would notify the other of any complaint made. The CBSA would be required to investigate any complaint, except those disposed of informally. The commission would be able to conduct its own investigation of the complaint in situations where the chairperson is of the opinion that doing so would be in the public interest. If an individual is not satisfied with the CBSA's response, the commission would be able to follow up as it sees fit.

The new PCRC would also be able to produce findings on the CBSA's policies, procedures and guidelines. It would also be able to review CBSA's activities, including making findings on CBSA's compliance with the law and the reasonableness and necessity of the exercise of its powers. Indeed, the commission's findings on each review would be published in a mandatory annual public report.

Bill C-3 not only fills a gap in our review system. It answers calls from the public and Parliament for independent review of CBSA. Most significantly, the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence, in its 2015 report, encouraged the creation of an oversight body. I would like to acknowledge Bill S-205 from our last Parliament, introduced in the other place not long after the government took office, which proposed a CBSA review body as well.

Certainly we have heard from academics, experts and other stakeholders of the need to create a body with the authority to review CBSA. During testimony at the public safety committee on December 5, 2017, Alex Neve, secretary general of Amnesty International, said, “how crucial it is for the government to move rapidly to institute full, independent review of CBSA.” This was reflective of much of the testimony we heard, and I am pleased the government is acting on this advice. I would also like to acknowledge my colleague from Toronto—Danforth for her efforts and advocacy for the establishment of a CBSA review body.

The CBSA has a long and rich history of providing border services in an exemplary fashion. It does so through the collective contribution of over 14,000 dedicated professional women and men, women like Tamara Lopez from my community, who is a role model for young women looking for a career in the CBSA.

The CBSA already has robust internal and external mechanisms in place to address many of its activities. For example, certain immigration-related decisions are subject to review by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, and its customs role can be appealed all the way up to the Federal Court.

That said, when it comes to the public, the CBSA should not be the only body receiving and following up on complaints about its own activities. Indeed, some Canadians might not be inclined to say a word if they do not have the confidence that their complaint will be treated independently, objectively and thoroughly. Bill C-3 would inspire that confidence.

The Government of Canada is committed to ensuring that all of its agencies and departments are accountable to Canadians. Bill C-3 would move the yardstick forward on that commitment. It would bring Canada more closely in line with the accountability bodies of border agencies in other countries, including those of our Five Eyes allies.

The accountability and transparency of our national security framework has improved greatly since we were elected in 2015. This bill would continue these efforts by providing border services that keep Canadians safe and by improving public trust and confidence. Bill C-3 would ensure that the public continues to expect consistent, fair and equal treatment by CBSA employees. That is why I am proud to stand behind Bill C-3 today.

In the last Parliament, the House of Commons unanimously passed Bill C-98, which was a bill to bring oversight to CBSA. Although that bill died in the Senate, it is my hope that all parties will again come together to pass this bill.

I listened to the member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner speak earlier in this debate. He spoke at length about firearms and his petition opposing our promise to make Canadians safer by enhancing gun control. I would remind him that almost 80% of Canadians support a ban on military-style assault rifles according to an independent Angus Reid survey.

I know he and his party supported oversight of the CBSA in the last Parliament. I hope he and all members will join me in supporting oversight in this Parliament under Bill C-3 and assure the bill's passage this session.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

There is no internal resistance at all. In fact, the organization, CBSA, recognizes that this is a gap in the architecture and that it needs to be filled.

Part of it was filled by Bill C-22 with the committee of parliamentarians, as far as national security is concerned. Part of it was filled by Bill C-59 and the creation of the new NSIRA, again with respect to national security.

This legislation fills in the last piece.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Well, as I said, Monsieur Dubé, we have had an enormous volume of work to get through, as has this committee, as has Parliament, generally. The work program has advanced as rapidly as we could make it. It takes time and effort to put it all together. I'm glad we're at this stage, and I hope the parliamentary machinery will work well enough this week that we can get it across the finish line.

It has been a very significant agenda, when you consider there has been Bill C-7, Bill C-21, Bill C-22, Bill C-23, Bill C-37, Bill C-46, Bill C-66, Bill C-71, Bill C-59, Bill C-97, Bill C-83, Bill C-93 and Bill C-98. It's a big agenda and we have to get it all through the same relatively small parliamentary funnel.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

In the spirit of brevity and efficiency, I think I will forgo the opportunity to put a 10-minute statement on the record and just speak informally for a couple of minutes about Bill C-98. Evan Travers and Jacques Talbot from Public Safety Canada are with me and can help to go into the intricacies of the legislation and then respond to any questions you may have. They may also be able to assist if any issues arise when you're hearing from other witnesses, in terms of further information about the meaning or the purpose of the legislation.

Colleagues will know that Bill C-98 is intended to fill the last major gap in the architecture that exists for overseeing, reviewing and monitoring the activities of some of our major public safety and national security agencies. This is a gap that has existed for the better part of 18 years.

The problem arose in the aftermath of 9/11, when there was a significant readjustment around the world in how security agencies would operate. In the Canadian context at that time, the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency was divided, with the customs part joining the public safety department and ultimately evolving into CBSA, the Canada Border Services Agency. That left CRA, the Canada Revenue Agency, on its own.

In the reconfiguration of responsibilities following 9/11, many interest groups, stakeholders and public policy observers noted that CBSA, as it emerged, did not have a specific review body assigned to it to perform the watchdog function that SIRC was providing with respect to CSIS or the commissioner's office was providing with respect to the Communications Security Establishment.

The Senate came forward with a proposal, if members will remember, to fix that problem. Senator Willie Moore introduced Bill S-205, which was an inspector general kind of model for filling the gap with respect to oversight of CBSA. While Senator Moore was coming forward with his proposal, we were moving on the House side with NSICOP, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, by virtue of Bill C-22, and the new National Security and Intelligence Review Agency which is the subject of Bill C-59.

We tried to accommodate Senator Moore's concept in the new context of NSICOP and NSIRA, but it was just too complicated to sort that out that we decided it would not be possible to salvage Senator Moore's proposal and convert it into a workable model. What we arrived at instead is Bill C-98.

Under NSICOP and NSIRA, the national security functions of CBSA are already covered. What's left is the non-security part of the activities of CBSA. When, for example, a person comes to the border, has an awkward or difficult or unpleasant experience, whom do they go to with a complaint? They can complain to CBSA itself, and CBSA investigates all of that and replies, but the expert opinion is that in addition to what CBSA may do as a matter of internal good policy, there needs to be an independent review mechanism for the non-security dimensions of CBSA's work. The security side is covered by NSICOP, which is the committee of parliamentarians, and NSIRA, the new security agency under Bill C-59, but the other functions of CBSA are not covered, so how do you create a review body to cover that?

We examined two alternatives. One was to create a brand new stand-alone creature with those responsibilities; otherwise, was there an agency already within the Government of Canada, a review body, that had the capacity to perform that function? We settled on CRCC, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, which performs that exact function for the RCMP.

What is proposed in the legislation is a revamping of the CRCC to expand its jurisdiction to cover the RCMP and CBSA and to increase its capacity and its resources to be able to do that job. The legislation would make sure that there is a chair and a vice-chair of the new agency, which would be called the public complaints and review commission. It would deal with both the RCMP and the CBSA, but it would have a chair and a vice-chair. They would assume responsibilities, one for the RCMP and one for CBSA, to make sure that both agencies were getting top-flight attention—that we weren't robbing Peter to pay Paul and that everybody would be receiving the appropriate attention in the new structure. Our analysis showed that we could move faster and more expeditiously and more efficiently if we reconfigured CRCC instead of building a new agency from the ground up.

That is the legislation you have before you. The commission will be able to receive public complaints. It will be able to initiate investigations if it deems that course to be appropriate. The minister would be able to ask the agency to investigate or examine something if the minister felt an inquiry was necessary. Bill C-98 is the legislative framework that will put that all together.

That's the purpose of the bill, and I am very grateful for the willingness of the committee at this stage in our parliamentary life to look at this question in a very efficient manner. Thank you.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Madam Speaker, I will continue with the public safety minister's comment at committee:

[T]he government is launching, almost immediately, a public consultation process on our national security framework that will touch directly on the subject matter of this bill, and I need that consultation before I can commit to specific legislation.

Well, that was almost three years ago. To say that the bill is late would obviously be an understatement. It has taken the minister over three years to bring forward this legislation. That is quite a long time for a minister who said he was already working on something in 2016.

In keeping with his recent history on consultations, there appears to have been little or no external consultation in preparation for the bill. Hopefully, at committee, the government will be able to produce at least one group or organization outside of the government that will endorse the legislation. However, I am not holding my breath.

The government even hired a former clerk of the Privy Council to conduct an independent report. Mel Cappe conducted a review and provided his recommendations in June 2017. It was only because of an access to information request by CBC News that Parliament even knows of this report.

A CBC News article noted:

The June 2017 report by former Privy Council Office chief Mel Cappe, now a professor at the University of Toronto, was obtained by The Canadian Press through the Access to Information Act....

[A] spokesman for [the] Public Safety Minister...would not comment directly on Cappe’s recommendations, but said the government is working on legislation to create an “appropriate mechanism” to review CBSA officer conduct and handle complaints.

The proposed body would roll in existing powers of the civilian review and complaints commission for the RCMP.

The government and the minister had the recommendations two years ago, yet they are bringing this forward at the last minute. It appears to be an afterthought. Again, in February of this year, the minister said that they continue to work as fast as they can to bring forward legislation on oversight for the CBSA.

Perhaps the Liberal government was just distracted by its many self-inflicted wounds. It created many challenges for Canadians, and now it is tabling legislation in the 11th hour that deals with real issues and asking parliamentarians to make up for the government's distraction and lack of focus on things that matter to Canada, Canadians and our democracy. These are things like public safety, national security, rural crime, trade, energy policies and lower taxes.

There is an impact to mismanagement and bad decision-making. The Liberals' incompetence has had a trickle-down effect that is felt at every border crossing and also across many parts of the country.

We know that RCMP officers had to be deployed and dedicated to dealing with illegal border crossings. When the Liberals set up a facility to act as a border crossing in Lacolle, Quebec, RCMP officers were there covering people entering into Canada. Those RCMP officers were not commissioned that day. They were pulled from details across the country. They were pulled from monitoring returned ISIS fighters and from monitoring and tackling organized crime. They were taken and redeployed, most likely, from rural detachments across the country. We know that in my province of Alberta, the RCMP is short-staffed by nearly 300 officers. It is not a surprise, then, that there was a rise in rural crime while this was going on. Rural crime is now rising faster than urban crime.

However, it is not just the RCMP that has been impacted by the mismanagement at the border. It is also border officers, who will have the added oversight created through Bill C-98.

CBSA officers told me and many other MPs about more shifts and about workers being transferred to Manitoba and Quebec. The media reported that students were taking the place of full-time, trained border officers at Pearson airport. This is the largest airport in Canada, and the impacts of having untrained and inexperienced officers monitoring potentially the top spot for smuggling and transfer of illegal goods are staggering.

We have a serious issue in Canada at our borders, one that is getting worse. We know from testimony given during the committee's study of Bill C-71 that the vast majority of illegal firearms come from the U.S. They are smuggled in. At the guns and gangs summit, the RCMP showed all of Canada pictures of firearms being smuggled in as part of other packages. The minister's own department is saying there is a problem with smuggled goods, contraband tobacco and drugs coming across our borders.

Rather than actually protect Canadians, we are looking into oversight. Do not get me wrong. Oversight is good, but it is not the most pressing issue of the day.

The media is now reporting that because of the Liberals' decision to lift visas, there are many harmful and potentially dangerous criminals now operating in our country. This comes on the heels of reports that there are record-high numbers of ordered deportations of people who are a security threat. There were 25 in 2017. There are also record-low removals. Deportations were about or above 12,000 to 15,000 per year from 2010 to 2015, but that is not what we are seeing now. The Liberals, even with tens of thousands of people entering Canada illegally, are averaging half of that.

We know that the CBSA is not ignoring these issues and security threats. It just lacks the resources, which are now dedicated to maintaining an illegal border crossing and monitoring tens of thousands more people.

This failure is not just my opinion. It is the opinion of many Canadians.

A Calgary Herald headline from last August read, “Confidence in Trudeau's handling of immigration is gone”. The Toronto Sun, on May 29 of this year, wrote, “AG report shows federal asylum processing system a mess”. Another reads, “Auditor General Calls out Liberal Failures”. The news headlines go on and on.

This is not something the minister did when he implemented reforms in Bill C-59, the national security reforms. Under that bill, there would be three oversight agencies for our national security and intelligence teams: the new commissioner of intelligence, with expanded oversight of CSIS and CSE; the new national security and intelligence review agency, and with Bill C-22, the new parliamentary committee. This is in addition to the Prime Minister's national security adviser and the deputy ministers of National Defence, Foreign Affairs and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

Oversight can be a good thing. Often, because of human nature, knowing it is there acts as a deterrent. From my career, knowing that police are nearby or ready to respond can deter criminals, and knowing that someone will review claims of misconduct will add credibility to an already reputable agency, the CBSA.

It is probably too bad that this was not done earlier, because it could have gone through the House and the Senate quite easily. It could have been a law for a year or two already, perhaps even more. Sadly, the late tabling of the bill seems to make it a near certainty that if it reaches the Senate, it might be caught in the backlog of legislation there.

The House and the committee can and should give the bill a great deal of scrutiny. While the idea seems sound, and the model is better than in other legislation, I am wary of anything the government does on borders. It has not managed our borders well and has not been up front with the House or Canadians about that. In 2017, the Liberals told us that there was nothing to worry about, with tens of thousands of people crossing our borders illegally. They said they did not need any new resources, security was going well and everything was fine.

Well, the reality was that security was being cut to deal with the volume, provinces and cities were drowning in costs and overflowing shelters, border and RCMP agencies were stretched and refugee screenings were backing up. According to the ministers, everything was fine. Then, in the budget, came new funding, and in the next budget, and in the one after that. Billions in spending is now on the books, including for the RCMP, the CBSA and the Immigration and Refugee Board.

What should we scrutinize? For one, I think we should make sure to hear from those people impacted by this decision, such as front-line RCMP and CBSA officers who will be subject to these evaluations.

A CBC article had this to say:

The union representing border officers has heard little about the proposal and was not consulted on the bill. Jean-Pierre Fortin, national president of the Customs and Immigration Union (CIU), said the president of the CBSA also was left in the dark and could not inform the union of any details of the legislation.

How reliable is legislation when the agency it would actually impact and involve was left out of the loop?

It seems odd that the Liberals would appoint one union, Unifor, to administer a $600-million media bailout fund just after they announce a campaign against Conservatives, and, yet, the border services officers union is not even consulted about legislation that impacts it. I would hope that consultations are not dependent on political donations and participation.

That is why Parliament should be careful about who sits on this new agency. We do not need more activists; we need experienced professionals. We need subject matter experts. We need people with management expertise. We need to make sure that the people who work on these review organizations are appropriately skilled and resourced to do their work. We need to make sure that frivolous cases do not tie up resources, and that officers do not have frivolous and vexatious claims hanging over the heads.

We need to make sure that Canadians do not need to hire lawyers to get access to the complaints commission and its process.

We need to make sure that the minister and his staff, and other staffing leaders across the public safety spectrum cannot get their hands inside the processes and decisions of these bodies. We need the agency to have transparent, clear processes and systems that are fair to applicants and defendants alike. We need to make sure that these processes do not eat away resources from two agencies that are already strapped for bodies.

I hope there is time to do this right. I hope there is the appropriate time to hear from all the relevant witnesses, that legal advice is obtained, and that we have the appropriate time to draft changes, changes that, based on the minister's track record, are almost certainly going to be needed.

As the House begins its work on this legislation, I trust the minister and his staff would not be directing the chair of the public safety committee to meet their scripted timeline, which seems a little difficult to be done now with only a week remaining. Knowing that the chair is a scrupulous and honoured individual, he certainly would not suggest that legislation needs to be finished before we can hear the appropriate testimony.

There is a lot of trust and faith needed for the House to work well on legislation like this and many other pieces, trust that is built through honest answers to legitimate questions, trust that is reinforced by following integrity and the need to get it right, rather than the need to just be right.

I hope, perhaps just once in this legislative session, we could see the government try to broker such trust on Bill C-98, but I will not hold my breath.

Motion That Debate Be Not Further Adjourned

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Mr. Speaker, in the last election we were very specific about the things we found inappropriate, deficient or headed in the wrong direction that had been enacted by the previous government. We enumerated those things in our platform document. Bill C-59, together with other pieces of legislation before this Parliament, has dealt very effectively with the agenda of things that needed to be corrected.

For example, we said there needed to be a committee of parliamentarians to deal with national security and intelligence issues. We created that through Bill C-22. We said we needed to protect the right to civil protest and dissent to make sure those civil rights were never impinged upon. That is dealt with in Bill C-59. We said we needed to make clear that threat reduction measures would not violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That too is dealt with in Bill C-59.

If we went through each one of the items that were enumerated during the course of the election campaign, we would find that in Bill C-59 and in other pieces of legislation that have already been adopted by the House, commitments made in 2015 have, in fact, been satisfied by legislation.

National Security Act, 2017

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to rise in the House today.

I ask for the indulgence of the House and I hope no one will get up on a point of order on this, but because I am making a speech on a specific day, I did want to shout out to two of my biggest supporters.

The first is to my wife Chantale, whose birthday is today. I want to wish her a happy birthday. Even bigger news is that we are expecting a baby at the end of July. I want to shout out the fact that she has been working very hard at her own job, which is obviously a very exhausting thing, and so the patience she has for my uncomparable fatigue certainly is something that I really do thank her for and love her very much for.

I do not want to create any jealousy in the household, so I certainly want to give a shout-out to her daughter and our daughter Lydia, who is also a big supporter of mine. We are a threesome, and as I said at my wedding last year, I had the luck of falling in love twice. I wanted to take this opportunity, not knowing whether I will have another one before the election, to shout out to them and tell them how much I love them.

I thank my colleagues for their warm thoughts that they have shared with me.

On a more serious note, I would like to talk about the Senate amendments to Bill C-59. More specifically, I would like to talk about the process per se and then come back to certain aspects of Bill C-59, particularly those about which I raised questions with the minister—questions that have yet to be answered properly, if at all.

I want to begin by touching on a more timely issue related to a bill that is currently before the House, Bill C-98. This bill will give more authority to the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP so that it also covers the Canada Border Services Agency. That is important because we have been talking for a long time about how the CBSA, the only agency that has a role to play in our national security, still does not have a body whose sole function is to review its operations.

Of course, there is the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, which was created by Bill C-22, and there will soon be a committee created by Bill C-59 that will affect the CBSA, but only with regard to its national security related activities.

I am talking about a committee whose sole responsibility would be to review the activities of the Canada Border Services Agency and to handle internal complaints, such as the allegations of harassment that have been reported in the media in recent years, or complaints that Muslim citizens may make about profiling.

It is very important that there be some oversight or further review. I will say that, as soon as an article is published, either about a problem at the border, about the union complaining about the mistreatment of workers or about problems connected to the agency, the minister comes out with great fanfare to remind everyone that he made a deep and sincere promise to create a system that would properly handle these complaints and that there would be some oversight or review of the agency.

What has happened in four whole years? Nothing at all.

For years now, every time there is a report in the news or an article comes out detailing various allegations of problems, I have just been copying and pasting the last tweet I posted. The situation keeps repeating, but the government is not doing anything.

This situation is problematic because the minister introduced a bill at the last minute, as the clock is winding down on this Parliament, and the bill has not even been referred yet to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

I have a hard time believing that we will pass this bill in the House and an even harder time seeing how it is going to get through the Senate.

That is important because, in his speech, the minister himself alluded to the fact that in fall 2016, when the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, of which I am a member, travelled across the country to study the issue and make recommendations ahead of introducing Bill C-59, the recommendation to create a committee tasked with studying the specific activities of the CBSA was one of the most important recommendations. As we see in Bill C-98, the government did not take this opportunity to do any such thing.

It is certainly troubling, because Bill C-59 is an omnibus piece of legislation. I pleaded with the House, the minister and indeed even the Senate, when it reached the Senate, through different procedural mechanisms, to consider parts of the bill separately, because, as the minister correctly pointed out, this is a huge overhaul of our national security apparatus. The concern with that is not only the consideration that is required, but also the fact that some of these elements, which I will come back to in a moment, were not even part of the national security consultations that both his department and the committee, through the study it did, actually took the time to examine.

More specifically, coming back to and concluding the point on Bill C-98, the minister does not seem to have acted in a prompt way, considering his commitments when it comes to oversight and/or a review of the CBSA. He said in his answer to my earlier question on his speech that it was not within the scope of this bill. That is interesting, not only because this is omnibus legislation, but also because the government specifically referred the legislation to committee prior to second reading with the goal of allowing amendments that were beyond the scope of the bill on the understanding that it did want this to be a large overhaul.

I have a hard time understanding why, with all the indicators being there that it wanted this to be a large, broad-reaching thing and wanted to have things beyond the scope, it would not have allowed for this type of mechanism. Instead, we find we have a bill, Bill C-98, arriving at the 11th hour, without a proper opportunity to make its way through Parliament before the next election.

I talked about how this is an omnibus bill, which makes it problematic in several ways. I wrote a letter to some senators about children whose names are on the no-fly list and the No Fly List Kids group, which the minister talked about. I know the group very well. I would like to congratulate the parents for their tireless efforts on their children's behalf.

Some of the children are on the list simply because the list is racist. Basically, the fact that the names appear multiple times is actually a kind of profiling. We could certainly have a debate about how effective the list is. This list is totally outdated and flawed because so many people share similar names. It is absurd that there was nothing around this list that made it possible for airlines and the agents who managed the list and enforced the rules before the bill was passed to distinguish between a terrorist threat and a very young child.

Again, I thank the parents for their tireless efforts and for the work they did in a non-partisan spirit. They may not be partisan, but I certainly am. I will therefore take this opportunity to say that I am appalled at the way the government has taken these families and children hostage for the sake of passing an omnibus bill.

The minister said that the changes to the no-fly list would have repercussions on a recourse mechanism that would stop these children from being harassed every time they go to the airport. This part of the bill alone accounted for several hundred pages.

I asked the government why it did not split this part from the rest of the bill so it would pass sooner, if it really believed it would deliver justice to these families and their kids. We object to certain components or aspects of the list. We are even prepared to challenge the usefulness of the list and the flaws it may have. If there are any worthy objectives, we are willing to consider them. However, again, our hands were tied by the use of omnibus legislation. During the election campaign, the Liberals promised to make omnibus bills a thing of the past.

I know parents will not say that, and I do not expect them to do so. I commend them again for their non-partisan approach. However, it is appalling and unacceptable that they have been taken hostage.

Moreover, there is also Bill C-21.

I will digress here for a moment. Bill C-21, which we opposed, was a very troubling piece of legislation that dealt with the sharing of border information with the Americans, among others. This involved information on citizens travelling between Canada and the United States. Bill C-59 stalled in the Senate, much like Bill C-21.

As the Minister of Public Safety's press secretary was responding to the concerns of parents who have children on the no-fly list, he suddenly started talking about Bill C-21 as a solution for implementing the redress system for people who want to file a complaint or do not want to be delayed at the airport for a name on the list, when it is not the individual identified. I think it is absolutely awful that these families are being used as bargaining chips to push through a bill that contains many points that have nothing to do with them and warrant further study. In my view, those aspects have not been examined thoroughly enough to move the bill forward.

I thank the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness for recognizing the work I did in committee, even though it took two attempts when he responded to my questions earlier today. In committee, I presented almost 200 amendments. Very few of them were accepted, which was not a surprise.

I would like to focus specifically on one of the Senate's amendments that the government agreed to. This amendment is important and quite simple, I would say even unremarkable. It proposes to add a provision enabling us to review the bill after three years, rather than five, and make amendments if required. That is important because we are proposing significant and far-reaching changes to our national security system. What I find intriguing is that I proposed the same amendment in committee, which I substantiated with the help of expert testimony, and the Liberals rejected my amendment. Now, all of a sudden, the Senate is proposing the same amendment and the government is agreeing to it in the motion we are debating today.

I asked the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness why the Liberals were not willing to put partisanship aside in a parliamentary committee and accept an opposition amendment that proposed a very simple measure but are agreeing to it today. He answered that they had taken the time to reflect and changed their minds when the bill was in the Senate. I am not going to spend too much of my precious time on that, but I find it somewhat difficult to accept because nothing has changed. Experts appeared before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, and it was very clear, simple and reasonable. Having said that, I thank the minister for finally recognizing this morning that I contributed to this process.

I also want to talk about some of what concerns us about the bill. There are two pieces specifically with regard to what was Bill C-51 under the previous government, and a few aspects new to this bill that have been brought forward that cause us some concern and consternation.

There are two pieces in Bill C-51 that raised the biggest concerns at the time of debate in the previous Parliament and raised the biggest concerns on the part of Canadians as well, leading to protests outside our committee hearings when we travelled the country to five major cities in five days in October 2016. The first has to do with threat disruption, and the second is the information-sharing regime that was brought in by Bill C-51. Both those things are concerning for different reasons.

The threat disruption powers offered to CSIS are of concern because at the end of the day, the reason CSIS was created in the first place was that there was an understanding and consensus in Canada that there had to be a separation between the RCMP's role in law enforcement, which is making arrests and the work that revolves around that, and intelligence gathering, which is the work our intelligence service has to do, so they were separated.

However, bringing us back closer to the point where we start to lose that distinction with regard to the threat disruption powers means that a concern about constitutionality will remain. In fact, the experts at committee did say that Bill C-59, while less unconstitutional than what the Conservatives brought forward in the previous Parliament, had yet to be tested, and there was still some uncertainty about it.

We still believe it is not necessary for CSIS to have these powers. That distinction remains important if we want to be in keeping with the events that led to the separation in the first place, namely the barn burnings, the Macdonald Commission and all those things that folks who have followed this debate know full well, but which we do not have time to get into today.

The other point is the sharing of information, which we are all familiar with. We opened the door to more liberal sharing of information, no pun intended, between the various government departments. That is worrisome. In Canada, one of the most highly publicized cases of human rights violations was the situation of Maher Arar while he was abroad, which led to the Arar commission. In such cases, we know that the sharing of information with other administrations is one of the factors that can lead to the violation of human rights or torture. There are places in the world where human rights are almost or completely non-existent. We find that the sharing of information between Canadian departments can exacerbate such situations, particularly when information is shared between the police or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Department of Foreign Affairs.

There is an individual who was tortured abroad who is currently suing the government. His name escapes me at the moment. I hope he will forgive me. Global Affairs Canada tried to get him a passport to bring him back to Canada, regardless of whether the accusations against him were true, because he was still a Canadian citizen. However, overwhelming evidence suggests that CSIS and the RCMP worked together with foreign authorities to keep him abroad.

More information sharing can exacerbate that type of problem because, in the government, the left hand does not always know what the right hand is doing. Some information can fall into the wrong hands. If the Department of Foreign Affairs is trying to get a passport for someone and is obligated by law to share that information with CSIS, whose interests are completely different than those of our diplomats, this could put us on a slippery slope.

The much-criticized information sharing system will remain in place with Bill C-59. I do not have the time to list all the experts and civil society groups that criticized this system, but I will mention Amnesty International, which is a well-known organization that does excellent work. This organization is among those critical of allowing the information sharing to continue, in light of the human rights impact it can have, especially in other countries.

Since the bill was sent back to committee before second reading, we had the advantage of being able to propose amendments that went beyond the scope of the bill. We realized that this was a missed opportunity. It was a two-step process, and I urge those watching and those interested in the debates to go take a look at how it went down. There were several votes and we called for a recorded division. Votes can sometimes be faster in committee, but this time we took the time to do a recorded division.

There were two proposals. The Liberals were proposing an amendment to the legislation. We were pleased to support the amendment, since it was high time we had an act stating that we do not support torture in another country as a result of the actions of our national security agencies or police forces. Nevertheless, since this amendment still relies on a ministerial directive, the bill is far from being perfect.

I also proposed amendments to make it illegal to share any information that would lead to the torture of an individual in another country. The amendments were rejected.

I urge my colleagues to read about them, because I am running out of time. As you can see, 20 minutes is not enough, but I would be happy to take questions and comments.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Madam Speaker, the reason is that the subject matter is different. Any security or intelligence activities of CBSA will in fact be reviewable under the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and under the provisions of Bill C-59. What remains to be done, and this is the subject of Bill C-98, is a review mechanism for the activities of CBSA that do not relate to national security and intelligence. That is what Bill C-98 covers. The intelligence and security part of CBSA is covered by Bill C-59 and by the previous bill, Bill C-22.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Madam Speaker, I think the hon. gentleman will find that the whole pattern of our amendments to national security law over the last three and a half years has in fact been to become more aligned, rather than less aligned, with our allies.

For example, our allies have had, for years, the concept of a parliamentary mechanism for reviewing security and intelligence activities. Canada had never had that, until this House passed Bill C-22 and created the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. All of our allies had that; we did not. We changed the law, and now that provision exists.

The point I was about to finish on the previous question was to give my colleague, the member for Beloeil—Chambly, some credit for actually having raised the three-year number in the first place. Now that it is going to be in the law, I think he can assume both some credit and some responsibility for that.

Extension of Sitting Hours

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

moved:

That, notwithstanding any Standing Order or usual practice of the House, commencing upon the adoption of this Order and concluding on Friday, June 21, 2019:

(a) on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays, the ordinary hour of daily adjournment shall be 12:00 a.m., except that it shall be 10:00 p.m. on a day when a debate, pursuant to Standing Order 52 or 53.1, is to take place;

(b) subject to paragraph (e), when a recorded division is requested in respect of a debatable motion, including any division arising as a consequence of the application of Standing Order 61(2) or Standing Order 78, but not including any division in relation to the Business of Supply or arising as a consequence of an order made pursuant to Standing Order 57, (i) before 2:00 p.m. on a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday, it shall stand deferred until the conclusion of Oral Questions at that day’s sitting, or (ii) after 2:00 p.m. on a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday, or at any time on a Friday, it shall stand deferred until the conclusion of Oral Questions at the next sitting day that is not a Friday, provided that, if a recorded division on the previous question is deferred and the motion is subsequently adopted, the recorded division on the original question shall not be deferred;

(c) notwithstanding Standing Order 45(6) and paragraph (b) of this Order, no recorded division in relation to any government order requested after 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, June 20, 2019, or at any time on Friday, June 21, 2019, shall be deferred;

(d) the time provided for Government Orders shall not be extended pursuant to Standing Order 45(7.1) or Standing Order 67.1(2);

(e) when a recorded division, which would have ordinarily been deemed deferred to immediately before the time provided for Private Members’ Business on a Wednesday governed by this Order, is requested, the said division is deemed to have been deferred until the conclusion of Oral Questions on the same Wednesday;

(f) any recorded division which, at the time of the adoption of this Order, stands deferred to immediately before the time provided for Private Members’ Business on the Wednesday immediately following the adoption of this Order shall be deemed to stand deferred to the conclusion of Oral Questions on the same Wednesday;

(g) a recorded division requested in respect of a motion to concur in a government bill at the report stage pursuant to Standing Order 76.1(9), where the bill has neither been amended nor debated at the report stage, shall be deferred in the manner prescribed by paragraph (b);

(h) for greater certainty, this Order shall not limit the application of Standing Order 45(7);

(i) when one or several deferred recorded divisions occur on a bill at report stage, a motion, “That the Bill be now read a third time and do pass”, may be made in the same sitting;

(j) no dilatory motion may be proposed after 6:30 p.m., except by a Minister of the Crown;

(k) notwithstanding Standing Orders 81(16)(b) and (c) and 81(18)(c), proceedings on any opposition motion shall conclude no later than 5:30 p.m. on the sitting day that is designated for that purpose, except on a Monday when they shall conclude at 6:30 p.m. or on a Friday when they shall conclude at 1:30 p.m.;

(l) during consideration of the estimates on the last allotted day, pursuant to Standing Order 81(18), when the Speaker interrupts the proceedings for the purpose of putting forthwith all questions necessary to dispose of the estimates, (i) all remaining motions to concur in the Votes for which a notice of opposition was filed shall be deemed to have been moved and seconded, the question deemed put and recorded divisions deemed requested, (ii) the Speaker shall have the power to combine the said motions for voting purposes, provided that, in exercising this power, the Speaker will be guided by the same principles and practices used at report stage;

(m) when debate on a motion for the concurrence in a report from a standing, standing joint or special committee is adjourned or interrupted, the debate shall again be considered on a day designated by the government, after consultation with the House Leaders of the other parties, but in any case not later than the 31st sitting day after the interruption; and

(n) Members not seeking re-election to the 43rd Parliament may be permitted to make statements, on Tuesday, June 4, and Wednesday, June 5, 2019, at the expiry of the time provided for Private Members’ Business for not more than three hours, and that, for the duration of the statements, (i) no member shall speak for longer than ten minutes and the speeches not be subject to a question and comment period, (ii) after three hours or when no Member rises to speak, whichever comes first, the House shall return to Government Orders.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to Motion No. 30, which allows for the extension of the sitting hours of the House until we rise for the summer adjournment.

I rise today to speak to Motion No. 30. This motion would allow for the extension of sitting hours of the House until we rise for the summer adjournment. There is a clear and recent precedent for this extension of hours to give the House more time to do its important work. It occurred last year at this time and also the year before that. As well, in the previous Parliament, the hours of the House were extended in June 2014.

Four years ago, our government came forward with an ambitious mandate that promised real change. Under the leadership of our Prime Minister, our government has introduced legislation that has improved the lives of Canadians from coast to coast to coast. However, we have more work to do.

So far in this Parliament, the House has passed 82 government bills, and 65 of those have received royal assent. The facts are clear. This Parliament has been productive. We have a strong record of accomplishment. It is a long list, so I will cite just a few of our accomplishments.

Bill C-2 made good on our promise to lower taxes on middle-class Canadians by increasing taxes on the wealthiest 1% of Canadians. There are nine million Canadians who have benefited from this middle-class tax cut. This tax cut has been good for Canadians and their families. It has been good for the economy and good for Canada, and its results have been better than advertised. On our side, we are proud of this legislation. We have always said that we were on the side of hard-working, middle-class Canadians, and this legislation is proof of exactly that.

As well, thanks to our budgetary legislation, low-income families with children are better off today. We introduced the biggest social policy innovation in more than a generation through the creation of the tax-free Canada child benefit. The CCB puts cash into the pockets of nine out of 10 families and has lifted nearly 300,000 Canadian children out of poverty.

Early in this Parliament, in response to the Supreme Court of Canada, we passed medical assistance in dying legislation, which carefully balanced the rights of those seeking medical assistance in dying while ensuring protection of the most vulnerable in our society.

Also of note, we repealed the previous government's law that allowed citizenship to be revoked from dual citizens. We also restored the rights of Canadians abroad to vote in Canadian elections.

We added gender identity as a prohibited ground for discrimination under the Canadian Human Rights Act. Also, passing Bill C-65 has helped make workplaces in federally regulated industries and on Parliament Hill free from harassment and sexual violence.

We promised to give the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer the powers, resources and independence to properly do its job. We delivered on that commitment through legislation, and the PBO now rigorously examines the country's finances in an independent and non-partisan manner.

Through Bill C-45, we ended the failed approach to cannabis by legalizing it and strictly regulating and restricting access to cannabis, as part of our plan to keep cannabis out of the hands of youth and profits out of the pockets of organized crime. Along with that, Bill C-46 has strengthened laws to deter and punish people who drive while impaired, both from alcohol and/or drugs.

These are just some examples of the work we have accomplished on behalf of Canadians.

We are now heading into the final weeks of this session of Parliament, and there is more work to do. Four years ago, Canadians sent us here with a responsibility to work hard on their behalf, to discuss important matters of public policy, to debate legislation and to vote on that legislation.

The motion to allow for the extension of sitting hours of the House is timely, and clearly it is necessary. We have an important legislative agenda before us, and we are determined to work hard to make even more progress.

Passage of this motion would give all members exactly what they often ask for: more time for debate. I know every member wants to deliver for their communities and this motion will help with exactly that. We have much to accomplish in the coming weeks and we have the opportunity to add time to get more done.

I would like to highlight a few of the bills that our government will seek to advance.

I will start with Bill C-97, which would implement budget 2017. This budget implementation act is about making sure that all Canadians feel the benefits of a growing economy. That means helping more Canadians find an affordable home, and get training so that they have the skills necessary to obtain good, well-paying jobs. It is also about making it easier for seniors to retire with confidence.

Another important bill is Bill C-92, which would affirm and recognize the rights of first nations, Inuit and Métis children and families. The bill would require all providers of indigenous child and family services to adhere to certain principles, namely the best interests of the child, family unity and cultural continuity. This co-drafted legislation would transfer the jurisdiction of child and family services delivery to indigenous communities. This is historic legislation that is long overdue.

We have another important opportunity for us as parliamentarians, which is to pass Bill C-93, the act that deals with pardons as they relate to simple possession of cannabis. As I mentioned, last year we upheld our commitment to legalize, strictly regulate and restrict access to cannabis. It is time to give people who were convicted of simple possession a straightforward way to clear their names. We know it is mostly young people from the poorest of communities who have been targeted and hence are being left behind. This bill would create an expedited pardon process, with no application fee or waiting period, for people convicted only of simple possession of cannabis. Canadians who have held criminal records in the past for simple possession of cannabis should be able to meaningfully participate in their communities, get good and stable jobs and become the contributing members of our society that they endeavour to be.

Meanwhile, there is another important bill before the House that we believe needs progress. Bill C-88 is an act to amend the Mackenzie Valley Resource Management Act and the Canada Petroleum Resources Act. This legislation only impacts the Northwest Territories, and its territorial government is asking us to act. This legislation protects Canada's natural environment, respects the rights of indigenous people and supports a strong natural resources sector. This bill will move the country ahead with a process that promotes reconciliation with indigenous peoples and creates certainty for investments in the Mackenzie Valley and the Arctic.

Earlier this month, our government introduced Bill C-98, an act to amend the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act and the Canada Border Services Agency Act. This bill would create civilian oversight of the Canada Border Services Agency. It would provide citizens with an independent review body to address complaints about the CBSA, just as they now have complaint mechanisms in place for the RCMP. Let me remind members that it was our government that brought forward Bill C-22 that established the national security intelligence committee of parliamentarians, which has tabled its first annual report to Parliament. We are committed to ensuring that our country's border services are worthy of the trust of Canadians, and Bill C-98 is a significant step towards strengthening that accountability.

We have taken a new approach. We, as a government, have consulted with Canadians when it comes to our legislation. We have seen committees call witnesses and suggest amendments that often times improve legislation, and we, as a government, have accepted those changes. We were able to accomplish this work because we gave the committees more resources and we encouraged Liberal members to do their work.

Likewise, currently there are two bills that have returned to the House with amendments from the Senate. I look forward to members turning their attention to these bills as well. One of those bills is Bill C-81, an act to ensure a barrier-free Canada. Our goal is to make accessibility both a reality and a priority across federal jurisdictions so that all people, regardless of their abilities or disabilities, can participate and be included in society as contributing members. Bill C-81 would help us to reach that goal by taking a proactive approach to getting ahead of systemic discrimination. The purpose of this bill is to make Canada barrier free, starting in areas under federal jurisdiction. This bill, if passed by Parliament, will represent the most significant legislation for the rights of persons with disabilities in over 30 years, and for once it will focus on their abilities.

The other bill we have received from the Senate is Bill C-58, which would make the first significant reforms to the Access to Information Act since it was enacted in 1982. With this bill, our government is raising the bar on openness and transparency by revitalizing access to information. The bill would give more power to the Information Commissioner and would provide for proactive disclosure of information.

There are also a number of other bills before the Senate. We have respect for the upper chamber. It is becoming less partisan thanks to the changes our Prime Minister has made to the appointment process, and we respect the work that senators do in reviewing legislation as a complementary chamber.

Already the Senate has proposed amendments to many bills, and the House has in many instances agreed with many of those changes. As we look toward the final few weeks, it is wise to give the House greater flexibility, and that is exactly why supporting this motion makes sense. This extension motion will help to provide the House with the time it needs to consider these matters.

There are now just 20 days left in the parliamentary calendar before the summer adjournment, and I would like to thank all MPs and their teams for their contributions to the House over the past four years. Members in the House have advanced legislation that has had a greater impact for the betterment of Canadians. That is why over 800,000 Canadians are better off today than they were three years ago when we took office.

We saw that with the lowering of the small business tax rate to 9%, small businesses have been able to grow through innovation and trade. We see that Canadians have created over one million jobs, the majority of which are full-time, good-paying jobs that Canadians deserve. These are jobs that were created by Canadians for Canadians.

That is why I would also like to stress that while it is necessary for us to have honest and vibrant deliberations on the motion, Canadians are looking for us all to work collaboratively and constructively in their best interests. That is exactly why extending the hours will provide the opportunity for more members to be part of the debates that represent the voices of their constituents in this place, so that we continue to advance good legislation that benefits even more Canadians.

It has been great to do the work that we have been doing, but we look forward to doing even more.

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act

[John McKay, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we have just seen a classic example of people not being able to get out of their partisan lanes.

We now know that the Liberals, the Conservatives, the NDP and the Green Party agree that Bill C-98 is a good bill and that it should move forward. However, what are we going to do? We are going to spend the rest of today, and possibly into the next sitting of the House, talking about a bill that we all agree is a good bill.

Every day that we talk about it here is a day we cannot talk about it in committee, which means that we cannot hear witnesses on the very issues the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands raised. We cannot deal with the issues the previous speaker raised, and we cannot bring in witnesses who have useful things to say about the operation of this bill.

This is a classic example of some dysfunctionality in this place at a level that is really quite distressing. Everyone agrees that this is a bill that needs to be passed. This is a bill that needs to hear witnesses. It is going before a committee that I have the great honour of chairing and that functions at a very high level. The member for Beloeil—Chambly is a very helpful and co-operative member, as is the member for Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles. Both are vice-chairs of the committee who help with getting legislation through. I daresay that there is not a great deal of distance between the government's position and the opposition parties' positions. The situation continues to evolve.

As the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands said, this sounds like an egregious set of facts for which there is no oversight body. That is why we are here. It is to get an oversight body put in place for the CBSA.

The CBSA apparently interacts with between 93 million and 96 million people on an annual basis. That is about three times the population of Canada on an annual basis. Some are citizen interactions, some are permanent resident interactions, some are visitor interactions and some are refugee claim interactions. I daresay that with 93 million to 96 million interactions on an annual basis, not every one will go well. That is something we are trying to correct.

There is something in the order of 117 land border crossings, some of which are fully staffed, such as at Toronto Pearson International Airport, Montréal-Trudeau International Airport or wherever, but others are simply a stake in the ground. There are about 1,000 locations across this long border over four time zones. The CBSA facilitates the efficient flow of people and goods, and it administers something in the order of 90 acts and regulations. It administers some of those acts and regulations on behalf of other levels of government.

In addition to having 93 million to 96 million interactions on an annual basis, the CBSA collects about $32 billion in taxes, levies and duties over the course of the year.

This is an enormous organization. It has enormous numbers of interactions with people, services and goods, and I dare say, not every one of them goes the way it should, as much as we would like to say otherwise. Hence the bill before us as we speak.

I heard the other speaker say that we have not had enough consultation, and the speaker before that said that all the government does is consultation. They cannot have it both ways. Either there is too much consultation or there is too little consultation.

All I know is that we have very little legislative runway left. We are speaking on a Friday afternoon about a bill that we all agree on, and by speaking on it, we are in fact preventing the bill from proceeding to committee, where it could be dealt with. I would be absolutely delighted to give up my time in order to let debate collapse and allow us to go to the vote, but there does not seem to be a huge amount of enthusiasm. Therefore, regrettably, members are going to have to listen to me talk for the next 15 minutes about a bill that we all agree on.

The unusual part of the situation in which we find ourselves is that unlike the case with the RCMP, unlike CSIS, unlike various other security services, there is no actual oversight body. That is a clear gap in the legislation.

Bill C-59, which I had the honour of shepherding through the committee, is an extraordinarily complicated piece of legislation.

I know, Mr. Speaker, that you love flow charts and appreciate the way in which legislation proceeds, and I commend you. The flow chart produced by Professor Forcese on Bill C-59 shows that Bill C-59 is extremely complicated in making sure that there are enough supervisory bodies for the various functions of CSIS, the RCMP, CSE, etc., spread over quite a number of agencies. There are at least three ministries responsible, those being defence, public safety and global affairs. It is an extraordinarily complicated piece of legislation. We anticipate and hope that it will return from the Senate and receive further debate here—though hopefully not too much—because it is really a revamping of the security architecture of our nation.

One of the gaps, as has been identified by other speakers, is the absence of an oversight body with respect to the activities of the Canada Border Services Agency. I expect to have an interaction with the Canada Border Services Agency in about two hours. Many of my colleagues will similarly be having interactions with the Canada Services Border Agency within a very short period of time, and I am rather hoping that my interaction and all of their interactions will go well, as I dare say they probably will.

The committee is now in place, and I want to talk about one further piece of legislation that has passed and is functioning, Bill C-22, which established the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. In addition to its reporting function to the Prime Minister, there is a reporting function to the public safety committee. I know you, Mr. Speaker, were present as the chair of that committee presented his first report to the public safety committee. I have to say that while listening to the interactions with the chair of that committee, I felt that the questions by the members of the public safety committee were of quite high calibre and gave very pointed and useful insight into the work of that committee.

Bill C-98 fills a gap. It is being strengthened and renamed the public complaints and review commission, or the PCRC, and will have, in effect, a joint responsibility for both the RCMP and the CBSA. If the PCRC were to receive a complaint from the public, it would notify the CBSA, which would undertake an initial investigation. I dare say that this would resolve a great percentage of the complaints the public may have. In fact, 90% of RCMP complaints are resolved in this way.

The PCRC would also be able to conduct its own investigation of a complaint if its chairperson was of the opinion that it would be in the public interest to do so. In those cases, the CBSA would not start an investigation into the complaint.

Therefore, in effect, there is an ability on the part of the CBSA to say it is not going to refer it to mediation or some further investigation, but to simply assume the jurisdiction and move forward with it. To make that request, the complaint would have to be made within 60 days of receiving notice from the CBSA about the outcome of the complaint. The idea here is that the complaint does not just languish.

When the PCRC receives a request for a review of a CBSA complaint decision, the commission would review the complaint and all relevant information and share its conclusions regarding the CBSA's initial decision. It could conclude that the CBSA's decision was appropriate, it could ask the CBSA to do a further investigation or it could assume the jurisdiction and investigate the complaint itself.

The commission can also hold public hearings as part of its work. At the conclusion of the PCRC investigation, the review body would be able to report on its findings and make recommendations as it sees fit, and the CBSA would be required to provide a response in writing to the PCRC's findings and recommendations.

In addition to its complaints function, the PCRC would be able to review, on its own initiative or at the request of the minister, any activity of the CBSA, except for national security matters. I think that is an important thing to take note of, because we do not want national security matters dealt with in an open and public forum, if at all possible. Then it would be reviewed by the national Security Intelligence Review Committee, under Bill C-59, which hopefully by then will be passed and brought into force.

PCRC reports would include findings and recommendations on the adequacy, appropriateness, sufficiency or clarity of the CBSA policies, procedures and guidelines, the CBSA's compliance with the law and ministerial directions, and the reasonableness and necessity of the CBSA's use of its power. On that latter point, the members previously have indicated instances where one would reasonably question the use, reasonableness and necessity of the CBSA's interactions with members of the public. Hopefully, with the passage of this bill and the setting up of the PCRC, those complaints would be adjudicated in a fashion that is satisfactory to both the service and members of the public.

With respect to both its complaint and review functions, the PCRC would have the power to summon and enforce the appearance of persons before it and compel them to give oral or written evidence under oath. It would have the power to administer oaths and to receive and accept oral and written evidence, whether or not the evidence would be admissible in a court of law. That provides a certain level of flexibility. As this is not a criminal case, we are not asking for a standard of beyond reasonable doubt; rather, by passing this legislation and giving these authorities, we are trying to create an environment in which issues can actually be resolved.

It would also have the power to examine any records and make any inquiries that it considers necessary. However, beyond its review and complaint functions, Bill C-98 would also create an obligation on the CBSA to notify local police and the PCRC of any serious incident involving CBSA officers or employees. That includes giving the PCRC the responsibility to track and publicly report on serious incidents, such as death, serious injury or Criminal Code violations involving the CBSA. Hopefully, we could reasonably anticipate a reduction in these incidents by virtue of just the very existence of this entity because, as has reasonably been said by speakers previously, there is nowhere to go when one has a complaint with the CBSA.

Operationally, the bill is worded in such a way as to give the PCRC the flexibility to organize its internal structure as it sees fit, and to carry out its mandate under both the CBSA Act and the RCMP Act. The PCRC could designate members of its staff as belonging either to the RCMP unit or the CBSA unit. Common services, such as corporate support, could still be shared between both units. There are several obvious benefits that can be generated by operating in this fashion. For example, expertise could be shared between the RCMP and the CBSA. Hopefully, by doing so, the agency would be strengthened. Clearly identifying which staff members are responsible would also help with the management of information.

In addition, a vice-chair and chair will be appointed to the PCRC, which would be mandatory. It would ensure that there will always be two individuals at the top who are capable of exercising decision-making powers.

Under Bill C-98, the PCRC would establish and publish an annual report covering each of its business lines, the CBSA and the RCMP, and the resources devoted to each. The report would summarize their operations throughout the year, such as the number and types of complaints and any review activities, and would provide information on the number, type and outcomes of serious incidents. I am hopeful that this will be a readily accessible report, transparent to all, so that those who follow these issues can operate from the same set of facts.

The annual report would be tabled in Parliament by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. Presumably, the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security would be able to review that report, call witnesses and examine the functionality of the entity.

The new public complaints and review commission proposed under Bill C-98 would close a significant gap in Canada's public safety accountability regime.

As I said earlier, the number of interactions we have with Canadians, visitors, landed folks, refugee claimants and others is quite significant, because Canada is open to receiving not tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands, but millions of people crossing the border on an annual basis. The legislation is long overdue.

I would urge my colleagues to get out of their partisan lanes and let the bill move to committee. The complaint seems to be that the bill is last minute and will therefore never see royal assent. Well, the bill will certainly never see royal assent if the chamber holds it up. All parties are responsible for House management, and I would urge all party representatives who are responsible for House management to let the bill move to committee sooner rather than later.

[Karen McCrimmon, Liberal, Kanata—Carleton, ON]

Mr. Speaker, since the fall of 2016, our government has been dramatically reshaping Canada’s security and intelligence apparatus to ensure that it has the authorities and the funding it needs in order to keep Canadians safe. At the same time, we have been ensuring that those agencies, which we trust with tremendous power, have strong and robust independent review mechanisms so that the public can be confident that they are using their powers appropriately.

These mechanisms instill confidence in the public that these agencies are using their powers appropriately. Since 2018, following the passage of Bill C-22, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, has been reviewing classified national security information. The committee, which is formed of three senators and eight elected members of Parliament, recently released its first annual report. This brings Canada into line with all four of our other Five Eyes alliance allies when it comes to parliamentary or congressional review of national security activities.

Bill C-59, which is currently awaiting third reading debate in the Senate, would create a national security and intelligence review agency. This would be a stand-alone review body that would incorporate the existing Security Intelligence Review Committee, or SIRC, which reviews the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, and the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, which reviews the Communications Security Establishment, CSE.

The agency would also have the powers and authorities to review any department with a national security function. Some academics and experts have dubbed this idea a “super SIRC“. They have argued for years that such a body is needed so that it can follow the thread of evidence from one department to another rather than ending its investigation at the boundaries of a single agency. The Federal Court has also suggested that this kind of super review agency needs to be created. We have done all of this so that Canadians can be confident that our security and intelligence community has the tools it needs to keep Canadians safe.

This brings me to Bill C-98. The one piece missing from this review architecture puzzle, should Bill C-59 pass, of course, is an independent review body for non-national security-related reviews of the Canada Border Services Agency, or CBSA. Bill C-98 would fill in that gap by creating PCRC, or the public complaints and review commission.

The new agency would combine the existing review body for the RCMP, known as the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, CRCC, with the yet to be created review body for the Canada Border Services Agency. It would add a mandatory new deputy chair position to the new agency. Budget 2019 has provided nearly $25 million over the next five years to ensure there is enough staff to take on this new important role.

I would now like to walk members through how the PCRC would work in practice. A Canadian who has a complaint about the actions or behaviour of a CBSA member would lodge a complaint with either the Canada Border Services Agency itself or the PCRC. Regardless of where it is filed, one agency would alert the other to the complaint. There will be no wrong door for Canadians to knock on. The system will work for them in either case.

The CBSA would then be required to investigate every complaint, much like the existing CRCC does for the RCMP. If the chair believes it would be in the public interest to do so, the PCRC can initiate its own investigation.

The vast majority of complaints to the CBSA are already handled to the satisfaction of the complainant. For those who are not satisfied, complainants would be informed that they can request a subsequent complaint review from the fully independent PCRC. The review agency would have full access to documents and the power to compel witnesses in order to ensure it can undertake a thorough investigation. If, upon review, the PCRC were not satisfied with the CBSA's investigations and conclusions, it would make a report with any findings and recommendations.

There are several areas that the CCRC would not be able to investigate because there are already existing bodies which could handle those types of complaints. For instance, officers of Parliament like the Privacy Commissioner and the Commissioner of Official Languages are best suited to deal with complaints that fall within their jurisdiction.

Should someone file a complaint with the CBSA or the CCRC that falls within those realms, either body would decline the complaint but inform that individual of the proper course of action.

The chair of the new PCRC would be able to conduct reviews of CBSA activities, behaviours, policies, procedures and guidelines not related to national security. National security reviews would, of course, be handled by NSIRA. The Minister of Public Safety could also ask the agency to undertake such a review.

In addition, the PCRC would be notified of any serious incident in which the actions of a CBSA officer may have resulted in serious injury or death. This includes immigration detainees who are being held in provincial corrections facilities on behalf of the CBSA. Further, the Minister of Public Safety or the president of the CBSA may deem that in incidents of such significance, the PCRC must investigate.

Bill C-98 would complete the review architecture for the public safety portfolio by creating a review body similar to the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, or the Office of the Correctional Investigator for Correctional Service Canada. This is another important step that would ensure Canadians have confidence in our border agency. However, it is far from the only improvement that our government has made over these past four years.

Let us take, for instance, the new immigration detention framework and its focus on best rights of the child, increased resources to combat gun and opioid smuggling at the border, and new money for detector dogs that will help to ensure African swine fever-contaminated meat does not enter Canada and decimate the stock of pork producers.

There is the new entry-exit legislation, which closes a major security gap by allowing us to know when someone is leaving the country, and the new Preclearance Act, which allows for the expansion of pre-clearance sites in all four modes: air, land, marine and rail. In addition, this act provides cargo pre-clearance to reduce wait times at the border.

Our government takes the security of Canada’s border seriously and knows that it not only needs to be secure from threats that would enter, but also be open to the legitimate travel and trade that drives our economy.

The time left in the 42nd Parliament is, unfortunately, growing short, and I am convinced that this piece of legislation would be, by leaps and bounds, an improvement over the status quo. There is a reason we committed to doing this particular action. We know that having independent oversight bodies will make a difference. We have worked hard to make that happen with the RCMP, and now our other national security agencies have the same kind of mechanisms. It is all about instilling confidence in the public that the powers our national security agencies have are being used appropriately and that their privacy, rights and freedoms are being respected. At the same time, our national security agencies are working hard to keep them safe.

One of the most significant steps forward was the implementation of Bill C-22 and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, because now we have representatives from Parliament actually having access to classified security information and making judgments about where we should go, what the priorities are and what the major threats are, and the committee members can share that information among themselves in a non-partisan way.

The chair of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians went before committee and talked about the work it does. It has issued its first annual report. The chair talked about the ability of this committee of parliamentarians to act in a non-partisan nature. That is what allows it to do the kind of work we need it to do. There are three senators and eight elected members of Parliament, and it is working. The other Five Eyes alliance countries have a parliamentary or congressional review body, and now Canada does too.

Bill C-59, which we have talked about, would create the national security and intelligence review agency. This stand-alone body would incorporate the existing Security Intelligence Review Committee, which reviews CSIS, and the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, which reviews CSE. Having this review function under one single umbrella would give it the flexibility and ability to focus where it believes it needs to be done. It would also have the power and authority to review any department with a national security function.

I like the name super-SIRC. I think it is representative of what we are trying to do, which is create an oversight organization that has the bandwidth and authority to review any national security agency's work to make sure that it is being done in terms of the legal authorities it has and that also has the ability to go across national security agencies if it needs to find information that pertains to a particular issue.

We have argued for years that we needed such a body that could follow a thread of evidence from one department to another, from one national security agency, across boundaries, to another. Even the Federal Court agrees that this kind of review agency needs to be created.

It comes back to having national security agencies that have the confidence of their people. I believe that now, with these independent oversight agencies that have been put in place, Canadians can be confident that our security and intelligence community has the tools to keep them safe while at the same time respecting their privacy, respecting their freedoms and respecting their rights.

The Canada Border Services Agency was the last piece. In Bill C-98, we would create the public complaints and review commission, the PCRC. This new agency would combine the existing review body for the RCMP, known as the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, with the yet to be created review body for the CBSA. It would add a mandatory new deputy chair position to the new agency.

I would like to walk the members through how the PCRC, the public complaints and review commission, would work in practice.

A Canadian who had a complaint about the actions or behaviour of a CBSA member would lodge a complaint with either the CBSA itself or with the public complaints and review commission. There would be two options to file a complaint. The system would be designed so that once a complaint was filed with one agency, it would automatically be transferred to the other agency. Both would know what was going on, and both would be responsible for addressing the particular complaint. On top of that, even if a complaint had not been issued, if the chair of the public complaints and review commission believed that it was in the public interest to do so, the public complaints and review commission could initiate its own investigation.

If one submitted a complaint to the CBSA and was not happy with the result, one could request a subsequent complaint review by the fully independent public complaints and review commission. This would give the agencies two opportunities to address complaints from the public. This review agency would have full access to documents and the power to compel witnesses to ensure that it could make a thorough investigation.

I am convinced that this piece of legislation is, by leaps and bounds, an improvement over the status quo. While some may want to improve some parts, I think most of us would agree that Canadians would be better off if this bill were to receive royal assent before we rise this summer. As we all know, Parliament can move quite expeditiously when we are all of a mind to do something in the public interest. If any of my colleagues in this chamber, on either side of the aisle, would like to discuss the prospects of this bill's passage, I would be pleased to have that conversation with them.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Okay, very good.

I just want to ask a more general question about the committee and how you operate now.

During study of Bill C-22, which is the legislation that created your committee, former CSIS director and national security adviser Richard Fadden said that the committee should go slow and see how the committee does.

Now that you have 16 to 18 months of operations under your belt, do you think there are aspects that the committee should consider changing in its operations, in its role or its access? I know you and Mr. Dubé just talked about the timeliness of its release once you give it to the PMO. Is there anything else you can think of? Would those changes be legislative or internal? There must be touchpoints now, some things you need to work on.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

We certainly see that, basically, colleagues from all parties who work with you on the NSICOP have done so seriously since it was created. That is also clear as we read your report. There is a desire to take the work very seriously.

However, we still have doubts about what will come of your reports. Right from when you submit a report in which you identified serious matters, the Prime Minister basically always has the last word.

The concern we have had since the beginning, when Bill C-22 was introduced, is about the way information is transmitted. Of course, we understand that highly secret information cannot be made public.

However, when the Prime Minister himself is the subject of a study, we don’t expect a response.

As chair of the committee, do you expect at the very least a reply to your studies from the government and the Prime Minister?

Opposition Motion—Terrorism

[Marco Mendicino, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Infrastructure and Communities, Lib.]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the member for London North Centre.

I appreciate the opportunity to add my voice to the debate on the motion before us.

I want to start by recognizing that we are having this debate four years to the day since the attack took the life of Corporal Nathan Cirillo just a few blocks from here. That attack was preceded two days earlier by the killing of Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec. I wish to attribute myself to the comments made during the debate on this motion honouring their sacrifice, as well as support for those hon. colleagues, first responders and public servants, both past and present, who served in Parliament on that horrific day.

Four years later, we stand here now to debate a motion brought forward by the member for Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles. It is an important motion. It is one that calls for the House to support the sentiments expressed by Nadia Murad, a Yazidi survivor who, along with her family, suffered at the hands of ISIS-Daesh, and later wrote about it. For her activism, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

Nadia Murad's story has inspired many to support the work of this government in providing refugees, and in particular Yazidi refugees, safe harbour. Among those who took up the cause for expanding our refugee humanitarian efforts is former leader of the opposition Rona Ambrose. She should be commended. We have provided a new home to more than 1,400 women and their families, who endured the brutality of Daesh, some 85% of whom are Yazidi.

This is good. It is moments like this, especially today, when we should put aside partisanship to stand together in the fight against terrorism. Millions of Syrians and Iraqis have been displaced, and thousands more killed or tortured at the hands of Daesh henchmen in the most gruesome and barbaric ways imaginable. Others were forced to endure unspeakable cruelty and violence on an almost daily basis. Perhaps no group has suffered more under its depraved rule than Yazidis and Yazidi women in particular.

This motion quotes the brave words of Ms. Murad, and we owe it to her and to ourselves to take them to heart, and to see to it that we defeat ISIS-Daesh and eradicate all forms of terrorism.

As a nation founded on democratic values, the rule of law and the institutions which safeguard the fundamental rights to which every individual is guaranteed, including freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of association and the right to due process, Canada has a vital role to play. We are fulfilling this role in a number of ways.

First, from a military perspective, Canada continues to participate in Operation Impact. We are a major partner in the fight against ISIS-Daesh. Operation Impact is a U.S.-led coalition, including 70 partners. Our objective is to contribute to the goal of ensuring a strong, stabilized region through support that is backed by $1.6 billion over three years to provide humanitarian, development and security support in the region. This includes providing local training and support to individuals who live in the region. Last year alone, we saw to it that ISIS-Daesh lost more than 60% of controlled territory in Iraq and 30% in Syria.

Canada's security, intelligence and police agencies have identified approximately 190 people with a connection to Canada who joined up with terrorist groups in various locations around the world, and remain abroad. That includes people who joined Daesh.

About 60 more have returned to Canada, a number relatively unchanged since 2015. Again, some of these people were in Daesh-controlled territory, but many were identified elsewhere. These individuals pose a potential threat, and we take that threat extremely seriously.

If at all possible, we want them to be arrested, charged, prosecuted and convicted for their crimes. Police and prosecutors do the difficult work of meeting Canadian evidentiary standards regarding activities committed in a distant war zone.

I can speak with some personal experience in this regard, having worked on a case involving domestic terrorism and national security. Certainly, the evidentiary standards, the rule law, the independence of the judiciary and the role that the prosecutor plays are absolutely essential in bringing terrorists to justice.

It is a testament to my former colleagues, as well as our partners in the national security and public safety spheres and all of their work that we have seen four of these travellers or returnees charged in the last couple years. Two have been convicted and two are still facing those charges in court. There are undoubtedly more criminal investigations under way. I would point out that no returnees were charged under the previous Conservative government.

At the same time as Canadian law enforcement goes about collecting the evidence required for prosecution, returnees can expect to be closely monitored by our intelligence and law enforcement agencies. These agencies work each and every day with international partners, including the Five Eyes, the G7, the EU, Interpol and many others. They have been doing so for years, and their expertise and capabilities are second to none. They expertly assess and reassess all data available to them to ensure Canada's responses can be effective and appropriate.

Our security agencies have a wide array of tools and powers at their disposal to keep Canadians safe. That includes surveillance and monitoring; revocation, cancellation or refusal of passports; the use of the no-fly list; peace bonds under the Criminal Code; and legally authorized threat reduction measures. Another tool is the RCMP-led National Security Joint Operations Centre.

The goal of the centre is to identify high-risk travellers and assess the threat that they may pose to our collective security. It is responsible for compiling and analyzing available information from Canada's security and intelligence community and uses this information to prioritize risk and to assist in coordinating an appropriate operational response. Canadians can be assured that our world-class security agencies actively track and assess any threat they may pose. Our government recognizes that the return of even one individual may have serious national security implications, and we continue to take those threats seriously.

The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness discussed the issue of extremist travellers with his G7 counterparts in Toronto earlier this year. In fact, most of the allies at that table have far more of their citizens involved with international terrorist groups than we do.

Our government has also introduced legislation to modernize Canada's national security framework, which was passed by the House last spring and is currently before the other place. This legislation is designed to ensure that our agencies continue to be effective at keeping Canadians safe from threats precisely like these. Along with the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians we established under Bill C-22, it enhances the accountability of our security agencies. Accountability is not just about ensuring that our rights and freedoms are protected, although that is obviously very important, but accountability and oversight are also about ensuring that our agencies are operating as effectively as possible to keep all of us safe.

There are parts of today's opposition motion that are clearly designed to use the serious issue of returning terrorists to score political points and we should discourage that. However, on the anniversary of the attack on the National War Memorial and Parliament Hill, I prefer to join in solidarity with our opposition colleagues, because I know we all stand firmly against terrorism, as we should. We all stand firmly in solidarity with Nadia Murad, the Yazidi Nobel laureate, in her call for the perpetrators of Daesh brutality to be brought to justice. We do that by adhering to the rule of law. We do that by adhering to the norms in our charter. We do that by extending respect for the judiciary, the representatives and officials who work in our public safety apparatus and who do an exceptional job every day.

The Prime Minister said earlier today:

As Canadians, we will not surrender to hatred, and let attacks like these divide us. In the face of cowardly violence and fearmongering, we will not compromise our most cherished values—freedom, democracy, diversity, and inclusion.

I hope that all members will endorse those words. For those reasons and for all the others I have stated in my remarks, I encourage all members to support this opposition motion.

National Security Act, 2017

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Madam Speaker, I rise tonight to speak against Bill C-59 at third reading. Unfortunately, it is yet another example of the Liberals breaking an election promise, only this time it is disguised as promise keeping.

In the climate of fear after the attacks on Parliament Hill and in St. Jean in 2014, the Conservative government brought forward Bill C-51. I heard a speech a little earlier from the member for Bellechasse—Les Etchemins—Lévis, and he remembers things slightly different than I. The difference is that I was in the public safety committee and he, as the minister, was not there. He said that there was a great clamour for new laws to meet this challenge of terrorism. I certainly did not hear that in committee. What I heard repeatedly from law enforcement and security officials coming before us was that they had not been given enough resources to do the basic enforcement work they needed to do to keep Canadians safe from terrorism.

However, when the Conservatives finally managed to pass their Anti-terrorism Act, they somehow managed to infringe our civil liberties without making us any safer.

At that time, the New Democrats remained firm in our conviction that it would be a mistake to sacrifice our freedoms in the name of defending them. Bill C-51 was supported by the Liberals, who hedged their bets with a promise to fix what they called “its problematic elements” later if they were elected. Once they were elected in 2015, that determination to fix Bill C-51 seemed to wane. That is why in September of 2016, I introduced Bill C-303, a private member's bill to repeal Bill C-51 in its entirety.

Some in the House at that time questioned why I introduced a private member's bill since I knew it would not come forward for a vote. In fact, this was an attempt to get the debate started, as the Liberals had already kept the public waiting for a year at that point. The New Democrats were saying, “You promised a bill. Well, here's our bill. It's very simple. Repeal all of C-51.”

Now, after more than two years and extensive consultations, we have this version of Bill C-59 before us, which does not repeal Bill C-51 and fails to fix most of the major problems of Bill C-51, it actually introduces new threats to our privacy and rights.

Let me start with the things that were described, even by the Liberals, as problematic, and remain unfixed in Bill C-59 as it stands before us.

First, there is the definition of “national security” in the Anti-terrorism Act that remains all too broad, despite some improvements in Bill C-59. Bill C-59 does narrow the definition of criminal terrorism speech, which Bill C-51 defined as “knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general”. That is a problematic definition. Bill C-59 changes the Criminal Code wording to “counsels another person to commit a terrorism offence”. Certainly, that better captures the problem we are trying to get at in the Criminal Code. There is plenty of existing case law around what qualifies as counselling someone to commit an offence. Therefore, that is much better than it was.

Then the government went on to add a clause that purports to protect advocacy and protest from being captured in the Anti-terrorism Act. However, that statement is qualified with an addition that says it will be protected unless the dissent and advocacy are carried out in conjunction with activities that undermine the security of Canada. It completes the circle. It takes us right back to that general definition.

The only broad definition of national security specifically in Bill C-51 included threats to critical infrastructure. Therefore, this still raises the spectre of the current government or any other government using national security powers against protesters against things like the pipeline formerly known as Kinder Morgan.

The second problem Bill C-59 fails to fix is that of the broad data collection information sharing authorized by Bill C-51, and in fact maintained in Bill C-59. This continues to threaten Canadians' basic privacy rights. Information and privacy commissioners continue to point out that the basis of our privacy law is that information can only be used for the purposes for which it is collected. Bill C-51 and Bill C-59 drive a big wedge in that important protection of our privacy rights.

Bill C-51 allowed sharing information between agencies and with foreign governments about national security under this new broad definition which I just talked about. Therefore, it is not just about terrorism and violence, but a much broader range of things the government could collect and share information on. Most critics would say Bill C-59, while it has tweaked these provisions, has not actually fixed them, and changing the terminology from “information sharing” to “information disclosure” is more akin to a sleight of hand than an actual reform of its provisions.

The third problem that remains are those powers that Bill C-51 granted to CSIS to act in secret to counter threats. This new proactive power granted to CSIS by Bill C-51 is especially troubling precisely because CSIS activities are secret and sometimes include the right to break the law. Once again, what we have done is returned to the very origins of CSIS. In other words, when the RCMP was both the investigatory and the enforcement agency, we ran into problems in the area of national security, so CSIS was created. Therefore, what we have done is return right back to that problematic situation of the 1970s, only this time it is CSIS that will be doing the investigating and then actively or proactively countering those threats. We have recreated a problem that CSIS was supposed to solve.

Bill C-59 also maintains the overly narrow list of prohibitions that are placed on those CSIS activities. CSIS can do pretty much anything short of committing bodily harm, murder, or the perversion of the course of democracy or justice. However, it is still problematic that neither justice nor democracy are actually defined in the act. Therefore, this would give CSIS powers that I would argue are fundamentally incompatible with a free and democratic society.

The Liberal change would require that those activities must be consistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That sounds good on its face, except that these activities are exempt from scrutiny because they are secret. Who decides whether they might potentially violate the charter of rights? It is not a judge, because this is not oversight. There is no oversight here. This is the government deciding whether it should go to the judge and request oversight. Therefore, if the government does not think it is a violation of the charter of rights, it goes ahead and authorizes the CSIS activities. Again, this is a fundamental problem in a democracy.

The fourth problem is that Bill C-59 still fails to include an absolute prohibition on the use of information derived from torture. The member for Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan made some eloquent statements on this with which I agree. What we have is the government saying that now it has included a cabinet directive on torture in Bill C-59, which gives the cabinet directive to force of law. The cabinet directive already has the force of law, so it absolutely changes nothing about this.

However, even worse, there is no absolute prohibition in that cabinet directive on the use of torture-implicated information. Instead, the prohibition says that information from torture can be used in some circumstances, and then it sets a very low threshold for when we can actually use information derived from fundamental rights violations. Not only is this morally repugnant, most likely unconstitutional, but it also gives us information that is notoriously unreliable. People who are being tortured will say precisely what they think the torturer wants them to say to stop the torture.

Finally, Bill C-59 would not do one of the things it could have done, and that is create a review agency for the CBSA. The CBSA remains without an independent review and complaints mechanism. It is one of our only law enforcement or security agencies that has no direct review agency. Yes, the new national security intelligence review agency will have some responsibility over the CBSA, but only in terms of national security questions, not in terms of its basic day-to-day operations.

We have seen quite often that the activities carried out by border agencies have a major impact on fundamental rights of people. We can look at the United States right now and see what its border agency is doing in the separation of parents and children. Therefore, it is a concern that there is no place in Canada, if we have a complaint about what CBSA has done, to file that complaint except in a court of law, which requires information, resources, and all kinds of other things that are unlikely to be available to those people who need to make those complaints.

The Liberals will tell us that there are some areas where they have already acted outside of Bill C-59, and we have just heard the member for Winnipeg North talk about Bill C-22, which established the national security review committee of parliamentarians.

The New Democrats feel that this is a worthwhile first step toward fixing some of the long-standing weaknesses in our national security arrangements, but it is still only a review agency, still only an agency making recommendations. It is not an oversight agency that makes decisions in real time about what can be done and make binding orders about what changes have to be made.

The government rejected New Democrat amendments on the bill, amendments which would have allowed the committee to be more independent from the government. It would have allowed it to be more transparent in its public reporting and would have given it better integration with existing review bodies.

The other area the Liberals claim they have already acted on is the no-fly list. It was interesting that the minister today in his speech, opening the third reading debate, claimed that the government was on its way to fixing the no-fly list, not that it had actually fixed the no-fly list. Canada still lacks an effective redress system for travellers unintentionally flagged on the no-fly list. I have quite often heard members on the government side say that no one is denied boarding as a result of this. I could give them the names of people who have been denied boarding. It has disrupted their business activities. It has disrupted things like family reunions. All too often we end up with kids on the no-fly list. Their names happen to be Muslim-sounding or Arabic-sounding or whatever presumptions people make and they names happen to be somewhat like someone else already on the list.

The group of no-fly list kids' parents have been demanding that we get some effective measures in place right away to stop the constant harassment they face for no reason at all. The fact that we still have not fixed this problem raises real questions about charter right guarantees of equality, which are supposed to be protected by law in our country.

Not only does Bill C-59 fail to correct the problems in Bill C-51, it goes on to create two new threats to fundamental rights and freedoms of Canadians, once again, without any evidence that these measures will make it safer.

Bill C-59 proposes to immediately expand the Communications Security Establishment Canada's mandate beyond just information gathering, and it creates an opportunity for CSE to collect information on Canadians which would normally be prohibited.

Just like we are giving CSIS the ability to not just collect information but to respond to threats, now we are saying that the Communications Security Establishment Canada should not just collect information, but it should be able to conduct what the government calls defensive cyber operations and active cyber operations.

Bill C-59 provides an overly broad list of purposes and targets for these active cyber operations. It says that activities could be carried out to “degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization or terrorist group as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.” Imagine anything that is not covered there. That is about as broad as the provision could be written.

CSE would also be allowed to do “anything that is reasonably necessary to maintain the covert nature of the activity.” Let us think about that when it comes to oversight and review of its activities. In my mind that is an invitation for it to obscure or withhold information from review agencies.

These new CSE powers are being expanded without adequate oversight. Once again, there is no independent oversight, only “after the fact” review. To proceed in this case, it does not require a warrant from a court, but only permission from the Minister of National Defence, if the activities are to be domestic based, or from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, if the activities are to be conducted abroad.

These new, active, proactive measures to combat a whole list and series of threats is one problem. The other is while Bill C-59 says that there is a still a prohibition on the Canadian Security Establishment collecting information on Canadians, we should allow for what it calls “incidental” acquisition of information relating to Canadians or persons in Canada. This means that in situations where the information was not deliberately sought, a person's private data could still be captured by CSE and retained and used. The problem remains that this incidental collecting, which is called research by the government and mass surveillance by its critics, remains very much a part of Bill C-59.

Both of these new powers are a bit disturbing, when the Liberal promise was to fix the problematic provisions in Bill C-51, not add to them. The changes introduced for Bill C-51 in itself are minor. The member for Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan talked about the changes not being particularly effective. I have to agree with him. I do not think they were designed to be effective. They are unlikely to head off the constitutional challenges to Bill C-51 already in place by organizations such as the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Those constitutional challenges will proceed, and I believe that they will succeed.

What works best in terrorism cases? Again, when I was the New Democrats' public safety critic sitting on the public safety committee when Bill C-51 had its hearings, we heard literally dozens and dozens of witnesses who almost all said the same thing: it is old-fashioned police work on the front line that solves or prevents terrorism. For that, we need resources, and we need to focus the resources on enforcement activities at the front end.

What did we see from the Conservatives when they were in power? There were actual cutbacks in the budgets of the RCMP, the CBSA, and CSIS. The whole time they were in power and they were worried about terrorism, they were denying the basic resources that were needed.

What have the Liberals done since they came back to power? They have actually added some resources to all of those agencies, but not for the terrorism investigation and enforcement activities. They have added them for all kinds of other things they are interested in but not the areas that would actually make a difference.

We have heard quite often in this House, and we have heard some of it again in this debate, that what we are talking about is the need to balance or trade off rights against security. New Democrats have argued very consistently, in the previous Parliament and in this Parliament, that there is no need to trade our rights for security. The need to balance is a false need. Why would we give up our rights and argue that in doing so, we are actually protecting them? This is not logical. In fact, it is the responsibility of our government to provide both protection of our fundamental rights and protection against threats.

The Liberals again will tell us that the promise is kept. What I am here to tell members is that I do not see it in this bill. I see a lot of attempts to confuse and hide what they are really doing, which is to hide the fundamental support they still have for what was the essence of Bill C-51. That was to restrict the rights and freedoms of Canadians in the name of national security. The New Democrats reject that false game. Therefore, we will be voting against this bill at third reading.

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Canadian Heritage (Multiculturalism)]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the member for Oakville North—Burlington this evening.

I rise today to speak in support of Bill C-59. With this bill, our government is entrenching our commitment to balancing the primacy of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms with protecting our national security. We are enhancing accountability and transparency. We are correcting the most problematic elements of the Harper government's old Bill C-51.

Our government conducted an unprecedented level of public consultation with Canadians about our national security in order to effectively develop the bill. Canadians told us loudly and clearly that they wanted a transparent, accountable, and effective national security framework. That is exactly what we will accomplish with Bill C-59.

The minister took the rare step of referring Bill C-59 to the Standing Committee on Public Safety after first reading, underscoring our government's commitment to Canadians to ensure that we got this important legislation right. Prior to the bill returning to this chamber, it underwent an extensive four-month study, hearing from nearly 100 witnesses. I would like to thank the members of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for their hard work in studying the bill extensively and for their comprehensive report.

Fundamental to our promise to bring our national security framework into the 21st century, we are fixing the very flawed elements of the old Bill C-51, which I heard so much about from my constituents in Parkdale—High Park during the 2015 electoral campaign.

I am proud to support this evidence-based, balanced legislation, and I am reassured to see positive reactions from legal and national security experts right around the country, including none other than Professors Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, two of the foremost legal academics in Canada who have been at the centre of concerns about the overreach of the Harper government's old Bill C-51.

Professors Forcese and Roach have said, “Bill C-59 is the biggest overhaul in Canadian national security since the creation of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1984—and it gets a lot of things right."

Bill C-59 builds on our commitment to enhance accountability, which started with our government's introduction of Bill C-22 in 2016. Bill C-22, which has received royal assent established an all-party committee of parliamentarians, representatives elected by the Canadian public, to review and critically analyze security and intelligence activities. For the first time in history, a multi-party group of members of this chamber as well as the Senate are now holding Canada's security apparatus to account.

We are building on Bill C-22 with the current bill, Bill C-59, which would establish a national security and intelligence review agency. The NSIRA, as it would be known, would function as a new expert review body with jurisdiction across the entire government to complement the efforts of the recently established parliamentary oversight committee, which I just mentioned. This feature would incorporate one of the important recommendations of the Maher Arar inquiry, which called on the government to, and I am citing recommendation 16 from the Maher Arar inquiry, “develop a protocol to provide for coordination and coherence across government in addressing issues that arise” respecting national security.

With the establishment of a parliamentary oversight committee in Bill C-22, and a new arm's-length review body in Bill C-59, we would be addressing the glaring gap that exists in our review bodies for national security agencies. Currently, some agencies do not have a review body or are in charge of reviewing themselves. We cannot allow the lack of such fundamental oversight to continue, especially with regard to the safety and security of Canadians.

As Professors Forcese and Roach have observed, with respect to Bill C-59:

the government is finally redressing the imbalance between security service powers and those of the review bodies that are supposed to hold them to account. Bill C-59 quite properly supplements the parliamentary review committee...with a reformed expert watchdog entity. Expert review will be liberated from its silos as the new review agency has a whole-of-government mandate.

This is a critical piece in our government's work, providing my constituents in Parkdale—High Park and indeed Canadians right around this country, with a comprehensive and responsible national security framework.

In addition to establishing the NSIRA, Bill C-59 calls for increased and improved communication between this organization and other relevant review bodies, such as the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. This will not only boost efficiency and avoid duplication and unnecessary use of resources, but also promote a more holistic approach to protecting privacy and security at the federal level.

While speaking with the residents of Parkdale—High Park in 2015, I heard about the Harper government's old Bill C-51 over and over again at the doors. The major concern the residents expressed to me was about the threat posed by the previous government's Bill C-51 to their constitutional rights and freedoms. The residents of my community are an intelligent and engaged group of citizens, and they were on to something. The federal government, under the guise of “public security”, cannot be permitted to infringe on the rights and freedoms that are fundamental to our very society, to what it means to be Canadian.

Yes, ensuring public safety is the pre-eminent responsibility of any government, but it is simply not acceptable to pursue security at any cost. My constituents, and indeed all Canadians, expect a government that respects fundamental constitutional rights, a government that will put in place mechanisms and safeguards to protect those rights.

That is precisely what Bill C-59 would achieve. How? First, it would tighten the definition of what constitutes “terrorist propaganda”. The narrower and more targeted definition would ensure that the sacrosanct protection of freedom of expression under section 2(b) of our charter is observed, and that our security laws in Canada are not so overreaching as to limit legitimate critique and debate.

Second, as a corollary to this point, Bill C-59 would also protect the right of all Canadians to legitimate protest and advocacy. One of the most searing criticisms of the Harper government's old Bill C-51 was that bona fide protestors who dared to disagree with the government of the day could be caught up in a web of security sweeps, all in the name of public safety.

That is not how our Liberal government operates. We respect the charter and the right of all Canadians to engage in legitimate protest and advocacy, whether they represent a group with charitable status that opposes a government policy, or a gathering of students on a university campus who take up the call for more aggressive investment of federal funds to support the expansion of women's rights internationally.

That kind of advocacy is not a threat to our public security. To the contrary, it is an enhancement of our democracy. It is civil society groups and public citizens doing exactly what they do best, challenging government to do, and to be, better.

In Bill C-59, we recognize this principle. We are saying to Canadians that they have constitutional rights to free speech and protest, and that we are going to affirm and protect those rights by correcting the balance between protecting safety and respecting the charter.

Third, Bill C-59 would also upgrade procedures as they relate to the no-fly list. We know that the no-fly list is an important international mechanism for keeping people safe, but its use has expanded to the point of encroaching on Canadians' rights. In Bill C-59, we are determined to address this imbalance.

Our changes to the no-fly list regime would do the following. They would require the destruction of information provided to the minister about a person who was, or was expected to be, on board an aircraft within seven days following the departure or cancellation of the flight. It would also authorize the minister to collect information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity.

This is a critical step that would provide us with the legislative tools needed to develop a domestic redress mechanism. The funding for a domestic redress mechanism was delivered by our government this year, specifically $81.4 million in budget 2018. However, in order to start investing this money in a way that would allow Canadians, including children, who are false positives on the no-fly list to seek redress, we need legislative authority. Bill C-59 would provide that legislative authority.

Finally, with Bill C-59 we would re-establish the paramountcy of the charter. I speak now as a constitutional lawyer who practised in this area for 15 years prior to being elected. It is unfortunate that the paramountcy of the Constitution needs to be entrenched in law. As a lawyer, I know, and we should all know, that the Constitution is always the paramount document against which all other laws are measured. Nevertheless, the previous government's disdain for the charter has made this important step necessary.

Through Bill C-59, we would entrench, in black and white, that any unilateral action by CSIS to collect data in a manner that might infringe on the Constitution is no longer permitted. Instead, under Bill C-59, any such proposals would have to come before a judge, who must evaluate the application in accordance with the law, where protecting charter rights would be the paramount concern. Our party helped establish the charter in 1982, and our government stands behind that document and all the values and rights it protects.

As I and many others have said before in the House, the task is to balance rights and freedoms while upholding our duty to protect the safety of Canadians. That is not an easy task, but I am confident that Bill C-59, in partnership with Bill C-22, would provide a comprehensive and balanced approach to national security. It is respectful of the charter and our Constitution. That is why I support this bill, and I ask all members to do the same.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Mr. Speaker, I have had the opportunity to discuss this legislation with Mr. Fadden, as well as the previous bill, Bill C-22, the committee of parliamentarians. In putting together this legislation, as with Bill C-22, I have had the opportunity also to benefit from his input and his good advice.

The issues we are dealing with here are complex and that does require a degree of complexity and sophistication in the legislation. However, I have every confidence with the talent that exists in our security, police, and intelligence agencies and with the resources that will be provided to those agencies that they will be able to do the jobs that we expect them to do, keeping Canadians safe, safeguarding rights and freedoms, and do that all, while they also account publicly to Canadians for their conduct and behaviour. There is no reason why the two have to be mutually exclusive.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

moved that Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters, be read the third time and passed.

Mr. Speaker, as I open this final third reading debate on Bill C-59, Canada's new framework governing our national security policies and practices, I want to thank everyone who has helped to get us to this point today.

Historically, there were many previous studies and reports that laid the intellectual groundwork for Bill C-59. Justices Frank Iacobucci, John Major, and Dennis O'Connor led prominent and very important inquiries. There were also significant contributions over the years from both current and previous members of Parliament and senators. The academic community was vigorously engaged. Professors Forcese, Roach, Carvin, and Wark have been among the most constant and prolific of watchdogs, commentators, critics, and advisers. A broad collection of organizations that advocate for civil, human, and privacy rights have also been active participants in the process, including the Privacy Commissioner. We have heard from those who now lead or have led in the past our key national security agencies, such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the RCMP, the Communications Security Establishment, the Canada Border Services Agency, Global Affairs Canada, the Privy Council Office, and many others. While not consulted directly, through their judgments and reports we have also had the benefit of guidance from the Federal Court of Canada, other members of the judiciary, and independent review bodies like the Security Intelligence Review Committee, and the commissioner for the Communications Security Establishment.

National security issues and concerns gained particular prominence in the fall of 2014, with the attacks in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and here in Ottawa, which spawned the previous government's Bill C-51, and a very intense public debate.

During the election campaign that followed, we undertook to give Canadians the full opportunity to be consulted on national security, actually for the first time in Canadian history. We also promised to correct a specific enumerated list of errors in the old Bill C-51. Both of those undertakings have been fulfilled through the new bill, Bill C-59, and through the process that got us to where we are today.

Through five public town hall meetings across the country, a digital town hall, two national Twitter chats, 17 engagement events organized locally by members of Parliament in different places across the country, 14 in-person consultations with a broad variety of specific subject matter experts, a large national round table with civil society groups, hearings by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, and extensive online engagement, tens of thousands of Canadians had their say about national security like never before, and all of their contributions were compiled and made public for everyone else to see.

Based upon this largest and most extensive public consultation ever, Bill C-59 was introduced in Parliament in June of last year. It remained in the public domain throughout the summer for all Canadians to consider and digest.

Last fall, to ensure wide-ranging committee flexibility, we referred the legislation to the standing committee before second reading. Under the rules of the House, that provides the members on that committee with a broader scope of debate and possible amendment. The committee members did extensive work. They heard from three dozen witnesses, received 95 briefs, debated at length, and in the end made 40 different amendments.

The committee took what all the leading experts had said was a very good bill to start with, and made it better. I want to thank all members of the committee for their conscientious attention to the subject matter and their extensive hard work.

The legislation has three primary goals.

First, we sought to provide Canada with a modern, up-to-date framework for its essential national security activity, bearing in mind that the CSIS Act, for example, dates back to 1984, before hardly anyone had even heard of the information highway or of what would become the World Wide Web. Technology has moved on dramatically since 1984; so have world affairs and so has the nature of the threats that we are facing in terms of national security. Therefore, it was important to modify the law, to bring it up to date, and to put it into a modern context.

Second, we needed to correct the defects in the old Bill C-51, again, which we specifically enumerated in our 2015 election platform. Indeed, as members go through this legislation, they will see that each one of those defects has in fact been addressed, with one exception and that is the establishment of the committee of parliamentarians, which is not included in Bill C-59. It was included, and enacted by Parliament already, in Bill C-22.

Third, we have launched the whole new era of transparency and accountability for national security through review and oversight measures that are unprecedented, all intended to provide Canadians with the assurance that their police, security, and intelligence agencies are indeed doing the proper things to keep them safe while at the same time safeguarding their rights and their freedoms, not one at the expense of the other, but both of those important things together.

What is here in Bill C-59 today, after all of that extensive consultation, that elaborate work in Parliament and in the committees of Parliament, and the final process to get us to third reading stage? Let me take the legislation part by part. I noticed that in a ruling earlier today, the Chair indicated the manner in which the different parts would be voted upon and I would like to take this opportunity to show how all of them come together.

Part 1 would create the new national security and intelligence review agency. Some have dubbed this new agency a “super SIRC”. Indeed it is a great innovation in Canada's security architecture. Instead of having a limited number of siloed review bodies, where each focused exclusively on one agency alone to the exclusion of all others, the new national security and intelligence review agency would have a government-wide mandate. It would be able to follow the issues and the evidence, wherever that may lead, into any and every federal department or agency that has a national security or intelligence function. The mandate is very broad. We are moving from a vertical model where they have to stay within their silo to a horizontal model where the new agency would be able to examine every department of government, whatever its function may be, with respect to national security. This is a major, positive innovation and it is coupled, of course, with that other innovation that I mentioned a moment ago: the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians created under Bill C-22. With the two of them together, the experts who would be working on the national security and intelligence review agency, and the parliamentarians who are already working on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, Canadians can have great confidence that the work of the security, intelligence, and police agencies is being properly scrutinized and in a manner that befits the complexity of the 21st century.

This scrutiny would be for two key purposes: to safeguard rights and freedoms, yes absolutely, but also to ensure our agencies are functioning successfully in keeping Canadians safe and their country secure. As I said before, it is not one at the expense of the other, it is both of those things together, effectiveness coupled with the safeguarding of rights.

Then there is a new part in the legislation. After part 1, the committee inserted part 1.1 in Bill C-59, by adding the concept of a new piece of legislation. In effect, this addition by the committee would elevate to the level of legislation the practice of ministers issuing directives to their agencies, instructing them to function in such a manner as to avoid Canadian complicity in torture or mistreatment by other countries. In future, these instructions would be mandatory, not optional, would exist in the form of full cabinet orders in council, and would be made public. That is an important element of transparency and accountability that the committee built into the new legislation, and it is an important and desirable change. The ministerial directives have existed in the past. In fact, we have made them more vigorous and public than ever before, but part 1.1 would elevate this to a higher level. It would make it part of legislation itself, and that is the right way to go.

Part 2 of the new law would create the new role and function of the intelligence commissioner. For the first time ever, this would be an element of real time oversight, not just a review function after the fact. The national security and intelligence review agency would review events after they have happened. The intelligence commissioner would actually have a function to perform before activities are undertaken. For certain specified activities listed in the legislation, both the Canadian security intelligence agency and the Communications Security Establishment would be required to get the approval of the intelligence commissioner in advance. This would be brand new innovation in the law and an important element of accountability.

Part 3 of Bill C-59 would create stand-alone legislative authority for the Communications Security Establishment. The CSE has existed for a very long time, and its legislation has been attached to other legislation this Parliament has previously passed. For the first time now, the CSE would have its own stand-alone legal authorization in new legislation. As Canada's foreign signals intelligence agency, CSE is also our centre for cybersecurity expertise. The new legislation lays out the procedures and the protection around both defensive and active cyber-operations to safeguard Canadians. That is another reason it is important the CSE should have its own legal authorization and legislative form in a stand-alone act.

Part 4 would revamp the CSIS Act. As I mentioned earlier, CSIS was enacted in 1984, and that is a long time ago. In fact, this is the largest overall renovation of the CSIS legislation since 1984. For example, it would ensure that any threat reduction activities would be consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It would create a modern regime for dealing with datasets, the collection of those datasets, the proper use of those datasets, and how they are disposed of after the fact. It would clarify the legal authorities of CSIS employees under the Criminal Code and other federal legislation. It would bring clarity, precision, and a modern mandate to CSIS for the first time since the legislation was enacted in 1984.

Part 5 of the bill would change the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to the security of Canada information disclosure act. The reason for the wording change is to make it clear that this law would not create any new collection powers. It deals only with the sharing of existing information among government agencies and it lays out the procedure and the rules by which that sharing is to be done.

The new act will clarify thresholds and definitions. It will raise the standards. It will sharpen the procedures around information sharing within the government. It will bolster record keeping, both on the part of those who give the information and those who receive the information. It will clearly exempt, and this is important, advocacy and dissent and protest from the definition of activities that undermine national security. Canadians have wanted to be sure that their democratic right to protest is protected and this legislation would do so.

Part 6 would amend the Secure Air Travel Act. This act is the legislation by which Canada establishes a no-fly list. We all know the controversy in the last couple of years about false positives coming up on the no-fly list and some people, particularly young children, being prevented from taking flights because their name was being confused with the name of someone else. No child is on the Canadian no-fly list. Unfortunately, there are other people with very similar names who do present security issues, whose names are on the list, and there is confusion between the two names. We have undertaken to try to fix that problem. This legislation would establish the legal authority for the Government of Canada to collect the information that would allow us to fix the problem.

The other element that is required is a substantial amount of funding. It is an expensive process to establish a whole new database. That funding, I am happy to say, was provided by the Minister of Finance in the last budget. We are on our way toward fixing the no-fly list.

Part 7 would amend the Criminal Code in a variety of ways, including withdrawing certain provisions which have never been used in the pursuit of national security in Canada, while at the same time creating a new offence in language that would more likely be utilized and therefore more useful to police authorities in pursuing criminals and laying charges.

Part 8 would amend the Youth Justice Act for the simple purpose of trying to ensure that offences with respect to terrorism where young people are involved would be handled under the terms of the Youth Justice Act.

Part 9 of the bill would establish a statutory review. That is another of the commitments we made during the election campaign, that while we were going to have this elaborate consultation, we were going to bring forward new legislation, we were going to do our very best to fix the defects in Bill C-51, and move Canada forward with a new architecture in national security appropriate to the 21st century.

We would also build into the law the opportunity for parliamentarians to take another look at this a few years down the road, assess how it has worked, where the issues or the problems might be, and address any of those issues in a timely way. In other words, it keeps the whole issue green and alive so future members of Parliament will have the chance to reconsider or to move in a different direction if they think that is appropriate. The statutory review is built into Part 9.

That is a summary of the legislation. It has taken a great deal of work and effort on the part of a lot of people to get us to this point today.

I want to finish my remarks with where I began a few moments ago, and that is to thank everyone who has participated so generously with their hard work and their advice to try to get this framework right for the circumstances that Canada has to confront in the 21st century, ensuring we are doing those two things and doing them well, keeping Canadians safe and safeguarding their rights and freedoms.

[Yvonne Jones, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak today to the bill. Bill C-59 is legislation that our government committed to prior to the last election. It came from a very disconcerting perspective that Canadians had with regard the legislation passed by the former government, Bill C-51.

Bill C-59 would enhance Canada's national security, while safeguarding the values, rights and freedoms of Canadians. That is very important. The bill before the House today would uphold our commitment to fix the problematic elements of the former Bill C-51, notably by tightening the definition of “terrorist propaganda”; protecting the right to advocate and protest; upgrading the no-fly list procedures; and ensuring the paramountcy of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It would also strengthen our accountability and transparency by creating the national security and intelligence review agency and a position of intelligence commissioner. These would complement the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, which was created by Bill C-22.

In addition, Bill C-59 would also bring our security and intelligence legislation into the 21st century. Much of that legislation was written in the 1980s, before the revolution of information technology, which has transformed the national security and the intelligence landscape. Bill C-59 would ensure that our agencies could keep pace with evolving threats and to keep us safe, and that our laws would also keep pace in order to protect Canadians' rights and freedoms in the digital world.

Canadians had asked for the bill. It is what Canadians wanted. It is the result of being able to modernize our national security system in the country, doing so with the input of Canadians and many experts from across the country.

Today, I am pleased to speak about the proposed amendments in the bill to the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which is included in part 8 of the National Security Act of 2017. Through this set of amendments, our government is taking action to ensure that all youth, who are involved in the criminal justice system, are afforded the enhanced procedural and other protections provided by Canada's Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Before addressing the substance of the proposed amendments, I would like to provide a bit of background about the Youth Criminal Justice Act so people understand this federal law. We call it the YCJA, and it is the law that governs Canada's justice system for youth. It applies to young people between the ages of 12 to 17 who commit criminal offences, including terrorism offences. They are dealt with under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The act recognizes that the youth justice system must be separate from the adult system and it must be based on the principle of diminished moral blameworthiness of youth. It emphasizes rehabilitation and reintegration, just and proportionate responses to offending, and enhanced procedural protections for youth. The act also recognizes the importance of involving families, victims, and communities in the youth criminal justice system.

The YCJA contains a number of significant legal safeguards to ensure that young people are treated fairly and that their rights are fully protected. For example, as a general rule, the privacy of youth who are dealt with under the YCJA is protected through publication bans on their identity and significant restrictions to access to youth records. Young people also have enhanced rights to counsel, including state-provided counsel, and the right to have parents or other guardians present throughout key stages of the investigative and judicial processes.

While many aspects of the criminal procedure are similar in the youth and adult criminal justice system, the YCJA establishes distinct legal principles, projections, and options for dealing with youth who are alleged to have committed a criminal offence.

If a young person is charged, all proceedings take place in youth court. As I previously noted, while youth court proceedings are open to the public, the YCJA imposes restrictions on the publication of a youth's identity.

In addition, the YCJA establishes clear restrictions on access to youth records, setting out who may access the records, the purpose for which youth records may be used, and the time periods during which access to the records is even permitted.

Generally speaking, the penalties that are set out in the Criminal Code do not apply to youth. Instead the Youth Criminal Justice Act sets out the specific youth sentencing principles, their options, and their durations. There are a broad range of community-based youth sentencing options and clear restrictions on the use of custodial sentences.

As we turn to Bill C-59, it is important to recognize that there have been very few cases in Canada in which a young person has become involved in the youth criminal justice system due to terrorism-related offences. Nonetheless, it is important to ensure that when this does occur, the young person is afforded all of the enhanced procedural and other protections under the Youth Criminal Justice Act as other youth criminals are afforded.

Part 8 of Bill C-59 would amend certain provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act to ensure that youth protections would apply in relation to anti-terrorism and other recognizance orders. It would also provide for access to youth records for the purposes of administering the Canadian passport order, which I will explain a bit further in a few moments, and would be subject to the special privacy protections set out in the act. This would eliminate any uncertainty about the applicability of certain provisions to a youth for whom a recognizance order is being sought, including provisions relating to a youth's right to counsel and to detention of the youth.

In addition, there is currently no access period identified for records relating to recognizance orders, so the YCJA would be amended to provide that the access period for these records would be six months after the order expires.

In addition, Part 8 of Bill C-59 would amend the act to specifically permit access to youth records for the purpose of administering Canada's passport program. The Canadian passport order contemplates that passports can be denied or revoked in certain instances of criminality or in relation to national security concerns.

For example, section 10.1 of the Canadian passport order stipulates that the Minister of Public Safety may decide to deny or revoke a passport if there are reasonable grounds, including that revocation is necessary to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence, or for the national security of Canada or a foreign country or state. Basically, the amendment would allow the Canadian passport office to access this information. Of course it would still fall within the privacy regulations of the country, but it would allow the office to assess an application and to determine if a youth would still be a security threat to Canada.

Canadians can be assured that our government is addressing national security threats, while continuing to protect the democratic values, rights, and freedoms of Canadians. We feel that along with other elements of the national security reform package that has been put forward by our government, these laws reform measures and demonstrate a commitment to ensuring that our laws are fair, that they are effective, and that they respect the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

As my colleagues look through Bill C-59, they will note that tremendous effort has been made on behalf of the minister and many in Parliament to ensure that the legislation responds to the safety and security needs of Canadians in a democratic way, in the way that Canadians have asked.

The bill has been through many hours of consultation. It has been through many hours of debate both in committee and the House of Commons. People from each end of the country have had an opportunity to provide feedback into the reforms of Bill C-51, which is now compiled as Bill C-59.

The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service Act ensures there is accountability of Canadian security and intelligence services for all Canadians. This legislation responds to what Canadians have asked for and it is supported by experts who study this field within Canada.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to rise in the House today to speak in support of Bill C-59. It has been very interesting to listen to the speeches, especially the last one, because they really exemplify why people in my community were so concerned about the way the previous government handled our national security issues and framework. It really epitomizes the concerns. Canadians were looking for balance, and that is what we brought back in Bill C-59, rather than fearmongering.

I will read an important quote, based on what we have heard. Professor Kent Roach provided a brief to the committee on November 28, 2017, in which he stated:

Review and careful deliberation is not the enemy of security.... There are no simple solutions to the real security threats we face. We should be honest with Canadians about this stubborn reality. All of us should strive to avoid reducing complex laws and processes to simplistic slogans. These are difficult issues and they should be debated with care and respect to all sides.

With that in mind, I will speak to this bill.

This important piece of legislation proposes a range of measures that represent a complete and much-needed overhaul of Canada's national security framework. I was proud to sit as a member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security that reviewed this bill. We heard from expert witnesses and put forward amendments to improve this proposed legislation. The bill was referred to committee at first reading, which increased the scope of our review, and our committee took this responsibility seriously. Taking into account what I said about not taking on a partisan tone, I want to commend all of the members from all parties who served on that committee, and the chair, because we worked very well together on this bill.

There are two aspects of Bill C-59 that are particularly important to me and my community. First, vastly improved and increased oversight mechanisms would be put in place to review the work of our security agencies. The oversight would increase the accountability and transparency of these agencies, and this should give us all great confidence in the framework put forth in this proposed legislation.

The second part of this bill that responds to issues raised by people in my community is the improved framework for the management of the Secure Air Travel Act. In particular, I am talking about concerns raised by parents with children who were subject to false positive name matches on what we call the “no-fly list”, as well as adults who were subject to false positive name matches. They came to me with their concerns, and I have been happy to advocate on their behalf.

The introduction of Bill C-59 followed unprecedented public consultations held in person and online. Thousands of Canadians answered the call and shared their thoughts and opinions on a range of topics related to national security. In my community, I hosted a consultation at Jimmy Simpson Community Centre, which was facilitated by my colleague, the member for Oakville North—Burlington. The input from that meeting was provided to the minister as part of the consultation, which led to the tabling of the bill. I really need to emphasize that one of the primary concerns raised by people was a lack of oversight and a need to ensure that charter rights were being respected.

Across the country, not just in my community, tens of thousands of views were heard, collected, documented, and analyzed as part of what our government would put together as a response, and citizens, parliamentarians, community leaders, national security experts, and academics provided valuable input that played an important role in shaping this bill. I would like to commend the study on our national security framework carried out by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, which formed a valuable part of that input. I was not part of the committee when that study was done, but it was a very important background document for the committee as it studied this bill.

Canadians were clear about one thing when they were consulted in 2016: they expected their rights, freedoms, and privacy to be protected at the same time as their security, and that is the balance that I referred to at the outset of my speech. More specifically, Canadians want to protect our freedom of speech, which is a fundamental freedom in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and they want to be protected against unlawful surveillance. I strongly believe that the proposed measures in Bill C-59 would meet those expectations.

Let me begin by speaking about the oversight brought forth in Bill C-59.

The result of the public consultations undertaken in 2016 showed a strong desire from Canadians for increased accountability and more transparency on national security. Also, the weakness of our existing oversight mechanisms had been noted by Justice O'Connor in the Arar commission. One of the commission's conclusions was that the review of our security agencies was stovepiped, meaning that the review was limited to each individual agency and there was no overarching system of review. The commission suggested that there be bridges built between existing review bodies. Getting rid of this stovepiped review is one of the most important aspects of this bill.

Bill C-59 builds upon the first cross-agency layer of oversight, which was adopted by this place with the passing of Bill C-22, which created the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. The committee has begun its work and is an important means of providing that overarching review.

The legislation we are debating today proposes the creation of a new, comprehensive national security review body, the national security and intelligence review agency, the NSIRA. This new review body would replace the Security Intelligence Review Committee and the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner. It would also take on the review of the RCMP's national security activities, currently done by the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP.

A significant benefit of the proposed model is that the new review body would be able to review relevant activities across the Government of Canada, rather than just being able to look at one agency. This model recognizes the increasingly interconnected nature of the government's national security and intelligence activities. The new body would ensure that Canada's national security agencies are complying with the law and that their actions are reasonable and necessary. Its findings and recommendations would be provided to relevant ministers through classified reports. It would also produce an unclassified annual report to Parliament summarizing the findings and recommendations made to ministers.

I had the opportunity to ask the Minister of Public Safety and National Security when he appeared at committee about one aspect of the oversight I would like to see added. On this point, I am referring to the review of the Canada Border Services Agency. The minister assured us at committee that this aspect is being worked on by our government, and I will continue to advocate for this important addition.

Before leaving the issue of oversight, I would also like to note that the legislation proposes to create an intelligence commissioner to authorize certain intelligence and cybersecurity activities before they take place. This is an important addition that speaks to many concerns raised by people in my community about wanting proper checks and balances on our security agencies.

Another issue that I mentioned at the outset that was very important to people in my community was the challenges faced by people who have children with a name that creates a false positive when it matches a name that is on the no-fly list. These families are unable to check in for a flight online, which can result in missed flights if a plane is overbooked, but more importantly, these families feel stigmatized and uncomfortable being stopped in the airport for additional screening based on the false positive.

This legislation, along with funding that was made available in the last budget, would change that system. I was pleased to ask the minister when these changes could be put into place. He advised us it would take about three years to make these necessary changes, but it is something that gives hope to many people in my community, and I am happy to see it being done.

These are only a few of the measures in Bill C-59 that show tremendous improvements and respond to the issues raised by people in my community. I am very happy to be here today to speak in favour of the bill.

Report stage

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, at this point in the proceedings, we can get back to the topic of Bill C-59 for what is really, under our procedures, both a report stage debate and a second reading debate.

I am very pleased today to rise in support of Bill C-59, as it has emerged from the standing committee, the government's proposed legislation to update and modernize our country's national security framework. This landmark bill covers a number of measures that were informed very throughly by the views and opinions of a broad range of Canadians during extensive public consultations in 2016.

It was in that same spirit of openness, engagement, and transparency that Bill C-59 was referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security before second reading. The committee recently finished its study of the bill.

I want to thank members of that committee for their diligent and thorough examination of the legislation, both during their consideration of the bill, and indeed, during their pre-study of this subject matter in 2016, which contributed significantly to the drafting of Bill C-59 itself.

An even stronger bill, with over 40 amendments accepted, is now back before the House. The amendments would bring greater clarity, transparency, accountability, and public reporting. One of the major changes made by the committee was the addition of a new act in the bill, entitled avoiding complicity in mistreatment by foreign entities act.

Last fall we undertook to enhance and make public a previously secret 2011 ministerial directive to both CSIS and the RCMP that dealt with how those agencies should share and receive information with and from foreign entities when there was a risk that the information may have been derived by, or could result in, torture or mistreatment. Obviously, it is important to have ministerial directives governing such a serious topic.

The goal of my directive was to establish strong safeguards to ensure that information shared by Canada would not lead to mistreatment and that Canada would not use any information that could be tainted by mistreatment, with one exception. That is when it is essential to prevent the loss of life or serious injury.

The new avoiding complicity in mistreatment by foreign entities act would go a step further than ministerial directives. It would create a statutory requirement for such directives to exist in the form of orders in council, and not just for CSIS and the RCMP but for all departments and agencies that deal with national security. It would also require that each of those directives in the orders in council be made public.

This amendment, which is now in Bill C-59, is another example of how this legislation would strive constantly to achieve two things simultaneously. This bill would strengthen Canada's ability to effectively address and counter 21st-century threats while safeguarding the rights and freedoms we cherish as Canadians.

Bill C-59 is the result of the most comprehensive review of Canada's national security framework since the passing of the original CSIS Act more than 30 years ago. That review included unprecedented open and transparent public consultations on national security undertaken by Public Safety Canada and by the Department of Justice.

Several issues were covered, including countering radicalization to violence, oversight, and accountability, threat reduction and the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, the former Bill C-51. All Canadians were invited and encouraged to take part in the consultations, which were held between September and December of 2016.

The response to the consultations was tremendous. Citizens, community leaders, experts, academics, non-governmental organizations, and parliamentarians alike made their views and ideas known over the course of that consultation period. In the end, tens of thousands of views were received, all of which were valuable in shaping the scope and the content of Bill C-59.

With almost 59,000 responses received, the online consultation was what generated by far the largest volume of input. In addition to that, there were nearly 18,000 submissions received by email. In addition, public town halls were held in five Canadian cities: Halifax, Markham, Winnipeg, Vancouver, and Yellowknife. This gave citizens across the country a chance to share their thoughts and opinions in person.

The Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security held numerous meetings on the consultations. It even travelled across the country to hear testimony not only from expert witnesses, but also general members of the public who were invited to express their views.

A digital town hall and two Twitter chats were also organized.

Members of the public also had the opportunity to make their voices heard at 17 other engagement events led by different members of Parliament at the constituency level.

In addition, 14 in-person sessions were held with academics and experts across the country, as well as a large round table with experts from civil society.

I simply make the point that there was an extensive effort to be open, to be inclusive, to ensure that every Canadian who had something to say on this topic could have the opportunity to do that. This was not a process reserved for politicians in Parliament or for experts in ivory towers. This was an open, public, inclusive process, and Canadians let their voices be heard.

After all of that information was collected, the next step was to carefully analyze every comment, every submission, every letter, and all of the other forms of input. All of the views that had been expressed to the various consultative mechanisms have now been published on the Government of Canada's open data portal, so anyone interested in actually seeing who said what to whom throughout the whole consultation process can look it up and see what the dialogue was like.

In addition to that, an independently prepared report provides an overview of what was heard during the consultations.

While it would be difficult to summarize everything that we heard from Canadians in a consultation process that massive, I can speak to a few of the key themes and ideas that emerged.

As one might expect, given the thousands of submissions, there were widely differing opinions. That is what we would expect from Canadians who are very engaged in an important discussion. Certainly that was the case in these consultations.

The results make one thing perfectly clear. Canadians want accountability. They want transparency and effectiveness from their security and intelligence agencies. They want all three of those things, accountability, transparency, and effectiveness, together. They want the government and Parliament to achieve all of those things at once. Bill C-59 goes farther and better than any other piece of legislation in Canadian history to accomplish those three things together.

Canadians expect their rights, their freedoms, and their privacy to be protected at the same time as their security is protected.

Consistent with what we heard, Bill C-59 would modernize and enhance Canada's security and intelligence laws to ensure our agencies would have the tools they needed to protect us and it would do so within a clear legal and constitutional framework that would comply with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

There is no doubt in my mind that the legislation before the House today has been strengthened and improved by the result of the close work that was done by the standing committee. All the scrutiny and clause-by-clause analysis and consideration, all the debate around all of those various amendments has resulted in a better product.

When we tabled this legislation, and before the committee did its work, many of the most renowned experts in the country said that it was very good legislation and that it accomplished more in the field of national security than any other proposal since the CSIS Act was first introduced. That was a great compliment coming from the imminent experts who made those observations. However, now, after the debate, after all of the input, after all of the amendments, the legislation is even better.

One of the things I am most proud of with respect to Bill C-59 is how it represents a dynamic shift in the review and accountability structure for our entire national security apparatus. Currently, some of our agencies that deal in national security have a review body that examines their work. CSIS of course has the Security Intelligence Review committee, SIRC. The RCMP has the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, CRCC. Those are a couple of examples. However, there is no unified review body that can look beyond one agency at a time and actually follow the evidence as it moves across government from agency to agency.

For the first time, Bill C-59 would fix this problem by creating the national security and intelligence review agency, or NSIRA. NSIRA is largely modelled on the often discussed idea of a “super SIRC”, which would have the authority to review all matters of national security, whether they are with CSIS, or CBSA, or IRCC, or the RCMP, or Global Affairs, or DND, or anywhere else in the Government of Canada.

When we link that to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, which was recently created by the passage of Bill C-22, Canadians can be assured that we have a review architecture in place that is required for the 21st century. It involves parliamentarians, through the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. It involves expert review through NSIRA. In addition to that, it involves, for the first time ever, a brand new innovation that we have introduced, a new element of actual real-time oversight, which has never existed before, through the work of the new intelligence commission, which is also created by virtue of this legislation, Bill C-59.

We also worked to ensure that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the central principle behind Bill C-59. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than the changes we have made to the former Bill C-51's threat reduction measures.

When Bill C-51 created these threat reduction measures, it created an open-ended, seemingly limitless course of possible action for CSIS to take. This bill would create a closed list of specific actions that CSIS could apply to a federal court for permission to undertake. It is open, it is transparent, while at the same time gives CSIS the tools it needs to keep Canadians safe.

Another part of the former Bill C-51 that we have undertaken to dramatically improve is the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, or SCISA. After Bill C-59 is enacted, this new legislation will be renamed to the security of Canada information disclosure act, and it will not grant any new powers to collect information on Canadians. Rather it is a roadmap for how existing information related to a threat to the security of Canada can and should be shared between departments and agencies in order to mitigate or eliminate that threat.

It clarifies that advocacy, protest, dissent, or artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada, and it creates a robust review framework to ensure that information is being disclosed to other departments appropriately, with proper record-keeping at both ends of the process.

Next I want to touch on an issue that I believe almost every member of the House supports, and that is the fixing of the passenger protect program, or what is sometimes known as the “no-fly list”.

I imagine that virtually every member of the chamber has met with a member of the group called “No-Fly List Kids” at some point during this Parliament. To be clear, there are currently no children on Canada's passenger protect list. However, there are children and adults who may share a name with someone who is on the list. Former defence minister Bill Graham famously had to deal with this very problem when someone sharing his name was actually listed.

Fixing the problem involves both funding and new legislation. Bill C-59 will play an important role, allowing the government to collect domestic passenger manifests and screen the list itself, rather than sharing our passenger protect list with over 100 airlines around the world. What this means is that once the government is collecting the passenger manifests, it will be able to issue redress numbers to people who share a name with a listed individual. Anyone who has booked a flight to the United States in the past few years has probably noticed that their system has a box for a unique redress number. Once Canada's system is up and running, it will operate in a very similar fashion.

I would also note that we got the necessary funding to develop this new system this past March, in the most recent budget. This measure is another excellent example of ensuring that the rights of Canadians are respected while at the same time safeguarding national security.

There are many other important parts of Bill C-59 that I will not have the time in 20 minutes to go through in detail. However, I would like to just mention some of the others—for example, the new stand-alone legislation to modernize Canada's Communications Security Establishment. It has needed this modernization. It has needed this new legislation for a long time. Bill C-59 introduces that legislation.

There are also important changes to the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which ensures that protections are afforded to young Canadians in respect of recognizance orders.

Changes in the Criminal Code would, among other things, require the Attorney General to publish an annual report setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into during the course of the year. Also, there are very important changes to the CSIS Act that would ensure that our security agents are confident they have the legal and constitutional authority to undertake their essential work on behalf of all Canadians, including, for example, the complex matter of handling data sets, taking into account the advice and judgments of recent decisions in the federal courts.

Should Bill C-59 pass, this historic piece of legislation would enhance Canada’s national security, keep its citizens safe, and safeguard Canadians’ constitutionally protected rights and freedoms.

For all these reasons, I would encourage all hon. colleagues to join me in supporting Bill C-59. I am glad it enjoys strong support among Canadians generally and among some of our country's most distinguished experts in national security and civil liberties. We have been very fortunate to have the benefit of their advice as we have moved this legislation through the parliamentary process.

Public Safety

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. gentleman is a distinguished lawyer and knows very well that I cannot comment on the items that are included in his question.

However, I can tell him that the issue of transparency and accountability is taken very seriously by our government. We have implemented measures in Bill C-59, in Bill C-22, and we have published the first-ever ministerial directives with respect to the issue of torture in dealing with international entities.

I am pleased to say that he is one of the members of Parliament that in fact serves on the national security and intelligence—

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Chair.

I'm leaning towards opposing this amendment. We came across this problem when we debated Bill C-22, creating the committee of parliamentarians, in terms of this notion of ongoing investigations. We can look at a situation like the Afghan detainees or Air India where those investigations could have been subject to this type of provision.

Interestingly, often some of our opposition amendments are rejected by those on the other side, on the grounds that these things are built into the legislation and understood in more subjective ways. This time I will be the one deploying that argument, because I believe it's understood that these review agencies are doing after-the-fact review at any rate, which was part of the rationale for rejecting my previous amendment about making orders that creep into oversight territory.

I believe that given that it already has a review function, and the fact that this kind of amendment could infringe on some of the more serious cases we've seen in Canadian history with regard to things spanning decades but where investigations were ongoing. This argument could have been made by authorities in those cases, and I don't think it's at all appropriate.

As I said, I would refer folks to the debate we had on Bill C-22 with the committee of parliamentarians where we heard evidence to that effect as well.

Opposition Motion—National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the government is trying to dodge the issue because we pointed out that there is a problem with debate at the committee of parliamentarians created by Bill C-22. Everything that happens within that committee is top secret. No information comes from the committee. A report was put on the Prime Minister's desk.

The problem is that the Prime Minister is involved in this situation. There is the Prime Minister's version and then there is everyone else's version. How can we get an answer if only the committee has the information? They really want to bury the truth.

[Michel Picard, Liberal, Montarville, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his question.

Not only do we have high standards for the quality and professionalism of our staff, but creating this committee of parliamentarians with Bill C-22 also shows that we want to enhance as much as possible what we want in terms of monitoring, if I may put it that way, to ensure we have the highest standards of quality and meet the expectations of all Canadians.

It is vital that national security matters be examined by the right people, in the right way, with a recognized protocol and process, in a confidential manner, where it is important and in a transparent manner, as necessary.

As for the second part of the question, at no time did we refuse. In fact, the motion moved this morning at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security simply implemented a previous request to adjourn debate. It was not a refusal, but simply a delay, because it was the subject of debate in the House today.

[Michel Picard, Liberal, Montarville, QC]

Mr. Speaker, thank you for giving me the opportunity to have a say in this debate.

The answer regarding the invitation in India is already quite clear. The invitation should have in fact never been extended and, as we have said many times, when the existence of the invitation was discovered, we withdrew it immediately. Another point: we have full confidence in Canada’s security advisors and diplomatic advisors, who consistently act impartially in the best interests of Canadians.

The opposition raises the importance of ensuring that parliamentarians are kept informed of security issues. On that, we absolutely agree. We agreed when former national security minister Anne McLellan introduced Bill C-81 in 2005 establishing a national security committee of parliamentarians. This bill died on the Order Paper when Stephen Harper’s Conservatives took office in 2006.

We agreed when former Liberal MP Derek Lee introduced a similar bill in 2007, when our colleague from Malpeque did the same in 2009, and when the member for Vancouver Quadra did so in 2014.

Each time, the Conservatives opposed the idea that parliamentarians of all parties and of both Houses should have access to secret information, and that they be kept informed of national security issues in Canada.

Fortunately, as my colleagues know, Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, received royal assent in June 2017.

Then, in November, the Prime Minister made it official by saying that “[i]n our system of responsible government, there is no substitute for scrutiny by parliamentarians.”

I am pleased to say that the committee is now in place. Its mandate is to review any matter relating to national security for all government departments and agencies. It will be supported by an independent secretariat headed by an executive director, who will be appointed shortly. The committee will be composed of eight MPs and three senators, all of them holding the highest security clearances.

It is now the appropriate vehicle for parliamentarians to thoroughly review and report on certain national security matters.

The committee is able to analyze the work of a wide range of government departments and agencies involved in security and intelligence.

Establishing this committee closed a loophole in our national security accountability framework. Before, Canada was an outlier in the Five Eyes alliance, since it was the only one not to have such a committee. However, establishing this committee has made Canada a transparency and accountability leader since our committee of parliamentarians has access to ongoing national security and intelligence operations.

By contrast, our committee’s Australian equivalent may only conduct statutory reviews or consider their agencies’ spending and administration. It must obtain a minister’s order to review other matters.

In our case, if the committee believes that a national security matter warrants review, it may simply do so.

In the United Kingdom, the committee must obtain a memorandum of understanding from the Prime Minister in order to review matters that go beyond the work of the three British agencies.

Our committee, with its distinctly Canadian design, has a much broader reach than those of two of our important foreign allies, who also have a Westminster-style system similar to ours.

I was pleased to witness the various debates during all the readings and to see how thorough a review it was given by the standing committee.

The expert consensus is that this new committee strengthens the accountability and effectiveness of Canada’s national security and intelligence system. Bill C-59 will further strengthen it by establishing the national security and intelligence review agency.

Since the current government took office, Canada has made great strides in national security transparency and accountability.

All that is to say that when I hear the opposition insist that parliamentarians should have access to security information, I cannot help but contrast the Conservative decade with the past two years.

The Harper government repeatedly rejected the principles of transparency and accountability when it came to national security. The current government acted to bring in significant transparency, openness and accountability with respect to national security.

We should all be confident that Canada’s security advisors and diplomatic advisors act impartially and in the best interests of Canadians.

They deserve much better than the insinuations and allegations on which this motion is based. I for one have full confidence in their professionalism, expertise, and service to Canada.

Opposition Motion—National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Madam Speaker, in response to an invitation from Indian Prime Minister Modi, the Prime Minister of Canada concluded his first official visit to India last month. He was accompanied by six ministers in the official delegation. Fourteen members of Parliament participated in key elements of the program.

Recognizing that the relationship is underpinned by people-to-people ties, the Prime Minister incorporated a strong focus on education and youth in the program, reflecting Canada's 1.4 million Canadians of Indian heritage, and cognizant of Canada's geostrategic and commercial interests in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Prime Minister's objective was clear: to reaffirm that Canada stands with a united India. Recognizing that the relationship between Canada and India is based on a shared commitment to pluralism, diversity, and democracy, the Prime Minister visited cultural and religious sites of significance to people in Canada, India, and around the world.

During the visit, the Prime Minister met with India's Prime Minister Modi, India's President Kovind, the Minister of External Affairs, business executives and entrepreneurs, civil society advocates, academics, and thought leaders.

The Prime Minister visited the world's most populous democracy, the fastest-growing major economy in the world, and a society on the cusp of dramatic cultural, political, and economic transformation. India's economic heft is increasing. Its middle class is expanding, and its global influence grows stronger every day.

Over the past few years, Canada's relationship with India has thrived. We have expanded and deepened our traditional areas of engagement. However, Canadians expect the Prime Minister to do more, to welcome more skilled workers, to attract more students to study in Canada, to facilitate the ease of doing business with and investing in India. Canada's Prime Minister took the pulse of the change afoot in India in order to guide Canadian stakeholders through this transformation.

The relationship between Canada and India is strong and mutually beneficial. Two-way trade between Canada and India is estimated to have reached $8.34 billion in calendar year 2017. This represents an increase of 3.9% over 2016, and an increase of over 30% just in the last three years. There is an estimated 1,000 Canadian companies active in the India market, of which 400 have a physical presence in the country.

Despite these impressive figures, there is a palpable sense that Canada-India trade should be higher than it is right now, that there is enormous potential in India. The fact that our trade and investment numbers are low relative to the size of our GDP is just one example. On the same note, our negotiations on a comprehensive economic partnership agreement, known as CEPA, and a foreign investment protection and promotion agreement, known as FIPA, are important priorities for both countries.

Closing these bilateral agreements has proven to be long and arduous, and we are not quite there yet. However, Canada shares the same objective as India: to work together to create economic growth, prosperity, and good middle-class jobs and more opportunities for our citizens.

To this end, in the joint statement issued by the leaders on February 23, Canada and India agreed to intensify negotiations to finalize both CEPA and FIPA. As well, Canada and India finalized a memorandum of understanding between Global Affairs Canada's investment and innovation bureau and Invest India, which will enhance two-way investment between the two countries.

The Prime Minister welcomed the conclusion of, and progress on, co-operation agreements in areas such as civil nuclear science and technology, education, audiovisual production, information technology, intellectual property, sports, and many other areas.

The leaders agree to encourage the private sector to explore further investment opportunities, and they welcome the signing of the commercial agreement, which will create thousands of new economic opportunities and jobs for both countries.

Clearly, this was a valuable international trip to engage with an increasingly important global partner, India. This brings me to the subject of today's supply day motion.

Unfortunately, the subject the opposition has chosen to put forward in today's supply day motion calls into question the professionalism of some of our most senior public servants in the country. Canada's national security agencies are non-partisan, as well they must be. They are highly competent and highly effective. We trust them to protect and promote Canada's security. They continue to do an excellent job in serving and protecting the interests of Canadians regardless of what party might be in power. We respect our national security agencies and we respect the non-partisan public service. We respect their ability to provide non-partisan advice, including on operational issues that bear upon national security.

As has been explained to the House on many occasions, the invitation to Mr. Atwal should never have been sent. When the government became aware of the invitation, it was withdrawn. The member of Parliament who extended that invitation has apologized for doing so.

Our security and intelligence agencies are highly competent and do their jobs extremely well. Our government has been working to ensure they continue to do that work despite deep cuts that were made by the previous Conservative government. In fact, in their last four years in power, the Conservatives cut $1 billion from our national security and intelligence agencies.

By contrast, the Liberal government has been providing them with integrity funding as we undertake reviews to ensure they have the resources to match their mandates and the difficult tasks we ask them to do every day on behalf of Canadians. More than that, we are restoring the public trust and confidence in our security and intelligence agencies that eroded over the 10 years of the previous Harper government.

Last year, Parliament passed Bill C-22, which created the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. For well over a decade, experts, academics, and parliamentary committees, including ones that I was on, have called for a committee of parliamentarians that would be mandated to review the work of our security and intelligence agencies and who would have the appropriate clearance to review all classified material. That committee is now up and running. It is currently reviewing and taking a look at our national security and intelligence apparatus.

We are also enhancing and making major changes to the existing review bodies by combining all entities with a mandate to review an individual department or agency into one body. Some academics have referred to this for years as a super SIRC. This too was called for in Justice Iacobucci's report and Justice O'Connor's report. Certainly in my time as the critic for public safety when I was in opposition, it was something that we called for and something that the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security called for.

We are calling it NSIRA, the national security intelligence review agency. There are benefits of having one review body that can actually follow the evidence as it moves from one agency to another. As an example, if SIRC were currently reviewing a CSIS operation and found that at one point CSIS had turned it over to the RCMP for an investigation, SIRC would not be able to follow the trail to see what the RCMP had done with that information. In other words, the security and intelligence review of matters would be siloed and there would not be the ability to follow them from one agency to the other. This would make knowing exactly what went on or what went wrong nearly impossible.

The Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, CRCC, could review what the RCMP has done with that information in the example that I gave earlier, but it would not be able to know what CSIS did in order to obtain it. Should Bill C-59 be passed by Parliament, the new NSIRA would have a mandate to look at every department or agency within the national security and intelligence function.

In line with Canada's feminist foreign policy and feminist international assistance policy, as well as the emphasis on gender equality in the budget tabled in Parliament, the goal of women's empowerment and gender equality featured prominently during the Prime Minister's visit to India. He participated in a women's business leaders round table and launched the Canada-India accelerator program for women tech entrepreneurs.

Canada and India announced collaboration between Canada's Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council and India's Department of Science and Technology to jointly promote and strengthen the participation of girls and women in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics.

As well, Canada's International Development Research Centre, IDRC, announced research initiatives into the most important and effective ways to empower women, prevent gender-based violence, and make digital platforms work for inclusive development in India. New investments by the IDRC in 2018 will improve the working conditions of homeworkers and improve business practices in global supply chains. Canada announced $7.9 million for 40 Grand Challenges Canada projects in India, supporting women's empowerment, sexual and reproductive health rights, water and sanitation, and mental health. Finally, Canada and India launched the Nutrition International's Asia campaign called “She'll Grow Into It”. The campaign, supported by $11.5 million of funding through the right start initiative, works to empower the world's poorest women, adolescent girls, and children.

On the last day of the visit, the Prime Minister delivered a keynote speech before 5,000 youth at the 2018 Young Changemakers Conclave annual conference. At this event, captured live on Facebook, the Prime Minister emphasized the importance of gender equality, youth engagement, and diversity, and discussed the role of technology and innovation in empowering young leaders. Canada's Prime Minister heard directly from India's young leaders on how they are making their country and their world a better place in which to live. India has the largest youth population in the world, with more than 780 million under the age of 35.

Speaking about youth, I want to turn to the topic of education. India has one of the largest higher education systems in the world. With over 30 million students enrolled in higher education every year, the demand far exceeds the supply. As a result, more than 550,000 Indian students opted to study abroad in 2017, and Canada is increasingly a destination of choice. Canadian institutions currently have over 400 arrangements with Indian institutions, and approximately 50 universities and colleges have a presence in India. In addition, the government has been proactively targeting students from abroad with the result that a record number of Indian students, an estimated 124,000, held a permit to study in Canada for six months or more in 2017. Canada now trails only the United States as a destination for Indian students going abroad for higher education.

Academic collaboration is also moving forward at an accelerated pace. In 2016, Mitacs, a Canadian not-for-profit organization, brought 184 Indian researchers to Canada with funding of over $2 million through the Mitacs Globalink program and $736,000 in support from the Government of India. Since its launch in 2013, the India-Canada Centre for Innovative Multidisciplinary Partnerships to Accelerate Community Transformation and Sustainability, known as IC-IMPACTS, has delivered 38 projects that have resulted in 16 technology deployments in Canada and India in a variety of fields. Recognizing the importance of innovation, the Prime Minister and Prime Minister Modi welcomed a call for research proposals amounting to $4 million toward cleaning polluted bodies of water and mitigating fire hazards in buildings. Key partners in this initiative are IC-IMPACTS and India's departments of biotechnology and science and technology.

During the Prime Minister's trip, a memorandum of understanding on higher education was renewed, and Canada announced it will host the 2018 meeting of the joint working group that oversees implementation of that memorandum of understanding. As well, the Prime Minister recognized the 50th anniversary of the Shastri lndo-Canadian Institute in promoting understanding between India and Canada through academic activities and exchanges, with the support of both governments to the institute.

To pursue this line further, if we continue to link youth and entrepreneurs in India and Canada and if we continue to encourage innovation and collaboration between academics, the private sector, and civil society, then government can back away and let these dynamics take over. There is nothing we wish for more than for the citizens of our two countries to drive forward this relationship and economic partnership.

A number of important security challenges face India and Canada in the Indo-Pacific region. On regional and global issues, the leaders discussed the prevailing security situation in Afghanistan, calling for an immediate cessation of violence, renunciation of links with international terrorism, and the dismantling of infrastructure of support for terrorism. The leaders reaffirmed support to the government and the people of Afghanistan to achieve an Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled national peace and reconciliation process.

The leaders called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the DPRK, to abide strictly by its international obligations and commitments. They called on all states to implement rigorously the relevant UN Security Council resolutions relating to the DPRK.

The leaders deplored the current state in the Maldives, and urged the Government of Maldives to allow democratic institutions, particularly the judiciary, to function independently in a fair and transparent manner.

The two leaders discussed the humanitarian and security crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar and across the border in Bangladesh, and called for the voluntary, safe, and sustainable return of the people displaced, while stressing the importance of ensuring law and order, and respect for human dignity in the process. The leaders also called for the restoration of humanitarian access for relevant UN and other international organizations to facilitate the return process.

In short, Canada and India resolved to work together, bilaterally and multilaterally, to promote a stable and rules-based Indo-Pacific region that would not only benefit Canada economically vis-à-vis India, but would serve to broaden our interests in the region and move us toward greater connectivity.

To promote and sustain collaboration, Canada's national interests call for a stronger relationship with India. To this end, the prime ministers of Canada and India reinforced the architecture of our security partnership. A dialogue of national security advisers was institutionalized. Canada's national security and intelligence adviser met with his Indian counterpart in New Delhi just prior to the Prime Minister's visit, and concluded a framework agreement on countering terrorism and violent extremism. This framework agreement reaffirms the shared resolve of India and Canada to combat terrorism and violent extremism in all their forms and manifestations.

Canada and India agreed to step up bilateral collaboration under a newly-formed national security advisers' dialogue, the joint working group on counterterrorism and its experts' sub-group. Both leaders agreed to work collaboratively to address the threat posed by cross-border and state-sponsored terrorism, stop sources of terrorist financing, dismantle terrorist infrastructure, prevent the supply of arms to terrorists, and to counter violent extremism and radicalization to violence.

On broader defence and security issues, the leaders committed to develop bilateral defence co-operation by exploring possibilities in diverse fields, including cold climate training. They agreed that Canada and India would coordinate on cybersecurity and address cybercrimes at bilateral and multilateral fora going forward.

India sent a high-level delegation to the Vancouver peacekeeping defence ministerial meeting in November 2017. It is the world's third largest contributor to international peacekeeping operations. The two leaders decided in India to enhance co-operation on peacekeeping to provide an effective response to global challenges. They stressed the importance of integrating gender perspectives into peace and security activities, and interventions in line with the women, peace and security agenda, including prevention of conflict-related sexual violence.

Taken as a whole, this visit reflects an important step forward in the Canada-India relationship. There is much our two countries can offer each other, in commercial and security terms and in the fruits of collaboration in international fora. To recognize the future of this commercial partnership, Canada and India announced a new dialogue on innovation, growth, and prosperity. This is a collaboration between Canada's Centre for International Governance Innovation and India's Gateway House. It will convene subject experts, government officials, and business leaders to promote economic growth and innovation in today's digital economy.

It is unfortunate that, rather than celebrating all of the accomplishments, the opposition is using today to attack public servants and question their non-partisanship. I will say one more time that Canada's national security agencies are non-partisan, highly competent, and effective. We trust them to promote and protect the security of Canadians. That is why I will be voting against the motion.

[Scott Newark]

Just on that point, I would also like to add I think either this committee or the C-22 committee could have a really significant role by calling people in and asking why this didn't happen, and the kinds of non-sharing activities you were describing to ask those very kinds of informed questions. Not as a finger-pointing exercise per se, but as a lessons-learned exercise. I have seen this work out when I was with the Ontario government; it produced some positive results. We were able to learn from it, and not repeat the silo kind of activities.

With respect to your question to me, again I will go back to the point that I think we should emphasize in this country using all the tools in the tool box, including criminal prosecution where necessary and appropriate, although keeping in mind how difficult that may be. Think about that. If you're dealing with people who have been detained overseas, the evidence you get from them has to end up being admissible in court. That could be challenging.

The larger issue is our successful integration of people into Canadian society. I think we have done a vastly better job of doing so in Canada and the United States than they have in Europe, When you see instances of organizations or groups doing things that are trying to stop that integration, that should be a red flag. I wrote a piece for the Macdonald-Laurier Institute some years ago about that kind of a strategy, about how you deal with it, and that is one of the points.

In my opinion, we have been very successful in integrating people from different cultures into our society, and we should continue with it.

[Scott Newark]

Included in my recommendations that I supplied to the committee are some specific recommendations in relation to that.

However, as you know, with the rule in our system—and it does apply now to terrorism cases because it's done through the criminal justice system—the real issue isn't whether or not the evidence is relevant, the issue is whether the evidence is admissible.

That's why I think the aspect of things like preambles, and saying that we've considered the privacy issues, and even after the fact making sure you have review bodies like the committee on Bill C-22 asking why you didn't share this information, are the kinds of things that I think will help us. However, we need to be ready in advance of those people coming back.

When the RCMP, for example, talks about 120 cases, I certainly hope that number is because of actual cases that are created, as opposed to some analyst doing a statistical judgment on what it should be, because we should be ready for this.

[Pierre Blais]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, everybody.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Bill C-59. I will focus my presentation on two main areas. The first part will lay out SIRC's high-level response to the bill. In the second, I will offer a few suggestions for improvements to the language of the bill based on SIRC's experience in this area.

This is a positive time to be working in the area of review and accountability for intelligence in Canada. Not long ago, I was here to discuss the creation of a committee of parliamentarians in the context of Bill C-22. I'm here again, this time to discuss the government's proposal to create the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, or NSIRA. I will use this abbreviation. I hate using those acronyms of NSIRA, NSICOP, SIRC, CSARS, etc., but we have to. I will go on with NSIRA, which will be responsible for reviewing intelligence and national security activities across government.

Indeed, as included in the bill before you, NSIRA is to review any activity of CSIS or CSE carried out in any other department or agency that relates to national security or intelligence and any other matter related to national security referred to it by the minister. This will bring a dedicated national security review of the type that SIRC has been doing for more than 30 years to a large number of other departments and agencies, including in particular the CBSA and the RCMP. This will answer the gap that so many, including SIRC, have commented on over the years.

The recently created National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, has been added to the proposals respecting the new intelligence commissioner. Together the three entities will represent a substantial change in the accountability system for intelligence in Canada.

I will just take a minute to describe for the committee the mandate and responsibilities of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, or SIRC. I will stress that SIRC is an independent external review body that reports to Parliament on CSIS's activities.

SIRC has three core responsibilities: to carry out in-depth reviews of CSIS's activities, to conduct investigations into complaints, and to certify the CSIS director's annual report to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. In essence, SIRC was created to provide assurance to Parliament, and by extension to Canadians, that CSIS investigates and reports on threats to national security in a manner that respects the law and the rights of Canadians.

SIRC has discharged its mandate faithfully over its history, and it has had an impact. This was demonstrated most recently by the Federal Court of Canada decision of October 2016 that confirmed SIRC's long-standing practice of assessing the lawfulness of CSIS activities, including how CSIS applies the “strictly necessary” threshold to its collection and retention of information, which is one element that is all over the place now. Through its review work, SIRC contributed to high-level discussions on the type of intelligence that CSIS can collect and retain, as we see in the dataset provision of Bill C-59.

But the legislation makes clear that the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, or NSIRA, is an entirely new entity, to be created—not from SIRC or the Office of the CSE Commissioner—but from a desire to push the accountability agenda forward in Canada. SIRC and the Office of the CSE Commissioner will be dissolved when NSIRA is created.

SIRC, along with its partners and counterparts in the review community, have long called for change of this nature that will break down the silos that have hampered review for so long.

When the decision was made in Canada more than 30 years ago to create SIRC, it represented some of the best, most forward thinking at the time on accountability for intelligence. But this is a new era, with new challenges for accountability. Canada has an opportunity to again fashion itself after the best of thinking on accountability, taking into account the important experience of others.

The parliamentary element of accountability means designing a committee of parliamentarians, which, I imagine, you already know. I am pleased that the government did not stop at the creation of NSICOP and has included equal attention to expert review.

Internationally, we can see our allies similarly adding substance to the review and oversight structures responsible for national security. In the U.K., there is the new Investigatory Powers Commissioner's Office. In New Zealand, there has been a doubling of the size of its inspector-general. In Australia, expanding the size and remit of its inspector-general for intelligence is actively being discussed as we speak.

Canada's deliberations on accountability are happening at a time when there has been a shift in thinking on accountability for intelligence agencies, translating into expectations among the public of greater transparency. To that end, one of the great strengths of the bill is the provision that allows for the agency to issue special reports when it decides that it is in the public interest to report on any matter related to its mandate. The new agency will issue these reports to the appropriate minister, who must then cause them to be tabled before each House of Parliament.

This will allow the new agency to signal a significant issue to the minister and the public in a timely way. SIRC is not currently able to do this, and it has been a limitation for SIRC in its ability to present the results of its work in a timelier manner. In light of the government's recent statements regarding transparency, this is an important provision. At the same time, we note that there are no provisions in the bill requiring CSIS to issue a public report to match the requirement of CSE in this regard. In the interests of transparency, SIRC views this as an important gap that SIRC puts to the committee to consider in its deliberations.

The proposed legislation makes clear that SIRC and its experience will be central to what is coming. The transitional provisions clarify that, at the coming into force of part 1, SIRC members, of whom I am one, are to be continued as NSIRA members for the remainder of their term. In the majority of—

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Before I start, I have a student shadowing me today. I want to recognize Ian Lewis, who is here. He's a student here in Ottawa. I think it's wonderful that he's taken an interest in what the national security framework in this legislation is looking at.

During our previous study on the national security framework, there was a lot of desire on the part of Canadians for greater transparency from the intelligence and security agencies. We also heard that when we were looking at Bill C-22. A witness we heard at the last meeting, Dr. Stephanie Carvin, was quite passionate about calling for better transparency. She cited a couple of models to look at. One was the U.S. Office of the Director of National Intelligence's worldwide threat assessment report as well as the recent report on cyber-threats to Canada's election system and democratic institutions by the Communications Security Establishment.

I wonder whether both of you might comment on that and say whether you see it as something that should be included in the legislation we're looking at or whether it's something that would be looked at more through regulation or ministerial directive.

[Daniel Therrien]

I think that on the whole this legislation would allow Canada to catch up to the Five Eyes. Particularly this, plus Bill C-22, with the committee of parliamentarians, would allow some catching up, perhaps getting us near the front of the pack.

[Daniel Therrien, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, I am here this morning with Patricia Kosseim, who is our general counsel, and Lara Ives, who is the director general of audit and review.

Thank you for the invitation to discuss Bill C-59.

As you know, Bill C-59 introduces a wide range of measures intended to strengthen Canada's national security framework in a manner that safeguards the rights and freedoms of Canadians. On the whole, I find it represents a step in the right direction, but as other commentators have noted, its weakest part is the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, or SCISA, which contains provisions related to information sharing and privacy. Professor Forcese, for instance, gave these sections a failing grade. I was therefore glad to hear Minister Goodale last week say that SCISA was probably the part most deserving of scrutiny. I hope your study will result in much-needed improvements to these rules.

In previous parliamentary briefs, I highlighted the need for rigorous legal standards around the collection and sharing of personal information, effective oversight, and minimization of risks to the privacy of ordinary law-abiding Canadians, particularly through privacy-sensitive retention and destruction practices. Specifically, I indicated that the law should prescribe two things essentially, which are useful to bear in mind. First is clear and reasonable standards for the sharing, collection, use and retention of personal information”, so substantive rules. Second is that compliance with these standards should be subject to independent and effective review mechanisms.

It is with this analysis in mind that I offer the following comments and recommendations. While I will focus in my remarks on SCISA, this analysis, looking at two types of issues, is also relevant for other parts of Bill C-59, including parts 3 and 4. The full list of our recommendations is attached to this statement.

Bill C-59 would create a new expert review body, the NSIRA, with broad jurisdiction to examine the activities of all departments and agencies involved in national security. Recently, Parliament also created, through Bill C-22, a new National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. Both of these bodies will be able to share confidential information and generally co-operate so as to produce well-informed and comprehensive reviews that reflect considerations both by experts and by elected officials.

These developments are most welcome, but they are, in my view, clearly insufficient. In my view, effective review of national security activities must include both parliamentary and expert review, and the latter must include both national security and privacy experts. Why privacy experts? Because the work of national security agencies depends in large part on personal information. It is what they call their “lifeblood”. The OPC is the federal centre of expertise in privacy and personal data protection. Canadians are concerned that anti-terrorism efforts in government not unduly impede their privacy rights, and they expect my office to play a role in ensuring that balance.

Bill C-59 is oddly silent on the role of my office. It does not amend the Privacy Act, so my existing authorities appear to be untouched. The only body with explicit authority to play a role in relation to part 5, the renamed SCIDA, or security of canada information disclosure act, is the NSIRA, the national security and intelligence review agency.

The ethics committee, in its study of SCISA, has already noted the ambiguity in the interplay between that act and the Privacy Act. It has called for amendments to clarify that the Privacy Act continues to apply to all personal information disclosed pursuant to SCISA. I have provided to your committee amendments that would confirm the application of the Privacy Act and the OPC's role, which I am told the government wants to maintain.

However, there is no ambiguity on whether my office would be able, with Bill C-59, to share confidential information with the NSIRA and the new committee of parliamentarians. We would not have that authority, and actually we would be prohibited by existing provisions in the Privacy Act from sharing such information.

This means that the comprehensive review process offered in Bill C-59, as a fundamental element to bring balance between security and respect for rights, would stop short of the objective by leaving privacy experts out of integrated review. I am at a loss to understand why. If the fear is of duplication between our work and that of other review bodies, I would gladly explain through the question period how bringing the OPC firmly within the family of review bodies would not only bring required expertise but would actually enhance efficiency and reduce overlap.

When Bill C-51 enacted the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, known as SCISA, I indicated that among my concerns was the fact that the relevance standard for sharing was set too low, and that there was an absence of clear data retention and recordkeeping requirements and a lack of information-sharing agreements and privacy impact assessments.

The relevance test is too permissive because it casts too wide a net and creates undue risks for ordinary citizens who pose no threat to national security. The government seems to recognize that a relevance standard does not sufficiently protect privacy because it is suggesting changes to section 5 of SCISA.

In its response to the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, the government said the following:

The key issue regarding the threshold is the need to establish specific decision making parameters for the discloser of information that will protect individual privacy but not cause undue delays in the information sharing process.

I agree with that assessment. The proposed new section 5, particularly paragraph 5(1)(b), incorporates some aspects of a necessity threshold but falls short of adopting what officials refer to as “strict necessity”.

In order to adequately protect privacy rights, under new section 5, this limited progress in increasing the threshold for disclosure would have to be accompanied by more complete changes to the standard applicable to receiving institutions, in other words, the security agencies receiving the information in question.

Information sharing involves two parties and, to protect rights, rules are also required for receiving institutions. If relevance is not adequate for disclosing institutions, it is also inadequate, even more so, for receiving agencies.

And the delay considerations that may apply to disclosure affect receiving departments very differently. These institutions are perfectly capable of applying the classic, internationally established necessity test, and should be required to do so.

We understand that the government intention is for receiving institutions to continue to be governed by the Privacy Act, or their specific enabling legislation where applicable. The current Privacy Act threshold is relevance.

As your committee recommended in its May 2017 report on Canada's national security framework, we also recommend that a dual threshold be adopted for information sharing—that set out in amended section 5 for disclosing institutions, and that of necessity and proportionality for receiving institutions.

Even if one accepts that government sharing of information related to law-abiding citizens may lead to the identification of new threats to national security, once that information is analyzed and leads to the conclusion that someone is not a threat, it should no longer be retained. Otherwise national security agencies will be able to keep a profile on all of us.

This is consistent with the conclusions of our review of the Canada Border Services Agency's scenario-based targeting initiative, summarized in my latest annual report to Parliament, and it is one of the principles upheld by the European Court of Justice in the passenger name and record case, decided in July 2017.

In addition, if the threshold for collecting or receiving information is higher than the standard for disclosure—which is currently the case at least for CSIS and would be the case if you adopt a dual threshold, that is, one for disclosing institutions and one for receiving institutions—then, rules are required to ensure that information is discarded without delay either when the collection test is not met or if the receiving institution is of the view that the disclosure standard was not satisfied.

In conclusion, my complete recommendations, annexed to this statement, include some that I have made in the past and do not have time to explain in the time allotted this morning. I also intend to write a fuller submission prior to the end of your study.

My team and I would be glad to answer any questions you may have.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

This is my last question. We promised Canadians to improve the accountability of national security agencies. We promised to fix the overreaching and in some cases unconstitutional nature of Bill C-51, and then Bill C-51 overall with Bill C-22 and Bill C-59.

Do you think we've done that?

[Prof. Wesley Wark]

Both Craig and I have testified previously on Bill C-22, and my view is that it's important to be realistic about what is proposed in C-22 as a practice, and what is necessary. Any time you give a committee of parliamentarians access to highly sensitive information, you have to surround that access with controls and protections. The challenge is to make sure that, in doing that, you don't intrude too much on the work of the committee itself.

From my perspective, C-22 reaches a reasonable balance in that regard. I don't regard the control, as you put it, of the Prime Minister's Office over the information flow as something that is likely to impact, in practice, the ability of the committee to do its work. It has many challenges ahead of it. It has only just recently, as you know, been set up in terms of members that are going to appear. The executive director has not yet been appointed. It's very much in its infancy, but my view is basically that the legislation should hit a reasonable balance until we learn otherwise through experience.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you.

I would like to go back to Part 1 of Bill C-59, which pertains to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.

The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians was created, pursuant to Bill C-22, and Part 1 of Bill C-59 includes this committee.

Our party was in favour of creating this committee, but we expressed reservations about the information being centralized in the Prime Minister's Office, and so we voted against the bill.

I would like to hear your thoughts on that.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

I would agree. That makes sense, which would suggest that maybe we don't have a gap in efficacy review with Bill C-22 on the table.

In any event, the new super-SIRC committee and the new commissioner don't have the exact same powers in replacing SIRC and replacing the current CSE commissioner. I have a note here, for example, that the CSE commissioner has certain authorizations under the Inquiries Act that the new commissioner would not have, that the reporting requirements for SIRC are more stringent in some cases, including the number of warrants that have been authorized for CSIS.

When we roll CSIS into this super-SIRC, when you roll CSE into the new commissioner role, shouldn't they have the same reporting requirements and the same powers? If not, why not?

[Prof. Stephanie Carvin]

That's a very interesting point.

When I testified on Bill C-22 I suggested that much of the focus of that committee should be on efficacy. One of the issues we have is that it's not really clearly defined yet what the differences are between what NSIRA and NSICOP are going to be doing, and that's a concern not just for myself but also other people who formerly worked in this area. You don't want them both going after the same thing.

It should be clear that the Bill C-22 committee should probably be taking a 60,000-foot view of what's happening and let the NSIRA get into the legal weeds. What I'm concerned with is that there is no division of labour, but where I think the efficacy review should be taking place is probably in the Bill C-22 committee.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

Thanks very much.

Thank you to you both for your testimony.

Ms. Carvin, you mentioned that in the total architecture of review you still had some concerns about efficacy. You mentioned Professor Forcese a few times. In a paper that he and Kent Roach wrote they talk about this three-legged stool and there is a parliamentarian committee on efficacy, there's a super-SIRC for propriety review, and then they talk about an independent monitor of national security law built on the U.K. and Australian model.

When we look at Bill C-59 and Bill C-22 together, do you see that largely meeting the overall review architecture?

[Prof. Stephanie Carvin]

When I testified on Bill C-22, I suggested that it should be legislated and should be required every 365 days. I believe Canadians deserve that transparency.

[Prof. Stephanie Carvin]

Thank you. This is an issue that I'm very passionate about. It's a great question.

One of the first examples out there is the worldwide threat assessment that's put out every year by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. We used to call it the Clapper report. It will now be called Coats report.

What I would say is that every year they put out a 15- to 20-page threat assessment that lists what the priority threats are to Americans. It's a very useful report because it's indicative of where the security services are putting their resources and what the major concerns are. It also shows the shift over time. If you look at the reports over time, you can see that they've gone from putting al Qaeda—particularly al Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula—as the number one threat to now putting cyber as the number one threat.

It's interesting that we've seen that shift in the American national security landscape, and I think Canadians should know as well. Right now, the only way we really have of knowing these things is through the threat environment section in CSIS's annual report, but that's no longer an annual report. It now comes out every three years. Also, now it's not even really a report anymore. The last report was a YouTube video of the director sitting in front of a camera, and I don't think this is sufficient to explain what the national security threats are to Canadians.

First of all, I don't understand why that report is no longer an annual one. It absolutely should be an annual report. When I testified on Bill C-22, I said we needed to make sure that there are annual reports discussing what these threats are, along the lines of the worldwide threat assessment. I think that would be one area.

The other area that we have is the public report on the terrorist threat, which is again supposed to come out every year. I don't believe this year's report has come out yet; I'm not entirely sure why. That is the only inter-agency report we have on any threat to Canada, not just terrorism, and it's in just one area. We don't talk a lot about espionage and we don't talk a lot about cyber, and these are things Canadians need to know.

[Professor Stephanie Carvin, Assistant Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual]

I'd like to thank the committee for inviting me to speak on Bill C-59, the most comprehensive and far-reaching reform to national security in Canada since 1984. I would like emphasize that I am not a lawyer. However, I do have experience working in national security and intelligence, and I study this area for a living. Indeed, in the interest of transparency, I would like to state that from 2012 to 2015, I worked at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service as a strategic analyst.

My comments are, of course, my own, but they're informed by my research and experience as the national security landscape in Canada has evolved in a relatively short period of time. All of this is to say that today my comments will be focused on the scope of this bill and will address some of the areas that I believe this committee needs to, at the very least, consider as it makes recommendations.

First and foremost, I wish to express my support for this bill. I believe it contains four important steps that are essential for Canadian national security and the functions of our national security agencies.

First, it provides clarity as to the powers of our national security agencies. There's no better example of this than part 3, the CSE act, which gives our national signals intelligence agency statutory standing and spells out its mandate and procedures to a reasonable extent. Given that the first mention of this agency in law was the 2001 Anti-terrorism Act, this bill takes us a long way towards transparency.

Second, Bill C-59 outlines the limits on the power of our national security agencies in a way that will provide certainty to the public and also to our national security agencies. In particular, the bill clarifies one of the most controversial parts of the current legislation formerly known as Bill C-51, that is, CSIS' disruption powers.

While it might be argued that this is taking away CSIS' ability to fight threats to Canada's national security, I disagree. Having found themselves embroiled in scandals in recent years, it is little appreciated how conservative our national security agencies actually are. While they do not want political interference in their activities, they no doubt welcome the clarity that Bill C-59 provides as to these measures.

Let there be no doubt that the ability to disrupt is an important one, particularly given the increasingly fast pace of terror investigations, especially those related to the threat of foreign fighters. In this sense, I believe that Bill C-59 hits the right balance, grounding these measures squarely within the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Third, Bill C-59 addresses long-standing problems related to review, and in some cases oversight, in Canadian national security. I will not go over the problems of our current system, which has been described as “stove-piped” by experts and commissions of inquiries. I will, however, state that the proposed national security and intelligence review agency, NSIRA, and intelligence commissioner—in combination with the new National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, NSICOP—create a review architecture that is robust and that I believe Canadians can have confidence in.

Fourth, in its totality, Bill C-59 is a forward-looking bill in at least three respects. First, the issue of datasets is not narrowly defined in law. While this has been a cause of concern for some, I believe this is the right approach to take. It allows flexibility of the term, but at the same time it subjects any interpretation to the oversight of the intelligence commissioner and the minister. It subjects the use of datasets to the internal procedures of the national security agencies themselves—and limits who may have access—and the review of the NSIRA and NSICOP.

Second, it takes steps to enhance Canada's ability to protect and defend its critical infrastructure. Increasingly, we are seeing the abilities of states and state-sponsored actors to create chaos through the attacks on electrical grids, oil and gas facilities, dams, and hospital and health care facilities. Much of this critical infrastructure is in the hands of the private sector. This bill takes steps to ensure that there is a process in place to address these threats in the future.

Third, Bill C-59 puts us on the same footing as our allies by mandating an active cyber-role for our national signals intelligence agency. I appreciate the legal and ethical challenges this raises, especially should CSE be asked to support a DND operation. However, the idea that Canada would not have this capability is, I think, unacceptable to most Canadians, and would be seen as unfortunate in the eyes of our allies, many of whom have been quietly encouraging Canada to enhance its cyber-presence in the wake of cyber-threats from North Korea, China, and Russia.

To reiterate, I believe this is a good bill, but there's room for improvement. I'm aware that some of my legal colleagues, especially Craig Forcese, Kent Roach, and Alex, of course, will be speaking to certain specific legal issues that should be addressed to make the law more operationalizable and compliant with our Constitution.

I encourage the committee to seriously consider their suggestions. However, I'm going to focus on four areas that may be problematic in a broader sense, which I believe the committee should at least be aware of or consider when it makes recommendations.

First, I think it's important to consider the role of the Minister of Public Safety. To be clear, I believe our current minister does a good job in his current position. However, the mandate of the Minister of Public Safety is already very large, and this bill would give him or her more responsibilities in terms of review and, in some cases, oversight. At some future date, the scope of this ministry may be worth considering.

Having said this, I acknowledge a paradox. Requiring the intelligence commissioner's approval for certain operations, as is clear in proposed subsections 28(1) and 28(2) of the proposed CSE Act, and potentially denying the approval of a minister is, in my view, at odds with the principle of ministerial responsibility in our Westminster system of government.

To be sure, I understand why this authority of the intelligence commissioner is there. Section 8 of the charter insists on the right to be protected from unreasonable search and seizure. The intelligence commissioner's role ensures that this standard is met.

Why is this a problem? Canada has an unfortunate history of ministers and prime ministers trying to shirk responsibility for the actions of our security services, which dates back decades. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau used the principle of police independence to state that his government could not possibly engage in review or oversight of the activities of the RCMP even though the national security roles of the RCMP are a ministerial responsibility. There is simply a tension here with our constitutional requirements and with what has been the practice of our system for decades. If this bill is to pass through, it will be up to members of Parliament to hold the minister to account, even if he or she tries to blame the intelligence commissioner for actions not taken.

Second, despite the creation of no less than three major review agencies, there's still no formal mechanism for efficacy review of our security services. We will receive many reports as to whether or not our security services are compliant with the law, but we still will not have any idea of how well they are doing it. I'm not suggesting we need to number-crunch how many terrorism plots are disrupted. Such a crude measure would be counterproductive. However, inquiring as to whether the analysis produced supports government decisions in a timely manner is a worthwhile question to ask. Efficacy review is still a gap in our national security review architecture.

Third, while I praise the transparency of Bill C-59, I'm also concerned about what I'm calling “report fatigue”. I note that between last year's Bill C-22 and now Bill C-59, there will have been at least 10 new reports generated, not including special reports as required. It is my understanding that some of these reports are very technical and can be automatically generated when certain tasks such as, hypothetically, the search of a dataset is done. However, others are going to be more complex. More briefings will also be required. Having spent considerable time working on reports for the government in my former work, I know how difficult and time-consuming this can be.

Finally, and related to this last point, it is my understanding that the security services will not be receiving any extra resources to comply with the reporting and briefing requirements of either Bill C-22 or Bill C-59. This concerns me, because I believe that enhanced communication between our national security services with the government and review bodies is important. As the former's powers expand, this should be well resourced.

In summary, the ability to investigate threats to the national security of Canada is vital. I believe that for the most part, Bill C-59 takes Canada a great step towards meeting that elusive balance between liberty and security. In my view, where Bill C-59 defines powers and process, it should enable our security services to carry out their important work with confidence knowing exactly where they stand. Further, the transparency in the bill will hopefully go some way towards building trust between the Canadian public, Parliament, and our security services.

Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

I will, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much to the members of the committee for their work as they are about to begin clause-by-clause study of Bill C-59, the national security act.

I am pleased today to be accompanied by a range of distinguished officials in the field of public safety and national security. David Vigneault, as you know, is the director of CSIS. Greta Bossenmaier, to my right, is the chief of the Communications Security Establishment, and the CSE is involved in Bill C-59 in a very major way.

To my left is Vincent Rigby, associate deputy minister at Public Safety. I think this is his first committee hearing in his new role as associate deputy minister. Kevin Brosseau is deputy commissioner of the RCMP, and Doug Breithaupt is from the Department of Justice.

Everything that our government does in terms of national security has two inseparable objectives: to protect Canadians and to defend our rights and freedoms. To do so, we have already taken a number of major steps, such as the new parliamentary committee established by Bill C-22 and the new ministerial direction on avoiding complicity in mistreatment. That said, Bill C-59 is certainly central to our efforts.

As I said last week in the House, this bill has three core themes: enhancing accountability and transparency, correcting certain problematic elements in the former Bill C-51, and ensuring that our national security and intelligence agencies can keep pace with the evolving nature of security threats.

Bill C-59 is the product of the most inclusive and extensive consultations Canada has ever undertaken on the subject of national security. We received more than 75,000 submissions from a variety of stakeholders and experts as well as the general public, and of course this committee also made a very significant contribution, which I hope members will see reflected in the content of Bill C-59.

All of that input guided our work and led to the legislation that's before us today, and we're only getting started. When it comes to matters as fundamental as our safety and our rights, the process must be as open and thorough as it can possibly be. That is why we chose to have this committee study the bill not after second reading but before second reading. As you know, once a bill has passed second reading in the House, its scope is locked in. With our reversal of the usual order, you will have the chance to analyze Bill C-59 in detail at an earlier stage in the process, which is beginning now, and to propose amendments that might otherwise be deemed to be beyond the scope of the legislation.

We have, however, already had several hours of debate, and I'd like to use the remainder of my time to address some of the points that were raised during that debate. To begin with, there were concerns raised about CSIS's threat reduction powers. I know there are some who would like to see these authorities eliminated entirely and others who think they should be limitless. We have taken the approach, for those measures that require a judicial warrant, of enumerating what they are in a specific list.

CSIS needs clear authorities, and Canadians need CSIS to have clear authorities without ambiguity so that they can do their job of keeping us safe. This legislation provides that clarity. Greater clarity benefits CSIS officers, because it enables them to go about their difficult work with the full confidence that they are operating within the parameters of the law and the Constitution.

Importantly, this bill will ensure that any measure CSIS takes is consistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Bill C-51 implied the contrary, but CSIS has been very clear that they have not used that particular option in Bill C-51, and Bill C-59 will end any ambiguity.

Mr. Paul-Hus, during his remarks in the debate in the House, discussed the changes we're proposing to the definition of “terrorist propaganda” and the criminal offence of promoting terrorism. Now, there can be absolutely no doubt of our conviction—I think this crosses all party lines—that spreading the odious ideologies of terrorist organizations is behaviour that cannot be tolerated. We know that terrorist groups use the Internet and social media to reach and radicalize people and to further their vile and murderous ends. We must do everything we can to stop that.

The problem with the way the law is written at the moment, as per Bill C-51 is that it is so broad and so vague that it is virtually unuseable, and it hasn't been used. Bill C-59 proposes terminology that is clear and familiar in Canadian law. It would prohibit counselling another person to commit a terrorism offence. This does not require that a particular person be counselled to commit a particular offence. Simply encouraging others to engage in non-specific acts of terrorism will qualify and will trigger that section of the Criminal Code.

Because the law will be more clearly drafted, it will be easier to enforce. Perhaps we will actually see a prosecution under this new provision. There has been no prosecution of this particular offence as currently drafted.

There were also questions raised during debate about whether the new accountability mechanisms will constitute too many hoops for security and intelligence agencies to jump through as they go about their work. The answer, in my view, is clearly, no. When the bill was introduced, two of the country's leading national security experts, Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, said the bill represents “solid gains—measured both from a rule of law and civil liberties perspective—and come at no credible cost to security.”

Accountability mechanisms for Canadian security and intelligence agencies have been insufficient for quite some time. Bill C-22 took one major step to remedy that weakness by creating the new National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. Bill C-59 will now add the new comprehensive national security and intelligence review agency, which some people, for shorthand, refer to as a super-SIRC, as well as the position of intelligence commissioner, which is another innovation in Bill C-59.

These steps have been broadly applauded. Some of the scrutiny that we are providing for in the new law will be after the fact, and where there is oversight in real time we've included provisions to deal with exigent circumstances when expedience and speed are necessary.

It is important to underscore that accountability is, of course, about ensuring that the rights and freedoms of Canadians are protected, but it is also about ensuring that our agencies are operating as effectively as they possibly can to keep Canadians safe. Both of these vital goals must be achieved simultaneously—safety and rights together, not one or the other.

Debate also included issues raised by the New Democratic Party about what is currently known as SCISA, the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act. There was a suggestion made that the act should be repealed entirely, but, with respect, that would jeopardize the security of Canadians. If one government agency or department has genuine information about a security threat, they have to be able to disclose it to the appropriate partner agencies within government in order to deal with that threat, and you may recall that this has been the subject of a number of judicial enquiries in the history of our country over the last number of years.

That disclosure must be governed by clear rules, which is why Bill C-59 establishes the following three requirements. First, the information being disclosed must contribute to the recipient organization's national security responsibilities. Second, the disclosure must not affect any person's privacy more than is reasonably necessary. Third, a statement must be provided to the recipient attesting to the information's accuracy. Furthermore, we make it clear that no new information collection powers are being created or implied, and records must be kept of what information is actually being shared.

Mr. Chair, I see you're giving me a rude gesture, which could be misinterpreted in another context.

Prevention of Radicalization through Foreign Funding Act

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Madam Speaker, I have some thoughts I would like to share with members, and I will start with one of the criticisms from across the way, which is that this government is not concerned about a very important issue to Canadians. We have not only talked about the issue of safety, but very tangible actions have been taken, whether it is budgetary or legislative measures.

My colleague made reference to the Magnitsky legislation that was passed by the House. It received all-party support. There were many strong advocates within the Liberal caucus for that legislation. In fact, Irwin Cotler, the former member for Mount Royal in Montreal, is a very strong human rights advocate. He is very well known and respected in the world. In fact, he is one of the most able-minded individuals dealing with that. He contributed immensely in the House with respect to that act, which was discussed not only over the last couple of years but for a few years. Even under Stephen Harper, there was discussion about the Magnitsky Act.

Many of the comments we are hearing, even this evening, have been dealt with in part through the Magnitsky legislation. I have had the opportunity, not only in Ottawa but in other places, particularly in Winnipeg, to talk about the importance of the issue.

This was one piece of legislation that passed with the support of all members of the House.

However, we also introduced government legislation. Members will recall Bill C-51 and the impact that legislation had in the chamber. When the member across the way is critical of the government and says that it is not doing enough, I remind the member that two substantial pieces of legislation have been brought forward to the House.

Bill C-22 dealt with the establishment of the parliamentary oversight committee. This might even be an issue the oversight committee could discuss, once it is up and running, but I suspect it will have a fairly busy agenda. That was put in place to ensure rights and freedoms were being addressed, which is very important.

When we talk about the safety of Canadians and the radicalization of individuals who call Canada their home, we take it very seriously. At the same time, we also want to ensure that the rights and freedoms of Canadians are being protected. Therefore, that legislation was put in place.

Today, we are having a great deal of discussion about Bill C-59. Many measures within that legislation deal with safety. I do not know how many times I have heard the Prime Minister talk about the importance of ensuring that Canadians feel safe. Aside from governance, it is most important to ensure there is an element of safety. Many measures have been put in place by this government. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the minister responsible for global affairs, and members as a whole recognize what is being talked about and the concerns that Canadians have.

This is the reason I asked the questions of the sponsor of the motion. What is the motivation behind this legislation? We all want to ensure we have safe communities and there is proper legislation in place to prevent radicalization whenever we can do that. There is already a litany of measures in the Criminal Code.

I emphasize that we have proactive law enforcement agencies, security agencies, and even the Canada Border Services Agency for border control. There are many different departments in place today to protect Canadians.

One of my colleagues across the way made reference to education. We have invested, through budgets, millions of dollars for education or outreach. In fact, we launched the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence to support local initiatives. To cite a few examples, we looked at pushing back against violent extremism, addressing online terrorist propaganda and recruitment, intervening early to turn young Canadians away from the path of extremism, and supporting families and communities affected by radicalization.

I was involved with the youth justice committee for many years, and we had a wonderful RCMP officer who participated in it. I know first-hand the commitment of our women and men in the RCMP. It is about making connections and connecting the dots to promote more harmony and tolerance in our communities.

I did not like the debate that took place here regarding Islamophobia. I believe it did more damage than good inside this chamber. I still do not quite understand why we have some people in the House who do not recognize Islamophobia as something that is real.

We have to go out of our way to ensure that there is more communication among the many different groups out there. We even have a group in our caucus that meets on occasion with two different faith groups to try to bring faith communities together. This is something I believe is really important.

When I think of radicalization, one of the areas of concern I have is not necessarily what takes place in communities as much as what takes place on the Internet. The Internet is one of those areas we could spend time evaluating. Some of the problems being generated in society are because of the Internet, and we should consider ways we can address that issue.

We have seen radicalization that has stemmed from the Internet. I am concerned about the attraction it has. It is universal. It does not apply to one group of people or one faith group. Youth look at it far too often as something that might be an attractive thing to do. At times, it even crosses gender.

Many of my colleagues reach out to the community on this issue. At the end of the day, I believe we should be promoting education. It think education is the best way to combat radicalization. Whatever we can do to support that—

National Security Act, 2017

[Robert-Falcon Ouellette, Liberal, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I am wondering if my colleague could talk about how this bill would strengthen accountability and transparency by creating the national security intelligence review agency and the position of the intelligence commissioner, which I hope would also complement the National Security Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians that was created by Bill C-22.

[Majid Jowhari, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is with great pleasure that I rise today to speak in support of the national security act, 2017, Bill C-59. Two years ago, our government came to Ottawa with the promise that it would address the numerous problematic elements of Bill C-51, which was enacted by the previous government. Canadians agreed that in attempting to safeguard the security of Canada, Bill C-51 failed to strike a balance between security and freedom.

Today I am proud to be able to rise in this House and say that we have wholeheartedly delivered our commitment to addressing those problem areas. Our government began its commitment to achieving this goal by first reaching out to Canadians in an unprecedented consultation process, where all agreed that accountability, transparency, and effectiveness are needed from their security agencies.

Secondly, Bill C-22 was passed earlier this year, which created the multi-party National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. It is tasked with reviewing national security and intelligence activities through unprecedented access, with the goal of promoting government-wide accountability. On November 6, our Prime Minister followed through on this commitment by announcing the members of the committee. Today we are debating the national security act, 2017, Bill C-59, the last step in achieving our commitment to improving those problematic elements of Bill C-51. This package consists of three acts, five sets of amendments, and a comprehensive review process.

In creating the national security and intelligence review agency, the office of the intelligence commissioner, and the Communications Security Establishment, we have created the robust and effective national security establishment that Canadians have asked for. In addition, we are amending the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, and the Secure Air Travel Act to strengthen the role of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, limit the collection of personal information, safeguard Canadian rights to peaceful assembly, and fix problems with the no-fly list.

Finally, our amendments to the Youth Criminal Justice Act would ensure young persons would be provided with all appropriate child protection, mental health, and other social measures needed when faced with a terrorism-related offence. Through my work on the mental health caucus, I know how important it is for all Canadians, especially those of marginalized groups, to have access to all available safeguards, services, and measures when navigating the criminal justice system. Therefore, I am pleased to speak today specifically about these proposed amendments to the Youth Criminal Justice Act included in part 8 of the national security act, 2017.

My riding of Richmond Hill is an incredibly diverse and vibrant riding, where over half of my constituents are Canadians from an immigrant background. Of these, the majority are youths and young families under the age of 30. For this reason, I am proud to say that through this set of amendments, our government is taking action to ensure that all youth involved in the criminal justice system are afforded the enhanced protections provided by Canada's Youth Criminal Justice Act, while also holding them accountable for their actions.

The Youth Criminal Justice Act, or YCJA, is the federal law that governs Canada's youth aged 12 to 17 who commit criminal offences, including terrorism offences. The YCJA recognizes that the youth justice system should be separate from the adult system, and based on the principle of diminished moral blameworthiness of youth. It emphasizes rehabilitation and reintegration, just and proportionate responses to offending, and enhanced procedural protections for youth. The act also recognizes the importance of involving families, victims, and communities in the youth criminal justice system. The YCJA contains a number of significant legal safeguards to ensure that young people are treated fairly and that their rights are fully protected, for example, the identity publication ban, and significant restrictions on access to youth records.

Young people also have enhanced right to counsel, including state-provided counsel, and the right to have parents or other guardians present throughout key stages of the investigation and judicial processes. If a young person is charged, all proceedings take place in youth court. In addition, the YCJA would establish clear restrictions on access to youth records, setting out who may access youth records, the purpose for which youth records may be used, and the time periods during which access to records is permitted. Generally speaking, although the offences set out in the Criminal Code apply to youth, the sentences do not. Instead, the YCJA sets out specific youth sentencing principles, options, and durations. There is a broad range of community-based youth sentencing options, and clear restrictions on the use of custodial sentences.

Turning now to Bill C-59, it is important to recognize that there have been very few cases in Canada in which a young person has been involved in the youth criminal justice system due to terrorism offences. In total, we have had six young people charged since 2002. Two were found guilty, three were put under a peace bond, and one had the charges dropped. Nonetheless, it is important to ensure that when this occurs, the young people are held to account, but also that they are afforded all of the enhanced protection under the YCJA. It is perhaps even more important in terrorism-related offences that we do everything in our power to reform young offenders so that future harm is prevented.

Part 8 of Bill C-59 would amend the provision of the YCJA to ensure that youth protections apply in relation to anti-terrorism and other recognizance orders. It also provides for access to youth records for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order, subject to the special privacy protections set out in the YCJA. The bill would also make important clarifications with respect to recognizance orders. Although the YCJA already provides youth justice courts with the authority to impose these orders, several sections of the YCJA would be amended to state more clearly that youth justice courts have exclusive jurisdiction to impose recognizance on youth. This would eliminate any uncertainty about the applicability of certain rights of protection, including the youths' right to counsel. In addition, there is currently no access period identified for records relating to recognizance. Therefore, the YCJA would be amended to provide that the access period for these records would be six months after the order expires.

With respect to the Canadian Passport Order, Bill C-59 would amend the YCJA to specifically permit access to youth records for the purpose of administering Canada's passport program. The Canadian Passport Order contemplates that passports can be denied or revoked as a result of certain criminal acts, or in relation to national security concerns. For example, section 10.1 of the Canadian Passport Order stipulates that the minister of public safety may decide to deny or revoke a passport if there are reasonable grounds, including that revocation is necessary to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence, or for the national security of Canada or a foreign country or state.

The current YCJA provisions governing access to youth records do not speak to access for passport matters. As noted, Bill C-59 would allow access in appropriate circumstances. However, it is important to note that the sharing of youth information on this provision would still be subject to the special privacy protection of the YCJA. Canadians can be assured that our government is addressing the national security threat while continuing to protect democratic values, rights, and freedoms for Canadians. Those two goals must be pursued with equal dedication.

I encourage all my colleagues to vote in support of the bill.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

I will, and let me first of all, Monsieur Picard, congratulate Parliament and this committee specifically—there were a few different players before—which did the heavy lifting on Bill C-22. We now have the new committee of parliamentarians, which has passed through all stages in Parliament, and Monday the announcement was made regarding the formation of the committee and the members of Parliament and Senate who will be participating in the committee, a brand new aspect of Canada's national security and intelligence infrastructure in place for the first time.

In addition to that, we now have Bill C-59, which you referred to, Monsieur Picard, which again enhances our national security and intelligence architecture. It clarifies a number of the powers and authorities of various agencies, including CSIS. There had been reports from the Federal Court, from commissions of inquiry, from the Security Intelligence Review Committee, and from others saying that there were doubts or ambiguities in the authorities of our various agencies, which needed to be clarified. In a field like national security, you don't want a lot of grey areas, so the law, the new proposal in Bill C-59, brings that clarity in a number of areas with respect to what our agencies can and cannot do. It also establishes new review and oversight mechanisms, including two things in particular. It's an elaborate—

[Robert Ramsay, Senior Research Officer, Research, Canadian Union of Public Employees]

Good afternoon. My name is Robert Ramsay. I work as a senior research officer with the Canadian Union of Public Employees at our national office here in Ottawa.

I want to start by thanking the committee for this opportunity to present our thoughts on Bill C-58. We look forward to seeing our recommendations as well as the serious concerns expressed by the witnesses in previous sessions reflected in your committee work.

The Canadian Union of Public Employees, or CUPE, is the largest labour union in Canada. We represent 650,000 workers across the country in sectors as diverse as health care, social services, child care, municipalities, schools, universities, and transportation, among others. Our members provide a range of vital public services in thousands of communities, where they and their locals are engaged civic partners.

Since our founding in 1963, CUPE has been one of the strongest and most consistent voices defending public services in Canada. We know that robust, well-funded public services serve Canadians best and that the privatization of these services leads to higher costs, as Auditors General have revealed when they gain access to the full range of information about a privatization project. Privatization, whether through asset sales, P3s, outsourcing, or social impact bonds, also represents a real threat to the quality and level of access that public services should provide. As such, CUPE has serious concerns about Bill C-58, both about the parts of the current Access to Information Act that it proposes to amend and about the existing deficiencies that it fails to correct.

First, this bill leaves intact sections 18 and 20, which exempt from disclosure any material or information that falls under the broadly undefined category of trade secrets of either the government or a third party. The language removes from public scrutiny any financial, commercial, scientific, or technical information that has what is called “substantial value” or is reasonably likely to have substantial value in an undetermined future.

The current language allows the government to refuse to disclose third party information that was treated confidentially by that third party. It exempts from disclosure, in a preposterously broad limitation, any information that “could reasonably be expected to be materially injurious to... the ability of the Government of Canada to manage the economy of Canada”. The scope of information that can be exempted from public disclosure under this language is virtually infinite: contracts with private security or accounting companies, pharmacological research, reports by consultants on proposed government actions, records of foreign investment, information relating to the health and safety performance of a third party entity providing public services. These are some of the possible exemptions under sections 18 and 20, and they are also examples of material and information that must be accessible to Canadians if access to information legislation is to be meaningful.

Certainly we understand that there are legitimate grounds for non-disclosure, such as national security and personal privacy, and that access requests can sometimes require judgment calls by government officials. These exemptions, however, like those in other sections that hide from view the actions and decisions of the PMO, cabinet, and ministers' offices, are overly broad, not subject to a test of real harm, and not subordinated to a meaningful public interest override.

We must note as well the dangerous ways these exemptions intersect with other legislation this government has proposed in what others more cynical than we are might characterize as a war on transparency. For example, Bill C-22 gives the staff of the Department of National Defence the authority to decide what is excluded from disclosure without any independent review. In Bill C-44, section 28 of the Canada Infrastructure Bank Act expands exclusions to include information about proponents, private sector investors, and institutional investors in infrastructure projects, again with no independent review.

The Canada Infrastructure Bank Act provides a clear example, in fact, of the regressive nature of the current legislative trajectory. Not only does the Canada Infrastructure Bank Act lay out overly broad additional exemptions, it also places final decisions before cabinet, essentially shrouding the entire process in darkness, out of the reach of the Information Commissioner, the Auditor General, and even the federal courts.

Let us provide a concrete example. CUPE recently filed an access to information request for information and material related to the government's participation in the private REM light rail project in Montreal, specifically for the reports and analyses prepared by a third party consultancy called Blair Franklin Capital Partners. This is a project to which the government has committed 1.3 billion public dollars, and it is something the government has indicated the Canada Infrastructure Bank may take on as one of its first projects.

Is this a good investment? What information has the government relied on to make that decision? Were environmental, health and safety, or accessibility concerns integrated into the decision? What is the business model and the business case? What is the projected fee structure, and will it be regressive or restrict access?

Answers to these questions are central to the public's understanding of this particular public investment. In other words, the public interest is immense. However, when we received a response—after a delay, of course—Infrastructure Canada invoked section 18 to redact virtually all of the records, making the entire 613-page disclosure incomprehensible and useless.

Rather than apply the exemptions narrowly and with respect for the public interest, it has become common practice for the government to redact by default, to exclude by default. This is an application that runs counter to the stated aims of the act and the bill under review, and counter to international standards of open government.

While there may be legitimate exemptions for disclosure of third party information, they would need to pass the test of real harm in each case. It is not legitimate for government to refuse disclosure simply because the information is related to a third party interest.

A recent report by the Vancouver-based Columbia Institute, entitled “Canada Infrastructure Bank and the Public's Right to Know”, notes that there is virtual unanimity among information commissioners across Canada that private entities that receive public funds or perform a public service or public interest function must be covered by access to information legislation. This is the emerging consensus internationally as well.

Here, though, this government has moved in the opposite direction by establishing a regime in which information on how our public services and public infrastructure are provided, how they are funded, how these decisions are made, and even who is involved in the work can be hidden behind a curtain of third party privilege. CUPE submits that the government instead needs to ensure that access to information under sections 18 and 20 faces far narrower exemptions that are subject to a test of actual harm, to a strong public interest override, and to review by the Information Commissioner, and that this act take precedence over any other act, such as the Canada Infrastructure Bank Act, that seeks to unreasonably limit the public's right to know.

We would also like to take a moment to echo the serious concerns of your previous witnesses. Proposed section 6, as written, creates new hurdles to gaining access by establishing requirements for the structure and content of requests that void the government's duty to assist and that defeat the very purpose of the act. Proposed section 6 also would allow the government of the day to create unilaterally a “do not respond” list of troublesome Canadians who always seem to want to know something and ask too many big questions. The determination that an access request is frivolous, trivial, vexatious, or made in bad faith is one that cannot and should not be made by the government of the day to whom the information request is made. This is a subjective determination that is necessarily rife with conflict of interest.

Another barrier to access is cost. Bill C-58 leaves open the possibility of government requiring new and onerous costs for access. Where is the promise for a nominal $5 fee with all other costs voided, and for the $5 fee itself to be refunded if timelines are not met?

We also agree with other witnesses that Bill C-58 represents a missed opportunity. There are serious problems with the current legislation, problems that the current government correctly identified while in opposition and that remain wholly unaddressed in the proposals before you. Canada, despite its leadership in other areas, sets a very poor example globally with the current act. According to the global right to information index compiled in part by the Centre for Law and Democracy and based on 61 indicators, Canada is ranked 49th out of 111 countries on the quality of its access to information laws.

News Media Canada has criticized this government's approach to access to information as being “even worse” than the previous government's. Your own outgoing Information Commissioner has called Bill C-58 “a regression of existing rights”, as has been mentioned many times at this committee. We urge you to take her 28 carefully considered recommendations.

To summarize, we submit that the law must apply to private third parties who receive public funds or perform a public service function. All exemptions must be discretionary in practice. The Information Commissioner's office must have at its disposal a full tool box of real order-making powers and the authority to enact penalties. We agree with Democracy Watch that the appointment process for the Information Commissioner must be changed so that it is open, merit-based, and not controlled by the very ministers the commissioner will be reviewing.

In conclusion, we cannot recommend that Bill C-58 proceed as written. It is, quite simply, bad legislation. It makes access more difficult rather than improving it.

Instead, CUPE calls on the government to review the problems that these hearings and previous commentary have identified, to research the best examples from your provincial and international counterparts, and to draft amendments that have as their guiding principle what Mr. McArthur, the acting commissioner from B.C., called “access by design”: an act that facilitates access rather than blocks it and that leads to a government that is truly open by default and closed only in the narrowest, independently defensible circumstances.

Thank you again for the time. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, good morning.

I'm sure you would all like to join me this morning in expressing our deep concern with respect to the two very serious incidents that occurred this past weekend, one in Edmonton and the other in Las Vegas. These circumstances are horrendous in our free and open and democratic society. It's at times like these that we all pull together to support each other and to applaud our first responders on both sides of the border, who have done extraordinary work. We extend our thoughts and prayers to the victims and the families and the loved ones, and we hope for the speedy and full recovery of those who have been injured. We make the emphatic point that events like this will not divide us, nor will they intimidate us. Police investigations are obviously ongoing; they're at a very early stage. A lot more information will be forthcoming in due course, but we I'm sure stand in solidarity with one another within our country and across the border when these kinds of sorry events occur.

Mr. Chairman, with respect to this meeting and this topic, this is my first opportunity to be before the committee since the return of Parliament, so welcome to you as the new chair. I notice some other new faces on all sides of the table, and some old-timers too. To all of you, welcome, and thank you for the invitation to be here today. I look forward to a very good relationship with the committee.

We begin, of course, with BillC-21. I'm joined today by Martin Bolduc, who is vice-president of the Canada Border Services Agency; Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère, who is director general of the traveller program directorate within CBSA; and Andrew Lawrence, who is the acting executive director of the traveller program directorate.

The bill that we're here to discuss will at long last enable Canada to keep track of not only who enters our country but also who leaves it. If that sounds pretty fundamental, actually it is. But there has been a gap in our border system for a great many years that we are now proposing to close with Bill C-21. I would point out that many other countries, including all of our Five Eyes allies, already collect this information that is commonly known as “exit” data. Canada, with Bill C-21, will catch up to those other countries and fill the gap.

The information that we're talking about is simply the basic identification information that is found on page 2 of everyone's passport, along with the time and the place of departure. It's the same simple identification information that all travellers willingly hand over when they cross the border. When you cross into the United States, you show your passport and the border officers take note of the information on page 2. It's that information that we're talking about here: name, date, place of birth, nationality, gender, and the issuing authority of the travel document.

The way this information will be collected is really quite straightforward, and travellers should notice no difference at all in the process. For people leaving Canada by air, the air carrier will collect that information, as it already does from passenger manifests, and it will give it to the Canada Border Services Agency before departure. For people crossing by land into the United States, American officials collecting this information, as they already do in the form of entry data, will then send it back to CBSA where it will serve as exit data. This will work in the same way in reverse for travellers crossing into Canada from the United States. The experience from the point of the view of the traveller will be absolutely unchanged.

With this information in hand, Canadian officials will be better able to deal with cross-border crime, including child abductions and human trafficking. It will strengthen our ability to prevent radicalized individuals from travelling to join terrorist groups overseas. It will help ensure the integrity of benefit programs where residency requirements are part of the eligibility criteria. It will also ensure that immigration officials have complete and accurate information when they do their jobs. They won't waste a lot of time dealing with people who have already left the country.

Finally, the legislation also addresses a concern raised in the Auditor General's report in the fall of 2015 about the need for stronger measures to combat the unlawful export of controlled or dangerous goods. Bill C-21 will amend the Customs Act to prohibit smuggling controlled goods out of Canada. Currently, and this may be a surprise to some people, only smuggling “into” Canada is prohibited. The new legislation will give border officers the authorities regarding outbound goods similar to the ones they already have for inbound goods.

Mr. Chair, I followed closely the second reading debate in the House about Bill C-21. There were not a lot of specific issues raised, but there was one mentioned by Mr. Dubé that I would like to respond to. It had to do with this issue of the sharing of information with the United States. I was concerned that there seemed to be a view that any exchange of information with the U.S. was inherently a bad thing.

I think we should keep in mind that the process of Canadian and U.S. authorities working together and exchanging information, pursuant to laws and agreements and subject to oversight, is essential for our mutual security. For example, when Canadian authorities were able to take action in Strathroy, Ontario, last summer to prevent a planned terrorist attack, that was due to an exchange of information with the United States. Because of that, the RCMP and local police authorities were able to prevent a much larger tragedy. Working in concert with our American partners, and exchanging information with them according to the rules, is very important to our national interests. It supports having the longest, most open, successful international boundary in the history of the world.

The key questions are these: what kind of information is to be shared, with what safeguards, and for what purposes? Bill C-21 provides very clear answers. What kind of information? As I said, it's the basic identification data, on page 2 of our passports, that we all offer up whenever we cross a border. It's worth pointing out that if Canada is sharing this information with the United States, that is only because the person in question has just come into Canada from the United States, to whom they necessarily gave the same information upon entry. It's not new or expanded information beyond the fact that they have left. That's the sum and substance of the data that is involved.

What safeguards are in place? To begin with, the government has engaged proactively throughout this whole process with the Privacy Commissioner. That engagement continues. You can find the privacy impact assessments of the current and previous phases of entry/exit implementation on the CBSA website. A new assessment will be updated once the new legislation is actually in effect.

In addition, exchange of information both within Canada and with the U.S. will be subject to formal agreements that will include information management safeguards, privacy protection clauses, and mechanisms to address any potential problems.

All of this will be happening in the context of the most robust national security accountability structure that Canada has ever had. We've already passed Bill C-22, which creates the new National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. Add to that Bill C-59, introduced in the spring, which will create a new national security and intelligence review agency. And as you know, we have proactively, in the last number of days, released new ministerial directives about information sharing that have been broadly applauded as significant advancements.

Finally, what purpose does the exchange of information serve? As I've outlined, it will help Canadian authorities do everything from combatting cross-border crime to preventing terrorist travel to improving the management of social benefits and immigration programs. But to give you a concrete example, if it's discovered one evening that a child is missing, police can do a check of the exit records to see if the child left the country earlier that day, where, at what time, and in whose company. That is obviously immensely helpful to investigators working collaboratively on both sides of the border in their efforts to recover the child and catch the kidnapper. For that reason alone, I hope the committee will see fit to report this bill back to the House with all deliberate speed.

I thank you for your attention, Mr. Chair, and look forward to questions.

Customs Act

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his speech.

It is interesting, because one of the things he emphasized was the idea of combining this with other information to help intercept someone who is known to authorities. That would be just another piece of the puzzle. However, there is a problem with that. When we look at some of the human rights violations created by the Government of Canada, for example, in cases such as that of Maher Arar, the sharing of information was often one of the problems. In fact, sharing information, in certain situations where profiling occurs, can insinuate something about an individual and lead to horrible and tragic situations like the one that Mr. Arar went through.

When we look at the proposed system, to allow more information to be shared, I wonder whether the hon. member realizes how little we can trust the process, especially in light of the current administration. Simply increasing the sharing of information without really putting in place adequate accountability procedures, is a problem.

For example, the Canada Border Services Agency is one of the only agencies responsible for dealing with national security, and before Bill C-22 was passed, it did not have a review mechanism, let alone any oversight, because no real-time monitoring was being conducted. Obviously, we have complete confidence in the men and women working on the Canadian side of the border, but what is happening on the American side is a different story, considering the racial profiling that is going on there.

Is the member not worried about this exchange of information? Before he tells me that the Privacy Commissioner was involved in this work, let us remember that, in the speech the minister gave about this bill, he said that the Privacy Commissioner should conduct further assessments after the bill was passed. That hardly inspires confidence.

Does the member not agree that the most important thing is protecting human rights? The government does not have a great track record in that regard when it comes to information sharing.

Preclearance Act, 2016

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to rise again to speak to Bill C-23. I had an opportunity to illuminate many of the great benefits the bill would bring to Canadians in my speech at second reading.

I want to begin my comments by thanking all the members of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for their work. It is evidenced by the fact that our government adopted all of the committee's amendments, including the NDP amendment for a five year review. There is an excellent relationship between the committee and our ministry in making sure we have the most effective bill possible. It has been a pleasure to work with the committee members, and I want to take the opportunity now at third reading stage to thank them.

It is appropriate that we are speaking to Bill C-23 on the eve of summer. Many Canadians are getting ready for their travel plans, visiting family, or taking a vacation. One of the things they do not want to deal with on vacation is long lines, hassles, and problems getting to where they want to go.

Pre-clearance would help us facilitate the movement of goods, services, and people, making sure people are avoiding long lines, and that they can expand the number of destinations they can go to. In fact, some 12 million passengers each and every year in the airline sector alone already use pre-clearance. Some people may use pre-clearance, and not even realize they do. People flying out of Pearson have the opportunity to go through customs before landing on U.S. soil, which not only accelerates the opportunity for them to get to work, see family, or start their vacation, it also means they get to have that process happen on Canadian soil. I will get back to that in just a moment.

On the range of airports, it means there are a vast number of airports that suddenly open up to airline passengers as if they are domestic travellers. If people want to go to Nashville, for example, in the absence of pre-clearance, they will be in for a lot of transfers. With pre-clearance, they get to go there directly, roughly doubling the number of cities they can travel to as Canadian citizens. That is certainly a big benefit as a traveller.

The other point, which is incredibly important, is that often in this debate, we have a discussion in abstraction about whether or not there will be issues with moving pre-clearance on this side. Aside from the fact that it has already been happening for six decades, there is the point that someone who is already travelling to the United States gets to have that process happen on Canadian soil. The great benefit of that is that individuals have the opportunity to have the full protection of the Canadian charter, the Canadian Bill of Rights, and Canadian law, generally, so that if something were to happen that they did not agree with, there is the opportunity in the process to have that protection on Canadian soil.

It is important to look at this in conjunction with the work we are doing on oversight, more generally, to ensure as we look at our oversight mechanisms more broadly, when someone does have problems, CBSA has independent oversight. Members can see what is proposed with oversight more generally with Bill C-59, which was tabled just yesterday. It was the largest update of our security intelligence framework since the creation of CSIS. It would put in place rigorous and effective oversight, both in the form of a security and intelligence review body, but also in the form of a committee of parliamentarians. I was very pleased to see the Senate adopt BillC-22 without amendment yesterday. It will allow us to bring forward that committee of Parliament.

Therefore, it can be seen that we are looking at oversight, and making sure that the laws and powers that are extended have rigorous oversight. Of course, one of the great advantages of having pre-clearance happen on Canadian soil is the leverage. If something were to go wrong, there is the opportunity to have discussions bilaterally with our U.S. neighbours to ameliorate that.

There have been some questions about different elements of the bill. For example, if people walk into a detention area, they have to explain why they are there. Some people have taken issue with that, saying there should not be unnecessary delays. Of course, that is exactly the language of the bill. One should only be detained for a limited period of time, and it should only be to ascertain necessary information. Some people have asked, why? Very importantly, we could imagine that if somebody walked into a detention area, was just looking around, casing out a pre-clearance zone, and then made a decision to leave, we want to know why they were there, why they showed up. Asking questions in that regard is extremely important.

I spoke to many of these matters when we were at second reading. I want to come to the testimony we heard at committee. The committee had an excellent opportunity to hear from a very wide array of witnesses as to the economic and other benefits that would come as a result of Bill C-23.

We are all aware of the aspirations of the Jean Lesage and Billy Bishop airports. It is important to enumerate and talk about some of the other witnesses we heard from in terms of the benefits of this bill. In conjunction with that, technical briefings were provided to parliamentarians by Public Safety Canada and the Canada Border Services Agency that expanded upon some of the concerns, and I hope answered them.

I would like to go to the individuals from a variety of sectors such as tourism, Canada-U.S. trade, airports, and others. They told the public safety committee how pre-clearance would benefit their businesses. On that basis, I am going to begin with the tourism industry.

Rocky Mountaineer, one of the sites included in pre-clearance expansion, spoke to committee about how the current customs process works at their station in Vancouver, B.C. With routes that run between Vancouver and Seattle, Rocky Mountaineer currently uses post-clearance customs and immigration processes.

For example, on a southbound journey, U.S. customs and border protection officers conduct customs proceedings on arrival in Seattle. It can take 30 to 45 minutes to clear an entire train upon arrival. With pre-clearance, passengers would be cleared as they arrive to the train station, similar to the experience they go through at one of the eight Canadian airports with pre-clearance operations, some of which I was referring to earlier. Instead of a large group of people arriving simultaneously to be cleared, passengers could be managed as they arrive, and check in for their trip. It would be a more comfortable and manageable experience for passengers, and much more efficient for customs and immigration officers. That is the primary goal of Bill C-23 more broadly, to make the traveller experience more efficient, while maintaining security standards at the border.

As the Business Council of Canada pointed out during its testimony to committee, travellers seek out the path of greatest convenience and least resistance in air travel. It is not just the convenience factor, but there is a major economic benefit to the changes being talked about today. As Canadians or others are contemplating what kind of travelling they may want to do this summer, or any point in the year, they are going to choose the options where they are least inhibited, and are going to be dealing with the least number of headaches. Helping facilitate that is only in our best interest, particularly when we are thinking of foreign visitors who may be attempting to travel in and around North America.

Pre-clearance would give Canada a competitive advantage. It would increase the number of destinations Canadians could travel to directly. I gave examples earlier, and Reagan airport in Washington is another great example. Without pre-clearance facilities, a traveller from Ottawa would not be able to fly directly to Reagan because it does not have customs and immigration facilities. I gave the other example earlier of Nashville.

Once travellers would be pre-cleared in a Canadian airport, they would arrive in the United States just like any other domestic travellers in the U.S. It would let them step off the plane immediately, make a connection, head to a meeting, or begin their vacation, all because they were able to pre-clear at the start of their travels in Canada.

The Business Council of Canada further stated that our country has a great desire for increased trade investment in tourism, and expanding pre-clearance would give a tremendous competitive advantage. It is worth noting that, in an age when there is so much competition for trade and commerce, anything we can do to eliminate obstacles and red tape, and move people, goods, and services in a better fashion is only to our advantage. Where we do not put it in place, we have a competitive disadvantage that is incredibly inhibiting. What we heard in testimony is how important it is to have pre-clearance go through to make sure we continue to have a strong competitive advantage.

Billy Bishop Airport also spoke specifically to this advantage. It has worked extensively to bring pre-clearance to the Toronto Island Airport over the last several years, and would work to implement pre-clearance facilities at its airport with the passage of Bill C-23.

I have had the opportunity to meet with the folks who are responsible for Billy Bishop, and they are ready to go. They foresee enormous economic benefits, not only for that airport, but for the entire greater Toronto region, and of course for the Canadian economy.

Billy Bishop welcomed 2.7 million passengers in 2016 alone, generating $2.1 billion as an economic impact per year. It is a huge amount, and that is before it has pre-clearance. It is the sixth-largest departing airport for U.S.-bound passengers, and the ninth-largest airport in Canada. Expanding pre-clearance to Billy Bishop will promote speed, access to increased destinations, and efficiencies, all without compromising security or safety of the border. In fact, from my earlier comment earlier, it would enhance them. It would make sure that Canadians are getting their pre-clearance done on Canadian soil under the full protection of Canadian law.

Toronto Pearson International Airport is the original example of the benefits of pre-clearance, as the original airport to be granted pre-clearance. As the Greater Toronto Airport Authority testified before committee, each new link or flight route is an opportunity for trade and jobs, something I do not think anybody in this House wants to stand between.

Toronto Pearson has become the fourth-largest air entry point into the United States. It pre-cleared six million passengers last year alone. It has had a 30% increase in pre-clearance traveller growth in the past five years. Quite simply, these numbers demonstrate the undeniable need for expansion and pre-clearance. If we see the benefit and impact of pre-clearance at Pearson, and we imagine Billy Bishop and all the other locations that are contemplating pre-clearance, and we magnify that increase in travel and that increase in commerce, it is not hard to get to a very significant number and the billions of dollars in increased activity for our economy.

The Tourism Industry Association of Canada spoke to these benefits as well. It noticed last year that $91.6 billion was generated from tourism revenues in Canada alone. Over 627,000 Canadians are employed in the tourism industry. It is a massive number of people who are counting on us to have a regime that works for them, and facilitates movement of people, goods, and services.

As Canada's tourism industry grows, we must ensure that we are doing all we can to modernize, and expedite the flow of people and products across our border with the United States. Not only does pre-clearance attract tourists, but it can attract the air service, and allow airports to offer enhanced connectivity in an incredibly competitive global industry. It is a huge boon for both travellers and airports.

Canadian airports connect and manage over 133 million passengers each and every year. Of those, 9.8 million are tourists to Canada. In 2015, 12 million travellers were pre-cleared in Canadian airports to travel to the United States. The expansion of pre-clearance to additional airports, and other modes of travel, such as rail, will build on the success of pre-clearance operations. The economic and traveller benefits cannot be overstated. As we heard from many in the tourism, airport, rail, and Canada-U.S. trade industries, these changes are absolutely vital. Bill C-23 would ensure that more Canadians have access to pre-clearance, while making border travel and trade easier, more profitable, and more secure.

Perhaps in the closing time that I have, I can go over some of the concerns that have been raised, and how we think those concerns can be fully addressed. One of the concerns that was raised, both during the committee proceedings and outside of them, was the ability for officers to conduct strip searches of travellers in Canada.

The rules governing searches by U.S. pre-clearance officers will be almost the same under Bill C-23 as they are right now. A U.S. officer will still have to ask a Canadian officer to conduct a search involving the removal of clothing. The only difference is that in a rare circumstance that a Canadian officer is unavailable, the U.S. officer would be able to conduct the search. Any search by an officer of either country would be subject to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is important to note just how rare a circumstance that would be, that a Canadian officer would not be present, but also how important, that if there were not a Canadian officer, that search could still take place.

Sometimes individuals have something on their person that could represent an immediate risk and danger to officers, and if officers are unable to conduct that search, it could put them at great risk, so it is something that cannot be deferred or simply held back.

Some people have asked what protections would exist for a transgender traveller being strip-searched by a U.S. officer. I can say that CBSA has policies in place allowing exceptions to the rule that strip searches must be conducted by an officer of the same sex as the traveller. For instance, in the case of a transgender person, searches of this nature by U.S. preclearance officers in Canada would be conducted in accordance with CBSA procedures and Canadian human rights jurisprudence. U.S. officers would be provided training to ensure that their conduct met these standards. This is yet another benefit of undergoing U.S. border procedures on Canadian soil.

I think I have explained why people have to identify their purpose when they arrive in a preclearance zone, so I will not talk about that any further.

Some people have questioned the term “unreasonable delay”. They have suggested that “unreasonable delay” of someone in a preclearance area is overly vague. Liberals would disagree. The concept of reasonableness is used widely in legislation and case law and usually means that other people in the same situation would reach the same conclusion or behave in the same way.

With respect to officer authorities, it has been used to refer to generally accepted standards. In fact, when the existing preclearance law was being debated in 1999, the NDP at that point argued in favour of adding the word “reasonable” to the section on the use of force as a way of limiting officer authorities. Certainly the NDP, in 1999, agreed that the term was specific enough to provide the protection and coverage required.

Others have questioned whether Bill C-23 would entitle U.S. officers to carry guns in Canadian airport terminals. The answer is no. Let me be very clear on this point. American officers would carry the same weapons as Canadian border officers in the same environment, without exception. Canadian border officers carry firearms at land, rail, and marine ports of entry, so U.S. preclearance officers would do the same. However, Canadian border officers do not carry firearms in airport terminals, so neither would Americans.

The same principle of reciprocity would apply to Canadian officers conducting preclearance in the U.S. One of the important tenets of the agreement reached with the Americans is the element of reciprocity. We would never see U.S.border officers with guns or comporting themselves in ways that would not be applied in the U.S. under similar circumstances.

It is worth mentioning that our hope and aspiration in passing this bill is that not only would preclearance be vastly expanded to include more locations across Canada but that we would see the same economic benefits and the benefits of the rapidity of travel we saw at YYZ . However, we hope, and have every reasonable expectation to believe, that the Americans will themselves also engage in preclearance in the opposite direction, which would have tremendous economic benefits and is something we would open by adopting Bill C-23.

The last question put to us was the question of permanent residents of Canada being denied entry by Canadian preclearance officers in the U.S. That is not a concern. In almost all cases, permanent residents would be treated exactly the same way in preclearance areas as they would be at any other entry point in Canada. The rare exception would be where there was a major issue of inadmissibility, such as serious criminality. Such individuals would still come to Canada, subject to the usual admissibility rules, at an ordinary point of entry. They just would not have the benefit of preclearance.

I hope I was able to outline for the House the tremendous benefits we have before us with Bill C-23. We need to get moving on this so we can help our tourism industry, trade, and Canada more generally.

Changes to the Standing Orders

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I agree that there have been some positive changes in this Parliament, such as the example the member gave of the electoral reform committee, which is something I was very proud of. I do not see why we cannot bring other committees in that would be more representative and have more independents on them. Indeed, there are standing committees and there are standing committees. We would also have a committee of parliamentarians established, under Bill C-22, which is not even within the realm of the Standing Orders. It is entirely separate.

Parliament is an infinitely adaptable institution. We have shown that in the examples the member gave and with the committee of parliamentarians. I think we can do better if we work together, but that is not addressed in what is before us in the motion.

Extension of Sitting Hours

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister of Small Business and Tourism]

moved:

That, notwithstanding any Standing Order or usual practice of the House, commencing upon the adoption of this Order and concluding on Friday, June 23, 2017:

(a) on Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays, the ordinary hour of daily adjournment shall be 12:00 a.m., except that it shall be 10:00 p.m. on a day when a debate, pursuant to Standing Order 52 or 53.1, is to take place;

(b) subject to paragraph (e), when a recorded division is demanded in respect of a debatable motion, including any division arising as a consequence of the application of Standing Order 61(2) or Standing Order 78, but not including any division in relation to the Business of Supply or arising as a consequence of an order made pursuant to Standing Order 57, (i) before 2:00 p.m. on a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday, it shall stand deferred until the conclusion of oral questions at that day’s sitting, or (ii) after 2:00 p.m. on a Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday or Thursday, or at any time on a Friday, it shall stand deferred until the conclusion of oral questions at the next sitting day that is not a Friday;

(c) notwithstanding Standing Order 45(6) and paragraph (b) of this Order, no recorded division requested after 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, June 22, 2017, or at any time on Friday, June 23, 2017, shall be deferred, except for any recorded division which, under the Standing Orders, would be deferred to immediately before the time provided for Private Members’ Business on Wednesday, September 20, 2017;

(d) the time provided for Government Orders shall not be extended pursuant to Standing Order 45(7.1) or Standing Order 67.1(2);

(e) when a recorded division, which would have ordinarily been deemed deferred to immediately before the time provided for Private Members’ Business on a Wednesday governed by this Order, is demanded, the said division is deemed to have been deferred until the conclusion of oral questions on the same Wednesday;

(f) any recorded division which, at the time of the adoption of this Order, stands deferred to immediately before the time provided for Private Members’ Business on the Wednesday immediately following the adoption of this Order shall be deemed to stand deferred to the conclusion of oral questions on the same Wednesday;

(g) a recorded division demanded in respect of a motion to concur in a government bill at the report stage pursuant to Standing Order 76.1(9), where the bill has neither been amended nor debated at the report stage, shall be deferred in the manner prescribed by paragraph (b);

(h) for greater certainty, this Order shall not limit the application of Standing Order 45(7);

(i) no dilatory motion may be proposed after 6:30 p.m.;

(j) notwithstanding Standing Orders 81(16)(b) and (c) and 81 (18)(c), proceedings on any opposition motion shall conclude no later than 5:30 p.m. on the sitting day that is designated for that purpose, except on a Monday when they shall conclude at 6:30 p.m. or on a Friday when they shall conclude at 1:30 p.m.; and

(k) when debate on a motion for the concurrence in a report from a standing, standing joint or special committee is adjourned or interrupted, the debate shall again be considered on a day designated by the government, after consultation with the House Leaders of the other parties, but in any case not later than the twentieth sitting day after the interruption.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak to government Motion No. 14. For the benefit of members, the motion would extend the sitting of the House until we rise for the summer adjournment.

We have much to accomplish in the coming weeks. Our government has an ambitious legislative agenda that we would like to advance in order to deliver on the commitments we made to Canadians in the last election. Let me reflect on our recent legislative achievements before I turn to the important work that lies before us over the next four weeks.

In our last sitting week, the House and Senate were able to reach agreement on securing passage of Bill C-37, which would put in place important measures to fight the opioid crisis in Canada. I would like to thank members of the House for the thoughtful debate on this bill and for not playing politics with such an important piece of legislation. In particular, I would like to thank members of the New Democratic Party for co-operating with the government to advance this bill when it was in the House and for helping us dispense with amendments from the Senate. This was a high watermark for the House and I hope that we can take this professional and courteous approach forward. I would also like to thank senators for their important contributions to this bill.

I would also like to point out the passage of two crucial bills related to trade. The first, Bill C-30, would implement an historic trade agreement with the European Union. The second, Bill C-31, would implement a trade agreement with Ukraine, a country that is dear to many members.

I am proud that our government continues to open the doors to trade and potential investment in Canada to grow our economy and help build a strong middle class.

In looking forward to the next four sitting weeks, I would like to highlight a few priority bills that our government will seek to advance. I will start with Bill C-44, which would implement budget 2017. This bill is about creating good middle-class jobs today while preparing Canadians for the jobs of tomorrow.

I will provide some examples of the initiatives that will contribute to building a strong middle class. The budget makes smart investments to help adult workers retain or upgrade their skills to adapt to changes in the new economy and to help young people get the skills and work experience they need to start their careers.

The budget also provides for investments in the well-being of Canadians, with the emphasis on mental health, home care, and health care for indigenous peoples.

Bill C-44 would provide financing to the provinces for home care and mental health care. It would also create leave for those who wish to care for a critically ill adult or child in their family. These initiatives help build stronger communities.

I would also like to point to initiatives in the budget that deal with gender equality. The first-ever gender statement will serve as a basis for ongoing, open, and transparent discussions about the role gender plays in policy development. Our government has other initiatives that aim to strengthen gender equality. For example, Bill C-25 encourages federally regulated companies to promote gender parity on boards of directors and to publicly report on the gender balance on these boards.

Another bill, which I will discuss in greater detail later in my remarks, is Bill C-24, a bill that would level the playing field to ensure a one-tier ministry. The bill has a simple premise. It recognizes that a minister is a minister, no matter what portfolio he or she holds.

Our government has committed to legalizing and strictly regulating the production, distribution, sale, and possession of cannabis. I look forward to the debate on this important bill tomorrow. I will note that the bill would provide strong safeguards and deterrents to protect young people from enticements to use or access cannabis.

The government has taken a responsible approach in seeking to legalize cannabis by ensuring that law enforcement agencies have approved methods to test the sobriety of drivers to guard against cannabis use while operating a motorized vehicle. This afternoon, the House will continue to debate this bill, which, I will happily note, has support from all opposition parties in the House. I hope that we can agree to send this bill to committee on Wednesday.

Now I would like to return to our government's commitment to improving gender equality. Bill C-24, which stands in my name, seeks to formalize the equal status of the ministerial team. This bill is very straightforward in its nature. It is fundamentally about the equality of all ministers. We strongly believe that the Minister of Status of Women should be a full minister. We believe that the Minister of Science and the Minister of Democratic Institutions should be full ministers.

I am disappointed that the Conservatives do not share this fundamental belief in equality. I think we should send this bill to committee for a detailed study of what the bill actually does.

I would like to draw members' attention to another piece of legislation, Bill C-23, regarding an agreement with the United States on the preclearance of persons and goods between our two countries.

This bill is currently being studied by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. The principle of the bill is simple. It is about ensuring a more efficient and secure border by expanding preclearance operations for all modes of transportation. This will increase the number of trips and the volume of trade, which will strengthen both of our economies.

As members may know, preclearance operations currently take place at eight Canadian airports, and immigration pre-inspection is also conducted at multiple locations in British Columbia in the rail and marine modes.

Once that bill comes back from committee, I hope that we can work together to send it to the other place.

In our last sitting week, our government introduced comprehensive modernization of our transportation systems. A strong transportation system is fundamental to Canada's economic performance and competitiveness. Bill C-49 does just that. The bill would enhance the utility, efficiency, and fluidity of our rail system so that it works for all participants in the system. Freight rail is the backbone of the Canadian economy. It moves everything from grain and potash to oil and coal, to the cars we drive, the clothes we wear, and the food we eat.

I would also like to draw to the attention of members provisions in Bill C-49 that would strengthen Canada's air passenger rights. While the precise details of the air passenger rights scheme will be set out in regulations, the objective is that rights should be clear, consistent, transparent, and fair for passengers and air carriers.

Finally, our government committed to creating a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. Bill C-22 seeks to accomplish two interrelated goals, ensuring that our security intelligence agencies are effective in keeping Canadians safe, while at the same time safeguarding our values, rights and freedoms, and the open, generous, inclusive nature of our country.

I appreciate the work that was done in the House committee to improve the bill. The bill is currently before the Senate national security committee, and I look forward to appearing before that committee with my colleague, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

Sitting a few extra hours for four days per week will also give the House greater flexibility in dealing with unexpected events. While it is expected that the Senate will amend bills, it is not always clear which bills and the number of bills that could be amended by the Senate. As we have come to know, the consideration of Senate amendments in the House takes time. This is, in part, why we need to sit extra hours. I know that members work extremely hard balancing their House duties and other political duties. I expect that extending the hours will add to the already significant workload.

I wish to thank members for their co-operation in these coming weeks. As I reflect upon my time as government House leader, there were examples where members of the House came together, despite their political differences, and advanced initiatives that touched directly upon the interests of all Canadians. I hope that over the four remaining sitting weeks before we head back to work in our ridings, we can have honest and frank deliberations on the government's priorities and work collaboratively to advance the agenda that Canadians sent us here to implement.

In the previous Parliament, when the government decided to extend the sittings in June of 2014, Liberal members supported that motion. We knew then, as we know now, that our role as legislators is a privilege, and we discharge our parliamentary functions in support of our constituents.

There will be initiatives that the government will bring forward over the coming weeks that will enjoy the support of all members, and there will be issues on which parties will not agree. Our comportment during this time will demonstrate to Canadians that we are all in this together, despite our differences, for the good of this great country. Let us not lose sight of that.

I believe the motion before the House is reasonable. I hope opposition members can support sitting a few extra hours for four days a week for the next few weeks to consider important legislation for Canadians.

Access to the House of Commons

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I do not know where my colleague gets the idea that our votes are not free, for I can assure him that they are. I do not understand why he would question the fact that we are mature enough to have robust discussions and then arrive at a certain consensus.

This makes two questions in a row, from two parliamentary secretaries, two representatives of the executive, that have attempted to bring up the Bloc Québécois or the operation of the NDP, even though we are talking about the operation of Parliament.

The example given by the Liberals is interesting. They speak of free votes and say that the Liberal backbenchers have won votes in spite of the government’s position, but when Bill S-201 received the support of Liberal backbenchers, the justice minister referred it to the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the amendments to Bill C-22 that were supported by certain Liberal members on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security are going to be reversed in the House.

It is all well and good, then, to say they have free votes and to congratulate themselves on that, but if the government can do an about-face on issues of fundamental importance such as medical assistance in dying and the committee of parliamentarians that will be overseeing national security agencies, then it is only smoke and mirrors. In any case, with the proposed changes, we may not even have to get up to vote any more. We will have remote voting or something.

I want to bring my Liberal colleagues back to the essential issue. To guarantee us that members’ privilege to represent their fellow citizens is properly defended, we ask for one simple thing: consensus.

Why are they unable to offer us that?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[The Speaker, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

I wish to inform the House of an administrative error that occurred with regard to Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts.

Members may recall that the House studied a number of motions at report stage. On March 20, 2017, the House adopted some of those motions and rejected others. One of the rejected motions was Motion No. 7, moved by the hon. member for Victoria, which was intended to delete clause 31 of the bill.

The House concurred in the bill, as amended, at report stage with further amendments and eventually adopted the bill at third reading on April 4, 2017.

As is the usual practice following passage at third reading, House officials prepared a parchment version of the bill and transmitted this parchment to the Senate. Due to an administrative error, the version of the bill that was transmitted to the other place was prepared as if Motion No. 7 had been adopted and clause 31 had been deleted, with the renumbering of another clause in the bill as a result. Unfortunately, the mistake was not detected before the bill was sent to the other place.

I wish to reassure the House that this error was strictly administrative in nature and occurred after third reading was given to Bill C-22. The proceedings that took place in this House and the decisions made by the House with respect to Bill C-22 remain entirely valid. The records of the House relating to this bill are complete and accurate.

However, the documents relating to Bill C-22 that were sent to the other place were not an accurate reflection of the House’s decisions.

Speaker Milliken addressed a similar situation in a ruling given on November 22, 2001, found on page 7455 of Debates. My predecessor also dealt with a similar situation in a statement made on September 15, 2014, found on page 7239 of Debates. Guided by these precedents, similar steps have been undertaken in this case.

First, once this discrepancy was detected, House officials immediately communicated with their counterparts in the Senate to set about resolving it. Next, I have instructed the Acting Clerk and his officials to take the necessary steps to rectify this error and to ensure that the other place has a corrected copy of Bill C-22 that reflects the proceedings that occurred in this House. Thus, a revised version of the bill will be transmitted to the other place through the usual administrative procedures of Parliament. Finally, I have asked that the “as passed at third reading” version of the bill be reprinted.

The Senate will, of course, make its own determination about how it proceeds with Bill C-22 in light of this situation. I wish to reassure members that steps have been taken to ensure that similar errors, rare though they may be, do not reoccur.

I thank hon. members for their attention.

Reference to Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, as you pointed out, this motion is before us again because, last week, the Liberals decided to shut down debate on a question of privilege concerning MPs' access to Parliament Hill.

I also want to remind everyone that the Chair made it clear this was unprecedented. We have a government that not only decided to shut down debate on a question of privilege about MPs' access to Parliament Hill, but did so cavalierly.

The Chair ruled on the matter and emphasized that it is of utmost importance. As our Standing Orders clearly state, questions of privilege take precedence over everything else, not because we like to spend time talking about ourselves, but because privilege is what enables us to do our job. Access to the Hill and our presence in the House of Commons are central to our ability to do our job.

Once again, recognizing what the Speaker has rightly highlighted about being on topic, I think these issues start to get a bit mixed up. The reason they do is that we have a government that has decided to end the debate on the question of privilege that is now before this House. Why? What is happening over on the government side, on the Liberal benches, that it would decide to do something that is unprecedented, that has never been done before, and end the debate on a question of privilege, which, as our rules say, is the core issue with which the House should be seized?

That is a question that, unfortunately, despite our attempts, we did not get an answer to from the Liberal speaker who just rose, I assume on behalf of the government. That is problematic.

I think the government decided to put an end to this discussion because it could not take the heat. It is starting to have a hard time reconciling the things it said during the election campaign and the way it treats Parliament. This is directly affecting our ability to do our job.

I want to stick to the issue of access to the Hill, which we have talked about at length, because I need to express my deep frustration. In a few weeks, it will be six years since I became a member of Parliament. I have seen this matter come up time and time again, and I still do not understand why a solution cannot be found, although I am well aware that these things are never perfect.

Before I go any further, I think it is extremely important to recognize the work done by the RCMP and the parliamentary security officers in Centre Block and everywhere on the Hill. This is not about pointing the finger at anyone, and that is precisely why we have a motion that calls on the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs to study the matter.

That is why my Conservative colleague moved an amendment for this to be the first item on the committee's agenda. It is because this issue comes up too often and is causing a lot of problems. This could affect new members, who may not be very familiar with our privileges despite the best efforts of the people who provide us with training when we arrive here. As my colleague said earlier, it feels quite strange when security officers know what we look like and know our names. That is quite impressive and can take us by surprise.

A new member who arrives at the bottom of the Hill before a vote when a foreign dignitary is on the Hill, or when the Prime Minister's vehicles are blocking the way, may not necessarily boldly invoke his privilege as a member and go ahead in order to get to his seat. He would not say it out of a sense of self-importance, but because he represents his constituents by voting, giving a speech, or carrying out any of his duties in the House.

It reminds me of a story involving one of my former colleagues, Jean Crowder. She and I were participating in, not a protest but a gathering, on the Hill. Some folks were here on the Hill to represent an issue. There were members from all parties at this gathering. Speeches were made by representatives of all parties.

We went back up the steps, and the security guard did not recognize me. I had only been a member for two months, and I did not have my pin. Sometimes I do not have it now. Sometimes I forget it on another suit jacket. I have had that issue before, so I always keep my ID card handy. That is the alternative.

That being said, even if a member has the pin, there is a jacket over it. Ottawa, with its lovely tropical climate, can get to a balmy -40 in the winter. We nonetheless have these gatherings, because some groups are courageous enough, and issues cannot wait until June. Sometimes these folks who are coming to the Hill to represent and lobby for issues they hold dear have to be here in January.

We walked up the steps, and the security guard did not recognize me. I said, “Oh, I am sorry”. I was fiddling, looking for my pass. Jean Crowder, who was a person I had never seen be curt with people said, “No. This is a member of Parliament. He has the right to pass”. The security guard said, “Okay”, and backed off.

Again, as my Conservative colleague so rightly pointed out, it is not a lack of humility that leads us to have this instinct, which we certainly do not have as new members. It is a question of being able to come here to do our jobs and represent Canadians.

That is why we call it privilege. That is why the government ending the discussion of that very privilege, and the Speaker stating that it is unprecedented, should say a lot about what the government is doing.

The Liberals shut down debate on our ability to do our work. Our privilege is our ability to do our work, which is to represent our constituents. The fact that the government shut down debate on protecting these privileges tells the House and the people listening a lot about this government's priorities.

That is the link to the discussion we are having right now. That is the government's approach. It wants to talk about privilege and the ability of members to do their job. The government wants to hear their ideas, but it does not want to provide them with a proper process that would let them have their say. As I said earlier, it is a dialogue of the deaf.

It is very problematic because something very important is being called into question. We were given examples of what happens in Great Britain under the Westminster system.

Without straying too far off topic, I just want to add that during debate on Bill C-22 and in the committee that analyzes and studies matters of national security, we said that we could elect the chair the same way they do in Great Britain. The government said that we must not move too quickly, that Canada was new to the idea, while Great Britain had several years to figure out how it would work. The hypocrisy is pathetic.

It is disappointing to see that when it works in the government's favour the government provides examples from around the world, but when it does not suit the narrative, the government ignores other examples. That is why it is important to have a structured process that allows the opposition parties to have their say.

This is not something new. This is how it has always been done, whether it was Stephen Harper, Paul Martin, Jean Chrétien, or anyone who came before them. This is how we have always changed the rules of the game. That is what they are. I know that game analogies are something we might chafe under. It is not always the best example to use, because what we do is not a game, but these are the rules that govern this place.

The Liberals now might feel that this is a good thing and that they can do it unilaterally and ram it through. What happens, after they create that precedent, when it is a Conservative prime minister, or, being an eternal optimist, a New Democrat prime minister or another Liberal prime minister with whom these members may not necessarily agree? Many of them, I have no doubt, ran because they appreciated the approach of this Prime Minister, but maybe another Liberal leader not so much.

As I saw in The Hill Times earlier today, a former Liberal MP was on the Hill today saying that this filibuster is a waste of time. That sounded like a criticism of the opposition, but it was not. He said he did not understand why his party created a toxic environment that is now leading the opposition to this recourse. That is the problem. They are trying to paint the opposition as the bad guys here, but we are just using the limited tools we have at our disposal, which they are trying to take away. They tried to do it with this question of privilege we are debating today by cutting off debate. That says a lot about their approach.

That debate, at its very core, is about our ability to do our jobs. It is not “Let us move to government orders, because we are here to be efficient and to pass legislation.” I am here to defend my privilege, because my privilege is not my privilege; it is the ability of my constituents to be heard, and ending that debate ends my ability to defend their ability to be heard in this place, and that is simply unacceptable.

The Liberals keeps using words like “modernization” and “discussion”, but those are just words. We cannot have a discussion until parameters are set for that discussion. A union would not have conversations with the employer in the hallway. There is a process and guidelines for collective bargaining. Similarly, teachers cannot teach their students whatever they want. They have to follow a curriculum. Every discussion on fundamental issues is structured.

Why does the government fail to see that this is not about the substance, but the process that we will use to get to our findings? Every other prime minister recognized that the process was the cornerstone of all this. Jean Chrétien and Paul Martin recognized it, and despite our considerable political differences, I will even acknowledge that Stephen Harper recognized it.

There are a lot of new members on the other side of the House, and I have had the opportunity to meet many of them either at functions on Parliament Hill or in committee. Most of them have told me that they ran as Liberals to do politics differently because their country and their Parliament was suffering. I told them they were exacerbating the problem they were meant to fix.

Everyone here is to blame for the toxic environment that currently exists, but the fault lies primarily with the government, which is unilaterally imposing sweeping changes. The government claims it is only acting to keep its election promises, but it never promised to impose anything on the opposition. The government promised to make Parliament work better. It lights fires and blames the opposition, and then cuts short debates on questions of privilege and the workings of Parliament. That is the opposite of making Parliament work better. That is the opposite of what motivated most of the Liberal members to go into politics, many of them for the first time.

What message is the government sending to those who really want to support us so that we can improve Parliament? It is not the same message that the Liberals were sending during the election campaign. It is not the same message as the one the government is trying to send with its supposed discussions. It is the very opposite.

I want to look at a great example south of the border, because the government seems intent on looking at the examples from other countries, whether they be Westminster models or otherwise. I look at what happened last week when the U.S. Senate was approving a Supreme Court nominee, which, dare I say, is probably one of the most fundamental responsibilities of a legislative body, given the importance that the Supreme Court has both here in Canada but also, looking at that example, in the United States.

What happened when there was a risk that Democrats in the Senate might engage in a filibuster, might use procedural tactics to delay the approval of a Supreme Court nominee where the consensus did not seem to be unanimous? I do not want to get into that debate, because that is not my business. What happened was that Republicans decided to use what they called the nuclear option. Instead of having the super majority that is normally required—60 votes to approve a Supreme Court nominee—they used their majority to change the rules of the game and make it so that it only required a simple majority of 50% plus one, 51% in that case.

What happened then? Respected senators like John McCain said that whoever thought of that idea was an idiot. Why did he say that? He said that because when he dealt with Democrats in the Senate on a nominee from President Obama, Republicans were very disappointed that the Democrats did the same thing. There were two parties changing the rules of the game to suit their political agenda, and in both cases, they chafed under that. Why? It is because it sets a precedent and creates a problem. Down the line, they can say it is how they will always solve their problems.

Coming back to Canada, what the government does not seem to understand is that changing the rules of the game might suit it this time, but it might not suit it next time when it loses an election after the broken promises start to pile up and people finally start getting fed up with the snake oil that they have been sold. That becomes a problem because it sets a precedent.

Instead of looking farther back and saying that Jean Chrétien sought Parliamentary consensus before making changes in the early 2000s, the next Conservative, Liberal, or NDP government can use this precedent and tell everyone not to worry because the government of the current Prime Minister, the member for Papineau, decided that a simple majority was enough to change the rules of the House.

I mentioned the United States because if the Liberals want to follow examples set elsewhere, they should look to respected individuals. For example, John McCain said it was idiotic to think that changing the rules was a good short-term solution to a problem that, in this case, does not exist. We have to think of the long-term consequences.

The long-term consequences have to do with the fact that we have to make a decision about a recurring question of privilege related to access to Parliament Hill. Precedent is not what worries me. I said at the outset that I was worried about the fact that we keep coming back to this issue of access to Parliament Hill, as several of our colleagues pointed out. I am concerned about the precedent the Speaker referred to, the precedent of shutting down debate. This is a problem. It is unacceptable, and it will cause problems for future generations of members of Parliament.

The government is using various tools. It forces votes in the House when, for example, we are debating motions that it does not like, since the government seems to think it is here to get its agenda passed as quickly as possible. If we read between the lines, this means imposing its will without debate using time allocation motions. The government wants to cut the debate short. The reason we are using these tactics and having this debate, which has been going on for three weeks at the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, is closely linked to the debate we are having today on the question of privilege. These are the tools we have to call on the government to seriously rethink the process. We have fundamentally different ideas on the substance of the issue. We could debate that. What unites the opposition is that we refuse to debate it until we know that this will not be dealt with unilaterally. This is central to parliamentary privilege. This is central to what is driving us here today, that is, questions related to access to the Hill, the length of the debate, and the fact that the government cut the debate short. Why? Because the privilege of the member for Beloeil—Chambly is not my privilege; it is the privilege of the people of Beloeil—Chambly. This goes for all of my colleagues and their respective ridings. This is crucial, and the opposition is united in saying no.

Public Safety

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, the law is there with respect to the use of these devices. The agencies that purport to use them need to fall within the four corners of the law, including the appropriate judicial oversight and authorization.

At the same time, what I was saying in the quote referred to by the hon. gentleman was that parliamentarians would soon have a new opportunity to provide oversight and review with the imminent passage of Bill C-22.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[The Speaker, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

It being 3:07 p.m., pursuant to order made Monday, April 3, 2017, the House will now proceed to the taking of the deferred recorded division on the amendment to the motion at the third reading stage of Bill C-22.

Call in the members.

The House resumed from March 24 consideration of the motion that Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be read the third time and passed, and of the amendment.

Business of the House

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

On a point of order, Mr. Speaker, there have been discussions among the parties, and if you seek it, I believe you would find unanimous consent for the following motion. I move:

That, notwithstanding any Standing Order or usual practice of the House,

(a) the recorded division on the amendment to the motion for third reading of Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, scheduled to take place today, at the ordinary hour of daily adjournment, be further deferred to Tuesday, April 4, 2017, at the expiry of the time provided for Oral Questions provided that all questions necessary for the disposal of the third reading stage of Bill be put forthwith and successively without further debate or amendment pursuant to Order made Monday, March 20, 2017, under the provisions of Standing Order 78(3).

(b) the subamendment and the amendment in relation to Ways and Means motion No. 10 be disposed of as follows:

On Tuesday, April 4, 2017, at 1:59 p.m., the Speaker shall interrupt the proceedings, the question to dispose of the subamendment shall be deemed put and a recorded division deemed requested and deferred until the expiry of the time provided for Oral Questions that day;

On Tuesday, April 4, 2017, at the expiry of the time provided for Government Orders, the Speaker shall interrupt the proceedings, the question to dispose of the amendment shall be deemed put and a recorded division deemed requested and deferred until the expiry of the time provided for Oral Questions on Wednesday, April 5, 2017.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak at the third reading of Bill C-22, which will create a committee of parliamentarians to oversee Canada's security bodies.

In Canada, our security apparatus and oversight must be constructed in ways that protect our freedoms and rights. Our Canada, strong and free, is the best country on the planet, and these are mutually reinforcing qualities that make our country. The recent terror attacks in Quebec, Strathroy, and indeed here on Parliament Hill in 2014, remind us that no country is immune to actions by those who would seek to challenge that freedom and security. While our strong global relationships, solid crisis response plans, and interconnected law enforcement networks are among the world's finest and meet rapidly changing global threats, we must guarantee independent parliamentary oversight to stand on guard of Canadians' individual rights and freedoms.

Canada is behind our international allies in this regard, and has been for far too long. Bill C-22 will help us catch up, better inform the public on crucial national security issues, and eliminate a weak link in the national security chain of accountability. In fact, the version of this bill introduced last June would already have put us far ahead of many other countries in terms of parliamentary oversight of national security. With the amendments adopted by the House earlier this week, Canada is poised to become a world leader in the area of national security and accountability.

It is worth remembering the history that accompanies the inception of this new committee of parliamentarians and the spirit of debate that has brought us to this point in its creation. We have certainly come a long way. Thirty years ago, the McDonald commission proposed an independent security review committee, in part as a result of public demands to make sure that mechanisms were in place to enforce the enforcers. There was widespread and growing concern that law enforcement operations carried out in secret but left unchecked could result in an above-the-law mentality and illegal activities by our paramilitary policing and security agencies. However, neither did the public want any parliamentary or government body with powers that were too broadly defined.

Fast-forwarding to 2005, only a few years after the tragedy of 9/11, an uncertain and changing environment meant growing demands for increased protection and stronger security measures. Prime Minister Paul Martin's government introduced legislation to create a parliamentary committee on national security and intelligence, reflecting renewed public demand for stronger oversight. That bill, as we know, died on the Order Paper.

In the last decade, the public and parliamentary debate in this area has intensified, and the issue of how to protect our security and our rights has become a major point of interest and now a driver of public policy. In recent years, we have discussed and debated stronger accountability for national security and intelligence agencies, following internal judicial inquiries and events surrounding the Maher Arar case.

Various bills have come and gone, including one introduced by the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra, which was rejected by the Conservative government of the day mere months before Bill C-51 was introduced.

[Anne Minh-Thu Quach, NDP, Salaberry—Suroît, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to hear the member opposite explain how the bill currently before the House, Bill C-22, can be transparent and require more accountability, given that the last minute changes made by the government seek to do the following: take away the committee's power to subpoena witnesses and documents; exempt ministers from the duty to disclose information—so much for accountability and transparency; and, among other things, give the Prime Minister the power to redact the committee reports and the discretion to compel the committee to revise its reports, to take out sensitive information without requiring the final report to specify which passages have been redacted or what kind of information was erased, where, or to what extent.

How can the Liberals talk about transparency and accountability when it is adding these measures, which totally undermine the effectiveness of the oversight committee?

[Marilyn Gladu, Conservative, Sarnia—Lambton, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the member opposite for his speech, but I am puzzled by one of the statements he made.

He said that Bill C-22 had gone to committee and that the majority of the amendments had been adopted. That is exactly opposite of what the member for Victoria just said. He said that the committee had come together and amendments had been proposed and accepted by all committee members, but at the eleventh hour the bill had been gutted and all those things had been taken away, such that the opposition could not support it.

Would the member explain, please, why there is such a difference in those stories?

[Majid Jowhari, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for Etobicoke Centre.

I am very pleased to stand in the House today in support of Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts. Bill C-22 fulfills the commitment made by our government to Canadians that it will bring forward legislation to create a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, otherwise known as NSICOP.

Throughout this speech, I will highlight three key points that outline the importance of the creation of NSICOP, namely: first, strengthening the accountability and transparency of our government; second, providing a comprehensive and reactive security framework through a wide-ranging mandate; and third, having extraordinary access to classified information in order to closely examine intelligence and security operations.

Bill C-22 is an essential component in the Government of Canada's efforts to ensure our country's national security is not beyond parliamentary oversight while simultaneously respecting the rights and freedoms of Canadians. This, I believe, is one of the most important fundamental duties our government can perform.

Many western democracies, including our Five Eyes allies—the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—have parliamentary oversight bodies on national security similar to what is being proposed in the bill. Just like those parliamentary bodies, Bill C-22 permits an examination of the national security work of federal departments and agencies, and holds them accountable as concerns their actions and responsibilities.

Canada currently has several oversight bodies that examine the activities of government organizations and agencies involved in national security operations. While each body does important work, they are organization specific and do not engage parliamentarians directly with their reviews.

The creation of NSICOP would strengthen transparency, accountability, ensure the possibility for government-wide reviews, and warrant greater effectiveness and efficiency throughout the larger review framework. In addition, it would allow for the complete independence of a parliamentary body in reviewing matters while not impeding on national security.

I would also like to point out that our government remains committed to addressing the problematic features and concerns of Canadians surrounding Bill C-51, which was introduced by the former government, and present new legislation that better balances our collective security with our rights and freedoms. Bill C-22 is one step towards addressing that.

The first key message that highlights the importance of the creation of this committee is that it would fill the accountability gap that has been outlined for more than 10 years by private sector experts, commissions of inquiry, and the Auditor General regarding the lack of an independent parliamentary body to scrutinize security and intelligence operations.

To give the committee the time and opportunity to learn the serious task it is undertaking and to get to know and understand the security and intelligence context on both a national and international level, our government has built an automatic review of NSICOP after five years to ensure it can accurately instill all the lessons it has learned in a timely and appropriate manner. This shows that our government understands the ever evolving nature of security threats and shows that we are remaining vigilant, responsive, and accountable to our security framework.

The government put forward the bill. The bill was studied at committee and amendments were proposed. The government, after careful consideration, has agreed to accept a majority of what the standing committee has requested.

One of these amendments is to add a whistle-blower clause, clause 31.1, which requires the committee to inform the appropriate minister, as well as the Attorney General, if it uncovers any activity that may not be in compliance with the law. I believe that this amendment adds to Bill C-22's already strong legislation, as it ensures Canadians that we are remaining vigilant to further enhance our capacity to keep Canadians safe through increased responsibility and accountability.

Second, the committee itself would have a broad government-wide mandate to scrutinize any national security matter.

The committee would also have the power to perform reviews on national security and intelligence activities, including ongoing operations, and the ability to conduct strategic and systemic reviews of legislative, regulatory, policy, expenditure, and administrative frameworks under which such activities are conducted.

Additionally, the committee would conduct reviews of matters specifically referred to it by a minister.

Given its broad mandate to review any operation, including an ongoing operation, the minister would have the authority to stop a review if it was deemed to be detrimental to national security.

It is important to note that the minister would have discretionary authority to withhold special operational information on a case-by-case basis should it also be believed that disclosure would be injurious to national security.

While these ministerial powers are within reason, I want to stress that ministers would not be able to withhold just any information. They are only permitted to do so in special and specific circumstances involving legally defined categories involving the most sensitive national security information where disclosure would have harmful national security implications for Canada.

Our government has recently agreed to adopt the amendment put forth by the public safety committee regarding the narrowing of the minister's authority to determine that a study of the committee is injurious to national security, which applies only to ongoing operations. The minister would have to explain that decision to the committee and would need to alert the committee as soon as the decision changed or as soon as the operation was no longer ongoing.

Third, our government is also supporting amendments to clause 14, which is the section that lists the type of information to which the NSICOP would not have access. This amendment expands the level of access to the different types of information available to the committee. We have removed from this exclusions list information about ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations, privileged information under the Investment Canada Act, and information collected by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada.

I believe the bill is stronger as a result, and I thank the members of the public safety committee for suggesting this amendment.

The committee will also decide on which national security and intelligence matters it will review. Additionally, the government may also refer matters for discussion at the committee.

The government is committed to protecting Canadians from national security threats. Bill C-22 would ensure that our national security framework will be working effectively to keep Canadians safe while not overriding the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Such an accountability mechanism is crucial to Canada, and it represents what Canadians asked for. That is exactly what our government is delivering. Canada is taking a step forward so that Canadians can see real and positive results on the serious issue of national security.

Bill C-22 would provide parliamentarians with extraordinary access to classified information and bring Canada in line with similar parliamentary oversight bodies that are already in place in the countries of our national security allies.

Bill C-22 represents a promise made and a promise kept.

[Anne Minh-Thu Quach, NDP, Salaberry—Suroît, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his passionate, thoroughly fact-based speech.

Given that he was the only NDP member to speak, how does my colleague respond to the assertion that this bill will enable members to participate in the conversation and improve security? My colleague from Victoria is an excellent MP, but that is not a very democratic way to start things off. What is more, that is the only time we will get.

With respect to security, one of the government's last-minute proposals for Bill C-22 was to remove the committee's power to subpoena witnesses and documents even though Kent Roach, Craig Forcese, and the first chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee recommended the committee have that power.

Another proposal would let ministers refuse to disclose information simply by citing national security privilege. I named just two, but there are at least three more that are very serious. In effect, these proposals would strip the committee of some of its powers.

What does my colleague think of that? Does he think this enhances or undermines oversight over Canada's security services?

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my hon. friend and colleague from Winnipeg for connecting the dots between what is happening here with Bill C-22 and what is happening all this week, as Canadians have observed, as the government decides to change the rules of democracy in this place on its own. The Liberals are calling it a discussion paper, putting a happy face on it, and using words like “modernization”, as if somehow Canadians will miss the fact that they are changing it without the support of other parties.

I never thought we would be here. I honestly did not think we would be here on Bill C-22. I cannot believe that a compromise that was achieved in a committee to say yes to this would somehow now be the subject of 11th-hour changes that take away our ability to agree to this. I was so hopeful that we could get this together as Canadians and put together a committee, security-cleared, in a non-partisan way, to review classified information and other information and get to the bottom of operational activities of some agencies that have never had any oversight whatsoever. Yet here we are, and that is why we are so disappointed.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Mr. Speaker, we have heard time and again from the government that it wants to respect the role of committees and that it wants to respect the work of its backbenchers and opposition MPs. When it comes to this piece of legislation, the Liberals are not doing that.

There was a good working relationship in committee. The committee came up with good amendments for what ultimately really needs to be a nonpartisan venture.

On a parallel track, the government members are saying that they want to have a discussion about the Standing Orders of the House and that we should just trust them to engage in good-faith discussions, and not ram things through, and that they will operate under a sunny model to make laws better here in Parliament. Does the behaviour of the government with respect to Bill C-22 not give members of this place cause to worry that perhaps the government is not acting in good faith when the government members say they just want to have a simple discussion about the Standing Orders of the House?

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I will ask a direct question related to one of the comments made by the member in just a moment, but I want to express a bit of disappointment. Bill C-22 is a piece of legislation that has received accolades, even before it went to committee. Experts said it was good, solid, sound legislation.

Once it went to committee, a number of amendments were made that were accepted by the government as a whole, making the legislation that much stronger. Not all amendments were accepted, and I think that should be no surprise, but that is what took place. We have very robust legislation. I would compare this legislation to that in other jurisdictions.

The specific question I have relates to some comments the member expressed during his discussion. I want to make sure I get as close as I can to interpreting what the member said. During his speech, the members stated something to the effect that the committee should have operational control of police and intelligence agencies. Does the member across the way truly think the power to direct security and intelligence operations is a good idea? That is how I interpreted what the member said.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to rise to address Bill C-22 at third reading stage. Unfortunately, this is the final day of debate on an issue of national security that has divided the government from every opposition party.

Government members have remarked on the extraordinary nature of the proposed committee. They note that it would end our laggard status among the so-called Five Eyes, that it would allow some parliamentarians extraordinary access to classified information, and that it would enjoy a whole-of-government mandate. These claims are all true, but they are also the bare minimum requirements. They are simply the essential features of an oversight committee.

I hope government members are unsettled when they notice that every opposition party, and respected experts from across the political spectrum, are all pointing to the same flaws in the government's bill. I have spoken about these flaws in detail in the public safety committee and in this chamber. My colleagues and I have consulted with non-partisan experts to craft more than one dozen amendments to resolve them.

Let me summarize these flaws as succinctly as I can for Canadians.

This committee's job is to oversee the functioning and classified operations of every government agency linked to intelligence and national security. This 11 member committee will face a multi-billion dollar array of some 20 government departments and agencies, some of which have never yet been subject to any oversight. When these 11 members sit down together for the first time, all they will have to rely on is a dedicated staff, a limited budget, and the powers laid out in black and white in the bill. That is where they will begin to hit roadblocks.

Despite their top secret security clearances, this bill would bar those parliamentarians from accessing certain operational information. They would find themselves unable to summon witnesses or order documents. Instead they could only request information from cabinet ministers, who are permitted to withhold it.

While it clips the committee's wings at every turn, the bill bestows sweeping powers on cabinet and on the Prime Minister. Ministers can shut down investigations. The Prime Minister can appoint every member of oversight committees and censor its reports.

Canadians might well ask this. With such little power for Parliament and so much power for the cabinet, can this oversight body actually do its job? It is precisely in that context that the government has now shut down debate, after barely one-tenth of Canadians' elected representatives have been permitted to participate. That is the context for today.

I want to focus on what I see as the essential question for each member now, and that is this. Are the powers granted by this bill sufficient to create the degree of rigorous operational oversight that Canadians expect in the era of Bill C-51, and the extraordinary powers now granted to our security services? That is the important question because the test for this committee is not whether it can monitor uncontroversial activities. The true test is whether it can stand up to a government that is violating the law in certain circumstances, failing to protect Canadians, or encroaching on their hard-earned rights and liberties.

Let me be clear. I cannot support this bill in that context, in its current form. I believe it would fail that test and it would fail Canadians. At the very moment when they need it to be strong, independent, and effective, it would fail the test because it chooses to sacrifice transparency for secrecy, and favour executive authority over accountability.

In the wake of an intelligence failure that cost thousands of innocent lives, the American 9/11 commission report warned as follows: “Secrecy stifles oversight...current organizational incentives encourage overclassification. This balance should change...”. It also warned, “So long as oversight is undermined...we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need.”

That is what this is all about: giving Canadians not just empty assurances but hard proof that their security is protected and their rights upheld. Does this bill meet that standard when it comes to operational oversight?

In arguing against strengthening the committee, the public safety minister compared it to counterpart committees in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. He correctly noted that each of those allies allows the government to withhold sensitive information from the oversight committee, but he left out an important fact, and that is that none of them is an operational oversight committee. Canada's would be, and it would be only second among the Five Eyes.

How would its powers compare to those American congressional committees? What do the Americans require for the same kind of job we are asking our committee to do? In the United States, special committees of the House and Senate are kept informed in real time of all intelligence operations. They can cut funding and even overrule the White House to order the release of previously classified information, if it serves the national interest. This goes far beyond even what the opposition parties have proposed for Canada.

If we passed this bill without fixing it, we would be giving the committee a mandate but not the tools required to get the job done. Yet, the government resists all calls by the opposition and non-partisan experts to grant these tools to the oversight committee. This gets to the central question of trust.

To justify cabinet's sweeping powers to obstruct oversight, the government has hidden behind a straw man, the one limit to which nobody has ever objected, and that is the safeguard to protect individuals in the witness protection program. We heard all about that earlier today. One government member referred to the need to segregate especially sensitive information. With respect, this misses the point. Everything this committee would work on is, by definition, especially sensitive. Nothing should leak, and I am confident that nothing will leak, just as it has not in Britain in the 22 years that it has had a similar committee under way.

If the identities of protected witnesses were this committee's only blind spot, I would welcome it, but alongside the others, it has begun to serve as a litmus test for the government's trust in this committee. I say that because there is no meaningful distinction between that information and anything else within the committee's unique mandate. All of it is potentially damaging to national security and individuals' safety. It makes us wonder, if the government cannot trust the committee with the names of witnesses, why would it hand over operational details? The answer, I fear, is that it will not. If we passed the current bill, we would give the government the power to withhold that information at every turn. We would give the government the power to deny Canadians the operational oversight they were promised, and we would fatally undermine Canadians' faith in this new institution, because if cabinet does not trust the committee, why should Canadians?

Of course, the government insists that it would use these powers sparingly and only with the best intentions. The Liberals' faith in their own good intentions I believe is sincere, but it blinds them to the actual wording of the bill. Take clause 21 as an example. Several amendments have targeted cabinet's power to filter the flow of information from this committee to Canadians. No fewer than six government members have repeated the claim that the sole purpose of that power is to screen out classified information. Again, if that were true, I would support it, but it is simply not true. In fact, the relevant clause does not even use the word “classified”. In fact, it empowers the Prime Minister to censor any information he believes may be injurious to national security or defence, or even international relations. All he has to do is believe it and it is so, and it is not available.

A similar claim, repeated by five government members, is that this revision power could not be applied to the committee's findings. Again, I would support that clause, but it is not in the bill.

This has become a theme. Too often, government members assure us of the good intentions of this bill's authors and simply forget that legislation must be built to outlast the authors of the bill. We are making law not just for this regime but for the future.

The current Prime Minister may not intend to use his powers to suppress embarrassing committee findings, but another one may. The current cabinet may not intend to use its power to quash investigations or to hide mismanagement or scandal, but another one may. The current government may not intend to ban the official opposition from the committee or use appointments to control the agenda or hide illegal surveillance by withholding operational details on security grounds, but another government may.

Consider, for instance, the investigations taking place right now south of the border into President Trump's ties to Russia and his wiretapping claims. If Bill C-22 were the law there, President Trump could revise the reports of congressional intelligence oversight committees to remove information he felt could harm foreign relations. His cabinet could obstruct, and even shut down, investigations simply by asserting security privilege.

That is why Canadians are demanding that this committee be built to a higher standard of strength and independence, so that when the time comes, it can stand as a genuine check on the executive overreach and end operations that violate Canadians' rights or mismanagement that undermines their security. As it stands, it is simply not built to that standard.

However, I do want to recognize the progress that has been made and acknowledge the good work done by the members of the public safety committee. Because of an amendment from the NDP, the new oversight committee would now have a legal duty to alert the Attorney General to any potentially illegal activity within the entire national security apparatus.

While future prime ministers would still be able to censor reports on broad grounds, Canadians could now see exactly how much text had been revised in a particular report and the reasons the revision occurred. While cabinet ministers unfortunately retain the power to withhold information and even shut down investigations, Canadians could now monitor the use of those powers each year.

I want to personally recognize the hard work of every member of the public safety committee. They showed that progress is possible when the government is willing to work with opposition parties. However, before the government congratulates itself for accepting a handful of ideas from other parties, let us be clear about what it rejected.

The plan we proposed gave the oversight committee full access to information and the power to summon witnesses and order documents. It offered freedom to investigate any issue without interference by cabinet ministers. It let the committee choose its own chairperson from among the membership that would actually match the partisan balance of the House. It allowed the free flow of insights back and forth within the existing expert review bodies. Every last one of those proposals was rejected by the government.

While progress was made at the margins, the government is now asking Parliament to approve an oversight committee with only partial access to the information it needs to do the job for Canadians: a committee that can only request information from cabinet, not order it directly; a committee whose entire membership is selected by the Prime Minister, with no requirement that it even include members from the biggest opposition parties. This committee would not be out of place in Australia, New Zealand, or France, where there is no expectation of operational oversight, but it is entirely inappropriate in Canada.

I cannot accept the design set by the government for two fundamental reasons: first, it tilts the balance too far toward executive power at the expense of parliamentary accountability; and, second, it fails to meet the high standard of operational oversight that the Liberals made necessary when they joined with the Conservatives to dramatically expand security powers through Bill C-51.

It is against these two standards that the government's attitude toward this bill is so very disappointing. The government has adopted an approach which says that something is better than nothing insofar as parliamentary oversight is concerned, and that we should just be happy we got a little bit. It suggests to me the belief that national security is the exclusive domain of the executive branch and that Parliament is somehow an ungrateful guest on the government's turf. That is dead wrong.

Members will remember this question was addressed and answered by Speaker Milliken in 2010 when he ruled on the government's attempt to deny Parliament documents relating to the Afghan detainee affair. In denying Parliament's role as a watchdog for Canadians, the executive claimed that Parliament's general right of inquiry was limited by the executive's countervailing interest in protecting national security. Parliament, the government argued, was overreaching by demanding information on security matters and threatening the constitutional separation of powers. The parallels to our current debate are clear.

What was the outcome? After an exhaustive analysis, Speaker Milliken ruled that Parliament's right to access information, to do its job, to perform its duties is “absolute”. In fact it was the executive that jeopardized the proper separation of powers by attempting to censor information provided to Parliament.

The Canadians' elected representatives in Parliament must be named the ultimate watchdog in our system. That should be a point of unanimous agreement for everyone in this place. We all recognize, as Speaker Milliken did, that special safeguards must be put in place to allow Parliament to exercise that oversight role in sensitive domains like national security and intelligence.

That is why New Democrats supported many safeguards to protect sensitive information. For example, we supported security vetting for every member. That was a step that was rejected by the British Parliament. We agreed. Similarly, we think it is reasonable that members waive parliamentary immunity from prosecution should they leak information. We think that is entirely reasonable. That step, however, was rejected by another of our Five Eyes allies, namely, New Zealand.

These additional safeguards should be used to facilitate the greater flow of classified information required for operational oversight, but the bill turns those safeguards into shackles. It asks Parliament to accept that oversight cannot be exercised through a parliamentary committee, but only through an adjunct to the executive, the Prime Minister's Office. It asks Parliament to grant the executive veto power over its access to information against the advice of experts and the Speaker's analysis of parliamentary procedure as well. It asks Parliament to legislate limits on its own authority to investigate how well the government of the day serves the security interests of Canadians and defends their civil liberties.

Because we believe in upholding Parliament's place as the final watchdog, and because we cannot accept inadequate operational oversight of the powers that Liberals and Conservatives granted to our security agencies in Bill C-51 over the protests of so many Canadians, the New Democratic Party cannot support Bill C-22 as it stands.

However, we have everything we need to fix the bill. We have consensus among the opposition parties. We have the willingness to work together to compromise. We have all the tools we need. We just need the time.

I am asking all members to do what the members of this committee will soon be asked to do, and that is to set partisanship aside and consider whether this bill, with all the flaws agreed upon by so many security experts, meets the standards of operational oversight that Canadians rightfully demand in the context of Bill C-51, and if they have any doubt that it might fail to meet that test for Canadians, I would ask them to support the following amendment. I move:

That the motion be amended by deleting all the words after the word “That” and substituting the following:

“Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be not now read a third time but be referred back to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for the purpose of reconsidering Clauses 8, 14, and 16 with a view to assessing whether the investigatory powers and limits defined in these clauses allow for sufficiently robust oversight of ongoing intelligence and national security activities.”

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-22, an act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts, be read the third time and passed.

[Sylvie Boucher, Conservative, Beauport—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île d’Orléans—Charlevoix, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I was a member of the House from 2006 to 2011. I left when the orange wave washed over the House, but I came back stronger than ever.

As I said at the very beginning of my speech, I am not against Bill C-22, but nor am I in favour of it. There are some flaws in how it is being presented. I oppose the idea of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness leading the committee. For the sake of Canada's public safety, the committee should be independent and made up of people who have the necessary expertise. I do not want the committee to become the Prime Minister's puppet. That is not what an independent committee should be.

An independent committee, especially one dealing with Canada's public safety, should be made up of parliamentarians who have expertise in that area. Personally, I am a member of the Standing Committee on Official Languages, and I would not be the right person to sit on the independent committee we are talking about. I have no expertise when it comes to defence and public safety. In fact, I have no expertise in any areas as significant as that. We need to keep that in mind. I will never stand for such a committee to become the prime minister's puppet, no matter what party is in power.

[Francis Drouin, Liberal, Glengarry—Prescott—Russell, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for her excellent speech. I have a lot of respect for her, especially when it comes to official languages.

I am having a hard time understanding her remarks on Bill C-22. I do not know if she was in the House in 2006, but I would like to remind her that the Conservative Party literally wrote the book on disrupting parliamentary committees. Mr. Harper's legacy was a set of instructions on how to disrupt parliamentary committees.

Now, back to Bill C-22. Does my colleague agree that creating a parliamentary committee is important? It will make for greater transparency in our security organizations. I would like her to comment on that.

[Sylvie Boucher, Conservative, Beauport—Côte-de-Beaupré—Île d’Orléans—Charlevoix, QC]

A happy Friday to you, Mr. Speaker, and to all of my good friends.

I am very pleased to rise in the House today to speak in favour of Bill C-22. I will use my time to defend my point of view and common sense, which seems to be lacking across the way.

Before I get into the substance of the bill, I would like to comment on how the party in power always uses the same tactic when it knows the media and Canadians will take a dim view of its decisions. It sure likes to make itself look cute.

Here is an example of the government's sneaky tactics: it introduced Bill C-22 on June 16 of last year during the dying hours of the session to ensure that neither MPs nor the public would have much opportunity to debate it.

Here is another example. The Minister of Finance tabled a report indicating that the deficit would be $30 billion, not the modest $10-billion deficit they campaigned on. Any deficit at all is hard to swallow. My children and grandchildren will have to pay for it, but apparently the members opposite do not have grandchildren, so they do not care.

Finally, here is the last example. The Leader of the Government in the House of Commons tabled a document stipulating that the Prime Minister should have to be in the House to answer questions only one hour a week, and that the House should meet only four days week in order to balance work and family. Now that is what I call being a part-time prime minister.

I will now get into the substance of the debate, specifically, Bill C-22. I have no objection to the idea of creating a committee whose members would be tasked with examining and reviewing the legislative, regulatory, strategic, financial, and administrative frameworks of national security and intelligence. What bothers me is how this committee will be formed. I have some concerns about that.

First and foremost, public safety is a non-partisan issue. The fact that the Prime Minister's Office decided way back in January who would chair that committee, before the committee was even struck, says a lot about the Prime Minister's attitude towards the members of the House of Commons.

That decision was made by the Liberal Party alone and not as a result of discussions with the other parties. What is more, the Liberals made this decision without consulting the House, even though hon. members expressed interest in being part of the discussion to select the chair of this important committee. Public safety is very important and should never be a partisan issue.

For its part, the Prime Minister's Office will also be tasked with selecting the committee members, contrary to the election promise made by the member for Papineau, meaning that the committee members will be beholden to him and the committee will no longer able to do what it is asked to do. It will not meet the needs of Canadians, but rather those of the Prime Minister himself, as he sees fit. He will be lord and master as usual. Making the committee not as independent as it should be undermines its usefulness and legitimacy.

Under Bill C-22 the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness will have the authority to change or simply block any report drafted by the committee members. The Prime Minister will therefore yet again be lord and master of the committee. I think he rather likes being lord and master. He should consider the fact that there are members in the House who like doing their job.

Perhaps he does not like it, but we like to speak on behalf of our constituents. Is that not why we were elected to the House? There is a song about the world's kings being at the top, but alone. The Prime Minister should think about that. Someone should buy him a mirror. I think he would like that.

I will elaborate. If the report contained information that the Prime Minister or the Minister of Public Safety considered to be sensitive, they would have the right to delete it from the report. That is unacceptable. By “sensitive information” I do not mean confidential information that would harm Canadians' safety if it were disclosed. I am talking about parts of the report that would reflect poorly on the Liberal Party because they would demonstrate its incompetence and bad judgment when making decisions. Our public safety critic gave a very good explanation of the situation.

He said:

If we are going to implement parliamentary oversight, we need to do it right. It needs to be real and substantial oversight. It needs to be parliamentary. Otherwise, this is simply a Liberal Party communications exercise, and this is not something the Conservative Party can support.

It is very important to remember that the Liberals want a committee of parliamentarians and not a parliamentary committee. There is a big difference. The committee should be an independent body that is not accountable to the party in power. Rather, it must guarantee Canadians that their safety is assured in a legal and professional manner.

I am extremely troubled by the fact that the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety could have the last word on the reports of a so-called independent committee. Furthermore, it is truly important that the committee members already have experience handling secret information or experience with public safety, national security, intelligence, and defence issues.

That is one more reason why the leaders of all the parties should be consulted. They could ensure that we have the best parliamentarians for the important task they will be doing.

I would like to close by saying that I cannot support such a bill, unless some major changes are made. First, the opposition parties must be consulted before the committee members are chosen. Second, the committee's autonomy and independence from the Government of Canada must be respected in order to prevent the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety from interfering. Finally, I think that strict criteria must be maintained and that parliamentarians with extensive experience in the fields that I mentioned earlier must be selected so that the committee can provide top-notch service to all Canadians.

We are talking here about public safety. That is extremely important, and this committee must be independent. It must be specialized and non-partisan. However, the Liberal government took the liberty of appointing the committee chair in January without any consultation. The Liberals refused to consult with the opposition parties before the legislative measure was even drafted, despite the willingness of the Conservative Party and the NDP to discuss this important committee.

Like our Five Eyes allies, we think that the members of this committee should have significant experience in dealing with secret information, public safety, national security, intelligence, and defence. The chair who has been appointed does not have that type of experience. The committee members are appointed by and accountable to the Prime Minister's Office.

They should be appointed by Parliament and report to Parliament. During the election campaign, the Prime Minister advocated for a reduced role for the Prime Minister's Office, but no action has been taken in that regard.

Bill C-22 would provide for numerous exceptions, and it permits government departments and agencies to opt out of providing certain information to the committee. This undermines the committee's oversight responsibilities and prevents it from fully carrying out its mandate.

Here on the Conservative benches, as the official opposition, we see public safety as a priority and believe that protecting our security and intelligence officers must be a primary concern. We will examine the bill closely, but we remain concerned about the attempts being made by the Prime Minister's Office and the Liberal Part to make this committee another arm of the Liberal government.

The Prime Minister's comments are becoming increasingly totalitarian, despite his promises to be more transparent. Members across party lines are being silenced, even though we were sent here to represent Canadians. He wants to shut us up. The Prime Minister of Canada will never, ever shut me up. If he ever has the nerve to try, I will go straight to the media and shout at the top of my lungs that this prime minister has become a dictator.

We have a committee that is working so hard for the measures that the leader implemented. It is unacceptable to me that the Prime Minister, who was duly elected by the people and who knew what he was in for when he ran for his party leadership, should sit for just one hour a week. That is ridiculous. Do we have a part-time Canadian Prime Minister on our hands? When will he be accountable to Canadians? This is his job; this is what he is supposed to be doing.

What about the unfortunate Quebeckers working on that side, the 40 members who have been skewered by the Quebec media because we never hear from them? Has the Prime Minister shut them up too? Are they expected to keep quiet about the things that bother them?

People can say what they want about Mr. Harper, they can love him or hate him, but he listened to his Quebec MPs. We sat down with him every day in the lobby. He was always asking us how things were going in Quebec.

Have you had that kind of conversation with your Prime Minister? I highly doubt it. Have you Quebeckers on that side of the House ever sat down with your Prime Minister? Has he ever paid attention to what is going on in your ridings—

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened with astonishment and exasperation to the member's speech on Bill C-22. It included everything from reminding us that this is the only thing the Liberals have to say about Bill C-51, which I have a bill before the House to repeal—they have not presented anything other than this bill—to him saying that if we have objections to stand up and speak about them, when this is under time allocation and the NDP gets exactly one speaker at third reading. I am a bit exasperated.

The final thing I would say is that the member is somehow proud of a bill that, when the committee provided teeth, as the Liberal Prime Minister said he would allow committees to do, then the government proceeded to take the teeth out of this bill and put them in a glass by the Prime Minister's bed. We have a bill here that has absolutely no ability to do what it is supposed to do.

I am exasperated and astonished to hear a speech like this, which would revise history and tries to recast this in a way that is completely false. What we have here is the government taking control of a committee, overruling what was done, and producing a committee that is very important to this country, without any support from the opposition parties. What does the member have to say about that?

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, it is a privilege to stand today to talk about what I believe is a very important piece of legislation. Many members of the chamber will recall the debate on Bill C-51. That is where I would like to start this morning, to give a bit of perspective on why we have this bill before us today.

It is important to note that the former prime minister, Stephen Harper, brought in Bill C-51, a bill that had some fundamental flaws. At the time, the Liberal Party was the third party in the chamber, and we felt strongly, based on the feedback we were receiving and the research we were doing on the bill, that it was important to vote in favour of it. As the debate continued, many hours of debate in the House on that issue, I, for one, must have talked about the need for a parliamentary oversight committee at least a dozen times, possibly 15 or 20 times. That was when I was on the other side of the House.

The point is that it was a very important issue a couple of years ago. It raised quite a commotion outside the House. Many members, I suspect all 338 of us, can relate to Bill C-51, because it was an issue that was constantly being raised at the time. I even knocked on a few doors where people talked to me about the bill and how, if the Liberal Party leader was elected prime minister, he would respond to Bill C-51.

There was a commitment made by all members of the Liberal team, in particular the Prime Minister, that we would bring in a parliamentary oversight committee. Whether it was during the debates when Bill C-51 was in the House, in the lead-up to the campaign, through the media, in public meetings, or when we were going door to door throughout the last federal election campaign, Liberals were advocating how important it was to have an oversight committee made up of parliamentarians.

Therefore, it should come as no surprise to parliamentarians across the way that we are debating a bill that, in essence, captures the commitment the Prime Minister and every member of the Liberal caucus made as part of our election platform. No one should be surprised in the House of Commons, and I suspect that Canadians will look at this piece of legislation and see it as fulfilling an election promise.

I said yesterday that the Prime Minister says how important it is to him personally that when members of Parliament come to Ottawa they represent their constituents here. I can tell the Prime Minister and my caucus colleagues that this is something I believe the residents of Winnipeg North are behind 100%. I am convinced that this is good, solid legislation.

I would like to commend the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the government House leader for doing a phenomenal job in ensuring that this commitment is being fulfilled in such a timely fashion.

That is how I wanted to start my comments today. I know there has been concern among opposition members about how the bill would ultimately be passed. Maybe I could attempt to answer some of the questions they might have.

For example, we know that more than 40 members have been afforded the opportunity to give a 10- or 20-minute speech. Well over 100 have been afforded the opportunity to be engaged in one way or another on the floor of the House of Commons.

I also want to compliment the excellent standing committee that dealt with Bill C-22. I would argue that this was a fulfillment of one of the other aspects the Prime Minister has talked about. As a government, we want to bring more life to our standing committees. We want members on all sides of the House to be more engaged in a positive way in terms of trying to improve legislation. That is exactly what we have done here. After second reading, the bill went to committee, and in that committee, what did we see? A number of witnesses came before the committee, from different regions of the country, and made recommendations on how the legislation could be improved. A good number of those expert witnesses were very complimentary to the government about the legislation as it was presented to committee. They were very supportive of that legislation.

They recognized, as many of us have, that there is always room for improvement. We have encouraged that, and what we saw was a series of amendments brought forward. The ideas were talked about. The standing committee did its job in terms of setting the agenda and inviting witnesses.

I look at the standing committees as the backbone of the fine work parliamentarians do. All we need to do is focus some attention on that standing committee. There was a great list developed for witnesses who presented their reports and came up with ideas. The committee took a number of those thoughts and presented amendments. It was not just amendments from the government side of the House. There were amendments suggested, and some were accepted, from the opposition side of the House. That demonstrates the changes we are seeing at the committee level. I bring that to people's attention, because it is worthy of note.

The legislation has come back to the House. The government has the opportunity to review some of the work that was done at committee. Yes, there was a need to make some changes to it. I will give an example of one of the changes.

The witness protection program is of critical importance. Canadians appreciate the importance of informants or individuals who might be testifying before a court of law, when their life or their family's lives may be put at risk. Because there is risk, we need to have a system that protects those witnesses. That is why we have a witness protection program.

The committee, for a number of reasons, felt that we should talk about the names of witnesses and drawing too much information from that. A caveat was put in, in the form an amendment, and the government, at this point, felt that we might have been going too far on that particular issue. That is one of the amendments and why it is that some amendments were made at third reading.

I raise that because I believe that is really what Parliament should be doing on its legislation. We had the opportunity to see the legislation through first reading. Members were able to be engaged. No one would have been surprised by the introduction of the bill, given the fact that it was something that was talked about. It was brought in for second reading. Dozens of members were able to speak to it. Even more were able to be engaged in that debate. It then went to committee. In committee, it received wonderful support, and a number of ideas that would improve it were incorporated into amendments. Ultimately it went to report stage, at which point there were a few modifications. Now we are into third reading and we are debating it again in anticipation of the legislation being ready to pass.

We have a government that has made a commitment to Canadians. It brought in the legislation. The legislation has been improved through the process, and ultimately, we are getting into a position where we will be seeing it pass. I see that as a very strong positive. We should all take some pride in the manner in which it has actually gone through.

I know there have been some concerns among the opposition members with respect to the legislation, specifically dealing with what sorts of exemptions there will be. They are indicating that we could have done better in terms of not allowing as many exemptions.

I would like to address that point. It is important to recognize that this is somewhat historical in the sense that Canada will have a parliamentary oversight committee, among many other things. I like to think of it as an oversight committee that will protect the rights and freedoms of all Canadians in a very respectful fashion. That is one reason I am such a strong advocate for Bill C-22, because I believe in the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

It is the first time Canada is going to have a parliamentary oversight committee that is going to be looking at all of our security agencies and ensuring that there is a higher sense of accountability, whether it is border controls, corporations, or the RCMP. This is good news.

I want to be sensitive in terms of what the opposition is saying, but I want to assure members that it is very robust legislation. In fact, even though we might be the last of the Five Eyes countries, countries that move together in dealing with issues of this nature, immigration and so forth, I would suggest that we could be very proud of how robust our legislation is in comparison with the other countries' legislation.

Let me give an example. When we talk about the exemptions of what cannot be talked about, or what can be withdrawn from the committee, this is something that comes from the New Zealand act, which is one of the Five Eyes countries. In New Zealand, the act allows for the government to inform the committee that the documents or information cannot be disclosed because, in the opinion of the chief executive of the relevant intelligence and security agency, the documents or information are sensitive. In all fairness, I suspect that if we were to ask even the members of the opposition, one would think that our legislation is more robust than that. I would challenge the members across the way, who are concerned about that aspect, to indicate to this House whether they believe that the New Zealand legislation is more robust than ours. I do not believe it is, but that is an issue that is raised.

That is not the only country that we can draw a comparison to, but before I leave the subject of New Zealand, there is another point related to this. I want to talk about the Prime Minister, because a number of members across the way have talked about the influence of the Prime Minister. I will get to that right away, because there is another good example with respect to New Zealand.

On the same thought, let us look at what is being done in the U.K. act. The government is able to inform the intelligence and security committee, which is the equivalent of what we are establishing, that the information cannot be disclosed because the secretary of state has decided that it should not be disclosed. Again, I would suggest that our legislation is more robust than that, yet this is a big issue that is being raised, in particular by the New Democrats, and other opposition members also. That is not to say that our legislation is 100% perfect. There is always room for improvement. That is one of the reasons we are saying that we will take another look at it in the years ahead, and that is within the legislation itself.

I made reference to the Prime Minister. The members across the way talk about the Prime Minister and the control from the PMO. I would encourage them not to be paranoid about that particular issue. In New Zealand, the prime minister actually sits on the security committee. In Canada, we have a parliamentary oversight committee where the government members of Parliament make up the minority of the committee. That is a fairly significant piece in the legislation. In fairness, the opposition should recognize that it reinforces that we have excellent legislation in comparison to other Five Eyes countries.

Not only that, but the good news continues. Within the framework, we have a Prime Minister who is obligated to work with the opposition to fill the opposition member spots on the committee. Let me suggest to members that if we were to talk to Canadians to get a better sense of what Canadians believe, I would like to think that our Minister of Public Safety has done a phenomenal job with respect to this legislation, in bringing it forward and defending it. If there is any doubt in the minds of members as to why or how they should be voting, if they read what the Minister of Public Safety has put on the record here, I am sure that their concerns will be addressed.

I would argue that this is one of those pieces of legislation that should be passed unanimously by this House, because I believe that all Canadians want to see a parliamentary oversight committee. Even under Stephen Harper, where there was some reluctance—actually there was a lot of reluctance—I know there are now many members across the way who understand the value of a parliamentary oversight committee. I hope that they will come on side and support this good legislation.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

moved that Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be read the third time and passed.

Business of the House

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister of Small Business and Tourism]

Mr. Speaker, as I have said in this House time and time again, of course, I want to work with all members of Parliament. I know that we each have a role to play. I want to work better together, and that is why I will continue to communicate.

I appreciate the opportunity to answer the hon. member's Thursday question.

This afternoon, we will continue with the budget debate. Tomorrow, we will begin third reading of Bill C-22, an act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts.

Next week, members will be working in their ridings.

We will continue with the budget debate on Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday.

I wish everyone a good constituency week, next week.

[Karen Vecchio, Conservative, Elgin—Middlesex—London, ON]

Yes, I think Bill C-24 had more to do with CBSA. I have Bill C-22, Bill C-23, and Bill C-24 on my brain, but it is another one.

Thank you.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

—but am just making the point that it's a very long piece of legislation and deals with a wide variety of very disparate themes.

It is natural that the budget would touch on a broad range of themes, and I'm not yet ready to pronounce on whether it covers more themes than are appropriate for the budget or not. That's something I would have to make a more thorough study of than I've had a chance to do in the intervening time. Every budget that comes forward touches on many themes.

I notice that there is a subheading on Canada-U.S. relations; there's discussion of Canada's role in the world. If in the context of a budget you're talking about foreign affairs issues and Canada's role in the world, of course there's expenditure involved in foreign affairs, but I can only assume that when you're speaking of Canada's role in the world, the discussion is going to cover some basic philosophy as well as a discussion of expenditure items.

Very likely, this budget is an omnibus bill, at least insofar as omnibus bills are defined in the discussion paper.

I have to say that the definition of omnibus bill given in this discussion paper actually illustrates the problem with some of the discussion that is so critical of omnibus bills, in the absence of having a clear definition of what an omnibus bill is: it's actually very difficult to define what kind of bill you don't like.

I guess you could identify as such a bill that dealt with completely unrelated themes, with absolutely no plausible connection between the two or need for them to be connected. Omnibus bills are described in the discussion paper in this way:

The Government committed to end the improper use of omnibus legislation.

Even there, they're committed to end the “improper use” of omnibus legislation. Presumably they will replace it with the proper use of omnibus legislation, and it's not at all clear what in their mind the difference is.

They say:

Omnibus bills can be defined as a bill that contains separate and unrelated themes packaged into one bill. Members are then forced to vote for or against a bill that could have elements that Members would support or oppose.

Let's be clear. Members are required all the time to vote for or against bills that have elements they support and oppose. Even very short bills contain elements you might agree with and disagree with as well. That's very common.

For example, there was a bill before the House recently. I can't remember the number of it, but it was a bill that dealt in some clauses with the opioid crisis that we face. It also made some specific changes to the community consultation provisions, and we took real issue with those changes. This was an issue for us as a caucus. We said there were many provisions in this bill around the importation of pill presses, around the opening of certain kinds of packages that are being imported, and around the enhancing of the inspection process that we agreed with, but then there was one provision that we didn't agree with. We proposed to split that bill, and the government refused to allow us to split it, even though it was emphatic about the urgency of moving this bill forward. We agreed to actually expedite both halves of the bill if they were split, and yet the government was still unwilling to accept that.

Was that an omnibus bill? It some sense it was, in that dealt with separate and unrelated themes. It dealt with the importation of drug paraphernalia, and then it also dealt with issues of community consultation around supervised consumption sites. In a certain sense we're talking about different themes, but in a certain sense of course we're not talking about different themes, because both of those deal with prospective responses to the opioid crisis that we face.

Was that bill an omnibus bill? Actually, it was in the public interest for that bill to be split. It did create a situation in which members were forced, to quote from the discussion paper, to “vote for or against a bill that could have elements that Members would support or oppose”. That's all well and good, but then how do you make the determination about what is and is not an omnibus bill? I know that the previous government attracted a great deal of criticism for what some regarded as the inappropriate use of omnibus legislation. The proposals that the previous government made and passed in our budgets were not at all dissimilar to the proposals advanced by this government in each of its budgets.

Any budget includes a broad range of different changes to taxation, to regulatory environments, and to expenditure in the name of advancing the government's economic objectives. Of course, every budget has a common theme. The common theme of the budget is the fiscal and economic plan of the government. That is a common theme. That's a theme that has a relationship to all sorts of other themes. It's not a theme that can exist in isolation from the other things that governments do, but it certainly is a theme. Yes, when a government proposes a budget or a budget implementation act, there are a lot of different things in there that would generally be around a common theme.

I think it's fair to say that in some people's minds, there is a lot of difference between the improper combination of things of a similar theme and the proper combination of things of a similar theme, but it's not easy to actually put your finger on the distinguishing feature of improper versus proper omnibus legislation. Perhaps if the amendment is supported and we proceed to a study, we'll get some further clarity around what the proper and improper are meant to be in that context. You've got to have a bit of a sense of what you're talking about, especially if the discussion paper envisions that this is a judgment call that would have to be made by the Speaker.

We can expect the Speaker to make decisions that reflect what is dictated in the context of a standing order on the basis of precedent. However, in the absence of any clear precedent for making some kind of a formal distinction between the proper and the improper use of omnibus legislation, I think you would be putting the Speaker in a particularly difficult position unless this committee could arrive at a clear definition of what was and was not acceptable omnibus legislation.

Perhaps some people might say it's all in the length, and that was some of the criticism of some of the previous government's legislation. It was just too long. However, if you're trying to roll out a comprehensive economic plan, it could well be that it would all be thematically related to the same thing and would indeed, in that context, still be quite long.

It's not at all clear to me where this intends to go, but I'll tell you what I suspect it's planning to do. The government made a lot of commitments in opposition about institutional changes they would wish to make. Sometimes opposition parties make commitments about changes to institutions that they don't actually want to implement. We've seen that, certainly on the electoral reform issue and on others as well.

When it comes to omnibus legislation, they have used omnibus legislation. They want to continue to use omnibus legislation. In this day and age, given the complexity of governments, it's hard to imagine not having a budget that dealt with a certain diversity of themes, but in the context of an overarching theme. However, they want to be able to cling to this distinction between proper and improper use of omnibus legislation, just as they want to distinguish between proper and improper deficits and proper and improper uses of time allocation. Really, what they're applying is not an objective filter at all about what constitutes the proper or the improper. Actually, what they are applying is a wholly partisan filter. We get the sense that when it says the government is committed to ending ”the improper use of omnibus legislation”, they're just speaking about trying to establish a distinction between what they do and what the previous government did, which is a difference of party but not a clear difference at all in terms of the substance of what is involved there.

This then puts the Speaker, the neutral officer of the House, in a particularly difficult situation, in that he or she has to adjudicate on the balance of properness or not, when it's something that can't even be clearly defined by the government. How is it fair for them to expect a neutral person who is acting on behalf of the institution to be able to make a fine, defined distinction, when it's not clear at all that they even have a real sense or grasp on what that distinction is?

The next section, theme 3 in the discussion paper, is management of committees. I have to just shake my head a bit at the title of this section. As I go through this discussion paper from the government House leader, there is what the discussion paper says directly in terms of the arguments it makes and the issues one can and should raise about those, but there is also the tone, the language through which things are expressed, that really sets off the kind of perspective that's being brought to it and why we need to have consensus at this committee. I would prefer, frankly, that we have this committee generate the ideas and the path forward, rather than having the framing of the debate coming immediately from the government House leader.

We get phrases like “management of committees”. That's something that someone in a leader's office would say: “Okay, we have to manage the committees.” Those of us here on a committee would say that we have to consider the “governance” of the committee, the committee as a self-governing entity, not as a group of potentially stray children who have to be managed, but as a vital organ of our democracy that has to consider the way in which it's governed.

Some of these turns of phrase are disappointing. However, in a way, they're useful because of how revealing they are and how they hopefully will draw the attention of all members, government members as well as opposition members, to the need to pass an amendment that allows us to proceed with a discussion that is framed in a fundamentally different way, and that we need to start that discussion on a bit of a different foot.

Nonetheless, on “Theme 3: Management of Committees”, as it's called, there are a few other turns of phrase here that I think should jump out at members in terms of illustrating the problems with the tone taken by the government House leader, and therefore why protecting the input of the opposition through this amendment is so vital. It reads, “Members who are focused on substantive issues are less [likely] to resort to tactics.”

Let's be clear. What we had is the introduction of a discussion paper, so-called, with all these problems with it, during a break week, and then a refusal to support an amendment that would establish the conditions in which the government would seek to unilaterally impose dramatic changes to the way in which our parliamentary institutions operate. If you want to talk about resorting to tactics, that's certainly resorting to tactics, although it's still a rather strange and awkward turn of phrase.

The discussion paper continues, “As a result, the House could examine ways to make committees more inclusive as well as ways to ensure that obstructionist tactics do not crowd out the substantive work of committees.” This is, I think, setting up a justification for limiting such things as members talking at length about particular issues. Really, what is envisioned here are changes that would still leave in place the ability of the government to resort to tactics. In fact, that's what they're doing, through their motion, discussion paper, and refusal to support our amendment. It would simply eliminate the ability of the opposition to have tools to use in response.

What we have right now is a certain kind of equilibrium that is shaped by the Standing Orders. This means that the government has certain tools available to them. The opposition has certain tools available to them. We calibrate our use of these tools in response to certain circumstances, to certain situations. We use them in response to what's in front of us. We use them more or less. If we're wise, we use them sparingly, only to draw attention to very particular concerns we have that are indeed things we think have resonance with the wider public.

We have every incentive, as elected officials, to use the tactics available to us in a way that is wise, that is judicious, and that is measured. Instead, through the process they have set up, in the context of what's happening in this committee, the government is establishing the circumstances in which the opposition would not be able to use tactics, even while the government would be able to use tactics.

The language specifically refers to “obstructionist tactics do not crowd out the substantive work of committees.” It doesn't refer to the alternative set of tactics, which is dropping a motion on a Friday. Having a timeline, at this point, so that if the amendment passes and we were to go forward, even if it still limits the amount of time that could be used for debate, is not an obstructionist tactic. That's the inverse of the government tactic to try to inappropriately push something through that would merit a greater length and depth of conversation.

I think I've already objected to the title “Management of Committees”. I think a better title would be “Governance of Committees”, but a more accurate title, a more descriptive title of the content here, would be “Management of the Opposition in Committees”, or “Management of the Opposition's Desire to Represent Their Constituents”. It is important that we be able to use tactics to challenge the government and to challenge the ways in which they do things that are injurious to the interests of our constituency.

Now there is a proposal that I think one can probably see the value of in principle but some problems with in practice, and then immediately after see that it is actually about setting up the justification for something else the government wants to do that I have a real problem with. This theme 3 that we're dealing with talks about creating the space for “one independent Member [to be] an ex officio member of committees with all privileges except for the ability to vote, or to constitute quorum.”

I'm quoting, of course, and the quote continues, “This would allow independent Members to participate in in camera proceedings, question witnesses, and travel with committees.”

Now, on a few issues here, yes, there might be a need for provisions that would allow for greater opportunities for questioning and for travel, although I believe it should be the practice that we allow elected members to attend in camera meetings of committees. That hasn't always happened, and in the case of one particular bill early on in this Parliament that didn't happen, and I was very concerned about that. Generally speaking, it should already be the case that any member of Parliament who wants to sit in on the proceedings of the committee, whether they are public or in camera, should be able to do that, provided, of course, they respect the provisions that we know are associated with being in camera and the use of documents that are produced in camera. I think all members know about that and have an understanding of what's expected of them in that context, and if they're not a member of a particular committee, they may be a member of another committee.

The issue of in camera proceedings, I think, wouldn't necessarily be a dramatic change. I do want to ask a couple of questions, though, about this question of the involvement of independent members on committees with some of these privileges. I guess the question would be this: who gets to determine which independent members are on the committee? Who gets to determine which independents get to sit or be part of which committees?

The other question is that if the process would allow independent members of Parliament to choose which committee they wanted to affiliate themselves with, then it would actually have an effect of giving independent members of Parliament powers that members of Parliament who are members of political parties don't have because, as I'm sure government members know, typically the process is that they don't choose which committees they are on. It is the whip and their office who assigns them to committees. It's possible that some of the members who are here today didn't choose to be on the procedure and House affairs committee. I'm sure that's unlikely, but it's possible, yet, what is envisioned by the process that is imagined by the House Leader here is that the decision about who goes to which committee would be something that the independent member could choose.

It's not stated, but I think it's implied. They could say they wanted to be on the finance committee or they wanted to be on the foreign affairs committee. Then I guess we would end up with one of two problems. One, it would be at the government's discretion which independents ended up on which committees. I don't think you would want that, but the alternative would be to give independent members of Parliament in a sense a greater level of influence than members who are members of parties, because of the issue of committee selection.

There would be ways to address this. I think it would be interesting to imagine a committee system in which, independent of parties, members could signal their interest in being on particular committees. Then that allocation could be done in a more independent way. You could imagine that as being a possible alternative that would both engage independent members of Parliament in the process and at the same time ensure a certain equality of those who were members of parties and those who were not members of parties.

This is a concern I had around the government's legislation, Bill C-22, but it applies in this case as well. Bill C-22 says that for the security intelligence committee—I'm not getting the name exactly right, but it's the intelligence review committee—the Prime Minister appoints a certain number of members, only a certain number of whom can be members of the government caucus. That, though, creates an issue in which you could have independents who, for whatever reason, left the government caucus, but then they are, in a sense, quasi-members of the government caucus. They are being used by the government, because the rules provide for only a certain number of government members to be on a committee, yet the government could appoint someone as a non-member of the government who is effectively acting as a member of the government in that context.

We have the case of at least one former member of the government caucus who votes very frequently with the government. The government could recognize, in the context of having an independent who's outside of their caucus, that they can actually use that person to do things that government members can't do, such as be an additional person on a committee. If we were to see a government use those kinds of tactics, I think that would be a concern. I think that would be a misuse of process and of what it is to be an independent.

Right now, of course, there aren't many advantages to being an independent. Primarily, in the way our system is constructed, it's principally a matter of disadvantages associated with being an independent. There are potential concerns that are created, both by the framework established by Bill C-22 and by some of the language that's used here, that illustrate the need for that broader discussion. The opposition needs an opportunity to raise, to pronounce on, and in the context of the unanimity provisions to be involved in a discussion about some potential concerns that the government may not have thought of around some of these questions that may be more technical in nature. They may just be matters of not necessarily foreseeing something.

Why not build into the process a more ground-up, consensus-based approach to decision-making than the one that has been set up by the motion in the absence of the amendment?

[Jean-Pierre Plouffe]

With regard to Bill C-22 and the provision in that bill where we talk about the duplication, this is the suggestion that I've made. I'm not saying I'm the only one who has made that suggestion, but I made that suggestion a long time ago. If we want to be effective, the committee of parliamentarians and the expert review committees must not duplicate each other. As a matter of fact, more than that, we should be complementary to each other.

For the time being, not having seen how this new committee will operate, it's pretty difficult for me to tell you exactly how we will do it, but we have already made the offer so that when the secretariat is created, we will be there to assist them in any way, shape, or form, so that we can help them with regard—

[Jean-Pierre Plouffe]

There are 14. We await further information about the government's intentions for national security accountability mechanisms following the national consultations.

The main point I would make is that regardless of structure and the overall accountability framework, expert review, the type of review conducted by my office, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, known as SIRC, and by the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, also known as the CRCC, is a necessary and key component.

My third key issue is related to the previous one.

Bill C-22 defines cooperation, or information sharing, between the committee of parliamentarians and the existing review bodies. However, the creation of a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians will entail, and even require, greater cooperation among the existing review bodies, in addition to our cooperation with the committee of parliamentarians.

At this time, a certain amount of cooperation can occur between review bodies. For example, my predecessor and I have sent letters to my colleague, the chair of SIRC, with recommendations or findings from our reviews of CSE activities that implicate CSIS. SIRC must then follow up on those issues as it deems appropriate. However, as I said before, there should be an explicit authority in the legislation for cooperation among review bodies.

If intelligence agencies must work together, I don't see why we, the oversight bodies, can't work together officially. At this time, we can work together to a certain extent, but when operational information is involved, we can't share it. For example, if we want to conduct a joint review with SIRC, it's very difficult because we can't share operational information.

My fourth key issue deals with transparency. Since the disclosures of highly classified documents stolen from the U.S. National Security Agency by Mr. Snowden, public trust in the activities of the intelligence agencies and the effectiveness of review or oversight mechanisms have been put into question.

Greater information and explanations of why certain activities are conducted by the agencies would help the public debate, as it has in the United Kingdom. There, public reports by the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament and by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation have provided a great deal of detail that has, among other points, presented an operational case for use of certain authorities and powers.

I believe that most people engaged in this debate accept that secrecy is a fact of life in national security. The intelligence agencies would not be effective if they could not work in secrecy. It is important to point out that it is because of this fact that the review bodies were established in the first place, with security-cleared staff, to monitor what is going on inside the secret agencies and to assess whether activities comply with the law, including the protection of the privacy of Canadians.

Secrecy and the Snowden disclosures have raised scepticism. When the public learns of mass data collection, they want to know whether it is really necessary and whether there are adequate privacy safeguards. Explanations, indeed, would help.

The four issues I’ve described briefly will all help strengthen the accountability of national security activities and strengthen public trust.

In particular, I look forward to working soon with the committee of parliamentarians when it becomes a reality.

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. My executive director and I would be pleased to answer your questions. Anyway, we'll try.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. We're ready to answer questions.

[Jean-Pierre Plouffe, Commissioner, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner]

Thank you, Chair and honourable members.

I'm pleased to appear before this committee, and as mentioned by the chair, I'm accompanied by Mr. Bill Galbraith, the executive director of my office.

Good afternoon, everyone.

I'm pleased to be here today to meet with you and to speak about my work as the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, or CSE.

You have a copy of my CV, my resumé, so I won't repeat that, but I would like to emphasize two points to start.

The first point is the value I place on the first decade of my career as a legal officer in the office of the judge advocate general of the Canadian Armed Forces, and subsequently in the active reserves for about 20 years as both defending officer and military judge at courts martial. This experience has helped me to understand CSE’s role, particularly where it involves support for the armed forces.

The second point I would make is that I have found that my decade-long experience as a judge, where independence and impartiality are paramount, has stood me in good stead during more than three years as the CSE commissioner. Determining questions of compliance with the law based on facts—the real facts, not alternative facts—as a result of reviewing CSE activities, is consistent, I would submit, with a judicial career.

If you have looked at my resumé, I have devoted a good part of my life to public service.

Being a retired or supernumerary judge of a superior court in Canada is a requirement set out in the National Defence Act, the legislation that mandates both my office and CSE.

A few key points about the role and mandate of the office I hold are, first, the commissioner is independent and at arm's length from the government. My office has its own budget granted by Parliament. I have all the powers under part II of the Inquiries Act, which give me full access to CSE facilities, files, systems, and personnel, including the power of summons or subpoena should that be necessary.

That is why I'm called a commissioner. It goes back to the Inquiries Act when the office was created back in 1996. At that time the executive director was called the commission secretary. It stayed like that for a few years until the National Defence Act was amended in 2001.

My mandate has three components. The first component is to review CSE activities to determine whether they're in compliance with the law, including with regard to the protection of privacy. This is the largest portion of my work. I have a role in protecting privacy. I know that, in Canada, we have a Privacy Commissioner who looks after all federal departments and agencies. In my case, I simply need to look after CSE, and I focus on this agency.

The second component enables me to receive complaints and to conduct any investigations I consider necessary. I must admit that complaints are rare, which reflects the foreign focus of CSE activities.

The third component gives me the duty to inform the Minister of National Defence and the Attorney General of Canada of any CSE activity I believe may not be in compliance with the law. The Commissioner's external and independent role is focused on CSE. The Commissioner assists the Minister of National Defence, who is responsible for CSE, in his accountability to Parliament for that agency and also to Canadians.

Let me provide you now with four key issues that have my attention.

My primary concern is part V.1 of the National Defence Act, the section that mandates both CSE and my office, and that came into effect as part of the Anti-terrorism Act, when it received royal assent in December 2001. That legislation is now almost 16 years old and needs, in my humble opinion, revision. Let me briefly explain.

First, there are ambiguities in part V.1 that were identified, long go, after that part came into effect. This is not surprising given that it was written in haste in the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11, 2001. My predecessors began calling for amendments over 12 years ago to remove those ambiguities. The ambiguities are, in my mind, straightforward and not controversial.

Since 2001, on the other hand, technology, the threat environment, and the legal landscape have all evolved. The law has not kept up. During the course of reviews of CSE activities, other recommendations for amendments have been made. For example, in the fall of 2015, I recommended that the law give explicit authority to CSE to collect, retain, use, and share metadata. Both the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Justice accepted this recommendation.

The questions surrounding metadata and privacy, along with the value accorded metadata by the intelligence agencies for their work, make this a more complex issue that must be considered carefully. The challenge for the legislative drafters will be to have language that is technology neutral, so that the law will not become quickly outdated as technology changes.

My second key issue is the broader national security accountability framework and what impact it will have on the role of the CSE commissioner and the office.

The government introduced legislation to create a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. I spoke about Bill C-22 before another committee last fall. I believe the greater involvement of parliamentarians who are cleared for access to classified information will help strengthen accountability and public trust. Will this happen overnight? No, but it is, in my view, an important beginning. We have considered how we might begin a productive relationship with the committee and its secretariat. This would, of course, involve the direction provided in the bill as it was presented, that the committee and each review body will take all reasonable steps to co-operate with each other to avoid any unnecessary duplication of work.

There remain, of course, many other departments and agencies that have some role in national security, but are not currently subject to reviews. I think we are talking about 17 departments and agencies right now that are not subject to any type of review.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[John Brassard, Conservative, Barrie—Innisfil, ON]

Mr. Speaker, if truth be known, I only expected to speak for four minutes, so I want to thank you for the extra time. I just wish my colleague from Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman would have stood up and asked a question at that point.

However, I want to speak to a very important issue as the last speaker in this debate. What is interesting to me is to see the level of control that is going on within the Liberal government and within the Prime Minister's Office. In the election campaign the Prime Minister talked about doing things differently, holding his hand over his heart saying that for Canada things will be better, yet here we are, dealing with a time allocation situation. There have not been that many speakers, quite frankly, to speak to this very important issue.

The reality is that this was a campaign promise that was made by the Liberal government, and it is effectively fast-tracking it through Parliament.

As I prepared to speak to this issue in the short time that I had, I saw that a Google search on Bill C-22 shows us the level of concern that exists among Canadians, and certainly it has been been editorialized as well that we have to make sure we get this right. Getting it right is important. That means giving oversight of this committee to this body, to Parliament, not having it consolidated through the PMO. It means making sure that information is accessible to this committee. That is extremely important.

I know that the NSICOP would report to the Prime Minister's Office when it should be reporting to Parliament. The Prime Minister campaigned on a reduced role for the Prime Minister's Office, but again his actions do not speak to and certainly do not follow those words. There were several amendments that were proposed at the public safety committee to make this security committee much more effective. Some of those proposals and amendments would have provided truly effective scrutiny for members of Parliament on this oversight committee, yet they were rejected. As a result, the committee will not have the power it needs in order to have true oversight.

A lot of discussion has gone on about our Five Eyes allies. What the government has done is it has not used some of the examples from the United Kingdom with respect to a very similar parliamentary committee that the U.K. has. The new committee does need the powers to ensure that it has this democratic oversight.

One of the issues that is concerning all of us is that this bill, Bill C-22, was tabled in the final hours of the last session of Parliament to ensure there would be virtually no debate. That is effectively what is happening here. The government is shutting down debate on this issue. My colleagues and I on this side do not think that needs to be done. However, it is a systemic pattern of the current government.

I go back to the campaign. I know the government can criticize the time allocations brought by the previous government all it wants, but when we go back to the throne speech, when the Prime Minister's words were delivered by the Governor General in the Senate, it said that every voice in this chamber would be heard. In the throne speech it said that every member who represents Canadians will have their say, yet so far, not many voices in this chamber have been heard. Those voices were even echoed at committee, yet the Liberals, through the committee, decided that they would not accept any of the amendments.

I am pleased to say that there are a couple of amendments that we will be voting on this evening. One is from the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands. This motion was moved to remove the provision of the bill that states that the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians is not protected by parliamentary privilege. This is an amendment that is easily supportable, because the committee proposed by the legislation would make any type of disclosure or whistle-blowing from the proposed committee liable to prosecution under the Security of Information Act. That is a critical element.

The member for Beloeil—Chambly is also proposing an amendment to the motion, and this amendment to the motion is due for consideration because it would partially stifle the Liberal attempt to remove powers of the proposed committee. That really is the basis of concern with respect to this piece of legislation. Just what powers will the committee have, and how much of that power will be controlled by the Prime Minister's Office?

The other area of concern, and it has been mentioned several times, is that the committee chair has already been appointed. The committee chair was known a year ago, even before this legislation came to Parliament. Do we know the qualifications of the chair? Is this just a partisan play, in saying to a member that the member will not be in cabinet but will be put in charge of this important committee? It is not a committee of Parliament but effectively is turning out to be a committee of the Prime Minister's Office. Will it be a political arm of the Prime Minister's Office? A fair question for Canadians to ask is, what are the qualifications of the members who are going to be on this committee?

We on this side of the aisle understand how important it is for government to look after the safety and security of its citizens. Many times in the history of this Parliament it has been argued, and I would argue the same thing, that this is the number one priority of government.

The committee will view a lot of information, but unfortunately the truth is that it is not going to get to see all the information that it needs. In order for the committee to be effective, in order for it to achieve its objective as a true national security committee of Parliament, it needs as much information as it can get.

Furthermore, the committee should report to Parliament. Parliament represents Canadians. We are the ones that the committee should report to.

[Michel Picard, Liberal, Montarville, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to speak today in support of Bill C-22, an act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts.

After considering this bill at second reading and reviewing it in committee, we now have the opportunity to examine it at report stage. The sound parliamentary process has served us well. The bill was carefully reviewed by members from all parties in the House, who listened to advice from expert witnesses, and the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security proposed amendments.

As currently worded, the bill will move our country towards a more accountable and effective national security system. The creation of a new national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians will allow the government to keep one of its major promises to Canadians.

This committee will be a very important addition to our parliamentary landscape and will allow the following: extraordinary access to classified information in order to closely examine intelligence and security operations; increased scrutiny of national security and intelligence activities; a broader mandate than that of corresponding committees in other modern democracies; the ability to develop its own agenda completely independent from government; the duty to be accountable to Canadians by reporting annually to Parliament; and the power to examine activities across the entire federal government, including ongoing operations.

Under the current version of this legislation, the committee must meet the dual objectives we set in that regard at the outset: ensuring that our national security apparatus works properly in order to keep Canadians safe, while also protecting Canadians' rights and freedoms.

When this bill was first introduced, it proposed a more robust committee than those of many of our international allies. The amendments would further broaden the scope, powers, and access we are proposing for the committee, and the government indicated that it would accept most of those amendments.

With respect to the scope, for example, we all agree that the committee must have the authority to examine all operations related to national security and intelligence. As amended, this would now include the activities of crown corporations. Furthermore, according to the amendments, if the minister were to determine that a study would be injurious to national security, his power to delay would be limited to the time during which the activity is underway. The committee could examine the activity afterwards.

The provision concerning whistleblowers is another important amendment that would require the committee to inform a minister and the attorney general of any activity related to national security or intelligence undertaken by a department that may not be in accordance with the law. Like my colleagues, I am pleased to see that this amendment received broad support.

I also agree that the committee chair should have a vote in the event of a tie. I also agree with the many changes regarding exemptions to access to information that the bill initially proposed. The recent amendments, for example, will allow the committee to receive information about activities under way, related to defence intelligence, in support of military activities.

The Committee will also have access to pertinent information collected by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada and the information protected by the Investment Canada Act. The government also agreed to amend the bill so that the reason for any redaction is provided.

The government was open to reasonable amendments throughout the parliamentary process. Not only did we carry out a careful study of this vital bill, but we also benefited from many years of reflection on the creation of a committee, and a long collaboration with international partners.

Each member of the Five Eyes alliance, including Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, has a legislative body with access to classified information in order to monitor national security issues.

Canada has tried for more than a decade to create one. It is time for us to give Canadians and parliamentarians a mandate to examine these activities that we all want to have and that we all need.

Today, we are taking one more step toward implementing this important new body. We are getting closer to a system in which parliamentarians are in a better position to hold the government accountable. We can have greater assurance that concrete measures are taken when we target the flaws and problems associated with our security framework and operations.

We have learned lessons from some of our allies’ best practices. We are getting closer to a genuinely Canadian approach to accountability when it comes to national security. This is a major step forward for Canada.

This bill is as bold and progressive as it is well-thought-out and balanced. I am very proud to be part of the Parliament that will finally, I hope, put this essential accountability mechanism in place.

I would like to thank all the members and all the parties for their support, advice, consideration, and discussions, as well as the constructive attitude that has made it possible to craft a better bill. I urge all my colleagues to support the passage of this important legislation.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to address the House today with respect to the passage of Bill C-22, which would establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, also known as NSICOP.

Canadians want and need to be assured that our national security and intelligence community's activities are conducted responsibly. This means that these important activities fully respect individual rights, including privacy, and that they are carried out according to the rule of law.

Canadians also expect that we as parliamentarians are in a position to hold the government accountable as to the conduct of these activities so that both Canada's national security and Canadians' rights and freedoms are assured.

Bill C-22 provides a well-designed framework within which the government would be able to share highly classified information with a statutory committee of members of the House of Commons and the Senate to be selected on a multi-partisan basis according to the provisions set out in this legislation. As members of this committee, they would be able to review the government's national security and intelligence activities to ensure this highly sensitive work is conducted responsibly and thoroughly.

Such a bill is long overdue. Once it is enacted and when the committee of parliamentarians becomes operational, the committee would be independent of the government for the purposes of its mandate. This would include the ability of the committee to decide which matters to review, in what priority and to what depth, while ensuring that the appropriate safeguards are firmly in place.

Bill C-22 enables the committee to review any federal department or agency that performs national security or intelligence activities. For example, activities at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, the Communications Security Establishment, the Canada Border Services Agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and a number of other organizations would be part of the committee's responsibility.

The national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would be unique in Canada in that it would have a government-wide mandate that sets it apart from other bodies established to review a specific agency, for example, either the Security Intelligence Review Committee, the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, or the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP. In this way, NSICOP represents the biggest change to the national security review structure in a generation.

The proposed committee of parliamentarians would review the legal, policy, and administrative frameworks that underpin national security operations. It would also be able to scrutinize the operational aspects of security and intelligence work. To do this, Bill C-22 grants the committee the powers to access the information it would need, including highly classified information.

It is important that hon. members appreciate that Bill C-22 has been carefully crafted to avoid unnecessary duplications of efforts within the broader national security community. This means that relevant information, such as reports, findings, and opinions, may be shared between the committee of parliamentarians and the other review bodies during the conduct of their respective work. This represents an important way of leveraging the good work of these organizations to help NSICOP get up to speed on issues and to fulfill its role in ensuring that national security and intelligence activities are in Canada's best interests.

To ensure accountability and transparency, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would be required to report annually on its work, including its findings and recommendations, as appropriate, and these reports would be tabled in Parliament. The committee would also be able to independently issue special reports as necessary.

Although the bill requires that reports would be submitted to the Prime Minister before tabling for the sole purpose of ensuring that classified information is not contained in the reports, I want to reassure hon. members that the bill does not provide the Prime Minister with the power to change the committee's findings or recommendations. To reiterate, the intent of this provision is to ensure, in the final stages before a report becomes public, that classified information is not inadvertently included. This is in everyone's interest.

It should also be noted that Bill C-22 enables the committee to provide classified reports to a minister or ministers at its own discretion. In doing so, however, the committee would still be required to include an unclassified summary of any such report in its annual report.

While it is vital to involve more parliamentarians in examining how federal national security entities and agencies carry out their national security responsibilities individually or collectively, there must also be some boundaries to ensure that ministers remain fully responsible and accountable for their department's activities. Every department and agency of the security and intelligence community reports to the minister, who is ultimately responsible for its conduct. This minister is accountable to Parliament, and ultimately to Canadians, for ensuring that the organization under her or his charge carries out its duties to keep us safe, while respecting our fundamental rights and freedoms and the rule of law.

With respect to access to information for the committee of parliamentarians, I believe that the amendments proposed by the government at report stage represent a balanced, reasonable approach to some of the changes proposed by the standing committee. Notably, the proposal by the government to reintroduce some of the mandatory exceptions to the committee's access in clause 14 is intended to ensure that certain categories of sensitive, highly restricted information are protected from any inadvertent release that may cause harm to individuals and/or to national security related operations.

The government's proposed reinstatement of clause 16, as it appeared when the bill was tabled, would further provide ministers with a mechanism to ensure that special operational information can be protected, but only where necessary to protect national security.

Bill C-22, with the amendments proposed by the government, provides the necessary checks and balances, and I encourage hon. members to join me in supporting it. For example, if a minister determines it to be necessary to withhold information from the committee at a specific point in time to ensure the integrity of a national security operation, the minister would be required to explain the request to the committee. If disputed by the committee, the committee would have the ability to report this matter to Parliament.

I can assure hon. members that Bill C-22, with the proposed amendments, would give the committee of parliamentarians the ability to hold the government accountable as to its national security and intelligence activities. Also, the committee would be able to play a key role in ensuring that ministers take the necessary action to address problems and to fix deficiencies within their own areas of responsibility.

I want to emphasize that the bill would provide the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians significant powers with which to conduct its important work. However, it is also important to add that the bill also provides support for the committee by creating a professionally staffed secretariat.

Bill C-22 demonstrates that the government intends to set the bar higher for national security and intelligence matters because of the transparency and accountability it requires. Our government wants Canadians to feel confident that their Parliament will be able to hold the government to account in this regard.

I want to share with hon. members that it is my wish that the bill be seen as one of the building blocks to restore a high level of trust and respect of Canadians in parliamentarians. I hope hon. members from all parties will join me in supporting the enactment of the bill with the amendments we have proposed at this time.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague from Cowichan—Malahat—Langford for putting the concern so very clearly as to why that parliamentary committee of MPs and senators, with all of the stringent qualifications they would have to undertake to be members of the committee, should have information withheld from them.

I do plan to vote for Bill C-22, because I think it is important to have parliamentary oversight. We have never had it. However, I am still putting forward my own amendment, which I hope the hon. member will support, to delete the clause of the bill which removes parliamentary privilege from MPs. Other countries with parliamentary oversight of intelligence operations do allow their MPs to continue to have parliamentary privilege. I see that one deletion as a way of pushing back on the overall message from the government that MPs are not trusted with information.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is a great honour to rise today to take part in this very important debate on Bill C-22.

I feel honoured to give voice to the serious concerns that many of my constituents have in the great riding of Cowichan—Malahat—Langford. I also want to note that this debate is taking place under the yoke of time allocation. In other words, the ability of parliamentarians to provide oversight on a bill dealing with oversight has now been curtailed by the government.

Bill C-22 cannot be debated without being properly placed in the context of Bill C-51 from the 41st Parliament. Bill C-51 was one of the most draconian pieces of security legislation to emanate from the previous Conservative government. Indeed, more than 100 of Canada's brightest legal experts from institutions across the country sent an open letter to all members of Parliament at the time, expressing their deep concern about Bill C-51. They called that bill a dangerous piece of legislation, in terms of the potential impacts on the rule of law, on constitutionally and internationally protected rights, and on the health of Canada's democracy.

We had former prime ministers, former justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, and all sorts of experts who gave close scrutiny to Bill C-51 and were convinced it was unconstitutional. Many of my constituents were very vocally opposed to Bill C-51, and indeed many of them took part in the protests that erupted across Canada during that time.

It was a sad day in Parliament when the Liberals joined with the Conservatives to pass that bill. I think, and many of my colleagues will agree with me, that on Bill C-51, the Liberals were indecisive, unreliable, and plain wrong to support it at the time. I do not think they realized how much of a serious misjudgement they had made with the Canadian public on the mood of Canadians.

Then, when we edged closer to the 2015 election, we suddenly saw a commitment in the Liberal campaign platform to introduce new legislation that would balance collective security with our rights and freedoms. Part of that promise was to establish an all-party national oversight committee, which we see today in Bill C-22.

In our system today, we have a history of having opposition chairs in oversight committees. Committees on ethics, public accounts, status of women, and government operations all have elected opposition chairs to ensure proper accountability and oversight. It is most unfortunate that the government, through clause 6 of the bill, has provided for the Governor in Council to designate the chair of the committee. In fact, the government has not even bothered to wait for the passage of this bill, because, as we all know, it has been widely reported that the member for Ottawa South is to be the chair. The government has also rejected attempts at the committee stage to allow for the committee to elect its chair, something which I think is unfortunate.

If I could deliver one message today, it is that Canadians expect to have a watchdog and oversight committee that has real teeth. I think this committee must have full access to classified information, have adequate resources, and, most importantly, it must have independence subject only to justifiable limits and the power to share its findings with Canadians in an informative and transparent manner.

Without adequate access to information, the committee will not be able to do its job effectively. I think this work is far too important to do half-heartedly or ineffectively. I will not support creating a committee that cannot properly provide oversight in accordance with what Canadians expect.

One of the government's proposals is to allow cabinet ministers to withhold information from the oversight committee. This is evident in Motion No. 5, which the government has presented, which seeks to reinstate clause 16. It is worded in a way that allows a minister to withhold information if he or she feels that it is special operational information or that the provision of the information would be injurious to national security.

If injurious to national security is not a blanket statement to cover any kind of reason, I do not know what is. I have heard Liberal MPs say that there is a proper accountability in oversight because the minister simply has to inform the committee of his or her decision and the reasons for it, as if that somehow makes everything okay.

I cannot support such a reinstatement of that clause. The public safety committee and the experts who were heard made it very clear that the the executive branch having this kind of power over an oversight committee simply will not fly. It would make the committee completely ineffective anytime that a minister wanted to withhold information. With regard to the way that the government wants to write the bill, the minister could claim that a confidential inquiry somehow jeopardizes the country's national security. I think that giving the government the ability to shut down any kind of investigation into its actions is too dangerous for a functioning and accountable democracy.

The other thing is that we need to build Canadians' trust in our security and intelligence community, and the way to do that is to create meaningful parliamentary oversight. We need to have a fully briefed parliamentary oversight committee that can issue authoritative reports to Canadians. Without full access and full trust from the agencies, the oversight committee cannot help those agencies earn the trust of Canadians. It is very disappointing and frustrating that the Liberals are not living up to the commitments they made trying to fix Bill C-51. To rebuild this trust, the committee must be strong, independent, and effective. The Liberals must fulfill their promise to “repeal the problematic elements of Bill C-51”.

I find it very troubling that the government cannot seem to place its trust in a select group of parliamentarians who will be security cleared, sworn to secrecy, and who will have waived all immunity based on parliamentary privilege. To underline how ridiculous this premise is, I would like to point out that there are members of the Conservative Party in opposition who were once members of cabinet in the previous Parliament. At that time, they had access to all kinds of sensitive information and are still bound by secrecy. Why the government will not now trust this committee to have full access and provide proper oversight remains an elusive mystery.

All parties worked hard during the committee process to improve Bill C-22. The final product, as was reported back to this House, was praised by four of Canada's leading authorities on intelligence and oversight issues. They wrote a joint op-ed in The Globe and Mail, calling on the government to accept the improvements and pass the bill. The last-minute changes that the government is now trying to make are unsupported by evidence heard at the committee, and they would undermine the effectiveness of the committee and the trust of Canadians. The Information Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Kent Roach and Craig Forcese, the first chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, and a representative of the Canadian Bar Association, all testified that the oversight committee should not be restricted in its access to necessary information. I do not understand why the government is attempting to reject that expert evidence.

There are three core agencies responsible for security and intelligence work in Canada: CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP. They have a combined budget of approaching $4 billion, and they employ close to 34,000 people. Clearly such a vast network needs to have the accountability and oversight of Parliament in order to regain Canadians' trust. The role of Parliament is to scrutinize the government, represent the Canadian people, and bring forth good laws to govern our people.

I call on the Liberal MPs sitting in the back rows to go back to that special day on March 8 during the vote on Bill S-201, when they had the courage to stand up and assert their power as legislators in the face of the opposition from cabinet. As they did then, those Liberal MPs should reject the government's 11th-hour amendments to this bill, and instead listen to the evidence that was so clearly presented to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. I ask all MPs in this House to remember that the government is accountable to Parliament, not the other way around.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am not at all reassured when I hear my colleagues opposite saying that the fact that the government does not have a majority on a committee means that there is more democracy within that committee.

Let us recall the electoral reform committee. When a committee says the opposite of what the government wants to hear, the government could not care less about the committee’s recommendations and decides to make the decisions itself. That is our criticism of Bill C-22. Let us have a real parliamentary committee that will really have its say, and not a committee managed by the Prime Minister’s Office. The proof is that this bill is being passed under a gag order, because they are tired of hearing opposition representatives tell the truth about Bill C-22.

What does the member have to say about that?

[Karine Trudel, NDP, Jonquière, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for her speech, which I listened to with interest.

I would like to go back to 2014, when the Prime Minister, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and nine other ministers voted in favour of Bill C-622, which sought to create an oversight committee with complete access and subpoena powers.

Why is the government trying to take these tools away from the committee proposed by Bill C-22? Why are the Liberals flip-flopping today, when they are now in government?

[Alexandra Mendes, Liberal, Brossard—Saint-Lambert, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I have the great pleasure and honour to speak today to Bill C-22.

This bill will give Canada its first national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. By enacting legislation to create this new committee, our government is fulfilling its commitment to protecting national security while ensuring the utmost respect for rights and freedoms.

I would also note that the government has made it a priority to make Parliament more useful by consolidating its institutions and mobilizing parliamentarians. The national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians that will be created by Bill C-22 is intended to be a forum where national security agencies will be able to exchange highly classified intelligence with parliamentarians who have received the proper security clearance.

The public wants national security and intelligence activities to be carried out in a responsible way. They are entitled to know that this important work is being done in accordance with the rule of law and in full recognition of individual rights, including the right to privacy. Because our government knows this is possible, it is committed to consolidating the national security framework in order to protect Canadians without compromising their values, rights and freedoms or the openness and inclusivity that this country represents.

Within the strong framework laid down by Bill C-22, the government will be able to disclose highly classified information to a committee that will include members of both Chambers and all parties. The parliamentarians who sit on the committee will have a broad mandate, defined in the bill, that consists of verifying whether the government’s work in the realm of national security and intelligence meets high standards and is carried out rigorously and responsibly. For that reason, I would like to focus on two fundamental aspects of this bill: accountability and transparency.

People expect that we, as parliamentarians, will be able to hold the government to account concerning the work done by national security and intelligence agencies. My esteemed colleagues know that SIRC, the Security Intelligence Review Committee that oversees CSIS, the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, for the CSE, and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP are well established entities that were created many years ago to ensure the transparency and accountability that people expect of the corresponding agencies in their mandatory annual reports.

Each of these entities oversees a national security or intelligence agency to ensure that it adheres to the rule of law and the directives given by its minister, namely the Minister of Public Safety for SIRC and the CRCC and the Minister of National Defence for the CSE.

To date, however, Canada has not been able to address national security and intelligence issues from a government-wide perspective, that is, to cast a wider net than any of the three entities we just spoke about do, wider even than the three of them together. That is what we want to remedy with Bill C-22. I would like to commend the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for the fine work it did in its examination of this important bill.

At this stage, the government is proposing to reinstate several important provisions of Bill C-22. More specifically, the government wants to reintroduce three mandatory exemptions relating to the committee’s access to classified information: first, protection of information respecting ongoing law enforcement operations; second, protection of the identity of informants and sources; and third, protection of persons in the witness protection program. This is because it is essential to guarantee the independence of police investigations and the safety and security of individuals who work in national security and intelligence.

The government has also proposed an amendment that reinstates clause 16, so that ministers have the necessary discretion not to disclose certain special operational information, but only if providing the information might be injurious to national security, for example, where operations or the safety of the individuals involved are in issue. As an additional safety measure, the bill provides that a minister who exercises his or her discretion in this regard must do so on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, the minister must, under the bill, inform the committee and provide the reasons why he or she has done so.

I congratulate the government for responding to the concerns of the standing committee while at the same time preserving the necessary protection measures and guarantees specified in the bill. I support the amendments proposed by the government.

I also want to point out that parliamentarians must review the bill every five years, starting from the date on which it comes into force. This is an important provision, because it establishes a legislative basis that gives the committee the ability to make changes.

As parliamentarians, we introduce, debate, and promulgate legislation dealing with matters of national security. The committees of the House and the Senate consider matters of national security policy and carry out studies of the government’s national security and intelligence activities and of the associated laws.

To date, however, Canadians have not had the benefit of an entity that gives parliamentarians a mandate to examine the government’s overall national security and intelligence infrastructure. That is what we are seeking to accomplish with the bill we are proposing, Bill C-22, an act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts.

By creating the committee of parliamentarians proposed in Bill C-22 and holding a debate on the amendments proposed by the government at this stage of the report, we are showing Canadians that the government is resolutely taking a stance as protector of their individual rights, their freedoms, and their values, while at the same time focusing on their security and their safety.

That is why I intend to vote for the bill, and I encourage all my colleagues to do the same.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Mr. Speaker, we are here today to talk about Bill C-22 and the committee the government is proposing to establish for the future.

We need to come back to the fact that the committee needs to have authority. It needs to report back to Parliament, not to the Prime Minister. It needs to be appointed by Parliament. It also needs to be able to do a good job of intelligence oversight, or else we are just pretending that we have something that we really do not have.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Mr. Speaker, I wish I had more time to speak to this today because it is important that Canadians understand what the government is doing. Actually, it is important that they understand the work that the committee did.

We have a committee with all members on it who worked together to try to make the bill better. They brought back amendments and the government rejected the amendments that were made by a committee on which the government has a majority.

We need to make sure this thing has transparency. The government is going to remove that tonight with its vote. I am told there are multiple locking mechanisms entrenched in Bill C-22 that block committees from accessing information and calling witnesses. The government is making sure that those locks are in place so the committee will not be able to do the work it should.

We need to make sure this committee is non-partisan. The government is not guaranteeing that. Its chair and its members should not be appointed by the Prime Minister. We need to see that happen. Members of the committee need to be appointed by Parliament. Most important, the committee needs to report not to the Prime Minister but to Parliament. If it could do that, perhaps it could do some work that would be really valuable for Canadians.

[David Anderson, Conservative, Cypress Hills—Grasslands, SK]

Mr. Speaker, I am glad to be here this afternoon.

I am not sure I have seen a bill more emblematic of the Liberals than this bill. As I sit here and listen today, I see there is all kinds of enthusiasm over there, but no assurance of any kind of effectiveness. There is all kinds of work being planned here, but it is likely to have no results. There are all kinds of appointments in the mix, but it does not look as though there would be any balance either.

The Liberals made a promise in the campaign. Their promise was that they were going to set up a non-partisan parliamentary national security oversight committee. Bill C-22 is another broken promise from a government that is becoming famous for breaking them. I will talk about how it has broken that promise, but certainly there is no opportunity for this to be non-partisan or to be a real parliamentary committee, and it certainly is not going to have the oversight it should have.

There are several ways to set committees up around here. The one we thought the Liberals were promising was a non-partisan parliamentary committee. I assume that if we put that in place, we would be talking about equal numbers such that the opposition would be able to contribute on an equal basis and the power on that committee would be shared, perhaps through dual chairs or sharing the chairmanship. It would have the powers of a parliamentary committee. If it was a security committee, it would probably have to deal with some sort of secrecy issues around the content of what it is looking at.

There is a second opportunity, which is to set up a regular parliamentary committee that has parliamentary powers. All of us in the House sit on those types of committees. They always pretty much favour the government, because the numbers on the committee are set by the numbers we have in the House. Those committees are under the control of the government, and we recognize that.

There are also advisory committees of parliamentarians that can be set up, and then there is an advisory committee to the prime minister. We know the specialization that the Liberals across the way have on consultation, but typically those committees are appointed by the prime minister himself.

It is interesting that we saw the Liberals promise number one, a non-partisan parliamentary committee. What they are actually trying to deliver today is number four, which is that advisory committee to the prime minister, a committee that can consult with him and that he can talk to about these issues, but one which has very little power.

I want to take a bit of a look at some of the other countries involved in these committees. One of my colleagues across the way in the government a while ago talked about the United States intelligence committee structure and was actually trying to compare this structure to that. He talked about how there needs to be fairness and justice and that the rule of law must be guaranteed and protected by the bill. Bill C-22 does not do that. It does not compare in any way to the structure that is set up in the United States.

The previous speaker talked about the United Kingdom model being similar too. I am going to go through that a bit as well. I think we will find out that this committee does not have much similarity to the authority and power that the United Kingdom committees have either.

There are a number of other Commonwealth countries that do have oversight committees. New Zealand, for example, has a committee, but it basically is to examine issues of efficacy and efficiencies for budgetary matters, policy settings, and those kinds of things. It really does not have much to do directly with intelligence oversight. The members of that committee are the prime minister, two members of parliament nominated by him, the leader of the opposition, and one member nominated by the leader of the opposition. We can see in that situation that the Government of New Zealand would control that committee at all times. It is basically focused on budget oversight, not intelligence gathering.

The Australian model is a little bit different. It has a committee that is administrative. Its main functions are to do expenditure review and oversight there as well. It can also review matters that relate to some of the agencies that are referred to it, but it does not review intelligence gathering or operational procedures or priorities, and it does not conduct inquiries. Again, we see it is an oversight committee, but it is not what the Liberal government has promised to set up as a committee for Canadians.

The United Kingdom has a little stronger committee. It has a committee of parliament with greater powers. It was actually set up in 1994 as more of a monitoring committee, and in 2013 it was restructured or reformed to give it more powers and increase its strength. It now includes oversight of operational activity and the wider intelligence and security activities of government.

When people were thinking about this committee that the Liberals were promising during the campaign, they really thought that is what was going to be brought in, and it certainly is not, as we see when we look at the legislation, what the Liberals are doing to the legislation, and the work the committee did.

Bill C-22 is called the “national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act”. Usually a committee is named for what it really is, and if that is the case here, it probably should be called “the Prime Minister's advisory committee”, because while the bill may establish a committee, it clearly fails to meet either the election promise or to establish a real and true intelligence oversight committee.

It is a bit of an embarrassment, I think, for the government to find itself having to completely change its direction from what it promised. It is unfortunate that it is using time allocation this afternoon to cover what I would call its incompetence on this issue. It is unfortunate that we find ourselves once more in the situation of the government wanting to limit debate on a bill that is clearly not going to meet the priorities and needs of Canadians.

We have a Prime Minister who seems to love running around and appearing on stages more than he likes to do this kind of hard work, so it is not surprising to see legislation, time after time, that is written in ways that the government itself is unable to support. It has to reject the work of the committees, reject the amendments made by members from all parties in this Parliament, and basically turn its back on the promises it made.

The bill to set up this committee was introduced in June of 2016. The interesting thing is that the Prime Minister actually appointed a chair to this committee months before the legislation was even presented and long before it was even debated. I understand the member has been travelling around the world. I guess he thinks he is doing some work on this in his committee, but it is probably a pretty good gig to be appointed before the parliamentary committee is even set up and have the government pay to travel around to examine some of these issues. At least there is one person getting something out of this, if the rest of Canadians are not.

As I said, forming an effective non-partisan committee was a Liberal campaign promise. Every one of us in the House would like to ensure that there is an appropriate review of our national security agencies. Conservatives believe that is important and would like the committee, when it is set up, to have the capacity and the tools to be able to do what is required. I think we would all be glad to support a committee that would properly supervise and provide oversight to our national security and intelligence organizations, but the way it is being done in the House this afternoon is a clear demonstration that this whole project is far more about optics than it is about effectiveness.

If this committee is put in place, we need to make sure that it has the tools to do what is required, and that clearly has not happened. I just mentioned that the Prime Minister appointed a chair of the committee long before the legislation was written, or certainly before it was presented and long before it was debated. The person appointed, from my understanding, has very little expertise and does not have a history in these issues.

One of the issues here is that committees usually elect their own chairs and do not have ones imposed by the Prime Minister's Office.

The Liberals promised they were going to form this committee. It is not a parliamentary committee. It is controlled by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. I do not know how anyone in the House could possibly see a committee set up like that to be non-partisan. What does it mean when the Prime Minister has the authority to appoint the members of the committee? Again, as I mentioned earlier, if Liberals really wanted to treat this matter seriously, why would we not be talking about co-chairs and an equal number of party representatives in the House? Without that, we really have nothing useful.

This is just one more broken promise. The budget is being presented this week, and we will be reminded again of how many promises the government has broken. This is one more of those broken promises. This will not be a non-partisan committee. The Prime Minister will be controlling it. It will not be a parliamentary committee. It will not have the powers of a parliamentary committee. What the committee gave the legislation in its work the government is now taking away.

The point is that if it were going to be effective, it would not be under the control of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. It would be under the control of the members of Parliament who sit on that committee. If there were equal numbers of members and a sharing of the chairmanship, Conservatives could see how this committee might work effectively, but the government has made a decision that it is not going to do things that way, and that is unfortunate. It is unfortunate that the government finds itself in a situation like this today, but it is even more unfortunate that Canadians will end up paying for another mistake that has been made by the Liberal government.

[Karen McCrimmon, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise during this report stage to continue our review of Bill C-22, which would create a committee of parliamentarians on national security matters.

I am pleased to see that today this bill has not only been through committee scrutiny, but thanks to all of that work, the advice of experts, many stakeholders, and the voices of Canadians, we have landed on a version that balances all those concerns. We have agreed to an expanded mandate. We have agreed to remove certain exclusions to the unprecedented level of classified information that this committee will be able to access, and we have balanced concerns about ministerial powers of redaction and national security limitations with reasonable compromises.

As we have moved this significant legislation forward, much has been made about how Canada's committee will compare with counterparts in other Five Eyes countries. Indeed, Bill C-22 would have favourably compared to them as initially introduced. However, this amended version will make it even stronger. If we look closely at another country with a Westminster system comparable to Canada's, for example, the United Kingdom, we see very interesting comparisons with parliamentary review of national security and intelligence. There, in particular, the balance between access to highly sensitive information and protection of national security is reflected in the U.K. Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.

In the U.K. model, ministers may choose to withhold certain types of sensitive information, as long as the disclosure would be counter to the interests of national security. Specifically in the U.K., its Justice and Security Act states that if asked to disclose information, the government can withhold the information because it is “sensitive information” and that “in the interests of national security, should not be disclosed..”.

If we look to the Australian model, similarly, the government cannot be compelled to provide operationally sensitive information, including intelligence sources, operational methods, or foreign intelligence, if that information is deemed injurious to either national security or foreign relations. All international partners agree that access to information must be balanced with the need for safety of sources and the integrity of the national security framework, and that ongoing investigations should be free of political interference.

Under Bill C-22, Canada's committee would have a statutory right to access highly classified information in any department, any agency, and now, thanks to an amendment adopted by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, any crown corporation, making our committee an international leader in terms of information access.

To continue with comparisons, Canada's committee would also be in line administratively with other Westminster systems, for example, on security clearances. However, Canada's committee would go further still in the scope of its mandate, as its jurisdiction would not be limited to the main national security agencies.

Also, unique to Canada, the committee would be able to engage and collaborate with existing expert review bodies, including the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, the Security Intelligence Review Committee for CSIS, and the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner.

What is more, Canada's committee would have a unique membership. We are now proposing a body with up to eleven members, including up to three senators, and with a limit of five MPs from the governing party. Certainly this will be reflective of Canada's diversity in advice and expertise, in experience, and in opinion. It will ensure that the government does not control the committee.

I also want to emphasize that this is a made-in-Canada approach. We have taken the best of what we have learned from our allies and applied it to our own system and reality, establishing a body that is unprecedented in Canadian history. It has been lacking for a long time. This goes further than what the government under Prime Minister Paul Martin envisioned in 2005, and it goes further than what many of our allies actually have. What is more, I want to remind hon. members about the checks and balances we have in place to ensure that the committee can evolve and become stronger in the future.

As with any new institution, there will be early experiences that can lead to subsequent improvements. There will also need to be a confidence-building process with the security and intelligence community, as well as with the Canadian public, and with us as parliamentarians. In fact, when Dominic Grieve, the chair of the British committee, visited Ottawa last year, his advice was to start small, build trust, and enhance the committee over time. With Bill C-22, we will actually be starting rather large, with a committee that would have more access and more teeth than many of its international counterparts, including the United Kingdom. A mandatory five-year review included as part of this bill would ensure that the committee's effectiveness and experiences could be studied and lessons applied, so that this new institution in the Canadian national security landscape could become as effective as possible.

I see no reason at this stage of this bill's journey to hold back this truly collaborative and long-overdue legislation. It reflects values that we have long agreed upon, and the final version will incorporate, with the government's agreement, a significant number of amendments proposed by the public safety committee. I commend all members for their valued input, and I applaud the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for its review. We are at an important juncture in the history of our country's security framework, and this bill gets to the root of the dual objectives that Canadians have told us they want achieved: keeping our country safe while protecting our values, rights, and freedoms. I urge all members to support this bill.

[Marjolaine Boutin-Sweet, NDP, Hochelaga, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I will quote Suzanne Legault, the Information Commissioner of Canada. Because of Bill C-22, there will be a “ministerial override of the committee's review function”.

Does my colleague feel that the committee's loss of autonomy could put Canadians at greater risk?

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Mr. Speaker, today I rise to speak to Bill C-22, an act to establish parliamentary oversight of our security and intelligence services. Bill C-22 aims to plug a gap by giving a unique committee of nine security-cleared and secrecy-sworn MPs and senators substantial but not complete access to classified information and a whole-of-government mandate to review security and intelligence operations, policy, legislation, and administration.

Canada has not seen any progress toward security accountability in decades. In 1977, the government created the McDonald Commission to investigate the security services activities of the RCMP. The commission resulted in two key recommendations in its final report in 1981. The first was to separate security services from the RCMP, a recommendation that was fully implemented in 1984 with the establishment of CSIS. The other key recommendation, to create a special oversight committee of parliamentarians, was ignored and has gone ignored for decades.

Time after time, governments have resisted the call to create a body for parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence services. They have ignored experts in this country and around the world who have insisted that parliamentary oversight is crucial to bridging the gap between ordinary Canadians and the women and men of our intelligence services.

In 2005, a Liberal government bill was introduced that was almost a carbon copy of Bill C-22 in its original form. An interim committee of parliamentarians on national security, when studying that bill, actually toured allied nations and met with their oversight bodies. It too came to the conclusion that an oversight committee must be provided with complete access to classified information. Unsurprisingly, the Liberals rejected that provision.

Without oversight, Canada has been left behind. All of our closest allies, including those with parliamentary governments similar to ours, have adopted legislative oversight to ensure that national security efforts are being executed in the best interests of all citizens. In fact, Canada is the only member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand that does not have any parliamentary oversight of its security and intelligence services.

It is not good enough to simply look at past mistakes and attempt to evaluate where we went wrong. We need proactive, ongoing parliamentary oversight to ensure not only that everything is operating properly but to stop activities that we believe are not in the best interests of Canadians.

Canadians expect a watchdog with teeth. This committee must have full access to classified information, adequate resources, independence, and, subject only to justifiable limits, the power to share its findings with Canadians in an informative and transparent manner.

Without adequate access to information, the committee would not be able to do its job. This work is far too important to do half-heartedly or ineffectively. We will not support creating a committee that simply wastes time and erodes Canadians' trust.

While the Liberals insisted on watering down Bill C-22 to strip parliamentarians' access to crucial information, we believe that committee members must have full access in order to provide full and thorough oversight. When law professor Craig Forcese, from the University of Ottawa, testified at committee, he remarked that "Unless the committee can access information allowing it to follow trails, it will give the appearance of accountability without the substance''.

This is exactly what the Liberal government has become known for: all talk and very little action, no real commitment, just smoke and mirrors, just as we have seen with Bill C-51.

If the government truly believes that there should be a committee of parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence issues, it must stop trying to strip the committee of the ability to do its job effectively.

Since Bill C-51 was introduced in 2015, there has been a true awakening about the balance we expect the government to uphold between our privacy rights and national security objectives. This awakening did not happen overnight. In February 2015, 82% of Canadians supported Bill C-51, but by April, the level of support was down to 33%. The more Canadians learned about the bill, the less they liked it, and for good reason.

It is the New Democrats who fought against a very strong current to make sure that Canadians knew the rights we were all signing off and losing forever. It was politically risky, but we knew it was the right thing to do.

Still, to this day, Bill C-51's broad interpretation allows the government to cast a wide net, with the potential to scoop up union members, environmentalists, and aboriginal rights activists. The language in this bill is so broad that the definition of terrorist was watered down to individuals who practise their legal right to dissent. Under this legislation, police forces have the power to detain people they suspect of planning to break the law. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service will have new powers to arrest. These are only some of the examples of what the NDP stood against, whereas the Liberals in opposition were decidedly unreliable. They flip-flopped, ultimately deciding to amend the bill when they got into power. The problem is that they have not. The government is still playing lip service to its campaign promise. It is disappointing and frustrating that the Liberals are not living up to their commitments on Bill C-51.

To rebuild trust, the committee must be strong, independent, and effective. The current government must fulfill its promise to repeal the problematic elements of Bill C-51. Even the Canadian Civil Liberties Association agrees that legislation is needed to undo the damage done by Bill C-51.

While we agree that oversight of our national security and intelligence apparatus is badly needed, we cannot use such a bill as this one to cover up the inaction on Bill C-51.

The former auditor general has stated that review powers must be proportionate to the intrusiveness of powers wielded by security agencies and that anything less falls short of true oversight. In light of Bill C-51's expansion of security powers, should this committee's oversight powers not also be greater than what was envisioned a decade ago in a previous government's bill?

The original version of Bill C-22 gave committee members substantial access to classified information, but not complete access. Based on expert testimony and study, the public safety committee presented evidence-based amendments to the bill. These amendments aimed to give the committee the powers and access to information it would need to do its job effectively.

Furthermore, the bill aimed to limit the power of the Prime Minister to censor committee reports. Other efforts to amend the bill, like including a provision to elect the chair of the committee, were rejected by the government, even though it had the support of all opposition parties. Despite this, we were happy with Bill C-22 when it was amended. The amended bill fulfilled a crucial campaign promise by both the NDP and the Liberals and ensured that the committee would be both independent and well informed. However, it is clear that the government intends to neglect the evidence-based decisions of the committee and to bring Bill C-22 back to its original, watered-down form.

In The Globe and Mail op-ed on January 27, four national security and legal experts stated this point clearly:

Should the government choose to force a return to the restrictive original bill, it risks potentially undermining a new and historic Parliamentary ability that it has enthusiastically championed.

I strongly urge the government to keep the amendments as made by the committee. These amendments were made after hearing from 25 expert witnesses and with the united support of all opposition parties.

This country needs strong parliamentary oversight of our security and intelligence services that is transparent and accountable and serves the best interests of Canadians. I hope this government will live up to its election promises, respect the work of the committee, and pass this legislation as amended.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak in favour of Bill C-22.

The national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians being created is incredibly important. We just have to look at what is happening right now south of the border, where congressional committees are overseeing and questioning what is happening in the FBI, the CIA and other intelligence services, to recognize that without oversight, we might well have a very unfortunate situation with power concentrated only in the executive branch.

Up until today, the Canadian Parliament has been the only parliament among our Five Eyes partners that does not have a committee comprised of parliamentarians and legislators to oversee our intelligence department and agencies and to ensure that fairness, justice and rule of law values are imposed.

As such, I strongly agree, as I said when I campaigned in the last election, that such a committee is needed and would be much appreciated by Canadians.

I also want to congratulate the committee that studied the bill. The public safety and national security committee had extensive debates on the bill, which I had the pleasure of reading over the last couple of days. The debate that went on in committee was very interesting and it shed a lot of light on the amendments brought forward and the improvements that were made to the bill. The committee heard from over 40 witnesses. Members of the committee did not necessarily agree with other members of those parties. I congratulate the committee on a thoughtful review of the bill. It stands as an excellent example of how colleagues in the House can work together to make a bill better.

Let me outline a few of the amendments at committee.

In clause 2 and again in clause 15, the amendments made at committee will clarify that the mandate of the committee of parliamentarians includes crown corporations. This broadens the mandate of the NSICOP, and is in keeping with the intent to give that committee a government-wide review capacity.

In clause 5, a time frame of 60 days following the general election has been recommended for the appointment of NSICOP members, and the Prime Minister will be required to consult with the leaders of caucuses and recognized groups in order to name members to the committee.

Amendments to clause 8 to deal with the NSICOP's authority to investigate ongoing activities were made. The minister has authority to determine that an examination of ongoing activities could be injurious to national security. However, with the amendments before us, the time during which the minister can invoke this authority will be limited to the period during which the ongoing operation is injurious security. Once the review is no longer injurious to national security and once it is no longer an ongoing operation, the minister will be required to inform the committee of parliamentarians. That is an improvement to the original bill.

The amendments to clause 14 involve exemptions to the authority to review in certain instances. The amendments would cancel those exemptions. I agree with the standing committee that the exemptions concerning ongoing defence intelligence activities in support of military operations, privileged information under the Investment Canada Act and information collected by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada should be withdrawn.

There are, however, certain exemptions that I believe should remain in the bill.

On the one hand, there are exemptions to individuals who are protected through the witness protection program and to individuals who are confidential sources. I do not think the committee of parliamentarians needs to know the identities of these individual in order to oversee security and intelligence. There is potentially the risk of harm to them if their identities become more widely known. Also, the committee of parliamentarians risks the perception of political interference in police matters should the exemption for ongoing police investigations be removed.

In addition, the committee recommended that clause 16 be deleted. I do not generally support that recommendation. Clause 16 would authorize a minister to prevent disclosure of special operating information as defined by the Security of Information Act when it could be injurious to national security.

There will be situations in which a minister will need to avail him or herself of this prerogative in the interests of national security, but the bill also places checks and balances on this authority. The proposed amendment will require the minister to explain in writing their reasons why the authority is being invoked. This will effectively make public the minister's decision and the minister will have to contemplate the public's reaction before making use of this provision.

The equivalent committees in the other Westminster Five Eyes partners face similar and indeed generally more extensive restrictions on their access to information. In fact, the access provided to the NSICOP will broadly exceed the access afforded to the committees of our international partners.

To repeat a point made earlier, under Bill C-22, operational reviews may only be stopped for national security reasons during the period that the operation in question is ongoing, and only if the conduct of the review will be disruptive to that ongoing operation. Once the operation is complete, the committee of parliamentarians may begin or resume its review.

When the committee of parliamentarians tables its annual report to Parliament, it will be able to cite any instances where this authority has been used. In this way, we assure a degree of transparency that will enable Parliament and the Canadian public to hold the minister and the government to account.

One important aspect of the proposed committee of parliamentarians would be that the government would not have a majority of members on the committee. Indeed, as now agreed and amended, the chair would have a vote only in the case of a tie. By limiting the voting powers of the chair, we further ensure that the committee's work and findings will not be controlled by the government.

The amendments to clause 21 provide a further example of how the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security has ensured greater accountability in the legislation. Should the prime minister redact information contained in NSICOP's report, the new version of the report must be clearly identified as a revised version. On top of that, the extent of the revisions must be indicated, as well as the reasons for them.

A new clause 31 requires NSICOP to inform the appropriate minister or the attorney general if, in its opinion, it finds any activity related to national security or intelligence carried out by a department that may not be in compliance with the law. This whistle-blower provision is a significant addition to the bill before us. I congratulate the standing committee for championing this provision.

During committee stage, a wide range of witnesses shared the benefit of their experience and advice. The amendments before us today demonstrate that the committee listened to them and that the government also listened to the committee. Committee witnesses included leading professionals and academic experts, human rights advocates, and the heads of our existing national security and intelligence agencies. I thank them for their input.

There has been a consensus, I believe, that the bill would improve the accountability and effectiveness of Canada's national security and intelligence system. I urge all members to join me in supporting the bill. I am pleased that the government is supporting a majority of amendments that have come back from the standing committee.

[Peter Fonseca, Liberal, Mississauga East—Cooksville, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I have a lot of respect for the member, but it was his party that forced closure on legislation over 100 times. It was the way the Conservatives operated.

That is not the case with Liberals. We made a commitment to the people of Canada to address poor legislation that the previous Conservative government put forward, Bill C-51. We made a commitment to Canadians to bring a balance of freedom and liberty with security. Bill C-22 addresses that. It is imperative on the government to move forward with that agenda, because Canadians have asked for that.

The member should look at his party's record on closure.

[Peter Fonseca, Liberal, Mississauga East—Cooksville, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for the opportunity to speak about the good work done in committee, the many witnesses who were heard, and the amendments that came forward, which, in many cases, like adding senators, we will move forward with.

The hon. member also talked about some of the experts from whom the committee heard. Following the introduction of Bill C-22, the expert from the University of Ottawa, Craig Forcese, said, “this will be a stronger body than the UK and Australia equivalents. And a dramatic change for Canadian national security and accountability. This is a good bill. I would give it a high pass”. Also, University of Toronto expert Wesley Wark has called Bill C-22 a very good bill.

The committee heard from over 40-some-odd witnesses. There have been over 40 members in the chamber speak to the legislation. It strikes the right balance. We are moving in the right direction.

[Peter Fonseca, Liberal, Mississauga East—Cooksville, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am honoured to speak to Bill C-22, which is legislation that would establish a committee of parliamentarians to review our national security and intelligence activities.

This bill engages two areas of extraordinary importance to all Canadians: freedom and security. My constituents in Mississauga East—Cooksville, like all Canadians, are vitally concerned about their liberties and freedoms. They are also very conscious of the need for their security and the security of their fellow Canadians.

The debate in these areas is often set out in terms of a zero-sum game. Supposedly, increasing security means less freedom, or that as security decreases, freedom increases. Simply put, this is not true. While on some few occasions a trade-off or balance may be necessary, in reality, most of the time, freedom and security are entirely complementary ideals. There is no real long-term freedom without security. There is no real stable security without freedom. Freedom without security is a charade. Such freedom in a security vacuum is an empty concept. It is life inside a compound or a gated community living in constant fear. Likewise, security without freedom is life in a real or virtual prison cell. This is one of the reasons that I support this bill. It advances the mutually reinforcing goals of liberty and safety.

The need for review in the areas of national security and intelligence is now broadly recognized. Sadly, one can see many examples of failures to provide security and failure to protect liberties both abroad and in Canada. Such reviews involving classified information are particularly challenging. The U.S. 9/11 Commission found, “Secrecy stifles oversight, accountability, and information sharing”. Challenging or not, effective reviews must be done. Literally, it is a matter of life and death.

Accepting the need for such reviews, the real and productive debate is about the appropriate mechanisms for review. When we consider the appropriate mechanisms, we must recognize that this is a marked departure from our parliamentary system of government. National security and intelligence have traditionally been the exclusive preserve of the executive branch. A review system that works within our parliamentary form of government is required.

The first matter in this regard that one must consider is the very real problem of who is best placed to oversee these intelligence and security matters. It is the classic dilemma of who watches the watchers. Should the reviewers be experts? They have the experience and knowledge in such matters. Should the reviewers be independent outsiders, like parliamentarians? There are arguments supporting both positions.

Certainly, experts are used in Canada's other review bodies, being the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, the Communications Security Establishment commissioner, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee. Parliamentarians are obviously independent. They do not necessarily start with the required expertise. However, if one uses experts, particularly in this somewhat closed subject area, one tends to get those who, through long association, might be considered too close to the agencies under review. This closeness can develop in complete good faith and despite genuine efforts to resist it.

I believe it is right to use parliamentarians in this regard. As to their lack of expertise, members of Parliament are expected to act in many areas outside their common knowledge base. They deal with economics in their consideration of budgets and other financial legislation. They deal with health policy in legislation. They deal with moral issues in matters like the assisted dying law. They deal with scientific policy.

Parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence matters is based upon the very foundations of representational democracy. Our whole democratic system assumes a faith in the people's representatives' abilities. However, many parliamentarians will start their duties in this regard without any background knowledge. This makes the support of the secretariat set out in clauses 24 and 25 essential. It is critical that non-expert parliamentarians be supported by staff with the necessary long-term expertise and corporate memory.

I further note with approval that the secretariat could contract for independent legal advice. This is not restricted to the Department of Justice for legal advice. While that advice is admirably professional, the Department of Justice advises virtually all other actors in these areas simultaneously. Independent legal advice can enhance the independence and thus the effectiveness of the secretariat. Effectively, parliamentary review and oversight simply will not work without secretariat assistance. Therefore, I urge the government to give the secretariat the necessary priority and resources.

I note the review committee's mandate is not limited to simply protecting rights and ensuring legal compliance. The committee would be free to consider all matters, including those of effectiveness of subject organizations and even value for money, i.e., are we getting the security that we need commensurate with the resources we are expending.

I strongly support the composition of the committee as set out in clause 5. It nicely balances the interests of all major parties within this House and within the Senate. The inclusion of senators would provide for the possibility of some beneficial continuity for the committee.

This legislation in clause 8 would restrict the committee from reviewing ongoing matters if the relevant minister determines the review would be injurious to national security. This is an appropriate restriction recognizing the established responsibilities of the executive branch in our parliamentary form of democratic government. It is not hard to imagine the impracticalities and problems associated with such a review in the midst of an ongoing sensitive matter. The interference, distraction, and diversion of limited resources are only some of those potential problems.

Some members might note that the provisions make clear that committee members must honour their commitment to confidentiality. These matters are dealt with in clauses 10 through 12. Sadly, parliamentarians have not been above the breach of these rules. In this regard, I remind the House that one of our colleagues, Fred Rose, a former member for Montreal—Cartier, was convicted in 1946 for conspiracy to pass on official secrets to a foreign power, i.e., the Soviet Union. He was sentenced to six years in prison.

This legislation in clause 9 recognizes that there are other review bodies, albeit non-parliamentary, engaged in potentially related matters. Co-operation and de-conflicting are mandated and only sensible.

This bill would provide the committee the broadest powers. Clause 13 says that the committee is “entitled to send for persons, papers and records, and to have access to any information”. Please note the words “any information”. The only information excluded is cabinet documents being confidences of the Queen's Privy Council. This slight restriction is entirely consistent with our parliamentary system of government.

We must recognize that this legislation is a novel approach for Canada. National security and intelligence have traditionally been matters strictly of the purview of the executive, of the cabinet. The proposed review committee would be the legislative branch's first foray into these two sensitive areas. This lack of precedent is not a reason not to proceed, but a reason to recognize the limits of what we can sensibly do, predict, and provide for. This is another reason to tread carefully. Most important, to provide a mechanism to make sure that we have acted appropriately, that mechanism is the five-year review mandated by clause 34.

In conclusion, I am proud to support this bill because it introduces necessary outside review in matters of vital concern to Canadians. These matters heavily implicate both our freedom and our security. I also support it because this review is to be in the hands of the most appropriate persons, those persons being Canadian parliamentarians. The review committee would be appropriately composed and represented with a broad mandate and strong powers. This vital committee would be supported by a secretariat and executive director, whose support, I repeat, is absolutely essential. This would allow us to ensure that we are balancing our liberties and freedoms with our security.

[Raj Grewal, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the bill clearly states that the minister will have the prerogative to ensure that national security is still maintained, which is an important piece of the bill. It also states that after the national security risk has passed, the committee has the opportunity to revisit the minister's decision.

Again, Bill C-22 and this new committee will have the balance that we are trying to achieve, which is ensuring we are keeping Canadians safe while at the same time protecting the rights and freedoms we cherish so much.

[Raj Grewal, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Mr. Speaker, Bill C-22 and the government's commitment to setting up this committee, which is independent of government, is extremely important, especially if we look at the current security landscape in the world we live in today.

Canadians expect their government to ensure they are protected. The first job of any government is to protect its citizens. The committee will be able to do that. It will ensure that Canadians are safe and secure, while at the same time protecting their rights and freedoms.

I look forward to the committee being set up. I look forward to parliamentarians of all political parties serving on it and ensuring they carry out their mandate to protect Canadians.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, one of the issues we will vote on with Bill C-22 is an amendment I have made. As members know, and the Speaker has accepted it for a vote, it is a deletion to retain the powers of parliamentary privilege for members of Parliament on the committee. It is an attempt, even at this late stage, to have the bill respect parliamentarians and their ability, having taken the oath of confidentiality, to be responsible for the secrecy that is required of them in this very important committee for senators and members of Parliament.

I note that the New Zealand legislation does not require its members of parliament to give up their parliamentary privileges in order to serve on their committee for security operations. Would my hon. colleague please consider voting for my amendment to delete that provision?

[Raj Grewal, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the hon. member for making the analogy to a jar of olives. As I know, he is an afficionado of olives. On our recent trip to Israel, we learned a lot about them.

However, getting to the member's question, I want to reiterate that our government is making an historic commitment to Canadians to fulfill an election promise. However, it is not just our commitment. Other governments have tried to set up this committee, which we have needed for quite some time now, to ensure there is independent oversight over our security and intelligence. Just like our allies in the Five Eyes, every other country already has this committee. We are setting one up to ensure we protect Canadians. At the same time, we are ensuring that our rights and freedoms, which as Canadians we cherish so much, are protected.

I truly believe in Bill C-22, and I encourage the member opposite to support it.

[Raj Grewal, Liberal, Brampton East, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to rise today in support of Bill C-22, an act to establish a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

After second reading consideration and committee scrutiny, we now have the opportunity to review the bill at report stage. The robust parliamentarian process has served us well. The bill has been carefully studied by members on all sides of the House. Advice has been heard from expert witnesses and the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security has proposed amendments.

As the legislation stands today, it will move our country toward a more accountable and effective national security system. As many have said today and prior to today, the legislation is long overdue. We have heard stakeholders call it “crucial” and affirm that it will establish a committee in Canada that is stronger than its international counterparts. It will fill a significant gap that has existed in Canada for far too long. It will enable us to achieve our twin objectives of ensuring that our national security agencies are working effectively to keep Canadians safe and that the rights and freedoms of Canadians are protected.

Creating a new national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians honours a major commitment of the government to Canadians. The committee will be an enormously important addition to our parliamentary landscape. It will have: extraordinary access to classified information in order to closely examine intelligence and security operations; enhanced scrutiny of national security and intelligence activities; a broader mandate than counterparts in other modern democracies; the ability to set its own agenda fully independent of government; the responsibility to report annually to Canadians through Parliament; and the power to examine activities government-wide, including ongoing operations.

As the legislation stands now, the committee will meet the dual objectives we set long ago, which is to ensure our national security apparatus is working to keep Canadians safe and secure, while protecting the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

When the bill was first introduced, it proposed a stronger committee than those that existed with many of our international allies. With amendments, the scope, authorities, and access we are proposing for the committee will be broadened even further. The government has indicated that it will accept most of these amendments.

With respect to scope, for example, we agreed with the committee that the committee must be empowered to review national security and intelligence operations. As amended, that will include the operation of crown corporations. Further, as amended, if the minister determines that the examination will be against national security, his or her power to delay it will be limited to the period of time during which the operation is under way. Afterward, the committee can review the operation.

Another important amendment is whistle-blower protection that will require the committee to inform a minister and the attorney general about any national security or intelligence activity undertaken by a department that may not comply with the law. Like my colleagues, I was pleased that this amendment was widely endorsed. I also agree that the chair of the committee should be given a vote only in the case of a tie. I also agree with many of the changes regarding access to information exemptions for the bill initially proposed.

With the recent amendments, for example, the committee will now be able to receive information about ongoing defence intelligence activities that support military operations. It will also have access to relevant information collected by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada and to privileged information under the Investment Canada Act.

The government has also agreed to amend the legislation so that reasons must be given for any redaction. Indeed, the government has been open to reasonable amendments throughout the parliamentary process.

We have not only conducted a careful examination of this crucial legislation, but we have also benefited from many years of consideration in creating this committee and from long collaboration with our international partners. Every other member of the Five Eyes alliance, including Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, has a legislative body with access to classified information to oversee security and intelligence matters.

Canada has tried to create a committee for over a decade now. It is time we give Canadians and parliamentarians the mandate to review these activities that we all want and need. Today, we are all taking one step closer to bringing this important new body into existence. We are closer to a system in which parliamentarians are better able to hold the government to account. We are closer to ensuring that concrete actions are taken when deficiencies and problems with our security framework and operations are identified.

Having learned from some of the best practices of our allies, we are closer to a truly developing a Canadian approach to national security accountability. This is a significant step forward for Canada. The legislation before us is as bold and progressive as it is thoughtful and balanced.

I am very proud to be part of the legislature that will, hopefully, at long last, put this critical accountability mechanism in place. I thank all members and parties for their support, advice, scrutiny, and debate in creating a better bill. I encourage all colleagues to support the passage of this important legislation.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

Mr. Speaker, parliamentary oversight is essential. I certainly pushed for it as a critic. We ran on it in the last election. We are delivering it here in Bill C-22. It is a massive step forward.

As I said, we have not held this out as the sole component of the solution. There are other pieces that are coming. I referenced the committee's work and impending legislation that the government will table as well. However, the spirit of what the member asked is dead on: the importance of oversight, the importance of rigorously maintaining that protection of Canadian rights as guaranteed under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We are also ensuring at the same time that our security and intelligence apparatus has the tools it needs effectively to keep Canadians safe.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I share my hon. colleague's concerns. Before I address the concerns as they relate to Bill C-51, I will speak to the bill that is in front of us, Bill C-22. It is important to note that there would be a five-year mandatory review. While we are ahead of the Commonwealth and while we think, after the committee's recommendations and the listening that we did across the country, that we have a very good bill, there is a mandatory review process to make sure we could look at how effective this committee is being and how we could improve it. We do not hold this out as perfection, but we do feel that this is the right place to start.

On the issue of changes and when we can expect them, the committee at this very moment is considering a report on the security and intelligence framework. We want to hear from that committee. It has done incredibly important work. It has heard from witnesses across the country. That committee report is going to be a very important input into the minister's overall process on responding. We have very clear platform commitments on what we feel needs to be changed and improved to get right that simultaneous work that needs to be done to protect Canadians and also to ensure that their rights are also protected.

The committee report is coming out. I would expect action by the government very shortly thereafter, informed by that process.

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, it gives me great pleasure to rise to speak to this bill.

There are few responsibilities more important to government than ensuring the safety of the Canadian population while at the same time ensuring the protection of its rights as enshrined in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This became a dominant theme in the last campaign, and we said that these two issues are not mutually exclusive. They are not things that are traded off against each other. They are things that must be considered equally and simultaneously, and both must be done with full force and effect.

What we see in Bill C-22 is the beginning of an effort to finally address some major problems we have within our security and intelligence framework, the biggest one being oversight.

I go back to my time on the other side of the aisle as critic for public safety and national security, and harken back to the reports of Justice Iacobucci and Justice O'Connor and the imperative nature of oversight in ensuring that our security and intelligence agencies are operating effectively and within the proper bounds of Canadian law. Unfortunately, over the last decade, despite many recommendations from parliamentary committees, these recommendations languished and were not acted upon, which meant that these key provisions were not put into effect.

Why is that required? Let us look at the fact that right now the oversight for our security and intelligence, if it exists, exists in silos. For example, the RCMP public complaints commission looks at the RCMP but is not able to follow evidence as it pertains to or deals with other agencies. CSIS has SIRC. To take the other extreme, the Canada Border Services Agency has no form of oversight.

Right now, the parliamentary committee, in an all-party way, is very effectively looking at our national security framework. A piece of the answer that we have seen in other jurisdictions and that has been talked about in many of the recommendations I spoke to earlier is the need to have a parliamentary committee made up of members of the House that would be able to follow information no matter where it goes. There may be a single incident involving intelligence that moves from the RCMP to the Canada Border Services Agency and that is also involved with immigration and many other agencies.

This new committee would have the power to look into all corners of security and intelligence. From the government's perspective, it was incredibly important to bring it in early and set it up. I am very encouraged that the bill is before the House, and I am anxious for this new committee to get to work.

Even before the committee saw this, experts rang in on the efficacy of what was proposed. Of course, we improved it, but it is a good idea to take a look at what some experts were saying about the state of the bill in its improvement, the leap forward that we made even prior to the amendments made at committee stage.

Craig Forcese, a professor of law at the University of Ottawa and a renowned expert in this area, said, “this will be a stronger body than the U.K. and Australian equivalents, and a dramatic change for Canadian national-security accountability”. He went on to call it “a good bill” and gave it “a high pass”.

His colleague Wesley Wark said, “I fully support Bill C-22”. He noted some improvements, but he basically issued a warning not to let perfect be the enemy of the good.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association supported the bill, saying, “This new accountability mechanism is crucial”.

In the media, there were many positive comments. The Toronto Star said that this is “an important first step toward accountability” and that it “would provide an essential check” on the security establishment. That was before the committee made its recommendations.

In the Commonwealth, we have gone much further. This is particularly noteworthy given the fact that the testimony the committee heard from the United Kingdom, for example, was to go slowly at the beginning because the committee, as it establishes itself and its work, needs to earn the trust of both the Canadian public and the institutions it is reviewing.

Notwithstanding that, we thought we would start aggressively, start ahead of everyone else in the Commonwealth, because we recognize, particularly with the dearth of action over the last decade, that there is an imperative nature to get these oversight mechanisms that had been ignored in place.

In the course of testimony, the committee did what it should do. It reviewed the material, heard from expert witnesses, and made a number of recommendations. The government was happy to get behind and support a number of those recommendations which are reflected in the bill that is before the House today. I will run through some of those quickly.

There is a whistle-blower clause requiring the committee to alert the appropriate minister and Attorney General if it uncovers something that may be illegal. There is a requirement that the annual report indicate where redactions have been made and why. The chair only votes to break ties; in other words, the chair does not have a double vote. It limits a minister's authority to determine that an examination would be injurious to national security and therefore outside the committee's mandate to ongoing operations, and requires the minister to alert the committee when the operation is no longer ongoing or when examining it would no longer pose a national security problem. Finally, it allows the committee access to information about ongoing defence intelligence activities in support of military operations, privileged information under the Investment Canada Act, and information collected by FINTRAC. That is all in the amendment to clause 14.

It can be seen that a great number of recommendations that were made by the committee were accepted by the government and are reflected in the bill. I think they are important improvements. They certainly go well beyond the standard that we see in any other Commonwealth country. I will come to an examination of those in a minute, but let us take a look quickly at some of the clauses that were rejected.

Reinserting in clause 14 giving information about human intelligence sources and witness protection was rejected, and I think for very sensible grounds. If somebody is in a witness protection program, as an example, we do not want to be sharing that name any more than is absolutely necessary. Even for the agencies that are sharing that information, not everybody in those agencies has access to it. We want to limit how much those names go out. That just makes prudent and good sense.

There is also restriction around information on ongoing law enforcement investigations. This is to avoid perceptions of political interference in an ongoing criminal investigation. This does not mean after the investigation that they cannot look into what has transpired to ensure that everything was as it should be, but when that matter is ongoing and current, certainly there is cause for concern around whether or not that would constitute interference and whether or not police would have to divert resources, to pull it off a case in order to work with the committee, so retrospectively instead of while it is ongoing.

Briefly I want to talk about some of the differences, because they are important, about Canada and some of our Commonwealth comparators. If we look at Britain, for example, in order to look beyond MI6, MI5, or GCHC, a memorandum of understanding is actually required between the committee and the Prime Minister. In Australia there is a limit strictly to statutory reviews of legislation and administration and expenses of particular agencies. It would actually be a parliamentary resolution or a ministerial referral to look at any other issue. It would require that level of depth, but that is not the case here. There are no such restrictions. There is the ability for the committee to look in every corner.

With respect to access to information, every single one of the Commonwealth partners, and I will not list them all but I can say the U.K., New Zealand, Australia and so forth, all put in restrictions around information sharing that deal with operational sensitivity and things that pose a threat to national security.

Much has been made of this, but the fact remains, obviously, that there needs to be the ability for the minister to protect national security when it is appropriate, and if there is a disagreement between the committee and the minister, then there is the ability for the committee to file a report of all the accumulated instances where they feel the government has not provided that information, and that could be aired publicly. Of course, that committee would have a very strong pulpit from which to speak.

The bottom line is that the bill is the beginning, an incredibly important first step on a journey ensuring we have appropriate oversight for our security intelligence framework. I look forward to this bill passing and for the work to come that we committed to in the platform.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the only good thing about time allocation is that the parliamentary secretary's speeches will be shorter.

Honestly, we are not against parliamentary oversight. However, that is not what Bill C-22 provides. In fact, the bill provides for oversight by the Prime Minister's Office, and we find that deplorable. That is not what the Liberals promised during the election campaign.

The Liberals promised that a committee accountable to Parliament would provide oversight, and not a committee supervised by the person appointed by the Prime Minister and the PMO.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague very much for his presentation.

I also thank my colleague, the hon. member for Parry Sound—Muskoka, the official opposition critic for public safety, for his outstanding work on this very important issue.

I was prepared to speak to Bill C-22 in a perfectly normal debate in keeping with the standard procedures of the House. Unfortunately, today, we have all once again witnessed, as we have on a number of occasions, the government's willingness to shorten debate so that all those who have things to say on Bill C-22 cannot do so.

This is surprising in the case of a bill sponsored by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. The minister has previously had a very different view of the contribution of parliamentarians here in the House, if we go by a short article from 2013 on the website of the minister, who was then a member of Parliament. I will quote two short excerpts in English; it will be easier.

The piece is entitled Ideas For Making Our Democracy Stronger, and the paragraph that caught my attention reads as follows:

Ministers wanting to advance policy initiatives should be required to convince not only cabinet colleagues, but also backbenchers. They should not simply rely on the Whip to enforce support–they should earn it by merit.

However, what we are seeing today is quite the opposite. Not only is the whip being used, but so is the Leader of the Government in the House to move Bill C-22 quickly through all stages in the House.

In the same piece, when the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness was a member of Parliament, he says:

Restrictions are needed on the use of ancient but recently-abused Parliamentary tools such as Omnibus Bills, Closure Motions to terminate debates, and Prorogation. They have their place, but should be confined to their original purpose and intent.

Once again, what we are seeing today is completely the opposite. Those are the very words of the minister who is sponsoring Bill C-22.

Bill C-22 was introduced in the House of Commons last June 16, in order to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. Let us recall that the establishment of a parliamentary oversight committee was a promise made by the Liberals. Clearly, it is important to make sure that our national security bodies are properly examined. We must absolutely ensure that this committee has the tools it needs to do its work.

However, we know that the Prime Minister has already appointed a member of his caucus, the member for Ottawa South, as chair of that committee, even though the legislation has not yet passed. A gag was used today. A committee chair was appointed. There is no legislation in place, but we already know the name of the chair of a committee that does not exist.

The government is breaking a well-established tradition of our parliamentary system by imposing a chair the way it did. Committee chairs have always been elected by the committees themselves, not imposed by the Prime Minister's Office. The Liberals promised Canadians during the election campaign that they would form a committee of parliamentarians on national security. They said, promised and repeated that this committee would be non-partisan. Bill C-22 does not create a committee of parliamentarians. It is not neutral nor is it non-partisan. It is controlled by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.

We have to realize that the Liberal government is much better at making speeches and symbolic gestures than it is at taking real action. However, in finest federal Liberal tradition, they promise one thing in a campaign and do the opposite once ensconced on the government benches. This is called being partisan. It reeks of partisanship.

Bill C-22 imposes many barriers on the committee's ability to access information or call witnesses. This, also, is unlike similar committees that operate effectively in allied countries, such as the United Kingdom. The official opposition presented motions to amend Bill C-22 to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security in December.

On the issue of a non-partisan committee, we would expect some of the opposition's recommendations to be accepted, but all of the official opposition's proposed amendments were rejected. We only wanted to ensure that the composition of the committee is not partisan and that its chair and its members are not appointed by the Prime Minister.

Clearly, as we now know, that recommendation was not accepted. The committee should be established by Parliament and be accountable to Parliament, not just to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety. However, the Liberal government is not listening.

We also wanted to remove the many blocking mechanisms in Bill C-22 that limit the committee's access to information and power to call witnesses. Once again, the Liberal government has said no. We wanted to ensure the committee's annual reporting process to Parliament will be more transparent. The Liberal government has decided otherwise. This is what sunny ways look like. This government is becoming a master in the art breaking promises.

The Liberals promised a modest deficit. If we were to give them a report card today, they would get a failing grade. The same goes for electoral reform. The Minister of Public Safety even talks about this in the fascinating piece I just read from. I quoted a few passages, but I will refrain from quoting it any further. I will have other opportunities to do so. The issue of electoral reform was a monumental failure, even though the Liberals spent hundreds of thousands of dollars consulting Canadians. They ignored the results of those consultations. They simply went ahead and did what they wanted anyway.

There is no denying that the Prime Minister's sunny ways have also failed when it comes to transparency and accountability. If I were a teacher, I would be forced to write “fail” in big red letters on this government's report card.

On September 30, 2016, which was not so long ago, the Liberal member for Willowdale stated the following in this House:

In keeping with our government's commitment to evidence-based decision-making, Bill C-22 notably aligns Canada's security regime with accepted international best practices. As colleagues before me have highlighted, Canada is currently the only member of the Five Eyes alliance lacking a security oversight committee that grants sitting legislators access to confidential national security information.

Many of my colleagues have demonstrated in the House that the government has failed to do this. It has not kept its promise to align this committee with the best practices of our allies, including Great Britain. Will the member for Willowdale vote against the wishes of the Prime Minister's Office and honour the promise he solemnly made to his own constituents?

On September 28, 2016, the member for Montarville, who is now on the back benches but was then parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Public Safety, said the following in the House:

The bill before us would establish a committee with nine members. Seven of the committee members would be drawn from the House of Commons, and of these seven, only four can be government members. Two members would be drawn from the other place. This committee will be different from other committees and offices established to review security and intelligence matters.

A little further on in his speech, which was probably prepared by officials from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and edited by the Prime Minister's Office, he added:

Robust powers are given to this committee, its members, and its secretariat. The committee will be able to access any information it needs to conduct its reviews, subject to some specific and reasonable limits.

The powers conferred upon the executive, meaning the ministers of the Liberal government, are huge. For instance, subclause 8(2) of the bill states:

If the appropriate Minister determines that a review would be injurious to national security, he or she must inform the Committee of his or her determination and the reasons for it.

In language that everyone can understand, that means that a minister can decide what the committee will study. I am not sure that that is what voters voted for on October 19, 2015.

In conclusion, I invite my Liberal colleagues and all members to assert their independence with respect to the Prime Minister's cabinet and his staff. They already did so in the not too distant past when voting on Bill S-201. I believe that the members opposite are capable of doing it again if they can muster the courage.

I invite them to vote against Bill C-22 and not to renege on the promise they made to their respective constituents in the last election campaign.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague talked a lot about democracy in his speech.

Sadly, however, the government invoked closure today, this time on Bill C-22, in order to prevent parliamentarians from expressing themselves and prevent each person here from saying what they want to say about this important bill concerning the safety of all Canadians.

What does my colleague think about this decision to muzzle hon. members with regard to Bill C-22, when he had so much to say about democracy in his speech?

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to once again rise in the House to discuss Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts.

We on this side of the House pride ourselves in avoiding easy absolutes and rejecting simple binaries and false dichotomies. The question before us today is not, as some would have us believe, whether we need to prioritize our security on the one hand, or our cherished values on the other hand. Rather, the question before us is quite simple: Is our national security regime working effectively and in a manner that is consistent with Canadian law and values?

Simultaneously balancing these twin objectives, keeping Canadians safe while also respecting and safeguarding our rights and freedoms, are among the most fundamental duties that a government can perform. However, currently that duty does not contain an element of committee oversight, a glaring weakness which puts Canada at odds with accepted international best practices. To that end, in this legislation, we are confident that we have developed a model for robust and comprehensive parliamentary reviews, one that will help build the trust of Canadians in our national security and intelligence activities.

The establishment of the national security and intelligence committee represents the realization of a key 2015 campaign promise. However, I want to stress that it is by no means the only action we are taking to strengthen Canada's national security framework.

First and foremost, we recognize that when it comes to an issue that is fundamental to who we are as a country, it is important that the will of Canadians is reflected as much as possible. As a result, our government has engaged in an unprecedented series of consultations with experts, stakeholders, parliamentarians of all parties, and individual Canadians on issues of national security and civil liberties. These consultations remain ongoing, and as such ensure that our approach to national security remains rooted in meaningful conversation and dialogue.

Second, our government remains committed to addressing the more problematic elements of Bill C-51, as introduced by the former government. Specifically, and largely as a result of the aforementioned public consultations, we remain committed to amending Bill C-51 so as to better protect the right to advocate and protest, and to better define rules regarding terrorist propaganda.

Third, the ever-evolving nature of security threats, as well as the clear need to remain vigilant in defending civil liberties, require that any national security framework not be set in stone. As such, our government has committed to mandating statutory review of national security legislation.

Fourth, our government remains committed to fighting violent extremism in all forms. The recent rise in domestic hate speech and hate crimes, for example, has served as a poignant reminder of the need for vigilance and community outreach to combat domestic violence. The goal here is to coordinate the efforts being undertaken at multiple levels to further enhance our capacity to prevent radicalization and violence, and ultimately make Canada a global leader in this field.

Bill C-22 fits within this pattern of strengthening and modernizing our national security laws and policies. As members have already heard, this bill would establish the national security and intelligence committee, a body comprised of parliamentarians from across parties, to scrutinize all of the national security and intelligence operations of the Government of Canada. Given that there are more than 20 departments and agencies within the Government of Canada that carry out national security-related functions, it cannot be overstated how important this initiative actually is.

The current system of security oversight, such as it currently exists, remains highly fragmented, with non-partisan review bodies, judicial oversight, and ministerial discretion all playing vital oversight roles. While these existing mechanisms will remain independent, untouched, and in place, the creation of a permanent committee will allow for a more comprehensive and reactive security oversight framework. As such, the committee's mandate will be necessarily wide ranging. It will look at not only the legislative, regulatory, administrative, and financial aspects of national security and intelligence, but also the operations and activities that departments and agencies of the federal government undertake in the name of national security.

To carry out this vital role, committee members would be given broad access to classified information with appropriate safeguards and exceptions, as well as leeway to examine matters they deem worthy of examination. Importantly, Bill C-22 would allow the committee to analyze and study laws, policies, and operations in real time, increasing the discipline, responsiveness, and accountability of our security framework. With the establishment of this committee, we would close what has amounted to an important accountability gap, one that has existed in Canada for far too long. It would also allow Canada to at long last count itself among its Five Eyes partners and other western countries that have long had parliamentary review of national security and intelligence activities. Clearly, this represents an extraordinary responsibility, and as a result would require checks and balances. I believe that the safeguards embedded in Bill C-22 strike this balance.

Furthermore, I believe that an already strong piece of legislation has been generally strengthened by the exemplary work done at the committee stage. It is important to reiterate that the government has accepted the vast majority of amendments put forward by the public safety committee. In particular, members will recall that the second reading version of the bill said that the new committee could not have access to information about ongoing defence intelligence activities, privileged information under the Investment Canada Act, and certain information collected by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada. The public safety committee, wisely in my opinion, recommended amendments giving the new committee access to this information. The bill is stronger as a result, and I would like to thank the committee members and expert witnesses for all their hard work.

I also believe that this legislation has been strengthened by the additional report stage amendments introduced by the government House leader. In particular, by further amending clause 14 of the bill, the government has reinstalled important safeguards designed to protect vulnerable intelligence sources and reduce the risk of political interference in security operations. Finally, the restoration of clause 16 of Bill C-22 would realign Canada's security framework with similar provisions in place among our Five Eyes allies.

Let me end my remarks by getting back to where I started. It is vital that this esteemed institution has a clearer view into the national security and intelligence functions of the federal government. By establishing the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, we would finally open that window, and we would do it responsibly. This initiative would serve Canadians and our democracy well. I therefore call on all members for their support tonight.

The House resumed consideration of Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, as reported (with amendment) from the committee, and of the motions in Group No. 1.

Report Stage

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, normally I would say that I am pleased to rise in the House to take part in the debate on Bill C-22, a bill that the NDP supported at second reading. However, under the circumstances, with the rejection of most of the changes that were made in committee, contrary to what the minister claims, and only one hour after the adoption of a time allocation motion, I am far from pleased to take part in the debate on this matter.

Bill C-22 is important, especially for the Liberals, considering it is central to the intellectual backflips they have been doing for three years now to justify their support for Bill C-51, passed in the last Parliament under the Stephen Harper government. The Liberal government has been in power for almost a year and a half now and we have barely completed this stage. It is worth mentioning, even if this is an issue for another debate on another day, that there is still no legislative measure on the table to right the wrongs created by Bill C-51 regarding rights and freedoms.

That said, this is still a very important matter. Since Bill C-51 was passed and, I would venture to say, even before, many commissions of inquiry have been formed after various incidents in connection with the work of national security agencies. There is one very clear finding: Canadians have lost a great deal of confidence in our national security agencies. This issue obviously affects our rights and freedoms, as well as our privacy, given the rapid advances in technology. However, this is also a matter of national security because, after all, if the public has no confidence in its agencies, it is difficult for them to do their work effectively and appropriately.

In principle, Bill C-22 is a good first step, and I can say that the minister is right about that. It is something that we should have had for a very long time. That said, very serious problems with the bill were raised in committee. A number of amendments would have gone a long way—even though they would not have made the bill perfect—to at least allowing parliamentarians to do their work better and to start off on the right foot.

We can see that, and we have often heard the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons come back to one point. They say that this is new for Canada, that other countries have had more time to learn, and that we have to give ourselves some time. We are already some way ahead compared to other countries, but there is a problem. For example, look at how the chair of the committee is elected. In Great Britain, the committee chair is not only elected, but he is also an opposition member. As justification for not electing the committee chair, we are told that, in Great Britain, the committee has existed for a number of years now and that they decided to make changes only after a certain period of learning and becoming used to it. Here, clearly, as we have just heard, the minister is relying on a legislative review that will take place in five years.

However, why not apply now what we learned from our allies? Why relearn the lessons of the past? I have a theory, without wanting to spread conspiracy theories. When this nice job, which comes with a salary on top of an MP's salary, is announced a year in advance, it is difficult for the Prime Minister to break his promise to the Liberal member who had the good fortune to secure this great position. Therefore, I would say that this is why we were not listening to the opposition amendments or the testimony of the chair of the British committee who offered this extremely important point for the credibility of the committee. All the technical issues on the form could be addressed, but credibility is also very important, to get back to the point I made at the outset, which is the public trust in our national security agencies.

It is not just me saying this. I want to come back to the column in The Globe and Mail, co-written by professors Wesley Wark, Kent Roach and Craig Forcese, professors the minister likes to quote to talk about the importance of this first step that has been completed. In speaking of the amendments passed in committee, they said:

Should the government choose to force a return to the restrictive original bill, it risks potentially undermining a new and historic Parliamentary ability that it has enthusiastically championed. Failure to reach agreement with Parliament

—not the Liberal caucus, but Parliament—

on this issue also imperils non-partisan support for future national-security reforms and changes to other elements of the review system for national security.

When we hear that and with the majority of the amendments having been thrown out and a time allocation motion having been thrown in to boot, it is difficult to see a path forward that would allow the committee to have that credibility and non-partisan environment it so desperately needs. The committee needs that not only to do its work, but also, as I said and it is worth repeating, in order to gain the public's trust so the public can begin trusting the work that is being done by the national security agencies. This is a key element and the government is clearly failing on that front.

I want to come back to the two examples I mentioned in the questions I have asked the government since the debate began this morning, specifically regarding the time allocation motion and the bill itself. The issue of ongoing investigations has often been raised. That is one of the restrictions we tried to lift through our amendments.

Indeed, the two most striking examples of investigations into human rights violations that are worthy of examination by a body such as the one this bill proposes are the Air India inquiry and the Afghan detainees investigation.

These are still open investigations, so technically, they are still ongoing. Under this bill, however, the committee of parliamentarians will not have the authority or the power to gather intelligence or conduct investigations. Thus, various pieces of information revealed in the media recently and many questions raised in the House for many years now could never have been raised. That is problematic, because it undermines the committee's mandate.

Once again, this brings us to the public's confidence in the committee and its work, and by extension, in the work of our national security agencies. That is the theme of my speech, as members will soon see.

When the government talks about some of the other issues that we raised in committee, it is important to note that for us, one point that has been clear is the restriction on access to information and the obvious solution is to limit it to cabinet confidence. With respect to everything else, we have to trust these parliamentarians, and the minister alluded to that issue. These parliamentarians will be sworn to secrecy and could potentially face jail time if any of this information is leaked.

The government's approach seems to be one of not trusting the parliamentarians who will sit on this committee and who will literally never be able to talk about any national security issues in the public space. When the government House leader or the Minister of Public Safety stand and tell us not to worry because the committee can use the bully pulpit if ever it feels it is unable to do its work behind closed doors, that is just not true. It is critical for Canadians to understand that.

Moreover, we talk about compromise and the importance of this being a non-partisan process. We hear the government say, “Well, the NDP proposed 13 amendments. The Liberals proposed 16. The Bloc proposed nine. The Green Party proposed two. We adopted two of those amendments so we are in the clear and everything is all right.” It is critical that the government look at the broader picture and the public trust.

I move, seconded by the member for Jonquière:

That Motion No. 3 be amended by deleting paragraph (a).

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Madam Speaker, as has been universally stated by expert observers, both in the parliamentary process and beyond the parliamentary process in the public media and elsewhere, Bill C-22 is a major step forward. Thanks to the amendments that are being accepted in dealing with some of the issues that were raised by hon. members in the last two questions, the bill is stronger now than when it began, and it will be a major innovation in our national security architecture.

I would point out that many of the experts we consulted, both here in Canada and around the world, said it was very important to ensure that the new committee would have the time and opportunity to earn the trust and confidence of the very agencies it would have to oversee and scrutinize, as well as the Canadian public. According to many of these expert advisers, it would therefore be prudent to start in a cautious manner, learn from experience, and then make the appropriate changes when we in Canada have gained that experience.

That is the reason there is a provision in the bill to require the legislation to be reviewed in five years. It is so that we will have the chance to learn from that experience and in five years will have the obligation to make the appropriate upgrades and updates to the legislation to keep it in the forefront of such legislation around the world.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Madam Speaker, the expert witnesses who either appeared before the committee or made comments in public made the very strong point that a piece of legislation like Bill C-22 is long overdue in the country and that it does represent a major step forward in improving the oversight, review, and scrutiny architecture within the Canadian national security and intelligence system. They made a number of recommendations for making the provision even better, and a number of those recommendations have been accepted by the government. They are being embodied in Bill C-22.

Bill C-22 was a major step forward before the amendments. The amendments have made it better, and the end result is that we have a more successful piece of legislation now, thanks to the representations of the expert witnesses and thanks to the hard work of the parliamentary committee. I thank both for their contributions.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to have this opportunity once again today to address the House on Bill C-22, legislation that will at long last establish a parliamentary body to scrutinize the work of all our national security and intelligence agencies. This is something that has been called for by parliamentarians, academics, other experts, commissions of inquiry, by the Auditor General, and many others, going back for more than a decade.

The committee that will be created by this bill is key to our efforts in ensuring that our national security framework keeps us safe while protecting our rights and freedoms.

When the initial version of this legislation was introduced last June, experts such as Professor Craig Forcese from the University of Ottawa noted that it would put in place “a stronger body than the UK and Australian equivalents”, and that it would be “a dramatic change for Canadian national security accountability”. Since then, the public safety standing committee of this House has studied the bill extensively and proposed a number of amendments. I thank the committee for its work and support many of its amendments to help ensure that the mandate, authorities, and access of the new national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians will be extensive, effective, and appropriate.

Let me pause here to note that the title of this new entity is quite a mouthful, so during my remarks today, to save time, I may well use the acronym NSICOP.

With respect to the amendments that have been proposed by members of Parliament, the government has agreed to add a whistle-blower clause in clause 31 of the bill, requiring the committee to inform the appropriate minister, as well as the attorney general, if it uncovers any activity that may not be in compliance with the law. We also agree on a change that would restrict the chair of the committee to voting only in the event of a tie rather than having the chair vote as a matter of course.

We agree on amendments that would deal with the NSICOP's annual reports. MPs on all sides of the House have concluded that the Prime Minister should have the authority to redact certain sections of those annual reports if necessary, to safeguard vital national security interests or solicitor-client privilege. However, it would be mandatory for these reports to indicate the extent of and the reason for any such redactions. This is a reasonable and responsible approach, and I thank committee members for putting it forward. In essence, it mirrors the practice in the United Kingdom.

We are also agreed on amendments to the section dealing with NSICOP's mandate. Accordingly, the authority of a minister to determine that an examination would be injurious to national security and therefore fall outside the mandate of the committee would apply only to ongoing operations. What is more, the minister would have to explain that determination to the committee, and would be bound to alert the committee as soon as the determination changes or as soon as the operation is no longer ongoing.

We are also supporting several big amendments to clause 14, which is the section that lists the type of information to which the NSICOP would not have access. We have removed from this exclusions list, information about ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations, privileged information under the Investment Canada Act, and information collected by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada. All of these areas would have been excluded from NSICOP under the initial version of the bill. Those three blanket exclusions are now gone.

As we can see, the legislative process on Bill C-22 has been unfolding in a constructive manner. The government put forward a bill, the bill was studied in committee, amendments were proposed, and the government, after careful reflection, has agreed to accept a majority of what the standing committee requested. However, in all fairness and candour, there are also certain points on which we disagree with the committee, which is why the government House leader introduced amendments at report stage on Bill C-22.

For one thing, the government sincerely believes that giving blanket access to information about the personal identity of human intelligence sources and people in witness protection, as well as ongoing police investigations, is wrong. It could put lives at risk.

Certainly I do not expect parliamentarians to be indiscreet with this kind of information, but the risk grows each time we widen the circle of those who know the identity of a protected witness or intelligence source. The NSICOP is certainly able to do its job of scrutinizing the work of security and intelligence agencies without personally identifying individual protected witnesses or sources.

With respect to ongoing police investigations, I have two primary concerns. One is the simple importance of avoiding the perception of political interference in criminal investigations, which could appear from having politicians oversee police work in real time. The other is the potentially harmful impact of requiring law enforcement to divert resources from operations on the ground in order to keep parliamentarians apprised of their work while that work is actually happening.

On this point, the CSIS director gave the standing committee the very good example of last year's police operation in Strathroy, Ontario, in which a possible terrorist attack was effectively thwarted. In that kind of fast-paced, resource-intensive situation, requiring resources to be assigned to send information to the committee of parliamentarians “would have been a distraction from the operation in progress” and could have constituted a public safety risk.

We are also proposing to reinsert clause 16, which allows a minister to determine that certain information, narrowly defined, should be withheld from NSICOP on security grounds. I would point out that this is entirely in keeping with the way that these kinds of committees work in other countries, in the U.K., New Zealand, and Australia specifically.

In the U.K., for example, a minister may prevent information from being shared with the committee on the grounds that it is too sensitive and should not be disclosed.

In New Zealand, a witness may decline to provide information on the grounds that it is sensitive and that disclosing it would not be in the national interest, and then it is up to the prime minister to overrule the witness and force disclosure. Incidentally, in New Zealand, it is the prime minister who chairs the committee.

In Australia, ministers can issue certificates preventing witnesses from giving evidence to prevent disclosure of “operationally sensitive information”.

Therefore, as members can see, clause 16, as we have proposed, is very consistent with the best practices of our allies. Their ability to share information with Canada could be jeopardized without clause 16.

However, in other ways the NSICOP to be created by Bill C-22 would go well beyond the scope that exists in other countries. The British committee requires a memorandum of understanding with the prime minister in order to examine anything beyond the work of three specific agencies: MI5, Ml6, and GCHQ. In Australia, the committee is limited to conducting statutory reviews of legislation and examining the administration and expenditures of particular agencies. A parliamentary resolution or ministerial referral is required for the Australian committee to even look at any other issues related to those agencies. The Canadian committee, by contrast, would be able to look at any activity carried out by any government department or agency that relates to national security and intelligence, and it would be able to follow the trail throughout the federal government. That is a far broader scope than exists in most other countries.

In other words, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians created by Bill C-22 would have more access and more teeth than its counterparts elsewhere in the world. That was true even before the amendments made by the House standing committee, most of which the government is accepting, and it is certainly more true with those amendments now in place.

Finally, with the passage of Bill C-22 we will fix an anomaly in our security architecture and have a form of parliamentary scrutiny that this country deserves.

[Dianne Lynn Watts, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

Madam Speaker, I appreciate the work that my colleague did on the committee.

There is oversight on some of the national security agencies. It has been in place for 20 years. It is not in the form as is proposed in Bill C-22. As we have heard, and as I said in my speech, this is a starting point, and that is all it is.

If the committee does not have the tools to do its job, it will not succeed, it will fail.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

Madam Speaker, I want to thank my hon. colleague for her comments this morning, as well as for her work on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. I had the honour of serving with her on that committee.

In the context of those deliberations on Bill C-22, I am proud of the work that the committee did to ensure there was a broad mandate for this committee of parliamentarians to investigate any matter of national security; to ensure there was robust access to disclosure, the absence of which would trigger the committee's opportunity to use the bully pulpit to hold the government to account; and to be sure there was an appropriate composition of this committee. There will be nine parliamentarians, which is an increase of nine from the number zero. Why do I say that? It is because for 10 years, on the subject of openness and transparency, the last government did nothing to significantly advance that matter. This government has taken concrete steps.

I wonder how the hon. member can reconcile this government's action with the absence of action from the last government.

[Dianne Lynn Watts, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise to speak to Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts.

As a member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, I had the privilege to closely examine the legislation over the course of eight meetings. I also want to note that the committee concurrently undertook a study on Canada's national security framework. Because a significant amount of the expert testimony we heard was so relevant and crossed over to both of those studies, the committee passed a motion to include all that was heard to be included in both studies and ultimately in both final reports.

This is significant. I want to highlight the amount of work and effort that was done to examine the legislation, to hear from numerous expert witnesses, and to ensure the House was best positioned to pass the best possible legislation.

We heard from witnesses who came before the committee in Ottawa and as well from Canadians across our country during our cross country tour. We heard from experts in the morning sessions and we heard from the general public in the evening through public hearings in Vancouver, Calgary, Montreal, Toronto, and Halifax.

We heard from academics, from experts working in the national security and intelligence fields, from Canada's Information and Privacy Commissioner, from Canada's national security agencies, from the existing oversight bodies, and from groups representing different religious and ethnic communities throughout Canada. The overwhelming testimony was conclusive.

Experts agreed that while Bill C-22 was a good start, it needed several amendments to make the proposed committee truly independent, accountable, and effective. Therefore, when it came time to propose amendments to the bill, most members of the committee listened to experts and attempted to ensure the independent national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would have the right tools to do what would be intended and what it would be required to do.

Several amendments were proposed from committee members of all parties: the Liberals, Conservatives, and the NDP. While not all amendments were agreed to, several were.

The committee amended the legislation significantly to ensure the proposed oversight committee had subpoena powers for documents and witnesses, would be able to access all necessary information, would not grant the minister discretionary veto powers, and would be able to clearly identify whether the Prime Minister had requested that a report be revised before submission to Parliament and, if so, why the Prime Minister had requested such revisions. We as the official opposition also attempted to ensure the proposed committee's composition would be non-partisan and that its chair and members would not be appointed by the Prime Minister. However, this amendment was rejected by the Liberals.

All these amendments were aimed at making Bill C-22 more effective, more accountable, and more transparent to Canadians. However, the Liberal government had decided to reject the majority of the amendments that were adopted by the committee, therefore gutting Bill C-22, which took it back to its original form.

The Liberals promised Canadians that national security oversight would be transparent and that it would be accountable. However, Bill C-22 in its current form proposes an oversight committee that has little review powers, that is not transparent, and is not accountable to Parliament. In short, the Liberals are proposing a committee that is an extension of the Prime Minister's Office.

The Prime Minister appointed the chair of the committee, the member for Ottawa South, in January 2016. This was a full six months before Bill C-22 was even tabled before Parliament.

It has now been over a year since his appointment, and we are still debating the legislation. Well, we were debating it until the time allocation today. This is a key example of the Liberal government's unwillingness to be open to any changes or to strengthen the level of transparency and accountability. In spite of what the Liberals may say in this House and to Canadians, the Liberal government has decided to ignore the changes made by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, a committee made up of a majority of Liberal MPs I might add, and proceed with a version of the bill that very closely resembles the original one.

The Prime Minister will still appoint the chair of the committee; the minister will still be able to decide what information the proposed committee receives and what it does not; and the committee will continue to have no powers to subpoena information or witnesses, even though this is a privilege currently enjoyed by other parliamentary committees. In short, the committee will continue to be controlled by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety. It will not be transparent, not be accountable, and it will not have the tools necessary to do its job.

Furthermore, the Liberal government does not want to discuss or have debate on this issue. Prior to my speech, the House voted on time allocation as put forward by the Liberals to shut down any and all debate on Bill C-22. This means that not only does the Prime Minister not want to have a national security oversight committee that is accountable to Canadians, that is transparent, and that is effective, but now he also wants to make sure that the House has as little time as possible to debate it. The Liberals are shutting down debate on this legislation because they decided over a year ago, when they appointed the chair, that they wanted this committee to be controlled by the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety.We need to ensure that an appropriate structure and review process of our national security agencies is in place, and we also need to make sure that it is accountable to Canadians.

The public safety committee, including the five Liberal members, made significant changes to Bill C-22. We heard from experts and the general public. We did our job. However, these amendments were not what the Liberal government wanted, because it had already predetermined the outcome of what it wanted in the bill. It is not listening to experts, and it is not listening to the public safety and national security committee. It is insulting the parliamentary process and Canadians by extension.

I urge my colleagues in this House to vote against the changes proposed by the Liberal government, which ignore expert testimony, ignore the committee, and gut the legislation. Independent oversight of Canada's national security agency is critical, and Canadians deserve better from the Liberal government.

[Dianne Lynn Watts, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

Madam Speaker, as we look at Bill C-22, does the member believe it is appropriate for the Prime Minister to appoint the chair of a committee a year in advance before the legislation is even tabled?

[David Graham, Liberal, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Madam Speaker, it is always a pleasure to take a question from the member for Winnipeg North. I agree with him completely.

It is very important to have a robust system. Bill C-22 offers a very robust system. There are immense challenges. Our intelligence agencies do very interesting things all over the world and somebody needs to oversee them, see what they are doing, ensure they make sense, are within the rules, and have the power to do that without putting any of the operations into jeopardy. What they are doing is a very good, and I am very much supporting this.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Madam Speaker, the New Democrats have moved forward a number of amendments. Concern has been expressed with regard to the idea behind Bill C-22 and the exemptions provided. Earlier today we heard the government House leader talk about the amendments that were accepted.

It is important to recognize that when it comes to the whole idea of exemptions, Canada's legislation is very robust. In fact, to compare us with other countries of the Five Eyes, I would bring New Zealand's act to the attention of members. It allows the government to inform the committee that certain documents or information cannot be disclosed, because in the opinion of the chief executive of the relevant intelligence and security agency such documents contain sensitive information. This is the difference between exemption in New Zealand, which has had a system in place for years now, compared to what we are putting in place for the first time.

Would my colleague not agree that the legislation before us today is one of the most robust pieces of legislation to ensure Canada has one of the best parliamentary oversight committees in the world?

The House resumed from March 10 consideration of Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, as reported (with amendment) from the committee, and of the motions in Group No. 1.

Bill C-22--Time Allocation Motion

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Waterloo, ON]

Madam Speaker, I appreciate that question because it is important to highlight the amendments that were accepted. The committee made substantial changes to improve the bill and I would agree that the committee's work did improve this legislation. During clause-by-clause study on Bill C-22, amendments were made, including some by the government.

The Liberals amended the bill to broaden the committee's mandate in clause 8 and this was further amended by the NDP. It was agreed to by all parties and accepted.

The chair's double vote was removed from clause 19, ensuring the chair would only cast a deciding vote in the event of a tie. The committee advanced that amendment and the government accepted it.

Clause 21 was amended so that if anything is redacted from the committee's report, the revised version must be clearly identified as revised and must indicate the extent of the revision. The amendment was accepted.

A whistle-blower clause that would require the committee to inform the appropriate minister of any activity to discover that may not be conducted in compliance with the law was proposed by the NDP and was accepted.

Clause 14 and clause 16 in the original bill included seven automatic exemptions. The committee removed all of them. The government has reinstated those that are needed to protect individual privacy and rights, so the witness protection program and human intelligence sources for the government directly related to the ongoing investigations carried out by law enforcement agencies. The committee removed and the government has agreed to remove ongoing defence activities, the Investment Canada Act, and FINTRAC.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Madam Speaker, with all due respect to the hon. government House leader, it is not that members over here cannot fathom things, but that we do not agree that we are working together when we are looking at legislation that still needs to be as robust as it can be and respect the role of parliamentarians on the committee.

For instance, parliamentarians on the committee would lose parliamentary privilege and are assumed somehow to be not trustworthy, yet the government has done nothing to create the same kind of restrictions for the other review agencies, such as SIRC, on which the previous prime minister put a known fraudster in charge. Arthur Porter had access to all state secrets. Under Bill C-22 as now drafted, senators and members of Parliament would have even more restrictive access than a civilian who is the head of SIRC. There are substantive issues of concern here.

I would quickly like to note a historical record. The hon. government House leader is absolutely right that the Conservatives used closure 100 times in the 41st Parliament. However, the problem here is that what they did, which was egregious, seems to have normalized a practice that should not be seen as normal at all. In the early part of the 20th century there was a 40-year period in which closure was used exactly seven times. I do appreciate that the Liberal government is using it less, but it should be using it far less so that we could go back not just to a bar set by what Harper did, but to a bar set by normal parliamentary practice when debates did not face so many time allocations.

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Waterloo, ON]

Madam Speaker, I have appreciated the opportunities to work with the member as well. The member has to understand that as a government, we have a responsibility to have meaningful debate as well as to advance legislation.

When it comes to the important work the committee did, the government has more than considered the recommendations. This government actually has advanced legislation that is different from what was introduced at committee, because we took the work of the committee very seriously. The committee had eight meetings and 41 witnesses. Within this place, we have had more than 17 hours of debate.

It is important to note that this was an election promise that we are delivering on. Witnesses at the public safety and national security committee were all pleased to see us moving forward with this committee of parliamentarians and made some suggestions to improve it.

The committee made some of these changes to improve the bill. We have accepted many of them. During clause by clause on Bill C-22, the following amendments were made and included by the government: the Liberal amendment to broaden the committee's mandate in section 8, further sub-amended by the NDP and agreed to by all parties; the removal of the chair's double-vote from clause 19, ensuring that the chair would only cast a deciding vote in the event of a tie; and a whistle-blower clause that would require the committee to inform the appropriate minister of any activity it discovered that was not conducted in compliance with the law, proposed by the NDP and accepted by the government.

When it comes to a commitment to work together, this government is being very reasonable. I believe we can continue working together, and I encourage the members opposite to really consider these amendments seriously.

Bill C-22—Notice of time allocation motion

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister of Small Business and Tourism]

Mr. Speaker, conversations are ongoing between the parties. Regrettably, I would like to advise that therefore, agreements could not yet be reached under the provisions of Standing Orders 78(1) or 78(2) with respect to the report stage and third reading stage of Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts.

Under the provisions of Standing Order 78(3), I give notice that a minister of the crown will propose at the next sitting a motion to allot a specific number of days or hours for the consideration and disposal of proceedings at those stages.

I really do hope that we will be able to come to an agreement.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[David Graham, Liberal, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to Bill C-22 as reported to the House of Commons by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

We have been discussing the need for such a committee of parliamentarians for more than a decade, so this is an idea whose time has come. We lost 10 years. In fact, Canada has some catching up to do with our closest allies.

We, along with Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have an intelligence-sharing arrangement that dates back to the early days of the Cold War. Our alliance is known as the “Five Eyes”.

Every other member of the “Five Eyes” alliance has a body of legislators with special access to classified information relating to national security and intelligence matters. Further, I submit that the broad scope of the Canadian committee’s mandate will make it an even stronger body than many equivalents elsewhere.

I would like to explain to the House how the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, as proposed in Bill C-22, will compare to frameworks that our allies have established to provide parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence activities.

I will limit my comparison to models in the other Westminster parliamentary tradition in the Five Eyes, namely Australia’s Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, or PJCIS, and the U.K. and New Zealand, which have each established an Intelligence and Security Committee, known respectively as ISC-UK and ISC-NZ.

There are several similarities between the proposed Canadian committee, called NSICOP, and the parliamentary review committees of those three countries.

The membership of these three committees ranges from 5 to 11 members, appointed by the Prime Minister in consultation with opposition parties. We currently have before us a motion from the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons to increase the size of the NSICOP under Bill C-22 from 9 to 11, which will allow for one additional member from each House of Parliament.

I support this amendment, as it provides the additional flexibility to ensure that the NSICOP’s membership reflects a diversity of views within Parliament. Canada’s NSICOP will be similar to our allies' committees in that committee members will be bound to secrecy.

The mandates of our allies’ committees include the authority to examine matters related to the administration, policy, legislation, and expenditures of national security departments and agencies, but they differ markedly in the examination of operations. I will come back to that shortly.

Each country imposes similar restrictions on the public reports of their committees to ensure that no classified information is is disclosed.

In the other Westminster systems, as in Canada, the work of the committee is supported by staff that is required to have the appropriate security clearances.

When it comes to access to classified information, the other Westminster democracies also define the scope of that power by legislation. Generally, there are limits on the power to access certain information.

For example, details about sources, methods, and operations, or whether the information was provided by a foreign government may not be disclosed to the committees.

Each of the Westminster countries authorizes the executive branch, namely the minister responsible for the department or agency under review, with powers to withhold sensitive information to ensure that the national interest and security are not harmed.

The standing committee has made some significant changes to this area of Bill C-22. In particular, it deleted almost all of the provisions in clauses 14 and 16 of the bill. This includes provisions that protect important types of information such as the identities of sources and persons in the witness protection program.

I am pleased to see that the government has carefully considered the spirit and intent of the standing committee's changes, and is suggesting a compromise approach. We have before us a motion by the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons to restore clause 16 and partially restore clause 14.

Under this approach, the national security intelligence committee of parliamentarians would be provided with access to as much information relevant to its mandate as possible, with restrictions applied only where necessary to prevent harm to individuals, ongoing police investigations, or national security.

I believe this is a responsible, balanced approach, and I urge all members to join me in supporting these amendments.

I have, until now, described similarities between what is proposed in Bill C-22 and what is already in place among our Five Eyes allies, but the proposed national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians will be different from parliamentary review elsewhere in some significant ways.

The differences among the Five Eyes allies relate to the scope of the committees’ mandates, that is to say, the extent to which each committee can examine various institutions involved in national security. The other three Westminster models limit the jurisdiction of their committee to the main national security agencies. The UK and New Zealand allow for additional agencies or programs to be added, but only if the government agrees.

Bill C-22 will give Canada’s committee of parliamentarians a broader mandate. Committee members will be able to examine any national security and intelligence activity conducted by the Government of Canada, regardless of which department or agency is conducting this activity. This will include the main security and intelligence agencies, that is to say, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, as well as the other 17 or so other federal organizations that have national security responsibilities, such as the Canadian Border Services Agency.

One of the amendments reported to us by the Standing Committee will make it clear that the committee of parliamentarians' mandate and access to information includes crown corporations. I support this amendment, which is entirely consistent with the committee’s government-wide mandate.

As mentioned earlier, when it comes to the mandate that the committees have over operations, the Five Eyes countries differ considerably in their approaches. The committees in Australia and New Zealand have no mandate to consider operational matters. In the U.K., the committee may review operations, but only if it meets certain conditions, namely, that the Prime Minister has agreed that it is not part of an ongoing operation and that the matter is of significant national interest.

The U.K. committee may only review an ongoing operation if the matter is referred by the British government. Under the bill before us, the Canadian committee would have a broader mandate to review national security and intelligence activities. It would, for example, be able to examine ongoing operations on its own initiative, with the proviso that the minister could stop a review for reasons of national security.

I am pleased to see that the standing committee has strengthened this aspect of the bill by clarifying that operational reviews may only be stopped for national security reasons during the period that the operation in question is ongoing, and that once the operation is complete the parliamentary committee may resume its review. Furthermore, the instances in which this authority is used will be part of the committee’s annual reporting to Parliament, ensuring government accountability in this area.

Another unique feature of this bill is the ability of the committee to engage with the three existing Canadian review bodies that are dedicated to reviewing particular agencies, that is to say, the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, the Security Intelligence Review Committee for CSIS, and the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment. This ensures that the committee’s work can be informed by the work of these highly focused and expert review bodies.

I have outlined the similarities and differences between what is included in Bill C-22 and how our allies among the Five Eyes implement similar oversight and review of security and intelligence matters. We have taken some of the best practices from our allies and gone further to establish a strong, accountable, and transparent review of Canada’s security and intelligence community’s activities.

This is truly a made-in-Canada approach to parliamentary review of security and intelligence. Our country may be late in creating a parliamentary review committee, but Canadians will now have a bold and forward-looking framework for this committee of parliamentarians. Establishing the committee underscores our commitment to be more open and transparent and keep our country safe.

I commend the government for engaging with the standing committee in a constructive and thoughtful manner to improve Bill C-22. I urge honourable members to join me in supporting the amendments proposed by the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and the passage of this important bill.

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his contribution to the debate.

Bill C-22 is meant to be a direct response to Bill C-51. In fact, when we were debating Bill C-51, my Liberal colleagues often brought up this issue. They said that we needed to ensure some kind of parliamentary oversight of Canada's intelligence organizations. However, they went ahead and supported Bill C-51 anyway, even though the Conservative bill included no such measures.

Why did the Liberals support that bill in the first place, and why did they trust the Conservatives or the next government to fix the part of the legislation that deals with parliamentary oversight?

[Adam Vaughan, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Families]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to be able to speak to this extraordinarily important piece of legislation. Before I reference parts of the bill, I would like to provide a bit of background as to where my perspective emanates from. I was a member of Toronto City Council on the Police Services Board, and in particular on the Police Services Board during the G20 summit when elected officials were presented with information that they could not share with their constituents, despite the fact that they were on the board precisely because they represented constituents. It was a very trying period to provide oversight to an important police body and an important security operation. They had no capacity to talk to those in charge of the operation because it was nestled in the Ontario Provincial Police at the time, not at the City of Toronto as many think it was. At the same time they could not relate back to their constituents the steps they were taking to protect their civil rights and make sure that their rights to political protest as well as access even to their homes were going to be guaranteed.

Therefore, civilian oversight is at the heart of any democracy and is at the heart of any responsible approach to public safety, let alone intelligence and security measures that we are now embarking upon, which when Parliament was conceived were not really perceived as being part of the responsibility of Parliament but rather the executive branch and others in society. As Parliament has evolved over the last few centuries, we have been evolving the practice of stronger and stronger civilian oversight, in particular around public accountability for the way in which our police and security agencies operate. We have also developed, expanded, and layered our security and our police bodies as we have taken on more and more complex matters. Society has changed and we have become more cognizant of the realities that we have to encounter. As a result, there is not a single police operation that Parliament oversees but rather close to 17, 18, or 19. We could even include border security now in that, which we need to explore as dynamics change in an ever-evolving world.

Into this mix, we have had over the last decade, even the last 20 years I would argue, significant powers invested into our security agencies. What has not kept pace is an oversight body that is as complex and as far reaching as those agencies now are. When the RCMP was originally looked at as a security force way back when, 100-plus years ago, there was no need to think of it as a spy agency dealing with foreign interventions coming into this country. It was a completely different colonial period of time when it was conceived.

CSIS flew straight out of the inadequacies both in the regulation and the oversight of the RCMP, when that was discovered in the 1970s. When CSIS was established, a whole new chapter of security agencies was brought to bear in terms of the way in which this country and this Parliament prosecuted public safety. However, the rules and regulations that were brought in for CSIS were not applied to other elements of the government. We get into electronic surveillance, intelligence sharing with our allies, and the complexities that technology has brought to this issue. It is clear that it is time for a revisit as to how we provide civilian oversight, as I said the corner of democracy, to make sure that we are protecting both people's public safety and their private safety as well as their civil liberties and society's civil liberties. That is the challenge that we are trying to address with the bill in front of us.

Over the last decade in particular, the powers invested in our security agencies have been strengthened, but the powers of oversight have not. What this Bill C-22 seeks to do is strengthen those oversights. One of the most important components of this bill is that the committee would be struck in a way that it would report directly to Parliament. I know the opposition has talked about it going through the executive branch because the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office, in particular, have the ability to screen it to make sure that the reports that have been tabled in public do not compromise public safety. That is a prudent measure, it is not a political measure. It is a measure that has been put in place in particular to keep sensitive information away from public eyes, not to stop the work of the committee or the advice that the committee would give Parliament as it relates to public safety. That is a critical distinction to make. All redactions and all screenings would have to be justified in writing both to the committee and to Parliament and would have to be understood as such, as being filters that do not preclude activity or preclude areas of examination but rather make sure that the reporting of those activities is done in the safest way possible to protect our public safety environment.

The other thing that is critically important here is there has been criticism that it would not be a parliamentary committee but rather a committee of parliamentarians. The language there might sound very familiar, just a set of words reordered, but a committee of parliamentarians means that it would include the Senate.

Again, I think this is a critical piece of evolution. It would allow us to sit down with both chambers, both of which have carriage of public safety in this country, to make sure that real information and sensitive information are delivered in real time to both bodies, so that both bodies can make quick decisions when quick decisions are needed. What we know from the ever-evolving situation globally and internally in this country is that quick decisions are part of what of what we have to accommodate as we move through accountability practices in this country.

The other issue which I think is critically important is that the government would not have a majority on this committee. Let that be said again. It would be a committee of parliamentarians where government would not have a majority. This means that the activities, the advice, the description, and the publication of what is being done is constituted by a majority of parliamentarians who are outside of government, let alone outside of the executive branch. In other words, if the belief of some members of Parliaments is that civil liberties or public safety in the areas of inquiry are being frustrated by the government, they would have the ability, as a majority committee, to make a committee report to that effect and bring public pressure. That is the best form of accountability to bring to bear on the activities of this committee.

The other thing which I think is critically important to understand, as well, is that currently there are silos in which the different security agencies operate, and with the accountability officers for those different security agencies, all 17 to 19, depending on one's view of the configuration of the list, that is not shared in real time. The information among those organizations is shared in real time, but the accountability is not conducted in a coordinated, overreaching, and overarching method. What this committee would achieve is to bring that together under one accountability model. It would measure the relationships between these two organizations, or several different organizations, and make sure that the information that is being shared, the practices that are being pursued, the behaviour of these agencies, are consistent across all of government as we move to protect both civil liberties and the public's right to public safety.

These issues allow us to broaden the access of parliamentarians to security, and sensitive information and sensitive operations. Instead of just being housed inside the executive branch now, it is housed inside the Parliament of Canada. That, again, is a critically important development. It is one that fulfills our mandate and our promise to the electorate that sent us here to make sure that we strengthen, broaden, and engage all of Parliament as we try to make sure that public safety in this country is done with the most accurate, up-to-date, and effective civilian oversight possible. That is a principle that this party will not step back on.

I would like to also reference a couple of other components of the bill which I think are critically important. The notion that this is somehow not fulfilling our mandate, I think is just wrong. In fact, if we listen to the experts who were critical of the previous government's approaches to public safety, what we hear is that they are in accordance with us.

Craig Forcese said, “this will be a stronger body than the UK and Australian equivalents. [It will be] a dramatic change for Canadian national security accountability. [It's] a good bill.” He gives it a high pass.

The criticism of Bill C-51 largely emanated from this individual, and now the support is coming from this individual. Clearly, we have moved the yardsticks.

I am going to leave members with one last thought. I think this is a critical thought, as well.

There is a notion somehow, and I certainly saw it in Bill C-51 when I was here in the previous term, that governments can land on public safety issues or civil rights issues perfectly, every time that they present legislation. That is a fallacy. In fact, I would say that is an arrogance.

Public safety and civil rights in particular are iterative processes. We move forward carefully. We move forward prudently. We expand rights. We protect rights simultaneously as best we can. However, we never get it right. Circumstances change. The behaviour of institutions changes. Individual officers within these organizations behave in particular ways.

It is a constant moving target that we are trying to deal with here, both the need to protect Canada's public safety and the need to protect charter rights. This process, as we establish this committee, I can guarantee members will evolve over time. It must evolve over time, because the circumstances we are dealing with are evolving over time. To do it in a way that is responsible is to do it in a way that is open and parliamentary and accountable to this body, and not to the executive branch.

That is exactly what this legislation would achieve. It would allow us to make significant steps forward at this time. I assure members that as long as I am sitting in this House, the conversation around good legislation, strong ideas, and intelligent criticism that emerges around how we balance the complexities of the security environment which we live in, how we make sure that civil liberties are protected as we protect public safety, needs to be sustained.

I take the ideas that frame that endeavour and that work of this Parliament very seriously. I think members have seen over the last couple of days that when strong ideas and intelligent criticism are presented on the floor of this Parliament, all parliamentarians have the ability to say, “That's a good idea. Let's support that, and let's move that into law and move that forward to protect Canadians or develop Canadians rights.”

That is what this bill would do. It is in the spirit of that kind of thinking, that kind of discipline around public safety and civil rights. That is the hallmark of the Liberal Party and this government. I am proud to support this bill because it continues that reputation.

[David Graham, Liberal, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the member for Carlton Trail—Eagle Creek for acknowledging that this is a Liberal platform commitment that we are indeed fulfilling.

As the member knows, coming out of committee, Bill C-22 firmly enshrines in the legislation that government MPs cannot form a majority on this committee. Also, this committee would have powers to report to Parliament, including on obstruction by a minister, which the majority of the committee, which does not need to include the support of a single government member, have decided is undue. The member describes this as somehow giving the power of the committee to the Prime Minister, and speaks of it as “laughable”.

The government caucus contains no senators. If a future Conservative government wants to continue to appoint partisan senators, that is something the Conservatives can take up with the electorate.

[Kelly Block, Conservative, Carlton Trail—Eagle Creek, SK]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join this debate on Bill C-22 , the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act.

I had the opportunity to comment on this legislation at second reading, and unfortunately, my concerns have not been addressed. As I noted earlier, this legislation prescribes a committee that would be a PMO working group rather than a parliamentary oversight committee.

Above all else, Parliament's role is to oversee the government and the executive. Unfortunately, Bill C-22 would make the reverse true. The government and the executive would oversee parliamentarians. The committee would report to the Prime Minister and not Parliament. The Prime Minister would have the power to censor the committee's reports. Parliamentarians on this committee would not be protected by parliamentary privilege as they undertake their work. This committee would not be able to provide parliamentary oversight of Canada's national security agencies, because it is not a committee of Parliament. It is not even close. Without support from more than the governing party, this committee would not have multi-partisan legitimacy and, therefore, have no discernible impact.

During the bill's review at committee, Conservative and NDP members presented amendments that would have made this committee of parliamentarians something that somewhat resembles a parliamentary committee by, amongst other things, giving the leader of each opposition party input into which opposition members sit on the committee. The response from the government side by voting against this amendment speaks volumes as to why this bill is meaningless.

I will quote the member for Eglinton—Lawrence:

...if this amendment were to be passed, the Prime Minister would no longer have full responsibility or accountability for recommending appointments to the committee. As this committee is an extension of the executive, which would report to the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister's Office, it would be contrary to the purpose of this bill.

The contention of the member for Eglinton—Lawrence is clear. The members of this committee would be chosen by the Prime Minister without consultation or input from the other party leaders. According to the member, giving someone other than the Prime Minister the right to nominate members to this committee would reduce the power of the executive, thus making it unacceptable to the government.

The purpose of this legislation is not to empower Parliament, but rather to empower the Prime Minister. The committee's membership is critical as the members would determine the committee's agenda, determine what witnesses they want to hear from and what questions should be asked. They would be reviewing the documents they request, and they would be writing the committee's reports. Additionally, and most importantly, the members would serve as a liaison between the committee and each caucus.

Nothing is more important to the success of a committee than its members and their ability to meaningfully participate in the committee's proceedings. The sum of their experiences and contributions to the committee's process would determine whether the committee is effective.

If the Prime Minister is unwilling to relinquish the responsibility of determining which members of Parliament sit on this committee, it is hard to consider this entire exercise of creating this committee as more than going through the motions to check off a box on his Liberal electoral platform.

Ms. Heather Sheehy from the Privy Council described what the committee would actually be:

This committee is a committee of parliamentarians, as distinct from a committee of Parliament. The subclause that limits parliamentary privilege is consistent with a committee of parliamentarians, as distinct from a committee of Parliament.

Quite frankly, a committee of parliamentarians can be just about anything. The Conservative Party caucus hockey team can be considered a committee of parliamentarians. It does not mean it is an oversight body for the agencies and departments that oversee the security of Canadians.

The committee being made up of parliamentarians is simply not enough. The parliamentarians sitting on that committee must be given more power than what is being provided for in this legislation in order to be effective. As has been stated, Canada does not need to further enshrine executive oversight over its national security agencies. The executive in Canada, cabinet, already has oversight responsibilities of Canada's security agencies. In Canada, the executive branch is the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office that supports it.

The Prime Minister does not need to have a new advisory group of parliamentarians to provide him with input on Canada's national security. The supposed problem as outlined by the Liberals that this legislation was intended to solve was that Parliament, and not the executive, did not have the tools required to properly oversee our security agencies. Alternatively, the executive already has the ability to summon any member of Canada's security agencies to ask questions and order changes to operations, if necessary. Parliament does not. Therefore, it makes no sense to create another committee that reports to the executive.

The Liberal platform was clear on what it intended to do, which is to “create an all-party committee to monitor and oversee the operations of every government department and agency with national security responsibilities”.

In order to fulfill this commitment, the leaders of the opposition parties should have the responsibility of naming their members to the committee, and Parliament must have the autonomy to oversee every government department and agency with national security responsibilities. If a committee is to be part of the decision-making process, then it should be allowed to impact policy. It should also be noted that when in opposition, the Liberals called for this very kind of parliamentary oversight. If, however, the PMO chooses to set up this committee purely for advisory purposes, then it will lose the true advantage of presenting a diversity of views to Canada's security agencies and the quality of advice that they receive will be compromised.

Furthermore, when it comes to changing Parliament's Standing Orders or the appointment of an officer of Parliament, the governing party typically goes to great lengths to ensure that it has the support of all parties. This is done to ensure that any change to the Standing Orders does not benefit the governing party or the opposition. It also ensures that each officer of Parliament begins work with the support of all parliamentarians behind them, thus giving them a real mandate for that work.

Unfortunately, the creation of this committee breaks all the rules that typically govern this place. This committee would not even have a mandatory quorum that is set by Parliament. It is almost laughable that the chair of the committee could be the only one present and be able to receive evidence.

As members of all parties would be serving on this committee, it only makes sense that a majority of members from all parties support its creation, its mandate, how it conducts its business, and how it would eventually report back to Parliament. Throughout the legislative process, all opposition parties have tried to make this committee more of an agent of Parliament, while the government has insisted that it must be an agent of the executive. Unfortunately, the government has voted down these practical amendments from the opposition.

In conclusion, I am disappointed by this legislation. I cannot shake the impression that this entire piece of legislation is simply a facade for the Prime Minister to say that he fulfilled a campaign commitment. If that is the case, he has failed to fulfill both the spirit and the letter of that very commitment. As long as this committee remains a working group of the Prime Minister, it will have no legitimacy or practical use.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast—Sea to Sky Country, BC]

Mr. Speaker, on the contrary, I was elected in October 2015. I was not part of the former deliberations or government. I can assure the member opposite and all members of the House that Bill C-51 caused a grave amount of concern with respect to excessive use of powers that really belong to members of Parliament and Canadians. I am very pleased to support Bill C-22 today.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast—Sea to Sky Country, BC]

Mr. Speaker, as the member knows, this whole process is much more than a campaign commitment. This process is about engaging parliamentarians and the country in order to address what was broadly perceived as excessive use of power under Bill C-51. Bill C-22 takes a significant step forward by providing that kind of oversight. Our country was in the minority really, one of the only countries in the G20 not to provide this kind of oversight. I believe we will see a much more robust, engaged assessment as we move forward, because it is intended to say that we are open and transparent about providing and balancing our freedoms with our security and safety.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Trade]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to address the House with respect to the second reading of Bill C-22 establishing the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

Bill C-22 is about rebuilding trust with Canadians. It is about providing assurance that our national security and intelligence communities' activities are being conducted responsibly. Parliamentarians can and should play a major role in reviewing these activities. To that effect, our government made a commitment to an approach that protects our rights and freedoms and provides for the security of Canadians.

For many, Bill C-51 was cause for grave concern. Today, as our consultation analysis and improved legislation comes forward, it is a pleasure to demonstrate that we are being proactive and fair in our commitment to protecting Canada's national security and Canadians' rights and freedoms.

Democracy and freedom should never be taken for granted. Upholding democracy and freedom requires constant vigilance. Bill C-22 is a significant step forward. It stands against excessive powers of the state, something that I and many in the House believe in strongly.

Bill C-22 would provide a well-designed and sensible framework for the government to share highly classified information with selected members of Parliament from various parties, as well as senators, so that national security and intelligence activities in Canada would be subject to their scrutiny.

It is my pleasure to continue debate on this important bill that would help to protect both Canada's national security and Canadians' rights and freedoms. The amendments proposed by the government would strengthen the bill. The bill and an amendment brought forward by the committee would enable the national security and intelligence committee to review any federal department or agency, and now, because of a recent amendment, any crown corporation that performs national security or intelligence activities. This could be the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment, the Canada Border Services Agency, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for example.

The national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would have a government-wide mandate that would set it apart from other oversight bodies established to review a specific agency, such as the Security Intelligence Review Committee, the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, or the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP.

To ensure transparency, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would provide an annual report of its findings and recommendations to Parliament. It would also issue special reports at any time it considered it necessary. Because these reports would be available to the public, they would need to be submitted to the prime minister before tabling to ensure that they did not contain any classified information. However, I wish to emphasize the fact that the prime minister would not have any power to change the committee's findings and recommendations.

Bill C-22 would also enable the committee to provide classified reports to ministers at its own discretion. To ensure transparency about its reviews, the committee would be required to include a summary of these special reports in its annual report.

While it is vital to involve more parliamentarians in examining how federal agencies carry out their national security responsibilities, there must be some boundaries to ensure that ministers remain fully responsible and accountable for the activity of their departments.

Every department and agency of the security and intelligence community reports to a minister. That minister is ultimately responsible for the conduct of these departments and agencies. The minister is accountable to Parliament, and Canadians, for ensuring that the organization under her or his charge carries out its duties to keep Canadians safe while respecting our fundamental rights and freedoms. A minister may need to stop a review of a security or intelligence operation or may have to withhold sensitive operational information if the minister believes the review or the disclosure of the information could be harmful to national security.

I believe that such checks and balances are appropriate when we consider, for example, that the integrity of an active operation could be at stake. This is the reason our government has put forward amendments relating to access to information. Under the amendments proposed, ministers would not be able to use their power arbitrarily when it came to disclosing or not disclosing the information. Any request to withhold information would have to be explained to the committee, and if the committee was not happy with a minister's decision, it could report back to Parliament. The committee would have a legitimate platform to challenge a minister in public, in Parliament, before all Canadians.

Thanks to Bill C-22, the committee of parliamentarians would be able to hold the government to account. It would play a key role in ensuring that ministers took the necessary actions to address problems and fix deficiencies. It is clear that the bill would give the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians significant powers. It would also back it up with the necessary support through the creation of a secretariat.

It is also very important to stress the fact that the proposed national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians' mandate and powers could only be changed through amendments to the legislation, that is to say, only through the will of Parliament. Nevertheless, the proposed legislation includes an obligation for a review of all of its provisions and operations after five years to make sure it is meeting its objective.

Bill C-22 demonstrates how the government is setting the bar higher when it comes to transparency and accountability concerning national security. Canadians can be confident that Parliament can and will hold the government to account.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts, or, as I call it, another piece of bad legislation to cover for a campaign promise the Liberals made without really thinking it through.

There are some points I want to address in discussing this bill, as I mentioned: using bad legislation to cover for bad campaign promises, the problem with creating legislation that relies on putting blind trust in the government, a redundancy of some of the legislation, and what stakeholders are saying about the bill.

We start with a campaign talking point that turned out to be a poorly phrased policy platform: how to reconcile the Prime Minister's support of Bill C-51 when he was a third party leader and his current compulsion to oppose everything the previous government did. My colleague from Parry Sound—Muskoka said it perfectly when he said, “the devil is not only in the details; the devil is in the fundamental misappropriation of the bill to promise something to the electorate and then not deliver.”

Today's legislation is just another in a string of poor attempts to cover up politically popular, but operationally difficult, campaign promises. This bill gives broad discretion over intelligence and national security discussions to the government, with “strong” oversight from the PMO, but not from Parliament. MPs are told to just trust the Liberals and they will figure it all out later. We know from their actions, though, they cannot be so easily trusted. They find ways to bend, break, and skirt the rules.

Therefore, we use the mechanisms within the House to hold the government to account and make sure that Canadians are aware of what the Liberal government is up to. Bill C-22 creates a committee with broad oversight, heavy Liberal influence, and public disclosure solely at the discretion of the PMO. It is a system designed to operate on blind trust in the government of the day, but we know that a strong and secure democratic system of government will ensure our security and liberty no matter who is in charge. Bill C-22, demanding that Canadians blindly trust the Liberals, does not accomplish this.

With their already lengthy track record of abuse of privileges, ethical lapses, and skirting responsibility for their mistakes, as well as their general contempt for the opposition when it opposes flawed legislation, I just cannot trust the government to act in the best interests of Canadians. Bill C-22 simply does not provide reasonable, meaningful mechanisms for parliamentary oversight.

Let us look at the track record of this bill. The special committee is appointed by, and reports to, the PMO. It should, instead, be appointed by, and report to, Parliament. The Prime Minister campaigned on a reduced role for the PMO, but his actions do not follow his words. Similarly, the Prime Minister, independent of any discussion with the other parties, appointed the committee chair in January before the legislation was even created. He refused to consult with the opposition parties, despite the public willingness of my party and the NDP to discuss this important committee. We were at the table, willing and ready to talk, but they stood us up.

The purpose of this committee is not to encourage and ensure transparency for the security agencies that are already as transparent as they can be while still protecting Canada and Canada's interests, rather it is a knee-jerk policy decision to shore up public support the Liberals lost when they voted in favour of Bill C-51 previously. Bill C-22 is a roundabout way for the Prime Minister's Office to direct the way our national security agencies function, effectively politicizing institutions that should always operate at arm's length from political sources. If the bill achieved some balance between oversight for parliamentarians and effective oversight for the committee while enhancing our national security, perhaps Conservatives could support it, but the bill, as it is, is purposeless.

Oversight agencies, including the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, the RCMP External Review Committee, National Defence and Canadian Forces ombudsman, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee are already mandated to provide oversight for each department or agency. This includes providing annual reports to Parliament.

Let us look at the membership process of the committee. Subclause 4(2) of the bill states:

The Committee is to consist of not more than two members who are members of the Senate and not more than seven members who are members of the House of Commons. Not more than four Committee members who are members of the House of Commons may be members of the government party.

There are two members of the Senate, seven members of this House, and not more than four government members, so we could easily be looking at four parliamentary secretaries from the government, notably members who are accountable first to their cabinet ministers, two so-called independent senators, and three members of the opposition.

I have heard government members state that they only get up to, but not necessarily, four members. Let us be honest here. No one expects the government to appoint a majority made up of opposition members and Conservative senators.

We have seen all too often that the Prime Minister and his office truly believe that their unilateral decisions are the best courses of action for Canadians. They dictate the issues of the day and the alleged solutions to those issues.

The government House leader has offered amendments so that subclause 4(2) would instead read: “The Committee is to consist of not more than three members who are members of the Senate and not more than eight members who are members of the House of Commons. Not more than five committee members who are members of the House of Commons may be members of the government party”.

Even with this, we could have five government members, three so-called independent senators, and three opposition members. We would still be faced with a Liberal majority on the committee that could unilaterally direct our intelligence and security agencies.

We always talk about how important it is to consult with the relevant stakeholders on legislation, so I will read what a couple of stakeholders are saying about Bill C-22. Here is a spoiler alert. It is not praise.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association said:

we are concerned by the government’s power to halt a Committee investigation, or refuse to provide information, when it is deemed “injurious to national security.” While we recognize that the utmost secrecy is sometimes required, this is particularly worrisome because these decisions are final, and are not subject to judicial review or any other dispute resolution process. Also concerning is the prime minister’s power to redact Committee reports (without any evidence that redactions were made), as well as the numerous categories of information the committee cannot access. Furthermore, it should be the Committee members themselves—not the prime minister—that chooses the Committee chair.

The Civil Liberties Association seems to broadly agree with our concerns, that Bill C-22 would leave most of the discretionary decisions and oversight resolution mechanisms to the Prime Minister.

I am really not sure how the government can genuinely argue that it is increasing oversight by increasing the discretionary power of the PMO to censor information that claims to be injurious to national security but may actually just be injurious to the Liberal government.

The government seems to hide things it does not like. Just two weeks ago, members of the House debated a motion calling on the government to release the finance department's redacted data on a federal carbon tax. The information was unfavourable to the government, so it refused to disclose the information and voted it down.

The government has muzzled more than 100 public servants for life on the purchase of the politically motivated, sole-sourced Super Hornet purchase. We have heard testimony in committee that the government did not even bother to make these muzzled public servants aware of their rights under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, but it sure went out of its way to muzzle them for life.

The Canadian Bar Association, which I understand might be versed on the impacts of laws, waded in on Bill C-22 by saying:

While we have made suggestions and expressed concerns about various aspects of the Bill, our concerns about section 16 of the Bill are greater by several orders of magnitude. That section would provide broad discretion for Ministers and departments to refuse to provide information on vague national security grounds and on the basis of the expansive definition of ‘special operational information’ in the Security of Information Act.

Just recently, in the government operations and estimates committee, we heard how the government is making extensive use of national security exemptions to skirt rules on the procurement of such items as jackets for Syrian refugees, under the guise of national security, yet we are supposed to trust that government ministers are not going to opt out of the disclosure regime under Bill C-22 when they see fit.

However, it is okay, just trust that the Liberal government will always act in everyone's best interest, and shame on us for again questioning its so-called commitment to act openly and honestly.

I do not like legislation that relies solely on trusting the government to act properly. We have seen too many examples of the government hiding from responsibility for political gain, and this legislation will only make that easier, without tangibly increasing Canada's national security oversight.

As such, I cannot in good conscience support the bill.

[Lloyd Longfield, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure today to rise in support of Bill C-22. This bill would create a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. First, I would like to thank the members of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for its hard work on this file, and for what I understand was a great discussion at committee level.

Our government is committed to protecting both the national security of Canadians as well as Canadians' rights and freedoms. By establishing the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, this government is fulfilling the promise that we made to Canadians in 2015. The role of the committee will be to ensure that the national security framework is working effectively to keep Canadians safe, and that the rights and freedoms of Canadians are also safeguarded.

It was 17 months ago that Canadians elected this government to produce real change in Canadian society. Bill C-22 is part of our plan to address the deficit of public trust between Canadians and the intelligence agencies that protect them. Restoring public trust will be no easy task. What it requires is a return to the basics of public service. We do not need to look hard to find these foundational principles. They are enshrined in our Constitution, now 150 years old. The phrase, “peace, order, and good government” has come to symbolize Canadian constitutional principles. These words hold truth today and are in fact fundamental to the mandate of this new committee.

Peace is a universally recognized Canadian value. This committee would have a hand in overseeing our military and intelligence agencies. Canadians have empowered their security agencies with the tools they need to keep Canada safe and to maintain public peace and security, yet there must be measures in place to ensure that these tools are not abused. This is why the committee will have a broad government-wide mandate, in fact, broader than other partners in the Five Eyes. This will allow the committee members to review any national security matter in all government departments and agencies, and, if security allows, present their findings to the House. Assuring citizens that their privacy is respected is a challenge that persists for democracies around the world. This next step would help to provide the transparency that Canadians overwhelmingly voted for in 2015.

“Order”, the second foundational virtue of our Constitution, is a crucial element to the bill. Every democracy struggles to strike the appropriate balance between collective security and individual liberty. MPs and senators on the committee will have access to classified information and a robust mandate to review and to complete the scope of our national security framework throughout the federal government. All of our Five Eyes allies have similar committees, and the broad scope of this committee's mandate will make it a stronger body, as I mentioned earlier.

Here too, the government has struck a reasonable balance between peace and order. MPs and senators on the committee will have access to classified information, as well as the mandate to review the complete scope of Canada's national security framework.

However, there are provisions in the bill that limit access to certain information, such as ongoing military operations, cabinet confidences, and information related to ongoing law enforcement investigations. This balance ensures the security of classified information and the operational effectiveness of the DND, CSIS, and the RCMP, while also providing MPs and senators with adequate oversight to properly protect our Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

“Good government” is the final value reflected in this phrase. It is best embodied when we here and those in the upper house collaborate for the good of our country. With government amendments, the committee will be comprised of up to 11 members, eight from the House of Commons and three from the Senate. Up to five members of Parliament will be from the governing party.

This bill is an essential part of our national security strategy, which includes specific measures outlined in our platform, as well as consultations, so that Canadians can have their say about what other measures are needed.

Restoring public trust in Canada's security institutions is of critical importance. This is by no means the only measure the government will take to rebuild the public's confidence. The hon. Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is currently reviewing Bill C-51, to make much-needed reforms.

There are many lessons that history has to teach. Perhaps the most important is the government's role in society. Government is an instrument for good, where people can come together and work toward common goals. As MPs, we cannot forget this simple truth. We are tasked with protecting the rights of the people we serve, as well as future generations. We must not become complacent and rely upon false comfort and assumptions. Constant vigilance by Canada's leaders to maintain these freedoms is included in the review recommendations of this bill.

This past summer, the former president of the United States, Mr. Obama, addressed this House and emphasized the truth of this. He quoted the late prime minister Pierre Trudeau when he said, “A country, after all, is not something you build as the pharaohs built the pyramids, and then leave standing to defy eternity. A country is something that is built every day”.

If we are to keep building Canada as a monument to the world, we must take these words to heart.

To conclude, I urge my fellow MPs to support Bill C-22. The bill is a thorough and comprehensive piece of legislation. It would equip MPs with the resources they need to responsibly exercise their due diligence. I urge my colleagues to support the bill as a common-sense move to promote government accountability.

I welcome any questions from my colleagues.

The House resumed consideration of Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, as reported (with amendment) from the committee, and of the motions in Group No. 1.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise to speak to report stage of Bill C-22 today. The NDP was supportive of this bill at second reading because we are supportive of the idea that we need stronger oversight when it comes to our national security and intelligence agencies. We were optimistic that if the bill were to proceed to committee, we could work out details at committee that would make that oversight body of parliamentarians an effective means of oversight.

Our optimism was rewarded at committee. There was some good work done there. There was collaboration across party lines, which is really important to underline because part of the point of this committee of parliamentarians is to have that kind of co-operation across party lines. When it comes to issues of national security it is important not to make them partisan issues. Therefore, up to this point, the committee model for the legislation was working well as a model for the committee of parliamentarians. The kind of inter-party co-operation we would hope to see on that committee, once established, was actually taking place at the committee level.

It was not just committee members pulling ideas out of a hat and all agreeing on it; there were experts who testified at the committee and made suggestions as to how to make it better in the sense of ensuring that it would be effective. We can establish a committee of parliamentarians who can meet in secret, but if the government is controlling all of the information the committee gets, and if it does not have the power to subpoena witnesses and get that information that it deems is necessary for adequate oversight, and if government is able to control the release of its findings, rather than leaving it to its good judgment, then it is a horse and pony show. It is not really about providing meaningful oversight for our national security agencies, it is more about government placating Canadians, and having something it can point to that says, “We did something that really makes no difference operationally speaking for those security and intelligence agencies.” The committee was doing that. It was not just New Democrats and the Conservatives calling for those changes at committee; the Liberals on the committee were calling for those changes also. In fact, they made those changes.

The committee heard from experts. The experts gave good advice on how to make this a meaningful oversight committee. Amendments were passed in order to effect those changes. Then, when it came back to the House, the government presented a number of amendments, which we are debating now, to vitiate the substance of a lot of those amendments. That was disappointing because it means that if these amendments pass, structurally the committee would not be the kind of effective oversight body that Canadians and the committee members were looking forward to, including the Liberals on the committee. It is a disappointment in that sense, but it is also a disappointment, and I think foreshadows a legitimate concern for us and for Canadians, that the government is not taking a sincere and authentic approach to having this committee provide independent oversight. Here we had inter-party co-operation and it did not produce what the government wanted. We have seen this before. We saw it at the Special Committee on Electoral Reform, where again we had a lot of fanfare from the government about how it was going to do something totally different. This was precedent-setting. It was agreeing to the NDP's idea for a committee. It was even going to see it have a majority on that committee. Then, when the committee came up with something it did not like or did not already agree with, it said, “Forget it. We're not really serious about that.”

The substance of the government's amendments to the all-party work that was done at committee in order to make this a better bill foreshadows that same attitude on the part of the government. If it has that attitude toward the committee that did the work to create an effective oversight body, then I think it is reasonable for Canadians to expect that this is the attitude it will have toward the work of the committee itself. I think it is fair for Canadians to say, “Why bother with an independent oversight committee”, when the government is essentially giving itself a clear path to control the information that the committee would see, in other words, to make sure that, if there are things that would impugn the government, that independent oversight committee would not see that information, because the committee itself would not have the power to compel testimony and to get information for itself.

If the government is going to control it at that level, and it already have a history of ignoring the advice of committees that it initially said were going to be a great thing and were going to come up with something and were going to be an example of inter-party collaboration, then I do not think Canadians have cause to be optimistic that this committee would produce the results that everyone was so hopeful for. That is too bad. It is shameful in fact, and frustrating, particularly from a government that said it was going to respect the role of committees.

In the context of Wednesday night's vote on the genetic discrimination bill, the government had better start getting wise. It talks a good game about respecting the role of committees and the independence of parliamentarians, but it has actually been very heavy-handed in the way it treats committees and in the way it treats its backbenchers, at least in name. Instead of listening to its backbenchers up front to develop better policy, and instead of listening to its Liberals on committee who vote for good changes, it says it is not going to do it that way.

If it had listened to it backbench on the genetic discrimination bill it would have avoided an embarrassment. Essentially, Liberal backbenchers said they did not trust the Prime Minister's judgment when it comes to constitutional issues, because the Prime Minister came out and said he did not think the changes to the law were constitutional. The Liberal backbench disagreed. That is fine. That is their right.

All I am saying is it would be a better government and more consistent with what the Prime Minister has said if it had just listened to its members up front and listened to committees up front. If it had listened to the committee, and instead of taking out the committee amendments had gone ahead with them, we would have the gold standard in independent parliamentary review of security and intelligence agencies. It is because of the Liberal backbench, with no thanks to the government, that we are going to have a decent law on genetic discrimination in Canada. That is a good thing. Why the government feels it cannot do that as a matter of course, I do not understand. Perhaps some Liberals will want to shed light on that later.

There is a problem with the substance of these amendments in terms of what they do to the committee and its capacity for independent oversight. There are clearly problems with the process in terms of the government's attitude toward the work of its own members on committee, as well as the opposition. There is no better reason to oppose something when it is wrong on the substance of the matter and it is wrong with respect to the process. If it did not get the process right and it did not get the substance right, it is beyond me why members of the House would see fit to support these amendments.

The committee, if it were established, would simply be the first step, because there are other questions that play out in a number of different ways about how we provide effective ongoing oversight of our security agencies. Presumably, we want a committee that is going to have the information it needs in order to provide advice to government on whether we should have a super agency, for instance, that would supervise all of our security and intelligence agencies, or the current model, where we have a number of review bodies that specialize in the specific tasks and roles of particular security agencies, whether CSIS, CSE, or the RCMP. However, we need to give the committee a better mandate to collaborate more effectively, to make sure there are not any pockets where security and intelligence work is being done where there is no oversight.

We need a committee of parliamentarians who can provide good advice on that. However, we are not going to get it if that committee does not have the independence it needs. Also, if it does not have independence with respect to the information it receives, it does not have real independence as an oversight committee. That is why this change to the committee's ability to subpoena witnesses, and with respect to the minister's right to make judgments about what information the committee would receive, is so important.

It is for all those reasons, reasons of substance and process, that I am not prepared to support these amendments. It is for those reasons that if the amendments pass I will not be prepared to support the bill going forward.

[Scott Simms, Liberal, Coast of Bays—Central—Notre Dame, NL]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate this opportunity to speak to Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act.

We have now had the benefits of a healthy debate as we have witnessed today and prior to this, of course, at second reading and at committee stage. I would like to thank the members of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for their helpful analysis and of course for their hard work.

As many have said today and prior to today, this legislation is long overdue. We have heard stakeholders call it “crucial” and affirm that it would establish a Canadian committee stronger than its international counterparts. It would fill a significant gap that has existed in Canada for far too long, and would enable us to achieve our twin objectives of making sure that our national security agencies are working effectively to keep Canadians safe and that Canadians' rights and freedoms are protected. As members know, Bill C-22 would create a committee of parliamentarians with extraordinary access to classified information so they can closely examine intelligence and security operations.

This new Canadian committee would have a broader mandate and greater access to information than many of its international counterparts. The bill before us would allow the committee to review legislation, policy, regulation, administration, and financing related to national security and intelligence along with any related activity a department undertakes. By comparison, in Australia the equivalent committee can only conduct statutory reviews of legislation and review the expenditure and administration of their agencies requiring ministerial referral to look at any of the additional issues. In the United Kingdom, the committee requires a memorandum of understanding with the prime minister to look at anything beyond the work of three specific British agencies.

Therefore, from the start, Bill C-22 would provide the committee with a wider-ranging scope than those of some of our major international allies with similar Westminster-style systems. That was the case when the bill was first introduced, and the public safety committee has made amendments intended to move the Canadian version even further beyond the authorities and access that exist among our allies. I certainly applaud that objective and I agree with some of the amendments brought forward. Others, however, are problematic and I will explain which of the committee's amendments I would like to preserve and why.

As is the case with other similar national security committees in parliaments around the world, one of the key concerns is how to ensure that the committee has access to the information it needs to do its job, while ensuring that security is not compromised by the release of especially sensitive information. That is why the original bill listed certain types of information that would be exempt from the committee's purview and give ministers the authority to determine that certain information could not be divulged to the committee for national security reasons.

I support changes made by committee members that would expand the mandates of the new national security committee, notably by requiring ministers to give reasons for withholding information on national security grounds and to notify the committee when those grounds no longer apply. I also support the change that would only allow the chair of the committee a vote in the case of a tie. I support the requirement that public versions of committee reports must clearly indicate the extent and reasons for any redactions. I support the new whistle-blower clause added by the NDP. I also support changes to clause 14, which would give the committee access to information about ongoing defence intelligence activities in support of military operations, privileged information under the Investment Canada Act, and information collected by FINTRAC, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada.

There are, however, certain exemptions to the information the committee would have access to that I would like to see added back into the bill. These concern information about people in the witness protection program, the identities of confidential sources, as well as information directly related to ongoing police investigations.

In the first two cases, there is the potential for individuals to be placed in serious danger if their identities become known, and there is no reason that the committee would need to know who exactly these people are in order to properly scrutinize any intelligence activities. As concerns ongoing police investigations, it is important to guard against even the perception of political interference in active investigations and prosecutions. Once an investigation is no longer active, the committee would certainly review it retrospectively.

I would also like to see clause 16 reintroduced. This part authorizes a minister to prevent a disclosure of special operating information as defined by the Security of Information Act when it could be injurious to national security. In such cases, the minister would have to give reasons in writing, and the fact that this discretion was used would be public. This is comparable to the way equivalent committees operate in the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand.

Indeed, our proposed approach to access the information follows the best practices established in other allied countries. In both Australia and the U.K., for example, a minister may prevent the disclosure of operationally sensitive information to the committee if it is deemed that disclosure would not be in the interests of national security. Nevertheless, the Canadian committee would have expansive access to information and the powers necessary to ensure that our security framework is strong and effective, and that Canadians' rights and freedoms are well protected.

The committee would be well resourced and supported to do its job as a fully independent body setting its own agenda. This would strengthen democratic accountability. It would ensure that national security and intelligence activities are being carried out in an effective way that respects the values we cherish as Canadians.

It would indeed set a higher bar for accountability to Parliament than many of our international allies. It would fulfill an important promise that we made to Canadians during the campaign.

I urge all members to support this legislation, Bill C-22, and some of the amendments.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Vancouver Quadra, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I agree with the first part of the NDP member's question. We want an oversight committee that is as effective as possible. That is what Bill C-22 promises and I am proud of that.

I am also very pleased that we have a government that accepts amendments proposed by opposition party members. We are making history because for 10 years, hon. members were unable to contribute to improving government bills. Now, committees operate in such a way that members of all parties can contribute to creating a more effective framework. That is what the committee did and the government accepted several proposed amendments.

[Ruth Ellen Brosseau, NDP, Berthier—Maskinongé, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for her speech.

In 2014, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, and nine other ministers voted for Bill C-622, a bill that would have established an oversight committee with unfettered access and subpoena powers.

Is the member disappointed? Why is the government trying to take tools away from the committee that Bill C-22 would establish?

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join this debate on Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. It is a bill that would at long last enable Canadian parliamentarians to scrutinize our national security framework and our national security agencies, as our Five Eyes partners have been doing for years.

The creation of this committee would be part of achieving the dual objectives of keeping Canadians safe while safeguarding our rights and freedoms. It would also stand us in great stead among our international partners. In fact, the new Canadian committee would raise the bar for national security accountability worldwide.

I will touch on a bit of the history behind Bill C-22.

For many years, a great many Canadians, including me as an MP, have called for the creation of such a committee. The government of Paul Martin put forward a proposal that, unfortunately, died on the order paper.

Issues pertaining to the need for better oversight of national security organizations were discussed in 2008 in Justice Frank Iacobucci's Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin, and in 2006 in Justice Dennis O'Connor's Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar.

While the Conservatives were in power, both the private member's bill, Bill C-551, from the member for Malpeque, and my own private member's bill, Bill C-622, were tabled, as was a bill with bipartisan support in the Senate, all of which would have seen this committee created years ago.

My bill, Bill C-622, which called for the creation of a parliamentary committee of oversight, built on the two previous bills and also included an additional set of measures to increase the transparency and accountability of the Communications Security Establishment. It would have put metadata under the law and created a framework of accountability for acquiring, storing, or sharing information inadvertently or advertently collected. However, the timing of my bill was very interesting, because the final discussion and vote took place one week after the attack on Parliament, which had been preceded by two deadly attacks on Canadian soldiers. At that time, there was a great deal of concern about the security of Canadians, due to radicalization and potential terrorism.

In the remarks following the attack on Parliament, it was remarkable that all party leaders confirmed their commitment to protect the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of Canadians, even as security measures were to be analyzed and strengthened. Indeed, Canadians expect these fundamental aspects of their very democracy being guarded to be respected. That kind of attention to security measures and privacy is the underlying intention of Bill C-22.

At the time, in 2014, I invited members of all parties to support sending my bill to committee for further examination and to signal the authenticity of their commitment to protecting privacy at the same time as strengthening security in Canada. Unfortunately, instead, the previous prime minister instructed his Conservative members to vote against Bill C-622, even though all members of the Liberal Party and all other parties in the House, including one brave Conservative member, voted for it. The bill failed. It was not passed.

However, I am now happy to see the government following through on the spirit of Bill C-22. I was proud to campaign on the promise of delivering stronger national security oversight by parliamentarians, and Bill C-22 delivers on that promise.

It is regrettable that it has taken so long, but we can be proud as the members of Parliament who will, I am confident, finally bring this essential parliamentary body into being. After all, as the federal and provincial privacy commissioners stated in the fall 2014 communiqué, “Canadians both expect and are entitled to equal protection for their privacy and access rights and for their security. We must uphold these fundamental rights that lie at the heart of Canada’s democracy.”

I followed with interest as the members of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security studied this piece of legislation, proposed and debated amendments, and amended the bill, frequently with the support of several parties.

I want to emphasize what a pleasant change this is from working under the previous government, whose members viewed government bills as sacrosanct.

That was especially the case with laws concerning security measures. As we know, Bill C-51 followed shortly after the tragedies of the attacks on soldiers and on Parliament and was pushed through, essentially with no amendments, despite the deep concerns of Canadians.

I feel that many of the committee's amendments improve the bill and the new committee it will establish.

For example, the committee amended clause 8 to expand the scope of the committee's mandate. When it comes to examining activities carried out by national security or intelligence agencies, the power of a minister to determine that the examination would be injurious to national security would now be time limited to the period during which the activity was actually happening. Once it was no longer ongoing, the minister would be required to inform the committee and the committee could then undertake its examination. I support this change.

I also support the amendment that gives the committee chair a vote only in the case of a tie as well as the NDP's addition of a clause requiring the committee to inform the appropriate minister of the discovery of any activity that may not be in compliance with the law.

I also support some of the changes to the exemptions that were in clause 14 initially, the information to which committee members were not entitled.

I agree with the public safety committee that the new committee of parliamentarians should be able to receive information about ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations. I support that it should have access to information considered privileged under the Investment Canada Act and that it should have access to information collected by FINTRAC, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada.

There were certain changes made by the committee that were not accepted by the government, for a variety of reasons. For example, there is the amendment currently before the House to reintroduce clause 16, which would allow a minister to prevent the release of information that constitutes special operating information under the Security of Information Act, when disclosing it could be injurious to national security. This kind of authority exists in the case of other equivalent committees in similar parliamentary systems around the world. Moreover, Bill C-22 would still require the minister to give written reasons for preventing the release of information, and Parliament would be informed of each occasion on which this authority was used.

This legislation is a major leap forward for Canadian national security accountability. The new committee of parliamentarians would not only provide Canadians with the assurance that their elected representatives, the MPs in Parliament, were on watch to strengthen the protection of their essential civil rights but would also help identify opportunities to improve on current mechanisms for defending their security. In fact, effective protection of individual privacy and effective delivery of national security measures are not a balance, a dichotomy, or a trade-off. They are complementary, and both are necessary.

The United States Department of Homeland Security, for example, considers safeguarding civil rights and liberties to be critical to its work to protect its nation from the many threats it faces. This third-largest department of the U.S. government now explicitly embeds and enforces privacy protections and transparency in all the department's systems, programs, and activities.

In 2014, deputy secretary Mayorkas confirmed in a Department of Homeland Security speech that not only is this an integral part of the DHS mission and crucial to maintaining the public's trust but it has resulted in Homeland Security becoming a stronger and more effective department.

The original version of Bill C-22, as presented by the government at first reading, was already lauded by experts, and it has only become stronger with the amendments accepted from the public safety committee. Crucially, the bill requires that the act be reviewed by Parliament five years after coming into force, so all of the discussions we are having here in Parliament can be reviewed and the bill can be changed as appropriate.

I am proud to have contributed to the conversation leading to Bill C-22. I am pleased that our government has taken this essential step forward in protecting fundamental Canadian security and freedoms. Ultimately, the bill before us today would make Canadians safer and help ensure that our rights and freedoms are better protected. It has been a long time coming. I invite all hon. members to join me in making it happen.

The House resumed from March 8 consideration of Bill C-22, an Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, as reported (with amendment) from the committee, and of the motions in Group No. 1.

Business of the House

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister of Small Business and Tourism]

Mr. Speaker, this afternoon we will continue with the debate on the Conservative opposition motion.

After today, we will have one remaining opposition day in this supply cycle. That debate will take place on Tuesday, March 21.

Tomorrow we will continue with the report stage debate on Bill C-22 concerning the national security intelligence committee of parliamentarians. That debate will continue on Monday after colleagues return from the constituency week.

I should also mention that a take-note debate on Operation Unifier will take place on Monday evening.

Wednesday we will commence consideration at second reading of Bill C-17, an act to amend the Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic Assessment Act and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, until 4 p.m., at which time the Minister of Finance will make his budget presentation.

Thursday shall be the first of four days of budget debate, also referred to as leaders' day.

Motions in amendment

[John Nater, Conservative, Perth—Wellington, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to rise in the House today to debate this important issue.

Listening to the debate thus far today in the House and hearing the parliamentary secretary talk about the amendments that his government is bringing in at report stage and the amendments that it rejected at committee made me think of one of the great orators that the House has ever heard, the Right Hon. Arthur Meighen, one of this country's prime ministers, a relatively short-lived prime minister but a prime minister nonetheless, who was actually from my home area of Perth County.

Arthur Meighen once gave a speech and his words are valuable to the debate we have at hand. He was speaking of Edmund Burke, one of the great British thinkers, when he said:

...a ministry must yield to Parliament and not contrive that Parliament be new-modelled until it is fitted to their purposes. If the authority of Parliament...is to be upheld as long as it coincides in opinion with His Majesty's advisers, but to be set at nought the moment it differs from them, then the House of Commons will shrink into a mere appendage of administration and entirely lose its independent and effective character.

I get the impression from the structure and the makeup of this committee that is exactly what the government is trying to do.

Throughout the history of our great parliamentary democracies, the supremacy of Parliament has been well established. As a nation-state, there is no question our country owes a duty of care to the security and safety of our citizens.

Parliament has a duty to ensure that our laws are properly in place and that they protect our citizens. We must also be sure that we do not overstep the boundaries that are set out for us, which is why we are not entirely opposed as such to the creation of a parliamentary oversight committee, one that may be similar to that of the United Kingdom. The challenge though is that the government of this day has refused to listen to the important input of not only the committee but of members from this side of the House and from members down the way in the NDP as well. The government has refused to take the advice of our former public safety critic, the member for Durham, and the member for Victoria, both of whom have brought important contributions to this debate, but nonetheless, the government has refused to go about amending this bill and creating this bill in a way that would truly protect the rights of our citizens.

One specific element of the bill that I find troubling is subclause 4(3), which reads:

The committee is not a committee of either House of Parliament or of both Houses.

As such, the committee is called the security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. It would be a misnomer to call it a parliamentary committee because it is not and the government has structured it as such, very deliberately, I would say.

I would suggest it has been done so to exempt the committee from some of the normal practices that parliamentary committees of the House operate under. The government in effect, I would argue, is creating the committee to be a branch of the executive branch rather than the legislative branch of Parliament, and the government has failed to truly justify this approach.

Upon further examining the details of Bill C-22 it becomes clear the Liberal cabinet is not looking to enhance parliamentary oversight but rather to expand its own power. In fact, clause 21 of the bill gives the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister alone, in consultation with the Prime Minister's appointed chair, the ability to revise sections of these reports. In other words, it would give the Prime Minister the opportunity to force a redaction of the reports before they are tabled in Parliament. This allows the Prime Minister to decide what Parliament can and cannot see. So much for a parliamentary committee.

I would remind the Liberal government of the words of one of our former Speakers who, on April 27, 2010, said, and I quote from the Speaker's ruling on that date:

The insinuation that Members of Parliament cannot be trusted with the very information that they may well require to act on behalf of Canadians runs contrary to the inherent trust that Canadians have placed in their elected officials and which Members require to act in their various parliamentary capacities.

In fact, it was members on that side, members of the now Liberal government, who argued vehemently at that time for the release of sensitive information. Now they have constructed a committee which would, in effect, give the Prime Minister, in consultation with his own appointed chair, the ability to redact and keep information from this chamber.

A committee of parliamentarians, or what should be a parliamentary committee, should be the master of its own domain. It should, in effect, be able to decide how to act within its own jurisdiction.

I am also concerned that Bill C-22 authorizes cabinet to not disclose certain information to the committee. According to the rules established by clause 15 of the bill, the committee does not receive information directly from the departments. The committee must instead submit a request to a minister.

Clause 15(3) states:

After the appropriate minister receives the request, he or she must provide or cause to be provided to the Committee, in a timely manner, the requested information to which it is entitled to have access.

The expression “in a timely manner” is difficult to interpret. The ministers can put off complying with the request. My experience with how ministers can delay responding to committees' requests indicates that this clause is highly problematic. The bill should establish strict deadlines for the departments' response.

What concerns me the most is the fact that after stating that it wants to strengthen the role of Parliament by enhancing the independence of committees, cabinet chose the chair of the committee. We learned from the media that the member for Ottawa South will chair the committee.

I have no particular opinion on the performance of the member for Ottawa South as a parliamentarian. I am certain he is an exceptionally adequate parliamentarian and representative of his riding, but the fact is that this chair was appointed by the Prime Minister. He was not elected by fellow committee members, who, in fact, have not even been appointed yet and may not be appointed for several months to come, but the Prime Minister has already appointed his preferred choice as chair of the committee, likely a year and a half before the committee is fully established.

I would remind the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness that they ran on a platform of being open, accountable, and transparent, but they appointed a member with really no particular experience in the field of public safety or national security organizations to provide oversight of Canada's covert security and intelligence activities. The Prime Minister chose such a member to serve as chair. Why? Could it perhaps be that the member for Ottawa South has a particular skill set, particular experience, in one very precise area, and that is being a long-time Liberal? He comes from one of the most famous Liberal families in Ontario.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, before I get under way, I will comment on the last statement from my colleague across the way. Regarding New Zealand where the prime minister sits on the committee, is that something the Conservatives would want to see happen here on our parliamentary oversight committee?

It is important that we recognize that there has been a great deal of work on this. Let me start off my speech, though, by recognizing International Women's Day today, to applaud everyone who is participating in it, and to give a special call-out to my daughter, who is the youngest member of the Manitoba legislature. Her dad is very proud of all the wonderful work that she does.

I wanted to be able to put this thing into perspective. Let us put it into perspective in regard to a couple of points. One is that the Conservatives were out of touch with Canadians prior to the last election and today they demonstrated that they are still out of touch with Canadians. I say that because we know within the Liberal caucus that when the Conservatives introduced Bill C-51 there was a fundamental piece that was missing. We knew that. We understood that. We knew that because we were working and connecting with Canadians, listening to what Canadians actually had to say.

I understand that the prime minister at the time, Stephen Harper, had a bias. His bias was possibly that he did not trust; I do not know. All we know is that at the end of the day he did not want to have a parliamentary oversight committee and have parliamentarians take responsibility in terms of being able to ensure things such as rights and freedoms of Canadians were in fact being protected. We disagreed back then and I stood up across the way on many occasions and talked about how important it was that the government actually bring in parliamentary oversight. I believe the record will show that we pushed that consistently. The Prime Minister, during the last federal election, in addressing the issue of Bill C-51, made a commitment to Canadians, because we were listening, that if we were to form government we would bring in parliamentary oversight.

The concept is not new. As has been pointed out, there are other countries. Canada is part of a group of nations called the Five Eyes dealing with security and national security issues. We were the only country that did not have a parliamentary oversight committee. This Prime Minister recognized that, and even though our first priority was to deliver on that middle class tax cut and for those who are aspiring to be a part of Canada's middle class and the many other nice things that came out of the budget, I can say we did not lose sight of the parliamentary oversight committee. We recognized that this too was important to Canadians. We are a party that brought in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and we stand by that on all occasions.

I started by saying that the Conservatives were out of touch with Canadians, and we saw that in terms of not incorporating it into Bill C-51. I was amazed when the critic for the Conservatives said they accepted the results of the last federal election. If the Conservatives really did accept the results of the last federal election, they would be supporting this bill. However, we heard today that the Conservatives will not be supporting the bill. What did they base their arguments on? They said that we could have improved it here, we should have improved it there.

Let me read some of the things that were said at the committee stage, and this is Bill C-22 as it was in the committee room.

Noted academic Professor Wesley Wark credited the “government for seeing the importance of parliamentary scrutiny of security and intelligence and for making [the committee of parliamentarians] a centrepiece of its response to the previous government's anti-terrorism legislation”. He also told the standing committee that the new committee of parliamentarians “represents a necessary and timely experiment in parliamentary democracy and activism”. He is not alone. There are others. I made reference to Ronald Atkey, a former SIRC chair and former parliamentarian. He stated that the proposed review body “represents a major and welcome change” in Canada. He explained that he meant “welcome” in the sense that, in his view, “Canada in the last three decades [has fallen] behind our parliamentary cousins in the United Kingdom and Australia in terms of accountability to Parliament”.

He also noted, in the standing committee, that Bill C-22 will help to reassure Canadians that their elected representatives will play a key overview role in accountability regarding the serious powers granted to some of the 17 federal departments and agencies that contribute to Canadian national security measures.

The good news is that this is a commitment that was given by the Liberals when we were going through that last election, and that commitment is being materialized in a very tangible way.

Members, who are New Democrats, Conservatives, or even the Green Party, are saying that they did not listen to the committee and that the Prime Minister said we would be changing attitudes in the standing committee.

I was here for a good number of those years when Stephen Harper was the prime minister, and I participated in some of those committees. The opposition never gained anything.

If we look at this particular piece of legislation, amendments were brought forward, and even with these amendments that we have brought forward today, that are still in place. Let us take a look at it in terms of some of those things.

We have had a lot of discussion this afternoon about the exemptions. When the legislation was here, before it went to committee, that is during the same time in which we had professional experts saying how good the legislation was, the committee wanted some more exemptions. There were four exemptions that the government wants to keep, and we are doing that through the amendments.

At the committee stage, the exemptions were reduced down to one. We are putting three of them back in. In my books that means it is better legislation, because we actually accepted some of those exemptions that came from the standing committee. That means the government was listening to what the standing committee was saying. That is another promise that has been kept by this Prime Minister. When the committees and standing committees do good work and put in the effort, we recognize that.

What are the things that we are actually putting in? One of the things that we are putting back in that the committee took out, for example, was information described in the Witness Protection Program Act. I am not a security expert. I am not going to try to convince members that I am security expert. However, I do know that the witness protection program is an essential program here in Canada. We need to go all out in terms of protecting those individuals in that program.

I do not believe it is irresponsible of the government to bring that clause back in, because we need to protect the names of those individuals. Those individuals' lives are at risk. I believe that is a positive measure. This legislation is better today than when it was in second reading in part because of some of the work that was done in the standing committee.

The NDP members in particular are saying that we have too many exemptions. Let me talk about something that has come out in the New Zealand act, and maybe New Democrat members could respond to it. New Zealand is part of the Five Eyes. Its act allows the government to inform the committee that those documents or that information cannot be disclosed because, in the opinion of the chief executive or the relevant intelligence and security agents, those documents or that information is sensitive.

I would argue our legislation is far more effective at getting the badly needed information to our committee members. New Zealand is not alone. What about the U.K.? What is their exemption clause? Let us look at it. It says: inform the intelligence and security committee that the information cannot be disclosed because the secretary of state has decided it should not be disclosed.

I would argue that this is Canada's first, and this is somewhat historic. We have a great piece of legislation here. This is good news for Canadians. It is protecting rights and freedoms. We have gone further, in many ways, than other jurisdictions.

As opposed to trying to come up with excuses as to why members might not want to support it, I would suggest that members should get on board, listen to what Canadians are saying, and vote in favour of Bill C-22.

[Ted Falk, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the hon. member for Victoria, my friend, for that question. It was a great honour and privilege to work with him the last year and a half on the public safety committee. I have a great deal of respect for his opinion and his insight into security matters and issues, although we did not always agree. One good example would have been Bill C-51. My NDP friend from Victoria did not agree Bill C-51 was a good balance between security and freedom. Of course, I think Bill C-51 struck a very good balance.

The government has the opportunity today to build on the good work that we did as Conservatives through Bill C-51, which provides assurance to Canadians that we will keep them safe and gives our law and security agencies the right tools to keep them safe. The government had the opportunity to build on that through Bill C-22 and through the committee establishing oversight of our security agencies. Contrary to what the Liberal member said before, the proposed committee is actually disproportionately represented by Liberal members. It is appointed by the Prime Minister. The prime minister would have full oversight of the committee, even through the access to information the committee has by the prime minister having control over the ministers. No, I do not think this is a good balance.

The Liberals keep comparing the bill to what our Five Eyes partner nations have struck, and many of them have experience with this. Instead of gaining from that valuable experience our partners have in establishing their oversight review committees, the Liberals have decided to go it alone and say it is their first opportunity, their first kick at the can, that they will come up with this and review it. That is absolutely not acceptable. When we have methods that are proven with our partner nations, we should be looking at those structures and taking seriously what they have done and what works.

[Ted Falk, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act.

I want to thank my colleagues in this place who have already taken the opportunity to contribute to this important conversation. I have appreciated hearing all of the different perspectives they have raised.

The Conservative Party has always made the safety and security of Canadians a top priority. Our previous Conservative government understood that our ultimate responsibility was to protect Canadians from those who would do us and our families harm.

Providing law enforcement and national security agencies the necessary tools to prevent and detect national security threats ensures Canadians would be protected from the threats that are, unfortunately, today's reality. At the same time, it was paramount that we stood up for the Canadian values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law. This was and is the right thing to do as parliamentarians, to consider this delicate balance between freedom and security, and this is still our view in opposition today.

We cannot be so naive as to pretend that there are no credible threats against Canada today. There are real concerns that we must pay attention to, and to do that we have to create effective national security policies. It is critical that we treat public safety and the security threats that our country faces with clear, sober minds.

While I hate to say it, we live in a world that necessitates our constant watchfulness and vigilance. Unfortunately, Canada has been targeted by those who hate us, and who hate our most cherished values, values like freedom and democracy. They want us to feel unsafe in our own homes.

Indeed, we have seen in recent history examples of threats posed by these individuals on Canadian soil in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, here on Parliament Hill, and also in Strathroy, Ontario. Canada is clearly not immune to security threats, and it is critical that we take steps to counter threats at home and abroad. Horrendous attacks in Europe and the United States have shown that no country is immune to security risks.

Government has a large role to play when it comes to protecting Canadians, and the safety of our citizens is too important to be politicized. I know the member for Durham wrote the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in advance of the introduction of this bill to indicate that the Conservative Party was willing to work with the government to make this truly an effective and functional committee. The goal on this side of the House was to work collaboratively with all parties in the House to ensure that Bill C-22 is a sound piece of legislation. That is why I am extremely disappointed to learn that none of the meaningful amendments proposed by the Conservatives were adopted.

While this legislation provides a necessary framework for parliamentary oversight of our national security apparatus, it is far from perfect. Bill C-22 ignores some of the key areas where success has been so clearly pronounced in the U.K.'s experience. There are some serious holes in the legislation that have been pointed out in debate and at committee. Unfortunately, these were not addressed in the form of meaningful amendments during the committee process.

One of the issues with this bill is that it positions the Prime Minister to have ultimate control over the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. Subsections 5(1) and 6(1) of the bill would effectively give the Prime Minister full control over the direction of the committee. The Prime Minister would choose the committee members and the committee chair. It is designed to be an arm of the Liberal government rather than a non-partisan committee that can function based on the facts. This legislation would go forward to create a committee that acts according to the wishes of its political masters. The Prime Minister should not have full control over this committee. This committee was intended to be independent and non-partisan, and to provide oversight, as the committee should. The Prime Minister already has control over all of our security agencies through his ministers. The way this bill is designed, he would also have control over this committee as well.

It was unfortunate that months before this bill was even introduced, the Prime Minister had already selected and appointed a chair for the committee. In addition, to the Prime Minister already designating a chair, he would be paying him an additional $42,000-a-year for the privilege. The bill has not even received royal assent yet. Who does that? Who pays someone for a job that does not even exist? The Liberal government does.

A more congenial approach would have been to let a candidate or candidates stand before this House, or even just before the members of the committee to seek their consent on who should lead the committee. Again, this shows that there was no intention to collaborate with the opposition parties in any meaningful way.

The Liberal platform talked a good game about increasing accountability, strengthening the role of committee chairs, which included a commitment to their election by secret ballot, but when the rubber meets the road, we see that the Liberals' words are hollow. The best structure for this committee would be one in which it is appointed by and reports to Parliament.

It is clear, after the study of the bill, that the Liberals wish to continue the facade of collaboration and co-operation while they continue to pull the strings behind the scenes. This cuts at the heart of what I believe is the intent behind the bill, creating an oversight mechanism that would be independent of partisanship. We should expect nothing less from a committee which would, in effect, ensure the security and safety of the security and intelligence community. I believe as it stands, the safety of our security intelligence personnel is jeopardized by the partisan nature of this committee.

I also must raise concerns regarding the effectiveness of this committee going forward. Bill C-22 would provide for numerous exceptions and permits government agencies and ministries to opt-out of providing information for the NSICOP review. The committee cannot access information about ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations, information related to ongoing law enforcement investigations that may lead to prosecutions, and other notable exceptions that would really limit this committee's ability to do its job.

Section 16 would allow ministers to simply refuse to share information with the committee. The Prime Minister would control who is on the committee, who chairs the committee, and as if that was not enough, his ministers would decide what the committee is able to see. Control by the Prime Minister's Office is woven throughout this entire bill. This is unfortunate because this legislation could have truly been an effective tool for Parliament and be supreme in the equation rather than the Prime Minister.

An effective committee, like that of our U.K. allies, is supposed to have a cabinet-like level of secrecy where there is a reasonable, free flow of information to all of its members. Unfortunately, this committee has been left with no teeth, weakening oversight, and preventing the committee's mandate from being fulfilled.

For these reasons, I will not be voting for Bill C-22 in its present form.

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his intervention in the debate. In light of what we heard from the government side, I was wondering whether the hon. member thinks this is nothing more than a smokescreen or a charade. The government claims it is keeping an election promise, but it is creating a committee that could not be weaker or less independent from the government.

Although the government promised a committee of parliamentarians, this is just a half measure. This is just an attempt to keep an election promise to the extent possible. However, it seems like the government is not really interested in moving in this direction and truly creating an independent committee that can do its work properly, given the amendments the government proposed today in order to revert to the first version of Bill C-22, which was too weak in the opposition's view.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we promised Canadians that we would establish an all-party national oversight committee. Bill C-22 shows Canadians that important commitment has been kept.

As a reminder to the House, a committee of parliamentarians able to review classified security and intelligence documents has been a long time in coming. A special joint House/Senate committee was struck in mid-2004 to provide recommendations on how such a committee would function in a Canadian context. That report was followed by the tabling of Bill C-81 in 2005. That bill died on the Order Paper during the dissolution of the 38th Parliament.

Over the course of the next decade, two private members' bills were tabled that sought to create a committee of parliamentarians to review national security and intelligence matters, the second of which was defeated by the previous government at second reading shortly before it introduced Bill C-51.

As a member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, I heard witnesses tell us that the formation of an all-party national oversight committee had been anticipated for a long time. Let me read some of their testimony.

Wesley Wark said:

I fully support Bill C-22. I think it represents a necessary and timely experiment in parliamentary democracy and activism. I give full credit to the Liberal government for seeing the importance of parliamentary scrutiny of security and intelligence and for making this a centrepiece of its response to the previous government's anti-terrorism legislation, Bill C-51, and for making it a promise in their election platform.

Suzanne Legault, the Information Commissioner of Canada, said:

First, I wish to commend the government on tabling legislation to create a parliamentary oversight body of our national security agencies. The recommendation to create such an oversight committee dates back many years. The Committee could, with a properly designed legal framework, do much to increase public trust in our national security agencies

The Hon. Ron Atkey said, “I believe this represents a major and welcome change within our Canadian parliamentary system.”

Alex Neve, Secretary General of Amnesty International Canada said that finally after the Arar inquiry and Justice O'Connor recommendations, we had Bill C-22, which was very welcomed.

Special advocate Anil Kapoor said of Bill C-22, “This piece of legislation is crucial to public trust in our security intelligence apparatus.”

One of the most important obligations of a government is the responsibility to protect the safety and security of its citizens both at home and abroad. Equally important, in a country such as Canada, is the obligation to uphold the Constitution and to ensure that all laws respect the rights and freedoms we enjoy as people living in a free and democratic society.

These two obligations do not necessarily have to compete with each other. It does not have to be a question of security or rights and freedoms.

Bill C-22, and the future national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, will help to ensure that we achieve that balance. The committee will have a mandate to both confirm that our security and intelligence agencies have the resources and powers they need, as well as to ensure that those agencies do not exceed their authorities and respect the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

While supportive of the creation of an all-party national oversight committee, witnesses did share with our committee ways that we could make the legislation better. I am glad that we were able to reflect a number of these suggestions in our amendments.

Also, while the Conservatives were adamantly opposed to the creation of such a committee during their time in government, I am glad to see that during their time in opposition, they are much more supportive of the concept.

In fact, during clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-22 at the standing committee, many amendments received multi-party support. For instance, Liberals amended the bill to broaden the committee's mandate in clause 8. This was further subamended by the NDP and agreed to by all sides. The chair's double vote was removed from clause 19, ensuring that the chair would only cast a deciding vote in the event of a tie.

Clause 21 was also amended so that if something was redacted from one of the committee's reports, the revised version must be clearly identified as a revised version and it must indicate the extent of and the revision.

The NDP proposed a whistleblower clause that would require the committee to inform the appropriate minister of any activity it discovered that may not have been conducted in compliance with the law.

All of these are now a part of Bill C-22.

I will now turn to some of the report stage amendments, which are the focus of the debate before us today. The government has moved a motion to reintroduce some of the automatic exemptions that were originally in clause 14.

The original bill contained seven such exemptions, including: one, confidence of the Queen's Privy Council; two, information respecting ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations; three, information, the disclosure of which is described in section 11(1) of the Witness Protection Program Act; four, the identity of individuals who are human intelligence sources for the government; five, information relating directly to an ongoing investigation carried out by a law enforcement agency; six, information that is considered privileged under the Investment Canada Act; and seven, certain information that was collected by FINTRAC and not reported to another department. This usually occurs when FINTRAC determines that the transaction has no flags.

One of today's report stage amendments put forward proposed to put three of those back into the bill.

Information relating to specific individuals protected under the witness protection program and the identities of confidential sources are not required for the committee to perform its mandate. The mandatory exceptions relating to this information are designed to avoid risks to the safety of individuals that may result from inadvertent disclosure.

The mandatory exception relating to active police investigations is also being reinserted. This exemption is designed to ensure that criminal investigations and prosecutions are not tainted by even the perceived influence of political actors.

This is a very important division of powers that has a very long tradition in Canada. The exemption is time limited to the period when the investigation is active, thus allowing the committee to review the information once the investigation is concluded.

The other three exemptions would not be reinserted by the amendment. This represents a responsible compromise that takes into account the spirit and intent of the standing committee's changes. It would allow the committee to be provided with access to as much information relevant to its mandate as possible, with restrictions applied only where necessary to prevent harm to individuals or police investigations. The amendment should be supported.

A second report stage amendment would see the reintroduction of clause 16, which provides a minister the discretionary authority to prevent the release of information that constitutes special operating information, as defined by the security of information act, when it could be injurious to national security. When a minister declines to provide such information, he must notify the committee as well as the relevant review body and provide reasons for not disclosing the information. The committee of parliamentarians annual report would also inform Parliament of all the times this discretionary power was used.

This is very comparable to how countries, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, operate in terms of providing information to their respective committees of parliamentarians. For instance, Australia's parliamentary joint committee on intelligence and security cannot compel the government to provide operationally sensitive information, including intelligence sources and operational methods of information about particular operations. The government can also withhold anything it deems injurious to national security or foreign relations.

In New Zealand, the prime minister actually sits on the security and intelligence committee, which has existed since 1996. The New Zealand act allows the heads of agencies to determine sensitive information that cannot be disclosed to the committee.

In the United Kingdom, the intelligence and security committee may consider any particular operational matter, but only so far as it and the prime minister are satisfied that the matter is not part of an ongoing intelligence or security operation and is of significant national interest.

In many respects, the future Canadian version of the committee would have far greater access to information than the equivalent committees of our Five Eyes allies from Commonwealth countries.

It is important to note that after five years of working experience, the House of Commons would have the opportunity to review the legislation and amend it at that time if we believed it were then necessary.

It will be a tremendous step forward for Canada, one that will help to ensure that while our security and intelligence agencies are working to protect the safety and security of Canadians, they are fully respecting the rights and freedoms of the Canadians they serve.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, more expert witnesses have given a great deal of credit to the government for Bill C-22.

Let me quote another witness, Ronald Atkey, a former SIRC chair and former parliamentarian. He stated that the proposed review body “represents a major and welcome change” in Canada. He explained that he meant welcomed in the sense that, in his view, in the last three decades, Canada had fallen behind our parliamentary cousins in the United Kingdom and Australia with respect to accountability to Parliament.

Also, he told the standing committee that Bill C-22 “will help to ensure Canadians that their elected representatives will play a key overview role in accountability” regarding the serious “powers granted to some 17 departments and agencies” that contributed to Canadian national security measures.

Will the member not recognize that this is a significant step forward? It was a commitment given by this government in the last election, and it is being maintained by having the legislation go through the House at this time.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I supported Bill C-22 at second reading because the NDP is firmly committed to finally bringing effective and transparent oversight to our security and intelligence services. I recognized the flaws in the government's first draft, but I had faith that the parties could smooth its rough edges with the help of expert advice at the public safety committee. That faith was rewarded. All parties came together around evidence-based amendments. The bill that emerged from that committee is stronger, now has the endorsement of most experts, and could earn the support of all parties and the trust of Canadians.

That is why it is so very disappointing to see these last-minute proposals. They would roll back the progress made by all parties at committee and, in the words of four leading academic experts, “undermin[e] a new and historic Parliamentary ability”. I am firmly opposed to these proposals. We simply cannot reverse the progress made at committee and reject the evidence that guided it. With each passing day, the government's intransigence looks less like prudence and more like the reflexive rejection of contrary evidence that, sadly, became a hallmark of our last government.

Let me say a word first to the women and men of our security intelligence community, who no doubt are following this debate and wondering how it will affect the critically important work they do for us every day. As a former legal counsel to the Security Intelligence Review Committee, I know that to be effective, we need the trust of Canadians. To support the work, we need an authoritative, security-cleared committee of parliamentarians to bridge the gap between Canadians and their security services. Only when such a committee exists and speaks with authority can we give Canadians not just assurances but proof that their security and their civil liberties are protected.

The first thing we need to set straight about Bill C-22 is the idea that experts support the government's new design. This week, the public safety minister answered my criticism of these regressive amendments with a single brief quotation from a piece that Professor Craig Forcese wrote a year ago entitled “Knee Jerk First Reaction”. What has he said since? In November, Professor Forcese testified at the public safety committee as follows: “I would strongly urge...full access to information”. He warned that anything less would “give the appearance of accountability without the substance”. Calling for three key parts of the bill to be radically amended, he said, “These are all means to deny access to the committee.” He also said, “It is this triple lock on parliamentary reviews that I feel could well make the committee of parliamentarians stumble.”

What did the other experts say at the committee? The Information Commissioner of Canada rejected cabinet's ability to shut down investigations, saying it turned the committee's mandate into “a mirage”. Craig Forcese, Professor Kent Roach, and Ron Atkey, the founding chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, the Information Commissioner of Canada, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Canadian Bar Association, and Parliament's own Interim Committee of Parliamentarians on National Security all recommended lifting restrictions on access to information and giving this committee full access. After all, people get 14 years in jail if they break a secret and leak information. After all, being cleared top secret is not good enough, apparently, for the government. The public safety committee implemented this expert recommendation, but now the government seeks to reverse it.

With that expert testimony in mind, let us consider the government's new proposals. First, the government wants to remove the oversight committee's power to subpoena witnesses and documents. I would remind Canadians that this is a power that is enjoyed by every single statutory standing committee of Parliament, every one of them. It would be truly bizarre if our public safety committee could compel a witness to give testimony on the theory of subpoena powers, but this new top secret cleared committee could not wield the same power to fulfill the national security mandate.

The government's second proposal is to allow cabinet ministers to withhold information from the oversight committee. It is interesting that these two features, full access to information and the power to call witnesses, were proposed in a Liberal bill in 2014, Bill C-622. At that time, the current Prime Minister, the current public safety minister, and nine other members of today's Liberal cabinet voted for exactly what they now oppose.

Third, the government wants to add a senator and another government MP to the committee so that the votes of the government MPs will always outnumber those of non-government MPs.

The government's fourth proposal is to stop the committee from receiving information about all active law enforcement investigations all of the time. As Professor Forcese testified, the 1985 Air India bombing remains an active investigation some 30 years later. A more recent example might be the October 2014 attack on Parliament. In the aftermath of such an attack, would the proposal prevent the intelligence oversight committee from receiving necessary information about investigations?

As with many of the government's proposals on this bill, I do understand the intent. Oversight functions should not inadvertently impede operations, but the solution is a judgment and discussion, not clumsy statutory roadblocks. Remember that the Security Intelligence Review Committee has full access to any information held by CSIS, and yet the heads of both organizations testified that they have no concerns about this arrangement. They resolve issues through negotiation, not legislation. As the founding chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee testified, “Sometimes, as in Bill C-22, there is a tendency to over-legislate”.

However, there is still hope. It is vital for Canadians to understand that Parliament now has a choice between two paths. The first path is to impose these last-minute changes, reverse the work of the all-party committee on public safety, and reject the expert evidence it listened to. The second path is to withdraw these rollbacks, accept the evidence, respect the work of all parties on that committee, and pass the bill we already have. The current bill could still earn the unanimous support of this place and would give Canada a world-class oversight body worthy of the respect of our allies and the trust of Canadians. That is what the government throws away if it insists on undoing the progress made so far.

Let me address one of the government's favourite arguments, and we heard it here today, which is that we must scale back our ambitions and accept minimal progress on the theory that something is better than nothing. In response, I would cite one last piece of expert testimony, and that is the recommendation of the last parliamentary committee to study this issue. In 2004, the Interim Committee of Parliamentarians on National Security recommended the creation of an oversight body with complete access to information. It explained as follows:

Though this arguably goes further than the legislation enacted by some of our allies, it is in line with developing practice.... We strongly believe that a structure which must rely on the gradual evolution and expansion of access, powers, and remit would be inappropriate for Canada.

The British had a committee like this one and in 2013, after public criticism, they completely overhauled that committee, strengthening its powers and its independence. Why do we have to reinvent the wheel?

Since the government seems to insist on such a course, I have one last solution to offer and that is my Motion No. 7 on the Notice Paper, which calls for removing clause 31 from the bill. That is the clause that would block judicial review of a cabinet minister's decision to withhold information or shut down an investigation. If the government insists on hobbling this committee from the start, then the least we can do is remove our restriction whose sole purpose is to prevent the committee's powers from maturing over time. I would ask all members of this place to support that amendment as a counterbalance to the government's proposals here.

In closing, I regret that the government has chosen this course, but I cannot endorse the rejection of good all-party committee work and the rejection of expert evidence. I hope that some members on the government side will join us in opposing these sadly regressive amendments.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am afraid it is a very bad signal.

I thank my colleague from Sherbrooke. I completely agree. Genetic discrimination is another example, and we are going to be voting on that soon.

It is very lamentable this pattern of changes to bills that have been reviewed by committee. As the member noted quite rightly, with the exception of the parliamentary committee on electoral reform, all of the committees I have already referenced had a majority of Liberals present. The Liberal members on the committee that studied Bill C-22 must be feeling as cut off at the knees as I was when the mandate letter for the minister of electoral reform was changed.

This is a place of deliberation, and preferably non-partisan, collegial deliberation. I am afraid the amendments to Bill C-22 put forward today at report stage at the larger level of abstraction on how we function as a parliament will be damaged.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is my honour to rise today to speak to Bill C-22. I had not thought that we would see government amendments at report stage that undo a lot of the good work that has been done by the committee.

I approach this issue by first saying I support the creation of a national security committee of parliamentarians. I learned a great deal about the intelligence business, the security business, and where Canada stands within our Five Eyes partners, in the efforts to fight Bill C-51 in the last Parliament. I still hope that the review that is being undertaken right now by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of Justice will lead to massive changes in the five different bills, and others, that were amended through that omnibus bill known as Bill C-51, which set up CSIS, for the first time since its creation, as a body that can “disrupt” thoughts, act as having a kinetic function, as the experts call it.

There is nothing right now within our security agencies that ensures that there is any oversight, unlike our other Five Eyes partners, as the hon. government House leader mentioned. We do not have any oversight for a number of the bodies at all. We have no oversight for CSIS. There had been oversight of CSIS up until the moment of omnibus Bill C-38 in the spring of 2012, which eliminated an adviser to the Minister of Public Safety to warn him or her if CSIS was going amok. That position was eliminated, so there is no oversight of CSIS; rather, there is review of CSIS. There is no oversight of the RCMP; rather, there is review of the RCMP. There is neither oversight nor review of the Canada Border Services Agency. For the Communications Security Establishment Canada, which is a very strange body that collects and downloads massive amounts of metadata, there is neither oversight nor review.

We have all of these different intelligence agencies, therefore, it is of critical importance that we do two things. We must rein in and undo the damage and the potential chaos created for security agencies by Bill C-51. I say this parenthetically. I want to get to Bill C-22. However, I need to say that my opposition to what was done in the 41st Parliament in what was known as Bill C-51 was not exclusively with respect to concerns about civil liberties. Those are concerns, but I have heard from security experts in the course of a review of that bill. It is clear to me that, failing to ensure coordination between and among all of these agencies, while giving CSIS the right to be active in kinetic operations, to be able to have CSIS offer people they are surveilling basically a get-out-of-jail-free card, a prospective guarantee that they will never be arrested or put into the judicial system, without any alert to the RCMP that this has happened, the one hand will not know what the other is doing. The creation of the national security committee of parliamentarians will not address that threat, although we will have to address this concern. It has been one that has been well known since the inquiry into the Air India disaster where if there had been coordination enforced between the different security agencies, that disaster, the single largest terrorist act on Canadian soil ever, could have been avoided. That was certainly the opinion of the Air India inquiry.

Coming back to Bill C-22, I support the creation of a committee of parliamentarians. However, I am baffled by the changes that have just taken place. I turn to the leading Canadian experts in this, Kent Roach and Craig Forcese, professors of law, both of whom played a role in the Air India inquiry. They are the authoritative experts to whom I turn. Certainly, Professor Craig Forcese is baffled by the limitation on what parliamentarians will be allowed to know. I mentioned in my question earlier to the government House leader that these restrictions do not apply to the people who serve on the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, to which civilian non-elected people are appointed. For the purpose of pointing out that the appointment process can have gaps with respect to security, let us not forget that former Prime Minister Stephen Harper appointed the now late committed fraudster Arthur Porter as the chair of SIRC. Arthur Porter did not have the restrictions that Bill C-22 would now put on parliamentarians, who are elected, who take an oath, and who have an understanding of their responsibilities.

My amendment to the bill is to delete section 12, which is the section that limits the MPs' access to parliamentary privilege. It is what Craig Forcese has called the triple lock on what MPs and senators are allowed to know.

Parliamentarians sitting on this committee have already sworn allegiance to Canada. They will go through security checks. The way the bill is currently written, it is not as though there is no check on their access to information or risk of their revealing information. The Canada Evidence Act would apply, section 38. Even as these government amendments are rolling forward, Professor Forcese has noted that it would be probably better to rely on court and the Canada Evidence Act than on these very restrictive moves in terms of what parliamentarians can know, an overly generous discretion on the point of what ministers can withhold, as well as getting rid of what was a very good amendment achieved in committee of giving the committee subpoena powers.

I have to say that it is just simply baffling that the government has taken such a restrictive view on what parliamentarians can be allowed to know. I will just note that this is from an article by Professor Forcese titled, “Stronger Bill C-22 Goes Back to the House”. This was before the government amendments came forward. He noted that, “C-22 committee members will be surrendering parliamentary privileges and will be permanently bound by secrecy under the Security of Information Act (and therefore subject to criminal sanction for violating secrecy rules).”

I think the government, with all due respect, has overreacted to very good amendments that were passed by the committee, and this is a larger point as well. We are often told in this place that we should rush legislation through second reading so that it can go to committee where the committee will do the good work. We now have a fair litany of times where the Liberal government, with its majority, has decided to ignore the good work of committees.

The first was, of course, the committee that dealt with medically assisted death. That advice was completely overlooked in the drafting of Bill C-14. We have the committee work, on the committee on which I served, the Special Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reform, and that is a very sad story because we need to get back to that, but very good work was done.

For the first time since 1867, when the British North America Act said Canada will use the voting system from Westminster until such time as its Parliament chooses its own voting system, we had Parliament recommend a voting system and a way forward, and that was rejected. Now this committee's work has been rejected and, I think, hastily.

There is a way forward here. There is an appropriate balance. I do believe that the parliamentary committee struck that balance, and it is really important to remember that what the committee is looking at is already protected in many ways.

The U.K. parliamentary committee has never had a problem with breaching secrecy. One of the experts who testified in Bill C-51, Joe Fogarty from U.K. MI5, testified that there just simply were not problems. Parliamentarians instructed with the duty to maintain confidentiality have done so.

I also point out the precedent that the New Zealand Parliament has a very similar committee, and the New Zealand members of Parliament who serve on that committee do not have to surrender parliamentary privilege. It is explicitly preserved under the New Zealand model.

It leaves one wondering why the government has chosen to undo the good work of committee, further undermining the proper role of legislated deliberation in committee coming back to this place at report stage, doing serious damage to the work that was done by the committee, leaving, I fear, greater uncertainty as to how the committee will function and still wondering why is it that in taking measures to restrict the information that parliamentarians have, the independent expert national security review bodies, SIRC and the CSE commissioner, are not given the same set of handcuffs.

I do not think it makes sense. I urge the government to reconsider and accept my amendment.

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister of Small Business and Tourism]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to Bill C-22 as we consider the bill as reported to this House by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

I would like to commend the standing committee for its thorough review of this important bill. The standing committee heard evidence and views from a wide array of stakeholders and experts. I was pleased to testify with the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and our officials. Others who appeared at the committee included the heads of Canada's national security and intelligence agencies, our existing national review bodies, the Information and Privacy Commissioner, human rights advocates, and leading professionals and academic experts in the area.

With such a diversity of witnesses, it is not surprising that the committee heard differing views on some of the specific provisions of the bill. However, I believe one overriding theme has emerged from the debate on Bill C-22 so far. The national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, or NSICOP, is definitely an idea whose time has come.

Our government believes strongly in the importance of a well-functioning and accountable national security system that both protects Canadians while at the same time respects their rights and freedoms. Bill C-22 would fulfill a key commitment made during the last election to create a new national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

The proposed bill would establish a rigorous parliamentary oversight mechanism of national security and intelligence activities. The committee of MPs and senators would have a mandate that is distinctly broader than is the case in most other countries. It would be empowered to examine activities across the entire federal government, including operational matters.

Our government believes in the importance of those powers granted to the committee, while also ensuring that safeguards exist, so that certain classified information is not disclosed that could disrupt government operations or be injurious to national security.

Commentators have been virtually unanimous in commending the government for taking this major step in enhancing the accountability and effectiveness of our national security and intelligence apparatus. They have noted that a genuine capacity for parliamentarians to scrutinize government activity in this area has been a long-time coming in Canada.

It has been over 30 years since the McDonald Commission proposed this type of committee. During the intervening years, Canada has been left as the only Five Eyes partner that has not created a permanent structure to provide parliamentarians with access to classified national security and intelligence information.

As one of the witnesses mentioned, this is the first time that there have been hearings before a standing committee with respect to a government bill on this subject. Therefore, this is an important step that has been taken because the government made it a clear priority.

The standing committee heard several witnesses explain how the structure created by Bill C-22 is comparable to those established by other countries. In particular, Bill C-22 was often compared to the intelligence and security committee that was active for a time in the United Kingdom.

The U.K. experience is indeed an informative one, providing a relatively longstanding example of a committee operating in a Westminster system comparable to our own, and one whose mandate and structure has evolved over time. As in the U.K., Bill C-22 would seek to balance the access to highly sensitive classified information that would be afforded to parliamentarians, with protections to ensure that this information and vital ongoing operations would not compromised.

However, it is important to remember that while its development has been informed in important ways by international comparators, Bill C-22 would be very much a made in Canada approach. In particular, Bill C-22 would reflect our government's commitment to ensuring that all national security and intelligence activities of the Government of Canada would be included within the NSICOP's mandate, regardless of which department or agency is responsible for them; that is, the committee's mandate would not be limited to particular agencies, as is the case in other countries.

On this point, I was pleased to see that one of the amendments reported to us by the standing committee would make it clear that NSICOP's mandate and access to information includes crown corporations. I fully support this amendment as it would further the government's objective of ensuring that the committee could review in totality national security intelligence activities across the whole of government. This is a good example of the constructive discussions that were had around the committee table.

I was also pleased to see the inclusion by the committee of a whistleblower provision which would cause the committee to inform the affected minister and Attorney General of any activity carried out by a department related to national security or intelligence which may not be in compliance with the law.

Another unique aspect of Bill C-22 is that it would provide the new committee with a clear mandate to review any national security and intelligence operation, including operations that are ongoing.

The laws of other countries place more restrictions on this type of operational review. For example, some committees cannot examine the operations until they cease or if they obtain the government's approval in advance.

The NSICOP would have the statutory right to access highly classified national security and intelligence information in any department or agency and now any crown corporation as well. Again, this would put Canada at the forefront in terms of international comparators, and certainly no existing review body in Canada has this wide scope of access. Of course, as in other jurisdictions, Bill C-22 would also include some limits to access to information. These are carefully defined to protect the personal information of Canadians, the safety of individuals, the integrity of police investigations, and other important public interests.

The standing committee made some significant changes to the bill in this area, essentially removing all limits. Although I appreciate the spirit in which these amendments were made, I believe we need to consider the potential consequences very carefully. In doing so, we need to keep in mind the unprecedented scope of the NSICOP's mandate and access to information compared to other review bodies in Canada and elsewhere.

I have moved in the House further amendments to these sections, specifically for clauses 13, 14, and 16 of the bill. The proposed amendment to clause 13 is intended to ensure that the work of the NSICOP would proceed in the reasonable manner that is consistent with its mandate and would not be bogged down in judicial procedures.

My proposal to reintroduce some of the mandatory sections to the NSICOP's access as originally set out in clause 14, would ensure the necessary protections would be in place for the safety and security of individuals, and that active national security-related police investigations would not adversely affected.

Finally, my proposed reinstatement of clause 16, as it appeared when the bill was tabled, is meant, based on a minister's discretion, to protect against the risk of inadvertent disclosure which may cause harm to Canada or Canada's partners' national security interests. These proposed amendments would seek a balanced approach between the original version of the bill and the changes made by the standing committee. We are being responsive to the standing committee's concerns while trying to maintain necessary protections.

Enhanced accountability is not a one-off initiative, but rather an ongoing effort that requires continued commitment and periodic reassessment. The NSICOP would be a major step forward in improving the accountability of the government's intelligence and national security activities. We are starting ahead of where other countries began. The committee would have a broad mandate, and would have access to extensive information. That is the best possible starting point for the launch of this new committee of parliamentarians.

As the committee gains experience and expertise in its years of operation, we would have the opportunity to reassess whether this balance can be further improved. I urge hon. members to join me in supporting Bill C-22 and the accompanying amendments.

Speaker's Ruling

[The Speaker, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

There are seven motions in amendment standing on the Notice Paper for the report stage of Bill C-22.

The Chair has received a letter from the government House leader arguing that Motion No. 6 could not have been presented in committee, as the changes it proposes arose out of a decision of the Supreme Court rendered very shortly before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security began clause-by-clause consideration of the bill. A similar argument was made in relation to part (b) of Motion No. 3. The court decision in question was rendered on Friday, November 25, 2016, and clause-by-clause consideration began on Tuesday, November 29, 2016. The government House leader contended in her letter that there was not sufficient time to analyze the consequences of the decision and prepare amendments accordingly. For that reason, she has asked that they be selected at report stage.

The hon. member for Victoria has also sent a letter to the Chair arguing that these amendments should not be selected, as he believes they should have been presented in committee. He also argues that there are cases in the past where the Chair has refused to select motions presented by the government.

As members know, consistent with the note to Standing Order 76.1(5), the Chair would not normally select motions that could have been presented or were defeated in committee.

However, there have been exceptions. On September 22, 2014, the Speaker was faced with a similar case in relation to a motion at the report stage of Bill C-13, an act to amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act, the Competition Act and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act. The hon. member for Charlottetown submitted a motion arising out of a court decision rendered after clause-by-clause and, in that case, the motion was selected.

The circumstances in the present case, although not identical, are sufficiently analogous to satisfy the Chair that the motions in question should be selected for consideration at report stage.

The Chair has examined the remaining motions submitted and is satisfied they meet the criteria spelled out in Standing Order 76.1(5). Motion No. 1 could not have been presented in committee, as it requires a royal recommendation. Part (a) of Motion No. 3 and Motion No. 4 further amend changes made by the committee. Motion No. 5 restores a clause deleted by the committee. Motions Nos. 2 and 7 propose to delete clauses. These motions will all be selected.

Motions numbered 1 to 7 will be grouped for debate and voted upon according to the voting pattern available at the table.

I shall now propose Motions Nos. 1 to 7 to the House.

The House proceeded to the consideration of Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, as reported (with amendments) from the committee.

Freedom of the Press

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

Mr. Speaker, again, let us be very clear. This is not happening at the federal level. This has been stated unequivocally by not only the directors of CSIS and the RCMP, but by the Prime Minister and the minister.

Let me go one step further. Not only is this government relying on the fact that it has not happened, not only are we relying on the vigorous and strong mechanisms to protect freedom of the press, we are going further, both in Bill C-22, which will be before the House and which allows for political oversight of our security and intelligence framework, and in the review we are doing. In fact, very soon the committee will be tabling its recommendations on the security and intelligence framework to ensure there is vigorous oversight of all departments, so that not only are the powers in place but also the oversight mechanisms to ensure oversight is effective and is as strong as it can be.

Let me state unequivocally our support for freedom of the press, and to ensure that it is guarded in all forms with the utmost protection.

Preclearance Act, 2016

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague from Drummond raises an excellent point. Let us go through the examples.

We can look at the clear recommendation that was made by the committee on electoral reform. We can look at the clear recommendation that was made by the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights on Bill C-201. We can look at the clear recommendations that were made by the public safety committee with respect to Bill C-22. In each one of those instances, the committee did its due diligence, listened to the experts, and presented its recommendations to the House, only to have the government completely ignore the evidence and recommendations and proceed along a predetermined path.

Therefore, my friend raises a valid concern. In every instance, the Liberals tell us to trust in the committee process. I have trust in it, but I have no trust in the government following the recommendations and hard work that those committees do on behalf of the House.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I will make a quick response to the comment that was just made about the work of committees. A lot of experts came before committee with respect to Bill S-201 and Bill C-22 and made recommendations that were unanimously adopted by that committee, only to have the government completely ignore and refute those recommendations.

In asking us to put faith in the committee process and in the government respecting that process, I am sorry to say that my patience with that line of argument is wearing very thin at the moment.

My question to the member is about the part of the bill that gives authorization to U.S. customs officials to carry firearms on Canadian soil. I have yet to hear a convincing argument from the Liberal benches as to why this is necessary. Why, when we have a perfectly capable police force in Canada, would we cede this kind of sovereignty to U.S. agents on Canadian soil?

Public Safety

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, before the House standing committee did its work with respect to Bill C-22, the University of Ottawa expert in this field Craig Forcese said, “this will be a stronger body than the U.K. and Australian equivalents, and a dramatic change for Canadian national-security accountability.” That was before the committee amendments. The committee made some changes, some of those can be accepted and others cannot, but the net result is the bill is even stronger now than when Mr. Forcese made those comments.

Bill C-23—Time Allocation Motion

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Mr. Speaker, the hon. gentleman is rather overstating his point.

The committee work on Bill C-22 was very important, and has shaped a number of revisions and changes in that legislation to narrow the scope of the exemptions and exclusions, and that will represent a very substantial improvement in the legislation.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I found it interesting to hear the minister say earlier that not a single question was asked. The reason for that, first of all, was that the bill was introduced just a few days before the summer recess, just before we returned to our ridings, so, of course, we did not really have an opportunity to ask any questions last spring.

When we returned in the fall, we were asking questions about Bill C-51 and we introduced a bill to repeal it. We were dealing with the consultations that the minister launched in order to take attention away from the issue. There is also Bill C-22. The government is trying to tell us that it is no big deal, and that, if we have concerns about Bill C-23, we will work on it in committee and everyone will have a chance to be heard.

I will use the example of Bill C-22. It is ironic to be talking about this on the very day that we arrived in the House to find that all of the amendments that were adopted by the committee and supported by experts have been rejected by the government.

I would therefore like the minister to explain to me why he has a problem with questions from the opposition. Why should we trust the committee process for a bill so vital to Canadians' rights and privacy? The last time, the government decided to backpedal and not listen to the witnesses or the committee members, even though we were dealing with an issue that should have been non-partisan.

Business of the House

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister of Small Business and Tourism]

Mr. Speaker, this afternoon the House will resume consideration of the opposition motion.

Tomorrow, we will continue second reading debate of Bill C-23 on pre-clearance.

Monday, March 6, and Thursday, March 9, shall be allotted days. In terms of legislation for that week, we will be focusing on report stage of Bill C-22, concerning the national security committee of parliamentarians.

I wish all members a good week in their constituencies.

[Peter Edelmann]

They would be able to look into it once they're up and running, presumably, if the scope of their mandate is broad enough to encompass.... Right now, the scope that is set out in Bill C-22 is a third definition of national security. In other words, it doesn't refer to either the CSIS Act or the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act's definition of national security, and that was one of our criticisms of Bill C-22. We need a coherent definition of what it is we're talking about when we talk about national security. Right now, we don't have one. We used to have one that was referred to in general by legislation, which was the definition in the CSIS Act. Now we have this other definition and potentially a third one. How they play together is unclear and, in our submission, not helpful.

[Peter Edelmann, Executive Member, Immigration Law Section, Canadian Bar Association]

Thank you.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today.

The discussion focuses on many appropriate aspects of national security, including a number that have been raised in the government's Green Paper.

Three aspects are of specific concern to us.

The first, the most basic of the three, is the effective examination of Canada's national security and intelligence agencies. Like the Arar and Air India inquiries, the CBA agrees with the need to create specialized review bodies and to provide them with the resources and the mandate they need to examine all activities in the realm of national security.

As the CBA has set out in various submissions over the years, including our recent submission on the green paper and on Bill C-22, rigorous, independent oversight plays a crucial role in maintaining confidence in the national security apparatus.

I will emphasize three aspects of review that are of particular importance. First, each national security agency must have rigorous, independent review of its core activities. Some agencies like CSIS and the RCMP have these review mechanisms in place. Although there are criticisms of the functioning of these mechanisms in certain circumstances, at least the means for review exist. Other agencies, in particular the Canada Border Services Agency, have no review mechanism whatsoever outside of the agency and the minister in charge. This must be remedied and addressed.

Second, there must be effective review of the national security apparatus as a whole. This is all the more crucial as we see greater levels of information sharing and co-operation between the agencies. The reviewing agencies, if there are any at all, are siloed and not able to follow their investigations all the way through to where the information or the investigation is heading.

Of this aspect, there are two parts. One has to do with the proposal for a national security committee of parliamentarians. We expressed our support for this and made some suggestions for changes in the way this has been set out. We discussed these with you before in respect of Bill C-22. That's one aspect of it.

The second aspect would be the creation of what's being colloquially referred to a “super SIRC”, or an organization more independent of Parliament. Such an organization would be able to develop not only the required resources but also the institutional memory and the ability to engage in investigations beyond the scope and ability of parliamentarians, who have a lot of other responsibilities. Both of these mechanisms are important, particularly as investigations become more integrated within the national security apparatus.

The next issue raised in the green paper that I would like to address is information sharing. We raised a number of concerns during the hearings and review of Bill C-51 with respect to the information-sharing regime. This was significantly expanded by the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act.

As we pointed out at the time of the passage of Bill C-51, this expansion raised a number of concerns. First, there were concerns around the scope—in particular, the definition given of “national security” within the act. It is different from the definition in the CSIS Act and from the way things are framed in Bill C-22.

We are concerned about having different definitions of national security for different purposes. This needs to be remedied. It would be beneficial to have one definition for oversight, information sharing, and activities of national security agencies. The oversight and review ought to be of the same expanse as the activities and information sharing themselves. Currently that is not the case.

The second issue is information sharing with foreign entities and the ability to review these activities. This issue is becoming of particular concern in light of recent developments on the global stage with respect to the partners with whom we share information. It was at the core of the concerns raised in the Arar commission and with regard to what happened to Mr. Arar. This is an ongoing issue in terms of what kind of information sharing happens, who the information is shared with, and it's a growing concern with respect to expanding information sharing within Canadian agencies.

This has a domino effect in the sense that if you have further, and broader unrestricted and unreviewed information sharing within Canadian agencies, and those agencies are then co-operating in an unreviewable or unreviewed way with foreign agencies, the problems that faced Mr. Arar are likely to arise again in the future. This needs to be addressed in the information-sharing regime that we have.

Finally, the green paper raises once again the issue of lawful access, which was discussed in great detail under the previous government. At that time, it was framed by the previous government in the context of child pornography. I believe it was Minister Toews at the time who made comments in Parliament to the effect that you're either with us or with the child pornographers in regard to how the debate ought to happen with respect to lawful access. That's been reframed in the green paper in terms of terrorism. These are not helpful ways to engage in what are complex public policy discussions in balancing liberties against the interests of national security, or other interests of the community.

These are important issues that need to be addressed coherently and consistently across the board, and ought to be addressed in a way that's consistent, whether it's within the national security framework or outside of it.

We are happy to engage further in those discussions. I see that my time is up. I'm happy to address any questions. Thank you very much.

[Dr. Christian Leuprecht]

Yes, thank you.

I invite you to take a look at my study on Bill C-22, in which I compare several countries. This study will be published in a few weeks and will provide a precise answer to that question, and explain why the bill in its current form has not reached its objective.

[Béatrice Vaugrante]

I will let my colleague Alex Neve complete my comments, because he will probably be able to provide more references in this regard. For my part, I know that other countries such as Great Britain have created such parliamentary committees. We all understand that Bill C-22 refers to a parliamentary committee on national security, but that kind of mechanism often reaches its limits.

National security agencies sometimes have trouble working together, and we have unfortunately seen that in the past. Organizations all have their own particular culture. That is why other countries, and even Canada, have trouble putting in place an organization that will be able to oversee all of it. There has to be a way to get beyond those cultural differences and that past in order to be able to do so.

Perhaps my colleague could provide a better answer to your question.

[Béatrice Vaugrante]

Thank you very much, and my apologies to the interpreters.

All Canadian national security laws should include a provision requiring legislation to be interpreted and applied consistent with the Charter of Rights, the Canadian Human Rights Act, and binding international human rights standards.

Additionally, there should be specific and binding reference to the rights most frequently at stake: the right to life; the ban on torture and ill-treatment; the prohibition of discrimination; safeguards against unlawful arrest, arbitrary detention and unfair trials; freedoms of expression, association and assembly; freedom of religion; privacy rights; and the protection against refoulement.

Next, a clear lesson highlighted in the Maher Arar inquiry was the inadequacy of national security review and oversight bodies and processes in Canada. Commissioner Dennis O'Connor proposed a comprehensive new model of integrated review that would subject all agencies to robust review, by bodies that possess the necessary powers and operate in an integrated manner. Unfortunately, ten years later, that recommendation has not been taken up.

Bill C-22 would establish a national security committee of parliamentarians, but that proposal is not enough.

This leads to our second safeguard. Building on Bill C-22, Canada's model of national security review and oversights must be reformed to ensure all agencies are subject to robust, real-time review by expert and independent bodies which are able to cooperate with each other in an integrated manner.

Third, national security measures that encroach on rights should be exceptional and not permanent. However, national security measures adopted by governments are rarely temporary. Most national security provisions are part of Canadian law, including some that violate or undermine human rights provisions. Regular review helps safeguard against that possibility.

As the third safeguard therefore, Parliament should ensure regular reviews of national security laws, at least every three years.

Our final proposed safeguard is accounting for national security-related human rights violations from the past. The compensation and official apology provided to Maher Arar and Benamar Benatta are rare instances of redress being provided to individuals who have experienced serious violations.

Mr. Almalki, Mr. Abou-Elmaati and Mr. Nureddin have not been compensated for human rights violations documented in a 2008 judicial inquiry report from former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Frank Iacobucci. Omar Khadr has had no redress for charter violations upheld in unanimous 2008 and 2010 Supreme Court of Canada judgments. Other cases remain similarly unresolved.

Our fourth guarantee is therefore to appoint a judge or other independent expert to quickly review and resolve, consistent with international human rights principles, all pending legal cases involving claims for redress related to human rights violations arising in the context of national security operations.

My colleague Alex Neve will conclude our remarks.

Thank you.

[Karina Gould, Liberal, Burlington, ON]

I think that's still to be determined. However, I do believe that it would be very important for this to be reported back to Parliament. If Bill C-22 passes, that committee would certainly be monitoring and have access to this information. That committee would have purview over anything that deals with security intelligence or the CSE, so it would be. However, again I think it is important to highlight and to stress that the information collected would not be information from political parties. It's about providing political parties information to protect themselves. We need to make that distinction really clear—

[Arnold Chan, Liberal, Scarborough—Agincourt, ON]

In terms of any information gathered through this particular process, what would the reporting mechanism be back to Parliament? Would it be back to this committee, would it be through the public safety committee, or would it potentially even be to the new national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians proposed in Bill C-22?

[David Elder, Executive Member, Privacy and Access Law Section, Canadian Bar Association]

Thanks very much, and good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

My name is David Elder. I am an executive committee member of the privacy and access law section of the Canadian Bar Association. I also co-lead the privacy and data protection practice at Stikeman Elliott LLP. I was formerly the chief privacy officer for a major Canadian telecommunications company, and I have been practising privacy law for over 20 years.

Thank you for the invitation to present the CBA's view on the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act.

The CBA is a national association of over 36,000 lawyers, law students, notaries, and academics. An important aspect of the CBA's mandate is seeking improvements in the law and the administration of justice, and it is that perspective that brings us to appear before you today.

Our submission to the committee on SCISA was prepared by a CBA national security working group, with contributions from the privacy and access law section as well as other sections. The section's membership represents lawyers with in-depth knowledge in the areas of privacy law and access to information from every part of the country, drawn from private practice, industry, and government sectors.

Our section also worked on the CBA submission this past fall in response to the government's national security green paper, and the year before that on the CBA submission to the public safety and national security committee respecting Bill C-51, part of which contains SCISA.

I'll now address the substance of our submission.

The CBA supports information sharing for the purpose of national security when that sharing is necessary, proportionate, and accompanied by adequate measures against potential abuse. However, sharing too much information or sharing information for unrestricted purposes can lead to harmful consequences. Moreover, such oversharing is contrary to the principles underlying privacy laws in Canada.

SCISA has significantly expanded intragovernmental information sharing for national security purposes in Canada, including the sharing of potentially sensitive personal information, without precise definitions, basic privacy protections, or clear limitations on the purposes for sharing. While some helpful changes were made to SCISA before its final passage into law in 2015, the statute still causes concern on several fronts.

The CBA has four main concerns with the law as enacted.

The first is independent oversight. SCISA includes a number of useful guiding principles for information sharing, including the principle that originators should retain control over shared information and the principle that information should be disclosed under the act only to institutions carrying out responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada.

However, to be meaningful, SCISA must include a robust oversight and accountability mechanism to enforce these principles. In the CBA's view, any oversight body should have independence from the government institutions that will be sharing information under the act in order to avoid any potential conflicts of interest.

There may be several oversight models that could work in this regard. The committee of parliamentarians that was proposed in Bill C-22 could be one such option. Existing institutions, such as the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, might also work.

Whatever oversight mechanism is pursued, in order to better facilitate the review of activities carried out under SCISA, the CBA submits that regulations should be introduced requiring disclosing institutions to keep a record of all disclosures made under SCISA and requiring receiving institutions to maintain records of subsequent use and disclosure of information received pursuant to SCISA. If such records do not exist, it will be nearly impossible for any oversight body to determine whether the guiding principles of the act are indeed being respected.

The second concern is balanced information sharing.

The CBA notes that subsection 5(1) of SCISA permits disclosure among the 17 government institutions listed in the schedules of the act if the information is relevant to the recipient institution's jurisdiction or responsibilities under an act of Parliament or another lawful authority respecting national security. In the CBA's view, mere relevance is a very low standard for what should be an exceptional sharing of information between government institutions, and this could allow for unnecessary and overbroad sharing of information, undermining the privacy rights of Canadians. The CBA agrees with the previous submissions of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and others that a test of necessity would better balance the objectives of SCISA with privacy rights and principles. In other words, in order for information to be shared with another institution, such sharing must not only be relevant to the receiving institution's mandate respecting national security, but also have to be necessary in order to allow the receiving institution to fulfill that mandate.

The CBA is also of the view that the existing schedule 3 to SCISA, which lists the institutions with which information may be shared under the act, should be expanded to include references to the specific sections of the statute supervised or implemented by those institutions that might relate to national security concerns. Greater specificity would assist both disclosing and receiving institutions, as well as any oversight body, in assessing whether disclosure to another institution might be appropriate.

Our third concern with SCISA is the lack of restrictions around subsequent use and disclosure of information disclosed to an institution under section 5 of SCISA. More specifically, the current provision seems to allow for the subsequent disclosure by a recipient institution to other non-designated government institutions, to individuals, to foreign governments, or even to the private sector, and for purposes unrelated to national security.

In the CBA's view, the information sharing between government institutions contemplated by SCISA should be seen as an extraordinary measure designed to fulfill an explicit narrow purpose. Accordingly, SCISA must be designed to eliminate what is sometimes called “purpose creep”, including potential disclosure to third parties.

The CBA is particularly concerned about subsequent use and further disclosures by a receiving institution when the information has been obtained by the disclosing institution through the exercise of extraordinary powers, such as powers to compel production of information or enter premises. It would be inappropriate for a receiving institution to be able to leverage, for purposes unrelated to national security, any investigation and enforcement powers not conferred on the receiving institution by Parliament. SCISA should not allow receiving institutions to obtain indirectly that which they cannot obtain directly.

Fourth, the CBA is concerned about reliability of information.

The CBA is concerned that SCISA includes few effective checks and balances on information sharing or safeguards to ensure that shared information is reliable. The Arar commission stressed the importance of precautions to ensure that information is accurate and reliable before it is shared. Omitting safeguards in SCISA ignores lessons learned through the Arar saga and the recommendations of the Arar commission, and risks repeating the same mistakes.

In conclusion, once again the CBA appreciates the opportunity to share our views on SCISA. We support balanced information sharing for the purpose of national security when it is necessary and proportionate, and is accompanied by safeguards that are adequate to protect individual privacy rights and to ensure the reliability of any information shared pursuant to the act.

I'd be pleased to respond to any questions the committee members may have.

Public Safety and National Security

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I have the honour to present, in both official languages, the seventh report of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security concerning Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts.

The committee has studied the bill and has decided to report the bill back to the House with amendments.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to be here today particularly on supplementary estimates (B).

I'm very pleased to be joined by most of the usual cast of characters: my deputy minister Malcolm Brown; Michel Coulombe, the director of CSIS; Commissioner Paulson from the RCMP; and Caroline Xavier, who is vice-president of operations at the Canada Border Services Agency.

I would point out that the former president, Linda Lizotte-Macpherson, has retired as of last Friday, and her replacement, John Ossowski, is in the process of arriving. He will no doubt have the pleasure of appearing before the committee on future occasions. In the meantime, Caroline is representing CBSA today.

Fraser Macaulay, assistant commissioner with Corrections Canada is also here, as is Harvey Cenaiko, the chairperson of the Parole Board of Canada.

As you will note from studying the supplementary estimates (B), the department portfolio of Public Safety is requesting adjustments that result in an increase in our spending authorities of $256.3 million. I would like to run through very briefly what the items are that add up to that total.

Canada is, as you know, a safe and peaceful country, but we also know that we are not immune to threats, including natural disasters, terrorism, and other crimes and acts of violence. The women and men of the public safety portfolio, including the department itself and all of the various agencies that you see represented here today, do the essential and often dangerous work of protecting Canadians, and for so doing they deserve and I believe they have our admiration and our gratitude. It's up to us as parliamentarians to support them and their work so that they can continue keeping Canadians safe and protecting the rights and freedoms that we all hold very dear. The items included in the estimates are directed toward that end.

First of all, let me deal with Fort McMurray. As you know, we faced a terrible fire disaster there earlier this year, probably the worst in Canadian history. In coordinating the federal response to that disaster, I got to see some pretty remarkable things, including the courage of the people of Fort McMurray, the determined leadership of local, provincial, and federal officials, the skill and the selflessness of firefighters, police officers, and other first responders, and the tireless efforts of the Canadian Red Cross, and of course, from coast to coast, Canadians gave generously to support those who were so seriously affected.

The Government of Canada has transferred $104.5 million to the Canadian Red Cross, honouring the Prime Minister's commitment to match the individual charitable donations that were made by Canadians in support of Fort McMurray. That accounts for a large portion of the total authorities that are being requested today, those matching funds for the Red Cross.

Also, under the disaster financial assistance arrangements, we made an advance payment to Alberta of $307 million as a down payment on what will be the ultimate obligation to assist Alberta in dealing with this disaster. That amount of money is not in these estimates because it is covered in the main estimates. Every year there's an allotment for the DFAA, and the amount that's required for Alberta is covered in the allotment in the main estimates. The supps deal with the matching money for the Red Cross of $104.5 million.

The second topic is HUSAR, the heavy urban search and rescue teams. That capacity in Canada is something we mentioned in our election platform saying that we would reinstate federal funding to support the HUSAR teams across Canada. They are absolutely indispensable in responding to such emergencies as ice storms, floods, wildfires, building collapses, and so forth.

The previous government made a decision at one point to eliminate this funding. We decided it was of sufficient priority that it needed to be reinstated. In October I was pleased to deliver on the commitment we had made by launching the heavy urban search and rescue program, which will provide $3.1 million annually in funding for these heavy urban search and rescue task forces. This program will not only support and strengthen the four existing task forces in Vancouver, Calgary, Brandon, and Toronto, but they will also help to develop new capabilities in Montreal and re-establish capabilities in Halifax. To this end, $3.1 million is being sought through supplementary estimates (B).

The third major topic is RCMP class actions. Another part of the mandate that I received from the Prime Minister was to take action to ensure that all parts of the public safety portfolio are healthy workplaces, free from all forms of harassment. I've been working on this from the very beginning of our mandate, notably inviting the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP to undertake a comprehensive review of RCMP policies and procedures on harassment, and also appointing Sheila Fraser as a special adviser to examine the RCMP's complaints process and the treatment of complainants. That work is ongoing. I expect to hear from both of those processes sometime next spring.

I was also very pleased to join Commissioner Paulson on October 6 for the announcement of a $100-million settlement between the RCMP and a large number of plaintiffs in two proposed harassment-related class action lawsuits, of which $40 million is being sought through these 2016-17 supplementary estimates (B). The remaining $60 million will be accessed in the following year. In addition to the $40 million for actual payments for settlement, there is another $17 million for class action counsel and claims assessment being sought through these estimates. The total amount required to deal with the class actions is $40 million plus $17 million, for a total of $57 million.

I think we should be encouraged by this development and by the eloquent apology that was offered by the commissioner. We continue to advance other initiatives on this very important front of safe workplaces. This is an important step in helping us move forward from a deeply troubling aspect of the history of our national police force to a much different future.

In terms of the claims process, I think it's important to highlight that, totally separate and apart from government, totally separate and apart from the force, an independent process has been set up to actually adjudicate the claims. The RCMP will have no involvement except to make documentation available. The government will have no involvement except to provide the funding. The decisions will be made by the Honourable Michel Bastarache, a former justice of the Supreme Court of Canada, who is the independent assessor. He will make the determinations of the appropriate amounts, case by case by case.

On national security, the government continues its work to ensure that Canada's national security framework keeps Canadians safe while safeguarding our rights and freedoms. I'm pleased to report that the unprecedented engagement with Canadians that we have launched right across this country has been very successful, including a series of town hall meetings, round tables, public hearings, personal discussions, and meetings with subject matter experts, as well as quite literally tens of thousands of contributions coming in via email in our online consultations. That consultation remains open until December 15, but already the total number of participants is in excess of 45,000 Canadians. It's a very encouraging number.

Once again, let me thank the committee for the hearings that you held and the report you will make about the advice you would offer the government in relation to the national security framework. We are analyzing all of the input, and we will be putting forward a set of measures that will be designed to achieve two objectives simultaneously: protecting the public, keeping them safe and secure, and at the same time safeguarding the rights and freedoms of Canadians in a free, inclusive, and democratic society.

I also want to note the work the committee has done on Bill C-22. I understand it's now in the process of being reported back to the House, and I will be very anxious to consider that report.

One other matter under national security which involves an estimate in these supplementary estimates (B) is the creation of the office for community outreach and counter-radicalization to violence. That item was earmarked in the budget last spring, and to this end, you will note in these estimates that my department is seeking $2.3 million in 2016-17 to establish and staff the office as well as support the domestic programming and research initiatives through a newly established grants and contributions program called the community resilience fund.

The office will provide leadership on Canada's response to radicalization to violence, coordinate domestic and international initiatives, support programming and research, and enhance our expertise. We simply must become very good at this initiative if we want to retain that fundamental character of Canada as an open, inclusive, democratic society.

Immigration detention is another item I want to mention today. We are requesting $22.7 million this fiscal year to support the Canada Border Services Agency in its implementation of our new national immigration detention framework. A total of $138 million for this initiative was announced in August, spread over a number of years. In this first year we're asking for $22.7 million.

The goals of the new framework include: first, expanding practical, workable alternatives to detention; second, significantly improving conditions at immigration holding centres, including better mental and medical health services; third, reducing our reliance on provincial facilities; and fourth, reducing the number of minors in detention to the greatest extent possible.

Of the funding that's being requested for this year, $21.3 million is being directed to the construction of new immigration holding centres in Laval, Quebec, and in Surrey, British Columbia. These facilities will help reduce the reliance on provincial correctional facilities for immigration detention.

The balance of the funding this year will be used to begin enhancing medical services within our immigration holding centres and to implementing alternatives to detention so that, as much as possible, immigration detention remains a measure of last resort and not first resort.

A great deal is under way. A good many things have been achieved, but there is, of course, always much more to be done. My officials and I are happy to try to respond to your questions today. We look forward to working with the committee on a whole array of national security issues for the future.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

You'd like a recorded vote? Absolutely.

(Bill C-22 agreed to: yeas 6; nays 3)

Shall I report the bill as amended to the House?

[Heather Sheehy]

I would also just point out that I slightly misspoke. I want to be very clear that, in Bill C-22, at subclause 21(5), where I said “injurious to national security”, I should have been more accurate in saying:

the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations or is information that is protected by litigation privilege or solicitor-client privilege

Then the clause goes on, but I just want to clarify that I had misspoken on that point.

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Good afternoon, members of the committee, witnesses, and officials who are here to help us as we continue, pursuant to the order of reference of Tuesday, October 4, 2016, our consideration of Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts.

We welcome Mr. Sutherland, Ms. Sheehy, and Ms. Miles from the Privy Council Office, and Mr. Davies and others who are with us.

Welcome, as well, to Madam May, who is joining us today.

We're continuing consideration of the bill at clause 17. As we did last week, we will proceed relatively slowly. I'm not going to repeat the instructions that I gave at the start of the bill consideration. If anyone needs any time to sort anything out, please do ask the chair for a motion to suspend, and we'll certainly entertain that accordingly.

(On clause 17)

Are there amendments to clause 17?

Mr. Clement.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

With respect to oversight and review, we have Bill C-22, which will be in place soon enough. The committee of parliamentarians can be asked by the minister to engage in a particular review, including perhaps a SCISA review.

There was a Liberal amendment in the last session to suggest that all information shared under SCISA should be shared with the Privacy Commissioner and that the Privacy Commissioner should issue an annual report to Parliament on the nature of information sharing and identify any problems.

Perhaps if there were any problems with such information sharing, in the absence of a super-SIRC-type body, which I think both of you have referenced, would that be a palatable solution in the interim?

[Ziyaad Mia]

I will echo my colleague here. We've called for it for a long time. A committee of parliamentarians is fine. I think Bill C-22 needs some reform, but it's a step in the right direction to give some political accountability and public accountability linked to all of you who are elected.

The first thing is to have a national security review agency that unifies all the agencies, but it would not be separate agencies working together, which I think is too convoluted. You want one counterweight to the security agencies. It makes security better, makes them work better, and gives public confidence.

Second, we need well-resourced experts in the field who can build relationships with the agencies and have access to all information.

Third is that independent review of national security law and policy as they have in the U.K. That person would, in the case of Bill C-51, come and testify on that and give independent advice on it. That person would be able to have access to secret jurisprudence and legal opinions in government and be able to comment to the public and experts with some feedback on what the national security landscape looks like.

Business of the House

[Candice Bergen, Conservative, Portage—Lisgar, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order to challenge our moving to the orders of the day this early in routine proceedings, a procedure that seems to be used habitually by the government when it is poised to close debate on important issues.

In this case, the government has already limited debate on the third reading stage of Bill C-26, which is scheduled today. One day is the minimum number of of days that can be allotted under the Standing Orders, and the government House leader chose as that one day, the shortest day in our calendar. I will not take up more of the House's time on that point before I get back to my procedural intervention, but I do want to say one thing. The House expected more than a minimal effort from this so-called new tone government House leader and we are very disappointed.

Back in the spring, the government moved and adopted motions to proceed to the orders of the day four Wednesdays in a row, skipping over all rubrics of routine proceedings. That was done on April 20, May 4, May 11, and May 18. Most recently, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons moved such a motion on Thursday, November 17, and today the government is proposing to do it again for the sixth time.

I would argue that the government House leader is continuing where her predecessor left off in misusing this procedure. I refer to a Speaker's ruling on April 14, 1987. In his ruling on a similar matter, the Speaker stated:

Routine Proceedings are an essential part of House business and if they are not protected the interests of the House and the public it serves are likely to suffer severely.

He referred to a ruling of November 24, 1986, in which a motion having the effect of superseding a number of items under routine proceedings was inappropriate and excessive and was disallowed. However, the circumstances on April 14, 1987, were dramatically different and the Speaker allowed the government to move its motion.

I will compare those circumstances to today's circumstances and let you, Mr. Speaker, and the House draw its own conclusions. The Speaker observed that the opposition was significantly obstructing the progress of Bill C-22. He noted that seven divisions took place prior to the introduction of the bill, most of them resulting from the moving of dilatory motions under routine proceedings. Fourteen more divisions, with most of them again resulting from the moving of dilatory motions during routine proceedings, took place before the bill reached second reading on December 8, 1986. The bill was referred to committee and reported back to the House on March 16, 1987, after 24 meetings and 82 hours of debate. Numerous amendments were proposed at report stage and the House debated those amendments for four days.

On April 7, the minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs gave notice of time allocation. Unlike the opposition in 1987, we have negotiated openly and honestly with the government. Since this Parliament began, only two dilatory motions have been moved by the opposition. In contrast, five such motions have been advanced by the government. Today will be the sixth. The Speaker in 1987 noted that in the British House of Commons, the Speaker has the power to refuse a dilatory motion if he believes it to be an abuse of the rules of the House. He also noted that the Speaker is empowered to allow them if he believes they are justified.

In comparing Bill C-22 in 1987 and any bill the Liberal government has proposed to the House in this Parliament, the opposition has not given the current government justification to proceed in this manner. The scale of obstruction in 1987 was extreme according to any standard, and only under those circumstances was the government permitted to move its motion. The government should not be allowed to routinely skip over all rubrics during routine proceedings without just cause.

As Speaker Fraser pointed out, routine proceedings are an essential part of House business and they should be protected as a vital component that serves the interests of the House and the public. There is no moral ground or rational reason here for the government to proceed in this manner. Speaker Fraser, in his 1987 ruling, added:

It is essential to our democratic system that controversial issues should be debated at reasonable length so that every reasonable opportunity shall be available to hear the arguments pro and con and that reasonable delaying tactics should be permissible to enable opponents of a measure to enlist public support for their point of view.

Clearly, the 1987 case involving Bill C-22 demonstrated unreasonable delaying tactics. This House has never seen such delaying tactics, and the government has never experienced this sort of sideshow from the opposition. The government's problems are self-inflicted and are not due to the opposition. The government has had the privilege of working with a generally co-operative opposition in this Parliament and has frittered away that goodwill. It has foolishly squandered it through its mismanagement of the House, mean-spirited tactics, and its minimalist efforts to make Parliament work.

While the government house leader was marketed as new, we now discover that we did not get “new and improved”.

Mr. Speaker, I ask that you consider my arguments and not allow the government to move its motion to proceed to the orders of the day until it has at least demonstrated that an unreasonable obstruction has taken place.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the members of the committee.

I'll just take a moment to say that on November 18, under your deadline, I submitted to this committee a brief on the substance of what was formerly known as Bill C-51, in which I made commentary on this piece and particularly on how Bill C-22 is a much-appreciated bill. However, in and of itself it is insufficient to remedy the damage done to our security system by Bill C-51. You may not have that in your inboxes yet because I didn't submit it in both official languages. I hope you will take the time to consider it.

This amendment is very straightforward, and as you noted, Mr. Chair, it's similar to that put forward by other committee members. It deals with the current version of Bill C-22, which says that the Governor in Council is to designate the chair of the committee. As you will know from evidence before this committee, the committee process of the Parliament of Westminster, upon which Bill C-22 is based, does not have the appointment of the chair by the government of the day. In fact, based on a revision of their committee in 2013, the chair of the committee is elected by members of the committee. That is entirely the purpose of amendment PV-1. It is to ensure that the chair is elected by the members of the committee, and of course, the members of the committee, as you've previously approved in clause 5, are appointed by the Governor in Council.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Good afternoon. I call to order the 46th meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for the consideration of Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts.

We thank you, officials, for joining us today.

From the Privy Council Office, we have Mr. Allen Sutherland, Ms. Heather Sheehy, and Ms. Nancy Miles, senior legal counsel. As well, from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have John Davies.

Thank you for joining us.

We also welcome independent members to the committee today; we're very pleased that you're with us.

Welcome to this meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Today we are beginning our clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-22, and I'm going to warn the committee at the beginning that I'm going to be going slowly through today's meeting and through the amendments we have received to make sure that we give due consideration to the amendments and that we're understanding the process as we go. Because the committee has only done one clause-by-clause study before, and it was somewhat less complicated than this bill with the number of amendments we have, I want to review the process.

I'll just remind the committee that we have help with our legislative responsibilities with legislative clerks—we thank you for joining us today—as well as our usual clerk, who will keep me in order.

I'd like to provide members of the committee with a few comments on how committees proceed with clause-by-clause consideration of a bill.

As you would know and as the name indicates, this is an examination of each and all of the clauses in the order in which they appear in the bill, unless you choose otherwise.

I will call each clause successively, and each clause is subject to debate and a vote. If there are amendments to the clause in question, I will recognize the member proposing each amendment, who may explain it. The amendment will then be open for debate. When no further members wish to intervene, the amendment will be voted on.

Amendments will be considered in the order in which they appear in the package that each member received from the clerk. If there are amendments that are consequential to each other, they will be voted on together.

Just as a reminder, we received a package of amendments that have come in from various members of the House of Commons to our committee; however, other amendments are allowed as we proceed; we're aware of that as well.

In addition to having to be properly drafted in a legal sense, amendments must also be procedurally admissible. I as chair may be called upon to rule amendments inadmissible if they go against the principle of the bill or beyond its scope, both of which were adopted by the House when it agreed to the bill at its second reading, or if they offend the financial prerogative of the crown.

If you wish to eliminate a clause of a bill altogether, it is inappropriate to propose an amendment to the bill to remove a clause. If you want to remove a clause altogether, the proper course of action is to vote against the clause when the time comes, not to propose an amendment to delete it.

As I said, since this is only the second time our committee has been tasked with a clause-by-clause examination, I will go slowly to allow all members to follow the proceedings properly. If you have questions, do not be afraid to ask me, and then I will ask someone who knows, who is probably our legislative clerk at that point.

During the procedure, if the committee decides not to vote on a clause, that clause can be put aside so that the committee can revisit it later in the process.

As indicated earlier, the committee will go through the package of amendments in the order in which they appear and vote on them one at a time. Amendments have been given a number—it's in the top right-hand corner of each page—to indicate which party submitted them.

There's no need for a seconder when moving an amendment. Once it has been moved, you will need unanimous consent to withdraw it; however, you do not need to propose it, even if it is in the package.

During debate on an amendment, members are permitted to move subamendments. These subamendments do not require the approval of the mover of the amendment. Only one subamendment may be considered at a time, and that subamendment cannot be further amended.

When a subamendment is moved to an amendment, it is obviously voted on first. Then another subamendment may be moved, or the committee may consider the main amendment and vote on it at that time.

Once every clause has been voted on, the committee will then vote on the title, the bill itself, and an order to reprint the bill, which may be required if amendments are adopted, so that the House has a proper copy to receive at report stage.

Finally, the committee will have to order the chair to report the bill to the House. That report contains only the text of any adopted amendments as well as an indication of any deleted clauses.

I think the most difficult thing for me in clause-by-clause examination is the fact that if we take a certain action on an amendment at one point, it has effects consequentially, down the line. That may mean that an amendment is not able to be moved later in the process because we've already dealt with something that would nullify its effect. I will be trying to signal that to you as we go, on each of the amendments. For me, when I've done clause-by-clause study before, that has always been the trickiest part. You have to pay a lot of attention to what you're voting on. You may have forgotten that there's an amendment later that we will not be able to consider because it is consequential to what has happened already in the meeting.

I'm thanking you in advance for your patience with me and for your attention as we set out to have a very productive meeting. I am hoping for a very good and thorough consideration of what I think is an extremely important bill for this House to consider.

Are there any questions about that before we begin?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Okay, but it is not in the language that we have before us in Bill C-22.

[Suzanne Legault]

—under Bill C-22? Not that I can see.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Subject to the exemptions that are enumerated later in the act.

There is no complaints or inquiries function currently listed within the mandate of Bill C-22. Am I right about that, as well?

[Suzanne Legault]

Currently on our inventory, we have 400-and-some files dealing with national security. We see everything that we need to see. Whenever there are requests for information, we see the full gamut of the information. However—and this is an interesting option for the committee being formed under Bill C-22—when we're dealing with highly sensitive information, we go on site to view and review the information. We don't actually take it out physically from where it is. The information doesn't leave it's location, if it is at CSIS or CSEC or wherever. As I said before, the fact that the committee would be provided with the information does not mean that the information would become public. I think it's very important to understand the distinction. For a review committee or a review body to have access to information to properly assess what it is assessing at the time—and, as I said, the mandate is very broad—it really does need to see the relevant information. Seeing the relevant information does not mean disclosing the information.

[Suzanne Legault]

Well, first, on the very specific, on the cabinet confidence, the way it is in Bill C-22, it actually refers to the Canada Evidence Act. This definition of cabinet confidence is not the same definition as we have in the Access to Information Act. The jurisprudence has actually interpreted that to include some weighing of public interest, which I think is actually good here in C-22, the way that it's referring to the Canada Evidence Act for cabinet confidences. That's better than what we have in the Access to Information Act.

As I said, I do believe that the committee needs to have access to the information to do its work. There are too many ways to preclude information from being shared with the committee for the committee to do its work. What I did recommend is if, at the end of the day, Parliament decides that it's appropriate to keep these caveats as they are here, at the very least, if there were a discretionary component in a public interest override and the possibility of having the ministerial decisions reviewed in Federal Court, it would actually provide some measure of oversight on the exercise of discretion to disclose or not disclose to the committee. At the very least that would provide a little bit of discipline in the overall scheme, which I think would improve it quite significantly.

Under the access act currently, the exemption for national security is actually a discretionary exemption. So what you have in Bill C-22 is actually more restrictive than what we have currently under our Access to Information Act. I think we should keep the same model. I mean, why not? It has worked. As I said, it has not resulted in breaches of national security information certainly in a review function of my office.

The committee is supposed to be specifically mandated to do this work. It's going to be subject to significant penalties if there are breaches of security. Parliamentary privilege does not apply to protect the members. The Security of Information Act will apply in terms of consequences. Those are very, very serious consequences. We are putting in place a scheme where the participants in this committee, the members of this committee, will have a very high threshold of responsibility with this information, so I think the flip side should be that we should provide the committee with the necessary information it requires.

If Parliament decides to keep all of these restrictions, then at the very least there should be discretionary public interest override and the possibility of judicial review. The parliamentary budget officer has the ability to get these decisions on disclosure reviewed by the Federal Court. My office has the ability to do that. It provides a good measure of discipline in the process when the decisions are made not to disclose because the participants know that it is subject to judicial review by a court. I think that would at least provide some discipline extra to Bill C-22 that might actually go some way. If the purpose is to see with experience how this unfolds, it will allow us to see how it unfolds, but it will provide the potential scrutiny of the Federal Court which, by the way, has a lot of expertise in reviewing matters of national security in the first place.

[Suzanne Legault, Information Commissioner of Canada, Office of the Information Commissioner of Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Good afternoon, honourable members of this committee. It really is a pleasure for me to be here today. I'm very grateful to have been invited to speak to Bill C-22.

First, I wish to commend the government on tabling legislation to create a parliamentary oversight body for our national security agencies. The recommendation to create such an oversight committee dates back many years. The committee could, with a properly designed legal framework, do much to increase public trust in our national security agencies. However, I do have some concerns with the bill. These concerns are very much based on my own experience in an oversight role as the Information Commissioner of Canada. My comments today will be directed, first, to the review function of the proposed committee, and second, to the application of the Access to Information Act to the newly created secretariat that will support the committee.

With respect to the review function of the committee, I have concerns with the following six areas: first, the ministerial override of the committee's review function; second, the committee's ability to obtain information; third, the time frames to provide information to the committee; fourth, the private nature of the committee's meetings; fifth, the limitations placed on other review bodies when collaborating with the committee; and sixth, the final nature of decisions made by ministers.

The committee will have a broad mandate to review matters related to national security and intelligence. A broad mandate is important as it will allow the committee to direct its inquiries as it sees fit.

However, clause 8(b) of the bill undercuts this mandate by providing that the minister of a department may override a review where the minister determines it would be injurious to national security.

This override essentially turns the committee's broad mandate into a mirage. It will undermine any goodwill and public trust that may have built up towards the committee and, by extension, the national security agencies it oversees.

My next area of concern will Bill C-22 is the exclusions to the committee's right to obtain information. These are found at clauses 14 and 16 of the bill. Based on my seven years' experience as Information Commissioner, I can tell you that exclusions to oversight significantly undermine the review function. Under the Access to Information Act, but for a few exclusions, I have access to all records during my investigations so that I may independently review decisions on disclosure.

The notable exception to my review power is cabinet confidences. Cabinet confidences are excluded from the application of the Access to Information Act. This means that when I investigate a complaint about cabinet confidences, I cannot require that those records be provided to my office. I cannot independently assess whether they are, in fact, cabinet confidences and therefore not subject to the right of access. This severely curtails my ability to provide effective oversight of this exclusion. I still do investigate complaints about the application of cabinet confidences to the best of my abilities. In fact, in 2015-16, I was able to conclude, in 12% of complaints closed, that the cabinet confidences exclusion was not well applied, even without being able to see the records. I can tell you that consistently, year over year, that percentage varies between 10% and 20%, and that's without seeing the records, and it's only on cabinet confidences. Based on my experience, I am of the view that the committee will face difficulties in fulfilling its mandate if it cannot obtain relevant records.

In contrast to the committee, as the Information Commissioner of Canada, I have the authority to review records related to national security and intelligence. There is, in fact, a large discrepancy between the records that I can see and what the committee will be able to see. I have prepared a chart setting out those differences.

Based on my experience viewing those records, there is a tendency for institutions to interpret exemptions in an over-broad manner.

My final concern related to the exclusions at clauses 14 and 16 is that they include no explicit consideration of the public's interest in providing the committee with this information. A public interest component would require that the minister balance the public interest against the national security interest when deciding whether to disclose the information to the committee.

My third area of concern with the bill is found at subclause 15(3). This provision states that, after the appropriate minister receives a request for information, he or she must provide or cause the information to be provided to the committee “in a timely manner”. Similar language to this is used in the Access to Information Act, which provides that extensions in responding to access requests may be taken for “a reasonable period of time".

I have found over the years, as have all my predecessors in the last 30 years, language like this to be vague and open to abuse. In the access world, delay is a frequent subject of complaint by requesters. Where timeliness is at issue without resolution, requesters and I can seek redress from the Federal Court. Under Bill C-22, there is no such dispute resolution mechanism should information not be provided to the committee in a timely manner.

My fourth concern with the bill relates to the private nature of the committee's meetings. Clause 18 provides that:

Meetings of the Committee are to be held in private if any information that a department is taking measures to protect is likely to be disclosed during the course of the meeting or if the Chair considers it to be otherwise necessary.

This strikes me as an unclear threshold for the committee to go in camera and could easily result in nearly all of these meetings being private.

I next wish to discuss clause 22 of the bill.

This clause provides that the review bodies of the RCMP, CSIS and CSEC may provide information under their control to the committee related to the fulfilment of its mandate. In fact, these bodies are directed to co-operate with the committee at clause 9 of the bill.

However, this direction to co-operate and share information is weakened by clause 22(2) of the bill. This clause prevents the review bodies from sharing with the committee all the information listed in the mandatory exclusions at clause 14. It also prevents the review bodies from sharing information that a minister had decided to withhold from the committee, per clause 16. I have already voiced my concerns with clauses 14 and 16. It is my view that clause 22 compounds those issues and will prevent the review bodies from co-operating in a meaningful way with the committee.

The sixth area of concern I have with this bill is the final nature of decisions made by ministers. The bill prohibits the committee from seeking judicial review of a minister's decision. This can be found at clause 31 of the bill. I have concerns that giving the minister final decision-making authority could lead to overly broad interpretations of the law that favour non-disclosure to the committee.

I am concerned with how the Access to Information Act will apply to the secretariat of the committee. Bill C-22 proposes to extend coverage of the Access to Information Act to this new institution, which is designated with assisting the committee in fulfilling its mandate.

The purpose of the ATIA is to provide a right of access to all records under the control of institutions that are subject to the act, subject to limited and specific exceptions. Balancing the right of access against claims to protect certain information is clearly at the core of the access to information regime. Extending coverage of the act to the secretariat is a positive step and a positive aspect of Bill C-22 in ensuring transparency and accountability of this new institution.

However, given the way it is drafted, it is not clear to me how much information requesters will actually be able to obtain from this institution. Bill C-22, at clause 35, adds an exemption to the Access to Information Act that is, in my view, overly broad and could result in the secretariat having only the veneer of transparency. The bill proposes to exempt from the right of access any record that contains information created or obtained by the secretariat or on its behalf in the course of assisting the committee in fulfilling its mandate.

This is drafted as a mandatory exemption, which means that once the secretariat has determined that the exemption applies, it is under a legal obligation to refuse any kind of access.

My issue with the breadth of this exemption is three-fold.

First, the proposed exemption is mandatory. Discretionary exemptions are preferable because they allow for a balancing of factors, including the public interest in disclosure.

Second, it applies to any record that contains the protected information. When language like this is used in an exemption, it means that once it has been determined that a record contains protected information, the entire record is protected. This is the case even if only a small portion of the record actually contains information that legitimately requires protection. This essentially nullifies an institution's otherwise mandatory obligation to sever and disclose non-protected parts of a record.

Third, the exemption applies to any information obtained or created in the course of assisting the committee in fulfilling its mandate. This begs the question: what is considered to be assisting the committee on fulfilling its mandate? Does it encompass assistance of a more administrative, technological or financial nature?

One thing is certain: if we have to deal with a financial document that contains a mention of something that was said during a committee meeting and is protected, the actual text of the provisions means that the entire document must be protected. In my view, the exemption, as currently drafted, goes beyond protecting national security.

I have raised several concerns about Bill C-22, many of which have been raised by other participants in this committee review, that I believe will impede the committee in carrying out its mandate, but there are also relatively simple solutions to address these concerns.

First, there should be no ministerial override of the committee's review function.

Second, the committee should have robust access to records, with no limitations. This is necessary in order for the committee to properly fulfill its mandate.

I do not recommend giving the committee broad access to national security and intelligence information lightly. I am acutely aware of the security risks posed in sharing information like this. However, I would point out that, at my office, we are entitled to review records of any security classification, up to and including records that relate to signals intelligence. For all investigation files, security measures are put in place to meet the security classification of the records. In the 30-plus years my office has seen these records, we have never had a security breach. It is my belief that similar security measures could be put in place for the national security and intelligence committee and its secretariat.

It is also important to understand that giving access to information to the committee does not necessarily mean disclosure of the information to the public. In the event that limitations on the committee's access to information are deemed to be necessary, I recommend that a public interest override be added. This way ministers will be required to determine if non-disclosure to the committee is necessary and proportionate as compared to the public interest in having the committee review the information, bearing in mind the accountability function of the committee.

Third, there should be a precise number of days to provide information to the committee. In my experience, 30 days is generally sufficient time. Extensions should be available, but only with the permission of the committee.

Fourth, it should be clearly stated in the bill that the committee's meetings will be public by default. Meetings should only go in camera where a clear threshold is met, such as where disclosure of the information during a public meeting would be injurious to national security, and only for the length of time necessary.

The process would be similar to what we see in court, when they handle particularly sensitive cases. The open-court principle applies, and the court does not proceed in camera unless it is absolutely necessary.

Fifth, there should be no limitations placed on other review bodies when collaborating and sharing information with the committee.

Sixth, decisions made by ministers should be reviewable by the Federal Court. If, for example, there was a provision that made it possible to gauge public interest in the disclosure of the committee's information, those decisions could be reviewed by the Federal Court.

Hand in hand with this recommendation, I would also recommend that if it is determined that some exclusions to the committee's access to information are necessary, any disputes about the application of exclusions should be subject to judicial review. This will limit over-claiming of exclusions.

Finally, the exemption under the Access to Information Act for the secretariat should be discretionary and focused on protecting only the information that is subject to the review function of the committee.

I also recommend that the exemption protect only information and not any record. This is a nuance, but it is a significant nuance, in terms of having the ability to sever information that should be disclosed from the information that needs to be absolutely protected from disclosure. This will result in meaningful access to the secretariat.

Events such as the recent Federal Court decision regarding CSIS's retention of Canadians' metadata, the revelation that Quebec's provincial police have been spying on journalists, and the Snowden affair have eroded the public's trust in its security and intelligence agencies.

The work of the committee will be a key pillar in regaining that trust and increasing the accountability framework of our national security agencies. However, if we want the committee to be successful, it must function under an appropriate legal framework. At present, in my view, Bill C-22 does not strike the right balance between protecting the national security interest and maintaining transparency and accountability. In its current form, I do not believe the committee will be able to achieve its goals.

In closing, I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to present my views on Bill C-22, and I'm pleased to answer any questions you may have.

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

I'm very happy to call this meeting to order. This is the 45th meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security as we continue with hearing from witnesses with respect to Bill C-22, an act to establish a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. Before we begin, I want to thank the analysts for their summary of evidence from our national security framework study apropos of Bill C-22. I have read it once and found it to be a very helpful organization of information. Did everybody get that? It's a good piece of work. Thank you, both of you, I assume.

I want to welcome Madam Legault, the Information Commissioner of Canada, and Madam Gendron, the legal counsel. Thank you for accepting our invitation to join us today. We will begin with an opening statement from you and then we will turn to committee members for questions.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

Fair enough.

To the CBA, I was a bit worried about one of your comments about access to information. You noted:

The Canadian Bar Association opposes passage of Bill C-22 if it contains section 16, and recommends that section be deleted.

Clause 14 seemed to me to be a more worrisome clause, because it doesn't allow for any discretion to be exercised by the minister and doesn't have any additional criterion that would require the disclosure of the information to the committee to be “injurious to national security”.... It was mandatory.

We can look at the U.K., hearing from the ministerthat this committee is largely built on the U.K.'s experience. The minister does have discretion to veto providing information to the committee where it's sensitive information and where the provision or disclosure is deemed to be counter to the interests of national security.

I wonder if you could perhaps speak to why you're so worried about clause 16, and why the additional criterion of “injurious to national security” and the discretion that the minister would exercise—hopefully rarely, akin to the U.K.—is so worrisome. Why would you opposed the bill if it's not removed?

[Richard Fadden, As an Individual]

Thank you.

Thank you very much for having me here today. I'm particularly happy to be able to talk about a topic that I've thought about over the years.

I think the time has come for an effective role for Parliament in national security matters. Although this new role may not guarantee full public confidence in national security, I suspect that, along with the review bodies, the courts, and the media, Canada will be well on its way.

I would state unequivocally that substantive public confidence in the work of the national security entities is necessary if their work is to be effective. This is not only necessary for the public and for Parliament. If the national security agencies do not have the confidence of the public, then they can't do their work either, and this bill really should help.

Broadly speaking, I think Bill C-22 is a good document. To put it in different terms, if I were one of you, I would have quite happily voted “yea” at second reading.

Having said this, I have a couple of comments. Based on my time both as someone who has worked in national security and as someone who has worried about accountability issues and machinery-of-government issues, at the meta level I would argue that what's needed is post facto review, not the ongoing oversight of national security operations. We sometimes forget that oversight is characteristic of the United States' system of governance, and we shouldn't adopt it here lightly. It's not something that we do commonly in Canada, and just because the Americans do it doesn't mean that we should adopt it.

Clearly, now the work of the committee would extend to operations. I would note that it's not the case in Australia. Also, in the case of the United Kingdom, it took them several years before they gave their equivalent committee access to operations. My advice would be, let's take it slowly and see how the committee does.

To put this into context, the only people in Canada who really know a great deal about national security are ministers and officials. It's a very complex and complicated area. It seems to me that to ask a committee to start off by doing everything from legislation to operations is taking a bit of a risk. I would argue that, to the extent that you allow the committee to carry on in operations, it would be helpful to have some sort of declaration, which says that it should not do so in a way that would interfere with the effectiveness of the work of the various committees.

The bill retains the review bodies and also retains the role of the courts. I appreciate that the burden would vary between the three and four core national security agencies and those who are involved in the periphery, but I do want to suggest that it's worthwhile thinking about the burden that is imposed. The national security departments and agencies exist to promote national security, not to provide opportunities for oversight, review, evaluation, and audit. I'm making a bit of a joke of it, but it's not all that funny when you have a multiplicity of bodies all looking at the same thing, sometimes at the same time.

I think it would be worthwhile if the committee were to consider providing additional guidance in the bill to the committee and the review bodies on the nature of their relationship. If I recall correctly, even Mr. Goodale, when he spoke to you, suggested that this was a potentially problematic area. The bill could say that the review bodies' annual reports are to be tabled in the committee, that the chairs of those committees are susceptible to being called before the committee, and that there be a requirement that the work programs of everyone are to be shared with everyone else.

I make this point in part because over the years I've had a fair bit to do with statutory officers. They tend to take their statutory duties fairly seriously, and a general injunction to co-operate, even with full good behaviour and good intent, may mean that there will be difficulties in the relationships between the review committee and the bodies.

My last point relates to the protection of “special operational information” as it's defined in the Security of Information Act. The bill says that the minister may refuse to disclose such information. I would argue that special operating information, a large chunk of which comes from our allies, is so sensitive that the protection should be reversed and that it should only be released with the specific authority of the minister. It's not so much information about what is being done; it's often information on how things are done, in terms of technical information. I'm not sure the committee would need this all the time.

In any event, it's important that the committee, as previous witnesses have said, has not only the support of Parliament, the public, and the agencies, but also that of the allies. We need to make sure that organizations in countries with which we share information are absolutely certain that this is a reasonable bill and that their information will be protected.

As I said at the beginning of my remarks, I think this is generally a good bill. It will benefit not only Canadians but the national security departments and agencies.

I hope my comments are helpful. I'd be glad to try to answer any questions you might have.

Thank you.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thanks to both of you. This committee is very fortunate to have the benefit of your evidence today.

Mr. Portelance, I want to begin with you. You mentioned during the course of your opening remarks that you had some concerns with regard to clause 9 of Bill C-22 and the absence of a sufficiently articulated architecture when it comes to the oversight of national security.

Can you elaborate on that? What are the principles of architecture that you think that the government and, by extension this committee, should be taking into consideration when we talk about enhancing oversight and accountability?

[Anil Kapoor, Special Advocate, Kapoor Barristers, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair and members of the committee. I'm happy to be here.

In particular, I want to address you from the perspective of a special advocate—which is part of what my practice entails—in relation to this bill, Bill C-22. This piece of legislation is crucial to public trust in our security intelligence apparatus.

Commissioner Paulson said as much on November 1 when he said that it's “vital” to the success of the RCMP and their mission that they have the trust and confidence of Canadians in their ability to do their job. Michel Coulombe said on the same date that it's important that there be “an informed discussion” so that people understand “the threat environment that's out there in terms of classified information”.

What is the threat? What are the gaps in the tools that are available to us? From the CBSA, we hear that trust is absolutely essential. From the CSE, we hear similar comments, and in particular, that this will provide this committee, namely, a nice opportunity for the security and intelligence community to speak with one voice, and the committee will have an opportunity to strategically look at the community as a whole.

People are looking to this committee as possibly funding what I call a trust deficit—possibly. There exists a trust deficit today, and we know this from any number of decisions from our courts about the conduct of the RCMP, the conduct of CSIS, and, most recently, Justice Noël's judgment, where he said this:

...in regard to the CSIS’s duty of candour, I conclude that it had an obligation, beginning in 2006, to fully inform the Court of the existence of its collection and retention of associated data program. The CSIS also had the duty to accurately describe this program to the Court. The fact that it did not do so until 2016...amounted to a breach of the...duty of candour.

In my view, you can't have a situation where an intelligence agency for 10 years does not tell the court what is going on. This committee, potentially, if properly constructed, can go some distance to recovering that trust deficit. How do we do this?

You've heard from my colleague Kent Roach and from Professor Forcese. They had the three components to the overall security review process, with the committee of parliamentarians being one. Another was a consolidated and enhanced expert review body, and you heard their evidence on that point. You also heard their evidence about the need for an independent monitor of national security law, built on the U.K. or Australian model. But today I want to address you on the three fundamental aspects of this bill. There are three components that I think you should consider. One I call the architecture of the bill. The other is who is on the committee. The third is support for the committee.

Let me deal firstly with the architecture of the bill. There are many things you have read in this bill that people have testified before you are problematic. Most strikingly, I would say, from my perspective as a special advocate, is the fact that this top-secret cleared committee can have information withheld from it. We have had this problem in security certificate cases from the beginning, where the service has not provided us with information that we are entitled to. It took us all the way to the Supreme Court of Canada in Harkat and in Charkaoui number two to get proper disclosure.

That sort of—how can I put it?—passive-aggressive approach from the service just cannot be acceptable with this committee. This committee, those of you who may be on it, will be top-secret cleared. You can be trusted with the information. It's no different from what the Supreme Court of Canada said in Harkat about special advocates. They said, “The special advocates...have the ability to distinguish between...public and confidential” information. They said, “The judge should take a liberal approach in authorizing communications...”. In other words, special advocates can be trusted. Committee members can be trusted.

What's the difference, frankly, if you're on the government side of the House and you're sitting on this committee, and then a week later the Prime Minister appoints you the Minister of Public Safety? The day before that happens, we can't get inside the kimono, and the day after, it's open kimono. But you're the same person: you're able to maintain a secret.

In my view, this notion that the minister and these agencies can withhold information from this committee ought to be rejected.

One example is the example that Michel Coulombe gave in his evidence. It is interesting, because what was put to him was about “injurious to national security”. The example he gave was highly operational. Just for your reference, it's from November 1, at page 17, and he said:

I could provide an example.

...Take, for example, what happened on August 10. Had that lasted for three or four days and had it been a counterterrorism investigation—fast-paced with a lot of resources involved—and had resources been assigned to send information to the committee, that would have been a distraction from the operation....

I agree. If you're in the middle of an operation, the last thing you want to be doing is dealing with a review committee. The review committee is meant to review things that have happened, so I have no problem with that kind of operational postponement of information, but the test, “injurious to national security”, has a particular meaning in law, and it is far broader than that. Also, it applies when an operation is concluded.

It can be to protect foreign agencies. It can be to protect sources. Part of your job as a committee may be to inquire into the service's handling of sources, and the appropriateness with which they do so, and you ought to be able to. There's a difference between what you learn in closed...and what you put in a public report. In my view, parliamentarians, top-secret cleared, are capable of making that distinction, just as special advocates are.

Who is on the committee is the next point. This is unglamourous work, trust me. I've been involved in a lot of these national security cases, both on CSIS work and on security certifications, and when I was commission counsel on Air India. It is hard work, it is laborious, and it takes a particular aptitude to get into the weeds and then to be able to get out of the weeds. When you staff it with your committee members, you need that kind of person: someone who is rigorous, diligent, and has the aptitude for what I call unglamourous and rather bookish work.

Finally, on support for the committee, this is crucial. This committee of parliamentarians cannot do this job without a properly staffed secretariat, and I mean this. You are all busy people. You have other things. You have constituents. You have all kinds of things going on. You need to be able to rely upon the secretariat to properly brief you and to give you direction on where the bodies are hidden, to use the vernacular.

How are you going to do that? Well, you need a competent, highly skilled director of the secretariat—I think that's what they called it—and then you need to staff it up. How do you staff it up? It can't be government lawyers, obviously, so you staff it up with relatively junior and highly skilled people, who are top-secret cleared, to do what I call the grunt work. Then, I suggest, what you need to have are two or three senior counsel who are top-secret cleared and who can direct the inquiry, provide it with focus and shape, and ensure that your staff does what you want the staff to do.

Then you will be briefed. I don't think it's appropriate for counsel to examine witnesses. I think the committee ought to examine witnesses. You will be briefed and you will make your decisions as a matter of policy on what you want to cover. You may have matters one to ten and you may choose to cover one to four, but you will be expertly briefed and able to execute on the questions.

Most particularly, you will not be co-opted by the agencies. You will not. This is a real concern, because they will come in and they will talk to you about the threat level and all the things they need to do. You need to guard yourself against it. Some of it you may accept, and some of it you may not, but review must be skeptical. You can go back to what Justice Noël said about ten years of a lack of candour. That can't happen. You can stop it. You can deal with the public trust deficit.

Thank you.

[Luc Portelance, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for inviting me here today to speak to you in support of your study of Bill C-22.

I must admit that this is a new experience for me. I have appeared before this committee before, always as the representative of a government department, and this is the first time I've done so on my own. I have a very brief opening statement, and I look forward to the committee's questions afterwards.

I am aware, of course, that in your deliberations you've already heard from a number of witnesses, including experts from various fields, who have mostly endorsed the creation of a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. Let me add my voice of support by stating that I, too, welcome this significant addition to our national security review architecture.

I believe that Minister Goodale, in his testimony, mentioned how this piece of legislation is part of a broader suite of changes required to our national security framework. In fact, the current consultations undertaken by the government are likely to yield a significant public debate around investigative capabilities, privacy, and accountability.

Review is of course a critical element of this complex ecosystem. In many respects, Bill C-22 is the beginning of the broader debate, and the committee of parliamentarians, once created, will have a significant role to play in defining the future of national security in Canada.

As many have said, the legislation as currently drafted is not without some imperfections. You've already received useful advice about the scope of the mandate, exceptions and exemptions, coordination, and other critical clauses.

Thus, as I appear before you today, it strikes me as most useful if I approach my comments from the perspective of someone who was the subject of review for 24 years at CSIS. Of course, I also bring with me the perspective of having led the Canada Border Services Agency for a number of years, an organization whose apparent absence of external review has come under some criticism.

As such, there are only two issues I want to bring to this committee's attention this afternoon.

The first is a question about the value proposition for Canadians. How does this committee differentiate itself from the existing mechanisms, and what might success look like a few years from now?

Some would say that the mere creation of this new committee is a major step forward. Perhaps, but from my perspective, it's less about creating a new review body and more about creating a new mechanism for accountability, transparency, and support. In fact, more review will not necessarily mean better review, unless the committee understands and remains laser-focused on its value proposition.

As currently worded, clause 8 of the bill supports the committee's purpose of bringing about a greater level of accountability and public confidence. Craig Forcese, in his earlier testimony, accurately suggested that Canada—unlike the U.K.—doesn't have a solid track record of accounting for events, other than episodic enquiries over the past 10 years. I believe he is right, and the new committee will fill this important gap, particularly as a result of its broad horizontal reach.

It's important to remember, however, that accountability applies equally to departments and ministers, which should guide your consideration of potential modifications to clause 16 of the bill.

Similarly, I would avoid the temptation to list organizations that fall under the committee's purview, and, rather, let the evidence lead the way, as suggested by MinisterGoodale.

A critical element of the value proposition must also include what I refer to as “support”. A mature, experienced committee of parliamentarians will be invaluable in determining whether our national security agencies are adequately tooled and resourced to keep Canadians safe.

Whereas paragraph 8(a) does reference several administrative elements the new committee could review, there is no reference to performance, effectiveness, or adequacy. This may not require explicit mention, as long as this aspect of the committee's mandate is implicitly understood.

While agencies will not stand in the way of increased scrutiny, they will welcome the opportunity to explain their challenges to a receptive but critical interlocutor whose views can shape national security policy.

The value proposition of the committee is encapsulated in two paragraphs of clause 8, which speak to the what but not really the why. Most stakeholders would benefit from greater clarity, as will the new committee, as it seeks to position itself.

My second issue and my key area of preoccupation is the absence of a well-defined overall review architecture and the simplicity of clause 9 as currently drafted. Frankly, I see this as a considerable risk, and one that should not be left to the review committees that are taking reasonable steps to co-operate. Unquestionably, the brunt of agency review will still be conducted by the existing review bodies.

As stated by a previous witness—I believe it might have been Ron Atkey—the new committee will not be a substitute for a detailed review. The relationship between the review bodies—the complementarity, the hierarchy, if any, and the dependencies—should be clearly articulated.

Poor alignment in terms of access, along with the inability of existing review bodies to follow the thread horizontally, are bound to create friction. Any confusion, particularly duplication, redundancy, and lack of coordination, will unquestionably impact the agencies under review. Although these things may sort themselves out over time, there is a real risk that operational capacity will be impacted while review bodies assert their mandate with no mechanism to arbitrate. The government should likely re-examine everyone's roles and mandates, including those of parliamentary and Senate committees whose mandates cover national security and public safety.

In conclusion, there was a prevailing view at CSIS that the existence of SIRC since its creation in 1984 ultimately made the service better. In today's threat environment, with rapid advances in technology, diminishing investigative capacity, and pressure for more transparency and accountability, this new committee of parliamentarians must quickly find the balance between seemingly competing interests. Ultimately, its value will be measured on its contribution to the betterment of Canada's safety and security.

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

I'm very happy to call to order this 44th meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security as we continue our study of Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and make consequential amendments to certain acts.

We're getting down to the short strokes on this study of the bill.

We're delighted to have two witnesses with us for this first hour: Luc Portelance and Anil Kapoor.

Do you have a preference for who goes first? I think we'll start with Mr. Portelance for 10 minutes, and then go to Mr. Kapoor. Then we'll have questions from the committee members.

[Tamir Israel]

Very briefly about that, the independent arbitrator for Bill C-22 on disagreements, some, including us, have called for a mechanism to allow disagreements to be referred to the Federal Court. The Federal Court has expertise in making these decisions.

Just very briefly, yes, absolutely, some agencies have retention limitations on an ad hoc basis that apply to certain subsets of information they collect, but an overarching retention limitation in the Privacy Act would provide for a more principled and across-the-board process. CSE has some retention limitations that are imposed on it, depending on the type of data it's collecting; CSIS doesn't have any, or didn't until recently; and the RCMP does not have many. It's very ad hoc now, and imposing an overarching principled retention limitation with the Privacy Act that applies to everything would make it a more consistent obligation.

[Wesley Wark]

Mr. Bratina, under Bill C-22, the ultimate discretionary authority-holder is the Prime Minister, and the proposed national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would be beholden to the Prime Minister in certain instances with regard to the information they can access and information they can report on. Again, I think many people who commented on Bill C-22 believe that it's perhaps over-broadly written and that it could be narrowed in terms of those restrictions. But it's important to say that the essential dilemma of parliamentary scrutiny of intelligence and security revolves around secrecy, and the need to both access secrets, in order to make sense of the security and intelligence world, and to protect secrets in the interests of Canadian national security. Bill C-22 legislation tries to find a fix to that difficult dilemma.

If I can come back just for a minute to your question about retention, it's absolutely true that most information these days is digitally maintained. There are still a lot of paper records around, particularly on higher-level decisions, memoranda to cabinet, and that kind of thing. But I would disagree with my colleague Tamir about the fact that there are no retention schedules. There are plenty of retention schedules. The problem is that they are not legislated and they're not available in the public domain, but the mechanism that is used to enforce retention schedules is ministerial directives to the agencies of the security and intelligence community.

One of the things I have pressed for in various circumstances, including with regard to CSE, is that some of those ministerial directives around retention of information could be made public without endangering national security to reassure the Canadian public that information is not being kept in an abusive and overly long way. The retention mechanisms do exist; they just are, unfortunately, and perhaps in some cases necessarily, secret.

[Wesley Wark]

I should say to the committee that I have testified on Bill C-22 in front of the other committee. To make a long story short, I think there could be some useful amendments to kind of restrict the powers of the government on a discretionary basis and to impose restrictions on information that could be accessed and information that could be reported on by the committee.

That said, even with no amendments to Bill C-22, I think it's a great start and long overdue, but I'm hoping there will be some amendments of that kind.

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Do you think for the oversight committee proposed in Bill C-22, it hurts the credibility of that committee as an oversight organization that government is able to censure what information committee members will receive?

[Wesley Wark]

Thank you, Mr. Blaikie. I had the pleasure, once upon a time, of meeting your father. I just wanted to say hello.

There are various mechanisms in place. We're in the business, as you all know, of reforming and thinking about reforming the system. But the place to start with regard to SCISA and making sure that the government can be held to account for how this scheme is operated, even if it's amended, has to be proper record keeping.

Unless there's a paper trail, a digital trail, we'll never be able to do any accountability, and the Privacy Commissioner has made this suggestion in his annual report. That's one thing.

There is an issue of ministerial accountability as well. I note that the public safety minister, in recent testimony to the public safety committee, on the back of the Privacy Commissioner's annual report, said he has sent a letter out to all his cabinet colleagues encouraging them to ensure that all of their departments involved in SCISA are maintaining proper privacy protections. That's a step, but on its own, I think, it's an inadequate step, important as it might be.

So there's record keeping and ministerial accountability. Again, I would come back to the importance, certainly for the broader Canadian public, of transparency provisions that are part of the legislation. There is a mandated requirement to provide an annual public report from the relevant minister, in this case probably the public safety minister, on the operations of SCISA. It should be a meaningful report.

Then finally, there's the question of agents of Parliament and independent review bodies. Agents of Parliament, such as the Privacy Commissioner, clearly have a role to play. The Privacy Commissioner was trying to indicate that he has some resources but perhaps not enough. I know the Privacy Commissioner's office well. It's not my place to speak to it, but it has very limited resources on the national security side.

With regard to independent review, as everyone will know, the problem is that we don't have an all-encompassing independent review system. We have these siloed mechanisms that independently deal with CSIS, are meant to deal with the RCMP on the national security side but haven't yet, and deal with CSE, yet there's nothing for CBSA and many of the other core security and intelligence systems.

I think we're all at the point where we recognize that the system of independent review, which we've inherited over the years, is a legacy system that's not functioning well, and there are various proposals on the table for how to change it.

On top of that, a new committee of parliamentarians, if Bill C-22 is passed in Parliament, will be an added element in that picture of accountability.

[Daniel Therrien, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for inviting me to discuss the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, or SCISA, which was enacted under Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015.

When Bill C-51 was introduced in Parliament in early 2015, I expressed strong reservations, which remain true today. In my remarks this morning, I'll briefly summarize these reservations and will then encourage you to review national security information sharing issues more broadly. Finally, I'll explain the review we have undertaken of how SCISA has operated so far and how other legal authorities are used by federal institutions to share information for national security purposes.

My first point is that the justification for SCISA should be made clearer. I recognize at a general level that greater information sharing may sometimes lead to the detection and suppression of security threats, but we have yet to hear a clear explanation, with practical examples, of how the previous law prevented the sharing of information needed for national security purposes. A clearer articulation of the problems with the past law would help define a proportionate solution.

Second, I remain concerned that SCISA authorizes information to be shared where it's merely relevant to national security goals. Setting such a low standard is a key reason why the risks to law-abiding citizens are excessive. If the necessity or strictly necessary criteria is adequate for CSIS to collect, analyze and retain information, as has been the case since its inception, it's unclear to us why this standard can’t be adopted for all departments and agencies with a stake in national security. Necessity is the international privacy standard.

On a side note, the issue of standards leads me to the preamble of the act, which you discussed with government officials last week. This preamble indicates that information is to be shared among departments in a manner that is consistent with the charter and the protection of privacy. However, this is not a true legal standard, but rather a wish or a pious hope.

As we indicated in our submissions to Parliament last year, we believe that effective privacy protection requires more than guiding principles that don't have the force of law. It requires the adoption of real legal standards. The obligation to disclose information in a manner that is consistent with privacy protection should therefore become an enforceable legal standard, as is the case with the rules governing the disclosure of information. To that end, SCISA should adopt not only the principle of necessity, but also that of proportionality.

Third, independent review of information-sharing activities is incomplete, given that 14 of the 17 receiving institutions under SCISA don't have dedicated review bodies. A parliamentary review, such as the one suggested by Bill C-22, will help but is insufficient. All departments involved in national security also need to be reviewed by independent experts.

Fourth, retention rules should be clarified. If the government maintains that the sharing of information about ordinary citizens—such as travellers or taxpayers—is necessary to identify new threats, national security agencies should be required to dispose of that information after these analyses and when the vast majority of individuals have been cleared of any terrorist activities.

Fifth, the law should require written information agreements. Required elements to be addressed in these agreements should include the personal information being shared, the specific purposes for the sharing, and limitations on secondary use or onward transfer. Other measures should be prescribed by the regulations, such as safeguards, retention periods and accountability measures.

While SCISA was an important addition to the Canadian legal framework related to national security, it is intended to be one element of a much larger whole. Limiting your review to SCISA will give you a very incomplete picture of national security information-sharing activities. I would therefore encourage you to also examine information-sharing with international partners and domestic information-sharing under legal authorities other than SCISA. Knowing more about other authorities will give you a better insight into whether SCISA is really necessary.

When Bill C-51 was tabled, I committed to examining and reporting on how its implementation would ensure compliance with the Privacy Act and inform the public debate. Our findings following the first phase of our review of the first six months of SCISA implementation are tabled in the most recent annual report. We have identified a number of concerns and offered recommendations. The OPC has concluded that the privacy impact of the new authorities conferred by SCISA was not properly evaluated during implementation, and we recommended that formal privacy impact assessments be performed.

The OPC also found several weaknesses with a Public Safety Canada guidance document intended to help departments implement SCISA. Although Public Safety Canada agreed to improve the guidance, no changes have been made a year after the OPC provided recommendations aimed at minimizing privacy risks. During our review, the OPC sent a questionnaire to all federal institutions to determine how often SCISA was used and, more particularly, whether it had been used to share information about persons suspected of terrorist activities or about law-abiding citizens. Most institutions told us that they had not used SCISA during the review period, but that they relied, instead, on other authorities.

So, there is information sharing for national security purposes, but most institutions told us that they are relying on other sources of authority than SCISA.

Five institutions told us that they have used SCISA for a total of 58 disclosures and 52 receipts of information. Institutions also told us that all SCISA information-sharing activities in the first six months following implementation concerned persons suspected of terrorism.

During phase 2 of our audit, we will review departmental records to verify whether that information is accurate and whether information sharing under authorities other than SCISA concerned suspects or persons not suspected of terrorist activities.

The goal of this review is to provide as clear a picture as possible on the use of SCISA, and other laws, in order to inform public and parliamentary debate as we head toward the government's planned review of Bill C-51. We would like that review of Bill C-51 to occur with a clear, factual, evidentiary basis, as opposed to simply a discussion of principles, however important the principles are.

With that, I would be happy to take your questions.

[Michael Doucet]

I think that would have to be defined once Bill C-22 is enacted.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

No, I don't need you to repeat what the mandates are. Thank you.

With regard to prescribing what have been called in the Arar report the “statutory gateways” for co-operation, we've heard from the minister that he would, I think, envision a scenario in which that's not explicitly spelled out in statute, at least in Bill C-22, and at least for now. He would rather see that develop organically between the committee of parliamentarians and SIRC. Let's spend a minute or two on that.

What does that look like? What does the memorandum of co-operation look like between the committee of parliamentarians and SIRC? Does it involve objectives? Does it involve principles? Does it involve triggers for co-operation?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

That makes perfect sense.

The mandate of SIRC is not defined the same as the mandate of the committee of parliamentarians is under Bill C-22.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Mr. Doucet, I'm going to start at the end of this and put a question to you. I wonder whether you see a scenario in which the committee of parliamentarians makes a request of CSIS, or through the minister, about an ongoing intelligence or national security activity and then, under the co-operation provisions of Bill C-22, turns to SIRC and says, “We think this might be a good activity for you to do a review on.”

[Alex Neve]

The point about human rights safeguards was a broader point about the need for there to be human rights safeguards for our entire national security framework. In the submission we made to this committee more broadly about the national security review, we highlighted five human rights safeguards necessary for our framework. One is that we have in place strong parliamentary review combined with, exactly what you were just discussing with Mr. Doucet, integrated agency-wide expert review. The two go hand in hand. I guess that would be one of the things we would say is missing here.

The other is that we've also made a recommendation that a key human rights safeguard across the entirety of our national security legislation needs to be to embed clear references to our international human rights obligations. That's why we've made the recommendation that with respect to Bill C-22, the mandate of the committee should be amended to make it very clear that one of the things the committee is looking for is to review for compliance with our international human rights obligations. The activities of national security agencies need to have that kind of a human rights review.

[Dianne Lynn Watts, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

To that point, in some of the discussions we've had across the country, it's been brought up many times that the committee of parliamentarians can't get into the weeds on a number of issues, as you can, and that we should have a look at broadening that mandate so that there's the overarching parliamentarian group and then the one that's underneath. I want to get your comments on that.

With the human rights safeguards, Mr. Neve, you mentioned that Bill C-22 is lacking those safeguards. Can you let us know what it is you would specifically want to see embedded in there?

[Michael Doucet]

It has hampered us in the sense that in our post-9/11 era, our intelligence agencies are working much more closely together, and they co-operate much more than they have in the past. As they're co-operating more, we cannot follow the thread of information when it goes from CSIS to another one of the agencies. It doesn't necessarily hamper our view of CSIS or CSIS activities, but it hampers our view broadly on the intelligence community.

My understanding, in looking at Bill C-22, is that the committee of parliamentarians will have that broad access across the 17 agencies that deal in national security information. They probably won't go to the depth we go to.

We're on record at various committees saying that we are hampered, and we call it following the thread of information from agency to agency.

[Nicola Di Iorio, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

Bill C-22 provides for a review after five years to contemplate that it will have acquired institutional expertise after five years and that, therefore, we could complement it and add to the powers of the committee and eliminate some other restrictions that it contains.

Have you seen this institutional expertise being developed over time that enables—

[Alex Neve, Secretary General, Amnesty International Canada]

I am daunted.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and committee members.

Amnesty International very much welcomes the opportunity to share our views and recommendations with you on this very important topic.

Let me begin by highlighting where we start any time we enter into a discussion about national security, and it is to say the obvious but the necessary, which is that respecting and upholding human rights is not an obstacle to protecting national security in any way. It is, in fact, the very key.

That is why throughout the consultations and reforms under way right now we have been urging the government to move toward adopting a human rights based approach to national security which would have three dimensions to it. The first is that the regard for human rights is recognized as a foundational pillar to our security framework; second, that there are human rights safeguards adopted as part of the national security framework; and third, that provisions in our laws and policies that fail to conform to either national or international human rights obligations must be reformed. That human rights approach is what guides our response to Bill C-22.

Review bodies and processes play very important roles in boosting human rights protection in any context. Authorities who are aware that their actions are subject to scrutiny may take greater care not to commit human rights violations. Lessons learned will help avoid human rights violations in the future. Public confidence and trust increases the odds that officials will respect human rights. There may be potential to curtail violations, even while they are occurring, and human rights violations amounting to criminal conduct may be exposed and lead to accountability.

The need for review is particularly great when it comes to government action in the realm of national security for obvious reasons. National security agencies have considerable powers that have the potential for very serious impact across a range of human rights. National security agencies around the world abuse those powers in ways that have resulted in serious human rights violations. The operations of national security agencies are shrouded in secrecy. They make the potential for abuse of powers all the greater, and because of that secrecy, national security agencies are shielded from the full force of other forms of scrutiny that generally bring human rights concerns into the public realm, such as the role played by the media, civil society, and even the courts.

Amnesty International first expressed concerns about significant gaps in Canada's national security review apparatus while we were responding to the case of Maher Arar over 12 years ago. It was obvious from the very beginning that existing review bodies which might have been an option for him or his family had inadequate powers, and they were hampered by not being able to carry out reviews in a coordinated way that examined the ways in which security agencies worked together. There was also no clear means of turning to parliamentarians for review and remedy. There was truly nowhere to turn, and the only means forward became the costly and extraordinary step of convening a public inquiry, which lasted for over two years.

During the Arar inquiry, we urged that national security review in Canada be strengthened in two fundamental ways: first, by instituting a review role for parliamentarians; and second, by establishing a comprehensive national security review process that would ensure all agencies are reviewed by bodies with adequate powers that are able to work together in an integrated fashion.

That is what Justice O'Connor recommended in his 2006 report. Ten years later—it has been a decade—we have Bill C-22, which is very welcome, but it only takes us partway. Amnesty has four key recommendations with respect to Bill C-22 and Canada's approach to national security review more broadly. The first two deal with what is in the bill; the last two deal with what is not.

First, this law must make it clear that national security review is intended to play a key role in upholding human rights. In that regard, clause 8 of Bill C-22 should be amended to specify that the mandate of the committee of parliamentarians explicitly includes reviewing the activities of all departments and agencies that relate to national security or intelligence to ensure conformity with Canada's national and international human rights obligations.

Second, we urge that measures be taken to ensure that the committee has access to the information it requires to conduct not just a review, but a robust review. That is the goal here.

We seriously urge changes to the following provisions: Paragraph 8(b) should be amended to remove the power given to the minister to bar review of activities he or she determines to be injurious to national security. The exceptions regarding the committee's access to information in clause 14 should be significantly scaled back, in particular, paragraph 14(b) with respect to ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations; paragraph 14(d) broadly covering information from which the identity of confidential sources can be inferred; and paragraph 14(e) with respect to ongoing law enforcement investigations that may lead to a prosecution.

Those exceptions are broad and each has the potential to go to the heart of what is often contentious and troubling in the relationship between national security and human rights. There are several important high-profile cases in which robust review could have helped guard against human rights violations, all of which would still be significantly hampered by those exceptions.

Similarly, the overarching power of the minister in clause 16 to refuse to provide information to the committee if it is considered to be special operational information or if the provision of the information would be injurious to national security should be removed. Why? National security review, to be effective, requires full access to all necessary information for the review body in question. That is vital because of the secrecy that surrounds national security agencies and their operations. If the review body cannot examine all relevant information, who can?

Of course there needs to be assurance that the committee will not disclose to the public information that should be kept secret for legitimate reasons. The provisions in clauses 10 through 12 of Bill C-22 provide that assurance, requiring committee members to be security cleared, prohibiting committee members from disclosing information, and removing parliamentary privilege for unlawfully disclosing information. That provides a sufficient legal framework.

Let me end quickly by highlighting two important aspects related to national security review that are not addressed by Bill C-22. Amnesty International urges this committee to press the government to go further with respect to both.

First, echoing the comments from Mr. Doucet, we too want to highlight how important it is to go beyond this important measure of instituting parliamentary national security review and ensure that independent expert review—horizontal review, as Mr. Doucet highlighted—is improved in Canada. The current approach is fragmented; bodies have uneven powers; in some instances there are no bodies in existence with respect to important bodies, and as has been repeatedly pointed out, those bodies are not enabled to work together in an integrated fashion. This is critical and it would be a serious shortcoming and in many respects stands to even hamper the efficacy and work of the parliamentary committee if this is not addressed.

Finally, as I noted in my opening comments, one of the important functions of review in any context dealing with human rights is to lay the groundwork for accountability when violations are exposed. A central component to accountability is ensuring proper redress for individuals who experience human rights violations in national security contexts.

Canadian practice here falls far short of what is required under international law. I consider two particularly notorious instances, both of which have attracted the attention of the United Nations. The first is the three cases that were examined by Justice Iacobucci in the course of his 2006-08 review: Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou El Maati, and Muayyed Nureddin. It has been eight years since that report was released, and there's still no redress for those three men for a series of serious human rights violations to which Canada did contribute.

Second, in 2008 and again in 2010, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled unanimously that Canadian officials had breached Omar Khadr's charter rights, stemming from their interrogations of him at Guantanamo Bay, knowing that U.S. officials were violating his internationally protected rights. Six and eight years after those two rulings, Mr. Khadr has received no redress.

Why do I raise this here? It is little comfort to establish new review processes without confident assurance that wrongdoing that is exposed will be remedied. Parallel to reforming the review process, therefore, steps urgently need to be taken to ensure fair redress for individuals whose rights have been violated through national security operations in the past.

Thank you.

[Michael Doucet, Executive Director, Security Intelligence Review Committee]

Chair and members, good afternoon and thank you for having invited SIRC to appear before you today to discuss Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act. Our chair, the Honourable Pierre Blais, sends his regrets for not being able to join us.

I'm joined by Charles Fugère, acting senior counsel and director, and Marc Pilon, legal counsel, both from SIRC's legal and registry services team.

This discussion on national security accountability is very timely. For months, there has been healthy public debate on the powers that should be given to our national security bodies, and in parallel, the checks and balances required to ensure these powers are used properly. The government’s proposal to create a national security committee of parliamentarians goes to the heart of this matter.

SIRC has been following this committee's work on Bill C-22 with much interest. We are aware that you have had very productive exchanges with government officials, legal experts, scholars, and practitioners.

Today, I hope to advance the discussion and to enrich your study of this bill by focusing on three key points: first, to outline the value of the work performed by expert review; second, to discuss SIRC's possible relationship with the proposed committee of parliamentarians; and third, to take the opportunity to discuss the notion of horizontal expert review for Canada's national security community.

I will not take much time now to describe SIRC's mandate and responsibilities. I will be pleased to answer any questions about our work following my remarks. I will simply state that SIRC is an independent external review body that reports directly to Parliament on CSIS's activities through an annual report.

SIRC has three core responsibilities: to certify the CSIS director's annual report to the Minister of Public Safety; to conduct investigations into complaints; and to carry out in-depth reviews of CSIS's activities. Simply put, SIRC is key in providing accountability for CSIS.

This brings me to my first point. SIRC and expert review bodies play a crucial role in ensuring proper accountability of our national security agencies. Allow me to briefly outline what we feel are some distinct benefits of expert review, namely independence, expertise, and continuity.

First, SIRC is an independent body that operates at arm's length from government. It acts autonomously in its decision-making, including in determining which matters to investigate and report on. This independence allows SIRC to make findings and recommendations in an impartial and non-partisan manner.

Second, SIRC's reputation and credibility are built on its expertise. Our full-time research and legal staff have access to all information under the control of CSIS, with the exception of cabinet confidences. Our staff devote their days to reviewing CSIS's activities in all programs and across the world. They also keep abreast of changes taking place at CSIS, not to mention political, legal, or other relevant developments in the environments in which CSIS operates.

Third, SIRC's reviews involve continuous, ongoing, and detailed examinations of CSIS's core operations. A true benefit of SIRC's model is its ability to provide this detailed level of scrutiny on an ongoing basis. Our reviews provide a series of snapshots of CSIS's activities that when taken as a whole and over time yield a comprehensive assessment of CSIS's performance.

Let me use a recent example to highlight the value of expert review. In early November, the Federal Court issued a public judgment regarding CSIS's retention of associated data unrelated to threats to the security of Canada. SIRC first brought this serious matter to the attention of the Federal Court.

In SIRC's 2014-15 annual report, which was tabled in Parliament in January of this year, we reported on our review of CSIS's use of metadata. One of the recommendations stemming from this review was that CSIS advise the Federal Court of the particulars of its retention and use of metadata collected under warrant. This recommendation, which was rejected by CSIS, caught the Federal Court's attention and triggered a series of events leading to the ruling. To borrow Minister Goodale's words, SIRC blew the whistle on this matter and had a vital role to play in accountability.

From our perspective, this case serves to illustrate the value of SIRC's work. More importantly, I would argue this case underscores the importance of expert review bodies such as SIRC being properly resourced. On this point, I can assure you we are working diligently to secure capacity funding for our organization to ensure we can continue to carry out our mandate effectively.

On the second issue I wish to discuss with you, our relationship with the committee of parliamentarians, SIRC looks forward to establishing a positive and productive work relationship.

Three year ago, before a Senate committee, SIRC noted the importance of a future parliamentary committee working lockstep and hand in glove with SIRC to avoid duplication and achieve complementarity. This position holds true today. For this reason, we are pleased that the proposed legislation explicitly states that the new committee and review bodies will take all reasonable steps to co-operate with each other to avoid any unnecessary duplication.

Overall, the goal of accountability benefits from having parliamentary oversight and expert review. The proposed new committee will examine the legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative, and financial frameworks for national security and intelligence. This means it will be well placed to examine large public policy questions and the objectives, policies, and programs of operating agencies, as well as the overall purposes of the government's national security policy. This high-level coverage will serve to complement the detailed, in-depth operational reviews carried out by SIRC.

There has been some discussion around whether there is a need to further frame the relationship between this new committee and expert review bodies. SIRC believes there is merit to maintaining some flexibility on this issue and providing the new committee and review bodies time to establish rapport and to define points of intersection.

Having said this, SIRC believes there are ways in which it could engage with this new committee.

For example, SIRC could share its annual research plan to the committee to make it aware of its research focus. It could appear before the committee to discuss its work, findings, and recommendations, or to provide briefings on topics in which it has expertise. SIRC could also provide clear value to the proposed committee’s functions in relation to the clauses that would limit its ability to review CSIS activities or access CSIS information.

For example, should the Minister of Public Safety decide that the committee of parliamentarians could not review a specific CSIS activity, following a determination that the review would be injurious to national security, or that the committee could not have access to specific CSIS information, SIRC would be uniquely placed, given its unfettered access, to the refused information and the reasonableness of this recommendation.

SIRC could also, under its own mandate, decide to conduct a review of the CSIS activity in question. SIRC would then be able to report its findings to the committee and to Canadians in its annual report. This would represent a key safeguard, considering the limitations being placed on the committee’s access to activities and information.

To summarize, we believe that expert review can complement and contribute to the higher level, broad oversight by a committee of parliamentarians. I have no doubt that there will be a mutual willingness by all parties to work together, and there will clearly be comfort that if the proposed committee is precluded from reviewing a CSIS activity or having access to CSIS information, then SIRC has the ability to review it and to report on it.

The third and final issue I wish to raise relates to the need for a horizontal expert review of Canada’s national security community. Without doubt, greater parliamentary oversight represents an important step forward for accountability. In our view, there remains an important gap in our accountability framework as it relates to the ability to carry out community-wide expert review.

Canada’s national security accountability framework has fallen out of sync with contemporary national security activities. Existing review bodies like SIRC are ill-equipped to review our increasingly integrated national security activities. For a number of years, SIRC has said publicly that it lacks the ability to carry out joint reviews with existing review bodies and to follow the thread of information as our mandate does not extend beyond CSIS.

These challenges underpin a broader structural deficiency and the siloing of review. It highlights the need for an expert community review body with authority to examine all national security activities. This is all the more important, as most of the departments engaged in national security activities are not currently subject to independent review.

While I appreciate that this issue falls outside the scope of Bill C-22, it is nonetheless appropriate to raise it here today, because it is intertwined with our discussion on strengthening national security accountability.

Let me conclude by thanking you for your dedicated work on this matter. The government has made a firm commitment to enhancing national security accountability. The SIRC looks optimistically ahead to having its work support and further this goal.

I'm happy to answer your questions.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

We're going to come back to order.

Welcome to our witnesses, and thank you for agreeing to appear and give your thoughts on Bill C-22.

Because it continues with the last panel, we're going to begin with Mr. Doucet from SIRC for 10 minutes. Then we will have Mr. Neve from Amnesty International, for 10 minutes, and then questions from the committee.

[Nicola Di Iorio, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Ms. Fournier-Dupelle, Mr. Therrien and Professor Leman-Langlois, thank you for your help.

Professor Leman-Langlois, you said that the mandate was too broad. You were referring to section 8 of Bill C-22. Is that correct?

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Are you saying that we should add something to Bill C-22 to define that?

[Daniel Therrien, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and members of the committee, for inviting me here to discuss this important piece of legislation.

I'm joined today by Leslie Fournier-Dupelle, a policy and research analyst in my office.

Our interest in commenting stems from the intersections between the work of this proposed committee and the work of my office. Let me say up front that the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada is supportive of parliamentary oversight for security and intelligence activities, which has been proposed many times in the past. While we applaud this as a long-overdue development, some amendments could be considered to ensure this new committee will be as effective as possible in this important area.

We understand that the committee would be mandated to review three main things: first, the legislative, regulatory, policy, and administrative and financial framework for national security and intelligence; second, any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security, but subject to a ministerial override; and third, any matter relating to national security and intelligence that a minister refers to the committee.

By and large, we believe the creation of this committee would contribute positively to the necessary discourse around the work of security and intelligence agencies which, due to their secrecy, can be sometimes ill-understood. Among the positive aspects of Bill C-22, this committee would ensure that Canada keeps pace with other democratic nations, most of which already have some form of parliamentary oversight.

There are very real advantages to parliamentary oversight, principally that it enjoys democratic legitimacy since membership is comprised of elected officials. It has the additional advantage of situating security and intelligence activities within the context of the whole-of-government actions or broader parliamentary priorities. As such, a committee of this kind is well placed to directly influence policies in that it can recommend passing or amending legislation based on its findings. Finally, it can oversee broader financial frameworks, such as value for money and resourcing issues writ large, which specialized oversight bodies cannot typically undertake.

That said, there remains a definite and ongoing role for expert oversight bodies, which, given internal knowledge developed over a period of time, are well positioned to undertake more detailed analyses of the operations of national security agencies. Furthermore, expert bodies with a complaints investigation function, such as my office, are well positioned to spot systemic concerns that can inform the conduct of audits and compliance reviews or otherwise provide a window into the workings of the agency for which they are responsible.

In order to effect meaningful review, these bodies must have the capacity for proactive review and to educate both citizens and stakeholders, be non-partisan, and acquire and maintain in-house expertise.

We note that the bill allows explicit cooperation between the committee and certain named security and intelligence review and oversight bodies, which partially addresses gaps identified in the O'Connor Commission. However, the bill stops short of authorizing the sharing of information between oversight bodies, which should be remedied in order to support effective review.

We have on several occasions called for integrated oversight between ourselves and our oversight colleagues, including the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which oversees CSIS, the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, which oversees the Communications Security Establishment, and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission which oversees the RCMP.

Given the fact that information--including personal information--is the lifeblood of national security agencies, my office has a relevant role to play in ensuring that a proper balance is struck between security and civil liberties.

As you know, we have deep and extensive expertise in the area of privacy and personal information, from which other review bodies could benefit. We continue to advocate strongly for an appropriate balance between privacy rights and public safety. Consequently, I would recommend that my office be added to the list of oversight bodies to which information could be disclosed by the committee.

I would add a final point on transparency.

We note that the committee's meetings are to be held in camera “if any information that a department is taking measures to protect is likely to be disclosed during the course of the meeting or if the chair deems its necessary”. In order for the committee's work to contribute to the public discourse on security and intelligence, in camera meetings should be the exception rather than the rule. It may be helpful to introduce a clearer threshold before a meeting is to be closed.

A helpful threshold, which appears in the CSIS Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and elsewhere, is if information “injurious to national security” is likely to be disclosed during the course of a meeting, then it would proceed in camera. This expression should be included in clause 18 of the bill, which discusses in camera meetings. I know that the expression “injurious to national security” has been discussed in this committee in order to determine if this limit should be imposed either on the mandate of the parliamentary committee, on the type of information the committee should have access to in the course of its work, or on the information that should appear in its reports.

I am aware of these discussions. I would be happy to answer your questions on that or any other topic involving the bill.

Thank you.

[Stéphane Leman-Langlois, Full Professor, École de service social, Université Laval, As an Individual]

Good afternoon.

My comments will be divided into three broad categories: first, I will make some positive remarks, then I will discuss some more negative elements, and finally, I will raise the very negative aspects.

I would like to specify that even if my presentation focuses on the negative aspects, the bill is very interesting overall and should be supported, with a few small amendments, however.

I would first like to emphasize the importance of Parliament overseeing intelligence and national security activities in their entirety. That is very important. Canada is a particular case in the western world, and I think it is high time we invested in the oversight of these activities. In the final analysis, we do this on behalf of the public, and parliamentarians should be involved in the oversight of national security activities. That is very important.

Another aspect of this bill that makes me very enthusiastic is the idea that the entity discussed today will focus on all national security activities. The committee will not be targeting, one, two or three organizations that are more readily associated with national security, but also several others that engage in national security activities, although that is not their main activity. These two aspects are very important, and in my opinion mean that this bill must absolutely go forward.

I will now discuss what I would describe as problems that concern the way in which the bill is structured.

First, I believe the mandate is much too broad. There is an intent to review all national security organizations, at every level and in every way, which is a plus, but if people try to submit all of that to the committee, the work will be very incomplete, in my opinion, and the committee will not be able to keep its promises.

Clause 8 refers to “reviewing the legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative and financial framework”, which is very relevant, in my opinion. That is the type of work parliamentarians have to do. They must ask themselves if the spirit of these laws is being respected when they are applied in these organizations, and whether the will of citizens is being reflected in the law and in practice. That is exactly the type of work parliamentarians must do, and it is incumbent upon them, in fact.

This is also work that is not covered by the current oversight mechanisms, such as those of SIRC and the CSE Commissioner. They are much closer to what happens on a daily basis and generally limit themselves to determining if, yes or no, the organization that is being observed followed the law, in other words, whether it complied with the general parameters set by law that apply in this case.

Parliamentarians must also ask themselves if the law in its current form is adequate or if it contains major gaps that mean that the organizations can commit certain abuses that run counter to the spirit of the law because it is drafted rather broadly.

In addition to ensuring that the activities of the CSE, SCIS or other organizations comply with the law, we have to ask whether the law governing these activities is the one we want as Canadians. I think that is the work of parliamentarians.

That said, subclauses 8(b) and 8(c) involve daily activities and operations. There are two problems. First, the subject is really complex and is far beyond the scope of parliamentarians. I don't want to pass any judgments on the parliamentarians who will sit on this committee, but you need some very advanced skills, if only to understand the alphabet soup they use, starting with the acronyms, such as CSE. I thus think that we are headed for disaster, or that this committee will serve absolutely no purpose.

In fact, this nine-person committee will have to examine so many activities and organizations that even with staff at their disposal, this will not be enough. We don't know what the budget of the committee will be. Even with an ideal budget, the activities that must be assessed and overseen are far beyond the capacities of the committee that is being created.

Furthermore, this is a duplication of what is supposed to be the work of the oversight organizations. These bodies, such as SIRC or the CSE, are supposed to review daily activities, down to the fine details of programs, to see what was done and whether any abuses were committed against anyone. I don’t think the parliamentary committee should deal with that. It should leave that to the oversight organizations and focus far more on other issues. For instance, it should determine whether the programs as a whole truly reflect the wishes of Canadian citizens, whether the laws are adequate, and whether the budgets are sufficient. In other words, to comply with the bill's mandate, the role of the committee should correspond to what is described in subclause 8(a), rather than in subclauses 8(b) and 8(c), which describe a much broader mandate.

In addition, the creation of this parliamentary committee adds little to what the oversight organizations are already doing. The parliamentary committee will add a grain of sand to the sandy beach of oversight.

If the problem is due to the inadequacy of the oversight of operational activities by oversight organizations, the solution is not to add a layer of political monitoring, but to improve the structure of those organizations and increase their budgets. The budgets of SIRC and the CSE have been stagnant for years and years. They represent a laughable fraction of the budgets allocated to national security activities. I do not think the solution to the lack of effectiveness or power of these organizations is to create an additional layer that will have a great deal of difficulty navigating all of this.

I see another problem regarding access to information. I think this has already been said before elsewhere. There are far too many restrictions on access to information. There is a whole slew of reasons that can be invoked to avoid parliamentary oversight. In light of the Security of Information Act, I think the committee is being granted investigative powers that will be easy to counter. I am not suggesting that the organizations being monitored would not act in good faith or would attempt to avoid this monitoring, but I think the law should cover all possibilities. We must not assume that the people who work in these organizations are angels and that they will be thrilled to be monitored. That may be the case, but we have to prepare for the worst case scenario, the one where people may actively try to avoid oversight. The act must be equipped and armed to deal with that.

There is also the restriction for cases where national security is at stake. I think there is a semantic issue here. The committee is supposed to examine activities relating to national security, but there is a restriction: if national security is at stake, it can't access the documents. So there is a real problem there, since there is no definition, it's just being thrown out there and is very vague. I think a situation could arise where all of the activities to be subject to the committee's oversight could fall under the national security restriction, and no documents would be made available to the committee. I think this is a good way of shooting yourselves in the foot.

I want to conclude by mentioning two things that are not issues contained in the bill as such, but constitute potential problems.

First, I am very concerned that after the government has adopted Bill C-22, it will put an end to the project to improve the oversight of national security agencies, that is to say that there will be no more oversight and the file will be closed, since there will now be the parliamentary committee. However, I am afraid that a lot of things may escape that committee.

I am also concerned that the impression may be created that the new, very broad powers that have been granted by the Anti-Terrorism Act will be adequately offset by this committee of parliamentarians which, as I said earlier, will not be able, operationally, to meet the objectives that will be set for it.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

I'm going to call this meeting to order.

This is our 43rd meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Pursuant to the order of reference of October 4, we are considering Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts. This is one of our ongoing meetings as we prepare for amendments and then eventual consideration of the act.

We're very pleased to have Professor Leman-Langlois joining us by video conference from Université Laval.

Also, we have the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Daniel Therrien, and Ms. Fournier-Dupelle, also from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner.

Our usual practice is to start with the witness who is coming to us by video conference just in case things fall apart, which they do from time to time. It will give us more time to get you back online.

For 10 minutes we'll hear from Professor Leman-Langlois. After that we'll hear from the Privacy Commissioner.

Take it away.

Freedom of the Press

[Thomas Mulcair, NDP, Outremont, QC]

Mr. Speaker, those journalists were on the Hill today calling for a full public inquiry.

The government has no right to spy on journalists, period. The Liberals are all talk and no action. They refused to conduct a public inquiry. They refused to repeal Bill C-51 and they refused to fix Bill C-22.

What concrete measures are the Liberals going to take to protect freedom of the press in Canada?

[Jean-Pierre Plouffe, Commissioner, Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner]

Chair and honourable members, I am pleased to appear before this committee on the subject of Bill C-22. I am accompanied by Mr. Bill Galbraith, the executive director of my office.

Before I make a few remarks about the bill this committee is examining, and since this is my first appearance before this committee, I will very briefly describe the role of my office.

You have my biographical note and a summary of my mandate, so I won’t go over them here, but I would like to say that I have found that my decades-long experience as a judge has stood me in very good stead in more than three years as CSE Commissioner.

Being a retired or supernumerary judge of a superior court is a requirement set out in the National Defence Act, the legislation that mandates both my office and the Communications Security Establishment.

The CSE Commissioner is independent and arm’s length from government. My office has its own budget granted by Parliament.

I have all the powers under Part II of the Inquiries Act which gives me full access to all CSE facilities, files, systems and personnel, including the power of subpoena, should that be necessary.

The commissioner's external, independent role, focused on CSE, assists the Minister of National Defence, who is responsible for CSE, in his accountability to Parliament, and ultimately to Canadians, for that agency.

Let me turn now to Bill C-22.

I have stated on numerous occasions that a greater engagement of parliamentarians in national security accountability is indeed welcome.

In particular, following the disclosures by Edward Snowden of stolen classified information from the U.S. National Security Agency and its partners, including CSE, the public trust in the intelligence agencies, and in the review or oversight mechanisms, was called into question. Those disclosures dramatically changed the public debate.

I believe that a security-cleared committee, along with the expert review bodies, such as my office and that of my colleagues at the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, which reviews the activities of the CSIS, along with the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission—the CRCC—for the RCMP, headed by Mr. McPhail, can provide a strong complementary and comprehensive framework for accountability of security and intelligence activities and can indeed enhance transparency.

I believe this committee will help restore and enhance public trust, but it will not be without challenges. Historically, the CSE commissioner was rarely invited to appear before parliamentary committees and the work of my office may not have received its full due. The committee of parliamentarians may help to focus attention on the important work of the expert review bodies. My office and I look forward to working with the committee and its secretariat.

For maximum effectiveness, however, the respective roles of the committee of parliamentarians and of the expert review bodies must be well defined, to avoid duplication of effort and wasting resources. In my view, this is of paramount importance.

Avoiding duplication was an obvious theme and I was pleased to see it stated in the bill, in clause 9 entitled “Cooperation”. The words are straightforward but we will have to work closely with the committee secretariat to ensure this happens in practice. The objectives, to my mind, are to ensure comprehensive overall review and encourage as much transparency as possible.

I have some thoughts on how we might begin a productive relationship with the committee and its secretariat. Perhaps we can explore this issue during our question period.

There are, however, some points that should be discussed. I have a number of observations about various parts of the bill. The three-part mandate of the committee, provided for in clause 8 of the bill, is very broad in relating to any activity that includes operations as well as administrative, legislative, and other matters. As written, this will be another reason why we must work closely with the committee from the outset to ensure the rules are defined in practice, and not just to avoid duplication, but to ensure complementarity.

I am not privy to the government’s intentions with respect to this broad approach. However, the combination of this three-part mandate could adversely impact the effectiveness of the secretariat’s work. The committee will have to establish its priorities. And again, this is where the committee and the review bodies can work closely together for effective overall accountability.

What is clear is that the government wants to have a review of the national security and intelligence activities of those agencies and departments not currently subject to review. It is critical for effective review to maintain the capacity for expert review that we have now and to develop it for those agencies and departments not currently subject to review. This could be done by establishing another review body or bodies, or dividing them among the existing review bodies. The committee of parliamentarians will, I expect, turn its attention to this issue.

As I read the bill in its current form, it is clear that the committee does not have the same freedom of access as my office or, for that matter, as SIRC. In paragraph 8(b) the committee can review “any activity” that relates to national security and intelligence “unless the appropriate Minister determines” otherwise. This provides a potential restriction on what the committee may or may not see.

This is where I believe the complementarity between the committee and the existing review bodies comes in, with reassurance that the latter have unfettered access to the agencies they review. The gap is the departments and agencies not yet subject to review.

In conclusion, I would suggest a couple of small changes to provide clarity, and I could provide these in writing subsequently, if you so wish, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today. My executive director and I would be pleased to answer your questions.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

That's extremely helpful to our committee. Thank you so much.

In the remaining one minute, could you comment on a potential relationship between the Bill C-22 committee and the NCIU of the Canadian Forces?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

To get back to some of your testimony regarding operational activities, how do you interpret the proposed mandate of the committee of parliamentarians as articulated under clauses 4 and 8?

I took several notes during the course of your evidence, which would seem to suggest that you don't think there are sufficient tools currently within any of the existing civilian oversight—for example, SIRC—to shed some light on the intelligence products, as you've described them.

This is a two-part question. One, do you think the mandate of the committee of parliamentarians under Bill C-22 captures the exercise that you think needs to be there in the review of intelligence products? Two, if not, what do you recommend we do with the bill?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Ms. Carvin, for your presentation.

I want to pick up on your last recommendation, the fourth one, and turn your attention to subclause 21(1) of Bill C-22, which on the face of it would indicate that

the Committee must submit to the Prime Minister a report of the reviews it conducted during the preceding year.

Do you see that as sufficient assurance that there is a reporting obligation on the committee of parliamentarians to provide information to the Prime Minister, and through the Prime Minister, to the House of Commons, about their activities for the preceding year? Or are you suggesting that there needs to be something else?

[Professor Stephanie Carvin, Assistant Professor, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual]

I thank the committee for inviting me to speak today.

Before I begin, I would, in the interest of disclosure, state that from 2012 until 2015 I worked as an intelligence analyst with the Government of Canada. My views are shaped by this experience, as well as my academic research on national security issues.

However, with regard to the matter at hand, Bill C-22 and the question of intelligence oversight and review, I would like to speak to issues that have been somewhat less prominent. My presentation will therefore proceed in two parts. First, I will address three issues that I believe the committee should consider as this bill goes forward: efficacy review of intelligence analysis; counter-intelligence and foreign influence; and, communications with the public. Second, I will provide four recommendations.

The first issue is efficacy review and intelligence analysis. I am presenting these remarks almost two weeks after it was discovered that the CSIS operational data analysis centre, or ODAC, had illegally kept metadata and conducted assessments with it. While this issue largely refers to data collection and retention, it also speaks to the role of intelligence analysis within the Government of Canada.

We have frequently heard that CSIS's early 1980s mandate no longer reflects technological realities, but intelligence analysis was never discussed in the first place. Other than noting in subsection 12(1) that the service

shall report to and advise the Government of Canada

on national security threats, the role of intelligence analysis is barely given any consideration in the CSIS Act. There is no guidance as to how this role should be done, how intelligence should support operations, or in what way advice is to be given. There is no formal or consistent intelligence analysis review.

In short, there is little accountability within much of the intelligence community as to the delivery of intelligence products, how these products are produced, or whether those products are delivered in a timely manner. Additionally, there is no way of knowing how intelligence products are used, or if they adequately support internal operations or policy-making. Further, there is also no way of knowing if analysts have the proper equipment, tools, or training they need in order to produce their assessments.

I believe the committee proposed in Bill C-22 can play a role in helping to address these issues by becoming the first body dedicated to intelligence analysis efficacy review in Canada.

Second, thus far the discussion around reform of our intelligence agencies and oversight has largely referred to terrorism and surveillance, not espionage or foreign influence activities. Counter-intelligence work requires a different set of skills and activities than counter-terrorism does. For example, counter-intelligence activities can have an impact on foreign policy, and vice versa.

Therefore, the proposed committee could assess how well our foreign policy and national security agencies coordinate their activities, or whether intelligence services should be more frank regarding the activities of foreign governments on Canadian soil. Without a doubt, it is challenging to air these issues in public; espionage and foreign influence can be a source of diplomatic headaches and embarrassment. Nevertheless, they should not be left out of the conversation and the consideration of Parliament as Bill C-22 goes forward. This is especially the case as investigating these issues may require going outside the intelligence community in Canada as traditionally defined.

Third, the proposed committee has the potential to be one of the most important communication tools the government has with regard to providing Canadians information on national security. Unfortunately, at present, there are very few ways in which security agencies are able or willing to communicate with the broader public. Worse, in recent years, it has been a trend for national security agencies to publish their reports infrequently or erratically. For example, CSIS has not produced an annual—now a biennial—public report since May 2015, which covered the period of 2013-14. Public Safety Canada's public report on the terrorist threat, the sole multi-agency report on threat activity in Canada, appears on a more regular basis, but does not cover non-terrorism-related activity.

It is my hope that the committee's report will help remedy this gap and become a powerful communication tool that can help improve knowledge and generate trust. I see this manifesting in two ways.

First, it could become a central source of information on the current threat environment that Canada faces. That this would come from our elected parliamentarians would in my opinion contribute to an overall improvement in the understanding of national security issues in Canada. Second, an honest assessment of activities of our security agencies will generate confidence that our national security services are operating within the letter and spirit of the law.

For the second part of my presentation, I will now present four recommendations.

First, it is imperative that Parliament consider the wider context in which Bill C-22's committee will exist and the broader roles it can play in generating trust. Oversight and review of national security agencies is and should be the fundamental focus of the proposed committee; however, I would encourage parliamentarians to think broadly about the role it may play in communicating information and building trust.

Second, with regard to analysis, the committee should, as a part of its mandate, ensure the quality and timeliness of intelligence analysis to support the government and policy-making by holding the executives of national security agencies accountable. Additionally, it should also include review of innovative techniques, such as big data analytics. This would of course require a secretariat that is knowledgeable about these issues and that could advise committee members. This will help transform intelligence analysis from a second thought to core activities supporting policy-makers.

Third, while it might have to be done behind closed doors, the issues of counter-intelligence, foreign influence, and cyber-intrusions need to be given greater consideration in terms of how the committee will handle its mandate. This includes ensuring that these operations are well coordinated with other agencies and departments such as Global Affairs Canada, which might shape the scope and mandate of the proposed committee.

Fourth, the committee should be required to publish its findings every 365 days without exception. Everyone sitting here today knows how easy it is for government reports to fall through the cracks and miss deadlines. Nevertheless, as I have already stated, the committee's report will be a crucial tool in communicating to Canadians. The more frank and honest these reports are, the better informed the debate over measures to counter Canada's national security threats will be.

In this sense, I'm very much supportive of MP Murray Rankin's proposals regarding the committee, as stated in his speech to the House on September 27.

Thank you for your time. I'm happy to answer any questions or hear any comments you may have.

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Good afternoon, and welcome.

I'm calling to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, which is our 42nd meeting of the 42nd Parliament.

We are continuing our study of Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to other acts that are implicated.

We welcome Stephanie Carvin, assistant professor at The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, and her class, which is with her today, both for learning, hopefully, and for moral support.

Thank you for joining us at our committee meeting today.

Justice John Major was meant to be a witness today as well; however, our time is Eastern Standard Time, and he is on Mountain Time, which puts him two hours out. We may be able to track him down, but if not, we will reschedule him at another meeting.

We will begin with Ms. Carvin. You have 10 minutes, and then the committee will ask you questions.

Privacy

[Michel Picard, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Madam Speaker, I would like to thank the hon. member for his question regarding Canada’s privacy laws and the challenges faced by law enforcement in an era where communications technologies are changing rapidly. As the hon. member knows, these are important issues.

On the one hand, our law enforcement and national security agencies need to be able to collect information and evidence to investigate crimes and protect our national security. At the same time, we must ensure that the authorities that we give these agencies are consistent with our values and our rights and freedoms as set out in the charter.

As well, it is vitally important that the government work with the private sector to ensure that organizations take appropriate steps to protect the information that they receive from Canadians.

That is why the government has launched two sets of consultations. The first set of consultations on cybersecurity was launched on August 16. As hon. members know, the cybersecurity landscape is constantly evolving, and our government is committed to ensuring that Canada is an innovative leader in cybersecurity while also keeping Canadians safe online.

We heard from thousands of Canadians on the cyber security threat and how we can capitalize on the advantages of new technologies and the digital economy. That consultation wrapped up recently, and Public Safety is analyzing the many submissions.

The second set of consultations on national security was launched by both the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness on September 8. These consultations are an invaluable opportunity to engage Canadians on Canada's national security framework. They are an important step toward fulfilling this government's commitment to review Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015.

As part of the consultations on national security, we have invited Canadians to provide feedback on a number of different issues, including how best to ensure that our law enforcement and national security agencies have the tools they need to protect Canadians while simultaneously ensuring that Canadians' rights, including privacy rights, are protected.

We are also inviting Canadians to provide their thoughts on how we can ensure that our national security agencies are accountable to Canadians, and a range of other issues.

We have already begun to make important changes in this regard with the introduction of Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act. If passed, Bill C-22 would, for the first time, enable parliamentarians to meaningfully review the activities of our national security agencies.

The Government of Canada has two fundamental duties: to protect the safety and security of Canadians, and to uphold the Constitution to ensure that our laws respect the rights and personal freedoms we enjoy in this country.

I look forward to a diverse and vigorous debate on these issues. I hope that hon. members of this House will join Canadians in participating in these important consultations.

Public Safety

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, in the committee, we have already indicated that we are willing to consider all constructive ideas and amendments.

However, I would point out that the powers presently drafted in Bill C-22 do provide the committee of parliamentarians with the authority to examine current operations.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

I acknowledge my debt.

Mr. Forcese, The Globe and Mail just reported that a Federal Court ruling says CSIS has illegally retained sensitive data on Canadians over a 10-year period. This is the second time in three years the courts have found that CSIS has breached the duty of candour and hidden information from judges. Some of this stems from the powers in Bill C-51.

Professor Forcese, what does this ruling mean in terms of the need to repeal Bill C-51 and strengthen Bill C-22?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

I actually want to take you to task on that because one of the things that you're advocating for today is levelling the access playing field.

As I look at SIRC and its mandate in the CSIS Act, and I look at the committee of parliamentarians in Bill C-22, they actually do not share the same mandate. I think we could talk a bit about whether or not the parameters are more focused for SIRC, but the point is that they're not identical and that may offer a plausible explanation as to why access would not be the same. In other words, it may very well be that as the committee of parliamentarians gets its footing, in a scenario like the one I've just described, where it would find that it did not have access, it would rely on existing civilian oversight—and we've heard that from Professor Atkey, for example—as a way of referring a matter to that body for the purposes of investigation.

Let me hear your thoughts on that.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

Things playing out organically is the Canadian way, otherwise known as muddling through. It's suboptimal because it creates unnecessary conundrums. Ron Atkey, in his prior testimony, raised concerns about the degree of interface that's now possible, given the current drafting of Bill C-22, between the expert review bodies and the committee.

While there are gateways anticipated, those gateways themselves would be subject to the constraints on access to information by the committee. You could imagine the awkward scenarios that might arise.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Professors Forcese and Roach thank you for your testimony today.

I want to start by thanking you both for your public support of Bill C-22, although I understand from your testimony that it comes with certain qualifications, and that's part of why we're here, to discuss those qualifications and to see how we might improve on this bill.

On any reading of Bill C-22, this new committee of parliamentarians will be bestowed with a rather broad mandate. You would agree with that sentiment, would you not?

[Prof. Kent Roach]

Yes, if there was only one amendment, it would probably be to clause 14, that is, to take out paragraph (g), just to argue that the new parliamentary committee needs the same access as SIRC has, but also needs to work as closely as possible with SIRC, the CSE commissioner, and the RCMP review body. Indeed, I think there is some potential that the secretariat of the new committee, which I think will be critical to its success, could work with those existing review bodies that have the confidence of the agencies. Although the idea of having to win trust from the agencies is not a particularly palatable one for an affected parliamentarian, I think that reforming clause 14, which, as my colleague has said, is a very broadly defined no-go area, will undermine public expectations about what a parliamentary committee could do, say, with respect to something like the Afghan detainees, while working closely with the existing review bodies.

I guess one of my greatest fears about Bill C-22 is that it could lead people to think that this is somehow duplicative of the work of the existing review bodies. The Arar commission found that the review structure was inadequate in 2006, and it could be seen to be much more inadequate today after Bill C-51. There needs to be a very close relationship between the new committee and the existing review bodies. I think this will benefit the executive watchdog review and will help the new parliamentary committee to gain credibility while being educated about where they should be placing their limited resources and time.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

You avoid this issue if you pursue the course that I've suggested, which is to remove clauses 14 and 16 and go with the SIRC-style language about cabinet confidences. You don't have this issue anymore, because now you've moved beyond the dilemma posed by the U.K. language. If you were to persist with some kind of qualification on access to information, I'm not sure I would be as fully comfortable with the U.K. model as were some of the prior witnesses, in part because, if you look at the description, it's quite open-textured, and so the scope is potentially, in practice, broader than the enumerated list that you find in clauses 14 and 16.

In practice, though, the one distinguishing feature in the U.K., as I understand it, is that there's not an absolute bar, and so there's no equivalent to clause 14. Clause 14 in the current Bill C-22 says that you don't get this information ever, regardless of any exercise of discretion by the minister. In the U.K. context, the exclusion of information is discretionary, and the memorandum of understanding with the government and the ISC says that discretion will rarely be exercised. So, if you're going to retain a limitation on committee access to information, remove the idea of absolute bars; leave it as discretionary, and try to circumscribe the conditions under which that discretion would be exercised.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

You mentioned the U.K., so I'd like to turn to access to information with respect to the U.K. committee. My understanding is that information can be excluded from the committee if it's sensitive information and it's information that, in the interests of national security, should not be disclosed to the ISC. Sensitive information is then specifically defined. In Bill C-22, we don't see any dual test; it's just “injurious to national security” and it's completely undefined.

Would you speak to how we might be able to improve it? Should we adopt language from the U.K. if we're to go down that road, or should we just leave it as “injurious to national security”, without any definition whatsoever?

[Prof. Kent Roach]

Picking up from my colleague who addressed the access to information issues, I want to stress the importance of making the committee as non-partisan as possible and ensure that it has as much expert assistance as it needs.

Starting with subclause 4(2) of Bill C-22, I think there needs to be attention paid to ensure that there is not government domination of the committee. I think subclause 4(2) is a good start, certainly something that we don't see with other parliamentary committees, but of course as members know, the representation in the Senate now is evolving. I think it would be important to make this as nonpartisan as possible.

That brings us to clause 6, which contemplates that the chair of the committee would effectively be a prime ministerial appointment, as opposed to what you heard about in the last testimony, whereby the U.K. allows the members of their committee to elect their own chair. It is a bit concerning that this provision is there, especially when the Prime Minister also plays such a key role with respect to possible redactions from reports. Those features are an area that perhaps should be looked at, in keeping with trying to make the committee as non-partisan as possible.

I would also add that I agree with Mr. Atkey's suggestion that, rather than have the Prime Minister, you would in an ideal world have a neutral third party make a decision about what can go in and what can go out of a committee's report. Like the Federal Court, that provision can balance the competing interests of national security and transparency. Given that such may not and is not likely to be the case, there is a concern about potential government domination of the committee, which could be one factor leading to increased partisanship.

Second, the committee rightly has a very broad mandate, which relates to activities carried out by all departments involving national security or intelligence. This is the sort of whole-of-government mandate that was given to the Arar, the Iacobucci, and the Air India inquiries. I think it is very appropriate, given that we have an all-of-government approach to security. That said, we should not underestimate the steep learning curve that any person would have in exercising an all-of-government mandate.

In this respect, I think it is positive that the proposed committee, unlike most other parliamentary committees, is going to have a dedicated secretariat. I would urge that the secretariat be composed in such a way that there would be the maximum of flexibility in hiring staff, that the secretariat be able to use independent legal advice, be able to use the cadre of security-cleared special advocates, who could pop in on an as-needed basis. Obviously this committee's mandate will evolve over time. At certain times it will need certain expertise, and at other times it will need other expertise. The secretariat, in my view, should be less based on a permanent civil service model than a hire-as-required model.

Those are two of my thoughts about how to create conditions for success for the committee. In addition to full access to information, I think those are critical criteria for success, but it is also critical that the right people be available to assist the committee, and that the committee be as non-partisan as possible.

Thank you very much.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

Thanks very much.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you. As noted, Professor Roach and I have coordinated our presentations.

I'm going to start off by focusing on why we support Bill C-22, and then outline a key concern, some of which you've heard in the prior presentations, namely the proposed committee's access to information.

Let me begin by looking across the Atlantic. In November 2014, the United Kingdom Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliamentarians published a 200-page report on the intelligence relating to the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby by two terrorists on the streets of south London. That report concluded that seven different security agencies had flagged the two terrorists as persons of interest. Errors were made in these operations, although even without these mistakes, it was unlikely the services would have been able to predict and prevent the murder of Fusilier Rigby.

The report also considered, however, the wider policy implications of its findings. It drew lessons learned and recommendations on how interagency relations could be improved.

Juxtapose this with the situation in Canada. Just over two years ago, Corporal Nathan Cirillo and Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent were killed by terrorists in separate incidents, including the one that terminated in Parliament itself. We have no public accounting of any real sort of what happened. What did our services know? Why did they make the decisions they did? What are the lessons learned? At best, we have a heavily redacted accounting of the security systems on the Hill, as if the questions concerning national security started only when the terrorist entered the parliamentary precinct.

We do not, in other words, do lessons learned exercises well in Canada. Judicial commissions of inquiry such as that concerning the treatment of Maher Arar or the much delayed review of the Air India bombing investigation are episodic, and once they end, their recommendations usually die with them.

Our existing expert review bodies, meanwhile, are stovepiped to individual agencies and incapable of conducting seamless reviews of operational activities that cross agency boundaries. Their focus is usually on compliance with law and policy, what we call propriety review, and they rarely make recommendations on what we call efficacy questions, that is, how well our national security systems work, and especially work together.

That is why we support Bill C-22. It invests parliamentarians with a serious national security accountability function for the first time in Canadian history, and in that respect, aims to catch up to a role legislators now play in essentially all western democracies. Even more critically, it opens the door for the first time to all-of-government review by a standing body able to follow the thread of its inquiry across departments and to conduct efficacy review, as well as the more classic propriety review. This body will endure, and will be capable of follow-up in a manner impossible for ad hoc commissions of inquiry.

But we support Bill C-22 with serious caveats. The success of the proposed committee of parliamentarians will ultimately depend on three criteria.

First, the parliamentarians undertaking this role must be able to perform their functions in a serious-minded manner, in good faith, and without regulatory capture by the agencies. We need, in other words, the right people. Second, parliamentarians will, in practice, be part-time participants on the review committee, and turnover among parliamentarians will occur, especially between parliaments. A stable, well-resourced expert staff is required to ensure continuity and institutional knowledge, and to ensure that the committee can actually function. Third, the committee must have robust access to secret information.

In my remaining moments, I wish to emphasize this third axiomatic point. Unless the committee can access information allowing it to follow trails, it will give the appearance of accountability without the substance. On this point, unfortunately, if enacted in its present form, the proposed Bill C-22 committee will not be as robust a reviewer as are the existing expert bodies, at least on paper.

For one thing, its capacity in paragraph 8(b) to delve into the actual operational details that are a necessary focus of proprietary review is subject to a veto by the executive. Prior witnesses focused on this issue.

Also, the committee will have a much more limited access to information than at least two of the existing expert bodies. There are two principal reasons for this.

First, under clause 14, there are classes of information the government will automatically deny the committee. Take the example of paragraph 14(b) concerning military intelligence. Again, this was raised by the prior witnesses. I would hazard that this exclusion would mean that the parliamentary committee could not delve into the Afghan detainee affair in any full manner, meaning that we would still be left without any independent body able to get fully to the bottom of that matter.

Likewise, take the example in paragraph 14(e) concerning “ongoing” law enforcement investigations. These can endure essentially indefinitely. The RCMP, even now, decades later, still has an active law enforcement investigation into the 1985 Air India bombing. Even now, the new committee could be denied information concerning the disastrous security and intelligence community conduct in relation to Canada's most horrific terrorist incident.

Even the exception in paragraph 14(d) dealing with sources is potentially far-reaching. The reference to inferences opens the door to carving away considerable swaths of information, especially if the government applies its infamous “mosaic theory”; that is, it posits that individual units of information that are themselves innocuous should not be released since they could be stitched together by an omniscient observer to reveal sensitive information—in this case, informer-identifying information.

On top of that, there is an additional limit: clause 16. It gives every minister responsible for an agency whose information may be in play a limited veto power, allowing the minister to deny the committee something called “special operational information”. The items listed in this concept appear at first blush to be modest in scope, but again would have the effect of excluding information on things like Afghan detainees. There is also that open-ended word, infer, in the governing statute and cross-referenced by Bill C-22, that is, the Security of Information Act, which inevitably would have the effect of greatly broadening the universe of information that ministers can deny the committee.

There are three layers of constraint on the new committee of parliamentarians being an effective review body: clause 8 in paragraph (b), clause 14, and clause 16. It is this triple lock on parliamentary reviews that I feel could well make the committee of parliamentarians stumble.

In sum, Bill C-22 opts for a model that treats parliamentarians as less trustworthy than the often former politicians who sit on SIRC, or the judges who hear security cases, or ministers who sit at the apex of the security and intelligence services. It is not at all clear to me why security-cleared parliamentarians sworn to secrecy, subject to the criminal penalties of the Security of Information Act and stripped of their parliamentary privileges in terms of defending against those charges, are less trustworthy than their former colleagues who often staff review bodies.

I would strongly urge, therefore, amendments that would place the committee on the same footing in terms of access to information as these review bodies: full access to information except for cabinet confidences.

Thank you for your interest.

Opposition Motion—Preferential access to government

[Candice Bergen, Conservative, Portage—Lisgar, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to the motion my party put forward today. One day a week Conservatives get a chance to bring forward a motion that we feel is important and that needs to be talked about.

Right now, Canadians are concerned about jobs and the economy. We looked at this issue and out of respect for Canadian taxpayers, this place, and each one of us as parliamentarians, my party felt it was very important to bring this motion forward today and to deal with it, once and for all. We have been having a very difficult time getting any answers during question period and all we are hearing from the government is what would be described as the doubling down defence of its position.

I will be sharing my time today, Mr. Speaker, with the member for Edmonton West. I look forward to his remarks.

There seems to be a pattern with the Liberals, which we have seen very clearly from the outset. The Liberals say what they think people want to hear. They say what they believe the general public would like to hear. They certainly say what the media would like to hear. They say what they think will sell well on Facebook and social media. They do a very good job of that. Then, in action, they do the exact opposite. We have seen that over and over again.

For me, the examples that have really jumped out are in the budget. Liberals were going to run a very small deficit. Now they are running a massive deficit, without even any discussion of going back to a balanced budget. Whether one agrees or disagrees with that position, the Liberals have said one thing and then done something completely different.

Something I believe in very strongly is this. A policy of the Liberals is to nave a gender equal cabinet. They have said one thing and done another. I find it very insulting that they have given all of the women junior positions, without the same responsibility or ability to manage their departments. I am very black and white, I admit that. I see things in life, and there is not always a lot of grey. It is black or it is white, and with the Liberals it is always grey. They say one thing and then do something completely different.

We saw it with Bill C-22, which would apparently provide oversight for CSIS. The Liberals made a big show about providing this oversight, but, again, this group has no ability to oversee CSIS and the Prime Minister whitewashes all of the reports. It is the typical Liberal way of saying one thing and then doing something completely different. That is exactly what is before us today with respect to the Liberals' approach to ethics and cash for access at which they have been very good.

Let us talk about what happened.

This started very early on last year when we noticed that the Minister of Justice was having big fundraisers in Toronto with lawyers. We immediately said that there must be some mistake, that she must not have realized that it was a contravention of the code of ethics that the Prime Minister himself had set out.

Those of us of this side who were in government knew that because as soon as ministers were sworn in, we were immediately told by the prime minister what he expected of us. He gave us guidelines with respect to avoiding conflicts of interest and told not to raise money with lobbyists or our stakeholders. He expected us to follow those guidelines.

The former prime minister, Stephen Harper, was a man of principle, a man of character, a man who, when he said something, we knew he would do it. No one ever questioned his word. When he said he wanted his cabinet to avoid conflict of interest, even the appearance of a conflict of interest, he meant it. We knew what that meant and we followed it. We were not raising money off the backs of our stakeholders. I will give an example.

When I was minister of state for social development, my portfolio included issues to do with people with disabilities. I was going to Newfoundland to deal with a housing agreement related to my housing portfolio. At the same time, lo and behold, there was going to be a fundraiser. It was not for the Conservative Party or any political party. It was for a wonderful cause, helping people with spinal cord injuries. I was asked to attend that fundraiser as minister of state for social development.

However, I knew the guidelines that the prime minister had set out. I knew how important it was that we follow those guidelines and stay away from even the appearance of not following them. Therefore, I did what most of my colleagues did during our time in government. We wrote to the Ethics Commissioner and asked for her guidance. She gives soft guidance and hard guidance.

Here is what her office told me. In its letter, it said, “in light of the above, I advise that the Minister not speak at the event in her personal capacity since the association is a stakeholder of her department. As I also mentioned, in the examination report for Minister Glover”, and I will pause here because members may recall that Ms. Glover was a former minister in our former government. She errantly started to do a fundraiser with some stakeholders. It came to light and she immediately cancelled it, returned the money, and got an opinion from the Ethics Commissioner. That is called ethics.

I will go back to what the office of the Ethics Commissioner said, “the commissioner indicated that it is inappropriate for stakeholders of Minister Glover's department to be invited to make donations in order to attend a fundraiser at which the minister was also present.” These are not my words. These are the words of the office of the conflict of interest commissioner, saying that cash for access was inappropriate. That was her advice.

The letter went on to say, “I realize that the Spinal Cord Injury Association event is not a political one; however, they are still a stakeholder of the Minister's that received funding from her department”.

The advice was not to attend, so I did not attend. I was extremely disappointed. It would have been a real joy and a privilege to attended. I am going to repeat a quote that it is important, “Ethics is knowing the difference between what you have the right to do and what is right to do.” That seems to be where there is a huge lapse in judgment by the Liberals.

I will bring us right back to the motion we presented to the House. This is not about what is legal in terms of what Elections Canada says. Of course the Liberals can take donations from every lawyer, every lobbyist, every mining executive. They can take $1,525 from every one of them and they will not break the law. Congratulations, that is what it means to be a Liberal.

On this side of the House, we are not talking about the Liberal absolute lowest standard, just trying to reach the lowest bar ever. Have the Liberals not changed at all? How about the higher bar they set for themselves? I will read about that higher bar:

General Principles

Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries must ensure that political fundraising activities or considerations do not affect, or appear to affect, the exercise of their official duties or the access of individuals or organizations to government.

...no preferential access to government...

...no singling out, or appearance of singling out, of individuals or organizations as targets of political fundraising because they have official dealings with Ministers...or their staff or departments.

It is in black and white. This nonsense that the Liberals keep spewing that it is Elections Canada is absolutely ridiculous. I am embarrassed for them. The only thing I will say is that this is sad for democracy and sad for accountability. Frankly they can keep doing it because Canadians will see through it. Canadians are not dumb. They were fooled by Liberals once. They will not be fooled again with this kind of typical sponsorship entitlement where the Liberals will keep saying one thing, do something opposite and get away with it. It is not going to work.

[Ron Atkey]

It's five years, that's correct, but some have suggested that some review be held in three years. Some have suggested in five years. My big concern is that Bill C-22 is all you're going to do and that everything else is too delicate and too difficult to fix. If you do Bill C-22, the government has fulfilled its mandate on its promises during the election—

[Wesley Wark]

Historically, we do have a siloed system. We've created independent external review bodies that are focused on a particular agency of the government, SIRC for CSIS, the CSE commissioner for CSE, and what is now the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for aspects of the RCMP. Many other elements of the security intelligence community, as Mr. Atkey has pointed out, have not been subject to independent review. When we talk about a siloed system for review, or “oversight” as some people call it, that's really what we're referring to.

What Bill C-22 does is partly fix that problem by giving this proposed new committee of parliamentarians the opportunity, with the mandate written into Bill C-22, of taking a very broad look at all of the agencies of the security intelligence community. My only caveat about that is simply the cautionary reminder that while it can do that, it won't be doing that most of the time. There are going to be core agencies they need to look at, and maybe Parliament and the public of Canada need to understand that as it's written out legibly in the legislation, these are the key agencies that matter, but it will have that strategic level look.

The piece of work that remains—possibly for this committee, in the context of looking at the national security framework and the green paper, and possibly for the government down the road—is that it's one thing to create a committee of parliamentarians, but what are you going to do about the legacy review accountability mechanisms, including these siloed agencies and the relationships between the proposed committee of parliamentarians and other standing committees in terms of what they will look at? There is a lot of work that needs to be done. The Minister of Public Safety has referred to this a bit by suggesting he's open to the idea of creating something like a super-SIRC or bringing the siloed agencies together as a different layer of review.

I think the government has focused on Bill C-22 as it's first act in this field, but I think more work will have to be done.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Thank you.

I'm going to continue a little bit on clause 14 with Mr. Atkey.

You talked about this earlier. Clause 14 has a number of those exceptions Professor Wark talked about, exceptions to the right to have access. They're pretty well understood by the security community. You talked about the identify of sources, as a great example. In most cases, the identity of sources would not be necessary to do the work, but in some cases, it may be crucial in assessing whether an agency was operating effectively and appropriately. For instance, it might matter a great deal whether a target was a journalist.

In your view, do you think we should carve out permanent exceptions, as Bill C-22 does, to the committee's access, or should we broaden access and let the committee work with the agencies on a case-by-case basis to determine whether operational details are required? I think that's what you said the experience of SIRC was.

[Wesley Wark]

If my memory serves me correctly, we also conducted a round table on Ms. Murray's bill, which you took part in.

Putting it in context, we were aware, at the time, those of us who assisted Ms. Murray in drawing up the private member's bill, that the private member's bill had no chance of passage, so we were trying to design an ideal scheme. Part of my advice to the committee today is that you may not need an ideal scheme in the current circumstances, because you're going to get, finally, a committee of parliamentarians. but there is some fine tuning that can be done.

Don't get hung up on membership. The key issue here for the committee, whatever you emerge with in terms of rules on the election of a chair and how members are appointed, is that as long as you're satisfied that this works for you as Parliament, in terms of the House and Senate, then I think you're probably good, as long as you get good people.

I would agree, in many respects, with my colleague, Ron, that there are ways the legislation could be fine-tuned in terms of both restriction to material and the refusal to allow the committee to publish. Without having to redesign the wheel on all that, my suggestion to the committee is to have a comparative look at the British legislation, which is a product of experience that we haven't had. The U.K. intelligence and security committee legislation, particularly the changes made in 2013, provide a good model for us. We don't have to follow it slavishly, but it is a simpler, clearer model of both restrictions on reporting and restrictions on access, which I think we could usefully borrow from.

If I could take a minute and beg to differ slightly with Ron Atkey on clause 14 of Bill C-22, I'm not sure that we should just let clause 14 entirely fly. In particular, it would remove from the purview of the committee, among some technical areas of information, such as FINTRAC and the Investment Canada Act, and this is under paragraph 14(b), “information respecting ongoing defence intelligence activities”, etc. I think you have to be careful about letting that stand as written, because the ability to review defence intelligence activities in a retrospective sense is going to be very important to the committee, because, in fact, the Department of National Defence's intelligence agency is the largest single agency in the Canadian government.

I'm going on and stealing Mr. Rankin's time, so I'll just end on that.

[Ron Atkey]

Based on experience, sometimes you can over-legislate, and you're looking for too many exceptions. In my experience in dealing with CSIS over five years and subsequently with the Arar commission and as a special advocate, CSIS wants to protect two things at all costs. I think this is true of other security agencies within the government as well. One is their human sources, which they call the holy grail, what we want to protect. The other is methods of operation. They don't like to disclose the particular methods of operation to anyone they don't have to do so.

We would have long meetings with CSIS and we'd ask where they got this information. They would reply, “From a source in Vancouver”. We'd ask who was the source. They would reply that they'd prefer not to tell us. They would acknowledge that we had the right to that source if it were fundamental to our investigation, but there would be discussion among top secret security cleared people back and forth as to what was appropriate. In many cases, CSIS would persuade us that we did not need to know the particular name or address of that source or the methods of operation, because some of them were quite sophisticated. Some of them were related to simpler surveillance under wiretap legislation. We did get to know that. Now most of that is in the public domain.

A healthy tension existed between the review body and the agency, and it worked. From time to time there might have been disputes. In our CSIS act, we had the power to get anything within the body of CSIS, except cabinet confidences. We honestly never felt that we were frustrated, except in one situation that I can explain to you. In 1989 we wanted to have an inquiry into Air India, because CSIS wasn't being totally forthcoming with us on what was going on with Air India. We had many meetings back and forth. CSIS had to remind us—and it was there in the legislation, as our lawyers told us—that our jurisdiction only related to CSIS and the trail related to security accountability, which led into the RCMP and other agencies like Transport Canada. It was a more complicated type of situation, which ultimately was not resolved until the appointment of John Major and the Major commission in the next century. That was the only time we came to a fundamental disagreement.

We were right in our hearts but wrong in law, because the CSIS act said we shouldn't go into that. Sometimes, as in Bill C-22, there is a tendency to over-legislate, because this is new and it's a fresh step. But to be bold, a committee of parliamentarians, if they're supposed to do their work, should all be top secret security cleared. Having gone through a top secret security clearance with fear and trepidation on three occasions, it's not that bad. That should be fundamental for a committee of parliamentarians, and they should have access to everything, except confidences of the Privy Council.

[Wesley Wark]

Certainly. I think it's the clear intention in the mandate provided to the committee of parliamentarians that CBSA, along with other security and intelligence departments and agencies, would fall under its purview. In fact, if the committee is tempted to follow my suggestion of actually listing as part of the mandate the core agencies that will be the primary preoccupation of the committee, CBSA would be there and named alongside CSIS, the Communications Security Establishment, the RCMP, and the Department of National Defence. I think that's the core set of security and intelligence agencies that will be the subject for study by the committee.

Certainly, CBSA will find itself under the scrutiny of the parliamentary body. It will be up to the government to decide, I suppose post-Bill C-22, what it's actually going to do—this comes back to your question to Mr. Atkey—about the existing mechanisms for independent review. Is it going to roll them all together to make the system more efficient rather than have them siloed and independent as they are currently?

If I may add to that, on the other question that you asked Mr. Atkey, I certainly agree with him that you are going to continue to need another layer of review, another and more detailed layer that can, in particular, dig into questions of propriety, that is, lawfulness and following the directions of ministers. The committee of parliamentarians, on the other hand, I think is going to take that higher level strategic look at the activities of the security intelligence community, with a particular focus on just how well they are performing their functions, and are they serving the national security as they are meant to do?

[Nicola Di Iorio, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

Thank you.

My next question is for Mr. Wark.

How will Bill C-22 affect the operations of the Canada Border Services Agency?

You were on the board of advisers, so could you could enlighten us as to how Bill C-22 would impact the agency in collecting intelligence?

[Nicola Di Iorio, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

Thank you.

Based on your experience as chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, could you tell us how you would have fulfilled your role as chair had Bill C-22 been in force?

[Nicola Di Iorio, Liberal, Saint-Léonard—Saint-Michel, QC]

What will the purpose of committees such as the Security Intelligence Review Committee be after Bill C-22 is implemented?

What will be the relevance of committees such as SIRC once Bill C-22 becomes law?

[Ron Atkey, Adjunct Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I thank all of you for the invitation to appear to assist your study of Bill C-22.

Like my friend Wesley Wark, I believe this represents a major and welcome change within our Canadian parliamentary system. I say this having been both a parliamentarian for two short terms under Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments, as well as the first chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee in 1984-89.

It's a major change because it accepts the recommendation, as Wesley pointed out, of not only the Macdonald commission in the seventies, but also the of the Mackenzie commission in the sixties. It goes back to there, where they recommended some form of parliamentary oversight committee.

I recall that at the time Canadian governments and their security agencies were a bit hesitant at allowing elected MPs into the national security tent, because there was no assurance that they could keep security information a secret in the red-hot political environment in Ottawa. There was some concern among our allies at the time that elected members of Parliament should have access to the most secretive of all secrets, let alone have the time and inclination to monitor closely the vast array of departments and agencies with various security issues.

I must admit that when I was the first chair of SIRC, in 1984, our committee of privy councillors, and we were from different political parties, all went along with the notion that expert review of security intelligence was something that should be done only by independent persons of experience who could talk to MPs to get their views without necessarily giving them the secret information they might otherwise be interested in.

Bill C-22 represents a welcome change to that way of thinking—welcome in the sense that we saw Canada in the last three decades fall behind our parliamentary cousins in the United Kingdom and Australia in terms of accountability to Parliament, and we have now the chance to get caught up. It's welcome also in the sense that the important parliamentary debates in this century, particularly after 9/11 on Bill C-36, and after the 2014 attacks in Ottawa and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu on Bill C-51, were overly partisan, in my opinion, and not as well informed in the absence of a committee of parliamentarians such as the one being proposed.

I have some amendments. You asked me a couple of weeks ago what I would propose, and let me suggest just a couple. Let me say at the outset I emphasize that this is a good bill and it should be passed in this session of Parliament. It will help to ensure Canadians that their elected representatives will play a key overview role in accountability for the important but dangerous powers granted to some 17 departments and agencies that relate to national security.

Is it a perfect bill? No. Are there areas where amendments can be considered to improve the bill? Yes. Will this bill fix all the problems of BillC-51 and companion legislation that have concerned many Canadians over the last 18 months? Not at all. This bill is a first good step, but it should not be an excuse for government in action on fixing Bill C-51 during the remainder of this Parliament.

First of all, I suggest amendment on ministerial veto. Have a close look at this. The possibility of the proposed committee's work being frustrated by any minister determining that the review of his or her department would be injurious to national security is overly protected and should be removed or modified.

No such veto existed when I chaired SIRC between 1984 and 1989. And yes, there were tensions from time to time with CSIS, the body we were reviewing, but matters were worked out as they are in a reasonable context of being within the security tent. To my knowledge, no security operations were compromised at the time.

The language of BillC-22 in paragraph 8(b) reflects a reluctance to have the committee of parliamentarians act as a true watchdog.

Access to information is the second of my amendments. In order to do its work, the committee is rightly given access in clause 13 to any information that is under control of the department. This is a key for any watchdog to be effective, yet there are important exceptions in clause 14, which are well understood and accepted in the security intelligence community. I accept those for the most part.

However, then comes the discretionary refusal of information in clause 16, where the minister has decided that the provision of the information would be injurious to national security or would constitute special operational information. That's the nub. This is open-ended and dangerous in my opinion. Yes, the minister must tell the committee the reasons for the open-ended refusal, and this should be considered by way of amendment. But I think other investigative work of the committee may be frustrated if this is retained in its current form.

The third area of amendments relates to prime ministerial redactions.

A broad power is given in Bill C-22, in subclause 21(5), allowing the PM to direct the committee to submit a revised report to Parliament, one that has been censored for reasons of national security, national defence, or international relations.

This is a matter that was litigated between the Arar commission and the Harper government in 2007. Here I make full disclosure that I was participating in that case, as counsel on behalf of the Arar commission. The court had to consider, in that case, some 2,000 words in dispute in the commission's final report. Justice Noel found that a half of them should be disclosed in the public interest and a half of them should remain confidential.

The directed wording of Bill C-22 would preclude this court adjudication and would give full power to the PM and his officials to censor committee reports he doesn't like, with no explanation. At the very least, I think when he directs redactions, he should have to give the committee a detailed reason for his decision in camera, as in the case with ministerial refusals of information under subclause 16(2).

Finally, I recommend some form of dispute settlement system for some of these contentious matters, whether it's paragraph 8(b), or subclauses 16(1) or 21(5), the ones that I've just mentioned. They should be subject to in camera dispute settlement in the courts.

In my experience, the nine designated judges of the Federal Court have the proper structure and experience to adjudicate balancing the need for government secrecy against the public interest in disclosure in accordance with law.

In my concluding comments with respect to general structures and powers, let me offer three observations.

I do appreciate that Bill C-22, as it stands, is an initial step for Canada in letting parliamentarians into the national security tent, and that's good. But these observations of mine are not meant to deter Parliament from proceeding promptly in this parliamentary session.

First of all is the appointment of the chair. This was raised in the debate on second reading in the House. To ensure that the committee is truly a creature of Parliament, couldn't the chair be elected by Parliament, rather than appointed by the PM?

In a majority government situation, the PM's preference would likely proceed but, remember, this is permanent legislation and there may come a day when a minority Parliament might want to elect a member of the official opposition as chair. I think you might consider the long-term implications of that.

Second is the selection of members of the committee. Consultation on selections by the Prime Minister with leaders of the opposition parties, which is provided in Bill C-22, has worked in the past when there has been genuine consultation and not simply notification. But to ensure that the system is not abused for partisan purposes, there should be ratification of all members of the committee by Parliament itself. I think that would just be a good check that you might want to build into the system.

Finally, and I hesitate to sound like a lawyer on this, while you're not going to be establishing a committee that's a court of law or an administrative tribunal acting accordingly in the judicial context, the committee of parliamentarians, in carrying out its statutory review under clause 8 of Bill C-22, may require, and should require, subpoena power to summon witnesses, compel testimony on oath or affirmation, and require the production of all necessary documents.

This may be necessary where public servants are reluctant to respond to reasonable requests by the committee, or in situations where private sector individuals have particular knowledge about a security activity being carried out by a particular department. I think you might empower your committee of parliamentarians to have these particular powers.

In conclusion, Bill C-22, in its current or amended form, represents an historic opportunity for Canada to bring accountability for security intelligence into the 21st century.

My hope is that whatever form of bill emerges from these committee proceedings, it ultimately enjoys the complete support of Parliament as a whole, both here and in the other place.

Building trust, in my experience, is a two-way street. Parliamentarians have to be prepared to put in place a review system that has the respect and support of all members working co-operatively within the security tent to ensure there is a proper balance in the system that protects Canadians, yet respects rights and freedoms.

Similarly, government departments and agencies must recognize and respect that parliamentary security review operating within appropriate boundaries is not a nuisance, and that it means, ultimately, a stronger and more accountable form of government for the benefit of all Canadians.

I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

[Wesley Wark, Visiting Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Chairman, members of the committee, it's a great pleasure to have the chance to give testimony on Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians .

I'd like to begin by making some brief contextual remarks about the legislation. Genuine parliamentary capacity to scrutinize intelligence and security has been a long-time coming in Canada. Having such a body was first proposed by the McDonald commission over 30 years ago, but was rejected by a special Senate committee established to review the commission's report and recommendations. Instead, we got a different accountability mechanism back then, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, established with the CSIS Act in 1984.

Despite various efforts to bring forward legislation in subsequent years, including several attempts in recent years, Bill C-22 marks the first time that a legislative proposal supported by the government has come to a standing committee for hearings.

Much wasted time has passed and much has changed in the intervening years. The necessity for a committee of parliamentarians of the kind envisaged by Bill C-22 is irrefutable, in my view. We have been left behind by the efforts of our allies in legislative branch scrutiny. The Canadian security and intelligence community, which will be the subject of the reviews conducted by the proposed committee, has undergone tremendous change, in particular since the 9/11 attacks, and now benefits from much greater resources, capacity, and power than it has ever experienced in Canadian history.

With that increase in power comes a corresponding increase in the need for strategic level scrutiny of the activities of the security and intelligence community as a whole and a crying need for real parliamentary capacity. In addition, the Canadian public is much more attuned to security and intelligence issues than in the past and there is a much higher expectation in the public domain for the delivery of accountability, transparency, and adequate public knowledge.

I fully support Bill C-22. I think it represents a necessary and timely experiment in parliamentary democracy and activism. I give full credit to the Liberal government for seeing the importance of parliamentary scrutiny of security and intelligence and for making this a centrepiece of its response to the previous government's anti-terrorism legislation, Bill C-51, and for making it a promise in their election platform.

I don't think Bill C-22 is perfect, but Parliament will have to decide how significant the gaps might be between a perfect scheme and something good enough for a start-up. If we are honest, this is what Bill C-22 represents, a start-up. It's the beginning of a delayed experiment in parliamentary scrutiny, which requires, of course, robust legislation, but which will also be dependent on many other factors and will require a period of maturation before it can become fully effective.

This has been the experience of the U.K.'s Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, on which the Canadian legislation is clearly based. The U.K. committee was created in 1994, has over 20 years of experience, and was granted revised powers and procedures in legislation in 2013.

The success of the proposed national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians will depend, beyond robust legislation, on many factors, including strong membership, reflecting the stature of the committee, which makes it a highly desirable place for MPs and senators to aspire to a seat around the table; a steep learning curve about the complex domestic and international dimensions of intelligence activities; the trust of key agencies in the security and intelligence community; earned legitimacy in Parliament; and last but not least, and perhaps most important of all, public legitimacy, twinned with an understanding that one of the key roles of the a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians is to build and sustain public understanding of the role and challenges of intelligence and security endeavours in a democracy.

It seems to me that these are the challenges ahead for the committee, but to meet them the committee will need the right legislative tools.

In terms of having the right legislative tools, Bill C-22 has to find what I would call a “sweet spot” between committee access to secrets and the protection of secrets. Finding this sweet spot is the challenge before you in your study of this legislation. That sweet spot can be examined under five headings, all of which are core elements of Bill C-22: membership, mandate, powers, resources, and protection against leaks.

In the time remaining, I propose to make some short remarks about the strengths and weaknesses of Bill C-22, as it currently stands, under those five headings.

First of all, I will discuss membership. My plea to the committee would be not to too hung up on membership, though I imagine you might well do that. The key thing is having good members and instilling a culture of non-partisanship. How you arrive at those members is something that you'll have to determine. It's certainly the case that the Canadian proposal in Bill C-22 falls a little behind the revised procedures currently being used by the U.K. Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, but I hope this doesn't become the overweening focus of the committee's deliberations.

Mandate is the second issue.

The mandate proposed for Bill C-22 is very broad, and that's good, but it comes with challenges. There are core agencies of the security and intelligence community that will preoccupy the committee and take up almost all of its time. I would prefer to see these core agencies named, as is the case with the legislation for the U.K. intelligence and security committee.

You can of course maintain the broad mandate while still naming the key agencies that are going to be the subject of your work, by adding an additional clause indicating that other government departments and agencies would be under the purview of the committee as required and as it pursues its mandate. I think, however, that it's critical to name those core agencies, in part to assist the committee in coming up with a useful work plan and in part to help the public understand what its expectations around the reporting of this committee will be.

I would also add under mandate that it would be important to include something that does not currently fall under the mandate, which is a direct reference to operations. By operations I mean past operations. This area should be listed as part of the mandate of the committee, as is the current U.K. practice.

I'm going to skip over powers for a minute and turn to resources. The Bill C-22 provisions for a secretariat are, I believe, excellent. I had the opportunity to talk to the visiting intelligence and security committee delegation that travelled to Ottawa recently, and this was one of the things they commented on. They clearly felt some degree of jealousy about the explicit provisions for resources for a secretariat and for the leadership of that secretariat. This is one of the strongest pieces of the Bill C-22 legislation. I hope it will be supported and sustained.

Protection against leaks is a question of finding the sweet spot between access to secrets and protection against the inadvertent or deliberate revealing of secrets. The measures that are provided in Bill C-22 to protect against leaks are clearly overwrought; they go beyond the kinds of measures that were proposed in previous versions of draft legislation.

They're overwrought in imposing a security clearance requirement on members. I say “overwrought” in that regard because it is very likely that members of the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would not be cleared to the highest levels, in part because I can't quite imagine MPs and senators wishing to undergo polygraph examination.

I also think it's completely unnecessary. All it really needs is what was proposed in many versions of previous legislation, which is reliance on an oath of secrecy as the principal protection required, with an assumption of trust with regard to the behaviour of MPs and senators sitting on the committee. A properly administered oath of secrecy, surrounded by the kinds of protections you'll need with regard to documents and document handling that would be enforced by the secretariat is in my view sufficient. From my perspective, I think the government overplayed its hand here.

That leads me to the final point, which is about powers. I suspect this will be one of the most contentious issues you'll have to address in this committee. Again, I would urge you to think about these powers in the context of that sweet spot between access to secrets on the part of the committee and protecting legitimate secrets held by the government and provided to the government, possibly by many of our allied partners.

There are many complicated provisions contained in Bill C-22 with respect to access to records and in respect to reporting. I'm not going to run through these in detail. The point I would simply like to make is that in comparison with the U.K. legislation, which I think could usefully be our guide here, the legislation in Bill C-22 goes a little further than necessary. It's too complex and can be usefully simplified around the protection of intelligence sources and methods and around any kind of divulgence that might impact upon the proper working of intelligence and security agencies.

A lot of the other kinds of clauses and exemptions in terms of access to reports or the nature of reporting that could be done I think are frankly unnecessary. I think it could be very helpful in terms of the committee's work, Parliament's understanding of its work, the public's understanding of its work, and removing any suspicions about excessive executive control over this committee if all of those efforts to corral access and reporting could be vastly simplified.

One thing, in particular, that I want to draw the committee's attention to is to be careful about including in C-22 an exemption to access and reporting that refers directly to operational information. That is a reference to the Security of Information Act, and the definition of operational information in the Security of Information Act, which was passed as part of the Anti-terrorism Act in 2001, is extremely broad and, if it were read literally, could really bring the work of the committee to a halt. My main message is that this part of C-22 could be usefully and practically simplified.

Just by way of quick conclusion, there are two things I would encourage the committee to do as it scrutinizes C-22. First, seek genuine parliamentary consensus on an acceptable form of legislation, and practice bipartisanship as you do so. It seems there is a good amount of bipartisanship already, in terms of the sharing of ice cream going on, so this is a good sign.

I say this because consensus and bipartisanship are going to be the working ethic of the committee that is established. It would be a good place to start, to think about these things in this committee.

Second, keep in mind that the proposed national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians is a start-up and will be reviewed after five years, and accept that there is no perfect formula for balancing secrecy requirements and access requirements. Pease don't spin your wheels too much on that.

I'll end with a quote. As General William “Wild Bill” Donovan was fond of saying during his leadership of the Office of Strategic Services in World War II, “Perfect is the enemy of the good.”

Thank you.

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Welcome, everyone.

I call this meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security to order. This is our 41st meeting, and pursuant to the order of reference from October 4, we are considering Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts.

We welcome our guests as witnesses today, Mr. Wark and Mr. Atkey.

I understand Mr. Miller has a point he'd like to raise first.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

There is a discussion quite often about review versus oversight. There is some confusion about the terms, but in Canadian practice, oversight means command, control, and coordination. The oversight entity authorizes or has a role in authorizing activities.

Review is looking at the performance of the agency against standards. Typically it examines whether the conduct of the agency was legal and was in accordance with ministerial directives.

Review is after the fact, in the sense that you need agency action before you can review it, but review can be close to actual in the sense that the review doesn't necessarily have to be 20 years after the fact or a year after the fact or a month after the fact. My understanding from SIRC is that increasingly their review is more approximate in time to the actual operation, so it's still after the fact, but it's not that much after the fact.

The same thing should probably be true for the parliamentary committee under Bill C-22; that is, it is competent to do review. It does not do command and control oversight, and I think it would not be proper for that body to do command and control oversight. It does review, but I don't think it should fear doing review that's approximate in time to the actual operations, as long as it doesn't impede those operations.

Where this might become controversial is the extent to which the executive branch can deny the committee the information it requires to do this more timely review.

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

To respond to Mr. Massé, I would say that this was done during the previous Parliament, in Bill C-51.

The mistake too many governments make is to respond to unique, one-time situations by passing laws. Sometimes those laws are too radical and have unexpected consequences. Moreover, they are not necessarily adopted in the public interest, but rather in the political interest of a government. Unfortunately, many members in the previous Parliament fell into the C-51 trap.

That said, I would like to go back to the issue of the oversight of national security organizations and by the organization that will be created if Bill C-22 is adopted.

What do you think of the idea that existing oversight bodies, and the one that will be made up of parliamentarians, examine information in real time rather than information on past situations? Would it be appropriate that all of the oversight organizations, including the one made up of parliamentarians, have the information immediately, and not after the fact?

My question is addressed to you, Mr. Forcese.

[Prof. Kent Roach]

I agree with what both of my colleagues have said, but I would point out that even with the green paper, one of the things that we have to guard against is siloing these different areas. We have a whole-of-government approach to security, which I think is understandable, given the threats, but we still tend to think about this in a siloed way.

Our discussion today about this piece of legislation should lead you to thinking about the adequacy of review. That has been a scene that has come up again and again. Also, any new powers that may be given in the future to any department or agency of the federal government will be subject to this information sharing act, if it is not changed. I think the green paper is a good first start, but we need to encourage thinking about this in a holisitic way.

On the Bill C-22 question, I do regret the fact that, although it's a good idea to move ahead with a parliamentary committee, it's only part of the picture. We need to look at an executive watchdog review. We don't need to be looking for perfect legal language, because all legal language is going to be subject to interpretation, and as Professor Forcese has said, it's often interpretation that the public will not have access to. We need to think of a process solution to this issue. I think part of the process solution is to have a review structure that commands the confidence of Canadians.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

In the interest of full disclosure, Professor Roach and I are doing a doubleheader today. We're up in front of the standing committee on Bill C-22. Those thoughts are in the can, so to speak.

I would say that Bill C-22 provides a necessary remedy: that is, investing parliamentarians, for the first time in Canadian history, in a national security review function. That said, I would echo the concerns about the scope of information disclosure. It's not just that the government can, in certain circumstances, decline to provide information; there are actually mandatory exclusions, which are actually quite unusual as compared to our Five Eyes partners.

In the U.K. the exclusions of information are discretionary, and there's a protocol that the executive branch and the parliamentary committee have negotiated that says that those exclusions will only be used in the rarest of circumstances. In other words, they won't exercise their discretion to deny information.

In our system there's a whole cadre of information that will be ultimately excluded automatically. I would add that among the information that will automatically be denied the Bill C-22 committee are ongoing law enforcement investigations. It sounds sensible, except when you consider that the RCMP currently still has an ongoing investigation into Air India.

[Sukanya Pillay]

I think having a parliamentary committee would be a welcome move in Canada, but it is not a substitute for an independent reviewer of national security issues, so the two have to work together. Second, I think that Bill C-22 has ineffectual review, because at the end of the day there's discretion in terms of what can be withheld from the committee. That effectively undermines the whole objective, so that's problematic.

If I may add one thing, when I responded to Bill C-51, I stuck to the CSIS Act, but there are many other things with respect to CSIS, such as the references to the IRPA and the no-fly list, that I think need to be done, and they would also be very quick fixes.

[Wayne Long, Liberal, Saint John—Rothesay, NB]

Thanks.

I want to briefly talk to Bill C-22 and the oversight to get your opinions. Do you feel that Bill C-22 is adequate? Do you think that with parliamentarians having oversight of something like that, there's the expertise, experience, and resources to provide adequate oversight?

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you, Deputy. I hope you see our committee as effective, and now magnanimous as well.

I don't want the committee to move for a minute. I have a couple of things I need to do.

It's great to be surrounded by such fine public servants, so on behalf of the committee, thank you not only for today but for your work on the safety, security, and human rights of Canadians.

Committee members, I want to make just one suggestion for a change to our calendar. We'll have a lot of quality time. We have four more meetings on Bill C-22 with witnesses. Right now, we have the amendments scheduled for November 23 at noon. I'm going to suggest that we move that to the end of day on the 23rd.

On the 25th, I have work with the clerk and analysts. On the 24th, we will receive the summary of evidence from the national security framework studies thus far. Unfortunately, that evidence won't be able to inform your amendments—I know you're already writing them—but it will be able to inform our discussion about the amendments when we come to clause-by-clause on Tuesday, November 29. Clause-by-clause was going to be on the 24th. We're moving it to the 29th so you can get the summary of evidence on the 24th and use it in your deliberations. Is that okay?

I have two more things. Mr. Dubé has presented a notice of motion. We will deal with that on Thursday at our meeting, so we'll take five minutes. I draw that to your attention.

I also want to note that it is Chad Richards' last day in working with Mr. Miller. He served Mr. Miller well this year, and he served our committee well.

Good luck with your next venture. Thank you.

[Dianne Lynn Watts, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

Thanks very much.

I have just three questions. In drafting Bill C-22, did each of the agencies provide input?

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Have there been any preparatory discussions with other jurisdictions in anticipation of Bill C-22, that this committee may make inquiry on the practice of—

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

I do understand that they're to work in conjunction. Professor Forcese noted, though, that if you have certain bodies with certain access to private information and you have a parliamentary committee that's going to work with those bodies but can't access the same information, according to Bill C-22, isn't that going to impede their ability to work together in some instances?

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

Perfect. Thanks very much.

I think we're all on the same page that a review is important. CBSA we don't have reviewed, but the other three bodies that we're going to talk about, the RCMP, CSE, and CSIS, currently have review mechanisms.

For the officials of those four bodies, does anyone have any issue with the information you're currently required to give over to the respective review agencies? Is there any concern at all about the information you have to give over? No? Okay.

That leads me to this question, then. I understand from Professor Forcese that in fact the review agencies have more access to information than the parliamentary committee as designed under Bill C-22. Why wouldn't this committee have the same access to information as the review bodies, if none of the agencies have any concerns with the sharing of that information?

I'll put it to Mr. Brown or Mr. McCowan.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you.

In your opening remarks you talked about how you had taken the best parts in different parts of different countries. I know you met with the U.K. Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. You have had discussions with other countries as well. Could you elaborate a little bit more on how that's all reflected in Bill C-22?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

He was quite emphatic in his work in suggesting that this was a serious gap in the Canadian architecture. In putting together Bill C-22, we're responding to one of his principal recommendations. It's also consistent with the findings of Mr. Justice Iacobucci in his public inquiry as well. There will be, I'm sure, different administrative arguments about this structure versus that structure. We have tried to take on board, in our consultation here, what a whole variety of previous parliamentarians have done, what the public inquiries have done, what the Auditor General said, and also the experiences of other countries.

I think we've come up here with a unique Canadian model that best suits our circumstances. Providing a committee of parliamentarians to bring this new dimension of oversight to the Canadian security and intelligence community is something we've never had before. Mr. O'Connor and others said to fill the gap, and this legislation in fact does that.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you.

Could you fill us in on how Bill C-22 responds to the recommendations that Justice Dennis O'Connor made in the Arar report?

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Waterloo, ON]

Perhaps to build off what Mr. Goodale said, the mandate I've received as government House leader is actually the commitment of putting in place a different style of government and actually empowering parliamentarians to take leadership roles. As Mr. Goodale said so eloquently, each parliamentarian has something to offer, and Bill C-22 is just an important step in the right direction.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you very much.

Thank you to both ministers for being here today and also for your leadership in bringing this bill to us. We were on the road, as you mentioned. Although we weren't studying Bill C-22, oversight came up repeatedly in our meetings. It's something that the public has been asking for, so we're very pleased to see this before us now. Certainly this is only one piece in the puzzle of oversight.

I'll let either one of you answer these questions. I'll put it out to whoever thinks is best suited. Can you let us know how you envision the committee working with the current oversight bodies—the RCMP's civilian review and complaints commission, the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee, or SIRC?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

It's a pleasure to be back with you once again, accompanied this time by the government House leader; my deputy minister, Malcolm Brown; and also, from the Privy Council Office, Ian McCowan and Heather Sheehy.

The topic today, of course, is Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act.

The establishment of a rigorous parliamentary oversight mechanism of national security and intelligence activities was one of the crucial points of our election platform in the last campaign. It's a significant component of the steps we are taking to ensure the safety of Canadians while protecting our rights and freedoms. As I have clearly indicated on many occasions, Bill C-22 is the cornerstone of our approach, but it is definitely not the only measure we are taking.

Our multi-faceted approach to national security includes creating an office of community outreach and counter-radicalization with funds that were committed in the last budget; improving the no-fly system, particularly with respect to redress and appeal mechanisms; ensuring full compliance in all respects with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; protecting the right to advocate and protest; providing greater clarity regarding warrants; better defining terrorist propaganda; mandating a full review of anti-terror legislation after three years; and consulting Canadians, including parliamentarians, subject matter experts, and members of the public about what else should be done to achieve the dual objectives of protecting both our security and our rights.

It was in the context of these consultations that I appeared before you a few weeks ago. I know that this committee has since travelled the country to hear Canadians on this broad topic of national security. I very much appreciate your engagement, and I look forward to receiving the report that you will file, which will be an important contribution to this unprecedented national conversation about Canada's national security framework.

I'll turn specifically now to this one element of that framework that we have before us today, specifically Bill C-22. It will create, as you know, a committee of parliamentarians with extraordinary access to classified information so they can examine the security and intelligence operations of all departments and agencies of the Government of Canada.

This is something that most of our allies have had for many years, or at least some variation thereof. It's an initiative for which many in this country have been advocating for many, many years, including this very committee back in 2009; other parliamentary committees, including those in the other place; the Auditor General; and at least two judicial inquiries.

Bills quite similar to Bill C-22 were introduced by the Martin government back in 2005 and by several MPs and senators over the past decade. Unfortunately, none of them were adopted. Canada has, therefore, remained an anomaly among our allies when it comes to national security accountability. At long last, this legislation will fix that gap.

For just a few moments, I'd like to look more closely at how our proposed committee—that is, the Canadian committee—compares to those of our allies who have Westminster-style parliaments.

First, the scope of the Canadian committee's mandate would be distinctly broader than is the case in most other countries. Bill C-22 mandates the committee to review “the legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative and financial framework for national security and intelligence” as well as “any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence”.

In other words, the committee would be empowered to examine activities across the entire federal government, including operational matters, and to follow the evidence wherever it leads.

It's estimated that some 20 departments or agencies would be covered. That list, I emphasize, is open-ended. It's wherever the evidence leads.

This is in contrast, for example, to the British committee, which requires a memorandum of understanding between the committee and the U.K. Prime Minister in order to examine anything beyond the work of three specific agencies: MI5, MI6, and GCHQ. If the British committee wants to go beyond those three agencies, it actually has to negotiate a memorandum of understanding with the Prime Minister.

Similarly, the Australian committee is limited to conducting statutory reviews of legislation and the administration and expenditures of particular agencies. In fact, in Australia a parliamentary resolution or ministerial referral is required for the committee to even look at additional issues related to those same agencies. You can see that the language in the federal law here in Canada is substantially broader.

With respect to our Canadian committee's access to information, a matter that several members raised during the second reading debate, again I think it's useful to examine the way that these committees work in other countries.

In the U.K., a minister may prevent information from being disclosed to the committee on the grounds that it is sensitive information that in the interest of national security should not be disclosed. That's the British rule.

In New Zealand, a witness may decline to provide information to the committee on the grounds that it is sensitive and that it would not be in the national interest to disclose it. It is up to the Prime Minister to overrule if he or she determines that disclosure is desirable in the public interest.

In Australia, ministers can issue certificates preventing witnesses from giving evidence to the committee in order to prevent disclosure of “operationally sensitive information”.

Our allies have lists of types of information that cannot be disclosed, such as in Australia, for example, information that would or might prejudice national security or the conduct of foreign relations; in New Zealand, information likely to prejudice the maintenance of the law, including the prevention, investigation, and detection of offences; and in the U.K., information that might provide details of “operational methods”.

Clearly, our allies recognize the need for some discretion to ensure that committee investigations do not jeopardize security, and we agree with that principle. That's why, for example, Bill C-22 allows the minister to step in if he or she determines that a review would be injurious to national security. However, because of the extensive scope of the Canadian committee's mandate, and because Bill C-22 deliberately does not bar the committee from examining operational matters, our Canadian version will have investigative authority that generally exceeds that of its equivalents elsewhere.

It might also be noted that if there is a controversy between the committee of parliamentarians and the government, the fact that there is a dispute about some activity or some information is something that the committee is perfectly at liberty to report upon. If the committee, consisting of seven members of Parliament and two senators, reports an accumulation of incidents where the committee does not appear to be getting the co-operation of the government, that in itself will become a very serious discipline on the government. The controversy will not go away until the committee gives the all-clear signal.

Finally, another matter that was frequently discussed at second reading was the committee's annual report and additional special reports. The House leader has made reference to this. I simply want to underscore the importance of it. As is the case in the United Kingdom, the committee—that is, the Canadian committee—will send its reports to the Prime Minister before those reports go to Parliament. And as in the case in the U.K., the Prime Minister may have certain elements redacted on the grounds of security.

I don't think any of us would agree that this is unreasonable. When we're dealing with classified material, classified material needs to remain classified, but that is the only purpose for referring the report to the Prime Minister. He is not in a position to otherwise edit, alter, add to, or change the committee's report. It is simply for the purpose of protecting classified information. I suspect that this power in the Prime Minister would be used pretty infrequently in any event, because the committee itself would not want to publish classified information. I think we all have a common interest in making sure that such information is protected. Otherwise, the committee can say anything it wants to say, and at any time.

The suggestion was to indicate in the public report the parts that have been redacted, and I'm open to that possibility. I'm actually open to any good-faith proposals that might help us to achieve our dual objective of ensuring that Canada's national security framework is working effectively to keep Canadians safe while protecting our rights and freedoms.

As you study the bill, I encourage you to keep in mind also the international context in which this committee will exist and in which our Canadian arrangements need to be seen as credible. Those who have gone before us in other countries in developing this kind of review and oversight have all recommended to us that we start prudently and that we learn by experience.

The MPs on this committee will need to become familiar with the unique and extraordinary role and responsibilities they will have. The committee will need to earn the trust and the confidence of the public, and equally the trust and the confidence of the agencies they oversee, along with the other review bodies that already exist in the federal system.

On this point, I would quote former Senator Hugh Segal, who had this to say about how to get this committee started on the right foot:

The model suggested in Bill C-22, namely a committee of parliamentarians, chosen by order in council, as opposed to a parliamentary committee elected by the various parties in the House and the Senate, is the right choice and mirrors the initial form of oversight chosen by the United Kingdom....Moving to where the U.K. committee of parliamentarians is now, after decades of operation and a proven track record on trust and discretion, would be a...mistake....

You might remember that when this bill was introduced in June, one of Canada's foremost experts in national security law, University of Ottawa Professor Craig Forcese, said that the committee created by Bill C-22 will be a stronger body than its U.K. and Australian equivalents. I agree with that. He also said that it will be a dramatic change for Canadian national security accountability. I agree with that too.

Bill C-22 will finally give Canada the necessary parliamentary scrutiny of security and intelligence matters that we have lacked for far too long. Then, down the road a bit, after five years of working experience, we will have the opportunity to review the legislation and amend it at that time if we believe it is then necessary.

Mr. Chairman, may I just close with the observation that I notice that the makeup of this committee has changed since my last visit here. May I welcome Mr. Clement as the critic for the official opposition. I wish him well in his new responsibilities.

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Colleagues and all present, I am pleased to be here with the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to discuss Bill C-22. The bill would establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

Within Canada's Westminster system, Parliament is the primary forum for democratic accountability. By its very nature, parliamentary business is by default open and accessible to Canadians. However, this presents a challenge with respect to the review of classified information regarding national security and intelligence activities.

The purpose of Bill C-22 is to provide for a structured and responsible framework to securely share highly classified information with parliamentarians. When our government took office, we committed to doing things differently. One of my key priorities as government House leader is to make Parliament more relevant by empowering parliamentarians and strengthening our parliamentary institutions.

Bill C-22 is an important step forward in that regard. It will allow for a more meaningful engagement with parliamentarians in reviewing classified national security matters in a way that has never been done before. It will provide assurance to Canadians that government agencies are exercising their powers appropriately and are subject to appropriate oversight. I have no doubt that we can all agree with this objective.

Bill C-22 is designed to provide the committee with a broad, government-wide review mandate. This includes the power to review any national security matter, including an ongoing operation, carried out by any department or agency of the federal government.

I would note that this is unique to Canada, and no other Westminster model we examined, namely the U.K., Australia and New Zealand, provides for such a broad scope. We believe that this government-wide perspective is essential to enable the committee to perform reviews of our national security system as a whole, and to advise whether it is functioning effectively and efficiently while also respecting Canadians' rights and freedoms.

The bill establishes the mandate and powers of the committee of parliamentarians. This ensures the committee will act with full independence from the government in deciding which matters to review, and in reporting its findings and recommendations to Parliament.

As is the case in other Westminster countries that have established similar committees, such as the U.K., the bill provides for certain safeguards on the most classified information and to ensure that the committee's work does not disrupt or interfere with government operations.

I would like to discuss some recent criticism of these measures. The Prime Minister's review of the committee's report prior to tabling has been characterized as muzzling the committee. This is an inaccurate characterization. I would like to note that other Westminster countries that have well-established national security committees also provide for similar reviews of committee reports prior to public release. This review would be done in consultation with the chair of the committee and for the sole purpose of ensuring that the reports do not contain classified information. The Prime Minister will not have the authority to alter or redact the findings of the committee on the grounds that they are critical or embarrassing to the government.

Rather, it is the committee that has sole authority to determine the direction and conclusions of its public reports, including how to redact any classified information. How any redactions are done is decided by the committee itself and not the Prime Minister. If the committee wants to use blacked-out lines, as in an access to information request, the committee can do so. If the committee wants to denote a redaction with an asterisk, as the U.K. committee does now, they will be able to do that. It's up to the committee.

Some have commented that the committee lacks independence because of certain restrictions on accessing and reviewing some operational information and activities.

Mr. Chair, members of this committee will be examining each of these provisions in detail and we look forward to hearing their views. However, I would like to highlight that other international models either prevent their committees from reviewing operational matters, or limit such reviews to past operations only. We have taken a significantly different approach, where the committee's mandate and powers allow it to examine any matter it chooses.

The restrictions in the bill are intended to help prevent the committee's review from inadvertently interfering in or disrupting an active operation. This will ensure that ministers remain fully accountable to Parliament for government activities and for taking corrective actions when needed. This is a fundamental principle of our system of responsible government.

Bill C-22 fulfills the government's commitment to establish a committee of parliamentarians. It provides parliamentarians with access to classified information so that they can directly assess government activities, thus strengthening the democratic accountability of those activities.

I don't think that was 10 minutes, but that's good for now, Mr. Chair. Merci.

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Welcome to the 40th meeting of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Let me welcome the ministers.

Welcome to all our committee members.

We are continuing our discussion around a national security framework. However, we are particularly dealing with Bill C-22 today, which has been introduced in the House and has received approval at second reading to come to this committee for consideration.

We're delighted to have both Minister Chagger and Minister Goodale with us today to present remarks.

They each have up to 10 minutes. I understand they may not take all the 10 minutes.

We will begin with Minister Chagger.

Budget Implementation Act, 2016, No. 2

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to take the floor on the budget implementation bill, since it gives me the opportunity to speak to the shortcomings or errors that the government has made in its budget. There are many of them, and I would like to talk about those that are related to the issues I represent for the NDP, namely public safety and infrastructure. Naturally, I will also be talking about the repercussions of the Liberal government’s decisions on the lives of the people in our communities and in my riding.

First of all, I would like to talk about Bill C-51. This is not a budgetary measure in itself, but it grants budgets to the various committees that oversee the national security agencies. I am referring in particular to the SIRC, which reviews the activities of CSIS and, in certain circumstances, of the RCMP. But it primarily monitors those of CSIS, which has always experienced difficulties with its operating budget.

In the 2015-2016 budget, before the Liberals came to power and while the Conservatives were still in power, the budget of the committee that monitors the activities of CSIS was increased, after the population had expressed its opposition to the passage of Bill C-51.

However, in the last budget tabled by the Liberals, last spring, there was a decrease of $2.5 million per year in this budget, spread over the years ahead. Coming from a party that said it wanted to address the shortcomings in Bill C-51 and increase transparency and oversight, this is totally unacceptable.

Considering the size of the budget of a country such as Canada, that $2.5 million may not look like much, but I am going to demonstrate the consequences of this change for the committee that provides oversight of CSIS. It is the equivalent of 11 full-time positions that will be lost. And those are not receptionists or people who fetch coffee: they are high-level analysts who look into CSIS activities.

If the government really wanted to increase transparency and oversight, it would not confine itself to half measures, and it would not reverse course and cut the budget of a group of experts that already exists to provide oversight of those agencies.

Moreover, it is important to note that these budget cuts are taking place in a context where CSIS is using the powers it was granted by Bill C-51. Therefore, on one hand, those powers are being used, which is very worrisome—our colleagues are well aware of our position on that bill—and on the other hand, cuts are being made to the budget of the only committee that currently exists to oversee CSIS’s activities, pending the establishment of a committee of parliamentarians.

I am sure I can anticipate the government’s response on this issue. It is the response that the minister gave me in committee. He told us not to worry, because they were going to strike a committee of parliamentarians. That is fine, and that is why we supported the bill at second reading. We also plan to propose some amendments to address a few of its serious deficiencies.

However, let’s be clear: all the experts we heard in committee as part of our study on national security and the study of Bill C-22 that begins today have told us that the committee of parliamentarians could not exist in a vacuum.

Independent experts are needed to provide oversight and review in partnership with the committee of parliamentarians. However, the government is in the process of slashing the budget of an existing independent oversight agency. That is completely unacceptable.

Since we are talking about public safety, we also need to raise the issue of the ability of the police to do their job. For us, at the federal level, that means the RCMP. By focusing all of our efforts on preventing terrorism, we are ignoring a number of other areas.

In the last Parliament, budget cuts were made to the Eclipse squad, and we saw the impact that had on cities such as Montréal, with the proliferation of street gangs and the radicalization of youth. We have to be honest: radicalization is not just about religion. The aim is not to profile a single community. Radicalization takes many forms. It involves young people, sometimes street gangs, and sometimes extreme right-wing groups. We are well aware that our police services lack resources, and we are not taking these other factors seriously when we focus on a single threat. It is not me saying this, it is the RCMP commissioner.

In committee, we asked the RCMP commissioner whether we were neglecting other types of threats by focusing on the terrorist threat. He replied that that was quite true. For example, the RCMP no longer pays enough attention to organized crime. That is not the fault of the men and women who work for the RCMP; it is due to the lack of resources. It is a negative trend that started under the previous government and is continuing under the Liberal government.

I also want to talk about infrastructure, another topic that has raised some very serious concerns over the past few weeks. We are seeing this government's true colours when it comes to investing in infrastructure.

During the election campaign, the Liberals promised that they would take a progressive approach to infrastructure. They said that they would work with the provinces and municipalities by investing, spending, and running a deficit. That is nice, but we are starting to realize that the government is planning to privatize.

The most glaring example of that is the involvement of Crédit Suisse in the discussions with the Minister of Finance. We know that Crédit Suisse specializes in privatizing airports. I would therefore ask the government to explain to me how it fails to see a conflict in interest when a private company that earns a living privatizing airports is working in close collaboration with the Minister of Finance. We are told not to worry, that there will be no privatization.

As my colleague from Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques put it so well yesterday, this is letting a fox into the henhouse. This is troubling. We saw this tendency with CHUM in Montreal and with Highway 407 in Ontario. These seem to have inspired this government in the development of its infrastructure plan. It is completely unacceptable. We need to stand up and oppose this privatization. This problem is not just about foreign investment and the loss of control over our own infrastructure, which are public at this time, nor about the fact that taxpayers will then be accountable and assume all the risk while private corporations rake in all the profits. It is also about the user-pay principle. We will set up the toll booths, but the profits will go to private companies.

With regard to the Champlain Bridge, my former colleague from Brossard—La Prairie, Hoang Mai, the former members for Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert and Saint-Lambert, as well as my current colleague from Longueuil—Saint-Hubert and I all took a stand against the previous government. It is to the current government's credit that it respected that commitment. There will be no tolls on the Champlain Bridge.

However, if the government decides to sell the bridge to a private company tomorrow, and the company wants to introduce a toll system, that system will benefit only that private company, not Canadian taxpayers. It is completely unacceptable.

The clock is ticking, so I will wrap up with some comments on the local issues I mentioned. The most important issue for the City of Chambly is the dispute between the federal government and the municipalities over payments in lieu of taxes, an issue that has been festering for a very long time. As promised during the last election campaign, I introduced a bill about that as soon as possible after the election. Every year, the City of Chambly has to absorb a $500,000 shortfall because the Liberal government is not honouring its commitment to the municipality to pay its fair share of costs related to the Fort Chambly site. The timing is good because the Liberal candidate set herself up as the great champion of this issue, which I have been fighting for since I was elected in 2011. Of course, that is another broken promise because there is nothing in the budget for it.

That is another battle we still need to fight, and we could go on at length about it, but I see that my time is up, so I will take this opportunity to answer my colleagues' questions.

National Defence

[Christine Moore, NDP, Abitibi—Témiscamingue, QC]

Mr. Speaker, since my colleague was also a member of the Standing Committee on National Defence in the previous Parliament, he will understand what I am talking about. We had access to some secret defence documents, under certain conditions to prevent information from being leaked, of course. That helped us to better understand the issue.

Does the government intend to make detailed information, such as the statement of operational requirements, the analysis of the various aircraft, and everything that has been done by cabinet, available to the people who will sit on the committee that Bill C-22 proposes to create?

Will the opposition critics on this file have access to that information so that they can determine whether the best decision was made for the future of the Canadian Armed Forces?

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Good evening.

Welcome to the 38th meeting of the Standing Committee of Public Safety and National Security of the 42nd Parliament.

I want to welcome members of the public here, acknowledging that it's a Friday evening. I am glad that you are here with us.

I want to begin with a couple of remarks about what we are doing this week in the context of our study on the national security framework, and then I will have the members of the committee introduce themselves to you.

My name is Rob Oliphant and I am the chair of this committee. This past week, our committee has been undertaking a study of the national security framework that exists in Canada, which we began the week before in Ottawa. As you know, the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, was the culmination of a set of different acts over the last number of years that had restructured the national security framework.

It was felt that when this government was elected they wanted to make some changes, so we felt, as a parliamentary committee, that we should do a study on this security framework, both to advise the government of what Canadians were thinking, and as well to respond to what the government was doing in terms of study or legislation.

There are two consultations going on right now. They are simultaneous. The first consultation is being done by the government, through the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. He has issued a green paper, a shorter version and a longer background document, that is engaged now in public consultation. You can respond to it online. We can show you how afterwards, if anybody doesn't know.

Parallel to that is a parliamentary review. In this committee we represent Parliament, not part of government. Some of us are on the government caucus and others are not. However, we have not come here with an opinion. In some cities we have had large gatherings where people have wanted to know our opinion on issues, and we're not at an opinion stage. We are consulting with the public to find out what you think about the parameters of the national security framework.

We were in Vancouver for two meetings on Monday, in Calgary for two meetings on Tuesday, and in Toronto for two meetings on Wednesday. Yesterday in Montreal we had three meetings, and we're here in Halifax today. Our afternoon meetings are with experts in the field who may be academics or practitioners, and various civil society groups that come and give us their expertise. We have a chance to question them. Our evening meetings are your opportunity to tell us what your concerns or thoughts are.

The end of this study isn't quite clear yet. The goal is to report back to Parliament, and thus to have the government read our report and respond to it as well. Normally, when a parliamentary committee issues a report, they request a government response to that report. This study will also be fuelling all the legislation that the government is going to be bringing forward in the area of public safety. There's one bill that has already been tabled that comes under this umbrella. It's Bill C-22, and it establishes a committee of parliamentarians to do oversight of national security agencies. We are looking at oversight, but we will be studying that bill in depth beginning next week.

Tonight is your turn. I'm going to turn it over to the committee to introduce themselves. I let them tell you where they're from, and then we're going to turn on the microphone.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Absolutely. We'd be delighted to have any of your research work.

If any of you have anything you'd like to submit in writing to the committee, it would be very helpful. It would be helpful for this study, as well as for Bill C-22, so if you have something, that would be very interesting for us.

We're actually not bad for time with our extension.

Thank you for your help with our study. I'll remind those of you in the gallery today that we'll be reconvening at 5:30 p.m. That's an opportunity for anyone from the public who would like to speak to the committee to do so.

Thank you very much. The meeting is adjourned.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thanks for that answer.

Mr. Fraser, I don't want to spend too much time on Bill C-22 because we are going to study it, but inevitably it comes back again and again as part of this study because it is an important component.

My colleague Murray Rankin and I are working on what we think are some appropriate amendments to the bill, and some of that involves points that were raised about the fact that at the end the committee is answerable to the Prime Minister and cabinet, who have the final say over the content of the report. I believe you alluded to that in your comments.

The other question is in relation to public trust. For example, there are things like the election of the chair, as opposed to the chair being selected by the Prime Minister, in order to ensure more independence on behalf of the committee. Perhaps you'll share your thoughts on that and anything else you might want to add.

[David Fraser, Partner, McInnes Cooper, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much to this honourable committee for inviting me to provide my thoughts on this very broad consultation that the committee is undertaking, one that has obviously been influenced and affected by the green paper issued by the Department of Public Safety.

Though I have previously appeared before this committee on behalf of the Canadian Bar Association, particularly its national privacy and access law section, I am here today as an individual. I will not be speaking on behalf of my firm, any associations of which I'm a member, or any of my clients.

For some background, I am a lawyer in private practice with the firm McInnes Cooper, based in Atlantic Canada. I'm also a part-time instructor at Dalhousie law school, where I teach Internet and media law, and law and policy for e-commerce. I've also taught privacy law.

As you might be able to guess, my practice is exclusively devoted to privacy law and Internet law. In that capacity, I regularly provide advice to public sector and private sector clients from across Canada, and actually around the world, on their obligations under Canadian laws. That includes companies that are exclusively in the technology sector, the telecommunications sector, and other sectors. This means I'm often providing advice to my clients on interactions with law enforcement and national security agencies in Canada, where the police and national security authorities are seeking access to my client's customer information and information about others of their stakeholders. I have seen many things that inform the testimony I am about to give.

In my personal capacity, I am a strong proponent of a free and democratic Canada that is founded on the rule of law and rooted in our constitutional traditions. I am not associated with any political party, and I feel free to speak my mind on matters such as these from my heart, and hopefully informed by some serious, informed reflection.

I have some mixed feelings about where we are today. The current government campaigned and was elected on a platform that advanced scaling back Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act. I would have hoped we'd be discussing a piece of legislation that would be doing that rather than continuing the long-standing discussion that I expect will extend into the next year.

The information-sharing and disruption powers that the act contains have now become the status quo. We've heard testimony from others, and you've certainly heard it reported in the media, that these powers are being used. We are told they are working, but since we're dealing with the RCMP, CSIS, and CSE, we're not being given any real information about how they are being used. We're being kept in the dark, as usual.

That brings me to my first point. Our national security apparatus in Canada needs effective, accountable oversight. I think Bill C-22 is critical. Our system of government is a parliamentary one, in which Parliament makes the laws that set the limits under which the national security agencies operate. Parliament cannot do this job if it has blinkers on or if it's only given access to unclassified information, and in that case even information that only those agencies deem to be appropriate for Parliament to see. A committee of parliamentarians should have unfettered access to all information it deems relevant to carry out this critical job.

I would, however, suggest that we may need an officer of Parliament to oversee all the national security agencies, something in the model of the Information Commissioner, the Privacy Commissioner, or the Auditor General, who reports to Parliament directly. It may look like a super-SIRC, Security Intelligence Review Committee, that would have oversight over all of the agencies, because the line between CSIS, the RCMP, CSE, and others only depends upon who signs your paycheque, perhaps, or what's written at the top of your paycheque. They collaborate hand in hand. This oversight agency needs to be fully independent of the agencies and has to have unfettered access to everything. It should have the power to report to Parliament on its own initiative and to take any questions before any of the designated justices of the Federal Court on any question about lawful activities.

Our national security agencies by necessity operate largely in the shadows. The only way that we as Canadians can have confidence that they're doing their jobs appropriately is if we have confidence in the organizations that oversee them. I'm not sure we yet have that.

We saw recently a case in which CSIS, with the approval of the Department of Justice, knowingly lied under oath to a Federal Court judge in order to get a warrant. We cannot allow that to happen. We saw a situation in which our federal police department was found to have created terrorists through entrapment. This can't be allowed to happen. Dozens of police officers every year are disciplined for inappropriate and unlawful access to CPIC, the Canadian police database. That shouldn't be allowed to happen. We need to be able to assume the good faith of the individuals who act on our behalf in our police departments and our national security authorities, but it's only through effective oversight and accountability that this can actually be done.

I read with great interest the green paper, and I read with great interest its backgrounder. I could tell who the author was. It was drawn directly from the wish lists of public safety bureaucrats, folks like Commissioner Paulson and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police.

It advocates, in a one-sided manner, a whole bunch of police powers that have been debated back and forth over the years and ultimately have been dismissed.

You'll recall that Canadians roundly denounced the lawful-access provisions, the interception capabilities, and other things that were embedded in the Modernization of Investigative Techniques Act that was tabled by Vic Toews and ultimately left to die on the order paper.

I found that the green paper and its backgrounder on advocacy was disguised as consultation, and it's clear that somebody was looking to revive these lawful-access powers, notwithstanding that the Spencer decision was pretty clear about access to basic subscriber information and rights of privacy that individuals enjoy on the Internet. We're still hearing advocates of this sort of thing talking about phone book information—and I'm happy to talk about metadata as well—which was thoroughly debunked by the Supreme Court in that case. The fact that this discussion is taking place in terms that fly in the face of what in fact is the last word on the supreme law of the land from the Spencer decision further reinforces to me that strong oversight is required.

I'm happy to talk about the topic of warrantless access to subscriber information, a topic that I've done a lot of research into, as well as the topic of going dark through encryption.

Ultimately, to allow additional time for questions to make sure that everything the committee wants to hear is heard, we need to be careful that this wish list doesn't come at the expense of our rights. We need to be very cautious, and this committee has a very important job. The threat of terrorism is a threat to our democracy, but we cannot create a self-inflicted wound by marching towards a police state or undermining our democratic values.

I very much look forward to the discussion we're going to have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

We're going to reconvene.

Thank you to the witnesses who are here for our second panel. I don't think you were in the room when we started, so this is just to put this into context.

We are doing a study on the national security framework of Canada, and that is a large study. It's being done at the same time as the government is doing a study. They've issued a green paper on national security and how we reframe it. Our study is related to that, but not part of it, so we're not here as government. The green paper informs our study, but it does not encompass our study. Our study can be broader. It can be more foundational.

We're already having the first piece of legislation to deal with, and that's Bill C-22, around oversight. We're anticipating more pieces of legislation, and as a result of this study we may be recommending legislative changes to the government. However, we are not doing their consultation. This is our consultation.

The members of the committee have been travelling. As I've said, we've been in Vancouver, Calgary, Toronto, and Montreal this week, and we are delighted to be in Atlantic Canada.

There was some miscommunication, but we'd like to give each panellist would 10 minutes, so I'd like to go to about 4:10 or 4:15, if that's okay with the committee, so that we can have enough time for questioning as well.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you.

Thank you for your testimony.

I'm going to give advance notice to the committee that I have an idea in my head, which is always dangerous. We're beginning to get some different models of oversight presented to us at different meetings. I think maybe we need to host them to come together.

I think it was not quite fair to say Mr. Segal wanted to get rid of the oversight, he wanted a very beefed-up bureaucracy underneath the parliamentary oversight committee, the committee of parliamentarians. It could be like a super-SIRC that has experts, and there are all kinds of models. I think we're probably going to end up with three or four different models of oversight that we're going to have to test Bill C-22 against. I think a different format of meeting could be quite interesting where we have a panel of people who engage in a different way than we're normally doing. We're getting some fascinating expert opinions, and we as non-experts are going to have to make recommendations. You've inspired us today and we thank you for your work, not only today but always, in the pursuit of justice.

Thank you.

We're going to adjourn this meeting and we're going to reconvene at 5:30.

You are cordially invited to attend the public consultation meeting this evening.

Thank you.

The meeting is adjourned.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Can I stop you there, because I think that's a separate conversation. I think we can study that more when we're looking at Bill C-22 specifically.

Having served as commission counsel on the Arar inquiry, I'm curious to know how you think Justice O'Connor...and you envisioned co-operation between a committee of parliamentarians and whether it's just SIRC or SIRC and existing independent bodies working. Again, just focus on the overlap in reviewing activities. In my view, the committee doesn't have a lot of help at this stage to map that out by way of a recommendation to the minister.

[Paul Cavalluzzo]

That's one of the problems with Bill C-22. The stated purpose of the relationship between the existing bodies like SIRC and the parliamentary committee is to avoid duplication. That's the duty to co-operate in order to avoid duplication. I think you should be able to work together. One of the problems I see with what you refer to occurs in clause 8, which empowers the parliamentary committee to investigate national security activities. The problem is that the minister can say “No, you're not going to do that because it's injurious to national security.” The parliamentary committee has a very truncated jurisdiction. It's totally dependent upon the minister responsible.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

When I look at the mandates that have been carved out for the committee of parliamentarians under Bill C-22, along with the existing mandates of all of the independent review bodies, what I'm having trouble with is how we get the two sides of the accountability coin co-operating together.

I took down from your comments, Mr. Cavalluzzo, that you see the committee of parliamentarians to be focused on efficacy, blue sky. As it exists, the mandate does say that one of the primary functions the committee of parliamentarians is to look at is the legislative policy and regulatory framework. At the same time, it speaks, in very broad language, about the new legislative body's ability to review the activities of any matter that relates to national security. The goalposts are very wide, in my opinion.

That overlaps with the existing mandates of all of the independent review bodies that currently exist as they have been statutorily rendered. What I want to hear from you, Mr. Cavalluzzo, is how you see us disentangling those two mandates. The best we have right now under Bill C-22 is under what would be clause 9, where we talk about co-operation for the purposes of reducing duplication of work.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you.

I'd like to ask you one last question. You've spoken at length about Bill C-22. As the chair said, we will have the opportunity to study the bill, and I hope we'll be able to hear from you at that time.

Nonetheless, I'd like to take advantage of this opportunity to ask you a question, because I think it's important. You spoke about the importance of making the committee independent. A rather simple example, one that readily comes to mind, is the choice of a committee chair, which is made by the Prime Minister right now. We would propose to have the chair elected by the committee members, as is done in the United Kingdom.

Does this proposal make sense to you? Could it be an initial solution aimed at making the committee independent?

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Ms. Ataogul, when you talked earlier you touched on Bill C-51 and what have you. One of the concerns I have there is that no legislation, it doesn't matter what, is ever perfect. I believe it's put in with the best of intentions, and even Mr. Cavalluzzo pointed out some faults with Bill C-22. In order to give police or authorities the power to detain someone who they have a pretty good idea could commit terrorism, if the clauses in Bill C-51 aren't perfect in your belief, what could be there to still give police the powers to do what they have to do?

[Paul Cavalluzzo]

The key thing is the independence of the American congressional committees. Once again, they have the separation of powers that are much firmer than we have here. If we're going to have effective parliamentary oversight, we need this committee to be independent of the government.

Right now, under Bill C-22, as I found out in the presentation, you are going to be answering to the Prime Minister, in effect. That's a conflict of interest. The Prime Minister is responsible for the agencies you will be overseeing.

It would be better, in my view, for this new committee under Bill C-22 to report to Parliament, not to the government nor the Prime Minister.

[Paul Cavalluzzo]

Certainly, looking to the United States would be useful in terms of oversight. Of course they have a different system of government. But the congressional committees on national security, both the Senate and the House of Representatives, are very effective in oversight. Importantly, they have a great deal of access to top secret information, much more access than Bill C-22 is going to give the Canadian committee.

I think that in Canada, we should be proud. We have reached certain levels, the Arar inquiry, for example, was novel, unique in the world. It was the first time there was an independent review of national security activity.

Our record is good, but we can improve it. We can learn from other countries. The other country we might look at with respect to their oversight is the United Kingdom. They have certain procedures with respect to top secret information that are useful to look at as well.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Thank you.

We just may hold those thoughts and come back to you in our formal review of Bill C-22. I know you wanted to do more, I could feel it, but you'll have another opportunity, I'm sure, either in person, or somehow, for our review.

Ms. Ataogul.

[Paul Cavalluzzo, Representative, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group]

Thank you.

In the presentation I'm going to make today, I want to talk about the relationship between parliamentary review by the committee that will be created by Bill C-22, and independent review, which will be done, hopefully, by an expert body that is independent of government. I have prepared a presentation, which I understand will be given to you after it has been translated.

Now, having been commission counsel to the Arar inquiry and a special advocate for a number of years, I can attest to the fact that national security agencies and police agencies working in national security make mistakes. I don't say that they do it maliciously. They do it innocently, but they do make mistakes because they are human beings. Indeed, in Mr. Arar's case, what happened to him was that he was sent to Syria for a year of torture as a result of inaccurate information given to the FBI and the CIA by our Canadian agency, the RCMP.

His case is not an anomaly. Many Canadians have been caught up in the response of our agencies to terrorism.

One of the main problems that the agencies are facing is that they're dealing in intelligence. They're not dealing in evidence. Intelligence has been described as “glorified rumours”. Intelligence comes from human sources, foreign agencies, and whatever, and it is often not reliable.

The other problem we have with our agencies is that they're not totally forthcoming with our adjudicative bodies when they do make mistakes. Indeed, last year and in the last few years, the Federal Court of Canada has been severely critical of CSIS because it felt that CSIS had not been forthcoming in respect of its mistakes.

The other aspect, which is very important in terms of why we need effective oversight and review, is that most of the activities of these national security agencies, like CSIS, are conducted in secret. They are conducted in secret. Indeed, even the court proceedings respecting the activities of CSIS are conducted in secret.

At the same time as their activities are conducted in secret, both CSIS and other national security agencies have unbelievably intrusive powers, which can intrude upon the rights and freedoms of Canadians. When we look at that total package, we have to say to ourselves that obviously we want to protect ourselves in respect of national security, but at the same time, we want to protect our fundamental freedoms, which are guaranteed in the Charter of Rights. How do we do that?

These are very important questions. Probably one of the most difficult questions in our legal system today is about balancing national security along with our fundamental freedoms, and I think the answer to that is effective oversight by a parliamentary committee and independent review by an expert body. Let me take you through that.

First of all, at the outset, let me say that I'm very pleased that the government is intending to create a committee of parliamentarians to oversee the activities of our national security agencies. I have a number of problems with Bill C-22, which I will share with you at the end of my presentation. I understand you're going to be dealing with it next week, and I have some comments on Bill C-22, but certainly, parliamentary oversight by this committee is a step in the right direction to strengthen our national security system, both national security agencies and national security reviews.

The question is, is it enough? My firm answer, having dealt with national security issues for the last 10 years and in dealing with top secret evidence and national security agencies, is that we need something more, and this something more has to complement the parliamentary overview of this committee or whatever committee there will be in respect of dealing with our national security agencies. On the one hand, we have oversight, which is done by a parliamentary committee, and on the other hand, we have review, which is done by an independent expert body.

Let me tell you the differences between that, because Commissioner O'Connor in the Arar report dealt with those concepts dealing with oversight. It's a good step, as I said before, to have parliamentary oversight by a committee. Most liberal democracies have that, and it's good that we're going in that direction.

What is oversight? Oversight deals with efficacy issues, such as how the national agencies are running and what policy system should be applicable to our national security agencies. It's a blue-sky review or analysis. As parliamentarians, you don't have the time to get on the ground to deal with the review issues.

What is review? Review looks at the national security agency, after the fact, on the basis of propriety against standards of lawfulness, policies, and other kinds of standards. It's what SIRC does. As you know, SIRC is the review body of CSIS.

On the one hand, we have parliamentary oversight dealing with systemic issues and policy issues, and on the other hand, we have review.

You may ask yourself, now that we're going to have parliamentary oversight with this committee of parliamentarians, we have SIRC, and we have the CSC commissioner. don't we have the best of both worlds? The answer to that is clearly not.

Over 10 years ago, Commissioner O'Connor, in the Arar report, said that our review system is inadequate. Now, with Bill C-51, the problems with review are even more glaring.

I will give you three examples of why the review system is not sufficient and adequate today.

First, our review system is siloed. It only has jurisdiction over one agency. It doesn't have jurisdiction over all of the agencies. All of our national security agencies operate jointly. You just can't have a review body over CSIS when it's working with the CBSA, RCMP, and so on. That siloed jurisdiction is totally inadequate.

Second, national security agencies have been given more and broader powers by Bill C-51, and our review agencies have to be given more powers and resources that deal with these expanded powers.

The third example is about personal information. Bill C-51 gives over 100 Canadian agencies the power to send personal information to 17 Canadian agencies, such as CSIS. Of these 17, 14 of these agencies receiving this information do not even have a review mechanism. There's a number of reasons why the system is fraught with difficulty and why we need a broader review mechanism that has authority over all of the national security agencies.

In the last minute or so that I have, I'll deal with the problems with Bill C-22.

The main problem is that the government can interfere with the mandate of the committee. The committee is given authority to do a national security review, unless the minister says it would be injurious to national security.

It's the same thing with respect to access to information. The committee can ask for information from a minister or an agency, but it can be refused on the basis that it's injurious to national security. The problem with that, as the Supreme Court of Canada said in the Harkat case, is that governments constantly over-claim national security confidentiality assertions not only in this country, but in the United States, the U.K., and elsewhere.

The decisions made by the minister under Bill C-22 to refuse information and to refuse this committee to investigate is not reviewable by a court, which is a power I have never seen in this country.

You'll see in my paper a number of difficulties with Bill C-22, which is going in the right direction, but it's not quite there yet.

Thank you.

[Dominique Peschard, Spokesperson, Ligue des droits et libertés]

Good afternoon. I thank the members of the committee for having come to Montreal to hear what we have to say.

The Ligue des droits et libertés is a non-profit and non-partisan organization founded in 1963. Its objectives are to defend and promote the rights recognized in the International Declaration of Human Rights, and we support its principles of universality and visibility. The Ligue des droits et libertés is a member of the International Federation for Human Rights. Is also one of the oldest rights advocacy organizations in the Americas.

I am accompanied by my colleague Denis Barrette, who is a lawyer and a member of the Ligue des droits et libertés. Regarding the standing committee's interest in public and national security, Mr. Barrette represented the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group—of which the Ligue is a member—at the commission of inquiry on Maher Arar, presided by Judge O'Connor. He will speak to you more particularly about the problems regarding accountability and the mechanisms to monitor the agencies.

We are very pleased that the government has initiated a public discussion on national security. I am aware that we will not be able to cover everything in 10 minutes, but I want to point out today that we would like the national security framework, which goes back to the events of September 11, 2001, to be reviewed.

To provide some context, I want to read two quotes. The first one reads as follows:

“Shall we fail to remember that nothing can so weaken security as the loss of liberty?”

These are the words of Ramsey Clark, the former American Attorney General.

The second quote is from the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan: “Upholding human rights is not only compatible with successful counterterrorism strategies. It is an essential element.” Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, anti-terrorism measures have generally been adopted in fear and haste in the wake of specific events, without substantive discussions on the appropriateness of these measures, and what is more important, without assessing their impact on our human rights regime and on the freedoms which must be protected.

Some of the rights that have been put at risk are the presumption of innocence; the right to privacy and protection against searches and invasions of privacy; the right not to be harassed, questioned, arrested or detained on the basis of suspicion or racial, religious or ethnic profiling; the right of everyone to a fair and equitable public trial, and the right of appeal; the right to a full and complete defence; the right to be protected against arbitrary imprisonment and torture; the right of asylum; the right to information and freedom of the press; and freedom of expression, including the right to demonstrate publicly and collectively.

All of these rights have been affected in one way or another since the attacks of September 11, 2001. The idea that has been promoted among the population is that if we want more security, we have to sacrifice freedoms and that this is a matter of balance. We want to emphasize that this is a profoundly erroneous and dangerous idea. We will not obtain greater security by sacrificing our rights. Rights and freedoms are the basis of security.

I quoted Kofi Annan, but in a United Nations report on terrorism, it was pointed out that the societies that have the greatest respect for rights are the ones where there is the greatest security, and where there is the least violence and the fewest attacks.

Moreover, we wish to reiterate our position that the Criminal Code prior to 2001, as well as the 12 international treaties against terrorism which Canada subscribed to, already allowed us to fight effectively against terrorism. In its brief tabled when Bill C-36, the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act, was adopted, the Canadian Bar Association reminded us quite rightly that the Canadian government already has many legal tools to repress terrorist offences, and that the Criminal Code contains a solid arsenal of provisions aimed at fighting terrorist organizations.

We also wish to point out that the terrorist threat, as well as the search for security, have to be evaluated in a broader context. In a report submitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations in 2004 entitled “A more secure world: our shared responsibility”, an impressive list of threats to international peace and security was drawn up. The report also identified the main challenges, including war between states, and violence within states; poverty, infectious diseases and the deterioration of the environment; nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons; terrorism; and organized transnational crime.

In other words, terrorism is a threat to security, but there are many others, that in fact cause the deaths of many more people throughout the world.

Moreover, it is quite dismaying to note to what extent governments refuse to learn lessons from the past 15 years. Western countries, including Canada, have waged many wars against Muslim countries. These wars have sown death, destruction and chaos, and have created conditions conducive to the development of terrorist breeding grounds. Rather than revising this disastrous policy, which only leads to endless war on terrorism, governments persist in making us believe that our security rests with the surveillance of populations and extraordinary police powers.

In this short presentation, we cannot critique all of the anti-terrorism laws and measures that exist in Canada. However, the law based on Bill C-51 adds a particularly worrisome level to the measures that already exist. The power to minimize the measures granted to CSIS reminds us of the abuses uncovered by the McDonald Commission, such as the fact that the RCMP stole the list of members of the Parti québécois, burned down a barn, and issued false FLQ communiqués to counter the separatist menace.

The new crime which consists in advocating or promoting the perpetration of terrorism-related offences in general is a threat to freedom of expression. People may be put on the no-fly list on the basis of simple suspicion, without knowing what is being held against them, and without really being able to defend themselves. The possibility of detaining people for a week on the basis of simple suspicion when no charges have been brought against them is extreme and unacceptable. We also share the opinion of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, who criticized the new Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, based on Bill C-51.

Finally, we still do not have a mechanism to monitor and oversee national security activities. The proposed parliamentary committee is absolutely essential, and will be one of the ways of ensuring that the organizations concerned respect the charters and rights of citizens. However, improvements must be made to Bill C-22 which creates this parliamentary committee. It is essential that an independent body, with the capacity to closely examine all national security activities, be created. Otherwise, the committee will not be able to function.

In this regard, we share the point of view of the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, which will testify in the second panel. That said, we could go back to that issue, if you have questions on this topic for us.

In conclusion, you have the obligation not only to question anti-terrorist measures, but also to generate debate and promote real public discussion, both on the full exercise of fundamental rights and on the identification of true threats to security, as well as their causes and the means to curtail them. We are in favour of this consultation. It is a first step. We nevertheless expect this government to continue to set itself apart from previous governments by placing the rights and freedoms of individuals at the heart of security policies.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

My suspicion is that it's going to take several years to evaluate the whole thing. This year we have some very quick agenda items. We already have the first bill, which is before the House now: Bill C-22. I can't speak for the government, but generally this government has told us they're not in favour of omnibus bills, so each bill will come to us as a piece of legislation. It's not as fast, but this will be ongoing work.

[Roberto De Luca, As an Individual]

Thank you for the opportunity to address the committee. My name is Rob De Luca. I'm here today as a concerned citizen, but also in my role as a staff lawyer at the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. We are a national non-profit organization that has been working to protect civil liberties in Canada for more than 50 years.

One of our chief concerns regarding the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, popularly known as Bill C-51, is the lack of new accountability mechanisms to oversee the state powers introduced by Bill C-51. On that note, we support the governing party's introduction of Bill C-22, which creates a national security intelligence committee of parliamentarians with the capacity to monitor classified security and intelligence activities and report findings to the Prime Minister.

I was happy to hear this afternoon that there was quite a bit more discussion of Bill C-22 than I was anticipating. I want to make some brief comments on Bill C-22.

One of our concerns with Bill C-22 as currently drafted is that while it is a move in the right direction, it is not sufficient to address the current accountability deficit in Canada's national security framework, such as the need for, first, integration into the investigations of existing review bodies and, ideally, consolidation in an enhanced expert review body; second, a truly independent monitor of Canada's national security laws; third, an independent oversight and review mechanism of the Canada Border Services Agency beyond any oversight and review accomplished by the committee of parliamentarians.

We are also concerned by some of the limits on the new committee of parliamentarians. Most notably, Bill C-22 gives the government the power to halt a committee investigation, an independent oversight or review, or to refuse to provide information when it is deemed “injurious to national security”. I have paragraphs 8(b) and 16(1)(b) of Bill C-51 in mind.

Part of the problem with these provisions is that they cannot be reviewed by a court or by an alternative dispute resolution process. This broad limit on the committee's power seems particularly out of place given that the committee of parliamentarians will be subject to significant national security safeguards, such as a prohibition on the publication of classified information.

My questions or suggestions are twofold on this narrow question, that is, whether the committee and the Government of Canada are willing to reconsider the significant limits it has placed on the national security oversight body, and if not, are the committee or the Government of Canada willing to consider allowing courts or a specially designated institution or review body the ability to review government decisions to halt committee investigations or a government refusal to provide the relevant information?

Thank you.

[Barrie Zwicker, As an Individual]

Thank you very much.

I had prepared more than three minutes' worth, but I'll have to meet the criteria. Thank you for the opportunity.

I'm glad that this standing committee exists. The one time in my life that I was before a standing committee of the House of Commons, we were gloriously successful, but I don't necessarily expect that to happen today.

I would like to begin with a short quotation from the British historian and peace activist, E. P. Thompson, who said, “The deformed human mind is the ultimate doomsday weapon.”

If ever two dots needed connecting, they are the current developments around Bill C-51 and Bill C-22 on the one hand, and, on the other, the historic ruling by a B.C. Supreme Court judge in the case of the 2013 so-called Canada Day terror plot in Victoria. That ruling, called a “stunner” by Faisal Kutty in a recent issue of the Toronto Star, should be an international landmark.

Yet in all the reportage—my background is in journalism and communications—and almost all the commentary I've seen to date, including that by commentators wary or critical of spy agencies, the B.C. Supreme Court ruling has become more or less an elephant in the room. Its heart is “police-manufactured” terrorism. Those words are from Madam Justice Bruce of the B.C. Supreme Court. The words that are not sufficiently used but should be for an operation like this are “false flag operation”. A deep and wide and adult conversation about false flag operations in general is long overdue and could well be—and should be, in my opinion—one of the contexts for this committee's hearings.

The “police-manufactured crime” quote is from a 344-page ruling by Madam Justice Bruce on July 29, striking down the terrorism convictions of John Nuttall and Amanda Korody. As Thomas Walkom observed in the August 3 Toronto Star, “the entire bomb plot couldn't have happened if the RCMP hadn't organized it”. The Mounties cruelly exploited two impoverished recovering heroin addicts with clearly obvious mental health challenges.

I couldn't help but think about this, which I was planning to discuss anyway, in listening two hours earlier to the experts before this committee. It almost seemed to be very airy-fairy to me, very legislatively complex and so forth, without a reference to this larger context of what happens in the real world and what generates headlines and causes anxiety throughout society.

Academic studies, official reports, and even newspaper editorials show that the theat of terrorism has for years been blown far out of proportion, much as has been discussed here and is a matter of legitimate scrutiny for this committee.

[The Chair (Mr. Robert Oliphant (Don Valley West, Lib.)), Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

I call the meeting to order.

Good evening. Welcome to this meeting of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. This is our 34th meeting in this Parliament.

You're probably aware that the committee has been undertaking a study regarding the national security framework as it exists in Canada right now and as Canadians hope it should exist in the future. This is a study that is going on in parallel with a similar consultation being done by the Government of Canada.

The government, through the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, has issued a green paper in a short version and in a long version. This committee is not doing a consultation on the green paper; however, we are using the green paper to help us do a study of the whole framework. We are guided by the green paper, but we're not limited to it. It does provide a certain number of questions that we think are helpful for us to consider.

Already, the minister has presented a first piece of legislation, which has been tabled in the House. It is called Bill C-22, and it is in regard the oversight of national security agencies by parliamentarians. This piece of legislation is currently at our committee; it has been passed at second reading. It does come up in our meetings as we continue. However, it's a small part of the whole national security framework. It is the first and very important part, but it is a small part and is actually only part of oversight.

Our committee had meetings in Ottawa a couple of weeks ago as we began this study, and then we took it on the road. On Monday we were in Vancouver, where we held two meetings. Yesterday we were in Calgary. Today we are in Toronto. This is our second meeting here. Our format has been to have an afternoon meeting where we hear from invited witnesses, who give us testimony regarding questions that we have usually asked them to speak about. These people often represent organizations, but sometimes they come as individuals. They give us a broader understanding of what we are attempting to frame as a national security framework.

Because we are travelling, the afternoon meetings look very much like our Ottawa meetings. In the evenings, however, we have decided to hold public meetings where you are invited to give your thoughts to the committee. We have about 25 people so far who have asked to speak tonight. You might want to go to the desk and get on the list if you're not already there. Because we have about 25 people, I'm going to suggest that we limit remarks to about three minutes each. If it's like it was in Calgary and Vancouver, people will come in after the meeting has started and after they're finishing work and getting here through traffic.

The committee may or may not have a question for clarification regarding what you say, so I will be watching the committee members to make sure they have a chance to ask any questions they may have.

I'm going to have the committee members introduce themselves and their ridings.

[John Brassard, Conservative, Barrie—Innisfil, ON]

Mr. Segal, since it appears that you and I will only be here in one place at one time, I want to focus most of my remarks toward you.

With respect to Bill C-22, I'm sure you're aware that in the proposed legislation by the government that there are seven exemptions they are talking about. For example, the committee can't look into ongoing criminal investigations, anything to do with defence intelligence, the Investment Canada Act related specifically to money laundering, or the terrorist investment act.

My question to you is, and it's a matter of your opinion, do you think this committee will be limited in the teeth it will have to deal with this? Will it consolidate all power to the Prime Minister's Office? Lastly, how can you have real oversight or overview if you're limiting what a committee of parliamentarians can see?

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

That's one of the downfalls of being chair, isn't it?

Thanks, everyone, for coming today.

Senator Segal, you dealt with Bill C-22 mostly, so I'm going to leave that for when we deal with that bill, if that's okay.

I'm going to concentrate mostly on the people from the Munk School. In particular, on counter-radicalization, you mentioned the Kanishka project. I was looking at some of the things it specifically mentions, and there are a couple that aren't included in the green paper or what I had necessarily thought about under the national security framework: “Perception and emotion” and “Collective dynamics and resilience”, how events can “shape thought and action regarding national security”, “how majorities and minorities view these issues”, how terrorist acts can cause “damage to the social fabric”. Some of these things we are not really looking at.

When we are talking about counter-radicalization, are these things that we should be looking at? If so, do you have any suggestions about that?

The question is for either or both of you.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Segal, I don't want to litigate Bill C-22 too much, because we will have dedicated hearings for that, but since you are here, and some points were raised, I do have a few concerns. I just want to hear you out on that, and perhaps I'm misunderstanding. But I know in the Arar commission, Justice O'Connor specifically talked about the importance of having a broad integrated expert oversight, and every expert we've heard from has said that the expert oversight and parliamentary oversight go hand in hand.

You can correct me if I'm wrong, but I seem to understand that you're almost thinking that a robust parliamentary oversight should act alone almost. Am I misunderstanding that?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

So you think that if Bill C-22 passes and therefore SIRC and—

[Hugh Segal]

Let me first of all say, part of why I'm taking that view is because it's precisely the view that was taken unanimously by the Senate anti-terrorism committee in making recommendations to the previous government about the kind of oversight agency that should be established and what its terms of reference should be.

I believed it then and I believe it now that Bill C-22 is a pretty strong approximation of what those recommendations were. For me to desert that now would be a little disingenuous.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

I suppose what I'm getting at is that I see some tension between the two submissions, namely that the committee of parliamentarians needs the time to develop the public's confidence, and in that transitional period, we wouldn't want there to be a lacuna of experience, which is currently being filled by SIRC, however imperfect you may think it may be. Are you taking the position that SIRC should shut down the moment we pass C-22 and there's this new committee of parliamentarians, or do you accept that there needs to be in essence a period during which there is some overlap? That's the first question.

The second question is this. I think you stand in relative distinction in advocating for this model, because most of the other experts who have written about this do talk about drawing on the experiences of existing civilian oversight. Indeed, we've heard from some who are advocating for a super-SIRC where we have dedicated, full-time subject matter experts. One of the reasons for that is a concern, which I think is not completely without merit, that these parliamentarians who will sit on this committee have other responsibilities. I would ask you to address both of those questions, if you could.

[Hugh Segal, Chair, NATO Association of Canada, Massey College]

Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to share my perspective with you. I am going to focus primarily on Bill C-22, the parliamentary oversight proposition, because I think it's central to the premise of accountability for our national security and intelligence services.

I think the Government of Canada is to be congratulated for circulating the green paper and discussion paper on the balance between national security and individual freedom, and seeking public input on the choices that are ahead. The new legislation creating a committee of parliamentarians on national security, closely modelled on the U.K. committee of parliamentarians, is also a constructive and overdue initiative.

As Ms. Cheung pointed out, Canada has been the only major NATO partner without a legislative oversight structure for national security and intelligence operations. This is an unacceptable anomaly, an unpardonable gap in the vital linkage between the democratic institutions of the country and the agencies committed to protecting national security, which also means they're committed to protecting democracy.

While ministerial oversight has been clearly established by the enabling legislation for organizations such as the RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, Communications Security Establishment, and some retroactive but limited oversight was provided by SIRC and the Inspector General at CSE, their capacity to provide forward-looking oversight, as opposed to dealing retroactively with complaints, was severely limited.

The model suggested in C-22, namely a committee of parliamentarians, chosen by order in council, as opposed to a parliamentary committee elected by the various parties in the House and the Senate, is the right choice and mirrors the initial form of oversight chosen by the United Kingdom in the Thatcher-Major era. Moving to where the U.K. committee of parliamentarians is now, after decades of operation and a proven track record on trust and discretion, would be a serious mistake and a threat to our national security operations.

For the oversight by parliamentarians to work well, and for the agencies being overseen to, along with Canadians as a whole, benefit from the dynamic of oversight, a relationship of trust between the overseers and operating agencies must be established. A five-year automatic review of existing legislation and C-22 will allow the nature and structure of the committee of parliamentarians to be revised and updated, based on real experience with challenges met and addressed in the Canadian context.

In my judgment, the committee, as now proposed, is too small. It should be no fewer than 12 parliamentarians, with eight from the House of Commons and four from the upper chamber. The new mix of independent senators being appointed affords the government a refreshing opportunity to have senators with previous experience in military, police, security, anti-terrorist, foreign affairs, defence, and civil liberties work considered by the government for service on the committee of parliamentarians.

The preamble of C-22 should specify that the oversight mission of the committee of parliamentarians is to be carried out in a fashion that does not favour partisan advantage or preference. Rather, it should promote the protection of Canadian civil liberties, essential freedoms and privacy, consistent with the Constitution and Charter of Rights and Freedoms, increasing the national security and safety of the residents of Canada.

It would be preferable for all security agencies to fall under the oversight of the same committee of parliamentarians. Separate civilian oversight for the RCMP, or none to speak of for CBSA, is not appropriate and it's unacceptable.

A larger committee of parliamentarians, with the freedom to appoint the head of the research, monitoring, and oversight operational structure underpinning its work, makes the most sense. Members of the structure serving the committee should not be appointed by the Clerk of the Privy Council, or any of the operational deputies in the relevant line departments. The organization serving the committee should be answerable to the committee, with fixed terms of service, appropriate security clearance protocols, and measured experience.

The clerk of the committee should have the rank and status of a senior deputy minister, with an order in council appointment of no less than five years, renewable by mutual consent. The operations of Canada's military intelligence should also be under the oversight of the committee of parliamentarians. The operational and committee support structure for the committee, and its meeting place in camera or otherwise, should be away from Parliament Hill in an appropriately secure facility, not adjacent to CSIS, the RCMP, CBSA, or DND.

Its enabling legislation should protect them from ATI requests, except as they might relate to expenditures, costs, travel, and normative operational administration.

Matters for review, testimony heard in camera, negotiations on agenda with the appearing agencies, reporting relationships between operational agencies and committee and/or its operational support unit should, by statute, be exempt from ATI inquiries.

The committee chair, already designated by the government, should have a Senate vice-chair of the committee. Unlike the requirement in the legislation with respect to the House of Commons, Senate members of the committee or a Senate vice-chair, who should also be designated by the government, need not be members of a partisan group in the upper chamber. Any federal body established in this area by statute—for example, on anti-terrorist missions such as deradicalization and community outreach—should be under the oversight of this committee of parliamentarians.

I'd be delighted to take any questions on this or other matters before the committee.

Thank you very much.

[Prof. Carmen Cheung, Professor, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Good afternoon. It is a privilege to be here before the committee again. Thank you very much for the opportunity, and thanks again to Professor Levi for generously sharing his time.

I'd like to build a bit on his remarks and on the importance of learning from comparative experience, so let me start with something this committee already knows, which is that we cannot talk about Canada's national security framework without addressing the urgent need to update our framework for national security accountability. The international experience shows that Canada is, quite frankly, lagging behind our closest allies when it comes to comprehensive national security oversight and review.

This committee is currently studying Bill C-22, which would create a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. Political accountability is critical, and the move towards formalizing legislative review is a very welcome development; but as you will have heard from others, a modernized system of national security accountability requires more. Canada's system of independent expert review exists as a patchwork, in contrast to the consolidated model of integrated review that we see in countries like Australia.

The judiciary can play an important role in both oversight and review across a range of national security activities, from authorizing warrants for intelligence activities that might implicate constitutional rights to adjudicating claims arising from government actions. However, unlike in the United States, our courts play little role in authorizing foreign surveillance that might infringe on guarantees against unreasonable search and seizure. These are just a few examples.

This is of course not to say that there is a perfect model for accountability or even a best model. If anything, the value in comparative approaches is in seeing both what works and what does not work. We need not look any further than the recommendations from the Arar inquiry, or last year's extraordinary open letter calling for immediate reform to national security accountability, a letter that was signed by former prime ministers, senior security officials, and former Supreme Court justices. We need not look any further than to our own experts to know that the current system must be improved.

This national consultation we're taking part in represents an important moment of opportunity towards creating an integrated and comprehensive accountability framework, one that can evaluate whether national security policy and practices are effective, legal, and rights-respecting. International comparisons can help us build this framework.

Done right, a robust system of accountability enhances public trust. Also important for public trust is some measure of transparency in how government goes about protecting our national security. This is made complicated by the fact that national security activities will necessarily require some secrecy. Yet I would say that the experience has shown that government sometimes tends towards reflexive secrecy. The commissioners in both the Arar and the Air India inquiries concluded that the government over-claimed secrecy during the course of those two proceedings. Chief Justice McLachlin noted, in the 2014 Harkat decision, that government tends “to exaggerate claims of national security confidentiality”.

Excessive and unnecessary secrecy is problematic for several reasons. First, as Justice O'Connor noted in his report on the Arar inquiry, when government over-claims the need for secrecy, it “promotes public suspicion and cynicism about legitimate claims...of national security confidentiality”.

Second, Canadians should be able to understand and judge for themselves the nature of the security threats facing the country and the appropriateness of our responses to those threats. Excessive secrecy makes this sort of assessment difficult for ordinary Canadians.

Third, secrecy becomes normalized. We see this in new legislation allowing the use of secret evidence in closed courts, and judicial reviews of passport denials and no-fly listings. When processes are secret it's hard to know or hard to believe that they are fundamentally fair. The open court principle is foundational to the common law, and secrecy in the courts should be exceptional. In a democratic society we should always be looking for ways to make proceedings more transparent, not less.

So how do we balance fairness and transparency with the very real need to keep national security information from falling into the wrong hands? In the case of judicial proceedings, at least, we can learn from the criminal justice experience on how to protect sensitive sources and information in an open court, on which mechanisms are best for determining where the appropriate balance lies between confidentiality and disclosure, on how to go about gathering intelligence that can be presented in a court of law. The constitutional demands for a criminal proceeding may be different from those in administrative or civil cases; however, the presumption in favour of transparency and openness should not be.

Thank you again for this opportunity and we look forward to your questions.

[Ron Atkey]

They will relate primarily to ministerial veto and powers of the Prime Minister to redact and withhold information. I read the parliamentary debates on Bill C-22 and most of them are within that framework. I don't think we should use the time today when I'm going to do it next week.

[John Brassard, Conservative, Barrie—Innisfil, ON]

One of the issues you also spoke about was Bill C-22. While I completely understand we're dealing with a national security framework, you did mention Bill C-22 and you talked about some amendments you would like to see to it. What are some of those amendments?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

May I pause for a moment, because what I want to do is take it to the language itself. What clause 9 of Bill C-22 proposes is that the committee of parliamentarians take “...reasonable steps to cooperate with each other to avoid any unnecessary duplication of work by the Committee and that review body in relation to the fulfilment of their respective mandates.”

It seems to me that, as drafted, what we don't want is redundancy, but we do want co-operation and collaboration.

To be as tailored as you can be in your answer, how do you see that co-operation being mapped out?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Let me take you to the secondary, as I'd like to probe a little bit, and that is how you see cooperation between the committee of parliamentarians working with existing civilian oversight, like SIRC. There is a section under Bill C-22 which calls for cooperation between the committee of parliamentarians and other oversight and review bodies.

Drawing on your experience, what are the statutory gateways that could essentially road map the kind of co-operation you envision?

[The Honourable Ron Atkey, Adjunct Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for scheduling us in the first panel, so we'll be finished well in advance of the start of the baseball game. We'll see it, and we'll come back and report the score to you.

Thank you for this kind invitation to appear before you on the important subject of Canada's national security framework. Let me say how pleased I am that this consultation process is finally proceeding. I guess it was a year ago that an election was held. One might have thought, given the strong positions taken by opposition parties in the last Parliament on Bill C-51 and companion legislation, that the consultation process would start earlier, but I also understand the exigencies of the machinery of government.

I regret to say there was not a careful, measured debate on Bill C-51 in 2015, as the then-government rushed through Bill C-51, perhaps echoing public demand for swift and firm security action in response to the 2014 attacks in Ottawa and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu.

Let's be grateful that this much-needed conversation can now begin. Of course, we are all assisted by the recent release of two important documents. First, on August 25, 2016, the Minister of Public Safety released his “Public Report On The Terrorist Threat To Canada”, noting that the principal terrorist threat to Canada remains that posed by violent extremist groups at home or abroad who could be inspired to carry out an attack within Canada.

The second was an important background document released last month, on September 8, a national security green paper entitled “Our Security, Our Rights”, which is an objective discussion on most of the hot-button issues such as accountability, disruption, information-sharing, the no-fly list, interdiction measures, and investigative techniques.

This 66-page document, plus endnotes, is by no means bedtime reading, and it has been difficult for me to get my students to plow their way through it, but I am going to, before the end of the term, I assure you. It walks the delicate line between being an advocacy piece for enhanced security measures and the need to protect fundamental charter rights and freedoms. For those Canadians who want a shorter document, there is relief, because the actual green paper is only 21 pages.

I offer my sincere congratulations to Minister Goodale for finally getting this process under way. How long it will take remains to be seen. There are some provisions in the Anti-terrorism Act that are clearly unconstitutional and need immediate legislative fix, such as the power given to federal judges granting a disruption warrant that can ignore the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or the lack of due process on the administrative side in the administration of the no-fly list. These should not have to be litigated in the courts. They can be easily dealt with by Parliament in this session.

I note that the green paper proposes a mandatory review of the Anti-terrorism Act after three years, but I can't help but observe that this will provide the government with an excuse to do nothing following the current consultation, until the end of 2018 or perhaps after the next election.

The period 2018-19 will be the lead-up to the next general election—hardly a time, in my experience, for constructive, non-partisan debate and enactment of meaningful legislation, if 2015 is any guide to the process.

The first of two items I want to deal with is accountability. Now, to be very fair, last June this government introduced Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act, which was long overdue. This will provide, for the first time, a select group of Canadian parliamentarians with access to the national security tent. I hope the bill is passed this year, although not without some constructive amendments that may come forward. I may be suggesting some of these to you when I appear as a witness before you next week in Ottawa.

The point I want to make is that Bill C-22 is only a small part of the jigsaw puzzle of national security. Its anticipated achievement as a new structure in our system should not be used as an excuse for delaying necessary reforms to our national security framework generally.

Let me share with you my experience over the past 40 years. During that time, I was an opposition MP; a minister of immigration during troubled times in 1979-80; the first chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, from 1985 to 1989; amicus to the Arar commission; and a special advocate under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. I have taught national security law for eight years as my retirement project. So I know a little about the subject, and I have some views.

Regarding accountability, I've changed my views. When I first became the CSIS watchdog in 1985, along with four distinguished colleagues following consultations with the opposition parties, I accepted the conventional wisdom that reviewing the complex security operations at CSIS was too difficult and time-consuming for busy MPs, who could not be trusted to maintain security confidentiality in the political atmosphere of the House.

Over time that situation has changed. Whether it was Parliament's responding properly to the horrible events of 9/11 with controversial provisions regarding what was then the Anti-terrorism Act, or the heavy-handed response of Parliament with the passage of Bill C-51 to the 2014 attacks in Ottawa and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, which became law in June 2015 after much partisan debate, one thing has become clear: a way has to be found to bring elected MPs inside the national security tent.

The debate in Parliament and before committee on Bill C-51, which I closely followed, suffered from an absence of an understanding of the objectives and techniques of preserving national security for Canadians while protecting rights and freedoms under the charter. If Canadians are going to be asked to support the toughening of our national security framework, sometimes at the expense of individual rights and freedoms, they need assurances that changes going forward will be carefully scrutinized in camera by a select group of elected representatives. This committee of parliamentarians will be the first point of reference for an overview when something goes terribly wrong, which it's bound to under the circumstances.

That is not to say that the committee of parliamentarians should be a substitute for the independent review bodies like SIRC, or the CSEC commissioner, or the CRCC reviewing RCMP activities. In fact, the committee's work will be complementary to the expert review bodies. It is my view that the jurisdiction of these expert review bodies should be extended to cover other federal agencies such as CBSA or Transport Canada—that's my list—and that steps should be taken to allow these review bodies to share classified information with each other or to conduct joint reviews of national security and intelligence activities.

A lot of the work on the possible changes to the framework for national security accountability in Canada was undertaken by Justice O'Connor and his staff a decade ago as part of the mandate of the Arar commission. Unfortunately, many of his recommendations appear to have been ignored to date. I hope the release of the green paper currently guiding you in your discussions and debate on Canada's national security framework will rekindle some interest in the O'Connor recommendations, many of which remain valid today.

I'm going to conclude by commenting on something that's not in the green paper, and that is the national security adviser to the Prime Minister. Currently this office is within the Privy Council. It does not appear to have a high profile or any operational responsibilities. Given the communication problems that exist between the 17 agencies or departments involved in national security and intelligence activities, the complexity of sharing arrangements contemplated by the Security of Information Sharing Act under Bill C-51, and the practical efficiency of joint operations on a broader base than it is currently, why not give the responsibility to someone with clout at the centre, the national security adviser to the Prime Minister? Of course, the mandate would have to change under this proposal, and so would the manner of appointment. Similar to the Auditor General or the Privacy Commissioner, this person should be appointed by Parliament on the recommendation of the Governor in Council. Presumably the committee of parliamentarians established by Bill C-22 would play a major role in the nomination and approval process, and the national security adviser would be required to table an annual report in Parliament subject to the usual redactions regarding security matters.

Some commentators may regard this proposal as plumping for a national security czar for Canada, but the concept has worked in the U.S. to ensure, since 9/11, more inter-agency co-operation, and the avoidance of institutional stovepipes in the unwillingness to share important security information in an organized and secure framework.

That concludes my remarks. I want to thank you for letting me share these ideas with you, and I look forward to your questions.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thanks for your remarks.

While I don't want to just resort to saying that the proof we are listening is that we are here and I am taking copious notes, not just from what you said but from everybody else who has been up at the mike, I do want to address what I think is your second ask, namely oversight.

As somebody who appears to be studying the issue very closely, as a member of OpenMedia, you will have seen Bill C-22, which would create, for the first time ever, a committee of parliamentarians charged with oversight of the national security file. Hopefully, that is demonstrative of some progress and advancement in at least one of the areas you are concerned with.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Ms. Vonn and Mr. Whitaker, for being here.

It's pretty obvious, the disdain and dislike that both of you have for Bill C-51, but I stand by the comment that no legislation is perfect but no legislation is all bad, either. Even Bill C-22 was mentioned by a previous witness here, who made some criticism of it. That's fair enough.

What I'm trying to get my head around is that a number of so-called experts in the law enforcement field have made comments that if some parts of Bill C-51 had been in place prior to October 22, two years ago, Private Vincent and Corporal Cirillo might still be alive. Also, some of those same ones have stated that the would-be terrorist in Strathroy just a few months ago wouldn't have ended up being apprehended and stopped.

I see, Mr. Whitaker, that you shrugged your shoulders on that, as if it doesn't matter. If that's not the case, that's fine, but what I need to know is in your worlds, both of you, where and when should it not be that law enforcement powers have the right to infringe on an individual's rights if that individual has a distinct, deliberate plan to basically commit domestic terrorism or otherwise?

[Professor Reg Whitaker, Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Victoria and Distinguished Research Professor (Emeritus), York University, As an Individual]

I would certainly like to add my voice to applauding the initiative of opening up national security to wider public participation as with these committee hearings. It's certainly a contrast to the way in which Bill C-51 was carried through the last Parliament. A better-educated public is crucial to democratic decision-making, as is the enhanced role of Parliament as we see put forward in Bill C-22.

However, public consultation can be diffuse and unfocused, while the key agencies of government have their own sharply focused agendas, which are relentlessly pressed on governments of any political stripe. I see already evidence in the green paper and in Bill C-22 of this process at work. The agencies are acting as a kind of heavy anchor pulling in one direction, while counter-pressures from outside are much weaker.

I'm not saying there's anything inherently nefarious in this kind of bureaucratic behaviour. I'm assuming that the bureaucrats are trying to do the job they're assigned to the best of their abilities, but on the issue of the powers that they are granted and the protections in terms of privilege and secrecy for their operations, there is a clear public interest in limiting the agencies' capacity to act without accountability to the public and to Parliament, and as well, in limiting the scope of their powers to conform to the rule of law.

The agencies certainly have legitimate concerns about reforms. I think there have been some unrealistic concepts of accountability and oversight that have been put out there, such as the idea that there should be oversight of ongoing operations in real time, whether by a parliamentary committee or whatever, which would be unworkable and undesirable. However, the provision of extraordinary and unreasonable powers, even though the agencies have no apparent intention of actually using them at this time but might prefer to keep them in the back drawer, as it were, just in case, should not be tolerated, nor should excessive limitations on external oversight review just to make the bureaucrats' lives a little easier.

In the interest of time, I want to focus my remarks on one section of Bill C-51, what I consider to be the very worst part of what I would say is a very bad piece of legislation, generally badly conceived, badly drafted, and potentially pernicious in effect. I'm referring to the threat reduction or disruption powers awarded CSIS and the special warrants CSIS might seek for judicial authorization to break the law and violate charter rights. I will also try to touch on the closely related issue of the secret intelligence public evidence problem.

What is wrong with CSIS threat reduction powers? Well, I think, everything, literally. As someone who has co-authored a history of the security service from its late 19th century origins to its present post-9/11 era, from the RCMP to its present incarnation as CSIS, I would say unequivocally that threat reduction in Bill C-51 is dangerous to civil liberties and the rule of law, certainly, but it also threatens to undermine security and effective counter-terrorist law enforcement.

CSIS is a security intelligence agency empowered to collect intelligence on threats to security and advise governments. The RCMP, of course, is the law enforcement agency on national security matters. The security service was taken away from the RCMP in 1984 after the McDonald commission for good reason: the illegal activities in the 1970s, mainly in Quebec against Quebec separatists but also against various left-wing organizations in the rest of the country.

Violations of laws without accountability, no clear lines between violent versus legitimate political groups, the question of control by elected governments, and so on, was precisely what the McDonald commission reacted against, and CSIS was created apart from the RCMP, with no law enforcement powers and a mandate spelling out what it was authorized to do and what it was not authorized to do. All those things flowed from McDonald and we're seeing it threatened with a return back to that era, that scandal-filled era again.

I'll just skip over some of the credits and try to focus on each of the problems with this.

First of all, the special warrants allow law-breaking and charter violations, short only of murder, torture, and rape, to be authorized by a judge. They are not surveillance warrants, which are in effect judicial certifications that these acts are within the law and abide by the charter. Instead, they ask judges to enable law-breaking and unconstitutional acts. This is a radical revision of the role of the judiciary from protectors of the law and constitution to enablers of violations. This is a shocking assault on the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary, now turned into a tool of the executive. I expect most judges, if not all, would be quite appalled by this prospect.

The next point is that the warrant application is entirely secret, with no specified follow-up for the judge granting the warrant to determine if it has been carried out as promised, or what the results are. No reporting is required of warrants granted or turned down—no accountability of any kind.

The decision to seek a warrant—and this is an important point—is at the discretion of CSIS. If they decide that a disruption activity does not require a warrant, there appears to be no fallback accountability as to whether that decision is justified. That is unacceptable.

These threat reduction measures could involve detention, if you read this very carefully—not arrest but detention—and they could involve extraordinary rendition on the international stage. Of course, in the latter case, we could see the potential for somebody who is a Canadian perhaps being rendered to a country where torture is routinely practised.

All of these issues that I've been talking about are problems regarding the rule of law and the rights of citizens, and so on. However, it's also very important to realize that CSIS threat reduction efforts could impede rather than facilitate counterterrorism. This recreates the potential for conflict turf wars with the RCMP, as were tragically shown by the Air India commission. It opens up the possibility that CSIS, protecting its sources as a security and intelligence organization, could imperil convictions in court, and there's the distinct possibility that these activities could contaminate the evidentiary trail.

This brings us to the intelligence evidence conflict that the Air India commission addressed, in which the government did not take up any of the recommendations of the commission to deal with this problem. I can't go into this at any length, and certainly it's a topic best undertaken by lawyers, except to note that threat reduction or disruption activities can be useful, certainly. I'm not making the point that they should never be used. They can be very useful in counterterrorism, so long as they are undertaken with the goal always in mind of securing criminal convictions and putting dangerous terrorists behind bars.

The RCMP already does this, both in its criminal and national security investigations, if you look, for example, at the Toronto 18 case. CSIS does disruption as well, under pre-Bill C-51 law, and that's fine. I don't have any problem with that, so long as it does not interfere with the criminal law process and is rather supportive of the criminal law process.

A general point that I would like to make is that unlike the old Cold War era, the era of terrorism is one in which, given that the terrorist threat is against civilians, ordinary people, the priority must always be given to law enforcement and criminal convictions. CSIS has a role to play, but the notion that they have this role of slowly building a long-term picture of these networks like the old KGB in the Cold War has to be subordinated to law enforcement. The threat reduction powers and special warrants radically undermine this.

The last thing I want to say is that CSIS says it has not applied for any of these special warrants, and that presumably everything it has carried out, we can assume, has not required that kind of special warrant power, like the powers of preventive detention and investigative hearings in the 2001 Anti-terrorism Act, which were so controversial that time limits were put on them. They were actually allowed to lapse at one point and then were reinstituted by the former government, yet in all that process, they've never been used.

Are we seeing a repeat of the same kind of phenomenon?

In both cases, if they have never been used, why exactly are they needed? In the case of the threat reduction powers, perhaps CSIS had these foisted on them unwillingly by the government. In that case, then, we really ought to get rid of them. Or it may be another example of the unending pressure on governments to keep up powers that they might need “just in case”. That's a very bad case for keeping a bad law on the books to be potentially abused by less responsible people in the future.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I appreciate that. Like I said, I'll get off Bill C-22. There's a lot more to be said, but we'll have that opportunity when we study the bill.

You talked about the wider array of departments when it comes to the green paper and the review that needs to happen of the national security framework. There's a very specific story that comes to mind that's come out in the last couple of week of information sharing under Bill C-51 with consular affairs, for example, and the risk that runs of creating another situation like we saw with Maher Arar.

I'm just wondering, because you mentioned the foreign policy implications, if perhaps you could elaborate on that and some of the concerns there are even within Bill C-51 that the legal dispositions that exist here at home aren't the same as what happens abroad when information sharing happens.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Farson, thanks for being here. I have a few questions. I don't want to get lost in the weeds on Bill C-22 because we will, as was mentioned, have the chance to study it at committee. Since it was brought up, there are a few points. There are some things we brought up as amendments that should be seen, and I perhaps wouldn't mind hearing your thoughts on those.

For example, there is election of the chair, which is something the British model does that the current legislation doesn't provide for. There's the question of oversight versus review. I'd also like to hear from you about it, because you did mention briefly the issue of SIRC when it comes to the fact that it's a review and not actual oversight. It's a very important distinction that doesn't come up often enough. The other thing is that the executive's discretionary power over what the committee actually gets to see has been a huge concern we have as well. I'd just start off on those three points and hear your thoughts on them.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Sure, and I agree with you on that oversight.

You mentioned that C-22 should be amended. This is something that some of us have brought up before. It's been mentioned, as you did again, that C-22 is modelled after the British model. The one thing that hasn't come out is that the British model was amended, big time, in 2013.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

If I understand you correctly, you're saying that the committee created by Bill C-22, which is not a committee that would report to Parliament but instead the Prime Minister, should in fact report to the House. Would that be your recommendation?

[Prof. Stuart Farson]

Yes, indeed. Bill C-22 was in fact where I was going next.

This would establish a committee of parliamentarians. Recently a former director of CSIS said that we should pass it and think about amending it later. I happen to disagree with that. I think we need to really address it and get it right, right now.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Professor Farson, thank you for your testimony.

Let's begin where you left off. I got the sense that you had more to say about the subject of oversight. What I took down from your closing remarks was that, first, there was a need for a rationale, an explanation, as to why the oversight mechanism was necessary, but there was also a need to ensure that the oversight was robust and effective.

As you've seen, the government has recently tabled Bill C-22. That legislation will be studied by this committee. Perhaps you can take a moment to expand your thoughts on that piece of legislation.

Salaries Act

[Candice Bergen, Conservative, Portage—Lisgar, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C-24, An Act to amend the Salaries Act and to make a consequential amendment to the Financial Administration Act.

I want to talk briefly about what it looks like the bill would do, and then a little longer about what it would actually do, and its implications.

As my hon. colleague across the way said, the bill attempts to make all cabinet ministers equal. It would also allow the creation of three new cabinet posts, without actually naming what those cabinet posts would be. It then eliminates all of the ministers for the regional economic development agencies. Those are the three main things that the bill proposes to do, as well as some housekeeping issues tied to the financial implications of doing that.

I will talk a little about those three things, some of which are more important than others. I will start with the issue of making all ministers equivalent.

Some would argue that there was a fairly good system set up under previous governments, including our previous Conservative government. In that system, there were ministers of state who had smaller portfolios without the same scope, and perhaps not the same impact on the country or the same status as other ministers' portfolios. For example, the minister of sport, although running a very good ministry, was considered and styled as minister of state, because that minister probably did not have the same impact on the country as, let us say, the minister of defence.

I was a minister of state, so I can tell everyone in the House directly about my experience. I was a minister of state for social development. When I sat at the cabinet table with the minister for foreign affairs, the minister of health, and the minister of finance, I had completely equal status with them in terms of what I said. I had equal time to speak to the Prime Minister. My opinions had equal weight, and it was a great experience.

That said, the fact was that the minister of state portfolio I had was different. It was important, but it was different from that of the minister of defence, for example. Some would argue that that distinction is important to recognize. However, the Liberals have said that they want to make all ministerial portfolios equal. They have proposed doing that because, let us fact it, they have gotten themselves into a bit of a state. They have a bit of a problem because they put a number of people in as ministers of state and were criticized for it, and now they want to fix it all.

I am not going to spend a lot of time on this. I think it is a shell game. Frankly, I would have been immensely insulted and refused to be one of these ministers whom the government has used as tokens and told, “Sorry, we put you in the wrong position, but don't worry, we're going to pay you as much as every other minister, but you actually won't have that responsibility, you won't have a deputy minister, and you won't have the same scope. But don't worry your pretty little head about it, because we're going to pay you the same amount”.

This is the shell game that we see the Liberals do time and time again. They did it on Bill C-22, when they introduced that bill to create oversight over CSIS. It is a shell game. We see it in their consultations with the provinces. It is a shell game. It is window dressing.

This part of the bill is all window dressing. It is an insult to the ministers who are now ministers of state but will soon be full cabinet ministers, and frankly, it is an insult to Canadians, but it is not a surprise.

I am going to leave that part. There are other things I want to talk about that are more important in their impact on our country.

The second part of the bill that I am concerned about is these three blank ministerial positions that would be created, but which no one knows what they would be for. The bill was introduced about a week-and-a-half ago, and so I have had a little time to look at it. When I was reading the bill, I thought that maybe they have a couple of friends in high places that they need ministerial portfolios for.

Maybe it is for Gerald Butts? Maybe the Liberals need a minister for moving expenses. Maybe they need a minister for increasing taxes, but then I realized that every one of their ministers are ministers for increasing taxes. Maybe they need a minister for photography. Obviously I am being facetious, but the point is that we do not know what these ministerial spots would be for and, frankly the answer that the parliamentary secretary gave me was not sufficient. In fact, he answered his own question.

The Prime Minister right now has not even used the full scope of the ministers he has available. There is no reason that these three empty spots have to be created, and one has to wonder what game is going on. What is the plan? We do not have an answer for that. We do not know what these posts are for.

The third reason, and frankly the most important one, that we cannot support the bill is that it would eliminate all of the ministers for the regional economic development agencies.

Let me explain what this would do. It would not eliminate the regional economic development agencies themselves. I want to read them off for the record. There are currently six regional economic development agencies, and under our government and previous governments, there were ministers from each of those regions who oversaw these economic development agencies.

For example, we still have Western Economic Diversification Canada. Under our government, we had an individual from western Canada in charge of that portfolio, who understood and represented the region, and could get feedback from people from western Canada. Right now, under this legislation, that minister would be gone.

As for the Economic Development Agency of Canada for the region of Quebec, there was always a minister from Quebec who oversaw that regional agency. When there are so many Liberal members of Parliament from Quebec, what an insult it is that not one of them could now be named to this portfolio. I am from Manitoba. I cannot tell people in Quebec what would benefit them, what they need for economic development, but what an insult it is to those in Quebec to say it will not have its own regional minister for Quebec.

As for the federal economic development initiative for northern Ontario, or FedNor, being from Manitoba, I understand northern Ontario. I am sorry, but some members are from Toronto and some of the members across the way are from northern Ontario. Northern Ontario is a little bit like Manitoba in some ways. We have a lot in common. It is not like Toronto at all, or Mississauga.

Then there is the Federal Economic Development Agency for Southern Ontario. Okay, we have one from Toronto, which makes sense.

As for Canadian Northern Economic Development Agency, my colleague from Yukon just said that we should quickly get this bill through. Does he realize that without having a minister from the north watching over it and being accountable and listening to people from his region, he is being hamstrung in the job he needs to do? Instead, it is a minister from Toronto.

Then we have the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agencies, ACOA. Here we go again with Atlantic Canada. There are 32 competent members of Parliament from Atlantic Canada. Could one of them not have been named as the minister overseeing ACOA? Instead the government has centralized power in one member of Parliament, one individual MP, and that is the Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development from Mississauga.

We are seeing regional interests and accountability for these agencies being ignored. There is a lot of money going through these agencies. There was a reason there needed to be a minister to oversee each one of these agencies. There is a reason there is a minister looking over the money that is flowing through and where it is going. Now there is one minister who also has Innovation as his responsibility. He is in a pretty good portfolio, but he is in charge of each one of these economic development agencies.

Regions are being ignored, accountability is being ignored, as we see the very worrisome trend of regional ministers being taken away in practice already, before this legislation. Under previous Liberal governments and under our previous government, there was always a regional minister in each province.

For example, in Manitoba we had a couple of very good regional ministers, one being the former member of Parliament and minister, Vic Toews, now Justice Vic Toews. He served as our regional minister for a number of years. We saw regional ministers in B.C., Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Quebec.

However, now that these ministerial positions have been eliminated, there is no one in the provinces for the provincial governments to go to when they are having a problem and need a regional minister to connect his or her cabinet with in Ottawa to bring their issues forward. The municipalities have no one to talk to.

In Manitoba, we are hearing it over and over again. Municipalities are asking us who the regional minister for Manitoba is. They wonder if it is the Minister of Natural Resources, because he says one thing and the Minister of Labour says something different. In Quebec, there is no regional minister. That is what I am hearing from my colleagues in Quebec. Municipalities and provinces do not know who to go to. What is happening is a massive sucking noise of the centralization of power.

Last Monday, we saw the provincial ministers for environment meet with the federal minister. However, it is pretty scary when the federal government has the ability to say to the provinces “If you don't get in line with us on CPP, on the carbon tax, on health care, we're cutting off your infrastructure funding, and you don't have a regional minister who is going to say anything, because there is none”. There is one guy from Toronto and a guy from Edmonton who are going to be making the decisions, and that is it.

This is scary, because it is going to be the Prime Minister and his cronies who are making these decisions. However, it really should not be a surprise when we look at what the government has done in ignoring the regions, whether ignoring the normal convention of appointing judges from Atlantic Canada to the Supreme Court of Canada, whether ignoring the provinces when it comes to imposing a carbon tax, or whether ignoring jobs that are needed in Alberta and New Brunswick by not standing up for energy east. There is a huge lack of respect by the federal government toward the regions and their need to be represented.

As far as imposing a carbon tax on the provinces is concerned, we have just seen it happen. Some provinces have said they do not want a carbon tax, and some have said they want to fight climate change, but they do not want the federal government telling them how to do it, because the federal government does not always understand what is happening in northern and rural Manitoba, for example.

I think Brad Wall, the Premier of Saskatchewan, said it very well:

I cannot believe that while the country's environment ministers were meeting on a so-called collaborative climate change plan, the prime minister stood in the House of Commons and announced a carbon tax unilaterally...The level of disrespect shown by the prime minister and his government today is stunning.

I think the bill before us is showing that same disrespect. It is showing disrespect to the people who are supposed to be full ministers, but who will not now have their own deputy ministers, and they will not have the same scope and responsibility. For example, the Minister of Science is not equivalent to the Minister of National Defence. She will not have the same budget. She will not have the same staff. She will not have the same authority. What utter disrespect and window dressing toward that woman.

Then we are seeing disrespect for the regions to the effect that, “Atlantic Canada, Quebec, western Canada, we know you're suffering from job losses, but you don't need your own minister of economic diversification, you don't need your own minister to see economy flourish. We'll just put it in the hands of Toronto and the Prime Minister and you'll be fine”.

Finally, directly to the Canadian people, the Prime Minister just wants to be able to appoint as many ministers as he wants carte blanche. He wants three blank spots. I have never heard of that happening before.

If a prime minister wants to put more cabinet ministers in place, he makes the decision, he gets—

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

Committee, I know you'll be very pleased that we're going to get right to questioning. The opening statement was done by the minister, and we now have witnesses here.

Mr. Brown from the department is still here. He is now joined by Ms. Beauregard.

Monsieur Coulombe, from CSIS, welcome again.

Mr. Paulson, it's nice to see you back.

Thank you for taking the time to join us.

As you know, we are beginning a fairly large study of the national security framework. This is not a legislative study. It is a study by parliamentarians on the whole framework, which we hope will help to advise the minister as he considers both policy and legislative changes in the coming year. That is the nature of our work. We're not dealing with any legislation in particular. We will be dealing with Bill C-22, now that it has been referred to us. If Bill C-21 and Bill C-23 pass in the House, we expect they will also come to us. This is really very much at the theoretical level of what we as parliamentarians need to be advising the minister on, having listened to the agencies and Canadians.

Welcome, Ms. Khalid. We're glad to have you and Ms. Petitpas Taylor as well. Thank you for joining us.

We're going to begin this round of seven-minute questions with Ms. Damoff.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

Without getting into Bill C-22 and parliamentary oversight, but specific to expert review, the academic literature suggests that in addition to parliamentary oversight and review, and in addition to the three review bodies, a super-SIRC is likely necessary. Would you speak to that, specifically?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Bill C-22 provides to this Canadian committee of parliamentarians more authority, more scope, and more power than almost any of its counterparts in any of our allied countries. It will have more jurisdiction to provide a higher level of oversight, and the intervention of a minister or the Prime Minister is limited only to those cases where a particular review at a particular point in time would be injurious to national security. On those grounds, a minister or the Prime Minister could intervene to say, “Not this particular area at this moment in time”. They would have to give written reasons to the committee as to why they were making that judgment.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

We'll try to keep Bill C-22 to a minimum, and we estimate that we will be having you back on Bill C-22 in a few weeks.

I'll give you extra time because I've taken your time, but let's try to keep Bill C-22 down to a minimum.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Well, if you want an answer to the question, it takes a little time.

Bill C-22, which I gather we are discussing today, Mr. Chair, even though we weren't supposed to be—

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

—protections in place in the very structure of his ruling.

The point is this. With the greatest of respect to the author of that report from the Library of Parliament, I would disagree with his conclusions. I know we're not discussing Bill C-22—

[John Brassard, Conservative, Barrie—Innisfil, ON]

Minister, thanks for being here today.

Yesterday, The Globe and Mail reported that you said recently that Bill C-22 creates a committee that “will set its own agenda and report when it sees fit.” Yet an independent report by the Library of Parliament stated:

How much the committee members would be able to access state secrets is in question because the legislation would allow cabinet ministers to block reviews of some spy programs and thwart the committee’s bids to see sensitive documents. “Bill C-22 authorizes ministers to refuse to provide information,”

We know there are seven exemptions that are in place within the legislation. We also know there was an issue back in 2010 where Speaker Milliken ruled on a question of privilege. He was quite clear in his ruling that the fact that there was sensitive information, or intelligence documents, or information relating to an ongoing investigation did not remove the obligation of the government to share those documents with the House. In fact, you said in support of that ruling, “That series of questions of privilege resulted in your ruling on April 27, when, in very eloquent terms, you indicated that Parliament did have the right to information.”

As a committee of Parliament, what has changed, Minister?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

—while I'm saying that the core piece of legislation has been introduced. It's Bill C-22. There will be perhaps two or three other bills that will come later on, obviously the ones dealing with the specific commitments in the platform, but it is useful to ask Canadians what else they want to see considered. Indeed, the Privacy Commissioner's items are not included in the list of the first seven, so the consultation has already yielded results by bringing forward his perspective on that particular issue.

Other people have said that we need to deal with the deficiencies in peace bonds. That is a critical deficiency as well, and we learned in the Strathroy case that the peace bonds that were described a couple of years ago as being a kind of panacea solution aren't, and they need to be fixed.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good afternoon, members of the committee. It's a pleasure to be back again. Thank you for the invitation to come on this occasion to talk about the consultations on the national security framework. I want to begin by thanking this committee for undertaking that study. It's an integral part of the government's approach to the future with respect to national security, and I'm grateful to have the committee's participation in the examination of that framework.

I also want to welcome Malcolm Brown. It's the first time he's had the opportunity to appear before the committee as deputy minister of public safety. I rely upon his good work and that of the women and men who toil in the department so faithfully to support the safety interests of Canadians.

In the second hour you will have the director of CSIS, Michel Coulombe, and the commissioner of the RCMP, Bob Paulson, in front of you. Those are always exceedingly interesting sessions. Even though he's not here at the table at the moment, I would like to acknowledge particularly Commissioner Paulson, who this morning made a historic announcement about a court settlement, and an apology and an approach going forward that will turn the page, we all hope, on a period of some considerable distress within the force having to do with harassment and sexual violence in the workplace. That announcement this morning was exceedingly important, and I congratulate all of those involved, including the commissioner, but also the very brave women who led that process over the course of the last number of years and had the patience, the persistence, the courage, and the perseverance to see it through to a successful conclusion.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank this committee for its work in consulting with parliamentarians and with Canadians generally about Canada's national security framework. This helps to fulfill a commitment that we made to Canadians last year to give them an opportunity to have input on national security issues and to be as inclusive and transparent in that process as possible.

Before I wade into more details, let me pause for one more short detour, and that is to thank the committee for the report you filed earlier this week about post-traumatic stress injuries, which disproportionately affect first responders. Dealing with that challenge is another of my priorities on behalf of firefighters, police officers, and paramedics who work every day to keep the rest of us safe and secure. The committee's report was very well done, and it will be very helpful to the government as we bring forward a coherent national strategy for PTSI among our vital emergency response personnel across the country.

With respect to public consultations on Canada's national security framework, this initiative to have public consultations is absolutely unprecedented. We want to hear from parliamentarians, subject matter experts, and Canadians generally about how we can best achieve two overarching objectives. We need to ensure that our security and intelligence agencies are effective at keeping Canadians safe. Simultaneously, we need to be equally effective at safeguarding our rights and freedoms, and the open, inclusive, fair, and democratic character of our country.

I began this consultation work on this topic many months ago. We've collected important input from respected academics such as professors Wark, Forcese, and Roach, and from security and intelligence operators like Ray Boisvert, who was formerly with CSIS, and Luc Portelance, who was formerly at the CBSA and before that at the RCMP. I've also heard from former MPs like Bob Rae, Anne McLellan, and Irwin Cotler, as well as former senators Hugh Segal and Roméo Dallaire. I've met with a number of other current MPs and senators, and with outside groups like the B.C. Civil Liberties Association, OpenMedia, various organizations representing Muslim lawyers and other professionals, and many more.

That's a good start, but my direct meetings are going to be ongoing because the consultation is ongoing, and that is now augmented by the active and very welcome outreach by this committee.

More broadly, we have launched, as of last month, an online public consultation, and it will be running until the first of December.

By way of background, in the summer the government published its “2016 Public Report On The Terrorist Threat To Canada”. That report covered the period through 2015 and into the beginning of 2016, highlighting the particular threat posed by individuals or small groups of lone wolves who get inspired to violence in some perverted way by the insidious influences of organizations like al Qaeda and Daesh. The threat report also included for the first time a description of Canada's national terrorism threat level. That level, by the way, is currently set at medium, where it has remained unchanged since October 2014.

To begin our online conversation with Canadians last month, the Minister of Justice and I posted a discussion paper and a backgrounder on our website. These do not purport to be statements of government policy. They are intended to elicit ideas and to provoke engagement on national security, and they certainly seem to be achieving that effect. Thus far, more than 8,000 responses have been received, with nearly two months yet to go in the consultation process. As I said, this online consultation will run until the first of December.

Whether it's our discussion with subject matter experts, or your committee work in talking to experts as well as other parliamentarians and Canadians generally, or the input we are getting online, we're looking for two types of advice: how we can enhance the effectiveness of our security agencies, and how we can equally and simultaneously safeguard our rights and freedoms, our open, inclusive, democratic society, and our Canadian way of life. These two core themes underpin our entire national security agenda.

On that point, I have noticed, of course, the report last week, and the committee appearance this week, of the Privacy Commissioner about the sharing of information. I consider Mr. Therrien to be a key part of the parliamentary oversight and accountability apparatus. I take his input very seriously, and I have already had one discussion with him about the points he raised in his report, and others will follow. In the meantime, in response to his point about privacy impact assessments in various government departments, I am now writing to all of my cabinet colleagues to ensure that all departments and agencies have in place the right privacy-related protections to deal with the issue of information sharing.

To close this introduction, Mr. Chairman, let me put these national security consultations in the context of our overall national security agenda as a government. That agenda includes the following points:

One, there is the creation of that new committee of parliamentarians that is reflected in Bill C-22, which you will have before you for consideration at another time. That is a cornerstone piece to bringing a brand new element into our oversight, scrutiny, and review architecture that has never before existed in Canada, but which has been recommended on a variety of occasions, by parliamentary committees, by the Auditor General, by external independent inquiries, and so forth. Bill C-22 will remedy the defect of that deficiency.

Two, we are hard at work on a new office of community outreach and counter-radicalization. The money for that was provided in the budget, and we're in the process now of identifying the individuals who will be best placed to deliver that new initiative.

Three, we will ensure faithful compliance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Four is clarity with respect to warrants.

Five is a more precise definition of propaganda.

Six is repairs to no-fly lists, and in particular the appeal process that relates to the no-fly list.

Seven is full protection of the right to protest.

Eight is a statutory review, after three years, of our anti-terrorism legislation.

Nine is a new arrangement with the United States with respect to our common border, including a much improved pre-clearance system and the establishment of an entry/exit data collection mechanism for the first time, as well as other improvements in the arrangements with respect to no-fly lists.

Ten is, and for the first time, this process. Canadians are actually being thoroughly consulted about what other steps, in addition to what I've already mentioned on the agenda, they believe are necessary to keep them safe and to safeguard our rights and freedoms.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Wesley Wark]

Monsieur Dubé, I would add that we probably have to keep our attention focused on the problem we are trying to deal with. The inspector general was a small office within what became the Department of Public Safety to provide reporting directly to the minister on the activities of CSIS.

The real problem I think we have to address is something the commissioner has already raised, which is that in the existing system we have for independent expert review, we have created this very siloed system with different independent review bodies looking at single agencies without any capacity to link those views into a kind of strategic overview, and without any capacity to address the broader Canadian security and intelligence community.

Once upon a time, the Canadian security and intelligence community was small. Now it's large. I think the government has some difficulty in even deciding how large. The count is between 17 and 20 agencies that have different kinds of national security and intelligence functions.

I don't have a solution to this. The public safety minister has mused about the idea of creating a super-SIRC, as he has called it. Disappointingly, from my perspective, there is no reflection on these possibilities in the green paper itself. In fact, one of the ways in which I would say the green paper steers the conversation a little too vigorously is that it steers it away from a discussion about enhancing independent review and making sure it's strategic and capable of linking all the activities. There is even a hint of a suggestion that if you create this new committee of parliamentarians in Bill C-22, you may not need an additional layer of independent review, which I think would be a terrible backward step.

[The Chair, Liberal, Rob Oliphant]

I'm going to caution members that we will be having hearings on Bill C-22, and we'll be taking an extensive amount of time. If we use our time here on Bill C-22, we're not going to be able to get as much on the national security study, so try to keep your questions on our study.

Mr. Miller, for seven minutes.

[Daniel Therrien]

Bill C-22 is progress in that it would create a committee of parliamentarians. It is important that departments and agencies that work in the national security area be supervised, monitored, and reviewed by elected officials. The democratic legitimacy of that committee is extremely important. I do not think that it is sufficient. Parliamentarians bring democratic legitimacy, but they are not substantive experts.

I think we need both review by elected officials and review by experts in these national security issues, human rights, etc. On the expert review side, Bill C-22 does not deal with that issue. We are left with three national security agencies being the subject of expert review. The majority of the 17 national security agencies, if we look at that world, able to receive information under SCISA, are not the subject of expert review.

I think to have a complete picture it is important that all agencies involved in national security be the subject of expert review and oversight. On the mechanics of this, is it one review body? Is it several? It would need to be discussed. My point is that all departments and agencies involved in national security should be the subject of expert review.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thanks to the witnesses.

This is to build on the point that the chair made. Not only will this committee act independently, and not only will it be informed by some of the broad parameters of the green paper, but we will be informed by your testimony, and those of future witnesses, which is of course given to us, we expect, objectively, dispassionately, to a certain extent. We will reflect on that evidence in shaping our report and whatever recommendations that may flow.

I hope you take that assurance, Professor, in good faith, because it is certainly delivered with that intent.

Let me ask a few quick questions because I don't have a lot of time.

Mr. Therrien, I read your department's most recent annual report. There's a recommendation there that Parliament address the question of oversight. You address that in your written remarks. To what extent does Bill C-22 not address those concerns? Do you have any residual concerns? On your read of it, do we have the balance right?

[Daniel Therrien, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the committee for inviting me to appear before you today.

In particular, I will be focusing my comments on the government’s Green Paper, which was recently released. We will present our formal response to Public Safety by December 1. In the meantime, I am happy to provide preliminary comments, in the hope these may be helpful as you prepare to engage with Canadians in several cities across the country.

The stated purpose of the Green Paper is to prompt discussion and debate about Canada’s national security framework, which is broader than the reforms brought about by Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015. I fully support the need to review the entire legislative framework, not just the changes brought about by Bill C-51. But to do that in a comprehensive way, the focus cannot be only on addressing challenges faced by national security and law enforcement agencies. It must also take into account legislative changes and other developments that have had an impact on human rights, including international information sharing and the need to adopt rules to prevent another tragedy like the one lived by Maher Arar.

In order to ensure our laws adapt to current realities, it is important to consider all that we have learned since 2001, including the revelations of Edward Snowden regarding government information gathering and sharing activities, as well as other known risks regarding the protection of privacy and human rights, including those identified during commissions of inquiry. Obviously, we must also consider recent terrorist threats and incidents.

In my public statements on Bill C-51, I expressed significant concern with the broad information sharing authorized by the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act. I warned that the lowering of thresholds for sharing could lead to large amounts of personal information on law-abiding citizens being disclosed. Edward Snowden demonstrated how government surveillance powers can be used on a massive scale. Unfortunately, there is nothing in the Green Paper that addresses the lowering of legal standards for information sharing.

When Bill C-51 was tabled, the government maintained SCISA was necessary because some federal agencies lacked clear legal authority to share information related to national security. The Green Paper addresses complexity around sharing, which can prevent information from getting to the right institution in time. These references to the complexity of the old law do not clearly explain its shortcomings. Situations where there is no legal authority for sharing information related to national security can be identified, but so far they have not. I strongly urge this committee to ask specific questions on the subject. A clearer articulation of the problems with the previous law would help define a proportionate solution.

The green paper speaks of the challenges of law enforcement getting access to what it calls “basic subscriber information”, which is cast as relatively innocuous on the premise that it does not include the contents of communications. There has been extensive work done by my officials and other technical experts that finds that this subscriber information, or metadata, is far from benign. Daniel Weitzner, who founded the Internet Policy Research Initiative at MIT, considers metadata to be “arguably more revealing [than content] because it's actually much easier to analyze the patterns in a large universe of metadata and correlate them with real-world events than it is to go through a semantic analysis of all of someone's email and all of someone's telephone calls.”

The GCHQ, the British signals intelligence agency, has publicly stated that metadata is more revealing for intelligence purposes than the content of communications. If, as the green paper suggests, new legislation is to be informed by the privacy expectations Canadians have about metadata, Canadians should be clearly advised of the personal information metadata can reveal about them.

The green paper presents a scenario in which a police officer wants to obtain metadata from an Internet service provider but is unable to do so when the investigation is still in its early stages, and there is not enough information to convince a judge to provide authorization. While we appreciate that it might be useful information to have “at the outset of an investigation”, as it says in the green paper, it is unclear to us why neither the evidentiary threshold required to obtain judicial authorization via production order or warrant nor the exigent circumstances exception articulated in R. v. Spencer can be met.

I should add that preservation orders can be obtained on a reasonable grounds to suspect threshold, a very low standard indeed. In that context, we would urge the committee to probe government for precise explanations of why current thresholds are unreasonable and why administrative authorizations to obtain metadata, rather than judicial authorizations, sufficiently protect charter rights.

Encryption, another issue raised in the discussion paper, represents a particularly difficult dilemma. On the one hand, as a technological tool, it is extremely important, even essential, for the protection of personal information in the digital world. On the other hand, as a legal matter, individuals who use it and companies that offer it to their customers are also subject to laws and judicial warrants that may require access to personal information where legitimately needed in cases in which public safety is at risk. Ultimately, the issue is whether it is possible to enable authorized access for the state without creating technological vulnerabilities imperilling the privacy of significant numbers of ordinary citizens. Where it is not possible to do this, I think it is important to ask which of these two important public interests should prevail. We expect to have more to say on this by December.

The green paper lists accountability mechanisms, including ministerial oversight, judicial review, Parliament, and review by independent bodies of experts. On the issue of parliamentary review, I would note that Bill C-22, which proposes to create the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, fills the need for democratic accountability and brings us into alignment with other western democracies. I would note, however, that many agencies that have a role to play in national security or public safety are not currently subject to any independent expert review. This is an omission that, in my view, needs to be addressed.

As I mentioned, my office will be submitting a formal written response to this green paper once we've fully analyzed some of its newer proposals. In the meantime, I would be happy to answer any questions you may have. For instance, I think it would be important to discuss how monitoring of the Internet to prevent radicalization should not create a climate such that ordinary Canadians feel they cannot enjoy fundamental freedoms.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[The Speaker, Liberal, Geoff Regan]

Pursuant to an order made on Friday, September 30, the House will now proceed to the deferred recorded division on the motion of the second reading stage of Bill C-22.

The House resumed from September 30 consideration of the motion that Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Public Safety

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, Bill C-22 is only one piece of the puzzle to fix the breach in Canadians' rights that that minister voted for.

Still on the worrisome subject of Bill C-51, today we learned that CSIS and Global Affairs Canada finalized an information-sharing agreement.

This is despite the fact that the ministerial directive allowing the use of information obtained through torture, which happened recently with Canadian citizens tortured in Syria, is still in place under the Liberal government.

Will the government repeal that ministerial directive or at least give us a good reason for not doing so?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, a major step in that regard is Bill C-22, which is before the House right now. It will establish the new committee of parliamentarians to provide greater oversight, to ensure that Canadians are properly kept safe, and, at the same time, that their rights and freedoms are guaranteed.

We welcome the report from the Privacy Commissioner. That report will be an integral part of the national security review, which is under way at the present time, to make sure this framework is consistent with what Canadians want.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Andrew Leslie, Liberal, Orléans, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I think if you seek it, you would find unanimous consent for the following motion:

That notwithstanding any standing order or usual practice of the House, the recorded division on the motion for second reading of Bill C-22, an act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts be further deferred until the expiry of the time provided for oral questions on Tuesday, October 4, 2016.

[Pierre Nantel, NDP, Longueuil—Saint-Hubert, QC]

Mr. Speaker, in light of some of the reports we have heard on CBC over the past week, clearly, it seems appropriate to ask some questions. There were reports of incredible abuses committed against Canadian citizens who were literally sent to be tortured at the request of various Canadian agencies. That is precisely why I am pleased to rise here today to speak to Bill C-22 at second reading.

My good friend, the member for Victoria, has been handling this issue skilfully and intelligently. I will therefore be voting in favour of the bill at this stage so that it can be studied further in committee. As always, that is where the real work is done for the benefit of Quebeckers and Canadians.

We certainly commend the government's initiative in bringing this bill forward. Not only does it respond to a very clear call from various commissions of inquiry over the past several decades, but it also fulfills a promise made during the election campaign last fall regarding some recent issues.

This bill to create a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians is crucial. The committee has to be formed not only with the greatest of care, but also with the necessary tools to be credible in the eyes of everyone, citizens and politicians alike, as well on the international stage. Half measures are not an option.

When it comes to credibility and legitimacy regarding national security, the truth is that the previous Conservative government missed the mark with Bill C-51 in the last Parliament. They went in exactly the wrong direction. A critical mass of national security experts were against that bill that was rammed through.

The NDP was the only party that firmly opposed this bill, and Canadians overwhelmingly rejected this intrusive approach that did nothing to balance national security with the protection of the individual freedoms of Quebeckers and Canadians.

Let us be clear: the Liberals have to keep their promise to get rid of the problematic provisions in Bill C-51. We will hold them to it. If we as parliamentarians, and the government MPs in particular, want to win back the trust of Quebeckers and Canadians, then this is definitely the right first step.

Honestly, the public's trust in our institutions should be among the primary objectives of Canada's security policy. Let me explain.

We live in a world that is constantly evolving and, unfortunately, as shown by the tragic events in Istanbul, London, New York, Paris, and Brussels, it is unpredictable and quite dangerous. The length of this list should be enough to attest to that.

We must ensure that our national security organizations, the RCMP, CSE, and CSIS, have the necessary tools and resources to do their job, but that they also do not operate without administrative transparency, so that Canadians can know that they are effective and that they protect Canadians' rights in the best possible way.

Make no mistake, the world in which we live is not a John le Carré or Ian Fleming novel set in the cold war. The duty to protect is particularly important, but entails a responsibility.

I agree, our national security organizations already have oversight bodies, but the truth is that these bodies operate somewhat haphazardly and do not have full and systematic access to sensitive information.

The mandate of oversight and review bodies is limited to examining the work of their target organization. They are unable to follow the thread that connects them to various government organizations.

I want to remind everyone that the annual budget for CSIS, the RCMP, and CSE is close to $4 billion. That responsibility, not to mention the significant amount of taxpayer money involved, justifies the creation of this committee of parliamentarians. I know that every MP represents his or her constituents admirably. That is the spirit in which the members of this parliamentary committee will be tasked with overseeing these operations.

To get back to my first point, the committee must be put together very carefully. All of our allies have parliamentary committees for international security, but they differ in their makeup and especially in their mandate. We can learn from both their experience and their flaws to ensure that our review committee is robust.

Quebeckers and Canadians want a watchdog with sharp teeth. The new committee must have full access to classified information, sufficient resources, and independence. Within reasonable limits, it must be able to share its findings with Canadians in an informative and transparent way.

Twelve years ago, an interim committee of parliamentarians on national security recommended that, should such a committee be created, it should have complete access to all of the information it needs.

Of course, the NDP will be working hard to ensure that this new committee has access to that information.

In that regard, Kent Roach and Craig Forcese, legal experts and authors of a book that was recently published on Bill C-51 and Canada's anti-terrorism laws, have said that without full access to classified information, the committee would not be able to accomplish its task. Mr. Forcese added that this is a good bill, albeit one with inevitable flaws, which likely reflect compromises designed to reconcile elements within the government. Bill C-22 is a good start, but even the best review mechanism in the world cannot make up for flawed legislation, such as Bill C-51. It is therefore important not to lose sight of the bigger picture. These are very clear statements from very competent individuals.

It seems obvious to me that the new parliamentary oversight committee must act as a sufficient counterbalance to restore Canadians' confidence and, more importantly, prevent the kind of abuse that we have seen or bring it to light.

On that note, in order to demonstrate why we need an oversight committee with adequate powers, I would like to draw the House's attention to fact that the excellent journalists at CBC/Radio-Canada managed to report that, from 2001 to 2004, Canadians were imprisoned and tortured in Syria with the complicity of Canadian authorities.

Following the September 11, 2001, attacks in New York, CSIS and the RCMP wanted to find al-Qaeda cells located within the country. In the end, that contributed to massive human rights violations and complicity in the torture of three individuals in Syria. CBC/Radio-Canada had to comb through some 18,000 documents to bring this story to light.

Let us be clear: complicity in torture is unacceptable. It is unacceptable for our authorities to use such an approach. While waiting for a proper parliamentary committee with the right tools to be set up, it is up to talented reporters, like the ones at CBC/Radio-Canada, to ensure that our national security institutions do not engage in this sort of abuse.

I think it is high time that we had this tool so that Quebeckers and Canadians can have confidence in the institutions responsible for protecting us.

[Karen Vecchio, Conservative, Elgin—Middlesex—London, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to stand here today in the House to discuss Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act.

I stand here after reading hours of previous debate from this parliament as well as previous parliaments, media reviews of this bill as well as the bill itself. The bill is extremely misleading and should have a disclaimer that states "read the small print”. The bill truly deceives Canadians. The government has deceived Canadians by introducing a bill that would not provide true parliamentary oversight, but is a facade that it is doing something.

Just a year ago many members of the House sat through electoral debates. It was during this time that the current Prime Minister campaigned on real change and less power of the PMO. Yet, in this bill, the Prime Minister would have even greater power than we can even imagine when it comes to the actual inner workings of the proposed committee.

Let us start by pointing out that the Prime Minister would personally choose the chair of the committee, and he chose that member and provided a handsome bonus for this position. Let us point out that the make-up of the committee would not be like one of the standing committees in the House of Commons. These committee members would be approved by the Prime Minister. This committee would only be able to receive information approved by the Prime Minister and his cabinet. This committee would report directly to the Prime Minister, and the report that would be tabled in Parliament would be vetted by the Prime Minister. Let us not forget the Prime Minister would have the right to edit this report. I truly think I see a theme in these things that I am stating.

On another note, this committee would be made up of parliamentarians who would not require any experience in security, policing, or defence. Am I wrong for thinking that a hand chosen committee with political imbalance is right for Canada?

I would like to point out that the information that would be reviewed by the parliamentarian committee would already have been cleansed by the cabinet and the Prime Minister. Information that would be reviewed by the committee would have been approved yet restricted. I will share a section of a speech given by the hon. member for Durham, citing former speaker, Peter Milliken:

The insinuation that members of Parliament cannot be trusted with the very information that they may well require to act on behalf of Canadians runs contrary to the inherent trust that Canadians have placed in their elected officials and which members require to act in their various parliamentary capacities.

This legislation would do exactly opposite of the statement by the former and reputable Speaker.

We all understand that there would be sensitive information presented to this committee. However, the fact that the committee would not be seen to have this privilege is very disturbing. My thoughts on this committee can be compared to a family dinner. The committee is not old enough and not wise enough to sit at the grown-ups' table. As well, how could there be true oversight if the information received were already edited? It is sort of like reading a letter that has black marker all over it, except in this case it would be done all by the Prime Minister's Office.

I am unsure if the members of the committee would even know there was edited information that they would be receiving, so that when it came to them it would already have been edited so therefore they would not have all points of view and they would not have the opportunity to look at all of the information necessary to make the appropriate decisions. I say that because there has been little information provided on this actual committee, just the limitations it would be given.

The government is introducing a committee to be more transparent to Canadians, the Liberals say. However, we know that transparency is truly not the case here. I speak as an average Canadian with the honour of representing the great constituents of Elgin—Middlesex—London, an average Canadian who hopes the government will recognize this flawed bill and make important amendments, such as the amendment requests that were presented to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and completely ignored, amendments that were not only reviewed by the official opposition but were shared with the critic for the NDP for its input as well.

These suggestions include: a set number of members and senators; the ability for the committee to summon any witness required; the election of the chair; the request that all parties should have the right to select members who have the necessary experience and who are familiar with security, intelligence, and defence issues; and as well become a member of Her Majesty's Privy Council and swear an oath of secrecy for the work conducted.

These are just some of the suggestions presented to the minister, and as I just stated, with no response.

Changing gears, I have reviewed numerous suggestions indicating some sort of support for the bill. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association supports the introduction of the bill; however, it notes that there are many considerations that need to be addressed. These include the government's power to halt a committee investigation, the Prime Minister's power to redact the committee's report, as well as the decision that the Prime Minister personally appoint the chair.

A law professor at the University of Ottawa, Craig Forcese, has stated that he has concerns about the government’s ability to veto the committee’s plans, limit its ability to see secret materials, and redact its reports. A University of Ottawa historian stated that this is a “good bill”, but he too adds that the real test will be finding the right members.

Even when people look at the bill who actually support it, they too have questions. We have seen academics, lawyers, and many people react to the bill by saying that it is just not right. It needs to have amendments made to it, and it needs to have suggestions from the opposition parties as well.

The bill is not perfect. Therefore, I urge the Minister of Public Safety to start looking at these suggestions and start listening to the opposition members. My colleagues and I are not saying that third-party oversight is not important, but we see a government setting up a new branch of the PMO, not a committee that is allowed to do its job.

Currently, there are watchdogs in place, including the Security Intelligence Review Committee that reviews CSIS, the CSE commissioner who reviews the Communications Security Establishment, and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission that reviews the RCMP.

This is a committee that is not and will not have the tools and resources available to be effective. This committee already has limitations set out by the Liberal government. The committee is already hampered by the government's decision on the development of the parliamentarian committee.

I ask my colleagues to review this piece of legislation and proposal for the committee, and ask themselves whether this is what Canadians are really looking for. Did they ask for a committee that is another branch of the Prime Minister's Office, or did they ask for third-party oversight? Did they ask for hand-picked members, including a hand-picked chair that reports to the Prime Minister directly, or did they want to see a committee that truly has the rights of a committee and can do its work with all resources available to them?

The legislation is very worrisome to me. If the Prime Minister is hand-picking, then can we be sure that he is not also setting the agenda? How can we be sure that the agenda is allowed to be scrutinized by members, ministers, and the Prime Minister himself, or is this committee just fluff?

I am not against watchdogs and whistleblowers. However, the legislation is not that at all. The legislation would not provide the true parliamentary oversight that is necessary. This committee is window dressing, and it does not have the teeth to be able to do anything. This committee reports to one person and one person alone, and that person is the Prime Minister of Canada. It is he who will decide what is actually tabled in the House. National Security is extremely important and the Prime Minister would not allow the committee to do its work.

I urge the Minister of Public Safety to scrutinize the bill and provide something to Parliament that is meaningful. I urge the minister to work with all members, government and opposition, to do what is best for all Canadians. Please work with the recommendations made by former security lawyers, our Armed Forces members, and former RCMP and police officials, who now sit in the House, to make this a better piece of legislation that we can all support.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Public Safety

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Madam Speaker, on Monday, I introduced my bill to repeal Bill C-51. The New Democrats are still saying today what we said from the beginning: Bill C-51 infringes on our civil liberties without doing anything to make us safer.

The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness now calls Bill C-22 the centrepiece of Liberal national security policy. During the campaign, of course, the Liberals' centrepiece was fixing Bill C-51.

What we have in Bill C-22 is a necessary but flawed review committee, a case of bait and switch, plus more consultation. Yet, more consultation is cold comfort to Canadians whose rights are under threat, including those engaged in legitimate dissent, like first nations leaders and environmentalists, or even ordinary citizens who value their privacy.

We all know what works when it comes to combatting terrorism. We need to devote adequate resources to de-radicalization and to traditional intelligence and enforcement work. Neither restricting our rights nor collecting so much information on all of us that we lose focus on the real threats will help keep us safe. That is why it is time to repeal Bill C-51.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Ziad Aboultaif, Conservative, Edmonton Manning, AB]

Madam Speaker, I hope Canada will be safer after Bill C-22 is passed. How can the bill guarantee accountability and public trust when the chair of the committee is being parachuted into the position by the Prime Minister?

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

[Bill Blair, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

Good morning, Madam Speaker. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to rise in the House today to speak in support of BillC-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. With this bill, our government would fulfill a key commitment it made to Canadians to ensure that our national security framework is working effectively to keep Canadians safe, and to ensure that our rights and freedoms are safeguarded.

Far too often, I have heard in the House that the great imperatives of every government to keep its citizens safe and to safeguard their rights and freedoms is being spoken of as if we are required to make a choice, a compromise, or a calculation. The very nature of the public discourse suggests that it may be necessary to sacrifice one in order to achieve the other. I respectfully disagree. I believe it is the responsibility of every government, and by that I mean every member of the House, to ensure that we achieve both safety and freedom in equal measure.

I have had the opportunity over the course of my life to be involved in operational matters of national security. From these operational matters, I want to share some of my experience. There is always a tension between those who are responsible for gathering national security intelligence, those responsible for gathering evidence for prosecutions, and those who are responsible for ensuring that nothing bad happens in any of our communities. That tension is often resolved through certain guiding principles.

The principles that guide the work of those dedicated men and women who are responsible for keeping our communities safe while adhering to the rule of law are precisely these things, including the highest in this country, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is their responsibility not only to obey those laws but to uphold them, to uphold them to be respected and honoured throughout the country.

We are also guided by the important principles of public interest. It is important that those who are responsible for keeping us safe do the right thing. That means, of course, not merely obeying the law, because this can lead to situations that in my old business we used to call “lawful but awful”, but respecting the public interest, ensuring that we are doing the right things and in a way that will engender the respect and trust of the public.

That brings me to the most important principle that always has to guide the work of those responsible for and tasked with keeping our communities safe, and that is maintaining the public trust. Maintaining the public trust is based upon a number of things. Certainly the rule of law and acting in the public interest are important, but it also requires transparency and accountability. This is particularly difficult in circumstances where the work is done in secret, where we are engaged in activities that are clandestine, covert, or are classified and secret, when it is not in the public interest to disclose to the public what we know or the means by which we came to know it. It is not in the public interest for that information to become known to those who would do harm in our communities.

How can the public be assured that those tasked with safeguarding their security and their rights obeyed the rule of law and acted in the public interest? It comes down to who guards the guards. I believe that Bill C-22 would allow for a more fulsome answer to this critical question in Canadian governance.

I have been the beneficiary of both good governance and bad governance, and I can say from my experience that doing the job right requires good governance. Indeed, the effective operation of a national security framework requires that we have in place governance and oversight mechanisms that work for us.

We already have a fairly robust system of oversight for national security. We have ministerial oversight, and many of our laws require the explicit consent of the relevant minister for those enforcement and intelligence-gathering agencies to proceed and for those involved to do their job. Much of their work requires judicial oversight to ensure that certain legal thresholds are met. The organizations and the individuals who are responsible for this work are guided by internal policy. In addition to that, we have other important review bodies. CSIS, for example, is governed and overseen by the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which has access to certain classified information to review the work of CSIS. The work of our RCMP officers and other police services is subject to the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission and other oversight bodies to ensure that they are obeying the rule of law and acting in the public interest. CSE is overseen by the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner.

In addition to that work, Parliament has a number of parliamentary committees. Here it is important to acknowledge that the committee being proposed in Bill C-22 would not be a committee of Parliament. It would not be a committee of either house of Parliament. Instead, it would be an additional review mechanism to assure Canadians that we are effective in our oversight and control of the extraordinary powers that are given.

I can tell the House from my experience that those who are tasked with this responsibility welcome oversight. They welcome that accountability. It is important to them that oversight and governance exist, because without public trust in the important work they will be doing, they cannot succeed in their dual mission of both maintaining safety and upholding the rights of our citizens. This measure is an important one to fulfill our commitment to provide effective governance and oversight of national security matters and to protect the rights and freedoms of our citizens.

The committee, from its proposed composition in the bill, would be an effective mechanism to ensure that matters are dealt with across various government agencies. In my experience, keeping our country safe and upholding our laws and freedoms is the responsibility not of a single agency of government, but of all agencies of government.

In far too many cases we have seen that oversight by one body is insufficient to review all of the activities of those other bodies engaged in this important activity, and that as a result there have been a number of gaps in information sharing, and our effectiveness has been compromised. Through the introduction of this new review committee, our government will be able to assure Canadians that those gaps are closed and that all committees are operating in a collaborative and more effective way.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Madam Speaker, my question was specifically about whether the member opposite felt that there would be more accountability because of the fact that there would be minority Liberal representation on the committee. I did not really get an answer to that, so I can only assume that she agrees that there would be more accountability.

It is my pleasure to rise in the House today to speak to Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act. This bill is of incredible importance and is part of this government's larger plan to rectify the Harper Conservatives' flawed attempt at anti-terrorism legislation, which infringes upon our most basic rights in a bad attempt to make Canadians safer. I am happy to see this piece of legislation, which was promised in the last election and which I believe an overwhelming number of Canadians support, before the House.

I am proud to represent the riding of Kingston and the Islands and have always enjoyed engaging with constituents on matters of importance to them. A common concern raised in my riding was with regard to flawed Bill C-51. My constituents were concerned about their rights and freedoms and how they would be affected by it.

Although it is true that the government must be equipped to adequately meet the security challenges of the day, it must never lose sight of its responsibility to be accountable to Canadians.

This bill begins to deal with many of the concerns raised by Canadians with respect to Bill C-51. The government has listened and is delivering on this important promise. I believe that this legislation ensures faithful compliance with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and is in line with what Canadians elected this government to do.

In my opinion, Bill C-22 is required to establish accountability and to ensure that Canadians' rights and freedoms are respected. Reforming the flawed provisions enacted by the Harper government is crucial in protecting Canadians' rights and freedom of expression, which is of the utmost importance in a healthy democracy. Bill C-51 set the course to erode this most fundamental right, a right that should never be taken lightly and should always be guarded with the utmost respect.

Canadians pride themselves on living in a democratic country, and they deserve their government respecting their rights and freedoms, period. The legislation before us sets the stage for ensuring that those rights and freedoms are respected while at the same time Canadians are protected from the changing reality of the serious threats posed throughout the world.

I am proud to stand with a government that does not use the politics of fear. I am proud to support a government whose policies are based on evidence and fact. It would be much easier to scare Canadians into believing that certain measures were paramount for their safety, as the previous government did, even if the measures meant infringing upon their most basic rights and freedoms. This government will not do that. It will not use fear to advance its political agenda, as we have seen in the past.

What we see before us today is the proper way to establish safety and security while respecting the rights of Canadians. These changes are long overdue, and I am glad to see this government fulfilling a promise to Canadians: to protect Canada's national security and rights and freedoms while at the same time protecting us from the realities of a changing world.

I listened carefully to the debate in the House throughout this week and heard concerns about the openness and accountability of the committee proposed in this legislation. Let me assure everyone that I, too, expect the government to be accountable, and that is why I see this legislation as a necessity. This legislation strikes the right balance. It would protect Canada's national security while allowing for accountable oversight for Canadians. This legislation has the proper checks and balances in place to address the concerns raised in the House during the debate this week.

The national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would have representation from both the upper house and the lower house and would be charged with having non-partisan responsibility for reporting on security matters in the interest of all Canadians. Members of this committee would be granted unprecedented access to classified material to adequately carry out their mandate.

With the current challenges Canada faces, this would be a crucial step in ensuring that Canada is prepared for what the future brings. By creating the national security committee of parliamentarians, the government would be ensuring that there was appropriate oversight and accountability moving forward. Specifically, this committee would have the ability to review the full range of national security activities, including all departments and agencies across the Government of Canada, and would be able to gain a full picture of what is being done by those government agencies in national security and intelligence matters.

Committees have been referred to as the backbone of Parliament. This committee would work to ensure that our national security was effective in keeping Canadians safe and that Canadians' rights were safeguarded. In fact, Canada is currently the only Five Eyes ally without parliamentary review. The U.S., U.K., Australia, and New Zealand all have committees similar to the one proposed in this bill. Many of our allies formed these committees in the late 1980s and 1990s. That means that Canada is already lagging behind our allies. We are long overdue for setting up this oversight, which is in the best interest of Canadians.

Actually, I am proud to see the broad scope of this committee and believe that it has the potential be a stronger body than those seen in other countries. This is significant for Canada, as it has the potential to be most effective committee within the Five Eyes group.

Something else caught my attention. On Tuesday, my colleague from Louis-Hébert pointed out that four former prime ministers, both Liberal and Conservative, have recommended that an oversight committee be formed. All four have called for an independent committee to review the actions of our intelligence agencies, but that is not all. Four Supreme Court justices and four former ministers also support the concept of this committee.

I am proud to join with those former prime ministers, Supreme Court justices, and justice ministers, as well as the current government and Canadians from across this country, in supporting this bill. This is not a place for blind partisanship but is an opportunity to fix our currently flawed system.

As one of my colleagues across the aisle said earlier in this debate, good oversight not only builds public trust but must make our security services much more effective. That is exactly what this legislation allows for. This committee would provide the oversight necessary to maintain accountability and to ensure that Canadians' safety and rights are maintained.

I urge all my colleagues to put their partisanship aside and see this important bill passed in this House. I see no reason why this legislation should not receive all-party approval.

[Kelly Block, Conservative, Carlton Trail—Eagle Creek, SK]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to join this debate on Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act.

Above all else, governments must be able to ensure the safety and security of the citizens they serve. All of us here in this place share in this duty.

Our public safety institutions take many forms and have different resources to fulfill their different mandates. Day in and day out, the people who keep us safe work to balance national security concerns with the privacy rights that Canadians expect and deserve. They do an excellent job. They work diligently under challenging circumstances and deserve our gratitude.

The bill being considered here today would create a statutory committee of parliamentarians appointed by the executive branch and housed within it. In Canada, the executive branch is the Prime Minister's Office and the Privy Council Office that supports it. This would be a committee of parliamentarians and not a parliamentary committee. The difference is important because one is able to decide its mandate while the other cannot. A parliamentary committee is the master of its own affairs and has standing orders and practices. The members of a parliamentary committee are named by each member's whip and not by the Prime Minister. The chair of a parliamentary committee is elected by its members.

This new national security and intelligence committee would have none of that. According to the government's press release, the committee would have a mandate to scrutinize any matter related to the national security of Canada. Unfortunately, the fine print is not as generous concerning the responsibilities that the committee and its members will have.

Under the bill, the Prime Minister and his ministers will be allowed to withhold information requested by the committee if they consider that the disclosure of the requested information would negatively impact national security. However, while the responsible minister would be expected to provide the committee with the rationale on his or her decision to hold back information, in practice this will not work. We cannot ask for something if we do not know it exists. If we are told that something exists but we cannot see it because of national security concerns, the entire point of having a committee to reinforce the oversight of Canada's security apparatus disappears. A member, or anyone for that matter, cannot be expected to work with only partial information.

As prescribed in the bill, the committee would be a creation of the executive branch and its dealings would be kept secret. Therefore, it is difficult to identify what resources the members of the committee would have at their disposal if they were dissatisfied or frustrated in their role.

Furthermore, if members of the committee have a major concern with the information they receive in testimony or through a brief, they can only report their concerns to the Prime Minister or the minister responsible. Presuming that the Prime Minister does not share the same security concern, he does not have to act on it, and members cannot bring their trepidation to the elected House of Commons, or to anyone for that matter, because they have been sworn to secrecy.

The way that this committee would be set up makes me think of the philosophical thought experiment of “If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?” If members cannot speak about what they have been briefed on, does it even matter that they have been briefed?

While it may be premature to speculate on what the committee will actually do, it is no stretch to imagine that the committee will meet semi-regularly and be given access to documents and testimony that an already existing parliamentary committee would receive and members could access via access to information requests. Assuming that the committee finds itself in agreement on recommendations, the government will review the committee's report before it can be tabled in Parliament.

If the purpose of the committee is indeed to provide elected members of Parliament with a greater role in overseeing Canada's national security institutions, then I do not understand why the inputs and the outputs of the committee will be screened by the Prime Minister.

Given how the government is proposing to structure this committee, I am unsure of whether the Prime Minister believes that elected members of Parliament can be trusted to steward the information they receive with care and discretion.

If the Minister of Public Safety is truly intent on creating a national security oversight committee, then the committee should have real oversight over our national security agencies. Unfortunately, as it is being set up, the national security agencies would have oversight over the work of the committee.

The Prime Minister or minister would also have the responsibility to name the chair of the committee. This is problematic, as we have already heard during this debate. It reinforces the impression that the committee is just a PMO working group. It is understood that a chair of a committee plays a critical role as the spokesperson for the matters that are directed to the committee, and committee reports are published through the chair. In order for the committee to be successful and have legitimacy, I believe that the chair must be chosen by members of the committee.

I understand that in a majority government situation, as we find ourselves in right now, the members of the governing party will never select an opposition member as their chair. Interestingly, while we are debating the bill, the Prime Minister has already appointed the member for Ottawa South to chair the committee. That is a clear sign that the government is unwilling to compromise on this specific aspect of the legislation.

Taking this into consideration, together with the bill before us, more than anything the committee appears to be a make-work project for members of Parliament and a way for the Prime Minister to deflect any criticism on his action, or inaction for that matter, on national security matters.

I would like to conclude by making a few remarks about the role of members of Parliament and how the legislation fits into a disturbing trend that I have observed over the past 11 months.

Members, even if they were elected as members of the governing party, have not been elected to serve the government. The legislation serves to reverse this relationship by making members work for the government. While members of the governing party argue that the government is giving parliamentarians access to more information, Bill C-22, in its current form, makes it difficult to believe. The real test of whether the committee would have any teeth and impact on policy would be on whether it can freely report its findings with the weight of Parliament behind it. Again, the bill ensures that this simply would not happen because the prime minister and his ministers would be able to read any report from the committee before it is made public, if it is made public at all.

Ultimately, the bill's stated purpose is to empower members of Parliament. Therefore, I sincerely hope that the government will take the advice and concerns of members from all parties, which have been seriously raised, into consideration as we move forward.

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is a great honour to rise today in support of Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

The proposed legislation fulfills a key campaign promise of the 2015 election, and represents a thoughtful and long overdue modernization of Canada's security framework.

Allow me to begin by referring to the Prime Minister's mandate letter to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, which unambiguously referenced the overarching goal of “keeping Canadians safe”. It reads:

This goal must be pursued while protecting the rights of Canadians, and with an appreciation that threats to public security arise from many sources, including natural disasters, inadequate regulations, crime, terrorism, weather-related emergencies, and public health emergencies.

What we are discussing here today is at the intersection of defence policy, foreign policy, and national security. The rationale behind this mandate is self-evident. We live in a world of new, ever-evolving, and unprecedented security threats. Just this past March, a lone wolf attack on a Canadian Forces recruitment centre in my riding of Willowdale underscored this point. While I am grateful for the incredible bravery and professionalism the RCMP and others displayed in responding to the attack, the fact remains we are largely operating in a brave new world where groups and individuals can pose serious challenges to our safety and security.

Meeting these challenges, while maintaining our respect for the cherished rights and freedoms of Canadians, requires a robust and responsible parliamentary framework. While the previous government curiously failed to recognize this, something I can assure members I heard repeatedly on doorsteps, it is my belief that Bill C-22 rectifies the obvious gaps within our existing security framework, namely, by establishing a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. This committee would be provided extraordinary access to national security information and an unprecedented ability to scrutinize federal departments and operations. In doing so, Bill C-22 rejects the notion that we must choose between prioritizing security concerns on the one hand and respecting civil and charter rights on the other. Rather, it establishes a framework that balances both.

The issue of accountability boils down to this. Does Canada have the institutions it needs to protect the safety of Canadians, while at the same time safeguarding our rights and freedoms? Bill C-22 ensures that we can answer that question in the affirmative.

The concept of establishing a parliamentary security oversight committee is hardly novel. The idea can be traced as far back as the 1981 McDonald commission report, while more recent efforts include a 2003 Auditor General's report, recommendations from the 2004 Interim Committee of Parliamentarians on National Security, the 2005 national security committee of parliamentarians act, a 2009 recommendation from the House of Commons public safety committee, a 2011 Senate report, and private members' bills introduced in 2007, 2009, 2013, and 2014, most recently by my Liberal colleagues from Malpeque and Vancouver Quadra.

Over the past decade, these efforts were repeatedly obstructed and denied by the previous Conservative government, despite widespread support amongst experts, stakeholders, academics, non-governmental organizations, and the Canadian public. While there is no making up for this lost decade, I am proud to say that Bill C-22 finally provides Canadians with a modern and meaningful security oversight mechanism.

In keeping with our government's commitment to evidence-based decision-making, Bill C-22 notably aligns Canada's security regime with accepted international best practices. As colleagues before me have highlighted, Canada is currently the only member of the Five Eyes alliance lacking a security oversight committee that grants sitting legislators access to confidential national security information. In an era in which security threats are increasingly global and interdependent, Canada cannot afford to be an outlier on this issue. This absence of oversight has limited the ability of parliamentarians to examine national security issues in depth. The previous government argued that there was no need for parliamentarians to have access to confidential national security information. On this side of the House, we disagree. Giving parliamentarians access to such information will benefit Canadians who want their government to be open and transparent, including our national security agencies.

As Professors Craig Forcese of the University of Ottawa and Kent Roach of the University of Toronto recently noted in their working paper to modernize Canada's inadequate review of national security, a robust national review framework rests on three pillars.

First is a properly resourced and empowered committee of parliamentarians with robust access to secret information, charged primarily with strategic issues, including an emphasis on efficacy review. Second is a consolidated and enhanced expert review body, a security and intelligence community reviewer or super SIRC with all-of-government jurisdiction, capable of raising efficacy issues but charged primarily with proprietary review. Third is an independent monitor of national security law, built on the U.K. and Australian models, with robust access to secret information and charged with expert analysis of Canada's anti-terrorism and national security legislation and able to work in concert with the other bodies on specific issues.

It is my belief that the bill meets these criteria. Professor Forcese would appear to agree, writing as he did that Bill C-22 represents a good bill. He goes on to say that it creates a stronger body than the U.K. and Australian equivalents and that it constitutes “a dramatic change for Canadian national security accountability”.

I believe the legislation is well intentioned, well considered, and well rounded. In particular, I would like to highlight five notable elements of the bill.

First, Bill C-22 allows the committee to analyze and study laws, policies, and operations in real time, increasing the discipline, responsiveness, and accountability of our security framework.

Second, the legislation before us tasks the committee with the invaluable capacity to monitor classified security and intelligence activities and report findings to the Prime Minister. Rather than reviewing security activities on an ad hoc and siloed department-by-department basis, Bill C-22 provides the opportunity for comprehensive security oversight.

Third, the provisions regarding ministerial discretion on limits to access to information contained within the bill are clearly delineated and follow the best practice models established by the United States, Australia, and others.

Fourth, Bill C-22 guarantees that the government will constitute a minority within the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, thus ensuring increased accountability.

Finally and perhaps most significant, Bill C-22 represents an important counterbalance to the sweeping powers introduced through Bill C-51. Indeed, as I mentioned earlier, the bill represents the fulfillment of a key campaign pledge on the part of the government to rein in the excesses of Bill C-51, while ensuring the collective security of all Canadians. The introduction of a committee of parliamentarians tasked with overseeing Canadian security and intelligence represents a much-needed return to accountability.

The bill, however, merely represents one part of the puzzle. Our government has also committed to amending Bill C-51 to better protect the rights of assembly and protest, and to better define rules regarding terrorist propaganda, mandating statutory review of national security legislation, creating an office of community outreach and counter-radicalization, and increased consultations with Canadians from coast to coast on how best to balance security concerns and civil liberties.

This process, both within and outside Parliament, will allow us to strengthen the security and intelligence system of Canada. It will also provide Canadians with confidence that in protecting their safety and security, the government stands firmly behind their rights and freedoms.

I urge all hon. members of the House to join me in supporting the bill.

The House resumed from September 28 consideration of the motion that Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Business of the House

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister of Small Business and Tourism]

Mr. Speaker, this afternoon we will continue to debate the NDP opposition motion. Tomorrow we will resume debate on Bill C-22, on the national security committee of parliamentarians.

I understand that tomorrow will be the final day of debate at second reading. I thank the opposition for their co-operation on this matter.

Next week we will debate a motion for the ratification of the Paris Agreement. As my colleague mentioned, I anticipate a very robust debate, as there is much interest by hon. members on all sides. I am working with the other House leaders to complete the debate with a vote on Wednesday.

Pursuant to Standing Order 51, the House will have a debate regarding the Standing Orders and procedures next Thursday.

Opposition Motion—Creation of a Standing Committee on Arms Exports Review

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in this important debate. Before I begin, I should indicate that I will be sharing my time with the member for Windsor West today.

I think it is really important that we start with what we are talking about and what we are not talking about. This is a forward-looking motion that is designed to achieve greater transparency and greater oversight. It calls upon Parliament to create, by amendment to the Standing Orders, an oversight committee for the issue of arms sales abroad and related procedural matters to that particular motion.

The objective is to say, learning from what we have done in the past, how we can do better in the future. The proposition in the motion that is before Parliament today is that we create a committee that would study this because our allies are doing a much better job and because we lack the information they have to do that job. That is what I would like to focus on in my remarks today.

In the last couple of days we have been dealing with another important initiative, Bill C-22 in which the Government of Canada has liberally adverted to the experience in the United Kingdom with its security intelligence oversight committee, and called for greater accountability through that process and greater access for parliamentarians to information about national security operations in our country.

Today's motion would do the same thing, but in a different context. It would create oversight of how arms exports occur in Canada, particularly when we learn more information about human rights abuses that may or may not be occurring in a particular country.

Let us examine the situation in the United Kingdom. Just as the government would want us to learn from their experience in national security oversight, I am suggesting that the House could profit from learning about the United Kingdom experience in this same area.

It was over 15 years ago that the United Kingdom set up a parliamentary committee on arms export controls. That committee had people drawn from a whole variety of other parliamentary committees to examine all aspects of the United Kingdom arms exports, from licensing to broader policy issues such as human rights. Every year in that country there is a government annual report on U.K. arms exports, and it has recently been focusing on exports to countries of concern, many of which are the subject of the debate we are having here today. It is looking at the role, for example, of U.K. exports to Saudi Arabia and the war in Yemen, which of course are very much at the core of why this debate is before us today.

That is about oversight, but what about the need for greater transparency and information? The British public, through that committee, has had much more access to information about what is going on so that they can hold their government to account as to the extent to which arms exports are being sent to countries most people in Britain would not want to receive them.

What is the situation in Canada? We have an Access to Information Act, but its exceptions swallow the rule. The moment anything to do with international affairs or foreign policy comes up, it is a black hole. The ability to actually find out what is going on is very limited. This committee would be an opportunity to hear, not just from the public, NGOs and the like but also from people in industry, which is perfectly appropriate, as well as government representations and indeed the public so that we can have a broader national conversation about this important issue.

I had the honour of working with the former member for Mount Royal, Irwin Cotler, a champion of international human rights, and we are on a committee called the Raoul Wallenberg human rights committee, with members drawn from all the representative parties here. We had the opportunity to meet the wife of Raif Badawi here in Ottawa, who was arrested and imprisoned in that country for insulting Islam, sentenced to 10 years and a thousand lashes. That international human rights debate was the subject of great concern across this country.

We have understood in recent years more than we understood before about where Canada's arms are going. I will admit, I had no idea the extent to which Canadian arms abroad have become an important component of international trade in arms. Canada's weapons exports have nearly doubled over the last 10 years. I confess, I did not know that.

In fact, Canada is the second-largest arms dealer in the Middle East, according to Jane's All the World's Aircraft, the defence industry publication. Now Saudi Arabia is the world's second-largest buyer of Canadian-made military equipment after the United States. I do not think many Canadians are aware of that information. It may be that I am the last to know these things, but I find it very disturbing, as I think a lot of Canadians would, that we have become such an important arms export contributor in the international sphere.

Therefore, I ask myself, what do we have to hide as a country? Why can we not know more? Why can we not know the human rights records of the countries to which we are sending arms? Yes, we have assessments, but those human rights assessments have been watered down over the years. They are not as available as they should be to the Canadian public and to us so that we as the representatives of the public can have a better idea of just exactly where our money is being spent, where our arms are going, and the extent to which we are contributors to world peace. I think that is something that we need to look at very carefully.

Apparently our existing arms export rules have changed over the years. They are supposed to prohibit sales of military hardware to countries “whose governments have a persistent record of serious violations of the human rights of their citizens”, and here is the condition, “unless it can be demonstrated that there is no reasonable risk that the goods might be used against the civilian population”. Well obviously there are problems, because we have seen in the Saudi example how arms sent to that country for domestic purposes have been diverted to put down Shia protests in one part of the eastern provinces of Saudi Arabia, and, it seems, to be used by the Saudis in countries like Yemen, where human rights atrocities have been so widespread. Over 6,000 people have been killed there.

Do Canadians realize that their arms may be used in that theatre of war? Do we not need to know whether light armoured vehicles, which are used for the suppression of those people, are in fact made in Canada? Maybe that is good public policy. Why can we not have a committee tasked with doing just that, not as an add-on to other work that the foreign affairs committee might be doing but as a stand-alone committee to address what is obviously a growing and important industry in our country, and its ramifications? Why is that any different from what we do with other committees that look at an area of our economy and address its ramifications?

Why would the House be opposed to greater transparency and accountability through an oversight mechanism like the British have? Why does the current government refuse to see that what it proposed two days ago in one bill, following the U.K. example of oversight and transparency, should not be used a couple of days later in another important area of our economy and society? That is what is before the House today. I really fail to see how this can be politicized as if we were somehow trying to talk about past events, who supported what and who did not, and how much information we had at a particular time versus how much we have now.

Anyone who has seen the videos of the repression of Saudi citizens with Canadian light armoured vehicles at least has to ask questions about whether we are on the right track. We do not have time, as parliamentarians, to cover every single piece of policy. Why can we not give a multi-party committee the opportunity to look at it, to get the information that members need, and to report to Canadians what it can legitimately report to them about what is going on with our dollars abroad?

That is what is before us today. I urge the House to support a motion that would provide greater accountability and greater oversight of our arms export industry.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, this is hardly my first speech in the House, but it is my first as public safety critic, and it is my pleasure to speak to such a crucial bill.

This is one of the many elements we debated during the previous Parliament in the context of Bill C-51 and the parties' election promises. I want to make it clear that we have a lot of criticisms, which I will cover in my speech.

We are willing to support the bill at second reading simply because it is a good first step. The NDP has long believed that we need to create this committee. However, there are some serious problems with the government's approach.

Before we get into the composition of the committee, I think it is important to point out many of the inconsistencies in the government's approach to this particular file, whenever it comes to proposing anything. We still have not heard, despite the minister's great grocery list in question period yesterday, what the actual plan is. There is no bill before the House, despite a lot of talk, as is becoming far too typical on the part of the government.

Well, there is one bill, the bill from my colleague, the member for Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, which seeks to repeal Bill C-51.

That said, we are hearing about all these grand plans from the government to bring specific changes, with no actual legislative plan in place.

The other problem is that we can form committees, create all sorts of mechanisms, but the fact is some already exist. One that springs to mind is the Security Intelligence Review Committee. That committee, which currently exists, reviews the activities of CSIS. The way things stand right now, in light of the budget the government brought down in March 2016 and according to the employees of that very committee, funding is expected to drop by $2.5 million annually. Over the next few years, this will lead to the loss of 11 employees assigned to overseeing CSIS. We can certainly form a committee, but we are definitely starting off on the wrong foot if resources are lacking due to budget cuts.

The other big issue is one that has come up a few times. With all kidding aside, we have been parsing the words. The Minister of Foreign Affairs seems to want us to distinguish between “discussions” and “negotiations”. In this regard, I would like the government to understand the difference between “review” and “oversight”. These are not the same thing, despite some of the speeches we are hearing from our colleagues on the other side of the House.

The key to protecting Canadians' rights and freedoms is to have proper oversight, not after-the-fact “review” done at the behest of the minister and the Prime Minister. This word “review” is the other one we seem to be having to parse, in response to the answer given by my colleague in the previous speech.

I will concede that the reports might not be edited, but it will be hard to figure them out under all the black Sharpie that will be left by the Prime Minister on the grounds of national security. That is cause for concern.

After all, the MPs on this committee will swear an oath and be trustworthy. The bill gives the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Prime Minister a lot of discretion and that makes me think of the Conservatives' argument when we were debating Bill C-51 during the last Parliament.

The Conservatives argued, or at least strongly implied, that we needed to trust the authorities, that we could not trust parliamentarians to do this type of review, and that independent committees already existed.

I find it downright disturbing because giving cabinet that much power reminds me of the Conservatives' argument. Again, though the government may have changed colours, its approach remains the same.

As I said, we support the bill at second reading so that we can try to make some important changes. At the end of the day, we cannot say no to forming this committee because, after all, it is what we wanted. Nonetheless, there are some serious flaws that need to corrected, as I said from the outset.

Clearly, the first flaw is the election of the chair. Ultimately, the chair will ensure that the committee will be independent, which will be difficult if the chair is chosen by the Prime Minister.

As I mentioned in my earlier question, we heard from our cousins from the U.K., when they came here at the invitation of the minister himself last week. They shared with us how important it was in the debate they had when creating a similar committee that the chair be elected. I heard the argument from my Liberal colleague before that this does not matter, because the opposition members will be in the majority on the committee anyway. That is not the issue here. The issue is not about which party is the majority. The issue is not leaving it up to cabinet who is carrying the committee. Parliamentarians from all parties need to have a say. I have no doubt that the Liberal members of the committee will make a wise choice to ensure the independence of the committee, much more independence that when it is coming down from the PMO.

We will have to make another important change. Once again, I am going back to the points I raised earlier. I am referring to the discretionary authority granted the minister and the Prime Minister. We have serious concerns about this and we want to debate it.

I am taking the opportunity to return to yesterday's news and the Privacy Commissioner's report.

I will read one excerpt from the chapter on Bill C-51 in the Privacy Commissioner's report. He said:

While our Office welcomed legislation to create a Parliamentary committee to oversee matters related to national security as a positive first step, we have also recommended expert or administrative independent review or oversight of institutions permitted to receive information for national security purposes.

What that says, and I certainly hope it will not be the case, is that the government cannot sit on its laurels now that it has tabled this bill. This is only one piece of a far larger, more complicated puzzle.

Nonetheless, the position of inspector general of CSIS was eliminated by the Conservative government. The NDP has been asking for a long time that this position be re-established to allow greater independent oversight by people who, unlike us parliamentarians, have some expertise in the matter. Those two items are closely related and that is the important thing.

To bolster this argument, I will mention the minister's response concerning the government's approach when we asked him about the ministerial directives concerning torture. I am taking this opportunity to officially state in the house that the NDP is calling for the repeal of these directives, because it is completely unacceptable that a country like Canada allows the use of information acquired through torture. The practice does not benefit public safety in the least, and quite frankly, it is immoral and goes against our international commitments.

When we asked the minister the question, he told us not to worry and that the government would establish a committee to deal with such questions and provide oversight. Come on. It is ludicrous to claim that striking a committee makes it okay to keep such a directive in place.

I will say this with all due respect, because it is worth repeating in both official languages that we in the New Democratic Party absolutely want to see this ministerial directive that allows for the use of information on torture taken off the books and gone. It is completely unacceptable that in a country like Canada, we would even ponder using that kind of information. This is not information that will ensure the safety of Canadians and it goes against our values and our international commitments. I will say once again, when the minister stands in the House and says that it is okay, because they have Bill C-22 and we should not worry because all of these things will be supervised, that is absurd. The Liberals are using the bill as an escape hatch, and we do not want to see that.

It is important to understand that this is a first step in the right direction. Although the bill before us may be vague and flawed, it is in keeping with the concept that was also proposed by the NDP. This is one of many issues that were raised in the debate on Bill C-51. I hope that the members opposite will listen to what we have to say.

I repeat that we are trusting the Liberal members who sit on this committee to elect a chair and access the information without the Prime Minister exercising his veto power and covering that information up with a big black marker.

After all, we certainly do not want Bill C-22 to become an excuse for not repealing or making major changes to Bill C-51, which violates the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

[Ted Falk, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

Madam Speaker, I thank my friend from Scarborough—Agincourt for his in-depth analysis of the way he perceives Bill C-22. I would suggest that Bill C-22 is a token gesture on behalf of the Liberal government to comply with the campaign promise that it made.

I was on the public safety committee last year when Bill C-51 came through and I think the Conservative government at the time did a very good job of presenting a piece of legislation that was effective and a useful tool for our security organizations. It better enabled them to do the job that they do, and as we can see, we have had very good results in Canada.

I am wondering if the member would agree that the committee could be strengthened in a couple of ways. First, I see a weakness in the fact that members are appointed by one individual, the chair is appointed by one individual, and one individual can redact any information provided by the committee by way of report. I see that as a weakness, and I am wondering if the member would see a benefit to there being more openness, more transparency, and more electability among parliamentarians.

[Arnold Chan, Liberal, Scarborough—Agincourt, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise and join the debate on Bill C-22. I want to use my time to focus not so much on why I am supporting Bill C-22, because I think the arguments have already been advanced quite significantly by the members of the government. I want to use my time instead to address some of the substantive concerns coming from the opposition parties, which is what I will do in the time that has been allotted to me today.

There are some broad themes that have clearly emerged from the opposition that I want to address and put to rest to try to allay their concerns.

The first, which has been advanced by the official opposition members, is the concept that the architecture of Bill C-22 undermines the independence of parliamentarians because of the apparent supremacy of the executive branch over the legislative branch. They have cited the various provisions in the act that deal with the Prime Minister's capacity to appoint the members of the committee under section 5, and the ability of ministers of the crown to withhold information in certain situations under section 16. They have highlighted issues with respect to the ability of the Prime Minister, in consultation with the chair of the committee, to redact certain portions of the proposed report coming from the committee that might be injurious to national security or might disclose information that might be subject to solicitor-client privilege or might be injurious to or impact international relations.

I appreciate this particular point because we do live in a Westminster model, wherein our branches of government, both our executive branch and our legislative branch, are fused into the same body. The supremacy of the executive branch is particularly exacerbated in this type of model, unlike, for example, in the United States, under a congressional model, where there are very clear and separate branches of government, and the executive branch is specifically divorced from the legislative branch.

I would remind my colleagues of a point that was specifically highlighted by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness in his address to the House on the bill. The mandate of this committee is very broad. If we look carefully at the language of the legislation under section 8, it says that the committee's mandate is to review:

(a) the legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative and financial framework for national security and intelligence;

(b) any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence, unless the appropriate Minister determines that the review would be injurious to national security; and

(c) any matter relating to national security or intelligence that a minister of the Crown refers to the Committee.

Therefore, the oversight role, the review role, is very broad as set out specifically in the act. However, I would point out that the purpose of this piece of legislation is to do exactly that, to review the broad mandates of our national security and intelligence agencies. It is not to go and delve into the specific operational endeavours of the military or our police services to examine specific matters that are of a specific ongoing operational nature. I would submit that falls within the purview of the government's executive branch, to execute, in real time, responses to potential national security threats and to deal with those instances. The role of the committee is to look at these particularly broad mandates.

Some of the committee's other mandates are to review that our security and intelligence services have the right legislative tools, that the resources appropriated to our national security agencies are appropriate, that we have the appropriate interagency co-operation, and that the legislative framework allows for that appropriate exchange of information. I would also argue that it has to deal with some of the concerns that the third party has advanced, which is to ensure that the appropriate procedural and substantive protections are afforded to individuals who may be impacted by the actions of our security agencies.

I believe those are the appropriate measures of review, not the actual review of specific ongoing operational issues. The way I would frame it is that the role of the committee is not to play M in MI6 in a James Bond movie. Its role is to provide oversight and a check on the exercise of executive authority.

The second theme I wanted to address that I think has been overplayed by the opposition is with respect to the ability in terms of both access to information and the ability to redact information. Again, I would invite my colleagues on the opposite side to carefully review the actual language in the bill as it relates to those specific limitations.

Let me take, for example, the provisions that are dealt with under the access to information provisions in clauses 13 and 14, particularly as they relate to the exceptions under section 14. My colleagues on the other side have noted that there are seven exceptions, and they refer to them as being problematic. However, if we examine them carefully, they are very narrowly construed. Basically, they are construed with respect to other rights and immunities and privileges of other classes of persons other than parliamentarians.

Again, I think it is a bit of a mis-characterization that the supremacy of Parliament and the role of parliamentarians somehow supersedes the rights, privileges, and immunities of other classes of persons. I do not think that is a fair characterization. I think we have to always constantly engage and make sure that there is a balance.

We can take a look at the seven specific provisions in section 14. The first one is “a confidence of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, as defined in subsection 39(2) of the Canada Evidence Act”. In plain English, that means cabinet confidences. The question is whether parliamentarians should be subject and be able to access information as it relates to the deliberations of cabinet. Again, I think not.

The second one refers to “information respecting ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations”. My point is that those are operational decisions. Again, I do not think that it is within the purview of the committee to be reviewing ongoing military action.

The third is “information the disclosure of which is described in subsection 11(1) of the Witness Protection Program Act”. If somebody goes into the witness protection program, I do not think we need to know the identity of who that particular individual is.

The fourth is “the identity of a person who...has been approached to be...a confidential source of information, intelligence or assistance to the Government of Canada”. Therefore, if somebody is prepared to spy on behalf of Canada, again, I do not think we need to have that specific type of information.

The fifth one is “information relating directly to an ongoing investigation”. Again, that is an operational matter. We can certainly look at it retrospectively and review if there was a problem, but I do not think that this committee should be in a position to compromise an ongoing active investigation.

The sixth is information related to the Investment Canada Act, and seventh is information relating to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act. Again, if we look at these particular sections, they are very narrowly construed.

Therefore, the exceptions that are articulated in the bill are very narrow. Again, I would argue that these are very narrow areas that are carved out, and that the mandate of the committee is in fact very broad.

The other point that has been raised is with respect to subclause 21(5), the writing of reports and the Prime Minister's capacity to edit the reports.

Again, I invite my colleagues to read subclause 21(5) carefully with respect to what it means. It does not mean that the Prime Minister rewrites the report. It means that a report that has been received by the Prime Minister is reviewed to make sure there is no sensitive confidential information that is then subsequently disclosed to the public. It is this information alone that would be redacted. Through consultation with the chair that information would be subject to review and allowed to be redacted on the basis of national security, on the basis that it might be injurious to international relations, or that the information is confidential because of solicitor-client privilege.

Again, it is very narrowly construed. I simply submit that to my colleagues—

[Peter Julian, NDP, New Westminster—Burnaby, BC]

Madam Speaker, I know that we disagreed with the former Conservative government when it introduced Bill C-51. In fact, all political parties, except the Liberals, disagreed with the Conservatives on Bill C-51. There is a real impact on rights and freedoms, but the Liberals voted to support Bill C-51 which has left us in a very difficult situation.

Now the Liberals have introduced Bill C-22. I think the member would probably agree with me, as I agree with him, that there are huge flaws in this legislation. Instead of providing the independent oversight that comes from having an independent chair, we would have a chair who is chosen by the government and by the Prime Minister, which certainly flies in the face of the way our major allies do this type of oversight committee. Then we would have the censorship oath in terms of the information that would be permitted to go to the oversight committee, and a censorship control of the Prime Minister's Office on what comes out of the committee.

Instead of having oversight that Canadians can have confidence in, does the member not think that we have a very flawed piece of legislation?

[Jamie Schmale, Conservative, Haliburton—Kawartha Lakes—Brock, ON]

Madam Speaker, I rise today on Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians

It goes without saying that safety and security of Canadians is one of the top priorities of any government. I am sure every member in this chamber would agree with that statement.

Like many members, I spent the last few months in my riding, travelling from one end to the other. I spoke with countless constituents about the issues that were important to them. For many, their highest priorities were, of course, jobs and the economy. As a Conservative, I am proud to say our record speaks for itself on those two files.

I also heard from people who were concerned about public safety and national security. Across the globe, terrorist attacks are taking place and have taken place. The idea that these types of attacks do not happen in Canada was a common belief a few years ago, but now, when we look at the political landscape, terrorism cannot be overlooked.

As we know, attacks have taken place in our own country, plans have been thwarted many times by our brave women and men in law enforcement. Do not misunderstand me, please, I am not attempting to strike fear into the hearts of Canadians, but I believe it is important that we are not naive about our place in the world.

The most prominent example of this was October 22, 2015, or even most recently in August, when our enforcement agencies stopped an attack. There have been attacks across Europe. We see them in France, Belgium, and Germany, among others, and of course, in the United States. I say all of this because it is important to provide context on what members of the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians will have to review.

Our law enforcement, intelligence, and military agencies have played a crucial role in keeping Canadians safe. This bill has legislated a committee of specific design. I think we agree on the essence of it, but there are parts of it that I have issues with, members on the Conservative and NDP benches seem to have the same issues.

The committee will consist of a chair recommended by the Prime Minister. The committee will have up to eight additional members of Parliament, to a maximum of four from the government and no more than two from the Senate. Members of the committee cannot be a minister of the crown, minister of state, parliamentary secretary, and are appointed by the Governor in Council on recommendation by the Prime Minister, and the leader of the other members' party.

The committee is intended to be non-partisan and highly independent, but yet, the Liberal government appointed the committee chair in January before the legislation was even created. This committee will review agencies that were highly specialized and effective in their designated fields; yet, there is no requirement that the members of the committee have any experience in public safety and security issues.

I also find it concerning that the government refused to consult with opposition parties, despite the public willingness by the Conservatives and the NDP to discuss this important committee. In fact, our official opposition critic wrote to the minister twice about this committee. The committee, as it is currently written, is appointed by and reports to the Prime Minister's Office.

I believe, and I think most members on this side believe, that it should be open and reporting to Parliament. The Prime Minister campaigned on a reduced role of the PMO. We all know actions speak louder than words.

The committee is mandated to review the legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative, and financial framework for national security and intelligence, any activity carried out by the department that relates to national security or intelligence, and any matter relating to national security or intelligence that a minister refers to the committee.

I am going to quote the government's own backgrounder here:

The committee would have robust powers to access any information to conduct its reviews, subject to specific limitations such as to protect third parties, prevent interference in active military operations and maintain the independence of law enforcement functions. While the NSICOP would have a right of access to information it requests, the legislation would allow Ministers to withhold special operational information, but only if the disclosure would harm national security. The responsible minister would need to provide the committee with the rationale for their decision to withhold information.

The NSICOP findings and recommendations will be tabled in Parliament

However, and here is where some of the big concerns I have arise:

The government will review the committee’s reports before tabling to ensure that they do not contain classified information.

I find it deeply troubling that Bill C-22 provides for numerous exceptions, and permits government agencies and ministries to opt-out of providing information for review. This weakens the oversight, and does not permit the committee's mandate to be fulfilled.

I also find it concerning that the Prime Minister would basically have a veto on what is in the reports of the so-called independent committee. Would it not be even more appropriate for non-partisan officials or the committee to decide what can or cannot be released? The government in power should not have a veto on what the committee reviews or reports.

As with any committee, the chair provides crucial support and direction to the committee as a whole. It is, therefore, peculiar for a committee of this importance, for a committee that is claimed to be independent and non-partisan, that the government would have already selected who it is going to appoint to this position. We know it is the member for Ottawa South, and like all of us he is political. I have great respect for the member for Ottawa South.

There are many members in the chamber who I am sure would like to be on that committee, and I have no doubt had there been a free election of the chair, the member probably would have won because he is well respected by members on all sides of the House. However, the government will not even give those members the opportunity to select their chair. What happened to the Liberals' sense of accountability? What happened to their transparency? Real change they said. However, the chair, as I have mentioned, was appointed before the committee was even struck.

There are seven exemptions under section 14 in this legislation, including that the committee cannot look at ongoing investigations that may lead to criminal charges. If I am not mistaken, that basically covers every investigation, and operation of law enforcement and security agencies in this country.

It has been made clear that Canada is not the first country to create this type of oversight committee. Many of our allies have enacted similar oversight systems. This includes the British, the Australians, and New Zealand. I will not get into all of the details because it has been discussed by my colleagues.

I would like to thank my colleague, the member for Durham and the official opposition critic for public safety, for his work on this important file.

The importance of a national security and intelligence committee cannot be overstated, and we have heard that throughout the debate. It is, therefore, critical that legislation be properly drafted. As I said earlier, we all agree on the essence of the committee, but there are just some finer points that need to be tuned up in order to appease people on this side of the House.

The committee of parliamentarians should not report to the Prime Minister or the government. This is something the Liberals raised many times in the previous Parliament. It is something the Liberals talked about during the election. They said the PMO has too much power, and that power needs to be given back to Parliament. What do we see with this piece of legislation? The Liberal government is no different than any other government before it. It just has the sunny ways title to go with it.

As the legislation stands now, the government will have the ability to vet and veto the decisions made by this committee. This, therefore, would take away all the independence claims that the government has made. In effect, under the current legislation, the committee would be controlled by the Prime Minister's Office, and the Prime Minister's Office has appointed the chair already. This is an issue I hope all members on both sides of the House would agree that politics should be left out of. After all, the Liberals campaigned on it.

We as parliamentarians need to continue to ensure that our enforcement agencies have the tools and equipment they need to keep Canadians safe.

I would like to take a moment to thank the men and women who put their lives on the line every day, and those who currently serve or who have previously served at home or abroad, in conflict or peacetime. I appreciate their sacrifices. We shall never forget. It is all in the protection of our rights and freedoms. Members of the Canadian Armed Forces, our intelligence agencies, police, firefighters, first responders, we thank them for their service.

[Michel Picard, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Madam Speaker, I rise to speak to Bill C-22, which will create a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. There can be no greater obligation than to protect the security of one's citizens, both here and abroad.

The government of a country such as Canada, which cherishes its hard-won freedoms, its democracy, and its rule of law, has another obligation, and that is to uphold the Constitution of Canada and to ensure that all laws uphold the rights and freedoms we enjoy as people living in a free and democratic society.

The need to simultaneously fulfill these two key obligations is at the very heart of the bill before us. This bill is a response to the threats and attacks that have targeted various countries in the world, including Canada and some of our closest allies. Faced with this violence, we must remain alert and never let down our guard.

In addition, Bill C-22 responds to the many calls over many years for enhanced accountability of departments and agencies working in the area of national security. Hon. members will recall that these calls intensified last year when the previous government introduced the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, also known as Bill C-51. At that time, our party made the argument that Canada's approach to national security legislation should avoid not only naïveté, but also fearmongering.

The threats are real, and so is the need to protect civil liberties. That is why we included improvements to our national security framework, including the creation of a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, as a major part of our campaign platform in the last election.

The bill before us would establish a committee with nine members. Seven of the committee members would be drawn from the House of Commons, and of these seven, only four can be government members. Two members would be drawn from the other place. This committee will be different from other committees and offices established to review security and intelligence matters.

Under the accountability framework, some review bodies can have access to classified documents, but only for a specific department or organization. The members of these committees are not sitting parliamentarians. Parliamentarians may be involved, but they do not have access to classified documents. Those external review bodies are the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which reviews CSIS, the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP. None of those bodies include sitting parliamentarians.

On the one hand, parliamentary committees review security and intelligence issues, but they do that primarily by listening to testimony during their public meetings. On the other hand, the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence has a broad mandate to examine legislation and national security and defence issues.

Moreover, in the House, the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security studies legislation or issues related to Public Safety Canada and the other agencies in the public safety portfolio. They do extremely valuable work, but as a rule, neither of these committees has access to classified information. They have neither the mandate nor the resources to dig deep into the details of national security matters in order to hold the government and national security agencies truly accountable.

Under the bill before us, members of the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would obtain the appropriate level of security clearance and would, therefore, have access to highly classified security and intelligence information regarding national security and intelligence activities across the Government of Canada.

I would also point out that our Five Eyes partners have review bodies that function in similar ways. In those countries, select parliamentarians have access to highly sensitive intelligence so that they can help protect the public interest with regard to civil rights while also helping protect public safety by ensuring that national security organizations are functioning effectively.

Until now, Canada has been alone among the Five Eyes partners in not having a committee where parliamentary representatives can access classified information. This bill would close that gap.

In fact, in some respects, our proposal goes a little further than that of our allies from Westminster parliamentary democracies. This committee will review all departments and agencies whose activities are related to security and intelligence. It will also have the authority to investigate ongoing operations.

When it comes to establishing a national security accountability mechanism, this bill sets a new standard that some of our allies might well follow.

Robust powers are given to this committee, its members, and its secretariat. The committee will be able to access any information it needs to conduct its reviews, subject to some specific and reasonable limits. As is the case with similar committees in other countries, while committee members are not in a position to disclose the classified information to which they will have access, they can bring tremendous pressure to bear on a given organization or the government in power by letting Canadians know that something is not right.

Clearly, this new committee represents a major step forward in strengthening the accountability of our national security and intelligence system. It will provide elected officials with a real opportunity to evaluate our national security policies and operations and to ensure that Canadians and their civil liberties are protected.

I encourage members to join me in supporting this vitally important bill.

[Dianne Lynn Watts, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House to speak to Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act.

The bill was first introduced in the House of Commons on June 16. It looks to establish a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

We know that the committee's mandate, as laid out in the legislation, is to review the legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative, and financial framework for national security and intelligence; any activity carried out by a department that relates to national security or intelligence; or any matter relating to national security or intelligence that a minister refers to the committee.

I believe that the overall principle of the bill is relevant and necessary, given what we are dealing with in today's reality. However, there is a significant amount of responsibility and understanding, and it requires knowledge and critical thinking on a number of fronts. This is why I find pieces of the legislation somewhat troubling, especially when the act does not require the members of the committee to have any experience in dealing with security or intelligence-related matters and information.

I will frame this up in order to put some context around the issue.

From a personal perspective, and as a former mayor whose city bordered on the United States and is the second-largest border crossing in the country, next to Windsor, Ontario, I have presented before the U.S. Homeland Security on a number of issues. I have presented and also had the largest RCMP detachment in Canada, and I have dealt with significant financial, legislative, and security issues, from the proliferation of gang activity, cross-border drug and firearms issues, and murder investigations to the importation of drugs from China, Mexico, the Middle East, and the list goes on.

I cannot stress this point enough. The people serving on this committee must have some understanding and experience of sensitive, confidential, and secure information as it relates to national security and intelligence.

The bill is about the security of our country and the committee and its processes must be transparent. Regardless of political stripe, we all bring something unique to this discussion and this debate.

The chair should not be appointed. Rather, the chair should be elected. I want to take a moment here, because at this point one of the government member's stated that the critic said, in a letter, that the chair should be appointed. However, I will reiterate point seven of the letter, which is that the committee should elect its own chair from among its members. This is the practice with the U.K. committee and other allied countries. The election of the committee chair was also a commitment made by the Prime Minister. This was a direct notation from the critic to the Minister of Public Safety.

There is no doubt that this is an issue. It is unfortunate that the chair of the committee was already selected and appointed by the Prime Minister before the mandate of the committee was even established. It undermines the integrity of the committee even before it begins its work.

We need to look at the U.K. model, which was reformed in 2013 to be a committee of Parliament that reported to Parliament, and the members are appointed by Parliament, except for issues of national security, which are reported to the Prime Minister.

The stark difference with Bill C-22 is that the Prime Minister appoints the chair, the members of the committee are recommended by the Prime Minister, and the committee reports to the Prime Minister.

Also, the bill states that:

If, after consulting the Chair [who is appointed by the Prime Minister], the Prime Minister is of the opinion that information in an annual or special report is information the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations or is information that is protected by litigation privilege or solicitor-client privilege or, in civil law, by immunity from disclosure or the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries, the Prime Minister may direct the Committee to submit to the Prime Minister a revised version of the annual or special report that does not contain that information.

While parts of subclause 21(5) of the bill make perfect sense, I believe it is also far-reaching and extremely broad in its context. Virtually, the Prime Minister can have any report from the committee rewritten if he does not like the content. I believe the parameters need to be much more prescriptive and narrower in scope.

Openness and transparency is what we all want. We all want to achieve this while still maintaining the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive or classified information. The current bill as it stands would not instill confidence in the process or the general public when the Prime Minister and the chair of the committee, whom he appointments, can revise and change the committee's report at will. Censorship of the committee just simply will not work.

As I stated earlier, I believe a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians needs to be struck. However, we need to get it right, because we are talking about the security of this country and its people.

Therefore, I put forward three points. First, the chair of the committee should be elected. Second, the committee should have full powers to summon any witnesses and require them to give or produce evidence that the committee deems necessary to meet its mandate. Third, the committee should submit an annual report to Parliament, but the committee, in consultation with the Prime Minister and their national security adviser, exclude from the report any information that may, if released publicly, jeopardize national security.

I believe that these three points would add a level of transparency, as the committee would be arm's length from the Prime Minister's Office, and instill a level of confidence within the general public.

I believe all members support the concept and the principles and really want to ensure that we get this done right. We want to make sure that the safety and security of our intelligence personnel is intact, and we do not want the polarization or politicization of the oversight of our national security operations.

Therefore, Bill C-22 in its current state, I will not be able to support.

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

Madam Speaker, thank you.

I guess it is now six times lucky. Our majority government has introduced Bill C-22 at long last, after 11 years of attempts and continuously being stymied by the opposition, to entrench parliamentary oversight of Canada's security and intelligence agencies.

However, we are not just replicating what we have seen among our Five Eyes allies. We are going one better. None other than Craig Forcese, the renowned law professor from the University of Ottawa and one of the foremost critics of the old Bill C-51, has said:

...this will be a stronger body than the UK and Australian equivalents. And a dramatic change for Canadian national security accountability.... This is a good bill.... I would give it a high pass....

Let me turn to the bill itself and see what people like Professor Forcese are enthused about.

This oversight committee of parliamentarians will have a broad, government-wide mandate to review any national security matter relating to all government security departments and agencies. Committee members will have top security clearance and can demand unprecedented access to classified material.

The committee is required to report back to Parliament annually, but can do so even more frequently through special reports, if it finds that a special report is required to protect the public interest.

The committee members are independent. They have the authority to self-initiate reviews of the legislative, regulatory, policy, financial, and administrative framework for national security in Canada. The committee members have tenure. They are appointed until the dissolution of the House.

This committee will not be dominated by government members, because government members will not make up the majority of the committee. Bill C-22 specifies that the committee will comprise nine persons, only four of whom may be government members of Parliament. The other five must come from the opposition parties. This is not a rubber stamp; it is actual accountability and oversight of government departments and agencies by a majority of opposition parliamentarians.

Allow me to provide an example. Throughout the extensive debate on the old Bill C-51, residents of my riding of Parkdale—High Park were very vocal about information sharing among government departments and agencies. Rightly, Canadians said that widespread information sharing may compromise privacy rights. Information sharing is precisely the type of thing this new oversight committee will scrutinize, because it will have a broad government-wide mandate over all national security departments and agencies. This can ensure that when information is shared for intelligence gathering, the rights of Canadians are not being violated or jeopardized. If a violation is identified, the committee can report that to all Canadians through Parliament.

Of course, there may be those who feel this legislation does not go far enough. The important response to those individuals is to note that Bill C-22 contains a mandatory review provision. Every five years, according to law, a committee must study this bill and report back to Parliament on how to strengthen it. In this way, the conversation of Canadians in my riding of Parkdale—High Park and around the country about how to balance security with the protection of rights and freedoms will not stagnate. It will remain dynamic.

This brings me to my third point. We want to hear from Canadians, not just in five years but now. Our government has commenced a Canada-wide consultation on our national security framework. These consultations will allow us to discuss the other campaign commitments we made to remedy the defects of the old Bill C-51, including entrenching a sunset clause, ensuring that no judge can issue a warrant that violates the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, guaranteeing the constitutional right to engage in advocacy and protest, and narrowing the overly broad definition of what constitutes “terrorist propaganda”.

This national consultation will allow us to hear from Canadians what else they want to see from their government. We do not just want to implement our campaign commitments, but to improve upon them. Throughout this, one thing will always be top of mind, that in seeking to balance security and the protection of rights and freedoms, we will work with Canadian communities, not against them.

Here, I address the House as a Muslim member of the Liberal caucus. The practice of our new government is not to vilify groups or to sow division, but to engage communities and to listen to their concerns. We have done this through our comprehensive efforts to counter Islamophobia. We have done this through our 2016 budgetary commitment of over $35 million over five years to create an office of community outreach and counter-radicalization. We have done this through our efforts to welcome, not shun, the victims of Daesh, which has translated into our accepting nearly 31,000 Syrian refugees to date. We have done this through our efforts today to improve the rights of those who inadvertently find themselves on no-fly lists, by creating a passenger protect inquiries office, and implementing a Canada-U.S. redress working group.

I know that Canadians prefer this approach. It is an approach they voted for in October 2015. It is an approach that seeks to address security concerns on multiple fronts, and one that engenders the confidence of all Canadians, including the very minority groups, like mine, that were disproportionally bearing the brunt of the previous government's surveillance.

I will end with this. It is a fine balance. Ensuring safety while simultaneously protecting rights and freedoms is not easy, but I am confident that Bill C-22 will help do just that. I am proud to support this legislation that has been 11 years in the making. At this time, I urge the members opposite to get behind it, rather than standing in our way.

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Immigration]

Madam Speaker, I rise today to speak in support of Bill C-22. The bill would create a committee of parliamentarians to oversee Canada's security agencies. For the first time in history, a multi-party group of members of Parliament and senators would hold Canada's security apparatus to account.

Bill C-22 represents a Liberal initiative that dates back to 2005 in fulfillment of a key part of our campaign commitment to Canadians to reverse the legacy of the old Bill C-51. I am proud to stand in support of it and the important idea that Canadian security must never come at the expense of our rights and freedoms.

I will start by turning back the clock to early 2015 and the previous government's introduction of Bill C-51.

In my riding of Parkdale—High Park last year, I heard about Bill C-51 over and over again at the doors. Residents in my community in Toronto are smart. They are engaged, and when they sense injustice, they speak out. They told me that they expect better from their government, that ensuring public safety is the preeminent responsibility of any government, but that it is not acceptable to pursue security at any cost. My constituents, and indeed all Canadians, want a government that respects Canadians' rights and one that will put in place mechanisms to protect those rights.

As a human rights and constitutional lawyer, I listened to those residents as a candidate in the past election. I communicated those very valid concerns to my party, and the party responded. In 2015, we committed on the campaign trail that if we were fortunate enough to earn the respect of Canadians and to form government, we would significantly amend that flawed bill and put in place the mechanisms that Canadians want to protect their rights while simultaneously keeping them safe. That is what Bill C-22 would start to do.

However, we cannot take all the credit. The idea of ensuring that parliamentary representatives oversee security agencies, like the RCMP, CSIS, and CSE, did not come to us as some sort of epiphany. It is exactly what our allies have been doing for many years. Every single member of the Five Eyes alliance but Canada has some oversight mechanism in place. Those are Australia, United Kingdom, New Zealand, and the United States.

The Auditor General identified the need for parliamentary oversight in a seminal report in 2003. Our party initiated this in 2005 when then public safety minister Anne McLellan introduced Bill C-81. That bill died on the Order Paper when the opposition parties voted down the minority government of then prime minister Paul Martin, triggering the election that brought us Prime Minister Stephen Harper.

A similar oversight committee was attempted no less than four more times in private members' bills, as introduced by Liberal Derek Lee on two occasions, in 2007 and 2009; by the member for Malpeque in 2013; and by the member of Parliament who sits right next to me, the member for Vancouver Quadra, Joyce Murray. On each of those occasions, the private members' bills were not passed in the House.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my esteemed colleague for making those points.

I also want to mention to the House that, on March 1, our public safety critic, the member for Durham, sent the Minister of Public Safety 18 recommendations relating to Bill C-22, all of which were designed to improve the bill and bring about consensus.

On April 15, having received no response, he sent another letter to the minister informing him that the official opposition, the Conservative Party, had worked hard to provide constructive suggestions designed to make the parliamentary committee work.

Once again, I am asking the government members to consider that and work with us.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Madam Speaker, my esteemed colleague asked a very good question. That is what makes Bill C-22 so complex, and that is why we are in this debate to talk about what we want to see.

As I said at the end of my speech, Bill C-22 would set up an all-party committee of parliamentarians to examine highly strategic and important public safety and national security issues.

However, because of the way Bill C-22 was written, the Prime Minister has complete control, which means that opposition members of the parliamentary committee will not be able to speak as freely as usual or even discuss things with their party leader because they will be sworn to secrecy.

The Prime Minister has given himself total control, and the parliamentarians who sit on the committee will not even be able to talk about it. If this is to be a truly parliamentary committee, the Prime Minister has to give up some of that power and give the committee its independence. That is the real problem here.

Yes, secrecy around national security matters is very important, but the opposition members who sit on the committee need some measure of control. If not, what is the point of the committee?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague from Portage—Lisgar for her speech, which brings me to mine. I am very pleased to speak today to share my concerns over Bill C-22, an act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts.

The first thing I question, and I am not the only one to have raised this in the past two days, is the part of the title that says “committee of parliamentarians”. When we read Bill C-22 we quickly understand the type of committee that will truly be created. Let us look at this together.

Clause 3 of the bill reads:

3 The Governor in Council may designate a member of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada to be the Minister for the purposes of this Act.

It is therefore a committee of parliamentarians formed by the Governor in Council, the government, and therefore by the Prime Minister himself.

Along the same lines, subclause 5(1) stipulates that:

5(1) The members of the Committee are to be appointed by the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, to hold office during pleasure until the dissolution of Parliament following their appointment.

The Prime Minister's approval is even required for the appointment of senators to the committee, as we see in subclause 5(2), which reads:

5(2) A member of the Senate may be appointed to the Committee only after the Prime Minister has consulted with one or more other members of the Senate.

The words “Prime Minister” come up quite frequently. Even when it comes time for committee members to resign from their duties, they must inform the Prime Minister, as required by subclause 5(5), which reads:

5(5) A member may resign by notifying the Prime Minister in writing

Since we have a Prime Minister who has the utmost respect for this institution and its elected representatives, what do you think he did? The Prime Minister also retained the right to control who will be appointed as committee chair. That is what it says in subclause 6(1), which reads:

6(1) The Governor in Council is to designate the Chair of the Committee from among the members of the Committee, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.

One quickly realizes from the way the bill is written that this is the Prime Minister's committee, not a committee of parliamentarians. He chooses who will sit on the committee and who will chair it. It is not a committee of parliamentarians. It is a committee for the Prime Minister so that he can show that the government is taking action on an issue that he has found it difficult to take a clear stand on.

The best response that the government was able to come up with was to create a fully sanitized committee over which the Prime Minister and his office will have complete control.

What is more, the so-called committee of parliamentarians will not report to Parliament as one would expect from its name. It will report, and I hope my colleagues are sitting down for this, to the Prime Minister himself. That is what it says in subclause 21(1), which reads:

21(1) Each year the Committee must submit to the Prime Minister a report of the reviews it conducted during the preceding year.

Subclause 21(2) also confirms that the committee can present a special report to the minister concerned and the Prime Minister.

The work done by the committee of parliamentarians will not be tabled in the House to inform the other members of Parliament, because everything clearly has to go through the central office that controls everything about this committee. Whose office is that? The Prime Minister's.

It is quite disconcerting to read this, but it was written by experts on consultation, transparency, openness, and good governance.

I would like to again quote Bill C-22, specifically subclause 21(5) on the information that is excluded from the report:

If, after consulting the Chair of the Committee, the Prime Minister is of the opinion that information in an annual or special report is information the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations or is information that is protected by litigation privilege or solicitor-client privilege or, in civil law,...or the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries, the Prime Minister may direct the Committee to submit to the Prime Minister a revised version of the annual or special report that does not contain that information.

Consequently, if the Prime Minister does not like the reports received from the committee, he can ask that changes be made to the various reports in order to table a report that suits the government.

Subclause 21(6) refers to the tabling of the report:

21(6) Subject to subsection (4), the Prime Minister must cause to be laid before each House of Parliament, on any of the first 45 days on which that House is sitting after a report is submitted under subsection (1) or (2), a copy of the report or, if the Committee was directed to submit a revised version, a copy of the revised version.

Only this sanitized report, which may be far from truthful, will be tabled in Parliament to inform Canadians. Even Maurice Duplessis could not have come up with anything better to hide the fact that the Prime Minister, and not the committee, has the final say.

Now that I have provided ample evidence that the government's proposed committee is not truly a committee of parliamentarians but a committee of parliamentarians who will do the Prime Minister's bidding, I would like to talk about another problematic aspect of Bill C-22.

In addition to selecting the members of the committee responsible for overseeing the activities of a number of agencies that play a significant role in keeping Canada and Canadians safe, the Liberal government is not giving the committee much latitude to do its work. In theory, the committee has access to all kinds of sensitive and classified national security information, but the government retains the right to refuse to provide some types of information the committee might request, as stated in subclause 16(1), which reads as follows:

Refusal of information

16(1) The appropriate Minister for a department may refuse to provide information to which the Committee would, but for this section, otherwise be entitled to have access and that is under the control of that department, but only if he or she is of the opinion that

(a) the information constitutes special operational information, as defined in subsection 8(1) of the Security of Information Act; and

(b) provision of the information would be injurious to national security.

Refusal of information is final and may not be appealed, as stated in subclause 31(1):

31(1) The appropriate Minister’s determination that a review referred to in paragraph 8(b) would be injurious to national security or the appropriate Minister’s decision to refuse to provide information under subsection 16(1) is final.

Bill C-22 therefore provides no meaningful mechanism by which the committee can appeal the decision, which might be questionable and put the government in an awkward position without necessarily being a threat to national security. Bill C-22 provides nothing, as indicated in subclause 31(2), which states:

31(2) If the Committee is dissatisfied with the determination or the decision, the Committee is not to bring the matter before the courts, but it may note its dissatisfaction in a report referred to in section 21.

The committee can note its dissatisfaction, but the government could choose to completely ignore the report, for the committee members will be inclined to say nothing, in order to continue sitting on the committee. On top of that, this protest report will never be tabled in the House.

From the way this was presented, the Liberals have a lot of work to do to get the unanimous support of the House. I strongly believe that something like this should have the unanimous support of all members of the House. We are talking about oversight of bodies that are responsible for ensuring the safety and security of Canadians. This is not about partisan politics. Unfortunately, from the way this bill was presented, it appears as though the top of the pyramid wants to make sure it can lead all of the work without any problems.

Let me be very clear: our intention is not to go public with any state secrets or any information that could compromise national security, far from it. We simply want to ensure that the committee is able to have the flexibility and independence needed to properly fulfill its mandate. If we are going to do something, we might as well do it right.

To sum up, what really matters to me is that a committee such as this be founded on trust. It must have the full confidence of all government members and all opposition members, across party lines. With this kind of committee on national security, we need to be working from a place of absolute trust. I will be the first to say it.

Let us listen to our colleagues in the governing party and let us all acknowledge these facts.

[Candice Bergen, Conservative, Portage—Lisgar, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today and join in the debate on Bill C-22, which would establish a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

I will be sharing my time today with the member for Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles.

National security has taken on even greater importance over the last number of years. Abroad, we have seen horrific jihadist attacks just months ago, in fact, month after month in countries like France, Belgium, and even the United States.

Right here in Canada, we saw a jihadi inspired attack in October 2014. Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent was killed in Quebec, and Corporal Nathan Cirillo was killed while he was on guard at the National War Memorial, just steps away from where we are standing today. Many of us who served in the last Parliament will recall being locked down, and not knowing what was going on, and we remember that day.

It is important that our national security agencies have the tools they need to do their job, and keep us safe from terrorists. That is why the previous Conservative passed the Anti-terrorism Act in 2015, more commonly known as Bill C-51. Bill C-51 is good legislation that struck an appropriate balance between protecting national security and protecting the privacy of others.

In fact, the director of CSIS recently told the committee in the other place that CSIS agents have used the powers created under that legislation at least two dozen times. That record speaks volumes.

Today, I am not here to talk about that bill, but I am here to talk about Bill C-22, and how to ensure that the rights and liberties of Canadians are appropriately protected through extensive review and oversight of our national security agencies.

While our men and women in these agencies do excellent work each and every day to keep us safe, it is always important to have a third party watchdog. Currently, national security agencies have a substantial review mechanism. CSIS is reviewed by the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which is composed of former parliamentarians and other prominent Canadians. The Communications Security Establishment is reviewed by the CSE Commissioner, and the RCMP is reviewed by the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission.

However, we note that the Liberals, in their platform, promised that they would “create an all-party committee to monitor and oversee the operations of every government department and agency with national security responsibilities.” Unfortunately, or maybe fortunately, depending on how we look at it, that is not the bill that we have before us today.

First, the bill does not provide for any oversight of national security agencies, in fact, the word oversight is not even in the bill. It is nowhere in the description or in the body of the bill. What it provides is a review mechanism for after-the-fact assessment, but it does so with enormous caveats. In fact, there are seven large caveats contained in section 14 of the bill.

These caveats allow the cabinet to deny the committee, a committee of duly-elected parliamentarians sworn to secrecy, the access to any confidence of the Queen's Privy Council, any military operation information, any information on the Investment Canada Act, and any information that may lead in future to criminal charges, among other things.

That pretty well covers off all of the information in the possession of the Canadian Armed Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. That is pretty well all of the information that this so-called committee would need to do the so-called oversight that it is created to do.

Unfortunately, what we have under this legislation is a committee that does not actually have any access to any relevant information. What is more, it is not actually a parliamentary committee. Right here in black and white in subsection 4(3), the bill states that this would not be a committee of Parliament, rather it would be a committee made up of parliamentarians.

What we have right now is a committee made up of parliamentarians with no ability to collect information. We will also learn it has absolutely no teeth to do anything because it cannot report anything outside of the committee, and we have the Prime Minister and ministers able to cleanse the report before it is brought to Parliament.

We kind of have a glorified parliamentary friendship group here, and really nothing more, because the committee cannot review any information. It cannot do anything with the information that it finds because if the Prime Minister deems it is not appropriate for a number of reasons, the Prime Minister or the Prime Minister's Office can change it. Really, this is a pretty hollow shell and nothing more.

I want to speak a bit about the fact that in section 12 parliamentary privilege is eroded by making it clear that a whistleblower could be prosecuted for making any of the information public. Let us think about that for a minute.

The Liberals have said they want this committee to fix the situation where they felt it left the public uninformed and unrepresented on critical issues, but they have established, through this legislation, a system where it would be a crime for a whistleblower to disclose anything from the committee. So, how can there be any access to the information by regular Canadians?

The bill before us does not even come close to meeting the Liberal platform commitments. In fact, it is a bill that further serves to centralize power in the Prime Minister's Office.

Typically, like in the United States and Great Britain, committees of this nature would report directly to the legislative branch rather than to the executive. Yet, in this legislation, the Prime Minister gets to play middleman between the committee and Parliament.

Under this legislation, it says in subsection 21(1) the Prime Minister will receive all annual reports, special reports, and other findings of the committee, so the Prime Minister is going to get everything before Parliament does. He will then have the opportunity to edit and change any report to suit his liking, and subsection 21(5) says that the Prime Minister can refuse to release information at his discretion.

The Liberals have said that this is to protect serious national information and security information, but let us read the text of the bill:

If,...the Prime Minister is of the opinion that information in an annual or special report is...injurious to...international relations...the Prime Minister may direct the Committee to submit...a revised version of the annual or special report.

I want to remind my hon. colleague, the parliamentary secretary, that the Prime Minister actually can direct the committee to submit a revised report. In this case, it would be if it contravened or hurt international relations.

What does that mean? That means that the Prime Minister and his office could delete or eliminate information that they thought might hurt international relations. From what we have seen recently, does that mean if this report said something that would show that the Chinese are doing something they should not be doing, that the Prime Minister would say not to say anything about the Chinese because we do not want to offend them? Maybe the Prime Minister would be concerned that his vanity project of getting a seat on the UN Security Council might be offended.

With the Prime Minister having the motivation, and the naïveté that he seems to be displaying, it is very concerning that this power would be in the Prime Minister's Office to vet this information, and eliminate information that he thinks would not be beneficial to international relations. This is not transparency in any way, shape, or form.

It is definitely not transparent that several months before this legislation was even tabled, we found out, through the media, that the member for Ottawa South was given the sweetheart deal as chair of this committee. That in and of itself is very disingenuous.

The government and the Liberals could have at least had respect for Parliament and for its own platform to have withheld that. I do not know why the Liberals felt they had to make that announcement, and do that so quickly unless it had to do with an inside deal that they were concocting.

How can someone become a chair of a committee that has not even been constituted by Parliament in legislation? With a partisan appointment like this, it is clear that the government is not taking the non-partisan goals of this committee seriously.

Let us look at the facts. The Minister of Public Safety and many of the Liberals who have spoken before me have touted that this proposed committee is modelled after the United Kingdom, but the Liberal partisan appointment of the chair is completely different from the U.K. model which allows its committee to elect its own chair.

Second, the committee reports to the Prime Minister, not to Parliament, and the Prime Minister has the ability to omit items and ask for revised reports.

There is more that I could say on this piece of legislation but at the end of the day we are seeing more and more that this is a hollow shell with no substance. This committee will be made up of parliamentarians with no power to do anything, with no power to get information, and with the Prime Minister vetting all of the information. It looks again like the Liberals want to look like they are fulfilling a campaign promise but they are actually not fulfilling it and they are disrespecting and being disingenuous by doing so.

Unless there are major changes to the bill I cannot support it.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, it is important to recognize that Bill C-22 is as a direct result of Bill C-51. A major fundamental flaw when Bill C-51 was brought in was the fact that there was no parliamentary committee to oversee our security systems.

That is very important because Canadians have expectations that their government will have a balance when it comes to issues such as freedoms, our rights, and security. We believe Bill C-22 will deliver what Canadians want to see. In fact, it would be a fulfillment of a commitment made by the Prime Minister and the government that we would bring in a parliamentary oversight committee. Bill C-22 is all about that.

The House resumed from September 27 consideration of the motion that Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Winnipeg North, MB]

Madam Speaker, the Liberal Party does support Bill C-22. We introduced the bill.

The member asked why I did not support a particular issue going to committee. Our standing committees have the potential to do phenomenal work. I have argued in the past and will argue into the future that committees are the backbone of Parliament. That is consistent with what our Prime Minister and many colleagues have said. The fine work that committees do is the backbone of Parliament going forward into the future.

We can refer virtually endless issues to committees, but today we are debating Bill C-22, a balance of rights and freedoms with the issue of security for all Canadians. If we continue to work in a co-operative way and have the bill go to committee, we could ultimately have one of the greatest parliamentary oversight committees possible.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Madam Speaker, what a privilege it is to be able to stand in this place to talk about what I believe is a really important piece of legislation, and it is so in many different ways. I hope to be able to provide some comments with respect to the process, some of the content, and some of the amazing work that, in particular, the Minister of Public Safety has done for all Canadians by putting in the effort that he has in working with his other cabinet colleagues, and indeed, coming right from the Prime Minister's Office, too.

I would recognize, first and foremost, that we have once again before the House, a piece of legislation that was promised in the last federal election. There was a great deal of discussion and debate at the doors and through many other venues about the issue of freedoms and rights and the issue of security and ensuring that we get the right balance. I am absolutely convinced that the government has provided a piece of legislation that will be overwhelmingly supported by Canadians.

It is not to say that there is no room for improvement. If I can quote the Prime Minister, there is always the opportunity to make things better. We opened the door for the opposition, and as the Minister of Public Safety indicated in his opening comments, we have already received ideas and thoughts, such as the appointment of the chair for this particular committee to be made by the Prime Minister, which was a recommendation or a thought that came from the official opposition.

However, it is important to recognize that this is indeed the first time ever where we have seen a parliamentary committee established to deal with the issues of security and privacy and freedoms for Canadians. That is a very big thing. We should be happy to see it here today because it has been a long time in coming.

Another big issue, which I really have appreciated, is that there has been a great deal of thoughtful debate that has taken place, as members from all sides of the House have been engaged on what we all know is a very important issue to Canadians.

I believe, at some point, it will pass and go to committee and we will find that the debate will carry over in the form of listening to what some of the different stakeholder groups have to say, with the idea that if there are indeed ways in which we can reflect on the current legislation, the government is, at the very least, open to that.

The other thing that I think is really worth noting is that the Minister of Public Safety also made reference to the Five Eyes. Canada is a member of the Five Eyes nations, which include the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand. I have had the opportunity to talk about this particular issue during the debates on Bill C-51. All those other countries have some form of a parliamentary committee to oversee these types of security and rights issues. Only Canada did not have something.

Today, what we are witnessing is not only Canada joining and being a part of the Five Eyes, in regard to a parliamentary committee, but it is a committee that has a far greater and broader mandate. Many would argue that it has the potential to be the most effective in the Five Eyes group. Again, I think that we owe a great deal of gratitude to all those individuals who have been involved.

I am sure that the different ministries would be first to indicate that it is not just coming from within the departments, but rather, it is from many of the presentations that were made during the debates on Bill C-51, many of the debates that took place inside this chamber, and the messages that we received, whether through emails, telephone calls, letters, or just the door-knocking that took place. The bill encompasses a great deal of dialogue that has taken place both here in the chamber and in every region of our country.

I think this is one of the reasons why we should all take a great deal of pride in what is being proposed by the government.

It has been noted that it was the government House leader who introduced the bill, and a number of members were somewhat surprised that it would be the government House leader. Let me assure members that when we talked about that, we made reference to the idea of this broader mandate. We need to recognize that a multitude of departments provide some form of security-related issues to Canadians. I believe it is 17. Therefore a number of departments are directly affected by this legislation, and so the committee would have a significant role that goes beyond one department. It is most appropriate that it be the government House leader who introduces the legislation. I am quite pleased that the Minister of Public Safety has had the opportunity to address the legislation also.

A national security green paper was recently released by the minister, and it was co-signed with a message from the ministers. I would like to refer to it. It was approved in terms of being received by the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of Justice, Canada's Attorney Journal. There is a great deal of content in it, and as we continue to have dialogue both in Ottawa and the different regions of Canada, I would encourage people, the listening audience and the different stakeholders, to get a copy of this green paper because it is loaded with wonderful content. By reading through it, we get a fairly good sense of why it is such an important piece of legislation and why Canadians have taken such an interest in it.

I would like to provide some selected quotes from the green paper, because it better reflects what the government is hoping to ultimately accomplish. It is not to say that every aspect of the green paper is going to be implemented by the government, but it shows that the government is listening and, where it can, it is taking the necessary action to make a difference in the lives of all Canadians.

I first refer to the message from the two ministers where they clearly indicate that:

A fundamental obligation of the Government of Canada is the responsibility to protect our safety and security at home and abroad. Equally fundamental is the responsibility to uphold the Constitution of Canada, and to ensure all laws respect the rights and freedoms we enjoy as people living in a free and democratic country.

On many occasions I have indicated my support for Canada's Charter of Rights and Freedoms. I have argued that the Liberal Party is a party of the Charter of Rights of Freedoms. We recognize how important those individual freedoms are, but we also recognize—and we saw that in the debate—that they are one of the things that distinguished the Liberals from the New Democrats while we were in opposition. We also recognized the importance of security, and that is why it is a balancing that needs to take place.

I go back to the document, which says:

Reflecting the seriousness with which the Government regards the concerns about the ATA, 2015, our mandate letters direct us to work together to repeal its problematic elements and introduce new legislation that strengthens accountability and national security. In this respect, we have made commitments to:

This is something that, I would hope, provides comfort not only to members of this chamber, but to all Canadians.

The government has made commitments on the following: it has guaranteed that all warrants of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service will comply with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to ensure that Canadians are not limited in legitimate protest and advocacy; it will enhance the redress process related to the passenger protect program and address the issue of false positive matches to the list; it will narrow overly broad definitions, such as terrorist “propaganda”; and it will require a statutory review of the Anti-terrorism Act after three years.

It is great that within this legislation there is a requirement for a mandated review five years after the bill has been proclaimed. We know that as time goes by, there will be a need to review and reflect upon what we could be doing differently to improve the legislation.

As the minister has pointed out, we are establishing a statutory national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, with broad access to classified information, to examine how national security institutions are working. That is, in fact, within the green paper and what we are actually going through today.

The legislation fulfills a key commitment we made during the election campaign by establishing a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

It is great that the committee would have nine members, seven members of Parliament and two senators. Up to four MPs would be from the governing party. The Prime Minister would be required to consult with the opposition party leaders before naming opposition members and with the Senate before naming senators.

I hear a great deal of concern from both opposition parties about the PMO and the Prime Minister. I think there is one point that has been lost in this. It is important to emphasize that the Prime Minister would not be authorized to alter the findings or recommendations of the report that would be tabled. The Prime Minister's role would be solely to review the report to ensure that it did not contain classified information.

I believe that the Conservatives are underestimating the abilities of members of Parliament when they question whether it would be an open process. Yes, ministers would have the discretion to withhold information on a case-by-case basis should they believe that disclosure would be injurious to national security, but one would expect that they would have that authority. However, a minister who wished to withhold information would have to provide a rationale for the decision to the committee. The committee could choose to report on the matter to Parliament should it deem the rationale unsatisfactory. We need checks in place, and that is within this legislation.

We are underestimating and undervaluing the potential role members of the House can play on such a committee, which I believe would be second to no other, potentially, in the world.

The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness talked about the way it would broaden responsibilities and about all the departments that would be taken into consideration.

As much as I would love to be a member of that committee, I am quite content not being a member, so I say this knowing full well that I will not be a member of the committee. Those who are selected to be members of the committee, I believe, will have the ability to ensure that rights and freedoms, versus the security of our national interest, will be protected first and foremost.

There are checks in place within the legislation that would allow this committee to get the job done. I believe that if the Conservatives, in particular, were to better appreciate that fact, then they would be supportive of the legislation.

I listened to members of the New Democrats respond, and I appreciate the response that I have heard today from the New Democrats. They are supportive, but they want to see some amendments. However, this is not quite as clear with regard to the Conservatives. I understand that the Conservatives are in a very awkward position because of Bill C-51. I sat in opposition and, yes, there were many members who stood up to say that we did not need a committee of parliamentarians. However, today when I listen to the debate the Conservatives are providing, they are a little unclear.

I understand that now the Conservatives are going to be voting against the legislation, but it would appear as if they are voting against the legislation because they want to see this parliamentary committee have more teeth. This seems to be the reason they are voting against it, depending on the member one is talking to. I did pose the question to my colleague across the way of whether he would be supporting the legislation. In fairness, they have been very delicate in terms of their responses today, but they had one member who has indicated a vote against the bill.

I would advise all members of the House, given the importance of the legislation, to take it for what it is and allow the legislation to be sent to committee where there can be a proper vetting from all parliamentarians. It is there that they can actually advance potential amendments if they have concerns and they can make their case.

We often hear of disputes over the facts inside the House. We listen to what the minister says here and believe that this is a committee that is going to be quite powerful and have many responsibilities. However, we then hear members opposite having reservations about just how powerful it will be and are wondering if the Prime Minister's Office would be too powerful. Therefore, there seems to be a bit of a disconnect.

However, where there is no disconnect is that there seems to be a political will that we are going to have this committee, and we will have this committee. The Prime Minister made a commitment to establish it, so we will have it. When that committee gets established, I do believe that there are members of the House who have the integrity, goodwill, and the ability to get the job done. I believe this is what we should be looking at going forward.

If in fact there are ideas that are genuine, where there has been background work and it can be clearly demonstrated, then I am sure, whether it is a government amendment coming from one of my colleagues, or from Conservatives, New Democrats, or independents, these ideas are something we will want to foster if in fact they are ways we can improve upon the legislation.

There are so many things that the government is doing that goes beyond Bill C-22 in addressing the concerns that Canadians have with respect to the issue of security, such as amending provisions enacted by Bill C-51 so as to better protect the right to advocate and protest; amending provisions enacted by Bill C-51 so as to better define rules regarding terrorist propaganda; mandating a statutory writ review of national security legislation; ensuring faithful compliance with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms; creating an office of community outreach and counter-radicalization from budget 2016, including $35 million over five years and $10 million annually, which would be ongoing; consulting Canadians about what further measures they would like—

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, absolutely, “smoke and mirrors” is very apt terminology for this practice.

It is incumbent on us, here in the opposition, to play our job properly during the proceedings on the bill, not only by pointing out the deficiencies of the bill, but also by not letting the Liberal government off the hook. I know that the Liberal government will say to the Canadian public that it has provided oversight in Bill C-22 and that its job is done.

We will not allow that to stand. There is still a lot more to be done.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, I would also like to congratulate my friend, colleague, and neighbour from Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke for a fantastic presentation and all of his work in the previous Parliament as the NDP's public safety critic.

There are three main points I want to outline as part of my speech on Bill C-22. First, I want to outline the fact that I think the overall intention of this bill is crucial to protect the safety and rights of all Canadians. Good oversight not only builds public trust, but it makes our security services much more effective.

I would also like to note that Canadians expect a watchdog with teeth. This committee must have full access to classified information. It must have adequate resources and the independence to go along with it.

My third point is that the government is going to have to work hard to earn Canadians' trust after its support for Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament. This trust starts with a strong committee, but it must be earned by fulfilling the promise to repeal the problematic elements of Bill C-51.

The idea of creating more parliamentary oversight has been around for some time. I want to outline and underline that this is not a uniquely Liberal idea. In fact, it has been around as a recommendation for the past 35 years. Despite that, I am glad to see that the Liberals have come forward with Bill C-22. There have been previous Liberal governments that have altogether ignored this recommendation.

There are certainly some things in this bill that I do want to take a look at. It is important that we use public money responsibly, that we protect sensitive information, but that we also stop abuses of power in their tracks. If we can come together as parliamentarians to build a robust oversight committee, we can bring in the real accountability that Canadians expect.

We can protect Canadians while ensuring that they trust that their rights are not jeopardized by a rampant security state. Indeed, the national security green paper, 2016, by the Government of Canada noted on page 9 that:

...effective accountability mechanisms are key to maintaining the public's trust in these agencies. Accountability mechanisms provide assurance that agencies act responsibly, strictly within the law and with respect for Canadians' rights and freedoms.

We can look at the historical significance of this issue, and compare Bill C-22 with what is going on in other jurisdictions. We know that our allies in France, Britain, Germany, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand all have similar bodies in place. It is about time that Canada stepped up to the plate, because for far too long we have been lacking in this very necessary oversight measure.

The change is very long overdue. We have seen abuses in previous years with the RCMP, going back to the 1970s. Of course, we here in the NDP know all about the RCMP spying that went on with the great Tommy Douglas, because of his link to left-wing causes and groups. This should serve as a reminder to all parliamentarians that the abuses of state can occur and have occurred. That is why oversight is needed. We need to make sure these kinds of things do not happen again in a free, open, and democratic society.

The McDonald commission was a royal commission used to investigate these unlawful activities of the RCMP. Of course it was also implicated in the illegal opening of mail and surveilling of members of other political parties as well, not just Tommy Douglas.

A part of that commission's report recommended the creation of CSIS, a civilian agency without law enforcement powers, but of course that was altered when we saw Bill C-51 come in.

The main recommendation that I wanted to point to today was that oversight committee of parliamentarians. I really think that Canada should be at the cutting edge of dealing with oversight in security apparatus. I am going to support this bill, but I hope that when it reaches committee it will be rigorously compared to models in other jurisdictions. I think there are some much-needed amendments.

For example, in Belgium, they allow their oversight body to seize documents and launch criminal investigations into wrongdoing by security officials. That body has real teeth. Even the United States, our closest ally and neighbour, allows its oversight committees almost real-time access to covert operations. If those parliamentarians in the United States Congress can have the oversight, why can we not as well?

My friend from Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke went over in detail of the most egregious examples of what was wrong with Bill C-51, but one of the recommendation in the McDonald Commission was to have a civilian intelligence force without law enforcement capabilities. Those waters were muddied by the Liberals and Conservatives when they allowed CSIS the disruption element. The real confusing part is that the definition of unlawful activities is open to interpretation.

We know our intelligence agencies have been complicit in spying on home based environmental groups, and we have also very concerned with Bill C-51's information sharing regime, which dramatically loosens the strictures on how a government internally shares data. It introduces, as mentioned, the dangerously broad category of activities that undermine the security of Canada, which can include much illegal protest. This will be of very special concern to anyone who has studied the infamous Maher Arar case.

I want to underline this fact. Bill C-22 cannot be treated as window dressing. This will not absolve the Liberals for being in support of Bill C-51, and we can be sure that the NDP will be holding them to account in that regard, very publicly, I might add.

I would like to congratulate my friend from Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke. Yesterday he introduced Bill C-303, which would repeal Bill C-51. That is a great step. I am glad to see us living up to our election promises for once.

The Liberals can earn the trust of Canadians by voting for that legislation or otherwise living up to their electoral promises.

Going on to the problematic elements of Bill C-22, I would like to quote the national security green paper again when it mentioned that Parliament had several roles in national security matters. It holds ministers to account for the actions of the institutions for which they are responsible.

However, the structure of the bill seems to allow ministers to hold complete sway over the committee. In other words, the committee suddenly becomes accountable to the executive branch, and that is not the function of Parliament.

Allow me this opportunity to walk members through the text of Bill C-22. Under subsection 8(b), it states that if a minister determines that a review is injurious to national security, the minister can withhold information.

Under subsections 14(a) to (g), there are seven points that further limit what information the committee can have access to.

Section 16 states that the minister may refuse to provide information that is special operational information, or again, injurious to national security. Yes, that minister has to provide reasons for the decision, but, again, if we go further down the bill to section 31, it states that the minister's decision in subsection 8(b) and subsection 16.1 is final.

If the committee is somehow dissatisfied with that decision, it can write out a report, which is outlined in section 21. Again, that describes the structure of the report, but section 21 basically gives the Prime Minister, who basically probably gave the minister the authorization to withhold the information in the first place, complete authority to revise that report and redact whatever problematic elements there are, again, on the grounds of national security.

Sections 10 and 11 of the bill outline the security requirements and oaths to secrecy that the members of that committee have to take. They will be completely free and they will suffer the consequences if any information is leaked. I do not see why concerns of national security have to be withheld from a committee whose main purpose is to oversea national security. We are just going around in circles with the bill.

I would like to remind Liberal members of Parliament that there are members in the Conservative caucus who used to serve as cabinet ministers and who had access to some of the most sensitive secrets of Canada. They are still sitting in the House, but they are still bound by their oaths of secrecy. They are able to hold a secret. There is no reason why this committee membership cannot do the same.

As the legislation stands, the government can still hide things from this committee, and that is the problem. There will be absolutely no relevant oversight if the government denies access to files and witnesses. Not only will withholding information make it near impossible for the committee to do an objective job, but it will further deteriorate the trust of Canadians in our police and intelligence services.

The Prime Minister has already appointed a chair of this committee, the member for Ottawa South. Choosing the committee chair back in January despite the bill only being introduced in June is putting the cart before the horse. By appointing the the member for Ottawa South as committee chair with a salary almost equal to the lower levels of the Liberal cabinet, the Prime Minister has, in a sense, made him a mini cabinet minister on the committee, accountable only to the government.

I will just end with—

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Madam Speaker, certainly I acknowledge that the consultation is going on. My concern is that it is an excuse for inaction. Certainly, Bill C-22 is a crucial bill but is no substitute for action to fix or repeal Bill C-51. Oversight is not a burden. Good oversight will help build public trust and ensure that our security services are more effective in a dangerous and changing world.

Canadians expect a watchdog that is both independent and has teeth. Bill C-22 needs to be amended to ensure that this committee has full access to classified information, adequate resources, and the power to share its findings with Canadians in an informative and transparent manner, subject to justifiable limits.

The government will have to work hard to earn the trust of Canadians after failing to deal with the question of changing Bill C-51, and to rebuild that trust we need a strong, independent, and effective oversight committee.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Madam Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford.

I rise today in support of Bill C-22 at second reading. This should not be a surprise to anyone in the House, because New Democrats from the beginning of these debates about national security have always argued that effective oversight of our national security agencies is necessary in a free and democratic society.

We also know that independent and effective oversight is essential to ensuring that the government fulfills both its responsibilities: a responsibility to protect our civil liberties, and the responsibility to keep us safe. Just as all of us also cherish our civil liberties, none of us in the House doubts that the threat posed by terrorism is very real.

Therefore, I will begin my discussion of Bill C-22 today with what I am sure many members will find is a long preamble, both about my concerns about Bill C-22 being part of a larger government strategy to avoid action on fixing Bill C-51, now the Anti-terrorism Act, and about why the passage of Bill C-51 makes effective oversight even more crucial. I will then conclude with some remarks on why I fear that Bill C-22 will not provide the effective and independent oversight we need without significant amendments.

Bluntly stated, I fear the Liberals will use the passage of Bill C-22 as an excuse to avoid action on Bill C-51. The Liberals promised during the election that they would introduce a bill that would address their concerns regarding Bill C-51. They said they were voting for the bill at the time, but that it had problematic elements. Once again today, the minister listed about 10 things that he finds problematic in Bill C-51.

I appreciate the relisting of those concerns, but here we are one year later and the Liberals have failed to put any specific proposals before the House other than Bill C-22, which is only one aspect of the national security concerns, although the minister says that it is the centrepiece. Again, I would submit that the centrepiece really ought to be fulfilling the election promises to fix Bill C-51.

When the minister talks about his consultation, he skips over what I think is an important fact. What the Liberals said they would do was introduce a bill to amend Bill C-51 and then conduct consultations. In fact, what they have done is turned their promised changes into a list of things to discuss as part of a broad general consultation on national security.

Therefore, we have proposed the repeal of Bill C-51, as this is the quickest and simplest way to restore our rights. We know that Bill C-51 tramples our civil liberties without doing anything to make us safer.

We know that both the Liberals and the Conservatives have bought into the idea that national security requires a balance between our freedoms and safety, and that somehow we can purchase security by giving up some of our rights. New Democrats believe that the responsibility of the government is to protect both our rights and our security, at one and the same time. It is a difficult task, but one that we must undertake in a democratic society.

If the Liberals really believe parts of Bill C-51 should be kept as they are, then it is up to them to tell us in the House which parts and why. New Democrats would be happy to work with the Liberals to help defend the rights of Canadians by repealing, or at minimum, amending Bill C-51.

In the meantime, as these debates have gone on, the federal government, whether Liberal or Conservative, has failed to provide any additional resources for those things we know to be the most effective in fighting terrorism: effective investigation and enforcement, and de-radicalization programs.

During the hearings on Bill C-51 in the public safety committee, we heard from the RCMP commissioner and the director of CSIS about having insufficient resources to meet national security challenges, yet there have been no real increases in spending for CSIS, the RCMP, or the CBSA by either the Conservatives or the Liberals since 2012. De-radicalization programs still are not functioning at the community level, despite all the promises and despite some good preparatory work. They are still not out there running on the ground. If we are going to fight the threat of terrorism, we need to focus our resources on de-radicalization and on the traditional intelligence and enforcement work that have served us relatively well so far.

With all of this in mind, New Democrats have called for the repeal of Bill C-51. New Democrats have always believed that the Anti-terrorism Act is in fundamental conflict with our civil liberties, and that these infringements on our civil liberties do nothing to make us safer. This is why we voted against the bill at the beginning. In fact, the overall impact of Bill C-51 is to cast a net so wide that it may actually prevent enforcement authorities from focusing on what are in fact the very real threats to our safety.

This point was reaffirmed by several witnesses in the public safety committee when we had the discussion of Bill C-51, including the former head of national security for the Toronto Police Service. He said that when we were looking for a needle in the haystack, the last thing we needed was more hay.

A bill that requires collecting vast amounts of information on people who pose no threat at all, which is ordinary Canadians, and collecting information on those who are engaged in legitimate dissent may in fact make us less safe by providing too much hay to the enforcement authorities.

Indeed, the Anti-terrorism Act is being challenged in the courts in a case filed by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association jointly with Canadian Journalists for Free Expression. This case was filed just a month after the bill's passage. However, the backlog in our courts means that a decision from the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of Bill C-51 will not come for at least another three years. That is cold comfort to those whose rights may be breached in the interim. That is why independent and effective oversight becomes so crucial while Bill C-51 remains in force.

Bill C-51 has now been in place for more than a year without any additional oversight and without the Liberals' promised report to the House of Commons by the CSIS director on the use of its new powers. At this point, we are left with no evidence whatsoever to support the contention that Bill C-51 has done anything to make us safer. If that evidence exists, it should be presented in the House.

The reason Bill C-22 and having effective oversight of our national security agencies is so important is precisely because of the threats to civil liberties posed by Bill C-51. Let me talk about those briefly.

First, the definition of national security in Bill C-51 is so broad that it potentially captures many forms of legitimate dissent. First nations leaders and environmental activists in particular are concerned that they can be subject to surveillance and even disruption of their activities as a result of the broadening of the definition of national security in Bill C-51 to include the economic security of Canada and to include critical infrastructure, read pipelines. Only “lawful” dissent would be explicitly protected. Good luck to those who inadvertently violate a court injunction or trespass as part of a demonstration or other action in defence of aboriginal and treaty rights or in the fight against climate change.

Second, Bill C-51 conflicts with the fundamental principles of Canadian privacy law by allowing the widespread sharing of personal information with other departments and even foreign states. We have always lived in Canada with the assurance that information collected by the government in Canada will only be used for the purposes for which it has been collected, and that it will stay in Canada. Bill C-51 has changed all that, and those are the concerns the Privacy Commissioner was raising in his report today. Those are the concerns that he asserts, quite correctly I believe, are not raised in the government's discussion paper.

The third challenge to our civil liberties are the new powers that were given to CSIS to act illegally and in secret without any additional oversight. CSIS is prohibited only from using murder, sexual assault, and interference with the justice system as tactics. This hardly fits with the idea of a democratic society and rule of law that most Canadians hold dear. If, and only if, CSIS sees it as necessary, then it can seek a warrant from the courts to violate charter rights. I am sure this provision will be found unconstitutional.

This provision gives CSIS and the courts a role in deciding when it is okay to limit charter rights, and that is a power that constitutionally belongs to this Parliament and only this Parliament. It is not the purview of CSIS to decide what are reasonable limits on free expression, and it is not even the purview of the courts to decide that. The courts have left that to legislation passed in Parliament, and rightly so.

The fourth threat to our civil liberties is the creation of this new broad criminal offence of supporting terrorism “in general”. This lacks the element of intent that is normally required for a criminal offence. We do not impose criminal penalties in Canada unless harm was intended. This therefore infringes on rights to free speech in terms of things like fair comment by journalists who might wish to cite writings by someone advocating terrorism as part of their investigation. It interferes with the rights of authors of fiction, of satirists, and with all kinds of people who have legitimate reasons to make statements about terrorism in general with absolutely no intention of inspiring terrorist acts, but they will fall under the purview of this new definition.

The fifth threat is that Bill C-51 lowers the standard applied to police action in national security cases in several different parts of the bill, from reasonable grounds based on evidence to mere suspicion. I find this disturbing in light of Canada's record of the detention of literally thousands of Canadians in times of crisis who were later found to have committed no offence whatsoever. This includes Japanese Canadians, Ukrainian Canadians, German Canadians, and Italian Canadians in World War II, and even Quebeckers in the 1970s.

Although there are more, I will deal with the no-fly list. Bill C-51 expanded the no-fly list to include all persons posing threats to this broader definition of national security. It did so without fixing the underlying problems in the list. This list still results in many Canadians being denied the right to travel in error because their name is similar to someone else's. It even has resulted in multiple instances of children being denied the right to fly. The list needs to remain focused on those who threaten aviation. What Bill C-51 has done again is to expand that list to include everyone who might be a threat to national security.

This is another example of the needle in the haystack and providing way to much hay to be dealt with at the airport. Therefore, we need to keep the focus on those who actually threaten our flights. All of the outstanding problems with the no-fly list could have been fixed by regulation. However, that task has been made much more difficult by expanding the list and using the new broader definition of national security.

Turning to the bill before us very quickly, I think there are some gaps here. We find a bill that is clearly necessary but I would argue is fundamentally flawed. We need a truly independent committee that would report to the House of Commons and not the Prime Minister. This would affect the confidence the public can place in the committee's reports. At minimum, there needs to be limits placed on the power of the Prime Minister to sensor and redact committee reports.

A truly independent oversight committee should also elect its own chair. Instead, the bill proposes that the Prime Minister choose the chair, and indeed the Prime Minister has already designated a chair for the committee before it has even been constituted. This means that the chair owes his job to the Prime Minister and not his fellow members of the committee. Electing a chair is a practice of our allies in all the other jurisdictions.

If I can just take—

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Madam Speaker, on the member's first point about the sponsorship of the legislation, I am sure he will recognize that the legislation, because it would create a committee that will fit within the machinery of government, is the prerogative of the government House leader. On the very front page of the bill, it indicates that the government House leader is the sponsor of the bill. Under the rules of the House, it is only that minister who can give the introductory speech and if that minister does not give the introductory speech, he or she is not in a position to cede their position to anybody else. It is appropriate parliamentary procedure for the sponsor of a bill responsible for the machinery of government to give the opening speech, not that it matters a heck of a lot because I have the opportunity to participate in this debate, as all members of Parliament do.

I was glad to receive the honourable gentleman's letter in March. He now seems to be aggrieved that I have accepted a number of his recommendations. He cannot have it both ways. He offered a number of suggestions and many of them are reflected in Bill C-22.

I look forward to the committee work on the legislation, which will drill down into the details of various sections. If members of the opposition parties wish to provide further advice, we will be anxious to hear it. We will also be anxious to hear from subject matter experts and from Canadians who also need to have their input paid attention to.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Madam Speaker, we all have pride in our security agencies but I am a little disappointed in the minister responsible for them today, first for not introducing debate on the bill, and second, for having the gall to reference my letter to him in debate, my letter which was the first of two written in collaboration with the NDP to talk about this. The minister refused all meetings. He also refused meetings with some of the leading experts he quoted in his speech to get this right. My letter said a Privy Council appointment and the oaths ascribed to that should be part of this committee if the committee was going to see real information.

The government has so many exceptions to Bill C-22 that this committee would just be window dressing. We want to see amendments, as does the NDP, so that we can make this work from a political basis and for our practical security needs.

I would remind the minister that when he was involved as House leader in the Milliken decision with respect to Afghan detainee documents, he demanded such disclosure of information to members of Parliament. Now he is denying that same disclosure. Which member is it? Is it the member for Regina—Wascana now or the member for Wascana in 2010 whose words in this place should ring true? I would like the member to square that circle.

I would also like the minister to say why he voted Motion No. 431 for the election of chairs and now refuses to allow a chair to be elected? Why does he now not seem to respect the privilege outlined in the Speaker Milliken decision? He is talking about earning trust, yet he denied the ability to work with the opposition to get this right.

We hope this debate is an opportunity for the minister to listen and make the amendments needed.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Madam Speaker, although Bill C-22 falls under the purview of the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, who is responsible for the machinery of government, I am pleased to have the opportunity to take part in this debate.

Might I just, for the information of the hon. gentleman from Selkirk who has just spoken, inform him that the description of the appropriate committee he put on the record in the last half hour or so bears very little resemblance to the advice given by his own critic in a letter sent to me on March 1, 2016. The member for Durham recommended a committee under a majority controlled by the government, nominated by the Prime Minister and appointed by Governor in Council. That was the advice the critic offered, so the description the hon. gentleman just put on the record in the House seems to be at odds with that of his own critic.

In the last election we laid out a clear agenda with respect to Canada's national security framework. It included these specific elements: first, stronger scrutiny of security and intelligence activity through a new committee consisting of parliamentarians; second, a new initiative on community outreach and counter-radicalization; third, faithful compliance with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; fourth, full protection for the right to protest; fifth, clarity with respect to warrants; sixth, conscientious treatment of appeals about no-fly lists; seventh, a more precise definition of the term “propaganda”; eighth, a full review of all terrorism-related legislation after three years; and finally, genuine consultation with Canadians to help identify any other steps that should be taken to achieve two simultaneous objectives, ensuring that all security agencies and police forces are being effective at keeping Canadians safe and, at the same time, safeguarding our rights and freedoms and the open, inclusive, democratic character of our country—in other words, the qualities that make Canada Canada.

Bill C-22 is the cornerstone of that agenda. It fulfills our single most important commitment to Canadians. The legislation will establish a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, and it will give those parliamentarians from all official parties extraordinary access to classified information so they can scrutinize all the security and intelligence operations of the Government of Canada.

As distinguished Professor Wesley Wark has said, the creation of this committee and the passage of this legislation is long overdue. Virtually every other country in the western world, including all of our Five Eyes allies—the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand—have had a body of this kind for a good many years. Canada, therefore, has been the anomaly.

Over a decade ago, in 2003, the Auditor General identified significant shortcomings in Parliament's ability to scrutinize the activities of Canada's security and intelligence agencies. The following year, a joint House-Senate committee recommended the creation of a parliamentary body to fill that gap.

In 2005, the then Minister of Public Safety, the Hon. Anne McLellan, sought to address the problem by introducing a bill that is very similar to the one we are debating today. Unfortunately, when a different government was elected in 2006, the proposal was dropped.

Since that time, private members' bills to institute parliamentary scrutiny of national security and intelligence agencies have been repeatedly introduced, including by the former member for Scarborough--Rouge River, Derek Lee, and the current members for Malpeque and Vancouver Quadra. Former Senators Hugh Segal and Roméo Dallaire also brought forward legislation to this effect in the other place.

That is all in addition to a report by the House public safety committee in 2009, calling again for the adoption of Anne McLellan's bill or something very similar to it, as well as inquiries by Justices Frank Iacobucci and Dennis O'Connor, both of which highlighted the need for greater accountability of our national security and intelligence agencies.

In the wake of the terrorism tragedies in October 2014 at Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and here in Ottawa, there came another opportunity to correct this major deficiency in Canada's national security framework. The whole country shared the grief of those sorry days. We were leaning on each other, on all sides, in this House. There was a clear sense that our security, intelligence, and anti-terrorism laws needed to be revisited and strengthened, and there was a palpable will, on all sides, to work together to get it right, because these are difficult questions. Getting it right would include strengthening scrutiny, review, and oversight of the process.

In the words of a large group of eminent Canadians, including four former prime ministers, who wrote in an open letter at that time, “Canada needs independent oversight and effective review...more than ever”. However, the government of that day resisted that argument, and the opportunity for collaboration and co-operation across the floor quickly evaporated.

That is why a central commitment in our platform last year was to deliver stronger national security oversight, which included the creation of an all-party committee to monitor and oversee the operations of every government department and agency with national security responsibilities.

With Bill C-22, we are keeping that promise.

The national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would be made up of nine members, including the chair. Two of the members would be senators. The other seven would be members of Parliament. No more than four would be from the government caucus. Ministers and parliamentary secretaries would not be eligible to sit on the committee. The law would require consultation with the Senate before senators were named, and consultation with the leaders of opposition parties before the appointment of opposition MPs.

The committee would have a broad mandate to examine the legislative, regulatory, administrative, and financial framework for national security and intelligence as well as any activity related to national security and intelligence carried out anywhere within the federal government.

There are nearly 20 departments and agencies within the Government of Canada that have some kind of security function, from the RCMP and CSIS to the Canada Border Services Agency, National Defence, Transport, Foreign Affairs, and many others. This committee would be able to look at all of them.

On its own initiative, the committee would be empowered to follow its investigations wherever they led, which means that it would get a full picture of what the government was doing in national security and intelligence matters. This would be in contrast to several of the Canadian committee's counterparts elsewhere in the world, where mandates are strictly limited to reviewing the activities of a particular agency or agencies or to examining general structures but not particular operations.

In fact, because of the wide-ranging scope of the committee's mandate, one of Canada's foremost experts in national security law, Professor Craig Forcese, has declared that this committee of parliamentarians in Canada would be a stronger body than its equivalents in either the U.K. or Australia.

Indeed, Bill C-22 would transform Canada from being a laggard to being a leader when it comes to parliamentary scrutiny of national security and intelligence activities.

To make certain that the nine parliamentarians on the committee could be as effective as possible, the legislation would also establish a secretariat to help them fulfill their mandate. The secretariat, made up of capable and knowledgeable individuals, would handle the research and administrative tasks necessary to ensure that the committee's work and the work products of the committee were of the highest possible quality and that the committee had the resources and the expertise it needed to get the job done.

The committee might also draw upon the help and expertise of existing review bodies, such as the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, the Security Intelligence Review Committee for CSIS, and others, and seek information from them, as appropriate.

The bill directs the committee and existing review bodies to work in close collaboration. I expect that by design and through experience, they would relate to each other in a way that would complement each other's efforts and ultimately produce for Canadians significant value-added and greater confidence in the activities of the respective agencies.

The committee would be required to prepare at least one annual report. There could be others. It could also prepare special reports as it saw fit. In other words, it would be able to report on whatever it wanted and whenever it wanted. Obviously, because of the nature of information related to national security and intelligence, not everything the committee looked into could be made public.

However, on this point, I would like to take a moment to discuss the recourse available to committee members should they uncover something they find truly problematic but that their oath of confidentiality prohibits them from disclosing.

Classified information must remain classified. However, without getting into specifics, committee members would command a great deal of attention and put a great deal of pressure on the government of the day if they were to tell Parliament and the public that there was something going on within the realm of security and intelligence activities that they believed was improper. The committee would be able to outline the problem in detail in its report to the prime minister, and the prime minister would be accountable to Canadians. Subsequently, the committee would be able to tell Canadians whether the problem had been adequately addressed, and the pressure would not go away until the committee gave the all-clear. That public pressure would be a powerful tool, and only a committee of parliamentarians could bring it to bear.

Finally, all of these aspects of the committee's operations would be reassessed five years after Bill C-22 came into force. The bill would require Parliament to conduct a review at that time to ensure that the committee was functioning effectively and to make recommendations about how to further advance its work.

We have included this statutory review in the legislation, because there will undoubtedly be lessons learned in the first years of the committee's existence, and we want to guarantee that there will be an opportunity for those lessons to be seriously considered and for any appropriate changes to be made as a result.

The goal is for Canada to have a national security framework that makes us a world leader in both effectiveness and accountability. The legislation before us today is an important step in that direction.

In our consultations with other countries that have had practical experience over the last many years with this concept, like the United Kingdom, for example, we heard repeatedly that it would be wise and prudent to move at this new initiative in a deliberate and measured manner, learning as we go, and to be prepared to accommodate further changes over time.

It is critical to earn trust on all sides: from the public, and after all, the public interest is what this committee would be designed to protect; and from the security and intelligence agencies that would be scrutinized.

Let me emphasize once again our two core objectives for national security for this new committee and indeed for all of our other initiatives in this domain. Number one, we need to ensure that all of our agencies are being effective in keeping Canadians safe. Number two, in lockstep with that, we need to equally ensure that Canadian rights and freedoms are safeguarded along with equality and the character of our democratic way of life.

Building that trust with the agencies and the public, all around, is crucial. That is why we are proposing a mandate for the committee that is not siloed to a few named agencies, as other countries do, but rather is a mandate that reaches across the full scope of government. Unlike other review bodies and other countries, this Canadian committee of parliamentarians would be able to follow the evidence wherever it leads.

In addition to looking at events and activities retroactively, this committee would also be able to examine ongoing activities, a unique power, subject only to basic, reasonable safeguards for classified information.

Again, please recall the full context of our national security agenda. The anchor piece would be the committee of parliamentarians that would be providing a brand new type and level of scrutiny and review, plus a new initiative, funded in the last budget, for community outreach and counter-radicalization, plus full compliance with the Charter of Rights, plus full protection of the basic right to civil protest, plus clarity about warrants, plus action to remedy issues with no-fly lists, plus a more precise definition of “propaganda”, plus a full review of terrorism legislation after three years, plus the first ever inclusive consultations with Canadians, parliamentarians, subject-matter experts, and the general public about other measures they deem appropriate, beyond the ones I have mentioned, and necessary to keep Canadians safe and to safeguard our rights and freedoms.

Already in the consultations we have undertaken we have received more than 7,000 submissions online, which indicates a considerable appetite to be involved and engaged.

In light of a report issued just today by the Privacy Commissioner, let me make one point about our national security consultations very clear: This is not a narrow exercise. All Canadians, including the Privacy Commissioner, can raise and pursue any issue they want to pursue under the rubric of national security and intelligence operations. The discussion paper we published a few weeks ago is not a statement of government policy. It is intended to provoke discussion and debate to get Canadians involved and engaged, and it is doing exactly that.

After we hear from Canadians, we will be able to put forward the appropriate changes in law or procedure that reflect the recommendations we have received.

I will look forward to hearing the full scope of what the Privacy Commissioner has to say about any and all dimensions of our national security architecture. Indeed, I understand that he may be appearing before the House security committee on this topic just next week to present his views on the national security framework. His ongoing input, advice, and oversight are important to me and to the government, just as we want to hear from all Canadians, an opportunity they have never had before.

Parliament has rightly been called the grand inquest of the nation. For too long, however, Canada's Parliament has been prevented from fulfilling that particular role in matters of national security and intelligence. Yet these are matters that concern the fundamental freedoms of Canadians, and they are quite literally matters of life and death. Parliamentarians, the people's chosen representatives, must be at the heart of our system of national security accountability, and at long last, Bill C-22 will make it so.

Before I close, allow me to pause for just a moment to recognize the tremendous work done by the brave women and men of our law enforcement and national security agencies, which they demonstrate on a regular basis. That was the case, in particular, in Strathroy, Ontario, this summer. They were exemplary professionals. The security agency plus at least four different police forces worked seamlessly and effectively, and they prevented a much larger tragedy. I know that we are all exceedingly proud of them and are grateful for their service.

I trust that hon. members in all parties understand the gravity of the issues we are dealing with and will approach not only the committee itself but the upcoming legislative process to establish it with the seriousness this topic warrants. I will be looking forward to good, useful, practical advice.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Madam Speaker, the member for Etobicoke—Lakeshore knows full well that the committee proposed in Bill C-22 would not provide parliamentary oversight. All it would be is an all-party caucus. It would not have the tools to provide true oversight and report back to us here in Parliament. We want to have parliamentary oversight and want it to work in a responsible manner. Those are some of the apprehensions that we had as a government. I can see, based on this bill, that those apprehensions continue with the PMO today, because it would control the committee.

If those apprehensions exist, the Liberals should not have promised in the last election campaign that they would provide parliamentary oversight, because they are not doing that. What they would do is provide more vetting and control by the PMO over anything this committee would do and over a number of parliamentarians who, in this process, would give up the immunity and privilege guaranteed to them by the House if it were done as a parliamentary committee.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Madam Speaker, I would just say this is not a parliamentary committee, and maybe they should call it an all-party committee for the Prime Minister on national security intelligence issues. That would probably be the best way. They will definitely go through the process of making it look like it is a parliamentary committee, but we know for a fact that Parliament would not approve this committee, that Parliament would have no say in what the committee does, and that Parliament would not see the reports coming from the committee until after they have been vetted and rewritten by the Prime Minister's Office.

Until that point in time when the government realizes the folly of Bill C-22, we unfortunately will not have a committee that provides the oversight that Canadians want and were led to believe in the last federal election they would have.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Madam Speaker, in the last election I always enjoyed how everyone referred to the big, bad PMO under Stephen Harper and said that Conservative members were all told what to do. In the last Parliament, I was the most independent voting member of Parliament. I did not see the Liberals or the NDP vote as often against their own party line as I or some of my other colleagues did, who were second and third. Therefore, that was not a fair analysis.

However, there is a lack of trust from our side with respect to Bill C-22, because it does not address the promise made by the Liberals, or what those of us who respect Parliament would like to see it do, which is to create a parliamentary committee by statute and the Standing Orders of Parliament that would provide the same type of oversight discussed in the legislation but not under the control of the Prime Minister. Unfortunately, with this bill, first and foremost, all of the control, vetting, and reports have to go through the Prime Minister's Office. That is not democracy.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Madam Speaker, I can see why the member opposite is confused. That is because she thinks the Liberals will be bringing in parliamentary oversight, and they are not. That is what we are opposed to in this bill. This bill must empower us as parliamentarians. It does not do that; it empowers the PMO.

If we look at the previous 10 years, Peter MacKay supported more parliamentary oversight of national security agencies. There are a number of us here who believe that we need to have more parliamentary oversight. Unfortunately, we did not see co-operation from all the other parties on how to do that in a responsible manner. Therefore, it was laid to rest. However, we now have an opportunity to do it right, but Bill C-22 is getting it wrong. All we are doing is putting more power in the hands of the Prime Minister, Gerald Butts, and Katie Telford.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to speak to Bill C-22, legislation about which we, as the official opposition, have a lot of apprehension.

I would like to refer to the earlier speeches of my colleague from Durham and my colleague from Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, clearly articulating some of the shortfalls in Bill C-22.

As someone who has been here for over 12 years, as a parliamentarian who has nothing but the greatest respect for this chamber and this institution, I believe Parliament has a key role to play in providing oversight to all sorts of government agencies, which include our security and intelligence agencies. Unfortunately, the bill of goods that is being presented in Bill C-22 falls far short of giving proper parliamentary oversight.

As has already been alluded to, there is a concern already, before the committee has been struck and before the legislation has passed and properly studied at committee, that a chair of the committee has already been named, the member for Ottawa South.

I suppose we should not be too surprised about that, knowing that the Prime Minister's BFF, Gerald Butts, and his chief of staff, Katie Telford, used to work for former premier Dalton McGuinty, the brother of the member for Ottawa South. That is a connection that a lot of people have made, one that we know is of concern about whether this committee will have true independence and be able to function the way we expect parliamentary committees to function.

We have looked at this, debated it, and have had conversations already about what our other Five Eyes partners are doing in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. This function has been missing in Canada over the years.

One of those reasons is that we have, within the Canadian system, ombudsmen and commissioners who oversee most of the intelligence agencies, like Communications Security Establishment Canada, CSEC, that operates under National Defence. As a former parliamentary secretary to the minister of national defence, I am well aware of the activities of the organization. As the defence critic, I still appreciate the role the commissioner plays in being independent and reviewing all the activities that are undertaken to ensure CSEC stays on point, the same thing that happens with CSIS. When there are issues, they report it immediately to Parliament. We get the information we need to make a decision as parliamentarians.

What we see in Bill C-22 is not a committee of Parliament. It does not mirror what is happening in the United Kingdom or in Australia, where the committee is appointed by Parliament and the committee functions as a parliamentary committee. What we are seeing here is something that is actually working out of the Prime Minister's office. That is what is being proposed.

If we look at the United Kingdom, and we always want to go back the mother of Westminster Parliament in London, it established its committee back in 1994, and it has worked incredibly well. Politics was left at the door. It works in collaboration. It looks over the operational and security measures that agencies are taking within the government. In 2013, parliament even expanded that committee's role. It is important that this is done because the committee reports back to parliament. It is not beholden to the prime minister, it is not beholden to any minister of the crown.

Australia also has a parliamentary joint committee. Again, it was set up by parliament, and it oversees six different security agencies. Again, we see this as being the proper way to do it, in that parliament has control of the committee.

I know there is some concern when we look at the history of this place. Probably its recent history is when we established the special committee on Afghan detainees, the transfer of those detainees, how those individuals were treated by the Canadian Armed Forces, and what happened to them after they left.

First, we were looking at having an all-party committee, but the NDP of the day decided not to participate on a committee, because it would have to be done in secret, and information gleaned through that process could not be used in the public domain. Therefore, they took a pass on sitting on the committee, and so just the Liberals and Conservatives sat on that committee and went through thousands and thousands of unredacted documents to try to determine whether or not there was any abuse, until they determined there was not.

I can see why the Liberals are up here speaking in favour of Bill C-22, but I think they are somewhat confused. If we look at their promises in the last election campaign, we see on page 31, on national security oversight, it says that:

We will deliver stronger national security oversight.

At present, Parliament does not have oversight of our national security agencies, making Canada the sole nation among our Five Eyes allies whose elected officials cannot scrutinize security operations. This leaves the public uninformed and unrepresented on critical issues.

The key word here is “Parliament”; it does not have oversight. What the bill before us would do is create an all-party committee, but it is not a parliamentary committee.

The Red Book from the last federal campaign for the Liberals, on parliamentary committees, says that they will “...strengthen Parliamentary committees so that they can better scrutinize legislation”. It also brought forward great ideas, such as making sure that they have non-partisan research, and that they would have committee chairs elected by secret ballot. They talked about having ministers and parliamentary secretaries removed from committee and not able to vote on committee.

Therefore, everybody assumed that we would review parliamentary committees, make them more independent, and allow members of Parliament to work and elect chairs, and that it would happen with the national security oversight. I can see how members from the Liberal caucus would be confused, because the two of them went one right after the other and they just assumed that they were going to have a true parliamentary committee.

We can look to the comments and rhetoric that have come from the government in the past. I listened earlier to the member for Malpeque. He has been in this place for a long time and has made some comments about wanting to have parliamentary oversight. He said, when he was speaking in the House in the last Parliament, “The key point here is that I really cannot understand the government's unwillingness to look at proper parliamentary oversight...”. They key word is parliamentary.

He said later that “I'm strongly advocating oversight, parliamentary oversight”. This was in the debate on Bill C-51 and one of the demands.

Also, the member for Vancouver Quadra brought forward Bill C-622, which was about trying to establish legislation to provide more security agency oversight through Parliament.

Therefore, I can see why there is confusion among Canadians. I can see why there is confusion among Liberals when they have actually always talked about parliamentary oversight, but what we are seeing today is that this process in Bill C-22 is all about having more control by the Prime Minister's Office.

I have the bill in front of me here, and I have read it carefully just so I can raise my concerns and the reason I have these concerns about the way this committee is being established. If we look at subclause 4(3) of Bill C-22, we see it says clearly that:

The Committee is not a committee of either House of Parliament or of both Houses.

Therefore, we are not talking about a committee of Parliament. It has no responsibility to Parliament. As a matter of fact, the extra remuneration that has been awarded to the chair and committee members will come from general coffers and not through parliamentary budgets.

The bill goes on to say in subclause 5(1) that:

The members of the Committee are to be appointed by the Governor in Council, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, to hold office during pleasure until the dissolution of Parliament following their appointment.

Well, parliamentary committees are established through whips assigning people onto committees, and chairs are elected by the committee, but not in this case. In this case, the Prime Minister will appoint every single member of the committee.

On the Senate side, it says that the Prime Minister will consult with a member of the Senate and then appoint those members. We have senators who are independent, and those members who are independent, of course, are appointed to the Senate on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, so they are beholden to the Prime Minister, and now the Prime Minister will appoint those independently Prime Minister-appointed senators to the committee. So definitely those senators, up to two members on the committee from the Senate, will act in the interests of the Prime Minister. Then members of other parties will be appointed by the Prime Minister after he has talked to the leader of that party.

That in itself clearly documents the shortcomings in Bill C-22. I encourage caucus members in the Liberal Party to read through it, to clearly understand that the bill of goods they sold Canadians in the last election was false. To make the point, in subclause 12(1), it says:

Despite any other law, no member or former member of the Committee may claim immunity based on parliamentary privilege in a proceeding against them in relation to a contravention of subsection 11(1) or of a provision of the Security of Information Act....

Here in Parliament we have immunity and true freedom of speech. That is removed from the committee, making the point that this may be a committee that has parliamentarians on it, but the committee is not part of this institution; it is part of the Prime Minister's Office.

Then we go to the information that the committee can use, and we continue to see that there are restrictions placed on the committee, on the information it gleans. There are actually seven exemptions keeping the committee from really doing its work of ensuring that intelligence agencies are taking our national security seriously and of protecting the rights and freedoms of individual Canadians.

We have to wonder whether or not the people of Canada, when they elected the government, fully understood that they were not going to get what they really deserve, which is true parliamentary oversight. There are exceptions. Members are appointed by the Prime Minister. Ministers have the right to refuse to give information of any department, so if there is any department that the committee wants to investigate, the minister can refuse that information. Even before it is out of the gate, it is already handcuffed. It is bound, gagged, and completely beholden to the PMO.

The other thing I have trouble with is that the committee chair has a vote on all proceedings. We see that only occasionally in our parliamentary process, on special joint legislative committees where a chair has a vote on policies, debates, and motions at committee and also can cast a vote to break a tie as well. It has been suggested here that the chair of the committee gets to vote, plus gets to cast a ballot to break a tie on all votes. Essentially even though Liberals are saying there are going to be four Liberals as it sits today on the committee, there are actually five because the chair has two votes.

In clause 21, it says the report is not presented to Parliament. The committee writes a report that is presented to the Prime Minister and to the minister or ministers whom it impacts. They get to vet all the reports. How is that freedom of speech? How is that our ability as parliamentarians to do our job if, when the committee reaches a decision, it still gets vetted by the PMO and vetted by the affected minister. That is beyond the pale of proper parliamentary procedure and democracy.

Not only do they vet it, but it actually says right in the legislation in subclause 21(5) that the chair of the committee will get direction from the Prime Minister or from the minister on how to properly write the report if they are not happy with what is in it.

It states that “the Prime Minister may direct the Committee to submit to the Prime Minister a revised version of the annual or special report that does not contain that information” about which they are concerned.

There are some major political gains and games that will be played in this process, and it is something that needs to be seriously looked at for amendment if Canadians are going to have faith in this process.

It continues on with a minister having the ability to refuse to provide any information. The committee can write a report about its dissatisfaction with that minister, but at the same time, has no control over whether a report would even get tabled.

There are not the checks and balances that we need to see in Bill C-22. That is why, as the official opposition, we are opposing the bill, unless some substantive changes are made.

I know that the member for Durham has tried on a number of occasions to reach out to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and our Liberal counterparts, along with the member for Victoria in the NDP caucus, to ensure that we develop a piece of legislation that everyone here would be comfortable supporting. Unfortunately, that fell on deaf ears.

This bill was tabled in the dying days of the summer session, just before the summer recess in June, so we did not have a chance to have a proper discussion on this bill, and we have only got an opportunity now to express our concerns over what is a poorly drafted piece of legislation. Canadians expect more. If parliamentary oversight is going to be provided, it had better be true parliamentary oversight and not just an extension of the Prime Minister's Office wielding its authority over parliamentarians.

Actually, I am baffled why anyone in the Liberal caucus, especially on the backbench, would want to be so tied up by the authority of the PMO. If Liberals wanted to exercise their rights and obligations as members of Parliament in the House and represent their constituents, they would be demanding that this committee become a true extension of Parliament, that it be set up the same way standing committees are set up, become part of the Standing Orders, elect its own chair, and table the reports here in the House.

We agree that the members from all parties who sit on this committee should be properly vetted. We agree that they should all take an oath to commit themselves to protecting the information they are going to see, as this is not information that should be used for partisan political purposes. This is about the security of our nation and the protection of Canadians, as well as protection of their rights and freedoms.

We also believe that the people who sit on this committee should have experience on issues of national security, national defence, and policing, so that the information they are going to look at in no way startles them or causes them to make ill-informed decisions.

We really urge the government to fix this legislation so that there can be all-party support. However, until it does, the official opposition, the Conservative Party of Canada, will oppose it since it does not reflect the promises made by the Prime Minister in the last federal election, it does not respect this institution, nor would Bill C-22, in its current form, achieve what we hoped it would achieve, proper parliamentary oversight.

[Joël Lightbound, Liberal, Louis-Hébert, QC]

Mr. Speaker, as I was saying earlier before being interrupted for oral question period, I think that Bill C-22, to establish an independent committee of parliamentarians to oversee the actions of our intelligence agencies, is a step that should have been taken long ago.

For example, the United Kingdom has had such a committee since 1994. Australia formed one in 1988 and New Zealand in 1996. Canada is at least a decade behind. The step we are taking today is way overdue, as they say.

When Parliament was passing Bill C-51, four former prime ministers, namely Jean Chrétien, Paul Martin, John Turner, and even Joe Clark, a Progressive Conservative prime minister not a neo-conservative, recommended that this oversight committee be formed. They recommended oversight of Canada's overseers and said that it would take an independent committee that would be called to review the actions of our intelligence agencies. These four former prime ministers were accompanied by a host of former Supreme Court justices and former justice ministers including Irwin Cotler, for example.

According to them:

Accountability engenders public confidence and trust in activities undertaken by the government, particularly where those activities might be cloaked in secrecy. Independent checks and balances ensure that national security activities are protecting the public, and not just the government in power.

Consider the extent of the resources used in the name of security in Canada. Communications Security Establishment Canada, which I am more familiar with than the other intelligence agencies such as CSIS or the RCMP, has annual expenses of about $500 million and its headquarters cost us $1.2 billion. CSE's headquarters is the most expensive building in the history of Canada.

In 2010, we learned that CSE was analyzing 400,000 emails a day to mitigate risk to information technology. These were emails sent to the government.

In 2014, we learned that CSE had studied email and cellphone metadata from Canadians travelling through a Canadian airport without actually getting their consent.

Before the Spencer decision, we learned that a number of Canadian telecommunication companies were voluntarily handing over information at the request of intelligence agencies without judicial authorization.

Under the circumstances, I do not think it is an extravagance to have an independent parliamentary committee overseeing the activities of our intelligence agencies, thereby ensuring that they do not act with impunity and are accountable not only to themselves but to elected parliamentarians.

Bill C-22 also addresses people's expectations for such a committee. Professor Craig Forcese, for whom I have tremendous respect, articulated certain expectations. He talked about four essential factors.

First, efficacy must be part of the committee's mandate. The committee must be able to evaluate whether our intelligence agencies are using their vast sums of money effectively. That is part of the committee's rather broad mandate. He also talked about propriety. The committee has to review whether government intelligence agencies are acting within their legal mandates.

Mr. Forcese also mentioned that the committee has to look at the whole picture. It cannot look at just the RCMP, CSIS, or Communications Security Establishment Canada. It must take a good look at the national security activities of all our intelligence agencies. His fourth and final proposal is to have enough money and human resources for the committee to do a good job. All these proposals are within the committee's mandate.

The committee created by Bill C-22 meets all the criteria. In my opinion, we will have an effective committee and one that will be useful for Canadians. It is a first step in the right direction, the first in a thousand-mile journey towards having checks and balances on the power given to intelligence agencies.

We need to have better and more robust checks and balances, especially when it comes to the fundamental rights of Canadians. I am hopeful about the thousand-mile journey we have to travel, especially with Bill C-22 as our first step. First and foremost, we need to return to specific judicial authorization regarding legal access. Judicial authorization, that is, a judicially authorized warrant for a specific person, for specific purposes, must be the norm in Canada. It must be the basic rule, and there must be no getting around it. In fact, I think we must be very strict about that.

In that regard, I congratulate the Liberal Party for having introduced Bill C-622 back in the day, a bill that required CSE to obtain judicial authorization before intercepting any Canadians' communications. That is not necessarily required at the moment. The ministerial authorization is broader. I hope we return to specific judicial authorization for access to Canadians' private communications.

The second thing is that there is no definition for metadata in any Canadian legislation. In the 21st century, we need to define metadata, particularly in terms of private communications. That would be an additional protection, especially when we know just how useful and precise metadata are.

For instance, Dr. Ann Cavoukian, Ontario's former information and privacy commissioner, said that metadata were more intrusive than the contents of a communication, because they make it possible to track people's habits and create very specific portraits.

The third thing has to do with Bill C-51. I know we are reviewing the bill and that we still have some consultations to do, but the information sharing the bill allows is fairly draconian. There is a way to limit information sharing among government agencies. The Maher Arar case showed us just what kind of impact that can have.

If we want to protect both Canadians and rights, an independent committee overseeing the activities of our government agencies is not too much to ask for. It is our job as legislators to strike a balance between protecting basic rights and protecting the physical integrity of Canadians. Bill C-22 is an excellent first step in that direction, and we have been waiting for it for at least 10 years.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Act to Establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians

[Joël Lightbound, Liberal, Louis-Hébert, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C-22, which in my opinion is at least 10 years late, if not more.

When we think about increased spending on security in response to a threat that is growing ever more diffuse and the increased authority granted to our intelligence agencies, the need to implement an effective system of checks and balances and appropriate oversight mechanisms seems obvious.

That is what Bill C-22 does. It seeks to correct that deficiency by providing seven MPs and two senators the opportunity to conduct a rather holistic review of all of Canada's surveillance mechanisms to determine whether they are effective and appropriate.

Right now, there is no such process in place. Every agency has its own mandate for reviewing its internal procedures. This independent committee of parliamentarians from the House of Commons and the Senate will bring us into the modern world when it comes to the oversight of our intelligence agencies.

Four of the Five Eyes allies, the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand, set up independent committees of parliamentarians ages ago, so it is surprising that Canada waited this long to do the same. One wonders if the former government did anything at all about this issue.

This was one of our campaign promises. I am very proud that we are moving forward with it today, and I think Canadians will be better off as a result. Nevertheless, this is just the first step, and we still have a lot more to do.

I am also very pleased that the government has begun consultations on public safety and national security. That is a step in the right direction. We need to hear what Canadians have to say. We have to figure out how to protect Canadians' rights and keep them safe. Those two things go hand in hand, and we must not neglect one in favour of the other.

Bill C-22 and the creation of this committee represent the first step in ensuring respect for Canadians' rights while keeping them safe. This bill has been very well received by people for whom I have tremendous respect, such as the University of Ottawa's Craig Forcese.

He gave Bill C-22 and the committee it creates a high pass. Forcese is a leading academic in his field, and his endorsement is worth something.

I can see that I am almost out of time and question period is about to start. I will pause for now, but I will get into other aspects of this bill when I conclude my remarks.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, last year during the election while knocking on doors we heard from almost every door that Canada has to be a model of openness, of tolerance, and of diversity, where people of different religions, different cultures, can come here and live together.

Bill C-22 is an essential part of our efforts on national security, which includes specific measures as outlined in our platform as well as consultations so that Canadians can have their say about other measures that are needed.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the fine words from my colleague across the way and I want to pick up on the point that when we reflect on Bill C-22 and talk about the issues from the last election, we have seen a government that has responded to what Canadians have been asking for. They appreciate freedoms and their rights. There is a sense of a need for security and it is a balancing. Bill C-22 brings forward an independent parliamentary group that will ensure that Canadians' privacy concerns are addressed in good part and many other things.

When the member reflects on the past election and the commitment from the government, would she not agree that Bill C-22 deals with many of the concerns raised by Canadians during the election, and therefore, it is a good bill that all members should get behind? At least let us send it to committee.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we can debate the mechanics of how this oversight mechanism should be established and I welcome that debate, but I would note that Bill C-22 represents a commitment to an unprecedented level of transparency and oversight that this country has not seen before. It is a level of oversight that was rejected outright by the previous Conservative government. We are correcting the mistakes of the past government and delivering the transparency that Canadians want.

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague for her speech today on Bill C-22.

I would like to ask her a fairly specific and direct question about one of the aspects of the bill, namely, the fact that the chair is appointed by the Prime Minister and not elected, which is the practice of most of our allies.

Our allies agree that the members of the committee can choose and elect one of the members as the chair.

In the case of Bill C-22, I am wondering why the government has chosen to appoint the committee chair rather than opting for the election of one of the committee members.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with the hon. member for Louis-Hébert.

I am pleased to rise in the House today to speak to Bill C-22, a piece of legislation that would bring overdue changes to our country's approach to national security and put the lie to, once and for all, the idea that we need to make a choice between the desire to keep Canadians safe and the desire to safeguard the rights and freedoms that all Canadians cherish.

Since the tragic events of September 11, 2001, as western governments and western societies have struggled to respond to this new terrorist threat, this false argument has been presented. We must ensure that law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the tools and resources they need to counter these new and often rapidly emerging threats. However, no, public safety need not come as a detriment to our fundamental freedoms and rights. I reject this false argument and so does our government. To quote Benjamin Franklin, “Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety.”

It has often been said of the terrorists that they hate us for our freedom. While I find that a trite and simplistic statement, the fact is that if we do trade our freedom for greater security then, in essence, those who use terror as a weapon have achieved their goals, for their mission is not merely death or destruction; it is terror. It is to fundamentally change our society for the worse and we must not allow that to happen.

We cannot close our society to the world, but rather, we must remain an example to the world, a model of openness, of tolerance, of diversity. Let our diversity truly be our strength and let Canada show that people of different religions, different languages, and different cultures can live together in happiness and in security. The world needs more Canada, and at a time when countries are looking increasingly inward, at a time when countries are closing their doors to trade, to refugees, and to the rest of the world, it needs the Canadian example more than ever.

Let me turn to the specific measures in Bill C-22. The centrepiece of this legislation is the establishment of a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians that would play a crucial role of oversight and accountability over our national security system. The members of this committee would have access to classified information and a robust mandate to review all the national security framework and ensure it is working to keep Canadians safe while safeguarding our fundamental rights and freedoms.

Sunshine is always the best disinfectant, and while it is only understandable that classified information cannot be shared with all Canadians, it is important that the people's representatives, elected by and accountable to the people, have this access to ensure the people's interests are safeguarded. This is a fundamental responsibility of a member of Parliament, and this is an oversight model that has proven successful for Canada's closest allies. I fully support this initiative.

As we design and debate a new national security framework for Canada, something that has been missing during previous debates is consultation. I am a Canadian Muslim of Pakistani descent. There are more than one million Muslims in Canada. I am a member of a community that has often felt unfairly targeted by security agencies and stigmatized as part of these security debates. From the attacks of September 11th forward, we have felt marginalized, profiled, and seen as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution.

I can assure the House that there are few Canadians more patriotic than my fellow Muslim Canadians, and I am honoured to be one of eleven Muslims whom the people of Canada have elected to represent all citizens in this hallowed chamber.

Those of us who have chosen to come to Canada and make this our home did so for both the security that all Canadians value and the rights and freedoms that all Canadians cherish. Many of us have fled countries where personal liberties are severely limited or even non-existent, and come seeking safety from countries where violence and conflict are a daily fact of life. Yet too often, as I said, we have been treated with suspicion and mistrust. It is as if the security agencies took a racial profiling approach to national security rather than trying to work with the community, and that needs to change.

We need to bring a community policing approach to national security. We know this approach works in our cities. When my colleague, the hon. member for Scarborough Southwest, took over the Toronto Police Service division in Regent Park, relations between the community and the officers sworn to protect it were at a record low. By taking a community policing approach, and treating the community as partners, the member for Scarborough Southwest was able to establish trust with the community, a trust based on mutual understanding and respect, and crime began to drop. People in the community knew they could turn to the police in times of trouble or when someone was going down the wrong path.

In the same way, national security agencies and the government must see communities like mine not as a problem but as part of the solution. Security agencies must proactively engage with all of the community and make us partners in building a safer and freer society. We are ready to be partners. Many of us have come to Canada to flee extremism and violence. We want nothing more than to root it out in our new home. That is why I was happy to see that budget 2016 included an investment of $35 million over the next five years to establish an office of the community outreach and counter-radicalization coordinator. This commitment is reaffirmed in Bill C-22.

There is already a lot of great work taking place in communities across the country on counter-radicalization initiatives. However, these initiatives are lacking coordination and resources, and best practices are not being shared. This new office would provide national leadership by coordinating federal, provincial, territorial, and international initiatives, share those important best practices that have proven successful on the ground, and support community outreach and research. Canada can, and must, become a world leader in counter-radicalization, and show that it is possible to build an open, pluralistic, and democratic society. That means engaging all Canadians in keeping our nation both safe and free.

Let us commit here and now to building a Canada where our youth never have to feel that they are different, that they do not belong, or that they are worthy of suspicion simply because of their religion, their ethnicity, or the colour of their skin. That is my dream for the next generation and for my two sons.

I am pleased to note that Bill C-22 also includes a number of other initiatives that seek to safeguard personal rights and freedoms that were missing from the previous government's Bill C-51. For example, there are amendments to better protect the right to advocate and protest, and a better definition of the rules regarding terrorist propaganda.

The government is also introducing a statutory review of national security legislation to ensure that the people's elected representatives have not only the opportunity but the responsibility to regularly review national security legislation to ensure that it is still necessary, still effective, and is not unduly restricting the rights and freedoms of Canadian citizens.

These are all amendments that our party tried to make to Bill C-51 in the last Parliament to bring more balance to the legislation. Unfortunately, these amendments were rejected by the previous government.

I will be supporting the bill. I hope my colleagues on the other side of the aisle will join with us in supporting this important legislation. I believe that Bill C-22 will strengthen our national security apparatus to help keep Canadians more safe and more free.

I am a Canadian by choice. I am a Canadian of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While growing up in Pakistan, the one thing we all knew about Canada was Pierre Trudeau and the Charter of Rights. It is a document that states that every Canadian and everyone within our borders have certain fundamental freedoms: freedom of conscience and religion; freedom of thought, belief, opinion, and expression; freedom of peaceful assembly; and freedom of association.

I would not be here in this chamber, and in this country, were it not for this charter and these freedoms. I am committed to protecting and defending them, and Bill C-22 does just that.

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague for his speech. He pointed out most of the shortcomings of Bill C-22.

For example, he noted that the chair would be appointed rather than elected by his peers on the parliamentary committee. Given that he would by appointed by the Prime Minister himself, the chair would be beholden to him.

In addition, unlike our security agencies, the committee's access to certain information will be limited. Furthermore, the Prime Minister can accept or reject certain parts or all of the report to be tabled in Parliament. In other words, it is as though the Prime Minister was telling a parliamentary committee that he had the final say on the parliamentary committee's report.

My colleague has a lot of experience sitting on parliamentary committees, and he knows how they work. It would be inconceivable for the Prime Minister to have the power to completely suppress the entire report that a committee wants to table in the House.

What message does that send about the Prime Minister's confidence in the institution of the House and its members?

[Arnold Chan, Liberal, Scarborough—Agincourt, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my hon. colleague from Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound for what I thought was a very thoughtful and engaging presentation to the House of his thoughts on Bill C-22. I have listened carefully to the comments from the official opposition over the course of the debate so far, and I do want to say that I am heartened here on the government side that there seems to have been a change of heart now that the official opposition sits on the opposition benches. Not too long ago it was the government and was at that time not as receptive to the basic content of what now is being proposed with Bill C-22.

My friend laid out, I think, four broad criticisms, and to me they seem primarily related to issues of process. I am only going to dig into one of them.

That, namely, is with respect to membership in the committee. The member indicated that it was his view that the members of this particular parliamentary review committee should have a background in security. However, I would argue, perhaps, that what is most important is that the members be independent and have an open mind with respect to challenging the positions that are advanced by the government, and not necessarily be captured by particular perspectives; for example, if they had previously served in a security agency or with the police, they would have particular perspectives.

Does my friend have a particular thought, or would he be willing to consider who ought to sit on that particular committee?

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to speak to Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act. Today, I would like to focus my remarks on four main areas of concern I have with the legislation as currently drafted.

However, before I begin, I would like to take a few moments to recognize the important work done by the men and women who serve our country's national security agencies. The work done by these agencies is paramount to the public safety of all Canadians, and I commend those who work tirelessly to keep us all safe. Like you, Mr. Speaker, and anyone else who was in the House two years ago on October 22, I have a lot of respect and admiration for those who kept us all safe that day. It could have been a different outcome. To all of those who were here that day and kept us all safe and able to go home to our families, I thank them very much.

We are not immune to the threats our allies are facing around the world from terrorism and homegrown radicalization. In fact, we all witnessed the tremendous work of our national security agencies this summer when they were able to stop a potential terror attack in Strathroy, Ontario, a community just a few hours south of my riding of Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound. My colleague here beside me represents that area and knows how the situation could have turned out much worse. Our security agencies were able to identify and intercept a threat from a radicalized individual before he was able to place homemade explosive devices in public locations. Without our security agencies, this could have ended in disaster. Again, I thank those who work around the clock to keep us all safe from threats like these and all others.

I would like to highlight four main areas of concern that I have with the legislation. They include the timing of the legislation and appointment of the chair; the membership of the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, which I will refer to as the committee; the level of access that the committee will have to important information; and the channels through which the committee will release its reports.

First and foremost, I feel that the timing of the legislation is strange. The government introduced the legislation in the final days before the House rose for the summer last session. This is fine and dandy, but we found out during the summer that the Minister of Public Safety would be launching a cross-country consultation on Canada's national security framework. The Department of Public Safety listed the topics for discussion at this consultation as accountability, prevention, threat reduction, domestic national security information sharing, the passenger protect program, the Criminal Code's terrorism measures, the terrorist entry listing procedures, and others as part of the scope of the consultation. It seems to me there are a number of aspects of the legislation that could be significantly impacted by what is heard from Canadians as the government carries out these consultations.

Furthermore, the minister has written to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, which I am a member of, to ask that the committee also engage in cross-country consultations with Canadians on Canada's national security framework. As vice-chair of this committee, I am looking forward to travelling across Canada to hear from interested Canadians on what they think about these very important topics. However, what I am concerned about is that the government once again has put the cart before the horse. I do not understand why or how it makes sense to anyone to table this legislation and several other pieces of legislation before the House when we have not yet consulted Canadians, unless of course the government is just carrying out these consultations to pretend it is actually consulting. I sincerely hope that that is not the case, but it certainly appears that it is exactly what it is doing.

Furthermore, I find it deeply concerning that the government named the chair of the committee before it even put the legislation before the House. The member for Ottawa South was named as the chair of the committee more than five months before the legislation was brought before the House.

I respect the member for Ottawa South as I do all colleagues in the House. I sat for a few years on the transportation committee with him. It is not about him so much as the process, and some other points that I will mention.

I have served on many different committees since I became a member of Parliament back in 2004, and never, not once, have I joined a newly-formed committee that already has had a chair for months. The chair is always selected by the committee members through an election at the first meeting of the committee.

We all know, and I am not naive, that when the Liberals are in power, or whichever party is in power, that it will be one of them that gets elected. However, we still have the election, and that is not happening in this case.

I actually find it very ironic that the government has already named the chair of this important committee, given that it was the Liberal Party during the election campaign that called and screamed for more accountability for parliamentary committees. Where is it?

The Liberal Party platform states on the increase on accountability that “...we will strengthen the role of Parliamentary committee chairs, including elections by secret ballot”. Does that sound like what we are doing? Not at all.

Why should the process be any different for this new committee? The chair should have never been appointed before the membership was even consulted.

This leads to my second concern with the legislation as it is currently drafted. I have several concerns with how the membership of this new committee will be formed.

The legislation states that the committee will be composed of the chair, up to seven members of Parliament, and up to two senators, and will become members of the committee through a Governor in Council appointment on the recommendation of the Prime Minister.

My concern is that membership on the committee is at the discretion of the Prime Minister rather than Parliament. Indeed, it has been expressed by many Canadians that they want parliamentary oversight of their national security agencies. What they do not want is for the Prime Minister to basically bypass Parliament and have full control of the committee, because that is the way it is designed.

If this committee is going to provide parliamentary oversight, then the membership of the committee should be approved by Parliament and not the Prime Minister. This committee should not be seen as an extension of the PMO.

Furthermore, in reading the legislation further, I note that the bill does outline security and confidentiality guidelines for the members of the committee, with each member having to obtain and maintain a security clearance, which is all good. They also have to take an oath or solemn affirmation, and comply with procedures and practices. Additionally, members are prohibited from knowingly disclosing information that was obtained in the course of exercising their under the act, and no member of the committee may claim immunity based on parliamentary privilege. I totally agree with that.

These provisions are very important, and I am delighted to see them in the bill. However, it is very unfortunate that there is not one measure or clause that would require members who are appointed to the committee to have at least some type of former experience related to the national security environment. The current chair does not have any previous such experience. I find it very difficult to believe that this committee will be able to effectively carry out important work related to our national security agencies if this is the very first time it has ever worked in such a field. It simply does not add up.

The reason for oversight is actual and legitimate oversight. We are not going to get that. I do not know how someone who is still getting his or her feet wet on the file is able to provide proper and actual oversight. This is a significant flaw in the legislation which I hope will be addressed as we move forward on the bill.

My third area of concern with the legislation relates to the level of access that the committee would have to important documents regarding the operation of Canada's national security and intelligence agencies.

As the legislation is currently drafted, it is extremely limiting with respect to the information that the committee will have access to and it entrusts a lot of power to the Prime Minister and several ministers to limit access to information for the committee when they see fit. It is totally inappropriate and absolutely unacceptable.

If we want this committee to provide true, independent oversight of our national security agencies, then the bill will need some amending. I hope the government is open to constructive criticism.

As it stands, the bill would give the government far too much power to block the committee at every turn and to limit what it would be able to investigate. This would significantly limit the ability of the committee to fulfill its mandate. Again, this is supposed to be a committee of parliamentarians, not an arm of the Liberal Party of Canada.

My final area of concern deals with the way in which the committee would report its findings to the House and by extension, the public.

The legislation is clear in stating that the committee will be required to submit annual reports on a yearly basis and special reports as required. This is great. The only problem is that these reports are given directly to the Prime Minister, rather than to all of us in Parliament. Again, that is totally unacceptable.

These reports are to contain the committee's findings and recommendations, and the Prime Minister then has the ability to remove any information that he may deem harmful to national security or defence before the report is tabled in the House of Commons. Essentially, the legislation would give the Prime Minister a final say on what is reported to the House.

I know members have sat on various committees. That is not how it works and that is not how it is supposed to work. However, under the current government, it seems to be the way it wants to do some things.

While it is very important that there are checks and balances, and I do not have an issue with that, to ensure that nothing in the committee reports harms our national security, I am definitely sure that giving the Prime Minister's Office a veto power over the contents of this report is not the best way to go about this. That is the committee's responsibility.

As I have stated a number of times throughout my remarks today, this is supposed to be a committee that provides parliamentary oversight. In this regard, the committee should be reporting directly to Parliament and should not have to get a stamp of approval from the PMO.

This truly removes the ability of the committee to act independently and gives the PMO a significant amount of influence over the committee, which I find ironic since the Prime Minister promised during the campaign to decrease the role of the PMO. I guess that was 2015 then. It is 2016 now.

Having highlighted my main areas of concern with the legislation, I want to take just a few moments to highlight how the United Kingdom has formed its own committee for parliamentary oversight of its national security agencies.

I know the minister and the chair of the committee have done some travel to do some fact-finding, but I am not sure the best practices from other countries have made their way into this legislation. We should learn from other countries when possible. We do not need to reinvent the wheel.

It is important to only make comparisons between Canada and other Westminister parliaments because, as I have repeatedly stated today, this is to be a committee of parliamentarians that reports to and for Parliament. This leads into the comparison that I want to make.

The Parliament of the United Kingdom established its intelligence and security committee of Parliament in 1994 to examine policy, administration, and expenditures of the security service, secret intelligence service, and the government communications headquarters.

In 2013, three years ago, and some nineteen years after the original legislation, it made very significant reforms to make this a committee of Parliament, with a number of greater powers. The members of this committee are appointed by Parliament, and it reports directly to Parliament. Issues of national security are reported directly to the Prime Minister. Furthermore, the members are given access to highly classified material.

To me, this seems like a committee that has much more independence from the prime minister's office and has the appropriate level of access to classified material to truly provide proper oversight.

The most important fundamental difference between the committee proposed in Bill C-22 and the committee that operates in the United Kingdom is that members are appointed by, and report to, Parliament and Parliament alone.

Again, as I have stated, if this is to be a committee of parliamentarians that provides parliamentary oversight, then the committee should be beholden to Parliament and not to the Prime Minister or the Prime Minister's office.

I would be very curious to know this. When the minister travelled to the United Kingdom, was he advised against making this committee an extension of the PMO? Was he encouraged to adopt the committee structure that came out of the reforms in the United Kingdom in 2013?

The reason this is a key point is that we have been a little away from some of the hot spots in the Middle East, where terrorism seemed to blossom. However, England and Britain saw this a lot quicker than we did, so their legislation has been there for some time. The longer a piece of legislation is place, no matter what it has to deal with, we learn things from it. I do not care how smart any of us in the House are, or any government, It would be wrong to say that every bill we draft is perfect. That is not the case. As things evolve and change, we adapt and make changes, which is what the Brits did in 2013.

The other bill seemed to be very similar to what the government is putting in place today. The United Kingdom realized that after 19 years, or 17 years, whatever it turned out to be, that it was not doing the job, that it was not right. Therefore, it has been changed to make it right. We should have followed those changes, and it is obvious we did not.

The Parliaments of Australia and New Zealand also have parliamentary committees that provide oversight over their national security agencies, though they are much different than what is proposed by Bill C-22. The United Kingdom offers the closest comparison to Bill C-22.

Therefore, we should learn from the experience of the United Kingdom. It has had some form of parliamentary oversight since 1994. Clearly the reforms that were made back in 2013 were brought about for a reason. We should, to the greatest extent possible, offer a similar model that reflects the lessons learned in the UK from having such a body in place for more than 20 years now.

Finally, I hope the minister and his department consulted all of the current oversight agencies when drafting this legislation to ensure that there would not be a duplication of work on this committee. The committee should respect the agencies already in place and work alongside them in providing parliamentary oversight.

I look forward to hearing from oversight agencies, such as the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee on this legislation.

In closing, I look forward to the rest of the debate that is going to take place today and in the coming weeks and months. I look forward to taking some questions from my hon. colleagues.

[Cathay Wagantall, Conservative, Yorkton—Melville, SK]

Mr. Speaker, there are some things that are concerning to me.

In the past, the Liberal Party became very concerned and expressed angst about there being too much power in the previous PMO. The member said that the current review systems could become political tools of the government of the day. When he says things like that, I wonder why he can justify Bill C-22, which basically gives an amazing amount of control and power to the PM, or possibly to his office. Why is he comfortable with the bill giving so much power to the Prime Minister?

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Surrey Centre, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to speak to the proposed legislation before us today to deliver on the commitment we made to Canadians to improve the scrutiny and review of the national security and intelligence activities of the Government of Canada. It is in answer to what Canadians wanted and what was reflected when I knocked on doors in my riding of Surrey Centre.

As members have heard, Bill C-22 would allow for the establishment of a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, a multi-partisan committee that would examine and report on the government's national security and intelligence activities, an area that many Canadians feel is far too opaque.

This important bill is a key component of our ambitious national security agenda, one that is focused on achieving the dual objectives of keeping Canadians safe and safeguarding the rights and freedoms we all enjoy as Canadians. As I will explain today, the work of the committee will be vital in helping us achieve both of those objectives.

In terms of structure, the proposed committee would be a statutory entity whose members would be drawn from the ranks of current parliamentarians across party lines. It would be composed of nine members, which includes seven members of Parliament, with a maximum of four being from the governing party, and two from the Senate.

Given the nature of its mandate, the committee would be granted unprecedented access to classified material. A dedicated, professional, and independent secretariat would support the work of the committee to ensure it has the tools and resources it needs to carry out its work.

The next element I want to touch upon is the proposed mandate of the committee. Indeed, one of the ways in which we would ensure that the committee is effective is by giving it a broad mandate. It would have the ability to review the full range of national security activities in all departments and agencies across the Government of Canada. That is a key tenet of the bill and is crucial to what we are trying to achieve.

Some 20 different agencies and departments are involved, albeit to varying degrees, in national security and intelligence activities. The committee would be able to look at all of this work to gain a full picture of what government agencies and departments are doing in national security and intelligence matters.

In terms of this mandate, the model and vision go even further than that which exists in most countries in the world where a similar type of committee currently exists. The committee would have the authority to self-initiate reviews of the legislative, regulatory, policy, financial, and administrative frameworks for national security in Canada; in other words, it would be able to look at the matters it wants to look at. Its goal would be to ensure the effectiveness of the framework, as well as its respect for Canadian values.

Beyond this power to look at the national security framework, it would also be empowered to review specific national security and intelligence operations, notably including those that are still ongoing. Understandably, this power would not be entirely unfettered. The appropriate minister for a department or agency may refuse to provide information if the information constitutes special operational information and the provision of information would be injurious to national security. This is a necessary provision to ensure the integrity of our national security operations, which can be highly sensitive. However, committee members would be able to bring pressure to bear on the government of the day by telling Canadians if they have uncovered something problematic, without discussing the specifics.

We also know that the Prime Minister or minister would not want to be the one defending his or her position to block an inquiry unless it is absolutely necessary. Therefore, I feel that this on its own would be an adequate deterrent to prevent the unnecessary blocks to inquiries.

Our government is incredibly proud of this bill because it would fill a gap in the national security accountability framework in our country, an assessment with which I know many members of this House would agree.

I would note that it is a shortcoming that several past and present parliamentarians have tried to address with other legislative proposals in the past. We certainly look forward to hearing any input from them, and indeed all members, throughout this legislative process.

At the same time, there may be some who would say that the review and accountability already exist when it comes to national security. It is true, of course, that a number of review bodies already provide a review function for their own specific organization, as the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission does for the RCMP and the Security and Intelligence Review Committee does for CSIS.

However, at a time when departments and agencies have been granted new mandates and new powers to disclose national security related information to each other, it is incumbent on parliamentarians to be able to meaningfully review Canada's overarching national security framework, as well as the operations of our national security agencies, so that we can make informed decisions about our laws and the effective use of our resources in protecting our national security.

Thankfully, Canada's security agencies have not been abused by the ministers or governments that run them, but in countries where there is an absence of parliamentary oversight, the security and intelligence review agencies have become political tools for the powers that govern them. Therefore, the prudent thing to do is to create a parliamentary oversight committee prior to such events occurring here in Canada.

That is also why we will be encouraging the new committee to co-operate and collaborate with existing review bodies, to avoid overlap and build on the great work that has already been done. For example, receiving copies of the reports that the review bodies draft would be beneficial for the committee for a number of reasons, including avoiding inadvertent duplication of effort, keeping abreast of potential areas of concern, and being able to follow up with its own reviews when deemed necessary. It is important to note, however, that the existing review bodies would remain autonomous institutions with distinct mandates, and such collaboration, while desirable, would be voluntary.

In terms of reporting, the committee would be required to prepare a minimum of one annual report. After the appropriate vetting to safeguard classified information, that report would be tabled in Parliament. It would also have latitude to issue other reports on any topics it deemed urgent and in the public interest.

On that note, I suggest that when the committee is struck, it be a committee that ensures that Canadians from all walks of life, races, creeds, cultures, and minority groups be protected and included.

Canadians must have faith in our security operations that are designed to protect us from the very real threats that we face in 2016. That said, it is important to maintain the dignity and the trust in the government departments and agencies whose mandates include security, and the bill before this House does exactly that.

At the helms of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are Canada's best and brightest. Canadians are proud of the hard work and sacrifice they make to protect our country. However, it is common when organizations work in silos that the big picture may be omitted.

Retired Justice John Major once said that it was a cascading series of errors in response to the early interactions between the RCMP and the newly created security agency, CSIS, that resulted in a security breech. We have come a long way since and have made significant improvements in that relationship, and the bill represents the next step in that progress.

I ask the House to monitor and scrutinize this legislation as necessary in the years ahead. As parliamentarians, it is our job to ensure that the legislation is up to date and that it is always in the best interests of Canadians.

We look forward to engaging in constructive and thoughtful debate with members on all sides of the House on this and other issues related to improving our national security.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to share the sentiment that there has been, for quite some time, a public conversation about the need to elevate the standards of accountability through the creation of a parliamentary oversight committee.

We heard earlier today in the House that the origins of that conversation go as far back as the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the McDonald commission recommended as much.

I would also like to take this opportunity to point out all of the hard work of my colleagues the member for Charlottetown and the parliamentary secretary to the President of the Treasury Board, for their work in past sessions, where they advanced the important work of elevating the standard of transparency and accountability through the creation of a parliamentary oversight committee.

For all of those reasons, I am very proud today to stand here in support of Bill C-22.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Mr. Speaker, before I begin my remarks, I would like to indicate that I will be splitting my time with my friend and colleague, the member for Surrey Centre.

I am honoured to speak today to Bill C-22, which would create, for the first time, a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. There can be no more important obligation of government than the responsibility to protect the safety and security of its citizens, both at home and abroad. However, there is another equally important obligation for government in a country like Canada that values our hard-earned freedoms, democracy, and the rule of law, an obligation to uphold the Constitution of Canada and ensure that all laws respect the rights and freedoms we enjoy as people who live in a free and democratic society.

The need to balance these two obligations simultaneously lies at the heart of the bill before us today. The legislation responds to the threats and attacks that have afflicted countries around the world, including Canada and some of our closest allies, in the face of which we must remain clear-eyed and ever vigilant.

Bill C-22 also responds to the many calls over many years for enhanced accountability of departments and agencies with national security responsibilities. Hon. members will remember that these calls intensified last year when the previous government introduced the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, also known as Bill C-51 at the time.

Then, the Liberal party made the argument that Canada's approach to national security legislation should avoid both naïveté, on the one hand, and fearmongering, on the other. The threats are real, and so is the need to protect civil liberties. That is why we included improvements to our national security framework, including the creation of a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians as a major part of our campaign platform in the last election.

The bill before us would establish a committee with nine members. Seven of the committee members would be drawn from the House of Commons, of which only four can be government members. Two members would be drawn from the other place. This committee will be different from other committees and offices established to review security and intelligence matters.

In the accountability system now in place, some review bodies can access classified documents, but only for a specified department or agency. The members of these committees are not sitting parliamentarians. Where parliamentarians do have a role, they do not have access to classified documents.

None of the existing independent review bodies, including the Security Intelligence Review Committee that reviews CSIS, the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, and the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, includes sitting parliamentarians. On the other hand, parliamentary committees examine security and intelligence matters, but carry out their mandates primarily through listening to testimony at public meetings.

In the other place, the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence has a broad mandate to examine any legislation or issues related to national defence or security. In the House, the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security studies legislation or issues related to Public Safety Canada and the other agencies in the public safety portfolio. They do exceedingly valuable and good work, but as a rule, neither of these committees has access to classified information. They have neither the mandate nor the resources to dig deep into the details of national security matters in order to hold the government and national security agencies truly accountable.

Under the bill before us today, members of the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would obtain the appropriate level of security clearance and would, therefore, have access to highly classified security and intelligence information regarding national security and intelligence activities across the Government of Canada.

I would also point out that our Five Eyes partners have review bodies that function in similar ways. In those countries, select parliamentarians have access to highly sensitive intelligence so that they can help to protect the public interest with regard to civil rights while also helping to protect public safety by ensuring that national security organizations are functioning effectively.

Until now, Canada has been alone among the Five Eyes partners in not having a committee where parliamentary representatives can access classified information. This bill would close that gap. In fact, in some regards, our proposal goes further than our allies in the Westminster democracies. This committee would review any and all government departments and agencies that are involved in security and intelligence. It would also have the authority to investigate ongoing operations.

When it comes to establishing a national security accountability mechanism, the bill before us sets a new standard that some of our allies might well follow. The powers given to this committee, its members, and its secretariat are robust. The committee would be able to access any information it needs to conduct its reviews, subject to some specific and reasonable limitations. As is the case with similar committees in other countries, while committee members would not be able to publicly divulge the classified information to which they would have access, they would be empowered to bring tremendous pressure to bear on a particular agency or on the government of the day by letting Canadians know if something is not right.

Clearly, this new committee represents a major step forward in strengthening the accountability of our national security and intelligence system. It would give the people's representatives a true opportunity to evaluate our national security policies and operations, and ensure that both Canadians' safety and their civil liberties are protected.

For those reasons, I urge hon. members to join me in supporting this very important and historic bill.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, today we are discussing Bill C-22, an act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

We do not support this bill because it is ineffective in its current form. The Prime Minister has all the authority. He chooses the members and the information the committee can have and present to the House of Commons. Having parliamentarians review the actions of the government when it comes to security and intelligence is very important, but this bill does not give us a realistic chance to do that.

This legislation demonstrates another Liberal smoke and mirrors show, another deviation from an election commitment.

I want to go through and in fairly precise detail talk about the mechanisms that this law would create.

I was in the House to listen to the government House leader's presentation. With great respect to the work she is doing, the reality is that many of the things she said, and I pointed one of them out in questions and comments, simply did not accord with the text of the legislation.

It is not sufficient for the minister to reassure us of the government's good intentions, or to somehow interpret what the government is trying to do, or wants to do or wants the legislation to mean. What is important is the substantive text of Bill C-22. If we think through the actual process in place, the mechanisms that the bill would provide, there is not any kind of seriousness in terms of parliamentary review or oversight being proposed.

I want to remind members of a commitment the government made during the election, and I found this on the Liberal Party website. It said that it would create an all-party committee to monitor and oversee the operations of every government department and agency with national security responsibility. Clearly, all-party was mentioned as well as providing meaningful review of past and oversight of present operations. This clearly was the commitment that was in place.

The House passed private members' bills that were proposed by members within the government. The parliamentary secretary who just spoke proposed Bill C-622 and the member for Malpeque previously proposed Bill C-551. It is interesting to look at what was being said by that party when in opposition in terms of structure and mechanism and what this would do, what those private members' bills proposed to do, and the slight of hand variations that were not even being acknowledged in the speeches but are present in Bill C-22. These are the major concerns we have.

Let us just go through it. I am going to talk about the limitations with respect to the appointment process as well as the provision of information, and then finally about the limitations in terms of the reporting process.

In terms of the existing appointment process, unlike Bill C-622 that was proposed previously by the now parliamentary secretary, this bill would provide for not only the appointment of the chair by the Prime Minister, but also the appointment of every member of the committee. It does say that not all of the members can come from the government, but the three members of the House of Commons who are not members of the governing party could be anyone who the Prime Minister chooses.

These could theoretically be independents recently departed from the government caucus. I do not know if that is likely but that is possible. There is nothing in this legislation to suggest that the official opposition would necessarily be represented. There is nothing to suggest that the committee structure should be reflective in some sense of the composition of the House or similar to some degree with what exists in parliamentary committees. This would be a committee where the Prime Minister could, at will, choose seven members of Parliament who he thought should be on that committee and then also two members of the other place.

There is a requirement for consultation with the leaders of parties from which members are appointed if that party has recognized status in the House of Commons. There is no requirement for consultation with the leadership of Senate caucuses or with the leadership of a party in the context of appointments in the Senate. There is no requirement for consultation in the case of members being appointed who are not from recognized parties. Perhaps more importantly, there is no requirement that the consultation actually be meaningful.

The legislation does not say that the leader of another party has to agree. What would be much more sensible, I would argue, if this process were more serious, would be to have the leaders of the different parties put forward names of those within their parties, as is normal practice, and the committee would then select its own chair. However, there is not a meaningful requirement for the engagement of other parties. It is totally and completely up to the Prime Minister as to who gets appointed.

I want to draw the attention of members to subclause 4(3) of the legislation, subtitled “Not a committee of Parliament”. The committee would not be a committee of either House of Parliament or of both Houses. That is a distinction we need to appreciate. The legislation says very specifically that this would not be a parliamentary committee. It would be a committee that happens to include parliamentarians but parliamentarians who are appointed by the Prime Minister and who effectively report directly to him, which I will talk about.

It is interesting, as well, that the way the committee would operate is different from what those of us who participate in parliamentary committees are used to. I will just read a couple of other sections of the bill. These are important to read into the record, as people earlier in the debate were saying things about the bill that just do not reflect the substance of what we are seeing in the bill. Clause 18 states:

Meetings of the Committee are to be held in private if any information that a department is taking measures to protect is likely to be disclosed during the course of the meeting or if the Chair considers it to be otherwise necessary.

Therefore, it would not be up to the will of the committee to determine whether they move in camera, as is the normal practice. It would be solely at the discretion of the chair.

The voting rules would be different as well. The bill states:

The Chair may vote at meetings of the Committee and, in the case of an equality of votes, also has a deciding vote.

This is again different from the normal procedure. Effectively, the chair would always vote, as I understand this section, and in the case of a tie, the chair would vote again. This is a situation where although the government would have only four members from the House, and potentially two appointed members from its own side from the Senate, the chair would effectively have two votes. He or she—but we know who it is going to be; it is going to be a he—would have the ability to vote twice. That is unusual. That is a pretty substantial deviation from the way the process normally operates.

These are limitations in terms of appointments. It is very clear that the government has designed an appointment procedure that gives all the control over who sits on the committee, and by extension, over aspects of its deliberations, directly to the person who happens to be the Prime Minister. Clearly, it would not be a parliamentary committee. It would be a committee made up of some parliamentarians but would not at all be a parliamentary committee.

We go on to the issue of the provision of information in the bill. What information is to be provided, and how would that information then be considered and synthesized by the committee? Again, there are substantial limitations in terms of the work of the committee.

I attended the technical briefing last night, and we were told by the Minister of Public Safety that the goal is to include, as much as possible, both retrospective review and oversight of current operations.

Yet if we look at clause 14 of the legislation, which deals with exceptions, the exceptions would effectively include any possible scrutiny of ongoing operations. I draw the attention of members to clause 14:

(b) information respecting ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations, including the nature and content of plans in support of those military operations;...

(e)information relating directly to an ongoing investigation carried out by a law enforcement agency that may lead to a prosecution;

Effectively then, it would be anything related to investigations that may hypothetically lead to prosecutions or anything related to military operations. I do not dispute the value of some exclusions, although these are people who are going to go through the process of getting security clearances. They are going to be approved for the purpose of doing these kinds of reviews. It is interesting that right at the outset, these exclusions would effectively seem to exclude most of the kinds of information that might be related to ongoing operations. Those exclusions would happen right at the outset.

That is not all. It is not just those automatic exclusions. In clause 16 we have sort of a discretionary exclusion for the minister involved that is extremely broad. It says:

(1) The appropriate Minister for a department may refuse to provide information to which the Committee would, but for this section, otherwise be entitled to have access and that is under the control of that department, but only if he or she is of the opinion that (a) the information constitutes special operational information, as defined in subsection 8(1) of the Security of Information Act; and (b) provision of the information would be injurious to national security.

Again, in the official opposition, we understand the importance of the sensitivity of this information, but this would be a matter of the opinion of the minister; this would not a matter of saying that in the opinion of experts there is a risk to national security. This would purely be a subjective determination by the minister saying that we do not want to give this information to this committee, because in the view of the minister, it is injurious to national security, but we do not actually have to justify that belief in any objective sense.

The legislation is clear that the committee would not have a mechanism, for instance, to challenge the exclusion in court.

The committee, already appointed by the Prime Minister, dominated by members of the government, where the chair, appointed by the Prime Minister, would effectively have two votes, could still be refused information solely on the basis of the opinion of the minister without any kind of review of that determination by the minister.

We talked about the limitations and exclusions in terms of appointments. It is clear that there are substantive limitations and exclusions in terms of the information an already secretive committee would receive itself privately.

Let us go on to the limitations in terms of reporting. Who would the committee report to? The Prime Minister would be appointing it, and the Prime Minister could determine that it would not receive information. Who should the committee report to? Well, let us keep it in the family. The committee would report to the Prime Minister. That is right. This committee of parliamentarians would not report to the House; it would report directly to the Prime Minister. Of course, the Prime Minister would then provide that information back to the House within a certain number of days. I believe it is within 90 days, but the Prime Minister would have total unfettered discretion in limiting what he tabled. I am going to read again from the legislation itself, subclause 21(5):

If, after consulting the Chair of the Committee, the Prime Minister is of the opinion that information in an annual or special report is information the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations or is information that is protected by litigation privilege or solicitor-client privilege or, in civil law, by immunity from disclosure or the professional secrecy of advocates and notaries, the Prime Minister may direct the Committee to submit to the Prime Minister a revised version of the annual or special report that does not contain that information.

I am sorry, it was not 90 days. The timeline between the Prime Minister receiving this and when he would be obliged to table it would be 45 days.

In terms of this section, it is very clear that, first of all, the Prime Minister would have full and complete discretion in terms of what is and is not tabled. He could go back to the committee and require it to make these kinds of changes before it was tabled. However, it is also clear from this section that he would not even need to invoke national security or national defence, because the section includes, as well, a reference to international relations.

In other words, if the Prime Minister believed that something in this report, which would then be tabled in the House, might have a negative impact on the reputation of the government and therefore would have some implications for our international relations, then on that basis, not even on the asserted basis of security, the Prime Minister could then go back to the committee and say that it needed to exclude that information.

What options would the committee have? Of course, in a normal situation, where we were not dealing with secrets, there would be an opportunity to publicly raise some objection. However, the committee could not do that. There would be no ability for the committee to then draw the attention of the public to this information in some other way, and quite appropriately, in this context.

However, we have to ask what is actually going on here. What is the effective check on the power of the government? Surely that is what is behind the very notion of parliamentary oversight, that there would be some opportunity for parliamentarians to meaningfully check the activities of the intelligence agencies that are accountable to the government.

However, there is no such check. The Prime Minister would fully dominate the appointment process. The Prime Minister and the cabinet would fully dominate the question of what information would flow to the committee, and the Prime Minister would be directly and fully in control of what information was or was not tabled in the House. This clearly is not in any sense a meaningful mechanism of scrutiny, at least as the bill presently stands. It is not a meaningful mechanism for checking the exercise of power by the government.

It is also worth looking at some of the differences between the legislation before us and the other private member's bills we have heard. Again, a few of them I have mentioned. Some of these other proposals refer to an all-party committee and not just to other members being chosen by the government. They also refer to the election of a chair by members.

Also, the legislation before us provides for significant remuneration not just for the chair of this committee but for all the members of the committee. That is a difference from what was promised in the past. The stipend available for the chair, and again the chair position has already been promised to someone, is substantially higher than the normal stipend for committee chairs.

We see these deviations, but we do not see a meaningful check in place.

I would very quickly mention that there are alternative models. The government has referred to our Five Eyes allies. It is worth underlining, for example, the British model, which does involve a parliamentary committee. It is not just a committee that happens to be made up of parliamentarians but is an actual parliamentary committee that reports to Parliament and is, of course, bound by all the same laws this committee would be bound by in terms of respect for secret information. However, it is ultimately accountable to the law and to Parliament, not to providing a report exclusively to a prime minister.

We also have a Canadian law that, frankly, has worked very well. The government has to explain how this addition would interact with our existing, highly effective Canadian model. It is not a parliamentary oversight model. It is a model of genuinely expert, independent oversight.

We have an intelligence review committee that is actually chaired by a former parliamentarian and has the expertise and the ability to provide an effective check, which this legislation just would not. Unfortunately, this is smoke and mirrors, not a substantive check on the power of the government.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board]

Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to speak to the proposed legislation before us as it would allow us to deliver on the commitment we made to Canadians to improve security and to include scrutiny and review when it comes to the national security and intelligence activities of the Government of Canada.

I was listening to the recent debate and the words of the critic for public safety from the NDP. It occurs to me that some of the concerns the member has assume that there is one right way and one right legislation. I would say that issues of privacy and security are so dynamic in our country and society that having, as he described it, parliamentarians of goodwill and open minds working together is the critical element. In terms of getting something on the table right now, the bill is critical. Therefore, I am very optimistic about the bill.

I want to remind the member for Victoria that the challenges around balancing security and privacy in an Internet age will not stop. There will never be a point where everything is exactly where we can freeze it in time and say, “That's it”. We will have to keep being aware of the issues as they arise and improving our responses to them. The bill is an excellent step forward on that.

As members have heard, Bill C-22 would allow for the establishment of the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. It is a multi-party committee that would examine and report on the government's national security and intelligence activities across an array of departments and ministries. This is an area that many Canadians feel is far too opaque, and I certainly am one of those parliamentarians.

Before I get into the details of the bill, I think it is worth reminding hon. members about the many calls in the House for this kind of committee to be created, and this has been happening for well over a decade. There have also been repeated attempts to introduce legislation in the House as well as in the Senate in order to address the concerns that the bill would address.

For example, two years ago, I was pleased to create and introduce Bill C-622, which would have created the intelligence and security committee of Parliament, very similar to the committee that we see in the bill today. However, my bill had an additional element of identifying measures that I felt were needed to increase the accountability and transparency of our Communications Security Establishment and link the operations of sharing information among agencies in a more structured and accountable way.

That bill was debated at second reading barely one week after the attack in this building and the tragic shooting of Corporal Nathan Cirillo down the street, and just 10 days after the tragedy of the killing of Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent. Therefore, the timing of Bill C-622 was unfortunate. In fact, I had someone on Twitter say that my Bill C-622 was the worst-timed private member's bill in the history of the Canadian Parliament. I had to say that I agreed.

However, it was fully supported by all of the opposition party members, including one member of the Conservative Party as well, because of the need to address improving security and the protection of privacy, and the way that was embedded in Bill C-622.

As I said in this place at that time:

In the wake of the recent deadly attacks on our soldiers and on Parliament itself, all party leaders confirmed their commitment to protect the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of Canadians, even as security measures are analyzed and strengthened. Indeed, Canadians expect these fundamental aspects of the very democracy being guarded to be respected, and that is the underlying intention of the bill.

Unfortunately, the legislation, as I said, was defeated by the Conservative government of the day just a few short months before it introduced Bill C-51. At the time, the Conservatives argued that the existing review mechanisms were adequate and that the creation of a committee of parliamentarians to scrutinize national security operations would be, to quote the former Conservative parliamentary secretary, “not in the best interests of national security” and “not in the best interests of Canadians”. I could not disagree more. Time after time, over many years, we have heard from experts, including the Auditor General, judges, MPs, and senators, and from ordinary Canadians that in fact just such a committee is in the best interests of Canadians and vital to our national security and our values as an open, inclusive, and rights-based democracy.

In the course of exploring this issue over a number of months and meeting with key members of the security and privacy networks in Ottawa and across the country, virtually no one thought that this committee of parliamentarians would not be an important and essential next step for the Government of Canada. The arguments made by the Conservatives at that time, that there were already surveillance mechanisms over our security agencies, were weak arguments because while some of those mechanisms were effective in their mandates and had very competent heads who were delivering on their mandates, their mandates were narrow and did not include thinking about the laws and policies being applied to the security agencies.

It was not within their mandates to comment on that, so if there were flaws, holes, or outdated elements of the laws or policies that the commissioners, such as the commissioner for CSEC, were applying in their review, they had no tools or teeth for recommending changes to policy. That meant that the oversight mechanisms had to accept the policies and legislation of the day and the limitations thereof, even though this is such a dynamic situation in our Internet age with the moving targets of the various threats of security breaches in our country. That is part of why it is so important to have a committee that has a broader mandate and looks across all of the security and intelligence functions of the Government of Canada.

The second key missing from the individual oversight mechanisms the previous government argued were adequate was that there was no looking across the board at the various approaches, policies, and operations to see where the gaps and duplications were. If there are gaps in the personal privacy safety net and in the security safety net, it could mean that we do not have adequate security for Canadians. It could also mean not having a robust enough approach to protecting the individual rights and privacy of citizens. If there is duplication, that means that resources are going unnecessarily to do work being done somewhere else and that those resources will not then be available for investing in the full application of the policies of the agencies to protect Canadians while respecting individual privacy and rights.

Indeed, the bill before us today is a key component of our government's ambitious national security agenda focused on achieving a dual objective, keeping Canadians safe and safeguarding the rights and freedoms that we all enjoy as Canadians, and which, indeed, are the hallmark of being Canadian and are looked at by countries around the globe as a model for what they aspire to in safeguarding rights and freedoms. That is why it was the central focus of the Liberal platform and has been put before the House.

I will now speak to the details of this legislation.

In terms of structure, the proposed committee would be a statutory entity whose members would be drawn from the ranks of current parliamentarians across party lines. That structure would create a non-partisan responsibility to other members of Parliament to report on our behalf on these matters in a way that crosses party lines and is in the best interest of Parliament's responsibility to the Canadian public to find the right way forward in balancing security and privacy rights.

The committee would be composed of nine members. That would include seven members of Parliament, with a maximum of four being from the government party, and two senators. Given the nature of its mandate, the committee would be granted unprecedented access to classified material. A dedicated professional and independent secretariat would support the work of the committee to ensure it had the tools and resources it would need to carry out its work.

That last sentence is critical. In some of the previous private members' bills that were proposed in the House, that function was not included. Therefore, the resources to get assistance to be able to dig into things and have research done and perhaps travel and all of the support the committee would need to be able to do its work without major constraints were elements that I added to my private member's bill, Bill C-622. It built on the previous work done by the able Liberal members of Parliament who had put forward a bill to create a committee of parliamentarians. Having this dedicated professional and independent secretariat to support the work of the committee, as I said, is critical to its effectiveness.

Another way the committee would be proven effective is by having a broad mandate. This committee would be able to review the full range of national security activities and all departments and agencies across the Government of Canada. That is a key tenet of the bill and crucial to what we are trying to achieve. I mentioned earlier how important it is to be able to find those duplications and to be able to make our security safety net much stronger thereby.

The committee would be able to look at all of this work crossing some 20 different departments and agencies who all are involved to varying degrees in national security and intelligence activities. It would gain a full picture of what the government agencies and departments were doing in national security and intelligence matters. In terms of this mandate, the model we have envisioned goes even further than what exists in most countries with a similar type of committee.

I am proud that our Prime Minister supported a delegation going to London, Great Britain to look at the British committee of parliamentarians that provides oversight, so that we could learn from and build on that model and improve it based on what the delegation heard. We owe a great deal of thanks to the co-operation of the members of parliament of Great Britain who, over the years, have been willing to share their successes, challenges, and ideas on how to make better legislation. It is worth mentioning, incidentally, that this kind of parliamentary body exists in most western democracies, including all of our Five Eyes allies. That is one of the reasons I was so surprised at the previous Conservative government's intransigence in refusing to support this concept. However, that is water under the bridge, and I hope we will see support from Conservative members today under a different, albeit interim, leadership.

The committee would have the authority to self-initiate reviews of the legislative, regulatory, policy, financial, and administrative framework for national security in Canada. In other words, it would be able to analyze whatever it believed needed analyzing to ensure the effectiveness of the framework, as well as its respect for Canadian values.

That is so important, as I mentioned, and represents an evolution from what a previous Liberal government had contemplated for this committee. It is an evolution to a more effective and more multi-layered approach for the committee's responsibilities, which I felt was exceedingly important when I was doing my work on this issue.

Beyond the power to look at the national security framework, it will be empowered to review specific national security and intelligence operations, including, notably, those that are still ongoing. Due to the inherently sensitive nature of the material examined by the committee, there will be reasonable limits on what the committee can share with the public. Committee members will still be able to bring pressure to bear on the government of the day by telling Canadians if they have uncovered something problematic and by letting Canadians know, thereafter, if the problem had been adequately addressed.

Those are incredibly important accountability mechanisms built into this bill. It is not enough to have parliamentary committee members review and find things that are problematic, and then have those buried under a blanket of security without the public ever knowing there was is an issue that needs to be attended to.

As I noted at the outset, several parliamentarians, past and present, have tried to address these matters with other legislative proposals. We certainly look forward to hearing their input, just as I look forward to providing my own input as one of those members. Indeed, all members, through this legislative process, are welcome to give their input.

I have already addressed the point by some that review and accountability mechanisms are already in place when it comes to national security. We have the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, the Security Intelligence Review Committee for CSIS, and the CSE Commissioner. However, as I have mentioned, it is incumbent on parliamentarians to be able to meaningfully review Canada's overarching national security framework, to make sure they can identify key gaps and duplications and also ministries that are doing important work on this but in isolation because their key mandate happens to be something completely other than security and privacy.

We will be encouraging the new committee to co-operate and collaborate with the existing review bodies to avoid overlap and to build on the great work already being done. In fact, in the research I did for Bill C-622, I spoke with former heads of the Communications Security Establishment, who supported the idea of a review committee of parliamentarians. I spoke with former and present commissioners for oversight of CSE, who are also doing very important work. I have to say that our current commissioner has really extended, over the last few years, the kinds of information he is providing in his reports, far beyond what was happening in the commissioner's office before.

These are important mechanisms and oversight initiatives. I am delighted that we will be building on the work they do. They will remain autonomous institutions with distinct mandates, and such collaboration that they will provide with this committee is desirable and will be voluntary.

This committee is going to go far in helping us re-establish the balance between democratic accountability and national security that is so hugely desired by the Canadian public. It is of crucial importance to our government. We heard about it throughout the recent election campaign in 2015. It is of crucial importance to Canadians. We look forward to engaging in constructive and thoughtful debate with members on all sides of the House on this and other issues related to improving our national security while defending and supporting the civil liberties and privacy rights of Canadians.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to rise to address this very important bill.

I want to thank my colleagues for their insightful contributions to the debate already. We agree on a great deal, and it gives me confidence that we will be able to work together to ultimately improve this bill.

Let me be clear: New Democrats support parliamentary oversight to finally bring Canada up to the standard of accountability that our closest allies have enjoyed for decades.

This bill would fulfill recommendations made some 35 years ago and ignored by successive Liberal and Conservative governments ever since. Neglecting that warning and ignoring our allies' examples has not enhanced Canadians' security or protected their rights.

Let us be clear: We face real threats to both our security and our rights. Canadians are concerned about the threat of foreign and domestic terrorism, they are concerned about cybersecurity, and they are concerned about armed violence and unrest around the globe, but they are also deeply concerned about their freedoms and their privacy. They are concerned about government secrecy and surveillance, and above all, they are wondering why, after nearly a year in power, their new government has maintained Bill C-51 as the law of the land without changing a single comma.

I support the principle of this bill and will be voting in favour of referring it to the committee so that it can get on with the study to get it right. However, I have deep concerns about many aspects of it.

I am concerned that this bill would fail to account for the lessons of the last decade and the experiences of our allies. Unless it is fixed, it will create a committee that is neither strong enough to be effective nor independent enough to be trusted.

I have solutions to propose for each of these flaws, and I welcome the input of all members on them, because this is no place for partisanship or politics.

Before we dive into the details of the bill, let us be clear on three important points of context. First, this bill is not a new idea. Rather, it answers a warning made 35 years ago in the wake of a string of high-profile scandals surrounding the RCMP.

One major recommendation coming out of the 1981 McDonald Commission of inquiry was the creation of CSIS as a separate intelligence gathering service. Another major recommendation was the creation of an overarching parliamentary oversight committee. That one has gathered dust for three decades, so the idea behind Bill C-22 is not new. In fact, our allies, including the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Australia, each created similar oversight committees decades ago.

The second point of context is that we should all be clear that the bill before us today is far from a fresh proposal. It is nearly identical to an earlier Liberal bill, introduced in November 2005, in the final days of the Paul Martin government, by the public safety committee as Bill C-81. While the powers of security agencies have grown considerably since that time, the few minor differences between the 2005 oversight bill and this one would reduce the committee's powers and independence. For instance, Bill C-22 introduces security vetting for members and a new power for ministers to halt investigations.

An old bill is not necessarily a bad bill, but the government must surely accept that a proposal drawn up before the Snowden revelations, before the October 14 attack on this Parliament, and before the shocking overreach of the Harper government's Bill C-51 must be open to updates from members.

The third and last point of context is that we should all have a clear picture of how this proposal compares to the practices of our allies so we can learn from them, and, as the government House leader said, create a made-in-Canada solution that works for us.

The body proposed by Bill C-22 is essentially a weaker version of its closest analogue, namely Britain's intelligence and security committee.

In 2013, after public criticism of its many shortcomings, the British government significantly overhauled its committee, strengthening its powers and its independence. The committee emerged with an independently elected chair, operational oversight powers, and a shift in appointment power from the prime minister to Parliament. We heard a great deal about that in the speech from the hon. member for Durham.

These reforms are simply not reflected in the bill before us today, and I do not understand why. The British committee was in fact in Ottawa last week, and its chair warned us to work hard to earn public trust. We do not want to repeat the errors of our allies; we need to learn from them.

Last week, when the previous chair resigned, the head of a prominent British legal advocacy group responded in this way:

From UK complicity in CIA torture to mass-surveillance, the [committee] has missed every [single] major security-related scandal of the past 15 years. It has fallen to the press, the courts and NGOs to expose these events, with the [committee's] members only discovering them by reading the newspapers.

We do not want the same to be said of our committee a decade from now; rather, we should be aiming to be the leading edge of international practice. That was the advice in 2004 of the interim committee of parliamentarians on national security when that committee recommended granting complete access to information far beyond what is considered in the bill before us today. Here is what that committee said:

Though this arguably goes further than the legislation enacted by some of our allies, it is in line with developing practice....

We strongly believe that a structure which must rely on gradual evolution and expansion of access, power, and remit would be inappropriate for Canada.

Therefore, there are examples we can learn from around the globe. Could we give elected representatives a bigger role in operational oversight? Absolutely; in the United States, federal law requires intelligence agencies to keep congressional committees “fully and presently informed” of all covert actions and operations. In Germany, the group that authorizes each interception of private communications is controlled by a committee of parliamentarians.

Could we give the committee stronger investigative powers? Absolutely; Germany's oversight committee can conduct random site investigations, and subpoena witnesses and documents. Belgium's committee can even launch criminal investigations. The committee in our case would not even have subpoena powers.

I raise these comparisons not to disparage the bill before us, but to show that the door must be open to amendments. If the government shuts the door on amendments from other parties, we will be shackling ourselves to a blueprint that ignores the last decade of history and falls short of the current best practices of our allies. To me this is simply unacceptable when our safety and rights are at stake.

With that in mind, let me point to five weaknesses in the current draft and propose some solutions. I have amendments ready for each and would welcome the chance to work with members of all parties to craft a solution by consensus.

First, the government is proposing that the chair be selected by the Prime Minister rather than elected by the committee. As I say, that is what Britain originally did. It changed its way; why can we not? We have to earn the trust of Canadians. It seems like a pretty poor place to start when the government gets to control who runs the watchdog committee in the first place.

The bill should be amended to allow the election of a member from outside the governing party to chair this committee. That was exactly what Mr. Justice McDonald recommended 35 years ago to another Liberal government. It is not unprecedented, as I said; examples are Germany, Australia, and elsewhere. I fear we are going to lose the confidence of the public if we do not get this right.

Second, the committee's access to information, as has been said, is really limited. Full information is a prerequisite to effective oversight and to earning the public trust, which the British chair told us we must earn.

If the government can keep its secrets from the oversight committee, how can Canadians trust its findings? To call the committee's access rights broad, as the minister does, ignores many exemptions that make Swiss cheese of its powers. No fewer than seven different categories of information would be absolutely denied to the committee. Two more, including a catch-all category, could be denied at the discretion of any cabinet minister. Some of these are innocuous, but some of them are not.

The committee would be absolutely denied access to special operational information as defined in the Security of Information Act. This would mean that the intelligence oversight committee could be denied all information on intelligence sources, methods and targets, encryption systems, and information received from foreign partners. If this information is not relevant, indeed central, to the committee's mandate, I do not know what is. Is this not, in fact, the very type of information that the committee was designed to safely handle? Is that not why its members are to have security clearance and be sworn to eternal secrecy?

The worst is what security expert Professor Craig Forcese has called the Mack truck exception: the power of any cabinet minister to withhold information from the committee on the grounds that providing it—are members ready?—would be injurious to national security. This phrase is not defined anywhere, nor is it explained how sharing information with a group of top-secret-cleared individuals inside a secure facility could compromise Canada's security. These holes have simply got to be closed.

The committee must have complete access to information, as was recommended in 2004 by another parliamentary committee. As a solution, we should grant the committee that kind of access with the reasonable exception, I concede, of cabinet confidences, and the power to compel documents and testimony, a glaring omission in the bill. I am preparing amendments to this effect, and again, I would welcome input from members on all sides of the aisle.

Third, clause 8(b) of the bill would allow any cabinet minister to bury an investigation into his or her own department by claiming that the committee's confidential inquiry would be damaging to Canada's national security. The potential for abuse to cover up sloppy management or a scandal within a department is simply overwhelming. This line simply has to be removed if any credibility is to be retained.

Fourth, clause 21 of the bill currently would give the Prime Minister's Office complete power to censor the committee's reports before they are released. Let us pause on that. So far we have learned that the government would appoint the chair, control what information the committee sees, and stop it investigating certain areas. The government proposes to control what it can report to Canadians. It is easy to see how, as the chair of the British committee warned us, the public trust could be so easily lost.

The government has a responsibility to ensure that sensitive information is handled appropriately. We all agree. However, this must be balanced against the need to earn and maintain public trust, and that requires meaningful commitment to transparency and accountability, not verbiage.

I propose a compromise. I would propose an amendment that would require any revised report to indicate the extent of and reasons for any censorship by the Prime Minister's Office. Ideally, this would include a description of the type of information removed so Canadians can distinguish the redaction of confidential sources from the redaction of committee findings, for example.

I would ask the members on all sides to consider the utility of what I call an override clause, such as the power of the German oversight committee to publish a general assessment of an ongoing intelligence operation if supported by a supermajority of the committee. That is an idea we can look at.

Last, I would propose an amendment to give the committee a legal duty to report all suspected non-compliance or illegal activity to the Prime Minister and the Attorney General of Canada. There is a precedent for this. Section 273.63 of the National Defence Act imposes the same whistle-blowing obligation on the commissioner responsible for CSEC, the Communications Security Establishment of Canada.

That kind of duty would not only bolster Canadians' confidence; it would resolve any confusion within the committee over the proper course of action when non-compliance is suspected. To reject that kind of duty, in my view, would send a very worrying signal to Canadians.

As I said, I am prepared to introduce amendments proposing solutions to each of these five weaknesses, as I perceive them, in the current version of the bill. I would, of course, welcome the input of any member from any party. This is not a place for partisanship or ego. All parties have to work together on this committee, and we may as well begin now.

Before I close, I would also like to take the chance to flag one last issue for the government, which I believe requires further consideration but for procedural reasons cannot be addressed through amendments to this bill.

I would urge the government, as part of its broader security review, to amend the CSIS Act and the National Defence Act to require the Communications Security Establishment of Canada, CSEC, to inform the committee every time a ministerial authorization is granted to intercept private communications, and to require CSIS to inform the committee when it conducts threat reduction activities, as that term is defined, or when CSIS seeks a warrant to do so under section 21.1 of the CSIS Act.

Canadians are rightly concerned about the use and abuse of these powers. There is no justification for withholding their use from the oversight committee.

In closing, let me say again that New Democrats welcome this bill and commit to working together with any member of any party to improve it. I have identified five flaws, in my judgment, and proposed five solutions, but I know there are many more of both, and I welcome input from all.

As I said at the outset, this bill is crucial to protecting all Canadians' safety and upholding their rights. Oversight makes security services more effective, and it bolsters public trust in them. This committee will be equally as useful in closing gaps as in reining in excesses, but we cannot take its utility for granted. The bill before us is imperfect. Without amendments, it will fail to give the committee either the strength to be effective or the independence to be trusted.

We cannot settle for good enough when it comes to Canadians' security and rights. I call on every member and all parties to work together to improve this critically important bill. Above all, I urge the government to demonstrate openness to that input and to these amendments. The security and rights of Canadians are not places for partisanship.

If the government demonstrates that openness, all parties may be able to work together to craft a committee that is independent, secure, and effective at strengthening our security, protecting our rights, and upholding Canadian values. However, if the government refuses to work in good faith with other parties to make changes to this bill, I fear the support of parliamentarians and the trust of Canadians will be lost.

Three decades ago, the McDonald commission warned us as follows:

....security must not be regarded as more important than democracy, for the fundamental purpose of security is the preservation of our democratic system.

Every parliamentarian will see that balance differently, but all of us must work together to get it right.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Mr. Speaker, my friend from Eglinton—Lawrence certainly knows the importance of such security information. I am sure he has been secretly lobbying to have the Prime Minister select him for this committee. He might bring some good insights to the committee from his work as a crown attorney.

I highlighted the election promise about the election of chairs, because the Prime Minister said that he would act in this way for transparency and accountability reasons. However, at the first opportunity to actually fulfill that promise, he broke it, on a committee that is of the utmost importance to national safety and security.

When the minister, who did not introduce this very important bill, appeared at committee on estimates, he had not tabled Bill C-22. He had appointed the chair. He had travelled the world to consult, and we know that the current government enjoys consulting heavily. However, there was no bill before the committee that I could question the minister on.

The Liberals dropped three security or border bills in this Parliament mere days before we rose for the summer. They did that because they did not want to be held to account, which is what I am doing today.

I could not finish the quote, because I ran out of time, but I will remind the member that in 2010, the minister, following Milliken's decision, stated:

Instead of unilateral, absolute control over information, which was the government's original position, the state of play today is that Parliament has taken charge of the process.

Let Parliament take charge of the process now.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Mr. Speaker, as the public safety critic for the Conservative Party, the opposition here in the House of Commons, it is my distinct honour to stand and begin to state our position in this debate on Bill C-22.

I would like to thank the government House leader for her remarks and to start by saying that I agree with one part of what she said in response to several questions and comments, that this is something that probably should have been in place for some time. If my friend looks back at it, she would know that in the past, in the last generation, this has been examined on several occasions by both Conservatives and Liberals.

The MP for Malpeque from her caucus, and the former MP from Pictou—Antigonish—Guysborough, Peter MacKay, from our caucus were supportive of this concept, as was the retired Senator Hugh Segal. Moreover, a number of eminent parliamentarians and scholars have talked about how Canada, as one of the Five Eyes allies, should have some degree of parliamentary oversight of its intelligence and security operations.

That is a ground of agreement. That is hard to carve when there is a minority Parliament and the government is trying to do something that needs to be above politics, because the operations and, indeed, the safety of our security and intelligence personnel depend upon this committee of parliamentarians not being politicized or not being used to advance political ends.

That is why am profoundly disappointed that the minister did not begin debate on this subject. Here I want to congratulate my friend, the MP for Victoria, the NDP critic on this subject, for his own extensive background working as a lawyer on national security matters, including as an adviser to the last Conservative government and with the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, some years ago.

That member from Victoria and I have collaborated on this subject from the beginning of this Parliament, because we want it to be above politics. Sadly, the government has not participated in that collaboration, despite several entreaties to take the politics out of this.

It is profoundly disappointing that the minister did not appear to introduce his own bill today on something that is supposed to be above politics. I am not overreacting. I have tried to speak to him on this. I wrote the minister on March 1, on behalf of our caucus, after consultations, and said that “the Conservative Party is willing to work with the Government to create this Committee”.

I laid out several recommendations that I thought should be part of a parliamentary oversight committee, a special committee of this unique nature. I got no response. In fact, I collaborated and shared my thoughts and ideas with the NDP critic, the member for Victoria. I wrote the minister again on April 15, outlining some additional considerations on how this committee of parliamentarians should work in conjunction with existing bodies like SIRC. I appreciate the amazing work that SIRC does, and the CSE commissioner, and the constellation of security oversight review that we already have. How can this committee fit within that constellation and not duplicate existing efforts and not to create a competitive oversight environment?

Finally, the minister gave me what I used to call a “thanks for coming out” response letter on April 20, after I had written him twice, and also the NDP member for Victoria, in trying to take the politics out of this. He said:

It remains the Government's intention to engage with parliamentary colleagues as the process of developing the committee of parliamentarians unfolds.

That never happened, despite the opposition's asking for this, to do this right, to do this the way the British, the Australians, and our Kiwi allies do. The minister has really failed in this department, because he has not sat down and taken advice. In fact, he has acted in a very cavalier manner.

As members will see, this bill violates the privileges of members of the House. That could easily have been remedied.

Proposed subparagraph 6(1) of the bill would designate the Prime Minister, not Parliament, as the controlling mind of the committee. I will remind members that the Prime Minister is just the MP for Papineau. He is a member of this chamber, like all of us. He does have a role within the government, but that is separate. Your office, Mr. Speaker, has considered this on several occasions. The Prime Minister should not have full control over this committee. What is ironic is that he also designates the members of the upper house, the Senate. Remember, he tossed the Liberal senators out. The Senate is now independent, according to the Prime Minister, except with respect to this committee. Those members are selected by him as well.

Why is this disappointing? Bill C-22 was dropped on Parliament about four days before we rose for the summer. Not only did the minister ignore opposition requests to discuss, it was tossed in before people left. However, months before that bill was tabled and before the structure of this committee was even understood, the Liberals appointed a chair to the committee.

I have a lot of respect for my friend from Ottawa South, but that has not left a good impression on how he will take the chairmanship role of this committee. If he wanted to be chair, he should have stood before this place or members of that committee and sought the position of chair. In fact, that was the position his party ran on in the election of last year. It was the Prime Minister's position with respect to committees of parliamentarians. I will quote from the Liberals' election platform. It states, “To increase accountability, we will strengthen the role of Parliamentary committee chairs, including elections by secret ballot.”

The Prime Minister talks so much about sunny ways that the glare of the sun allows him to break a lot of promises and people do not see them, and they do not get reported. This is yet another broken promise. The committees are to be more accountable and responsible. If we ever want a committee to be beyond partisanship, it is this one. However, sadly, the Liberals picked the chair months before they even brought the originating legislation to the House of Commons. That is unparalleled in terms of contempt for the House. We did not even know the structure of the committee, yet the deemed chair was travelling around the world with the minister, talking about it.

What is interesting is that in the last Parliament, my friend whose riding was Saskatoon—Humboldt in the last Parliament, introduced Motion No. 431, a motion where the members of this chamber unanimously reaffirmed the desire to have elected chairs of committees. Something ironic about that motion from 2014 is that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness voted for it. So did the MP for Ottawa South. Where was that good intention from that vote? They stood in this place and said that they wanted committee chairs elected. In fact, that motion from my friend and Conservative colleague was to elect the chairs from the entire chamber, not one person, the MP for Papineau.

This is pretty much everything the government does. It is set up with a facade of sunny ways, accountability, transparency, and it is a mug's game. It is actually not. Everything is done for the Liberals' own partisan advantage, but it is very much captured in a way that presents them in a positive fashion.

The Treasury Board president, the member for Kings—Hants, spoke in favour of the election of chairs. He said that having the election of chairs “has the capacity to render committees more independent, potentially more constructive and less partisan”. Another member of the Liberals' caucus, the member for Coast of Bays—Central—Notre Dame in Newfoundland and Labrador, went further and said that chairs of committees should be elected. However, is it not refreshing that all 308 members of the House have the chance to put themselves in a place where they are the chair of a committee based on their skill of being a member of Parliament and a decent chair?

It is not based on what kind of favours are owed to them in a party structure or a reward given for good behaviour. Quite frankly, that is essentially how it works. This takes control away from the executive and brings it back to the House of Commons.

That member is still in this caucus. I hope he referenced that in the way Bill C-22 has been handled, where the chair was not elected by this place. The chair was appointed before the committee was even struck, in fact, before the committee even existed. It was just an idea before Bill C-22 was tabled. It is profoundly disappointing that my friend for Ottawa South has to start under this cloud. I am quite sure he would have made the case for being the chair.

I will now switch to what renders the proposed legislation essentially ineffective and why we are still trying to work with the government on it. We want to see some substantive amendments, and I have talked to my NDP colleague on it as well.

There are seven exemptions under section 14, including that the committee cannot look at ongoing investigations that may lead to criminal charges. That is pretty much every investigation or operation of law enforcement or security agencies in the country. Defence intelligence cannot be looked at. The Investment Canada Act cannot be looked at. Then section 16, on top of those seven exemptions, piles on two broad “let's catch everything” exceptions. Special operational info is excluded and anything “injurious to national security”.

Once again, the Prime Minister appoints people and then he and his ministry decide. Those ministers are just members of the House like me. They decide what this committee sees. Therefore, the exceptions and outright control of all aspects of this committee by the Prime Minister's Office renders it ineffective and does not render it what my friend for Malpeque or other parliamentarians wanted to see years ago, which was Parliament being supreme and actually conducting oversight of security and intelligence. It is a real missed opportunity.

I now want to show how the bill, particularly the ham-fisted way the minister has not worked with the opposition parties on this thing that should be above partisanship, actually violates the privilege of the members of the House. Who will support me in my argument? The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, because I will be using some remarks from him.

The House leader tried to discount these exceptions by saying that ministers would have to justify why information could not go to the committee. With 20 different doors of exceptions to choose from, it will be simple to have this just as a token committee that will not be effective. I think all parliamentarians want it to be effective. It is supposed to be like it is in the U.K., a cabinet-like level of secrecy with a special room, and with special advisers. However, if they are not even seeing information relating to an ongoing investigation that may lead to charges, this is essentially window dressing.

Why I think this violates the privilege of members of the House of Commons is because your predecessor, Mr. Speaker, declared this, in Speaker Milliken's reading of April 27, 2010. In that widely-covered Speaker's ruling, the question of privilege was considered with respect to the production of documents regarding Afghan detainees.

Members will remember the positions were reversed at the time. The Conservative Party was in government and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness was then a very upset member of the opposition, as many people were.

However, the issues and the privilege attaching to the decision of Speaker Milliken is on the mark for this very issue, because it is the balance of what the House and members of the House should be able to see to perform their job, and how we balanced off sensitive information.

I will quote Speaker Milliken dealing specifically with this sensitive information argument, that the House leader said they would have to justify why information would not be received. The Speaker said:

However, I cannot agree with his conclusion that this obviates the government's requirement to provide the documents ordered by the House. To accept such a notion would completely undermine the importance of the role of parliamentarians in holding the government to account.

He went on to say:

Before us are issues that question the very foundations upon which our parliamentary system is built. In a system of responsible government, the fundamental right of the House of Commons to hold the government to account for its actions is an indisputable privilege and in fact an obligation.

Remember, as members of the House, we are the members holding the government to account. Speaker Milliken was quite clear that the fact there was sensitive information, or intelligence documents, or information relating to an ongoing investigation did not remove the obligation of the government to share those documents with the House.

That is even more pronounced now that the government is setting up a specialized committee of parliamentarians with security oversights and an oath of secrecy. There are even more safeguards for the sensitive information with the committee that wants to be formed by Bill C-22 than that which existed over the Afghan detainee issue in 2010.

Speaker Milliken went on to say:

The right of Parliament to obtain every possible information on public questions is undoubted, and the circumstances must be exceptional, and the reasons very cogent, when it cannot be at once laid before the houses.

Speaker Milliken was talking before the House. There was not even consideration of this highly secret, highly confidential, and protected, designed committee of parliamentarians. However, Speaker Milliken said that members of the House, as it stands, were entitled to that information. Bill C-22 violates that privilege.

The minister could have raised this issue by working with the opposition. We expressed some concerns. He could have raised it with some of the leading experts. He refused to meet with them too. Once again, sunny ways is the slogan but not the conduct.

Finally, I will provide one last quote from Speaker Milliken's judgment, because it is germane to this discussion on why this violates privilege. He said:

The insinuation that members of Parliament cannot be trusted with the very information that they may well require to act on behalf of Canadians runs contrary to the inherent trust that Canadians have placed in their elected officials and which members require to act in their various parliamentary capacities.

Speaker Milliken was clear in saying there could be a balance struck on sensitive information and the absolute right of the House to review information and to hold the government to account. With the apparatus and security safeguards set up around a special committee of parliamentarians, it is even easier to ensure that balance is struck. Sadly, the minister has missed the mark.

Let us see what the minister himself said in 2010, some weeks after Speaker Milliken's ruling. The member from Wascana called the actions of the government of the day's holding back some documents unilateral, arbitrary, and contrary to parliamentary tradition. He then went on to say:

That series of questions of privilege resulted in your ruling on April 27, when, in very eloquent terms, you indicated that Parliament did have the right to information. You indicated, at the same time, that there were sensitivities around issues related to national defence, national security, and international relations and that the House leaders and parliamentary critics should get together and arrive at a process to make information available to members of Parliament and Canadians for the purpose of holding the government to account and to do so in a way that would not imperil national security, national defence, or international relations.

He went on to say that Parliament was entitled to such information if safeguards could be in place. These are the minister's own words in 2010, saying that members of the House were entitled to that information.

I would ask the government, through its Minister of Public Safety, the member from Wascana, why the seven exceptions? Why the two blanket exceptions in section 16 that would not allow parliamentarians to fulfill their duties? Why the absolute control by the Prime Minister's Office?

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister of Small Business and Tourism]

moved that Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be read the second time and referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to begin second reading of Bill C-22, which would establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

This bill is a tangible expression of our commitment towards meaningful engagement with parliamentarians and for enhanced accountability.

It would provide for a structured and responsible framework to share highly classified information with parliamentarians so that they can scrutinize national security activities, hold the government to account, and ensure that our national security agencies consistently act responsibly.

Canada is a free and just society. It is a beacon in the world when it comes to democratic principles. When this government took office, we made a strong commitment to uphold and advance these principles and to enhance our democratic institutions.

National security is one of the most important responsibilities of any government. Canadians expect their government to keep them safe. At the same time, Canadians also expect their government to pursue this objective in a way that respects our fundamental rights and freedoms. This government has always advocated that any renewed powers to government agencies to combat threats to the security of Canada, must be accompanied by strengthened accountability. The protection of both security and our rights and freedoms must be maintained or neither can truly be achieved. In fact, this became a central plank in the platform we set out for the people of Canada in the election held last October.

Within Canada's Westminster system, Parliament is where the opposition fulfills its obligation to hold the government to account. However, the open forum of the House of Commons and its standing committees present a challenge with respect to the review of national security activities. To be effective, such reviews require knowledge and understanding of classified information that, if publicly released, could harm the national interest. Our government found it unacceptable that among the Five Eyes allies, Canada is the only nation whose elected officials do not have a forum to review and examine the classified activities of our national security agencies.

We know the previous government was opposed to giving parliamentarians a role in overseeing the actions and conduct of our national security agencies. However, we believe otherwise. Our Prime Minister long ago recognized the need for increased scrutiny. It was a commitment he made during the last Parliament. It was a commitment he made during the election campaign. It was a commitment for which he asked the Minister of Public Safety and me to work together so that Canadians could see real results. It is a promise made, a promise kept.

I also want to take this opportunity to thank the current Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board for the hard work she did on this file in her previous role as the Liberal critic on national defence.

I also want to highlight the fact that my colleague, the hon. member for Malpeque, introduced a private member's bill to create a committee of parliamentarians in 2013. This goes to show our long-standing commitment to protect both public safety and the rights of Canadians to privacy. The bill aims to establish an effective forum wherein parliamentarians can access classified information in a secure and responsible manner. Better information will lead to more informed parliamentary debate about national security activities and enhance accountability.

We have studied the national security parliamentary committee models of our Westminster allies, namely Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.

In fact, earlier this year, my colleague, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, travelled to the U.K. to see first-hand how their committee, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, is established.

While the models used by our allies where informative, ultimately, this is a made-in-Canada approach.

The bill would create a committee of parliamentarians comprising members from the House and the other place with a mandate to scrutinize our national security and intelligence activities in any department and agency, including ongoing operations, unless the responsible minister determines that the review would be injurious to national security. It would also be able to conduct strategic and systematic reviews of the framework that supports national security and intelligence activities, including legislation, regulatory policies, expenditures, and administrative procedures.

I would like to take a moment to discuss this broad mandate. Canada currently has a number of review bodies that examine the activities of specific government organizations engaged in national security operations and report to Parliament, such as the Security and Intelligence Review Committee, the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, and the RCMP's Civilian Review and Complaints Commission. These bodies play an important role in the accountability framework of our three main national security agencies: CSIS, CSE and the RCMP. I would be remiss not to highlight the particularly good work they do in investigating public complaints and ensuring that these these agencies operate lawfully.

However, we recognize that something more is needed. That is why, unlike these review bodies, the mandate of the committee would not be limited to reviewing specific organizations but would instead encompass all national security activities conducted within the Government of Canada.

I would note that this government-wide mandate is unique to Canada, and no other international model we examined provides for such a broad scope. This government-wide perspective will enable the committee to perform strategic and systemic reviews of our national security apparatus and examine the legal, regulatory, policy, and expenditure framework under which it operates. This will help ensure that our national security system as a whole is functioning effectively and efficiently, all the while respecting Canadians' rights and freedoms.

Another key element of our made-in-Canada approach is the ability of the committee to initiative reviews of any national security operations, including ongoing operations. No other Westminster jurisdiction we examined provides this much scope for examination. This exceptional power requires a safeguard to ensure the committee's operational reviews would not disrupt or harm any active operation. The legislation would allow the responsible minister to stop a review if it would be injurious to national security.

To provide a secure venue for the consideration of proposed draft legislation, policy initiatives, or issues of high public interest that require the examination of classified information, the legislation would further allow the government to refer specific matters to the NSICOP for study.

The committee would have the legal right to access all government information it needs to conduct its reviews, including information subject to solicitor-client privilege, to ensure that it can effectively carry out this broad review mandate.

We have limited the exceptions to information access only to areas of absolute need, such as cabinet confidences, identities of informants, sources and persons protected under the witness protection program, and personal and commercially sensitive information relating to personal banking transactions and foreign investments. We also take seriously the need to guarantee the independence of police investigations and avoid harm to military operations.

Though the bill would provide an authority for ministers to withhold special operational information, I want to be clear. Ministers cannot withhold any information, but only special operational information, a specific legally defined category of the most covert national security information, and only if ministers believe it would be injurious to national security. In every instance, ministers must provide the committee with an explanation as to why special operational information must be withheld. In this way, ministers are held to account if they misuse or abuse this authority.

The committee's mandate and powers will be legislated and cannot be altered by the government. The committee will act with full independence from the government in deciding which matters to review, and in reporting its findings and recommendations. In any case where a minister has decided to stop a review or withhold information, and the committee is dissatisfied with the minister's decision, it would be able to report on these matters to Parliament. Ministers would be accountable to Parliament and Canadians for their actions.

I recognize that my colleagues opposite are not only interested in what this committee will do, but also how the membership of this committee will be determined.

The committee of parliamentarians would be a multi-party committee. Members would be appointed by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of the Prime Minister and would consist of nine members: two from the other place and seven from the House of Commons. Among those seven members from the House of Commons, a maximum of four members would be from the governing party. This allows sufficient flexibility to adapt to future changes in the composition of Parliament.

Of course, parliamentarians who would sit on this committee will have a great responsibility to ensure that they maintain the confidentiality of the information that they are provided. Each member of the committee will be a “person permanently bound to secrecy” under the Security of Information Act and may be prosecuted for disclosing special operating information. Members would be required to obtain a security clearance and swear an oath of secrecy before assuming his or her position.

The security requirements proposed in the bill are consistent with those imposed on public officials who have access to highly classified information. Nothing in the bill would limit members' ability to draw perceived deficiencies in government performance to the attention of Parliament and Canadians, so long as they do not disclose classified information.

The committee's annual reports would be tabled in Parliament, including its findings and recommendations. The committee would also have the power to issue special reports at any time if it considers it necessary to do so. The committee's reports would be provided to the Prime Minister prior to tabling for the sole purpose of ensuring that they do not contain classified information. It is important to underline that the Prime Minister would not have the ability to alter the committee's findings and recommendations.

The committee would be supported by a small secretariat that will be established as a separate departmental entity. The secretariat would help ensure that the committee members receive the support they need to perform their mandates. This would include providing research, briefings, and legal and technical advice. It would include preparing work plans, meeting agendas, and draft reports. The secretariat would also liaise with national security agencies and review bodies to facilitate access to information and the appearance of officials.

In short, we intend to provide the committee with the necessary resources and support it needs.

Bill C-22 would fulfill the government's commitment to establish a committee of parliamentarians. The committee would provide parliamentarians with direct access to classified information so that they could directly assess government activities, thus strengthening the democratic accountability of those activities. Through its reports and recommendations, it would help to ensure that national security and intelligence activities are carried out effectively and in a manner that respects our democratic values. The committee would act with full independence from the government in deciding which matters to review and in reporting its findings and recommendations.

This would be a significant addition to the review mechanisms. Compared to our allies in the other Westminster democracies, it goes further to review policies and operations across the spectrum of departments and agencies involved in the national security system. In these ways, Canada would set a new benchmark for parliamentary review.

The bill is exactly what we committed to achieving and what Canadians have asked us to do. We have waited a long time for this kind of committee. It is an idea whose time has come. I hope my colleagues across the way will recognize the importance of the legislation and will support our proposal to include members of their caucus in the review of our national security agencies.

During the campaign, Canadians rejected the politics of fear promoted by the opposition. They decided that openness and transparency were better than preying on people's anxieties. That is the mandate on which we were elected and that is exactly what the bill would help us achieve.

In closing, I want to take a few seconds to acknowledge and thank two more of my colleagues. First, the hon. Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard, who previously as government House leader, did tremendous work to bring the bill to the House; and second, the hon. Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness for his close collaboration and hard work on the bill before us. I know my colleague is looking forward to his own remarks on the bill, as am I.

Business of the House

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons and Minister of Small Business and Tourism]

Mr. Speaker, I look forward to working with the member as well and congratulate her on her new role.

This afternoon, we will continue with the Conservative Party motion. Tomorrow, we will proceed with Bill C-4, the union bill.

I have had discussions with opposition House leaders to find agreement on the handling of the debate at report stage and the third reading of this bill. I would like to thank them for their co-operation. We will continue this debate on Monday as well, in the hope of concluding third reading debate at the end of the day.

On Tuesday, we shall commence second reading debate of Bill C-22, which establishes a national committee of parliamentarians. I expect that debate to carry over to Wednesday and I hope we can conclude the debate on Friday so that we can get the bill to committee early next week.

Lastly, next Thursday shall be an allotted day.

Public Safety

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, on Tuesday I was very pleased to table in this House a national security green paper, which is intended to stimulate public debate as we proceed with unprecedented national security consultations to let Canadians, at long last, have their say about how to keep our country safe and how to safeguard its open, inclusive, and democratic character at the same time. This is in addition to other measures, like the counter-radicalization initiative, parliamentary scrutiny through Bill C-22, and other measures that we will put before this House. This is an absolute priority for our government, and we are moving as quickly as we can.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, the reports conducted by Mr. Justice O'Connor and Mr. Justice Iacobucci are extremely important reports.

The core recommendation in both of those about additional scrutiny, particularly through a parliamentary process, is in fact a recommendation that we are moving on right now with Bill C-22 before this House.

More broadly, the fact is that the entire national security framework is under review. We are consulting Canadians; more than 7,000 are already participating in that process. We are determined to keep Canadians safe—

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, the allegations, to a very large extent, have been examined by two very important commissions, Iacobucci and O'Connor. Those commissions made important recommendations. Some of those recommendations have been implemented.

One key one was not implemented by the previous government, and that was the need for a parliamentary mechanism to provide review and scrutiny of all of the security and police agencies and all of their activities in Canada. We have introduced legislation to do exactly that in Bill C-22, and we look forward to that legislation being passed expeditiously.

Act to Establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to Make Consequential Amendments to Certain Acts

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Fisheries]

moved for leave to introduce Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts.

(Motions deemed adopted, bill read the first time and printed)