Bill C-70 (Historical)

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

Main Estimates, 2025-26

[Gary Anandasangaree, Liberal, Scarborough—Guildwood—Rouge Park, ON]

Madam Chair, I look forward to bringing forward regulations as well as other measures to implement Bill C-70.

[Claude DeBellefeuille, Bloc, Beauharnois—Salaberry—Soulanges—Huntingdon, QC]

Madam Chair, regarding foreign interference, several measures in Bill C‑70 were adopted during the last Parliament, but the regulations still have not been implemented.

When are you going to adopt these measures?

Strong Borders Act

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Richmond East—Steveston, BC]

Madam Speaker, the hon. member and I shared some time on committee, and he will know that I worked quite hard in the 44th Parliament to address the issue of foreign interference. That is why we brought in Bill C-70, which includes the registry and other measures like security of information. Through it, enforcement can take place on issues of foreign interference when it has to do with things like the passage of misinformation on social media or through other channels, such as when Mr. Chiu felt he was targeted. All members in this House have been targets of misinformation and disinformation.

I am happy to continue that hard work on Bill C-70 to make sure that the security of information and shared information and where it is coming from are top of mind.

Resumption of Debate on Address in Reply

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, let me congratulate you on taking the seat in the Speaker's chair as Deputy Speaker.

We saw in the throne speech that there was a lot of discussion about the threat towards Canada from the Trump administration, and rightfully so. Canadians and, I believe, every member of the House will be very focused on taking that issue to heart and on protecting Canada and our sovereignty.

At the same time, we also have another threat, and that is the issue of foreign interference. We knew that, heading into the election, our democratic institutions were under threat from foreign interference actors, yet the Liberal government, in the previous administration, did not put in place Bill C-70. We did not have that during the election, and there has yet to be any mention of that anywhere from the government bench, including from the Prime Minister.

Why was that not mentioned in the throne speech?

Democratic Institutions

[Jenica Atwin, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Indigenous Services]

Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to the paramount issue of combatting foreign interference in our democratic institutions. I certainly take this matter very seriously. I have respect for the House, and I wish the member would demonstrate the same. The allegations referenced here are misleading and defamatory, and he is simply peddling misinformation.

On this side of the House, the Prime Minister and ministers of the Crown have security clearances and have been vetted by national security. That is more than I can say for the Leader of the Opposition, who the member opposite is sitting closer and closer to. That is why I would like to turn my attention to what matters, which is what the government is doing on foreign interference.

In September 2023, the government announced the establishment of the public inquiry into foreign interference in federal processes and democratic processes following extensive consultations with all recognized parties in the House of Commons. All parties agreed to the terms of reference and the appointment of the commissioner, Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, a judge of the Court of Appeal of Quebec. The commissioner is mandated to examine and assess interference from China, Russia and other foreign state or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, to confirm the integrity of and any impacts on the 2019 and 2021 federal general elections at the national and electoral district levels.

As members of the House know, the commissioner's interim report was delivered on May 3, 2024. Some of the key findings from this initial report were that foreign interference did not affect the overall outcomes of the 2019 and 2021 elections, and the administration of these elections were sound. Foreign interference did not undermine the integrity of Canada's electoral system.

The commission's initial report did not make any recommendations for the government or other stakeholders. These will be included in the commission's final report. The government looks forward to reviewing the final report and any recommendations the commissioner may have for better protecting federal democratic processes from foreign interference. These will help inform future measures. In the meantime, the government continues its work to counter the evolving threat of foreign interference in Canada's democratic institutions.

Since the commissioner was appointed, the government has taken a number of steps. In September 2023, the Prime Minister made a statement in the House of Commons that there were credible allegations of a potential link between agents of the Government of India and the killing of a Canadian citizen in British Columbia. In October 2023, the government issued a second public statement on a probable Chinese government's “spamouflage” disinformation campaign targeting dozens of Canadian parliamentarians and issued letters to those parliamentarians who were targeted.

In December 2023, Canada joined the United Kingdom's attribution of malicious cyber activity in Russia that targeted U.K. politics and democratic processes. In January 2024, early preparations for the critical election incident public protocol panel began with individual briefings to panel members. Also in January 2024, the government published and shared a tool kit to resist disinformation and foreign interference and “Countering Disinformation: A Guidebook for Public Servants”.

In March 2024, the government introduced Bill C-65 which proposes amendments to the Canada Elections Act, including measures to further strengthen federal electoral processes against foreign interference. This bill has passed second reading in the House and is currently being studied in committee. In June 2024, unclassified briefings on foreign interference were provided to members of Parliament. On June 20, 2024, Bill C-70, the Countering Foreign Interference Act, received royal assent.

The Government of Canada has taken a range of measures to address the evolving threat of foreign interference in Canada's democratic processes. We look forward to reviewing any recommendations that Commissioner Hogue may have in her final report. In the meantime, the government continues to take steps to protect Canada's democracy.

[Irek Kusmierczyk, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Employment]

Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to the vital, ongoing work that the Government of Canada is doing to protect Canada's democratic institutions.

As all members of the House are aware, threats to Canada's democracy do not affect only some Canadians; they affect all Canadians. This is why the enhancements to safeguard Canada's democratic systems and processes against foreign interference set out in Bill C-70 are supported across party lines. Indeed, the Government of Canada's ongoing work to protect Canada's electoral systems and democratic institutions includes efforts to maximize public transparency while protecting what and how government documents are shared. This is because the nature of some records, as well as how they are intended to be used, is fundamental to the functioning of our democratic system of government.

I would like to take this opportunity to make clear what cabinet confidences are and why they are treated so carefully by the government. In this way, any misunderstanding along these lines can be put to an end. Cabinet confidences are documents prepared for members of cabinet. They include memoranda to cabinet, discussion papers, records of cabinet deliberations or decisions, records of communications between ministers, records to brief ministers and draft legislation.

The Canadian government is a Westminster system of government and has been since Confederation. This means that the principle of keeping cabinet confidences secret is older than Canada itself. It originates from the United Kingdom's Westminster Parliament, which dates back many centuries. Cabinet confidences are central to how the Westminster system functions because of another foundational principle called “cabinet collective responsibility”. The two principles complement each other. Members of cabinet consider all material at their disposal; they deliberate freely, and even disagree, around the cabinet table. Once the deliberations are finished, cabinet makes a collective decision, and all members are responsible for it.

Therefore, the secrecy of these deliberations and of the materials that are used to make cabinet decisions is paramount to the system functioning as designed. This has long been understood by successive Canadian governments, which have upheld the principle of cabinet confidences.

In addition to the government, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government. Protecting Canada's democracy also means protecting our democratic institutions and ensuring that they can function as intended. Protecting cabinet confidences is not a nefarious act; rather, it is a fulfillment of the government's duty to uphold the long-established principles of Canada's system of government.

While fulfilling this duty, the Government of Canada continues to support the ongoing work of the public inquiry into foreign interference, which it has done since the inquiry was established last year. The set of cabinet confidences specified in the terms of reference for the commission were already provided during the commission's first phase of work, and those terms were developed and agreed to by all recognized parties in the House.

As it has done all along, the government will continue to provide thousands of classified documents to the commission and to make government witnesses available to answer the commission's questions. The Government of Canada looks forward to the commission's final report in December, and it will consider how its recommendations can further help to enhance Canada's measures against foreign interference in its electoral systems and its democratic institutions.

RCMP Allegations of Foreign Interference by the Government of India

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, we have seen not just one instance of media; we have seen a former Indian army official who literally stated that $100 million should be spent to elect a Conservative government. It is clear that we have not heard the Conservatives really talk today about how we are going to tackle these issues they raise. They were talking about our Prime Minister and what he is not doing, when the Liberals are doing these things, with Bill C-70 and making arrests; the RCMP is actively engaged; and quite frankly, we have uncovered some of the most nefarious incidents we could ever think of.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with my dear colleague from Brampton North.

This past week, Canadians were taken aback, as we heard in the different speeches throughout this emergency debate, by the scope and seriousness of the Government of India's ongoing efforts to interfere in Canadian affairs. Last Monday, the RCMP made public its findings that Indian government diplomats have been engaged in serious criminal activities in Canada. These activities target Canada, Canadians and individuals residing in Canada, as well as Canadian interests. They are covert, deceptive and illegal. They threaten all levels of government, the private sector, academia, diaspora communities and the general public.

Through Canada's national task force and other investigative efforts, the RCMP has obtained evidence that demonstrates these agents supported violent extremism in both nations and links agents of the Government of India to homicides and violent acts. It demonstrates they were using organized crime to create a perception of an unsafe environment for the South Asian community in Canada and interfering in democratic processes. The most serious of these criminal acts took place in June 2023 when proxies were used to murder Hardeep Singh Nijjar in front of the Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara in Surrey, B.C., a holy place.

This government is determined to protect Canadians from these attacks. To push back against foreign interference, this government passed Bill C-70, amending the CSIS Act and the Security of Information Act for the first time in 40 years.

In May, I spoke to and seconded my colleague from Surrey—Newton's motion, Motion No. 112, about the real threats posed by foreign governments that seek to intimidate diaspora communities in Canada. Motion No. 112 specifically references the sharing of information and security intelligence to protect democratic institutions, maintain the rule of law and prevent violence and extremism. Information sharing with key allies is critical to pushing back against hostile actors. Since the Government of Canada made these allegations, Canada's Five Eyes allies have come out in support of Canada, because we share intelligence.

In response to the shocking revelations that Indian diplomats including India's high commissioner were actively undermining Canadian law, the Government of Canada expelled the commissioner along with five other diplomats. Evidence also shows that a wide variety of entities in Canada and abroad have been used by agents of the Government of India to collect information. Some of these individuals and businesses were coerced and threatened into working for the Government of India.

This is not the first time foreign governments have worked to intimidate diaspora communities in Canada. I mentioned this before in questions asked today. Under the previous government, the now Leader of the Opposition and Stephen Harper allowed Chinese police stations to set up shop in Canada. These became hubs where Chinese agents could intimidate, harass and even repatriate Chinese residents, claiming they were criminals.

Regrettably, efforts by Mark Flynn, the deputy commissioner of federal policing, to meet with his Indian law enforcement counterparts and discuss violent extremism occurring in Canada and India were unsuccessful. I call again on all levels of the Government of India to co-operate with these investigations. It is the only way forward.

This is a particularly sad time for the Commonwealth and all allied nations. Together, Canadians and Indians resisted the forces of 20th-century dictatorships in both the First and Second World Wars. They did this not to conquer but to preserve their way of life and build a better, more peaceful world based on co-operation, respect and a mutual commitment to a rule-based international order.

The beginning of the Commonwealth Charter reinforces:

the commitment of member states to the development of free and democratic societies and the promotion of peace and prosperity to improve the lives of all the people of the Commonwealth.

I was born and raised in Canada, but this would not have been possible if it were not for members of my family, Sikhs who served in both India's and Canada's armed forces to fight for the safety and freedoms we enjoy. The Government of India's actions represent a gross breach of international law and also of its commitment to the principles that bind the Commonwealth of Nations together.

These are difficult revelations. I know that there is a real concern in the South Asian community. I urge anyone who has been victimized by threats or knows of others who have been threatened to come forward and report these threats to the RCMP. The safety of Canadians, regardless of their background or beliefs, is the top priority of the RCMP and of this government.

The actions being perpetrated by India and other foreign states are a threat to Canada's national interests. They undermine Canadian sovereignty and social cohesion, diminish trust in our institutions and degrade the rights and freedoms to which all Canadians are entitled. This is why the Government of Canada will continue to denounce these actions as deplorable and unacceptable in the strongest possible terms.

Up to 30 arrests have already been made, and our public safety agencies will not stop working. We will not be intimidated. We will not be harassed, and we will have justice and answers for the flagrant disregard of Canadians as well as of international law. We need to remain united on all sides of the aisle and show leadership to protect our nation and our way of life.

[Maninder Sidhu, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Export Promotion]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the member for Surrey Centre.

The constituents in my riding of Brampton East are very anxious. They are anxious about acts of violence targeting the Sikh and broader South Asian community, about foreign interference in our democratic processes, and about these being directly tied to agents of the Government of India, as the RCMP commissioner publicly and clearly stated last week.

The rule of law must be respected, and our citizens must be protected. We will not tolerate any form of harassment, intimidation or violence targeting Canadians. I know that all parliamentarians in this chamber would agree with that.

There is a lot of misinformation flying around, and I have had constituents reach out to me with questions, so please allow me to state some facts on the record for those watching at home. There were 22 individuals who were arrested and charged in relation to extortion and eight arrested and charged in relation to homicides. This is thanks to the hard work of the RCMP and law enforcement agencies across Canada.

Back in February 2024, the RCMP created a multidisciplinary team to coordinate and investigate public threats. Through very active investigations, it has come across very serious findings, and it felt the public needed to know, which led to the press conference it initiated last Monday. I want to ensure that words are not mixed up, so I would like to read what the RCMP commissioner very clearly stated on the record last week.

He stated:

Investigations have revealed that Indian diplomats and consular officials based in Canada leveraged their official positions to engage in clandestine activities, such as collecting information for the Government of India, either directly or through their proxies; and other individuals who acted voluntarily or through coercion.

Evidence also shows that a wide variety of entities in Canada and abroad have been used by agents of the Government of India to collect information. Some of these individuals and businesses were coerced and threatened into working for the Government of India. The information collected for the Government of India is then used to target members of the South Asian community.

This evidence was presented directly to Government of India officials, urging their cooperation in stemming the violence and requesting our law enforcement agencies work together to address these issues.

I would like to note that the United States, the U.K., Australia and New Zealand have all urged the Government of India to co-operate with our law enforcement agencies. This is a very serious matter and we all need to stand together to show a united front against any form of foreign interference. There are people out there who want to divide communities, but as leaders here in the House, it is our job as parliamentarians to bring communities together. Four out of the five party leaders represented in this very chamber have either received their security clearance or are in the process of getting it. There is only one party leader who chooses to close his eyes and remain oblivious to foreign interference and continues to refuse to get a security clearance. That is the leader of the Conservative Party of Canada.

The Prime Minister stated, under oath I may add, “I have the names of a number of parliamentarians, former parliamentarians and/or candidates in the Conservative Party of Canada who are engaged, or at high risk of, or for whom there is clear intelligence around foreign interference”.

Is that what the leader of the Conservative Party of Canada is afraid to confront, Canadians being threatened, coerced with violence and even murdered? As a leader, would he not want to know about the risks that impact the safety and security of Canadians? Would he not want to know if someone in his party is engaged in or at risk of foreign interference? Would he not want to stand up for the protection of democracy? These are the important questions being asked by Canadians across the country with respect to the leader of the Conservative Party of Canada. Having a top-level security clearance would allow him to receive classified briefings on foreign interference.

Of Conservative Party voters, 60% said that all leaders, including the Conservative leader, should get a security clearance. He is not even listening to his own party. What is he hiding? He needs to wake up, get his clearance and start taking foreign interference seriously.

I would like to thank the Minister of Public Safety for his commitment to disrupt and counter foreign interference risks. This past June, Bill C-70 received royal assent, bringing a significant update to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, among several other legislative amendments. These amendments enhance Canada's collective resilience and uphold these values that we know are pivotal to maintaining a healthy and strong democracy.

With accountability comes transparency. That is why our government, through the public safety ministry, has established a new Canada foreign influence transparency registry. This registry imposes an obligation on individuals and entities to register their arrangements with any foreign principal and disclose any foreign influence activities in relation to governmental or political processes in Canada. Activities such as communication with a public office holder, communication or dissemination of information to the public by any means, as well as the disbursement of money or items, including providing a service or use of a facility, would result in a registration requirement.

Not reporting can lead to penalties and fines of up to $5 million and up to five years in prison. Although this is a new policy for Canada, other allied countries, such as the United States and Australia, already have foreign registries in place that require those acting on behalf of a foreign state to register their activities. The United Kingdom has also announced its plans to introduce a similar process.

Our government knows that now is not the time to sit back on our heels and wait for things to happen. Now is the time to be proactive in our efforts to ensure that policies and mechanisms we have in place protect Canadians and our institutions. With these measures in place, our government is better able to hold those in positions of influence to account by ensuring that they report on matters of importance regarding foreign principals. As the age-old saying goes, knowledge is power, which is why the proper procedures and policies must be in place so that Canadians are aware and informed.

I, like many of my hon. colleagues, have received a heightened number of emails, calls and letters from constituents who are scared and who are worried about their families and friends. Attending prayer, gathering with loved ones or attending community events should not be coupled with worrying about one's safety or the fear of being a target. Canadians have the right to express their religious beliefs, thoughts and ideas freely, without fear of persecution, without inciting any type of violence or hate.

I hope that what I have spoken to today can provide my constituents and all Canadians with reassurance that our government will always uphold their rights and freedoms and impose serious consequences on anyone who decides to infringe upon them.

I also want to take this opportunity to thank the Peel Regional Police and all of the law enforcement agencies across our country who have been vital in keeping our communities safe. Their bravery, dedication and unwavering response to answer the call of duty should be recognized and commended.

No matter what our political stripes are, I know that all members of the House can agree upon condemning any acts of foreign interference. In the essence of unity, I know that we will continue to stand together in the pursuit of justice. As the RCMP's investigation continues, maintaining a united front is paramount, and any act that impedes the pursuit of justice will not be tolerated.

I close today by saying that whether we are Buddhist, Catholic, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh or agnostic, at the end of the day, we are all Canadians. As Canadians, regardless of our political leanings, we need to continue to stand together against foreign interference that targets our communities, that wants to divide our communities, that wants to instill fear in our communities. We are united as Canadians. Let us continue looking out for each other and lean on each other, because that is what Canadians do.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Madam Speaker, I think I will be lucky. I think this is the fifth time that I am asking a member of the Liberal Party this question. What is more, I get along fairly well with my colleague who just gave an excellent speech. We have the good fortune of being able to serve together on the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, and we work really well together. It is the only subcommittee that operates by consensus and where no voting takes place. Perhaps it would do the House some good to look at how this subcommittee operates.

I will ask him the question because I know that he will answer me. Can he explain to me why, despite the fact that a motion was adopted in the House on November 18, 2020, calling on the government to create a foreign agent registry, the government waited until March 2023 before beginning the public consultations that led to the drafting of Bill C-70, which was passed in 2024? Can my colleague tell me why the government took three years to begin consultations after the motion was adopted in November 2020?

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Madam Speaker, I have asked my Liberal colleagues a question a few times. They have yet to respond.

I just listened to the minister's speech. She was very passionate and emphatic. I could tell she really believed in what she was saying. Someone on the Liberal side will have to explain to me, then, why it took so long.

A motion was adopted here in the House of Commons in November 2020 to establish a foreign agent registry. The Liberals who are here tonight speaking so passionately took three years to begin public consultations to come up with Bill C‑70, which finally passed in 2024.

My question is simple. If the government takes its responsibilities seriously, why did it wait three years to begin consultations and take four years to come up with a bill, since the motion dates back to November 18, 2020?

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, I do not want to say whose experiences are worse than others, but I can say that certainly during the testimony on Bill C-70, we did hear from Canada's Tibetan community. Witnesses certainly relayed the transnational repression that the community is feeling from the People's Republic of China and the fact that family members who are still in mainland China regularly receive threats. The family members here in Canada are told to stay in line and to not misbehave, because their family is vulnerable in China.

Whatever nationality is being affected by whatever country, we need to stand united and call out foreign interference, especially the criminal kind, for what it is. This is a moment that demands all members of Parliament to stand firm and united, and to say to our foreign adversaries that we see them, that they are on notice and that we will no longer put up with this.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to rise for the very serious emergency debate that has seized the House of Commons, which was brought forward by the leader of the NDP, the member for Burnaby South. What we are talking about tonight is, of course, the very serious allegations that have come forward over the last week, presented by the RCMP.

Before I get into the crux of my speech tonight, I want to say that as the member of Parliament for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, I represent a fairly large South Asian population. I want to tell them directly that we are taking this issue seriously. I know there is a lot of fear in that community, and I know there are some very complicated relationships with the Indian government.

I also want to say that I bear no personal ill will toward the country of India or the Government of India, but the circumstances that have presented themselves to us demand that we as parliamentarians stand up and act. No self-respecting country would let these types of allegations slip by without a firm and serious response. That is precisely what we in the NDP are doing.

Let us go back to the bombshell RCMP announcement that came on Thanksgiving Monday, October 14, which presented evidence that agents of the Government of India were involved in “serious criminal activity in Canada”: homicides, extortions and other criminal acts of violence; the use of organized crime to create a perception of an unsafe environment targeting the South Asian community in Canada; and, of course, interference in the democratic process.

This is not new. This is something our country has been exposed to for over a year. It started in September 2023 when the Prime Minister stood in this chamber and used the power given to him as a member of cabinet to make an explosive statement about the Government of India's interference in our internal processes. Since then, the Hogue commission has released an interim report, and in that report, we see references to India's clandestine activities littered throughout. That was followed, of course, by the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, which detailed everything India has been doing, from election interference to the use of criminal activity to terrorize the South Asian population.

This is not just coming from hearsay. Both of these reports are based on credible and solid intelligence gathered by the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. It is from the men and women out there in the field working on our country's behalf, and they are ringing the alarm bell of what India and other countries are currently doing in Canada.

I think the most worrying part of the NSICOP report is in paragraph 73. I am going to quote it because it was quite the revelation: “This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described India’s alleged interference in a Conservative Party of Canada leadership race.”

We know those tentacles are running deep. We know that members of Parliament for several months now have been operating under a cloud of suspicion because some members have been named as witting or semi-witting participants in foreign interference. They are taking direction and sometimes monetary resources from a foreign power to do that power's bidding and to influence the processes in this place. Canadians have a right to be concerned about that.

We came together in a rare moment at the end of June as the spring session was running out and passed Bill C-70. The Senate then passed it in short order and it found its way to the Governor General to receive royal assent. I was directly involved in that bill. I serve as the NDP's public safety critic and serve on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. The bill gave our law enforcement and intelligence agencies the important legislative tools they need in order to do their jobs. In fact, I talked with many CSIS members, and they felt that with the previous law, they were operating under an analog law that was out of sorts with what is required in the digital world. It is not enough, though, because we find ourselves here today following October 14 and the RCMP's announcements.

I briefly want to go over what the NDP has been doing since then, because we are the party in this place demonstrating to Canadians a solid commitment to uncovering the truth on this issue.

We started off last week by spearheading a call for an emergency meeting of the public safety committee. I led the way in getting unanimous support for that, which is very rare. We had a meeting on Friday and were able to pass a motion to start a study on this. We are going to call upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Public Safety, national security experts and members of the RCMP to come before our committee to provide us with the answers that Canadians deserve.

That motion successfully passed, and I would like to thank members from all parties for passing it, as it was unanimous. I followed that motion up with another one, which basically called on the committee to report to the House the need for “all federal party leaders to apply for the appropriate security clearance level in the next 30 days in order to review classified information and take necessary actions to protect Canadians.” However, the Conservatives immediately started filibustering that motion, and I suspect they are going to continue tomorrow. They are the only party in this place whose leader has refused to get the necessary security clearance to protect Canadians, and that is absolutely shameful. I will get back to that near the end of my speech.

Today, our leader asked for unanimous consent to establish a special committee on Canada-India relations, and unfortunately the Liberal member for Winnipeg North rushed in to shout out no. At a time like this, when we need to focus our attention on the fraught relationship between our two countries, it is absolutely unbelievable that the Liberals would say no to the formation of a special committee to investigate this very serious issue.

That brings us to the emergency debate tonight, which was spearheaded by the leader of the NDP and has allowed members of Parliament to stand in this place and report back on the serious things that are happening in our communities. We will not waiver on this issue. We will continue to show the leadership necessary to get to the bottom of it. When the Liberals and the Conservatives are too busy throwing insults at each other, the country needs moral clarity. It needs to see leadership that stands up on behalf of all Canadians, and the NDP will continue to do that.

I have been listening to the Conservatives dodge, weave and provide the most flimsy excuses for their leader not getting security clearance. Let me note what some of the top national security experts in Canada have said. I am talking about former CSIS executives and former advisers to prime ministers, both Liberal and Conservative. They have described the Conservative leader's position as nonsense, as ridiculous and as nonsensical, as there is no reasonable justification.

We are at a point where the Leader of the Opposition's continued refusal to get security clearance is raising far more questions than necessary at this time. This is a time when need to present a united front. We need to show our foreign adversaries that in this place, we may have our partisan differences, but when they mess with our internal affairs, we stand united, we are unshakable and we are unbreakable. It is absolutely shameful that the Conservative leader, who aspires to be prime minister, continues to refuse to get his security clearance. He is putting the partisan interests of his party over the interests of the country. He needs to be held to account. It is time for him to step up to the plate and get the security clearance that is necessary so we can tackle this issue with the united front it deserves.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Mr. Speaker, tonight we are talking about foreign interference. After listening to all of my colleagues' speeches and concerns, it occurred to me that the word “interference” rhymes with the words “negligence”, “indifference” and “complacence”.

Consider water as an analogy. When water seeps in, when it erodes a road or shoreline, it does not happen suddenly. It happens gradually. We are here, tonight, debating foreign interference because of the previous governments' negligence and, I would say, their indifference, with one consequence being the assassination of a Sikh Canadian on Canadian soil. India considered this person a terrorist, but the RCMP questioned him and did not see fit to extradite him. Nevertheless, international regard for Canada is so low that India, through its representatives, managed to send contract killers to murder a Sikh Canadian. This is no trivial matter.

Tonight we can also talk about the fact that, when it comes to interference, the Conservative leader is more interested in being free to promote his video clips than in discovering the truth. A respectable and careful attitude would involve going to the source to find out what the whole thing is about, especially since it also appears that people in certain parties were involved in foreign interference or may have been targeted by it.

I would like to clarify something so that people understand. A Conservative member said earlier that Conservatives deserve the credit for the fact that we have a foreign agent registry and that the government was unwilling to create a foreign agent registry.

The member for Trois-Rivières tried to make that happen. His name was chosen in the private members' draw and he drafted a bill to create such a registry. In the end, the government introduced a bill in that regard, Bill C-70, but not until four years later. The government reacted. I have to give it credit for that, but it did so four years later, or as we say in my riding, an hour later in the Maritimes, which shows that the government did not really take this seriously.

There is a conflict between India and Punjab. Punjab is a province of India that borders Pakistan and India, and the Sikh community in India would like to create a country, a state, called Khalistan. The Sikh separatists are claiming their corner of the world, based on their religion, and the Indian government has totally prevented the Sikhs from obtaining that recognition since the partition of India in 1947.

This conflict, which has been going on since that time, has been marked by acts of extreme violence perpetrated by both Indian governments and Sikh representatives. These include the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the bombing of an Air India flight.

The conflict finally reached Canada's shores in 2023, when Mr. Nijjar was assassinated. The absolute worst thing a country can do is fail to defend and protect the people who live there. That is the absolute worst thing, from a disrespected G7 country. People are coming here to commit their crimes.

Canada then decided to react by expelling diplomats. We supported that. The Indian government also retaliated. What is important to remember in this story, however, is that interference in a country does not happen overnight. Give them an inch, they will take a mile. The more the government loosens the reins, the more it will come to realize that it has zero control at any given time.

I identify first and foremost as a Quebecker, as everyone knows, but I find it embarrassing as a parliamentarian in this place that we have reached this point. What I also find embarrassing is how long it took the government to be transparent. It did not want a commission on foreign interference. It appointed a special rapporteur to buy some time. The rapporteur then said what we thought he would say, namely, that there was nothing there.

There is nothing there? Come on. Perhaps we were talking about foreign interference based on election results, but interference is much broader than that, and we wanted a commission to clear up the issue of foreign interference in all its forms once and for all.

When I say that “interference” rhymes with “indifference”, “complacence” and “negligence”, that is what I am talking about. I do not think many people would tell me I am wrong. Even on the government side, I would find it hard to believe that they did not realize they were asleep at the switch.

This issue was raised by my colleague from Lac-Saint-Jean when he said that the government was dragging its feet. I do not understand. During his first four years in power, when his government had a majority, the Prime Minister seemed to be focusing only on matters of foreign policy and neglecting domestic matters.

Then he had to deal with a pandemic that revealed all the Conservative government's failures that he should have addressed, but did not. He did not care. The Prime Minister travelled around the world, but what for? Given the state of foreign interference, we have to wonder what it was all for. He took a trip to India and took some nice photos for the upcoming election, but he could not even thoroughly, properly and respectably address an issue like the one that ended in the murder of a Canadian national.

I am a little ashamed of that, not because I care that much about the Prime Minister and his indifference, but because if Quebec were a country, this type of thing would certainly never happen there.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the member who spoke before my hon. colleague did not answer the question I put to him. I would like to ask my question again in the hopes of getting an answer from his colleague from the Liberal Party.

We are talking about taking action against foreign interference, and we are talking about government responsibility in relation to this scourge. My question is about government responsibility. On November 18, 2020, the House passed a motion calling on the government to create a foreign agent registry. The federal government did not begin public consultations until March 2023, and Bill C‑70 was not introduced until 2024.

My question is very simple. Why did it take four years when everyone was aware of the problem?

Electoral Participation Act

[Vance Badawey, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport]

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to speak to Bill C-65 this evening in the House, the electoral participation act. As the title of this bill suggests, one of its key priorities is to encourage participation in the electoral process. We know that democratic engagement rests on trust in our electoral system, and that is why Bill C-65 proposes to enhance safeguarding measures in the Canada Elections Act.

As we all know, Canada's democracy is among the strongest and most stable in the world, thanks in large part to the Canada Elections Act, which is the fundamental legislative framework that regulates our elections in this great nation. We have every reason to be proud of this legislation, but we are not immune to the global challenges that modernized democracies face. The integrity of the electoral process in the lead-up to, during and after elections is a prerequisite for trust in our democracy. This is why it is essential that we continue to address evolving threats to our democracy through regular improvements to the Canada Elections Act. This helps ensure that our system remains robust, resilient and equipped to keep pace with the issues of our time.

It should come as no surprise that safeguarding our elections includes measures to mitigate foreign interference. Foreign interference can take many forms, including social media campaigns designed to sow disinformation. The Communications Security Establishment's latest report highlights that online foreign influence activities have become a new normal, with adversaries increasingly seeking to influence our elections. We and all Canadians have a right to be concerned about these threats. This is why the government has been proactive in taking steps to counter foreign interference.

Our government's work to protect our democracy began as early as 2016, when we tabled Bill C-22. It led to the creation of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, a committee that assembles members from both chambers of Parliament to review matters concerning national security and intelligence.

In 2018, the government put forward Bill C-59, which enacted the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, giving the agency the mandate to review and investigate all Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities. That same year, we also introduced Bill C-76, which modernized the Canada Elections Act and introduced a number of prohibitions, including a prohibition preventing foreigners from unduly influencing electors, a prohibition against foreign third parties from spending on election-related activities and a prohibition against third parties from using any foreign funds.

In 2019, we put in place the plan to protect Canada's democracy, which included the security and intelligence threats to elections, or SITE, task force. The plan was subsequently updated in advance of the 2021 general election.

Most recently, we introduced Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act, which complements measures to further safeguard our federal elections and mitigate foreign influence in Bill C-65, which I am speaking to today. Finally, last September, our government launched the public inquiry into foreign interference. We look forward to receiving the commissioner's final report as well as recommendations.

These substantial government-wide initiatives demonstrate this government's commitment to remaining vigilant in our efforts to protect our electoral system. This commitment is further reflected in the safeguarding measures proposed through Bill C-65. I would like to highlight how this bill proposes to better protect our elections from foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and the misuse of technology, all of which seek to erode trust in our institutions. We do this so that Canadians can feel safe and confident when participating in our democracy.

First, we know that election interference can happen at all times and not just during elections. This is why Bill C-65 proposes to extend the application of the existing ban on undue foreign influence at all times, rather than being limited to the election period. This means, for example, that the ban on foreign entities unduly influencing voters to vote a certain way or influencing them to refrain from voting would extend to all times.

Second, Bill C-65 would create a clearer and more consistent definition of foreign entity activities under the act to close any and all gaps. For example, currently foreign entities can circumvent the law by having more than one purpose, where the ban on undue influence is limited to a foreign entity whose only purpose is to unduly influence voters. That would no longer be possible under Bill C-65. The bill proposes that foreign entities who have even just one of their primary activities as unduly influencing electors would be captured.

Third, Bill C-65 proposes important new financing rules to increase transparency and prevent anonymous foreign and dark money from entering our elections. This includes banning the use of crypto asset contributions, money orders and prepaid instruments such as prepaid credit cards or store gift cards for regulated activities by third parties and political actors.

Bill C-65 would introduce important new financing rules for third parties. Allow me to explain. Bill C-65 would allow third parties to use only contributions they have received from Canadian citizens and permanent residents to pay for regulated election expenses. This includes partisan activities, partisan advertising, election advertising and election surveys. This means that third parties would no longer be able to use funds received from any other third parties, such as corporations or businesses, for regulated expenses. For greater transparency, third parties would also need to report on the details of the individuals who contributed in total over $200, including names, addresses and amounts of each contribution.

We understand that third parties may not all receive contributions and may have their own revenue they wish to use for regulated expenses. In those instances, third parties who meet the threshold of 10% or less of their overall annual revenue and contributions would also be able to use their own revenues to pay for regulated activities. In addition, third parties would be required to provide financial statements to Elections Canada proving the revenue is their own.

The amendments to enhance transparency on the source of third party funding are important. Under the current rules, third parties are required to report only on contributions given to them for election purposes. Contributions received for other purposes may be mixed into the third party's general revenue, leaving a transparency gap as to where the funds came from.

The Chief Electoral Officer spoke to this concern in his June 2022 recommendations report tabled here in Parliament. He noted that the proportion of third party reporting on the use of their own funds for regulated expenses increased significantly, from 8% in 2011 to 37% in 2019 and 63% in 2021. This increasing trend in third party financing is concerning, which is why the government is taking action through Bill C-65. Let me reiterate, however, that third parties who do not meet the threshold would still be able to participate in regulated activities, but they would have to do so with the contributions they received as donations from Canadian citizens and permanent residents.

The next element I would like to speak on is disinformation. Disinformation, a key tactic by malign actors, aims to fuel discord and erode public trust in the electoral process. It seeks to manipulate voters and electoral processes through intentional falsehoods, often spread online, as well as, quite frankly, intimidation at times.

In 2022, the Chief Electoral Officer called disinformation about the electoral process the most important threat to Canada's election mandate. Security agencies have noted that disinformation is a persistent threat to election integrity. In the 2021 national electors study conducted by Elections Canada following the 44th general election, 71% of electors were concerned that the spread of false information online could have a moderate or major impact on the electoral outcome. This included 37% who thought it could have a major impact. As noted by the Chief Electoral Officer, intelligence officials and leading academics, the use and impact of disinformation is not limited to the election period.

Bill C-65 aims to build confidence in our electoral process and our democratic institutions through new and expanded prohibitions to address these threats. In particular, the bill would introduce a ban on false statements about the voting process that are deliberately made to disrupt the conduct or the results of an election, all while respecting the principles of free expression and open dialogue.

Amendments provide clear guidance on the type of intentional false statements that could be made or published to ensure that contraventions of the act are clear and enforceable. This includes making or publishing false or misleading statements relating to who may vote in an election; the voting registration process; when, where and how to vote; whom to vote for; the process to become a candidate; how votes are validated or counted; or the results of an election.

Another element I would like to address is the potential misuse of technology. Technology, as we all know, has helped revolutionize democracy, but it also gives rise to risks. For example, content generated by artificial intelligence is becoming harder to distinguish from reality. When paired with disinformation, artificial intelligence such as deepfakes poses a significant threat. Today, with a computer and a few keystrokes, malicious actors can generate highly realistic videos, audio and text content that can depict people saying or doing things they never said or did.

To address this emerging issue, Bill C-65 would amend existing prohibitions in the act that can lend themselves to the misuse of artificial intelligence, namely false statements, impersonation and misleading publications, to provide clarity that they apply regardless of the means used. This would mean, for example, that the prohibition on impersonating the Chief Electoral Officer, an election official, or a candidate would apply regardless of the technology that might be used now, to include deepfakes or other technologies that may evolve in the future.

Bill C-65 would also extend the scope of the existing ban on using a computer to affect the results of an election, to now apply to the use of a computer to disrupt the conduct of an election.

The last element I would like to speak about and highlight is the importance of the personal safety of those people who participate in our electoral process. As my hon. colleagues know well, the threat environment continues to evolve. There has, sadly, been a surge in vandalism at constituency offices, increasingly violent online discourse and threats made against party leaders, candidates and election officials, as witnessed during the 2021 general election.

Bill C-65 therefore seeks to address some of these concerns by providing increased privacy and safety to electoral participants. For example, returning officers' personal information would be better protected by removing the requirement for them to publish their home address in the Canada Gazette; rather, only their municipality and province of residence would be published.

We have also seen reports of or have personally experienced a growing uncivil discourse and behaviour targeting members of Parliament, including me. Members from all parties have spoken out against unacceptable harassment and threats, as well as intimidation.

Indeed, the Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer of the House of Commons recently noted that harassment of people elected to serve this very institution has skyrocketed, increasing 800% in the last five years. To respond to this alarming trend, Bill C-65 proposes two changes to the disclosure of requirements for regulated fundraising events over $200 that include a prominent attendee, such as a party leader. To ensure the safety of all participants, the requirement to provide five days' advance public notice of such regulated fundraising events would be repealed. To ensure ongoing transparency, precise location details for events would continue to be provided to the Chief Electoral Officer as part of the party's postevent reporting requirements under the act.

However, to protect the security of hosts of events who engage in politics or book a political event, the requirement for a public-facing postevent report 30 days later would only include the municipality and the province of the event. This approach aims to prevent bad actors from undermining the safety of participants and hosts at these events. It aims to strike an appropriate balance between the very real security threats faced and the ongoing need for transparency.

In closing, I know that safeguarding our democracy is a priority shared by all of my hon. colleagues in this House. The amendments to the Canada Elections Act proposed in Bill C-65 build on existing safeguards and propose a number of targeted but critical improvements to continue to build trust in our democratic processes.

I am confident that all members of Parliament can work together to ensure that Bill C-65 is studied and passed in time for all measures to come into force before the next fixed-date general election.

Democratic Institutions

[Justin Trudeau, Liberal, Prime Minister]

Mr. Speaker, we just passed Bill C-70 in the House, with the support of the Bloc Québécois, and sent it to the Senate for further study. This bill will allow for more rigorous and regular information sharing with the premiers of the provinces and territories on issues of foreign interference and national security that involve them.

We are working in a respectful and collaborative way to fight to protect our democracy together.

Electoral Participation Act

[Lisa Marie Barron, NDP, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Mr. Speaker, if anything has come to light in the last few months, it is the importance of all legislation looking at the potential of foreign interference, the prevention of foreign interference and the identification of foreign interference. This needs to be implemented in all legislation. Yes, there are some components within this bill that look at addressing that, as the member mentioned, such as payments or donations that are not allowed to be made through money orders or cryptocurrencies, as well as looking at who can donate and ensuring they are permanent residents and Canadian residents. These components are part of a bigger puzzle of work that we need to be doing together to ensure that foreign interference is identified, prevented and avoided altogether and that there is accountability when it does happen.

I was happy that all members of Parliament voted together on the recent foreign interference bill, Bill C-70. My hope is that we will see that work, and this work, strengthened, so this is no longer as problematic as has come to light in the last few months.

Democratic Institutions

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence]

Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to the vital, ongoing work that the Government of Canada is doing to protect Canada's democratic institutions.

As all members of this House are aware, threats to Canada's democracy do not affect only some Canadians; they affect all Canadians. That is why the enhancements to safeguard Canada's democratic systems and processes against foreign interference that are set out in Bill C-70 are supported across party lines.

Indeed, the Government of Canada's ongoing work to protect Canada's electoral systems and democratic institutions includes efforts to maximize public transparency while protecting what and how government documents are shared. This is because the nature of some records and how they are intended to be used is fundamental to the functioning of our democratic system of government.

I would like to take this opportunity to make clear what cabinet confidences are and why they are treated so carefully by the government so that any misunderstanding along these lines can be put to an end.

Cabinet confidences are documents that are prepared for members of cabinet. They include memoranda to cabinet, discussion papers, records of cabinet deliberations, records of communications between ministers, records to brief ministers and draft legislation.

The Canadian government is, and has been since Confederation, a Westminster system of government. This means that the principle of keeping cabinet confidences secret is older than Canada itself. It originates from the United Kingdom's Westminster Parliament, which dates back many centuries.

Cabinet confidences are central to how the Westminster system functions because of another foundational principle called cabinet collective responsibility. These principles complement each other, as members of cabinet consider all material at their disposal, deliberate, and even disagree freely around the cabinet table. Once the deliberations are finished, cabinet makes a collective decision, and all members are responsible for it.

The secrecy of these deliberations and of the materials that are used to make cabinet decisions is therefore paramount to the system functioning as designed. This has been long understood by successive Canadian governments, which have upheld the principle of cabinet confidences. In addition to the government, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized, “Cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government.”

Protecting Canada's democracy also means protecting our democratic institutions and ensuring that they can function as intended. Protecting cabinet confidences is not a nefarious act, but rather a fulfillment of the government's duty to uphold the long-established principles of Canada's system of government.

While fulfilling this duty, the Government of Canada continues to support the ongoing work of the public inquiry into foreign interference. Since the inquiry was established last year, the set of cabinet confidences specified in the terms of reference for the commission have already been provided during the commission's first phase of work. Those terms of reference were developed and agreed to by all recognized parties in the House. As it has done all along, the government will continue to provide thousands of classified documents to the commission and will continue to make government witnesses available to answer the commission's questions.

The Government of Canada looks forward to the commission's final report in December and will consider how its recommendations can further help to enhance Canada's measures against foreign interference in its electoral systems and democratic institutions.

Opposition Motion—Government's Economic Analysis on Carbon Pricing

[Han Dong, Independent, Don Valley North, ON]

Madam Speaker, on a point of order. I apologize for the interruption.

I missed the earlier vote on the third reading of Bill C-70. I humbly ask for the unanimous consent of the House to allow my vote to be recorded as in favour.

Business of the House

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Housing]

Madam Speaker, there have been discussions among the parties and, if you seek it, I believe you will find unanimous consent for the following motion:

That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order, or usual practice of the House, when Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, is called later today, it shall be disposed of as follows:

(a) the report stage motion in amendment, standing on the Notice Paper in the name of the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, be deemed adopted;

(b) the bill, as amended, be deemed concurred in at report stage with a further amendment;

(c) the bill shall be taken up immediately at the third reading stage and a member of each recognized party and a member of the Green Party each speak for not more than 10 minutes followed by five minutes for questions and comments, provided, if required, that Government Orders be extended to complete the said stage of the Bill; and

(d) at the expiry of the time provided for the debate at third reading later today, or when no member wishes to speak, whichever is earlier, any proceedings before the House shall be interrupted, and in turn every question necessary for the disposal of the said stage of the bill shall be put forthwith and successively, without further debate or amendment, and a recorded division shall be deemed requested and deferred until tomorrow after Oral Questions.

Opposition Motion—Foreign Interference in Democratic Institutions

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question and the context she provided. As we can see, the government did take steps to set up the Hogue commission and ensure that the mandate it was given had parameters.

These parameters are numerous, and they are being followed. We will leave it to Commissioner Hogue to continue to write her report and make recommendations. The government is taking action. We see that with the introduction of Bill C‑70 and Bill C‑65.

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House to discuss the government's efforts to protect our democratic institutions. As members know, Canada has an enviable international reputation because of the stability of its system and democratic institutions. It is important to remember that we have a strong electoral system built on a proven legal framework, and that Elections Canada is a high-calibre election administration agency that is the envy of many.

Obviously, we do not take the threat of foreign interference lightly, and it is essential that we continue to improve our approach. Last year was eventful, to say the least, and a lot of attention was drawn to these important concerns. Just in the last few weeks, in addition to the Hogue commission's initial report, reports were also published by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.

I would like to remind members that these two agencies began their respective studies following the Prime Minister's announcement in March 2023. These accountability mechanisms are essential to ensure transparency and contribute directly to the government's commitment to continue to improve its response to this threat, which is also constantly evolving.

In that same announcement, the Prime Minister asked the hon. Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs and Janice Charette, the former clerk of the Privy Council, to present a report on the government's approach to implement certain recommendations on foreign interference. That report was presented to the Prime Minister a month later. The approach set out in that report centres on four specific themes.

The first of these themes is communication with the Canadian public, meaning the need for transparency and the need to equip citizens with knowledge in this area. Communication is a key element in the fight against attempted interference in Canadian democracy. The government recognizes the importance of better communicating information about the threat of foreign interference and the measures taken by the government to deal with it. Much has already been done in this regard. For example, intelligence agencies have been publishing reports on foreign interference in elections since 2017. In addition, one component of the plan to protect Canada's democracy is the digital citizen initiative, overseen by Canadian Heritage, which aims to build the resilience of citizens and Canadian society against online disinformation.

Our work did not stop there. Since the release of this report, rapid response mechanism Canada, located at Global Affairs Canada, has released two reports exposing foreign actors' disinformation campaigns targeting elected members of the House. The Minister of Public Safety also announced details on the funding for the Canadian digital media research network to further strengthen Canadians' resilience to the increasingly complex information ecosystem. The minister also released tool kits to resist disinformation and foreign interference for elected officials, public servants and community leaders. These tools have been shared with several partners, including provincial and territorial ministers.

These initiatives are just a few examples of how the government is communicating with Canadians on these important issues. We recognize that more work needs to be done in this regard, and we are continuing our efforts. It is important to remember that this kind of communication comes with significant challenges. While we recognize the need for transparency, it is important that it not come at the expense of national security and the safety of those who risk so much, sometimes even their lives, to enable the collection of intelligence that is essential to our efforts to combat foreign interference. In her recent report, Commissioner Hogue aptly explains how difficult it is to strike a balance.

As members of the House can see, we have already made considerable progress on this first theme, as highlighted by the minister and Ms. Charette. The same is true for the second theme, which concerns governance and legal frameworks. This report demonstrated the government's commitment to considering improvements to the legal framework supporting the capacity of intelligence agencies, in particular the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, and our electoral process.

The Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs recently introduced two important bills in the House in support of these commitments.

First, Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, proposes important measures, including an update to CSIS' mandate. I would like to highlight the addition of offences related to foreign interference in democratic processes to the Security of Information Act.

The minister also introduced Bill C-65, an act to amend the Canada Elections Act. This bill continues to improve our electoral processes, including by implementing many of the Chief Electoral Officer's recommendations. This bill builds on the 2018 Elections Modernization Act as part of our efforts to counter foreign interference in our elections. I hope that all members in the House will support this bill.

The minister promised to advance these priorities and he did. Now it is up to members of the House and the representatives at the other place to ensure that these bills are adopted swiftly. The government continues to advance the commitments in the report discussed this evening that was submitted to the Prime Minister in March 2023. Our work continues.

This brings me to the report's third theme. It highlights the requirement for the government to have the ability to evaluate risks and vulnerabilities resulting from the growing threat posed by foreign interference in order to be able to adapt the government's tool kit to the evolving threat.

The recent reports, as well as the deliberations of the public inquiry into foreign interference in federal electoral processes and democratic institutions, provide valuable information that we can use to further improve existing measures for countering the threat of foreign interference. Among other things, this includes measures introduced under the plan to protect Canada's democracy.

As the report states, our government will continue to explore further enhancements to this plan. This will include an examination of making the security and intelligence threats to elections task force a permanent entity, with a mandate to conduct regular reporting on foreign interference activities.

Lastly, I would be remiss not to mention the final theme of the report, which involves engagement to raise awareness and improve resilience to foreign interference. I have already mentioned some of the government's efforts in this regard, including the publication of information kits to resist disinformation and foreign interference. The work on this is also ongoing, and resources have been invested to ensure active progress on these efforts.

The Government of Canada also created the protecting democracy unit within the Privy Council Office to coordinate, develop and implement government-wide measures. These teams are working with other agencies and partners within government and with stakeholders to advance these efforts.

Perhaps I should remind my colleagues that, when we swear our oath or affirmation of allegiance, we are swearing allegiance to democratic institutions and the principle of democracy. That means we have to take our responsibilities seriously, and I find it reassuring that the government is committed to better informing partners about the threat of foreign interference.

I am ready for questions.

[Francesco Sorbara, Liberal, Vaughan—Woodbridge, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is always an honour and privilege to rise in this honourable House. I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for the very near, and I say “near” because it is geographically near, riding of Ottawa—Vanier, who is a dear friend and great member of Parliament in the House.

We are having a debate on a very important topic, a topic none of us should take lightly and a topic we all need to think about, co-operate and opine on, because it impacts democracy in the country we live in. It is a topic that I know is very, very important to all of us and all of our citizens.

As the members opposite and all hon. senators know, the Government of Canada is firmly committed to combatting foreign interference.

Today, foreign interference poses one of the greatest threats to Canadian society, our economic prosperity, and our sovereignty. By giving law enforcement and intelligence agencies enhanced tools and powers, the countering foreign interference act will strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference threats to our national security.

Activities such as the dissemination of false information and misinformation through traditional and digital means undermine public trust and sow doubt in our fundamental institutions, traditional media, and the legitimacy of elections. Not only do these activities spread misinformation, but, as we learned from testimony heard during the foreign interference commission's public hearings, foreign state actors are monitoring, intimidating, and harassing diaspora communities across Canada.

We also know from Canada's security and intelligence community that a growing number of states have developed and deployed programs to exert influence online as part of their day-to-day activities. Public Safety Canada is leading the work of this community to identify and develop the right solutions for Canada.

We are also aware of numerous reports, such as the “CSIS Public Report 2023”; the initial report of Justice Hogue's commission; and, more recently, the studies by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

Through their insidious online campaigns, foreign actors are trying to realign our decision-makers' choices, our government relations, along with our politicians' and our country's reputations. The countering foreign interference act will strengthen Canada's ability to counter the threat of foreign interference while defending Canadian values and interests and respecting the need for transparency.

One of the key pillars of the act and its commitment to transparency is the creation of a foreign agent registry to ensure transparency when it comes to foreign influence. This registry will require the public registration of the activities of any person or corporation entering into an agreement with a foreign official and engaging in activities to influence a government or political process in Canada. The purpose of a foreign agent registry is to promote transparency for all those who advocate on behalf of foreign governments or entities, as well as to ensure accountability for those who seek to do so in secret. This will reinforce how seriously we take our political and democratic processes, and will align Canada's process with international best practices

By aligning ourselves with international best practices, we can assure our allies that our mutual security will be respected and that our shared values of democracy, openness and human rights will be defended.

Canada has remained open to learning from the experiences of our international partners. Many other countries have already adopted a similar foreign registry. For instance, foreign agent registries already exist in other Five Eyes countries, such as the United States and Australia.

With Bill C‑70, the government is proposing that Canada's registry be overseen by an independent foreign interference commissioner to independently administer and promote compliance with the act. The act is by no means a single solution to foreign interference. This is a complex national threat that requires a multi-pronged approach. That said, a foreign registry would build on our government's long-standing and ongoing efforts to protect our democratic institutions from the threat of foreign interference.

While our security intelligence community is working to identify and counter threats and develop strategies to protect our country and our citizens, we cannot become complacent or overly optimistic about mitigating these threats in the current geopolitical context. Targeted amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act would enable the government and other Canadian institutions and entities to better strengthen their resilience and counter the modern threats that Canada is facing today.

When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was established in 1984, the federal government was our adversaries' main target. However, as members know, foreign interference is now omnipresent in all spheres of Canadian society. Our adversaries boldly target not only the federal government, but also the provinces, territories, indigenous governments, industry, academics, community groups and individuals, both online and in person.

Among other changes, Bill C‑70 would allow wider disclosure of CSIS intelligence to those outside of the Government of Canada. With appropriate safeguards, this intelligence would help Canadians build resilience to threats. The bill would also allow CSIS to be more agile and effective in its investigations by introducing new Federal Court orders and warrants, and it would also improve the ability of CSIS to use data sets.

The proposed changes take into account the feedback received during consultations with individuals and entities from across Canada, and from various communities, industries and entities. Canadians have high expectations when it comes to the protection of personal information, including protection under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is with this in mind that these proposals have been developed. CSIS already has several layers of protection in place to ensure accountability and respect for the rights of Canadians.

I welcome any questions and comments that my colleagues may have.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey Newton, BC]

Madam Speaker, regarding the question from the hon. member for Mirabel, I already answered it when the member from Calgary East raised the issue.

I can tell the member what the Prime Minister and the government have done. We set up the national security and intelligence committee, which is made up of parliamentarians. Members from all parties sit on it, do the work, know exactly who these people are and know their boundaries. I have introduced Motion No. 112, which the Bloc Québécois supported, and our government put forward Bill C-70 to further protect Canadians and Canadian democratic institutions from foreign interference.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey Newton, BC]

Madam Speaker, as the members opposite and all hon. colleagues know, the Government of Canada is deeply focused on combatting foreign interference. Today, foreign interference poses one of the greatest threats to our Canadian society, our economic prosperity and our sovereignty.

Following the tragic killing of Mr. Hardeep Singh Nijjar at a place of worship in my riding of Surrey—Newton, a Canadian who was assassinated on Canadian soil, I introduced private member's Motion No. 112, which called for the government to protect diaspora communities from acts of political interference, violence and intimidation on Canadian soil by persons or agents of foreign states.

With Motion No. 112 receiving support from all members who had voted, our government also introduced Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act, to further combat foreign interference. By giving our law enforcement and intelligence agencies enhanced tools and authorities, the countering foreign interference act would strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference threats to our national security.

Activities such as spreading misinformation and disinformation through traditional and digital means undermine public confidence and spread doubt in our fundamental institutions, mainstream media and the legitimacy of elections. Not only are they spreading misinformation, but, as we know from testimony at the public hearings of the foreign interference commission, foreign state actors are monitoring, intimidating and harassing diaspora communities across Canada.

We also know from our security and intelligence community that a growing number of states have built and deployed programs dedicated to undertaking online influence as part of their everyday activities. Public Safety Canada is leading work across this community to identify and develop the right solutions for Canada. As well, we have this knowledge from numerous reports, such as from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service entitled “CSIS Public Report 2023”, Justice Hogue’s interim report of the foreign interference commission and, most recently, studies from the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

Through their deceptive online campaigns, foreign actors are attempting to reshape our policy-makers’ choices, our government relationships, and the reputation of our politicians and our country. The countering foreign interference act would further strengthen Canada’s ability to counter the foreign interference threat, while upholding Canadian interests, values and the need for transparency.

One of the main pillars of this bill and its commitment to transparency is the creation of a foreign influence transparency registry. This registry would require that all individuals or entities who enter into an arrangement with a foreign principal and who undertake activities to influence a government or political process in Canada would be required to publicly register these activities. The goal of a foreign registry would be to promote transparency from all people who advocate on behalf of foreign governments or entities, as well as to ensure accountability from those who would seek to do so in secret ways.

This would reinforce the seriousness with which we take the protection of our political and democratic processes and would align Canada with international best practices. This is what we would like to see for Canada. By aligning with international best practices, we could reassure our allies that our mutual security would be upheld and our shared values of democracy, openness and human rights would be defended.

Canada has remained open to learning from the experiences of our international partners. Many other nations have already adopted a similar foreign registry of their own. For example, foreign agent registries already exist in other Five Eyes countries, including the United States and Australia.

In Bill C-70, the government proposes Canada's registry be overseen by an independent foreign influence transparency commissioner, who would be responsible to independently administer and promote compliance with the act. However, the act is by no means a single solution to foreign interference. It is a complex national security threat that requires a multipronged approach.

This said, a foreign registry would build on the government's ongoing and long-standing efforts to protect our democratic institutions against the threat of foreign interference. While our security and intelligence community has been doing the hard work of detecting and countering threats and developing strategies to protect our country, we cannot become content or overly optimistic that these threats will decrease given the current geopolitical environment.

Targeted amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act would better equip the government and other Canadian institutions and entities to build resilience and to counter the modern threats Canada faces today.

When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was first created in 1984, the federal government was the primary target of our adversaries. However, as we know today, foreign interference is widespread across all facets of Canadian society. Our adversaries boldly target not just the federal government, but provincial, territorial and indigenous governments, industry, academics, community groups and individual Canadians, both online and in person.

Among other changes, Bill C-70 would enable a broader disclosure of Canadian Security Intelligence Service information to those outside the Government of Canada. With appropriate safeguards, this information would help Canadians build resiliency to threats. This legislation would also increase the ability of CSIS to be more agile and effective in its investigation, by introducing new Federal Court orders and warrants. It would also enhance the capacity of CSIS to use datasets. These proposed changes incorporate the input we received during the consultations with individuals and entities across Canada and from diverse communities, industries and entities.

People in Canada have a high expectation of privacy, including the protection provided by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These proposals have been developed with that in mind. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service already has multiple layers of protection to ensure it is accountable and that the rights of people in Canada are protected. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians also provide an important review function for CSIS activities.

I want to reassure my colleagues in the House and Canadians the government is and will be using every possible tool at our disposal to keep them safe.

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Mr. Speaker, democracy is a very meaningful word. It signifies power by the people, and I would add that it is also power for the people. Democracy has gone through changes since its very early days in ancient Greece, but the foundations remain. The people should be the ones making choices about their own future.

In light of the report on foreign interference, it behooves us to ask which people we are talking about, when we get right down to it. We may think that Quebec and Canadian parliamentarians represent the people of Quebec and Canada, but the report on foreign interference raises an important question: Are some members here for their constituents on Quebec and Canadian soil, or for foreign countries?

I think it is important first and foremost to clarify the difference between diplomacy and interference. Next, I will discuss certain troubling parts of the report. I will not discuss all of them, because we would be here until tomorrow morning. Lastly, I will go over some of the repercussions of this report.

Diplomacy is the branch of politics that concerns relations between nations. It involves representing a government's interests abroad, administering international affairs, and leading and conducting negotiations between nations. Diplomacy is the ability to resolve disputes. Diplomacy is also a skill. It is the tact involved in conducting state business effectively. Both definitions are important in our current situation. When we travel abroad for bilateral meetings with parliamentarians from other countries, we engage in diplomacy. We talk together to explain our realities. We share points of view and emphasize the important items to consider during negotiations between the governments concerned. Our ambassadors have the same duty to discuss and negotiate. Diplomacy serves the interests of nations and their people.

Interference occurs when one nation attempts to influence the domestic affairs of another nation. This definition illustrates the difference between diplomacy and interference. Interference is when one foreign state intervenes in another's domestic affairs. If we were to look a little closer at the history of humanity as a whole, we would see that several wars over the centuries have come about because of one country interfering in the affairs of another. Whereas diplomacy serves the interests of nations and their people, interference serves the interests of just one nation, and sometimes not the interests of any citizens.

With these two definitions in mind, we can only conclude that Canada has truly been a victim of interference, as have other countries around the world. Certain people have attempted to influence this country's domestic affairs, either wittingly or unwittingly. The report contains a number of elements, but I will focus on two or three of them. On page 25, paragraph 55 states:

Some elected officials, however, began wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after their election. [*** Three sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described examples of members of Parliament who worked to influence their colleagues on India's behalf and proactively provided confidential information to Indian officials. ***]

It says that they provided confidential information. That is worrisome. Despite the redactions, we understand that members helped facilitate Indian interference. We also found out that consulates and embassies would coordinate the actions of their networks. During the 2019 federal election, 11 candidates and 13 campaign staffers had close ties to China, including several who appeared to be wittingly working for the People's Republic of China. Despite the redactions, we understand that candidates and staffers had close ties to China. In this particular case, the involvement of consulates and embassies is worrisome since they breached their duty, which is to promote diplomacy.

How does interference happen? There is a list of methods, including the use of social media. Countries can intimidate the diaspora. Disinformation and misinformation are also used. Countries can use clandestine networks. They can even buy influence. That is just a short list of methods that can be used.

What worries me about all this is the lack of interest from successive governments of all stripes. The current Prime Minister's entourage dismisses intelligence reports on the pretext that they contain only unproven allegations, while the Prime Minister himself admitted when he appeared before the commission that he did not even read intelligence reports. That is worrisome. The least they could have done would have been to meet with the people who were mentioned, to ask for some explanations. How can they know that the allegations are unproven if the reports are systematically dismissed? If the RCMP or CSIS are not being questioned, how can they be sure that they are just allegations? How can they be sure, when the Prime Minister does not even read the reports?

When I first entered politics, one old-timer told me that a person cannot be accused of what they do not know. My own view is that, if I know about a problem, then I can act and improve it. Unfortunately, I see that the Prime Minister's team is very old school when it comes to a duty to act. They are like the three wise monkeys: see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil. However, now we all know, or at least, we know some things. The Minister of Public Safety raised an important point. We cannot mention people's names without making sure that the alleged offences are facts and not just unproven allegations. However, it is up to the RCMP and CSIS to determine that. It is not up to us.

I would like to know that these people will never again have the opportunity to facilitate foreign interference, either wittingly or unwittingly. I would like to know that real action is finally being taken to ensure the vitality of our democracy, without interference, without foreign interference. I want to be clearly, meaningfully and officially assured that the people of Quebec and Canada can have full confidence in their democracy. The current situation is just one more factor fuelling cynicism towards members who put their heart and soul into their work. The government is taking last-minute, urgent action because the report was released. The government quickly cobbled together Bill C-70. Here again, there was no planning, no preparation and no long-term vision.

In short, it is important to make sure that the people's elected representatives represent the people who elected them. They must be free from any collusion resulting in interference. This is essential to protecting our democracy. We are requesting that the terms of reference of the Hogue commission be expanded because we have a duty to protect our democracy. In doing so, we protect all the interests of our fellow citizens. In other words, we protect their confidence in us, and we protect our economy and its ability to provide good jobs and a bright future. We protect those who chose to make their home in Canada, far from strife. We protect people who left countries where they were being treated poorly.

Protecting our democracy transcends the walls of this House; it transcends politics. We must recognize that. I have said it before, and I will say it again: True statesmen and stateswomen protect human dignity, particularly the dignity of people of lesser means.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Madam Speaker, the hon. member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford made reference to Bill C-70 on a foreign interference registry, which we fast-tracked and which I supported. I have since heard from many concerned groups, and I wonder if he has as well, that in our collaborative spirit, which is so rare in this place, to get the bill through and be heard so that we would have a foreign interference registry, I think we made the mistake in not allowing the bill to be properly studied. There are a lot of concerns being raised now.

I wonder if the hon. member has any concerns as well, as a member of the committee, as to how we might be able, in a future Parliament, to hear expert witnesses and amend the bill.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, “I...do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.” I have uttered those words three times now: once in 2015, once in 2019 and again in 2021. Of course, now our allegiance lies with His Majesty King Charles II.

It is important to note that we are not giving our oath to the person. It is really given to the embodiment of the Crown as an institution, which is, of course, a symbol of the Canadian state, a ship that continues to sail on despite the occasional changing of its captain.

I never thought I would arrive at a moment in time when I had to seriously doubt the sincerity of that affirmation or oath from fellow members of Parliament, but given the astounding report we received last week from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, that is the moment we have all arrived at.

I do want to note that I am incredibly proud to be a member of a caucus that has consistently led the way on trying to get results on the file we are considering. I take members back to just over a year ago, when, on May 30, 2023, my hon. colleague, the member for Vancouver East, used our opposition day in the House of Commons to make sure we debated a motion calling for a public inquiry.

As members will recall, at that time, the government had set up a special rapporteur, the right hon. David Johnston, but it was quite clear that the faith in Mr. Johnston's abilities had become compromised because of his close relationship with the Prime Minister and the Liberal Party. That is why we felt at the time, as New Democrats, that it was necessary for the House to call on Mr. Johnston to step aside in his role and for the government to finally get serious about the matter of foreign interference and urgently establish a public commission of inquiry.

I am pleased to report that, thanks to all of the opposition parties, the motion brought in by my party passed by a vote of 174 to 150; unfortunately, the Liberals were the ones who voted against it. It did have results, because Mr. Johnston resigned the following week. He understood at that moment in time that it was simply untenable for him to continue in his role while not enjoying the full confidence of the House of Commons. As well, we know that finally the foreign interference commission was set up on September 7, 2023.

I am a member of a caucus that has seen its leader, the NDP leader, the member for Burnaby South, being directly impacted by foreign interference. We know that my colleague, the member for Vancouver East, has also suffered the same. In our small, close-knit NDP caucus, we know all too well how pernicious foreign interference is, because we have seen it directly implicate, constrain and negatively affect two of our members. It is very personal for our caucus.

That brings me to the motion the Bloc Québécois has brought forward on its opposition day for the House to consider and eventually vote on. I want to break up my speech into several parts, looking at the various components of the motion.

Let us take a look at the first part of the motion, “that the House take note of the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.” Let us take note of the report. First of all, I want to note that in the opening paragraphs, the following appears: “the Committee noted the intelligence community’s consistent assessment that threat actors continue to consider Canada a permissive environment, viewing interference activities as a low-risk, high reward way to pursue strategic interests.”

At the end of the report, there is a litany of scathing conclusions against the Liberal government, complaining that the delays in developing policy demonstrated a lack of urgency commensurate with the gravity of threat, that delays in actions undermined the government's operational responses to the threat, and that a slow response to a known threat was a serious failure and one from which Canada may feel the consequences for years to come. Let that sink in, “for years to come”.

We are very much behind the eight ball on this issue. The warnings have been there, and our country has been slow to act. Those are the findings of NSICOP. Furthermore, we know now that the Liberal government is withholding more than 1,000 pages of documents from the committee, just as it has withheld documents from the public inquiry. Those are hardly the actions of a government that is dedicated to transparency. I would argue that at this moment in time, what we need is transparency. We need to rebuild trust, and we need accountability. This is an issue that rises above any one political party. This comes to the foundations of our democratic system itself. That is not full of hyperbole; that is the actual truth.

There is a real deficit in trust in the Canadian public right now, and underpinning all of that is trust that we have faith that our democracy will continue through the turbulent times and that we can have faith that the people we elect to this place are doing their job honourably, on behalf of their constituents and in the best interests of the country we call Canada. It is clear that we have arrived at a moment when we must forcefully push back against hostile foreign powers that seek to undermine our democracy.

Let us go to the second part of the motion, which states that the House “express concern that certain elected officials may be wittingly or unwittingly working in the interests of foreign powers”. The NSICOP report landed with the force of a bomb last week. Its allegations that sitting members of Parliament are working on behalf of foreign interests are an incredibly serious issue that this House must be seized with. For example, paragraph 55 in the report talks about “Some elected officials...wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after their election.” The paragraph was heavily redacted, but the description of the redacted elements make mention of “members of Parliament who worked to influence their colleagues on India’s behalf and proactively provided confidential information to Indian officials.”

Paragraph 56 talks about a foreign state, and it does not mention which one, supporting a witting politician. Again, it is heavily redacted. Paragraph 57 talks about the People's Republic of China establishing a quid pro quo relationship with MPs where it would mobilize its network in Canada in the members' favour in return for positive engagement with the PRC. On and on it goes, detailing clandestine networks influencing the political process, the use of proxies, covertly buying influence with candidates and elected officials, etc.

I want to take a moment to ask a question that I think is on a lot of Canadians' minds, and it is certainly on my mind. What is going on with the leader of the Conservative Party's ongoing refusal to get the clearance necessary for a top secret briefing on this matter? The NDP leader already has the clearance and is going to get the briefing on who these compromised politicians are. For the life of me, I cannot understand why there is ongoing refusal on the part of the leader of the Conservative Party. The only thing I can derive from that fact is that it seems he would rather talk about things he does not know rather than know things that he cannot talk about. The report, specifically paragraphs 72 and 73, talks about the People's Republic of China allegedly interfering in the leadership races of the Conservative Party of Canada and India allegedly interfering in the Conservative Party's leadership.

That is a five-alarm fire. That is something that all parties need to take seriously. We know, of course, of the allegations that exist out there with the Liberal Party. It has already impacted one of their sitting MPs, who is now sitting as an independent. Again, this is an issue that I think every single leader in this place needs to get up to speed on. I will tell members why.

Last week, at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, of which I am a member, we were doing a thorough review of Bill C-70, which I will talk about later, which is designed to deal with foreign interference. One of our witnesses was David Vigneault, who is the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I asked him about this, about whether it is in the intelligence community's interest that key members of Parliament, i.e., leaders of parties, get briefed on this information. He said yes, that it is in their interest to make sure that as many key members of Parliament as possible, of the whole Parliament of Canada, are briefed on this.

Again, I understand that there is a wide gulf between intelligence and evidence, but there are other mechanisms that party leaders can make use of within their own caucuses, so that if a party leader learns the identity of a compromised MP, there are actions that leader can take within their caucus to make sure that the Canadian people do not have a compromised person on the ballot in the next election. That is one avenue that can be taken.

It is shameful, I think, that so many times there is a deliberate choice to play partisan games rather than become informed. In my opinion, that is simply not leadership. There is a veil of ignorance on the Conservative side, but on the Liberal side, their continued reliance on judicial process and the RCMP investigating is also a cover, because, again, there is that gulf between intelligence and evidence. The intelligence does not always meet the high standard that is necessary in a court of law. Often, intelligence agencies are very loathe to share that intelligence because it could compromise their sources that gathered the information in the first place. Again, to the CSIS director's point at committee, there are actions that party leaders can take, but they can only take them if they make the conscious choice to become properly informed. We have yet to see that from the Conservative Party leader.

The final part of the motion from the Bloc Québécois is asking that the terms of reference for the foreign interference commission, known as the Hogue commission, be expanded to investigate Canada's federal democratic institutions, including members of the House of Commons elected in the 43rd and 44th Parliaments, as well as senators.

I have listened to some of the debate thus far, and some members believe that the existing terms of reference already cover this. I would say that given the heightened attention and interest that there is on this issue and the very real concern that Canadians have with it, if there is any way we could ask the government to give more specificity and direction to what the terms of reference should be to the commission, then I, for one, would be in favour of it. I do think it is reasonable to ask for that because, again, we need to make sure that the inquiry has full access to all of the classified material. We cannot have cabinet confidences blocking the inquiry's search for the truth. That is very much a fact, and I think most Canadians would very much agree with that.

I think we are all very well aware of how serious this issue is and the attention that we need to pay to it from this point forward. The next question is, where do we go from here? I love reviewing Canadian statutes, and the statute, of course, that is most at play in these circumstances is the Security of Information Act. Anyone, under that act, who is permanently bound to secrecy commits an offence when they intentionally and without authority communicate or confirm special operational information.

In this case, that would be the names of these MPs. We are in a conundrum here. On the one hand, we have the Security of Information Act, SOIA, with very stiff penalties. If one committed an offence under the SOIA, one could be found guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not more than 14 years. That is a serious punishment for breaching these conditions in the act. Again, members of NSICOP are members of Parliament, but looking at the act that created that committee under section 12, no member of that committee can “claim immunity based on parliamentary privilege”. They have waived their parliamentary privilege to be a part of that committee. As a result, they are also bound by secrecy. They cannot utter the names, because they would be found liable to imprisonment as well.

I must return to the rights of the House of Commons itself, because I think we are setting up a battle here between the rights of the House and existing statutes. We all know that two of the most powerful mechanisms that the House of Commons has are the regulation of its own internal affairs and the power to discipline. Those are the dominant rights and powers, among a few others, that the House of Commons has. I would submit to colleagues that breaking the oath of allegiance or the affirmation that we all made to have the privilege of sitting in this place is probably the most serious offence that I can think of. It is something that I think the House would be well-versed to seize itself with and to find the appropriate punishment. I am not sure where this battle is going to go, again, because we have rights as members of Parliament in that anything we say here on the floor of the House is protected by parliamentary privilege. We literally cannot be held liable for the things that we say on the floor of the House, because there can be no impediment to an MP doing their job. Members of Parliament cannot fear prosecution to be able to do their job. We have to find a way where this information becomes known. The ultimate goal I want is for no Canadian to face a possibility where there is a compromised politician on the ballot who may be working on behalf of a foreign power, rather than the interests of the community they represent or of our country as a whole.

In the last two minutes I have, I do want to mention that, in terms of where we go from here, Bill C-70 is going to go through clause-by-clause this afternoon. I am going to be there, at committee, reviewing every single one of those clauses. It is going to be reported back to the House, hopefully by Wednesday. I think there are some substantive measures in that bill. We are certainly happy to be supporting it. I think it is important that we set up a registry. I think it is important that the CSIS Act gets updated so that it can work in a digital world. I also think it is important that the Security of Information Act gets important updates so that, for clandestine interference, we have appropriate punishments for people who are engaging in those kinds of activities.

However, let me say this. With every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. I think that foreign governments need to hear the message that their meddling in our internal affairs is now clearly on our radar and we are going to act. This is an item that the country is seized with, that this Parliament is seized with, and we are now prepared to take measures to make sure we root this problem out and get the perpetrators the justice that they so clearly deserve. The allegations that MPs knowingly received help from a foreign government are deeply disturbing. No one with those interests in mind should be sitting in this House of Commons. They should not be welcome in the Parliament of Canada. Canadians ultimately do deserve to know who these MPs are, who they are in undermining our democracy, and the government must find a way forward with this. All parliamentarians have an obligation to do everything they can to address foreign interference.

With that, I will conclude by saying that we will support this motion. We will always be on the side of supporting efforts to get to the bottom of this issue and treating it with the seriousness it deserves.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague from Laurentides—Labelle for raising this matter. Last week's special report from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians followed the testimony given by many witnesses at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security and the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, as well as numerous other reports. Communication was identified as a problem, along with siloing.

Bill C-70 seeks to solve part of this problem, but we will study that tomorrow. For now, I feel we should allow a culture of intelligence sharing, but above all, we should develop a culture of protecting ourselves and realizing that interference exists in 2024, that it is already here and that, whether we like it or not, it is spreading. I am in complete agreement with my colleague. I hope this type of procedure can be put in place.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague. We had the opportunity to work together to examine Bill C-70 in depth. His comments were always insightful.

At this time, we know that the NDP leader has gotten security clearance, that the Prime Minister has automatically received the information, and that the leader of the Bloc Québécois is completing the process to receive security clearance. Of course the Conservative Party does not want to do so. I like my colleague's expression when he talks about a veil of ignorance. It reminds me of my studies in philosophy with John Rawls.

I think that we cannot afford not to push together. I repeat, interference has no political stripe. It is a real threat. It is financial, and it is democratic. It is steamrolling everyone. Parliaments all over the world are interested in foreign interference. Last week, a law was passed unanimously in the European community. I think we cannot be against it. If we are against, I have serious doubts and I have a problem with that.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, first of all, it was a real pleasure working with the member for Trois-Rivières at committee last week. It was four days in a row of long sessions. I appreciated sitting next to him and getting through the important work of looking at Bill C-70.

When we look at the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, we see that the Liberals seem to be hiding behind judicial process and the need for the RCMP investigation. We know there is a big gulf between intelligence and evidence; we know intelligence cannot always make its way to satisfy judicial requirements.

The Conservatives seem to be hiding behind a veil of ignorance. Their party refuses to get briefed, the leader in particular. The member answered the questions of my Liberal colleague earlier about getting party leaders briefed. When the director of CSIS was before our committee, he talked specifically about the actions that party leaders can take with respect to who gets to sit in caucus and who is allowed to run under the party banner.

I would like my colleague to share his thoughts on the power of party leaders and the actions they can take here now if they are all properly briefed. This is a very serious issue, and we want the issues to be resolved as quickly as possible so we do not have compromised candidates on the ballot in the next election.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

moved:

That the House:

(a) take note of the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians;

(b) express concern that certain elected officials may be wittingly or unwittingly working in the interests of foreign powers; and

(c) request the terms of reference of the foreign interference commission (the Hogue Commission) to be expanded to allow it to investigate Canada's federal democratic institutions, including members of the House of Commons elected in the 43rd and 44th Parliaments as well as Senators.

Mr. Speaker, I am very proud to rise today to give the opening speech for today's Bloc Québécois opposition day, which is about foreign interference. I would like to take this opportunity to say hello to my constituents in Trois-Rivières. I often discuss this subject with them because they find it interesting. People are curious, and today we are going to try to satisfy that curiosity.

One week ago today, Canada, the Parliament of Canada and, undoubtedly, many of Canada's national security and intelligence allies lost their innocence. Despite the Liberal government's repeated denials, despite the ill-advised optimism of the so-called independent special rapporteur, despite the report by the ineffectual Rosenberg commission, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, published a devastating report on June 5. The report is not devastating in its tone. It is devastating because of what it contains, which was unknown to most, although suspected by many.

Despite the redaction that comes with this type of report, it is obvious that there is a problem, that we are at risk. Throughout its 178 paragraphs, the report describes the concept of foreign interference. Incidentally, I would like to point out that the concept of foreign interference is not defined in Canadian law, nor is it included in Bill C‑70, which we are currently studying. The report also describes the identity of the rogue states, their tactics, their use of cyber-tools and the absence of a coordinated response to these threats by the Canadian government.

Paragraph 50 and the paragraphs that follow are the ones that make the reader's hair stand on end.

First, we learn that some parliamentarians have communicated “frequently with foreign missions before or during a political campaign to obtain support from community groups or businesses which the diplomatic missions promise to quietly mobilize in a candidate's favour”.

Second, we learn that some parliamentarians have accepted “knowingly or through willful blindness funds or benefits from foreign missions or their proxies which have been layered or otherwise disguised to conceal their source”.

Third, we learn that some parliamentarians have provided “foreign diplomatic officials with privileged information on the work or opinions of fellow Parliamentarians, knowing that such information will be used by those officials to inappropriately pressure Parliamentarians to change their positions”.

Fourth, we learn that some parliamentarians have responded “to the requests or direction of foreign officials to improperly influence Parliamentary colleagues or Parliamentary business to the advantage of a foreign state”.

Fifth, we learn that some parliamentarians have provided “information learned in confidence from the government to a known intelligence officer of a foreign state.”

These are five devastating findings. This report confirms that, right now, there are members of the House who have, in one way or another, colluded with rogue states against our national interest. It is right there in black and white. If that is not foreign interference, then what is?

We cannot and must not remain indifferent in light of such a revelation. I promise that we will not remain indifferent. Of course, the government did warn us. I will give three examples of what it said. The government told us that intelligence is not truth. That answer has merit. Intelligence is not necessarily the truth. The government also told us that sometimes we have to look at the whole picture to understand the meaning, the direction and the path and to know where we are going.

That is not wrong. It is an interesting point. The report also states that the information was top secret and could not be revealed upon penalty of life imprisonment, which is also true. These three points are factual. We can agree on that.

I would like to hear and understand the justifications or answers but, in the end, the report is clear. There is currently interference in our Parliament. Instead of trying to reassure us with empty rhetoric, what did they do? What are they doing? What are we going to do? These questions remain unanswered.

After hearing the lame justifications concerning the Trudeau Foundation given before the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, after reading the complacent report of the so-called independent special rapporteur and the damning report of the committee of parliamentarians, what are they doing? What will it take for them to do something?

Currently, the situation is tense. There is a sense of distrust. That is no good for anyone, for any party. Then, to add insult to injury, the committee of parliamentarians mentioned something very interesting in its 2023 report. The committee said that the government submitted only four of the thousand documents requested. That is four out of one thousand. That has to be read to be believed. In all fairness, I would say that some of the 996 missing documents were submitted in redacted form. Okay, but still, it is a curiously small sample.

Once the parliamentarians read the report of the Special Committee on the Canada–People's Republic of China Relationship on the Winnipeg laboratory, there were all sorts of debates in the House, and approximately 600 pages of the report were redacted, including the footnotes and page numbers.

A special committee was struck to analyze the situation alongside arbitrators, who used to serve as Federal Court judges. The arbitrators found that the redaction was excessive. It may have been preventive, but it was excessive. We saw that the report's redactions were nearly eliminated. They were not entirely eliminated, because there was sensitive information in the report, but all in all, most of the redactions were done away with. We often come up against over-classification, which is to say that information is classified in too high a category. It goes from “confidential” to “secret”, from “secret” to “top secret”, and so on. It is done for preventive reasons, but perhaps not very accurately.

I would just echo the remarks of the Information Commissioner, who told us at a meeting of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics that this government clearly prefers darkness to light.

It is in that spirit that the Bloc Québécois is moving its motion today. The situation is worse than we could have possibly imagined to date. The report tells us not only that foreign states are interfering in our democratic process, but that parliamentarians are colluding with these states. These elected representatives are not publicly named, and the members who serve on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, are bound to secrecy forever, as I was saying earlier, under penalty of imprisonment.

In other words, the names of the individuals working for foreign interests may not be revealed by the NSICOP, but they can be through other avenues, such as a broader inquiry by the Hogue commission. The commission could dig deeper and obtain new testimony as part of a broader investigation.

The Liberal government must understand that its duty is to protect us, not protect itself. It must cease its strategy of dodging serious questions and remove its rose-coloured glasses, because the year is no longer 2015. The government must also stop trivializing the situation, as the parliamentary secretary and member for Pickering—Uxbridge did last week. Before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, she replied, “Boo hoo, get over it” to a parliamentarian who was querying the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs about the foreign interference.

This trivialization is unacceptable and will not be tolerated any longer. The Liberal government must also understand that not everyone is nice, that not everyone is telling the truth and that the interference is real. To get to the bottom of things, some explanations are in order. It is a given that the “top secret” security classification binds parliamentarians to secrecy for life. This is a real thing.

There is also something called cabinet confidence. Its purpose is codified in the Westminster Parliament, and that is not a bad thing in and of itself. It allows participants to perhaps be more honest with each other, with no filters and without the risk of being smeared or whatnot.

Secrecy is not a bad thing in and of itself. Cabinet confidence is not a bad thing in and of itself either. The problem lies in cabinet confidence being abused, in a way that could be described as unethical, in this instance. To make sense of it, we have to be able to distinguish between secrecy and concealment, which are very different notions. Without going into the origin of the word, secrecy is that which must not be shared. It is in a different category. Concealment is simply deception to conceal what could be shared. Concealment is a form of manipulation, a type of lying that implies a certain superiority over others, based on the fact that one knows and believes the other does not need to know. It is not very egalitarian. However, lying is mostly making people believe something and do what they would not have done had they known. That is fundamental in an election.

All lies are secret, but not all secrets are lies. This is an important distinction, and I encourage my friends across the aisle to think about it. Concealment and lies are the enemies of trust, which, I would remind members, consists in putting one's future in someone else's hands. In an election, citizens put their future in the hands of their elected candidates, and they have the right to expect those candidates to earn that trust. Citizens expect that the government will protect their interests, not those of a foreign power or, worse yet, partisan interests.

However, as it stands, when one looks at everything the Liberal government has done to address foreign interference, one can only be surprised by its casual approach and its elevation of concealment as a way of life. That is why we must push harder to do away with concealment and lies and restore the trust that Canadians deserve from elected officials.

After the failure of the so-called independent special rapporteur, the Bloc Québécois placed its trust in the Hogue commission. The Hogue commission was established by the four main parties, which worked together and unanimously agreed on the commissioner and the scope and nature of the commission's terms of reference.

For the benefit of those who may not know, I will list a few elements of those terms of reference. The commission will “examine and assess the interference by China, Russia and other foreign states or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, in order to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on, the 43rd and 44th general elections”. It will also “examine and assess the flow of information to senior decision-makers, including elected officials”. Third, it will “examine and assess the capacity of relevant federal departments, agencies, institutional structures and governance processes to permit the Government of Canada to detect, deter and counter any form of foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada's democratic processes.”

That is an extraordinary mission, and as they say, extraordinary problems require extraordinary remedies. The Hogue commission has extraordinary powers: It can adopt any procedures or methods it sees fit to effectively conduct the public inquiry, and it can receive and examine all pertinent documents, classified or not. That is the problem, because the commissioner admitted that she had not received certain documents or that she received redacted documents when they should not have been redacted, which brings me back to the issue of over-classification. We need to stop being afraid of being afraid. The four parties unanimously appointed a commissioner and gave her a mandate. The commissioner should be able to obtain these documents.

Foreign interference has no political stripe. Foreign interference affects every parliamentarian here in the House, every political party and every citizen. Tens of billions of dollars are stolen every year. Members of many diasporas are threatened on Canadian soil every year. The threats are real, now, here in the House. Doing nothing is not an option anymore. We must stop looking the other way and believing that the danger will go away on its own.

That is why the Bloc Québécois “request[s] the terms of reference of the foreign interference commission…to be expanded to allow it to investigate Canada's federal democratic institutions, including members of the House of Commons elected in the 43rd and 44th Parliaments as well as Senators.”

We must choose to make history rather than endure it. Great danger calls for great courage. The Bloc Québécois is moving this motion so that trust can be restored. I ask all my colleagues to have courage.

Democratic Institutions

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate that the Bloc members on the committee have been working hard and diligently with us, in good faith, on foreign interference. It is disappointing when Conservative mis-characterization of meetings takes place.

What is most important is that we are working hard to ensure that our democratic institutions are resilient and that we are combatting foreign interference. This is not a partisan issue, and it is why we have introduced a number of measures to strengthen our democratic institutions. This includes Bill C-70, which we are working on in committee.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, Conservative members know what actually happened at committee that day, but when it comes to foreign interference, this is something we take incredibly seriously. It is something we have taken seriously since we formed government, something that unfortunately Mr. Harper's government did not do. We have put in place measures like the NSICOP committee. We are currently debating Bill C-70 at committee, which will bring forward more provisions to help strengthen our democratic institutions.

I hope Conservatives will stop playing political games and instead focus on resilience in our democratic institutions.

Business of the House

[Steven MacKinnon, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, there is indeed a secret in the House, and that is the Conservative Party's true intentions when it comes to cuts. “Chop, chop, chop,” as my colleague from Gaspésie—Les Îles-de-la-Madeleine so aptly puts it. That party wants to cut social programs and the programs that are so dear to Quebeckers and Canadians: women's rights, the right to abortion, the right to contraception. The Conservatives want to scrap our government's dental care and pharmacare plans. The secret is the Conservative Party's hidden agenda, which will do great harm to all Canadians.

With our government's usual transparency, this evening we will proceed to report stage consideration of Bill C-20, an act establishing the public complaints and review commission and amending certain acts and statutory instruments, and Bill C-40, an act to amend the Criminal Code, to make consequential amendments to other acts and to repeal a regulation regarding miscarriage of justice reviews, also known as David and Joyce Milgaard's law.

Tomorrow, we will begin second reading of Bill C-63, an act to enact the online harms act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Human Rights Act and An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of Internet child pornography by persons who provide an Internet service and to make consequential and related amendments to other acts.

I would like to inform the House that next Monday and Thursday shall be allotted days. On Tuesday, we will start report stage of Bill C-69, the budget implementation act. On Wednesday, we will deal with Bill C-70, concerning foreign interference, as per the special order adopted last Thursday. I wish all members and the House staff a good weekend.

Democratic Institutions

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to think that all parliamentarians take democracy seriously, that everyone who is fortunate enough to be elected to the House to serve their constituents and Canada takes democracy seriously.

That is why I am very pleased to have worked with my colleague from La Prairie on establishing the Hogue commission, for example. I really enjoyed working together last summer. I look forward to seeing the Hogue commission's report. I look forward to working with members to pass bills like Bill C-70, which will strengthen our ability to resist foreign interference.

We will continue to pursue this approach.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from La Prairie for his question and for his contribution to the implementation of the Hogue commission. I would also like to thank him, his party and all the other partners for the important work being done today to support Bill C-70, for example. This bill will strengthen our national security institutions and our collective ability to recognize and counter foreign interference. For that, I sincerely thank him.

Parliament of Canada Act

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Madam Speaker, I want to thank everybody who participated in this important debate because it actually achieved one of my aims, which I talked about in my initial speech when I introduced this bill, and that is education. I will get into the reasons why that is so important.

I am not shocked by this, but after listening to members, there seems to still be a level of misunderstanding of what exactly this bill is. I am going to talk about what it is, what it is not, and why it is so important. I will read the crux of what this bill is into the record one more time because then it will be easy to break down. It is subclause 13.1(1) of this need-to-know legislation, which reads, “A member of the Senate or the House of Commons who applies for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada is, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information in respect of which the application is made.” That is the important clause.

My point is that the only thing this bill would do would be to allow parliamentarians to apply for a secret security clearance. The government would not be able to deny, regardless of who is in government, a parliamentarian from applying. That is all that it would do. It would allow them to apply. I would dare say that every speaker who spoke to this during the debate on my PMB highlighted two key examples: the Winnipeg labs, most recently, and the Afghan detainee file.

A colleague just spoke to what this bill does not do. This does not guarantee a parliamentarian will pass, should they apply. They still have to go through the same security vetting and clearance process that we have been doing for decades. I have had a secret level clearance for likely 25 to 30 years now. I have been at the top secret level for 15-plus years. The clearance does not guarantee one has a need to know or that one gets access to the information because that is how the system protects it. One still has to demonstrate that to the government.

Why is this so important? We have heard a little bit about this. The world is more complicated. We have listed a couple of historical examples. The most important one, which has been highlighted numerous times, is foreign interference. When we look at foreign interference, there are lots of cases. I do applaud the government about Bill C-70. It is going to come and address some of that because it allows changes to the CSIS Act, which then allows CSIS to actually share information beyond just the federal government, not just to potential parliamentarians. Again, if they are not cleared, they still cannot get that information, but it will potentially allow CSIS to share information to other levels of government, to industry and stakeholders, but they have to have the clearance.

We have heard testimony and speeches here, so we know that parliamentarians are being targeted. We have seen the original NSICOP annual report of 2019. What was one of the key takeaways? Parliamentarians need to be briefed on the threats that they face from foreign interference. We have seen Madam Hogue's public inquiry into foreign interference. Just recently we saw the NSIRA report that came out. We are only a few days away from seeing NSICOP's latest report. However, it is not just from those agencies. I would like to read again from the recommendations that came out of PROC, with unanimous consent, just a few weeks ago. Recommendation 3 reads:

That the government work with recognized parties’ whips to facilitate security clearances, at Secret level or higher, of caucus members who are not Privy Councillors (particularly those who sit on committees with mandates concerning foreign affairs, national defence and national security), who shall be taken as satisfying requirements for a “need to know,” to ensure that they may be adequately briefed about important national security matters, including foreign intelligence threat activity directed toward Parliament, or their party or its caucus members.

The point is that this has already unanimously passed at PROC to basically implement what my bill is trying to achieve.

In conclusion, I have not heard a single criticism of the bill that is based on what the bill would do and what is contained within it. I know members from all parties who I have talked to are going to support this bill. I am hoping that, when it does come up for a vote, it will pass unanimously.

Business of the House

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Madam Speaker, if you seek it, you will find unanimous consent for the following motion.

I move:

That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order, or usual practice of the House, in relation to the consideration of Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference:

(a) during the consideration of the bill by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security,

(i) the committee shall have the first priority for the use of House resources for committee meetings,

(ii) the committee shall meet for extended hours on Monday, June 3, Tuesday, June 4, Wednesday, June 5 and Thursday June 6, 2024, to gather evidence from witnesses,

(iii) the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, the officials from the RCMP and CSIS, the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, the officials from the Department of Public Safety, and other expert witnesses deemed relevant by the committee be invited to appear,

(iv) all amendments be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4:00 p.m., on Friday, June 7, 2024,

(v) amendments filed by independent members shall be deemed to have been proposed during the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill,

(vi) the committee shall meet at 3:30 p.m. on Monday, June 10, 2024, to consider the bill at clause-by-clause consideration, and if the committee has not completed the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill by 6:30 p.m., each party shall be allotted no more than five minutes for each of the remaining amendments and clauses, and the committee shall not adjourn the meeting until it has disposed of the bill,

(vii) a member of the committee may report the bill to the House by depositing it with the Clerk of the House, who shall notify the House leaders of the recognized parties and independent members, and if the House stands adjourned, the report shall be deemed to have been duly presented to the House during the previous sitting for the purpose of Standing Order 76.1(1); and

(b) the bill shall be ordered for consideration at report stage on Wednesday, June 12, 2024.

Justice

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we are listening constantly to communities that are being affected by extortion, particularly South Asians in the B.C. region and in the GTA. What we hear from them is that they need supports. We are providing those supports through aggressive responses under the Criminal Code. Extortion is against the law. Extortion with a weapon attracts a very significant penalty under Canadian criminal law.

What we also understand from them is that organized criminality, including foreign interference and organized crime, is behind these extortion attempts. That is why bills like Bill C-70 will make an important difference. So will the budget measures on money laundering and cracking down on organized crime.

Request for Office of Speaker to be Vacated

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is a pretty critical point in the legislative agenda that has come up.

I agree with the Bloc Québécois member and her argument that there are many bills we would like to discuss.

I appreciate that this is a critical time right now. We have a lot of legislation that we need to discuss in the House, legislation that our constituents have sent us to this place to get through. It is serious things that are so important, such as Bill C-49, Bill C-59, Bill C-70 and Bill C-64. We have two opposition day motions just this week. We are trying to deliver the help that Canadians so desperately need, including through legislation like the fall economic statement, which the official opposition has filibustered at committee for months and which is something that would deliver a great deal of support in terms of housing.

Something I am particularly proud of as a part of that piece of legislation is actually the removal of the HST on psychotherapy and counselling services. It is something that would help those who are working within that profession, and something that I actually had a conversation about just yesterday with a psychotherapist who asked me when we would be getting the legislation passed. I said we are working on it and trying to make sure it goes through. The person I spoke to needs the fairness for the removal of the federal tax to occur. She spoke to me about how important it was for her clients to have equality within the services that are provided to them. We know, of course, that we are in a mental health crisis and that every bit of assistance helps in that regard. That is one piece of legislation that the official opposition has filibustered at the committee.

There are, of course, amendments to the Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia accord act that we need to get through. There is the foreign interference act, which is of course becoming more and more important as we move through this parliamentary session.

I do not know how many times New Democrats have to talk about how incredibly important pharmacare is. We certainly know that the official opposition does not believe that. I think about the millions of Canadians who rely upon that piece of legislation to help them afford the medications they need, diabetics in this country, and I believe there are 3.7 million of them, who need the legislation to go through so they would not have to worry about the cost of their diabetes medications and devices. So many constituents have written to me thanking me for moving that forward.

Those are the key pieces of law that we need to get moving in the House. Yes, we are sitting until midnight most nights to do that. New Democrats believe in that absolutely because it is for people that it is important. There is an opposition party determined to delay every single one of the bills. Time again, the Conservatives have obfuscated, filibustered, screamed and yelled in outrage and then attempted to delay and stall all of that progress, all of those supports. I find it unacceptable.

The fact is that what the Conservatives are now calling out, in terms of their outrage, is that the Speaker seems to have been caught up in supposed partisan activity that clearly was not of his doing. He did everything he was supposed to do, ran through the permissions that he was supposed to get, and yet mistakes were made. The partisanship that the Conservatives are so outraged about actually fuels their own partisanship fire of trying to find yet some other thing that they can hold on to, so much so that it will delay again all of the incredible supports that we need to get to people.

I see this every day, whether I am at the procedure and House affairs committee or here in the House. The Conservatives are desperate to cling on to anything they can, and destroy whatever we are trying to do in the process, to show that this place does not work, because that fits into their communication strategy. I am sorry, but I am not going to allow something to fit into their communication strategy to disrupt what needs to happen for my constituents.

The member across the way for Winnipeg North did quote the letter, but I want to mention it again. We are here, in this case, over a tweet that was sent out by the Liberal Party without having consulted the Speaker. The letter is very clear. It is from the national director of the Liberal Party, apologizing very clearly to the Speaker. It states, “The Liberal Party of Canada unequivocally apologizes to you for this mistake, and we take full responsibility.”

Was there a mistake made? Absolutely. Is it horribly unfortunate? Absolutely. Are we punishing the right person in this instance? No. Should there be more vigilance on this issue? Absolutely, of course. However, calling for the Speaker's resignation is clawing to the communication strategy that benefits one group. It does not benefit the entire House. I do not agree with that. We on this side of the House do not agree with that.

We have to work on the legislation that the people have sent us to work on. We have a very important job, and I have no time for all of the bickering and squabbling. Canadians need this place to work. They need us to get to work. We can make this all about ourselves or we can make it about them. Canadians deserve that. New Democrats want to help deliver the supports they need. The work is urgent, and the official opposition just wants to delay. That is all I have to say on this matter.

Department of Justice—Main Estimates, 2024-25

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

Madam Chair, extortion is a Criminal Code violation currently and there is already a mandatory minimum penalty that applies to repeat extortion with a firearm. The mandatory minimum is seven years. The maximum penalty for extortion is life imprisonment. With respect to not tolerating extortion, what we are doing is looking closely and trying to work with law enforcement officials to understand the nature of the problem, particularly in the South Asian community in B.C. and in Ontario, to target this in a more robust manner.

I would also encourage the member to look at what we are doing with Bill C-70, the foreign interference legislation that we recently tabled in this House, which looks at organized criminality that is being orchestrated by criminal elements that are operating abroad but manifesting here.

Business of the House

[Steven MacKinnon, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I am always entertained by my hon. colleague across the aisle, with whom I work regularly. With gas at about $1.50 a litre in Ontario, if I am not mistaken, it is a lot cheaper than it is in Alberta, where Premier Danielle Smith unilaterally hiked the cost of gasoline by 13¢. She did not provide, of course, the very substantial rebates on the price on pollution we have put on and that the Conservatives would take away.

Of course, that was not his question. Tomorrow, we will call Bill C-58, concerning replacement workers, at report stage and at third reading. On Monday, we will resume third reading debate of Bill C-49, the Atlantic accord implementation act.

Wednesday, we will begin debate at second reading of Bill C‑70 on countering foreign interference, which is already a strong response to the issues being investigated by the Hogue commission. We will hear from the Minister of Public Safety at second reading of Bill C‑70.

I would also like to inform the House that Tuesday and Thursday will be allotted days.

Finally, as is only proper, there have been discussions among the parties, and if you seek it, I believe you will find unanimous consent of the House for the following motion:

That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order or usual practice of the House, during the debate on the business of supply pursuant to Standing Order 81(4) later today:

(a) the time provided for consideration of the Main Estimates in committee of the whole be extended beyond four hours, as needed, to include a minimum of 16 periods of 15 minutes each;

(b) members speaking during the debate may indicate to the Chair that they will be dividing their time with one or more other members; and

(c) no quorum calls, dilatory motions or requests for unanimous consent shall be received by the Chair.

Reference to Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

[Mike Morrice, Green, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we are fortunate to have debate in this place like we just heard from the member for Vancouver East. We are lucky that we can reflect on the words she shared with us this morning.

I am deeply concerned to hear about the double standard that exists for members in this place when it comes to foreign interference, and I would really appreciate hearing more from her. I understand that she wants to see Bill C-70 move ahead quickly. However, my concern is that the government is going to say that it is no problem at all, that it will all be solved, that Bill C-70 will fix the issues we have shared when it comes to foreign interference.

Could the member share with us the extent to which she feels that is or is not the case? Could she also share more, elaborating on the question from our colleague, the member for North Island—Powell River, on the extent to which she would like to see the government do more, and do it faster, to address the deep concerns she shared with respect to foreign interference?