Bill C-70

Countering Foreign Interference Act

An Act respecting countering foreign interference

Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act to, among other things,
(a) update provisions respecting the collection, retention, querying and exploitation of datatsets;
(b) clarify the scope of section 16 of that Act;
(c) update provisions respecting the disclosure of information by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service;
(d) provide for preservation orders and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records, documents or things through a single attempt;
(e) expand the circumstances in which a warrant to remove a thing from the place where it was installed may be issued; and
(f) require a parliamentary review of that Act every five years.
It also makes a consequential amendment to the Intelligence Commissioner Act .
Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create the following offences:
(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;
(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and
(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.
It also amends that Act to remove as an element of the offence of inducing or attempting to induce — at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or terrorist group — by intimidation, threat or violence, a person to do anything or cause anything to be done, that the thing be done for the purpose of harming Canadian interests when the person who is alleged to have committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.
It also amends the Criminal Code to, among other things, broaden the scope of the sabotage offence to include certain acts done in relation to essential infrastructures and ensure that certain provisions respecting the interception of “private communications” as defined in that Act apply to certain offences in the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act .
Finally, it makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act and makes consequential amendments to other Acts to, among other things,
(a) create a general scheme to deal with information relating to international relations, national defence or national security in the course of proceedings that are in the Federal Court or the Federal Court of Appeal and that are in respect of any decision of a federal board, commission or other tribunal;
(b) permit the appointment of a special counsel for the purposes of protecting the interests of a non-governmental party to those proceedings in respect of such information; and
(c) allow a person charged with an offence to appeal a decision, made under the Canada Evidence Act with respect to the disclosure of certain information in relation to criminal proceedings, only after the person has been convicted of the offence, unless there are exceptional circumstances justifying an earlier appeal.
It also adds references to international relations, national defence and national security in a provision of the Criminal Code that relates to the protection of information, as well as references to international relations and national defence in certain provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that equally relate to the protection of information.
Part 4 enacts the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act which, among other things,
(a) provides for the appointment of an individual to be known as the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner;
(b) requires certain persons to provide the Commissioner with certain information if they enter into arrangements with foreign principals under which they undertake to carry out certain activities in relation to political or governmental processes in Canada;
(c) requires the Commissioner to establish and maintain a publicly accessible registry that contains information about those arrangements;
(d) provides the Commissioner with tools to administer and enforce that Act; and
(e) amends the Public Service Superannuation Act , the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act .

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our security intelligence representatives for joining us today.

I'd like to take a moment to thank you for your work, your proactive efforts in community engagement and your work with respect to Bill C-70, specifically on strengthening the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act, something that hadn't been done in over 20 years. I want to thank you and the department for your efforts there.

I want to start by stating that prolonged operations by TikTok could allow foreign actors to exploit Canadian user data or spread disinformation. Is this an accurate statement in your mind, Director Rogers?

[Heath MacDonald, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses again.

Quickly, I just want to touch on Bill C-70, Canada's new Countering Foreign Interference Act, which came into effect last June. How will the measures in that bill enhance the ability of CBSA to leverage intelligence at the border?

[Daniel Rogers, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

I have a couple of points, and I'll try to make them fairly quickly.

My name is Daniel Rogers, and I am the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS. I am joined by my colleague Paul Lynd, the assistant deputy minister responsible for intelligence collection.

It is an honour to join you today and to have the opportunity to contribute to your important discussion on the winding up of TikTok Canada. Today, I hope to provide insights on CSIS's role plays in ensuring the protection of Canada's national security interests, the safety of Canadians and Canada's prosperity.

The Investment Canada Act, or ICA, which is administered by Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, ensures that significant investments in Canada made by non-Canadians benefit Canada's economy. To this end, the act allows the government to review foreign investments to ensure they are not harmful to Canada's national security.

The act aims to strike a balance promoting economic prosperity and safeguarding Canada from foreign actors seeking to gain ownership or control of sensitive Canadian goods, technology, infrastructure or personal data for purposes that could be injurious to Canada's national security.

In accordance with its mandate, CSIS regularly screens ICA notifications for security concerns, and we work with ISED, Public Safety Canada and federal granting councils to inform the GC’s decisions. This work is essential, as Canada is the target of a number of adversarial state actors looking to advance their own national interests at our expense through their investment activities.

Social media platforms in particular are of interest to threat actors because of the data they generate and collect. They run surveys, collate datasets and request access to users’ personal data through terms and conditions, enabling access to photo albums, messages and contact lists, among other sensitive details. Although some of this data is benign in isolation, when collected and collated on scale, it can provide detailed patterns and insights on populations, public opinion, communities and individual social and professional networks.

Authoritarian states like the PRC use big data, including from the private sector, to carry out foreign interference activities. While government use of data in Canada is subject to ethical, legal and privacy considerations, authoritarian states are not subject to these limitations. Through its 2017 National Intelligence Law, the PRC compels PRC citizens and entities to co-operate with PRC intelligence agencies upon request, which includes providing all information to the state and its intelligence apparatus. This policy supports, and is reflective of, the PRC’s attempts to interfere in Canada and like-minded democracies. Canada and its allies must therefore exercise heightened caution when agreeing to share their data with platforms linked to the PRC.

The ICA review process, which includes CSIS input, determined that allowing TikTok Canada to continue operating would cause injury to Canada’s national security. Although the provisions of the ICA limit what I am able to disclose about specific cases, I would note that the CSIS and Government of Canada assessment was consistent with the March 2024 policy statement on foreign investment review in the interactive digital media sector. Specifically, assessments consider factors such as reach and audience, the nature and extent of an investor's ties to a foreign government, and whether a Canadian business is likely to be used as a vehicle by a foreign state to propagate disinformation or censor information in a manner inconsistent with Canadian rights and values.

Use of social media platforms also raises national security concerns when they act as a breeding ground for extremist ideologies and radicalize users. The increasing volume of violent rhetoric online raises our concern that consumers of this content are more likely to mobilize to violence. Youth in particular can be especially vulnerable to becoming radicalized online due to their more frequent use of social media.

CSIS continues to actively investigate, advise on, and disrupt national security threats. CSIS is also committed to building resilience through our modernized authorities under Bill C‑70.

This new authority recognizes that protecting Canada's national security is a shared endeavour that includes partnering with all levels of government, Canadian communities, academia, the private sector, and others. We are committed to co‑operating with these groups in the national interest, including through increased sharing of detailed threat information.

I will conclude by noting that while CSIS cannot publicly comment on our specific operational activities or investigations, I welcome this opportunity to answer your questions.

Thank you.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

That's good to know. We have taken some legislative steps in the Parliament of Canada with Bill C-70, which will hopefully fix that problem for CSIS in the future.

That leads me to my next question.

I referenced the legislative changes we've put into place that bring the CSIS Act and the Foreign Interference and Security of Information Act up to speed to counter the threat. Looking back, is there anything you wish could have been done differently with these allegations? What kinds of safeguards would you like to see put in place to make sure that political parties and their internal mechanisms are not being affected by foreign interference?

[Peter Madou, Assistant Deputy Minister, Operational Intelligence and Assessment Requirements, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, Madam Chair and members of the committee.

My name is Peter Madou and I am the Assistant Deputy Minister of Operational Intelligence and Assessment Requirements at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

I would first like to thank the committee for inviting CSIS to appear on this very important issue.

CSIS takes all threats of violence very seriously and continues to monitor, investigate and mitigate threats against the 2SLGBTQIA+ community in Canada on a priority basis.

Violent extremism continues to pose a significant and growing threat to Canada's national security. While only a small number of Canadians are actually willing to engage in serious violence in support of their gender and identity driven views, their actions continue to have devastating real world consequences, as we saw in Waterloo just last year.

The increase in violent extremist activity is felt acutely within the 2SLGBTQIA+ and other marginalized communities, as they can be the target of threats emanating from both ideologically and religiously motivated violent extremists. The anti-gender movement, which rejects the 2SLGBTQIA+ community, is a national security issue when associated with extremists who exercise gender identity-driven violence as a result of personal beliefs stemming from misogyny, homophobia, transphobia, religious interpretations, conspiracy theories or a generalized fear of socio-cultural change.

It is important to note that while violent rhetoric itself does not equate to or necessarily lead to violence, the ecosystem of violent rhetoric within the anti-gender movement, compounded with other extreme worldviews, can lead to serious violence.

Exposure to entities espousing anti-gender extremist rhetoric could inspire and encourage serious violence against the 2SLGBTQIA+ community and its allies. Violent actors may also be inspired by real-world events, like the University of Waterloo attack, to carry out their own extremist violence, sometimes with little to no warning.

Anti-2SLGBTQIA+ rhetoric is also spreading widely through social media and online forums among violent extremists, increasing the risk of extremist violence against the community and its allies as well as the risk of vulnerable youth being radicalized on online platforms.

To counter these threats and protect public safety, CSIS continues to vigorously investigate and disrupt the threat activities of violent extremists in collaboration with foreign and domestic security intelligence and law enforcement partners. Where appropriate, CSIS leverages the full extent of its authorities to mitigate threats of gender identity-driven violence.

CSIS is also committed to building resiliency and increasing public awareness of these threats, including through modernized authorities granted to CSIS under Bill C‑70. CSIS' new resiliency disclosure authority recognizes that protecting Canada's national security is a shared endeavour that includes partnering with all levels of government, Canadian communities and the private sector. CSIS is actively using this new tool and is committed in its efforts to bridge across sectors and find ways to cooperate in the national interest. This includes increased sharing of relevant threat information to a wider range of recipients to protect national security.

However, more work needs to be done to ensure that all persons in Canada feel safe to express themselves and their identities without threats of violence. Canadians must work together to prevent radicalization at its root by combatting misinformation and disinformation, slowing the spread of violent content and hateful rhetoric, and fostering cohesion between Canadian communities.

I will conclude by noting that while CSIS cannot publicly comment on its operational activities or ongoing investigations, I welcome this opportunity for a frank and transparent discussion on the threats to Canada's 2SLGBTQIA+ communities.

I am happy to answer your questions.

Thank you, Chair.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Chair, thank you.

Colleagues, thank you for joining us. I hope that you were kind and gentle to the senior officials who were here before me. I hope that the same spirit of kindness continues for the next hour.

Mr. Chair, let me begin by congratulating you on assuming the chair of this important committee. I wish you a successful stewardship of this committee.

Teasing aside, I want to thank my colleagues, the officials. It's quite a collection of horsepower from the Public Safety portfolio. I'm glad that they were able to be here at 11 o'clock.

As you know, Mr. Chair, I was in a cabinet meeting that's still ongoing, and I will sadly excuse myself at one o'clock sharp because, as you know, the leaders of the opposition are meeting with the Prime Minister to talk about borders and border security and are meeting with President-elect Trump on Friday, and I was asked to provide an update. If you see me excuse myself, it will be for that reason.

It's also a moment to mention Dan Rogers and Joanne Blanchard. Joanne has assumed the chair of the National Parole Board, and Dan is the director of CSIS. It's my first time with them before this committee, and I think that they'll serve Canadians in an outstanding way. I'm happy to be here with them.

Back in March, I appeared before the committee to discuss my mandate. We talked about the work the government had done to apprehend criminals attempting to smuggle drugs and weapons into the country, as well as efforts to combat auto theft. We talked about foreign interference and the need to bring forward and pass legislation giving the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, the modern tools it needs to protect Canada. Since then, Canada's law enforcement agencies have done some excellent work.

Over the past two years, the Canada Border Services Agency, or CBSA, has intercepted more than 13 tonnes of illegal drugs at land border crossings across the country. In 2023, the CBSA seized more than 900 prohibited firearms and over 27,000 weapons. In June 2024, law enforcement agencies across the country took part in a nationwide operation to crack down on the manufacturing and trafficking of ghost guns. They seized approximately 440 traditional and 3‑D‑printed firearms, as well as fifty-two 3‑D printers.

As well, as colleagues will know, in October of this year, federal RCMP forces in British Columbia took down the largest, most sophisticated drug lab in Canada. This is the excellent work that the RCMP, with their partners, do in every corner of our country every day. The combined fentanyl and precursors seized at this facility alone would have amounted to 95 million potentially lethal doses of fentanyl entering our communities or being exported abroad.

On the auto theft front—something that this committee has leaned into—the Canada Border Services Agency has intercepted more than 2,000 stolen vehicles in rail yards and ports to date this year alone, already exceeding last year's work, but we recognize that there is, obviously, more good work to be done. Early trends for 2024 show a 17% reduction in auto theft, but we still recognize that these figures remain stubbornly high.

Additionally, in October of this year, the RCMP took the unprecedented step of releasing findings with respect to involvement of agents of the Government of India in serious criminal activity on Canadian soil. Due to that announcement and subsequent actions taken by the government and law enforcement agencies, to quote the commissioner of the RCMP—it's kind of awkward to quote him when he's sitting at the table, but this will flatter him—there has been a “significant reduction” to the public safety threat posed.

Additionally, in the supplementary estimates before you, Mr. Chair, our government is investing $16 million to support the RCMP's foreign interference-related criminal investigations. Those same estimates show that CSIS's budget is increasing by more than $53 million this year. While detailed breakdowns of CSIS expenditures are, understandably, classified, I can say that the tools available to CSIS have been strengthened and modernized with the passage of Bill C-70, and I thank colleagues on this committee for the good work that we did together in that regard.

This crucial funding will ensure CSIS can continue to keep Canadians safe from such threats as violent extremism and foreign interference. CSIS's budget will have increased 48% compared to 10 years ago. Under our government's stewardship, the RCMP will be receiving 101% more funding to do the important work they do for Canadians in this same period. These investments and the results that are being achieved, I think, should attest to everyone the collective concern all of us have around public safety.

Last year the government proposed a $637-million increase in the budgets of our public safety department and portfolio agencies. This year it's over $2 billion. Investments found in these supplementary estimates will combat auto theft, advance the work that the government and partner agencies are doing to combat foreign interference, provide increased police presence and investigative work to those experiencing violent hate and continue to keep communities safe across the country.

Our government will continue making responsible investments to keep our country safe.

I hope we can count on the support of all parliamentarians and members of this committee to get the votes in the supplementary estimates before you passed quickly.

I don't think it will surprise you that I'm very excited about the opportunity to answer questions from colleagues. It's something I look forward to. I was counting the days until I'd have this opportunity. It was like, “How many shopping days left before Christmas?” You can't imagine, Mr. Chair, how happy I am to be here with you this morning.

[Daniel Rogers, Director, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Thank you for the question. I'm happy to answer.

You're right that the bulk of the funding is for increasing intelligence capacity and mitigating security risks. I will say that it's not directly tied to the new legislation, but that will certainly help our ability to implement it.

An increase to our intelligence capacity means we will have better visibility for intelligence threats, which we can then share through resilience disclosures. This is something Bill C-70 affords us the ability to do. It also means that new tools in Bill C‑70 will be implemented through this. We have new production orders and mechanisms that allow us to seek information. Some of this capacity will be directed towards things like the ability to use technology and digital tools to assist in our intelligence. Those authorities interrelate.

We will see an overall increase linked to Bill C-70 but not directly tied to it.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all of the officials who are joining us at the committee today.

I'd like to start with Mr. Rogers and the service.

I've taken a look at the detailed breakdown of what you are asking for in these supplementary estimates. I can see that the lion's share of the funding you are requesting is to “mitigate security risks” and “enhance intelligence capabilities”.

What I would like to know is how much of this funding is related to the new legislative authorities the Parliament of Canada granted CSIS through Bill C-70. I just want to get a sense of how that legislation is being operationalized and how these costs relate to that.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

You had some suggestions. You talked about how we need to greatly expand the counter-intelligence capabilities of the RCMP and CSIS and really maximize the new tools that we have, such as Bill C-70.

Just turning to the political realm, we know that India and other countries have a desire to influence our politics. Outside of the things I just mentioned, what do you think political parties should be doing? Are there any recommendations that you want our committee to focus on?

[Aaron Shull, Managing Director and General Counsel, Centre for International Governance Innovation]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, vice-chair and members of the committee, for the opportunity to address the critical issue of foreign interference and criminal activities in Canada, specifically by agents of the Government of India.

To me, this issue strikes at the heart of our national sovereignty and public safety and, indeed, the integrity of our democracy. In my remarks today, I want to help clarify what happened, why it happened and what I think you can do about it.

Number one is what happened. The assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar in June 2023 was a flashpoint in uncovering the extent of foreign interference activities conducted by agents of the Government of India. Through investigations led by the RCMP and supported by CSIS, it became evident that these actions are part of a broader pattern of transnational repression. Indian diplomatic officials in Canada have been implicated in coordinating intelligence-gathering efforts and collaborating with criminal networks to intimidate and harm Canadian citizens.

The methods include espionage, whereby Indian officials gather intelligence on individuals within the Indo-Canadian community using diplomatic channels and coerced proxies, and criminal facilitation, whereby organized crime groups such as the Lawrence Bishnoi gang have been directed to carry out acts of violence, including assassination plots, intimidation campaigns and disinformation campaigns. Indian narratives have sought to polarize communities in Canada, labelling lawful advocacy for Sikh rights as extremism while amplifying propaganda through diaspora-targeted media.

This interference, however, is not isolated. Believe me, it reflects a deliberate strategy to suppress dissent and manipulate Canadian political and social systems to align with India's interests. Despite multiple diplomatic meetings and law enforcement interventions, the problem has persisted, underscoring the need for a stronger and more coordinated response.

Number two is why it happened. India perceives segments of the Canadian Sikh diaspora, particularly those advocating for Khalistan independence, as a direct threat to its national security and territorial integrity. This perception has driven the Indian government to conflate lawful political advocacy with violent extremism, resulting in a systematic campaign of surveillance, intimidation and violence targeting individuals and communities in Canada. India's actions are fuelled by its long-standing internal conflicts and an aggressive foreign policy aimed at silencing dissent abroad.

Number three is what I think you can do about it. First, expand CSIS and RCMP resources for counterintelligence operations targeting Indian proxies and agents. Under this, I think you should look at strengthening the threat reduction measures, or TRMs as they're referred to, to disrupt foreign intelligence networks and prevent imminent threats.

Second, use legislative and policy measures. Leverage the new tools under Bill C-70, such as production orders and cross-border information collection, to enhance investigations. Continue statutory reviews of intelligence legislation to make sure you're keeping pace with evolving threats and have flexibility in addressing emerging tactics.

Third is community protection and public outreach. I've heard other witnesses talk about the duty to warn. I think you need to maintain timely, transparent warnings for individuals facing credible threats, while also pairing these with robust protective measures, including law enforcement support and safety planning. There would be nothing quite like getting a notice that you are being targeted for assassination from a foreign state actor without anything else other than the warning. Build resilience within affected diaspora communities through education, direct engagement, public awareness campaigns and ensuring trust in Canadian institutions. Look at addressing the disinformation campaigns by countering narratives spread by Indian state media through coordinated efforts with the Department of Canadian Heritage and the CRTC.

The fourth area is diplomatic and multilateral efforts, so coordinating through coalitions like the Five Eyes and bilateral diplomatic channels. You need to make clear that violations of sovereignty through interference and violence will prompt significant consequences, and you can't just say it—you have to do it. You have to raise the cost.

The fifth area is a new idea that I don't think anyone else will have said. We should look at using speaking indictments. What I mean by that is that Canada should follow examples of jurisdictions like the United States in using speaking indictments to address and expose foreign interference.

A speaking indictment is more than a legal document. It's a public accountability tool. It details the evidence behind the criminal charges. It outlines the methods and actors involved and explains the broader context of foreign interference. It creates a clear narrative for the public. It names specific actors, including diplomats, proxies and criminal networks in an indictment, and it publicizes the risks and consequences of engaging in these activities.

As an example, in the United States, the Vikas Yadav superseding indictment effectively exposed the methods and coordination of foreign operations. In Canada, a similar tool could be used to detail India's role in directing and facilitating acts of violence, coercion and disinformation through both state and non-state actors. That superseding indictment read like a spy novel, but no one took issue with it. When it was an indictment, it did exactly what it was supposed to do.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Democratic Institutions

[Jenica Atwin, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Indigenous Services]

Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to the paramount issue of combatting foreign interference in our democratic institutions. I certainly take this matter very seriously. I have respect for the House, and I wish the member would demonstrate the same. The allegations referenced here are misleading and defamatory, and he is simply peddling misinformation.

On this side of the House, the Prime Minister and ministers of the Crown have security clearances and have been vetted by national security. That is more than I can say for the Leader of the Opposition, who the member opposite is sitting closer and closer to. That is why I would like to turn my attention to what matters, which is what the government is doing on foreign interference.

In September 2023, the government announced the establishment of the public inquiry into foreign interference in federal processes and democratic processes following extensive consultations with all recognized parties in the House of Commons. All parties agreed to the terms of reference and the appointment of the commissioner, Justice Marie-Josée Hogue, a judge of the Court of Appeal of Quebec. The commissioner is mandated to examine and assess interference from China, Russia and other foreign state or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, to confirm the integrity of and any impacts on the 2019 and 2021 federal general elections at the national and electoral district levels.

As members of the House know, the commissioner's interim report was delivered on May 3, 2024. Some of the key findings from this initial report were that foreign interference did not affect the overall outcomes of the 2019 and 2021 elections, and the administration of these elections were sound. Foreign interference did not undermine the integrity of Canada's electoral system.

The commission's initial report did not make any recommendations for the government or other stakeholders. These will be included in the commission's final report. The government looks forward to reviewing the final report and any recommendations the commissioner may have for better protecting federal democratic processes from foreign interference. These will help inform future measures. In the meantime, the government continues its work to counter the evolving threat of foreign interference in Canada's democratic institutions.

Since the commissioner was appointed, the government has taken a number of steps. In September 2023, the Prime Minister made a statement in the House of Commons that there were credible allegations of a potential link between agents of the Government of India and the killing of a Canadian citizen in British Columbia. In October 2023, the government issued a second public statement on a probable Chinese government's “spamouflage” disinformation campaign targeting dozens of Canadian parliamentarians and issued letters to those parliamentarians who were targeted.

In December 2023, Canada joined the United Kingdom's attribution of malicious cyber activity in Russia that targeted U.K. politics and democratic processes. In January 2024, early preparations for the critical election incident public protocol panel began with individual briefings to panel members. Also in January 2024, the government published and shared a tool kit to resist disinformation and foreign interference and “Countering Disinformation: A Guidebook for Public Servants”.

In March 2024, the government introduced Bill C-65 which proposes amendments to the Canada Elections Act, including measures to further strengthen federal electoral processes against foreign interference. This bill has passed second reading in the House and is currently being studied in committee. In June 2024, unclassified briefings on foreign interference were provided to members of Parliament. On June 20, 2024, Bill C-70, the Countering Foreign Interference Act, received royal assent.

The Government of Canada has taken a range of measures to address the evolving threat of foreign interference in Canada's democratic processes. We look forward to reviewing any recommendations that Commissioner Hogue may have in her final report. In the meantime, the government continues to take steps to protect Canada's democracy.

[Michel Bédard]

I will echo the words of the clerk in saying that this is often a political issue. When the political will is there, the legislative process can be used very quickly. We saw an example of that with Bill C‑70.

When it comes to House of Commons resources and the programs and services put in place, the relevant authority is often the Board of Internal Economy. I can assure you that, even though there may be prescribed timelines, it's relatively faster to go through the Board of Internal Economy than to go through the entire legislative process.

I would say that every situation is different and that measures have to be taken on a case-by-case basis.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to ask a question of both of you. I'll start with you, Mr. Moninder Singh.

The Parliament of Canada came together in quite a rapid fashion in the summer to pass Bill C-70, which updated a lot of our laws, including bringing the CSIS Act up to speed to operate in a digital world. There were also some significant amendments to the security of information act to really provide a lot more legislative flexibility in targeting clandestine foreign interference operations. I know from CBC News, from some of their sources, they have reported that India's clandestine operations remain largely in place and that it may be some time before we dismantle those.

When you've seen what Canada's Parliament has done and the fact that there is now this attention on the Indian government, are you optimistic that we are on a path toward finally confronting this? Do you remain optimistic, given all of your personal experiences?

[Nathalie Drouin]

It's true that any attempts at foreign interference need to be taken seriously. It's been said that the last elections were fair and free from the consequences of foreign interference.

As parliamentarians, you introduced Bill C‑70, which was a step in—

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

On the whole subject of foreign interference, I've heard it in my couple of years at this committee: We know the Iranian diaspora would have something to say about the Government of Iran. I've heard from the Tibetan community about what the People's Republic of China is engaged in. Now, of course, we're hearing the South Asian community with respect to the Government of India.

In my riding, I have a large South Asian population as well. The historic Paldi Sikh Temple is in my riding of Cowichan—Malahat—Langford. I think, to an earlier point, the attention on the Government of India is validating what many in that community have known for quite some time now.

I think my questions will be for both Director Rogers and Commissioner Duheme.

I don't doubt for a second that the men and women in your respective agencies are going to work every day and treating this with utmost seriousness. As a parliamentarian, it's also my job to hold to account, and I can't escape the fact that the most recent NSICOP report labelled Canada as a “low-risk, high reward” environment in which our foreign adversaries are able to operate.

I know that sources have reported to CBC News that the clandestine Indian network is still largely in place. You might see some elements of that disappear and go more quiet.

Maybe we'll start with you, Director Rogers. How do we flip those terms around? With the passage of Bill C-70, do you feel confident that we're now on a path towards making Canada a high-risk, low-reward environment in which to operate for our foreign adversaries?

[Daniel Rogers]

There are a number of things in Bill C-70 that could assist the service in dealing with foreign interference threats. I mentioned earlier that there is now a provision for us to be able to engage in resilience discussions and disclosures with people outside of the federal government. That's something we've been doing already.

There are other provisions to allow things like production orders and preservation orders, which could assist our investigations.

Importantly for us, there's a statutory review of our legislation, which will allow the service and its legislation to potentially keep pace with evolving technical threats.

I think I can leave it at that. There are a number of other measures.

I should say that it also closed one of our investigative gaps, which had come to light recently, where CSIS was unable to collect information about a threat actor in Canada if that information resided outside of Canada. That could certainly be applied in a foreign interference context. That was resolved with Bill C-70 also.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

Mr. Rogers, I brought in a private member's motion, M-112. Then the government took action to bring in Bill C-70.

How will Bill C-70 help to protect Canadians in the future, with the tools it gave you?

[Daniel Rogers]

It is a very good question.

Obviously, you heard earlier from the commissioner about some of the most egregious examples of criminality the RCMP has uncovered that have links to the Government of India. From a CSIS perspective, we could add some of the things we have been saying to the public recently, which is that the Government of India seeks to advance pro-India narratives and align Canada's position with the position of India.

This is particularly true when it comes to individuals whom India perceives as supporting a pro-Khalistan independence movement, which is a particular sore point for India. We see India using proxy agents here in Canada to try to advance those goals, and we see different types of foreign interference attempts, ranging from disinformation to criminal activities, which the RCMP mentioned, to achieve those goals.

Obviously, this is a concern for the service. As Madame Drouin said earlier, this is something we've been tackling for a number of years. We do investigations to try to uncover information. We use the information uncovered to work with our partners across the Government of Canada and with our allies. In an effort to protect public safety, if we see information that could be harmful to an individual in Canada, we work very closely with the police of jurisdiction and the RCMP, sharing that information through a robust framework. Where necessary, we can do things like use threat reduction measures.

The last thing I will say on that point is that we have, especially recently, engaged in a lot of stakeholder and community outreach to make sure we build resilience across various communities that could be threatened through foreign interference by India and others. Bill C-70 has helped us do that, with a new ability to do resilience disclosures with Canadians.

[Irek Kusmierczyk, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Employment]

Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to the vital, ongoing work that the Government of Canada is doing to protect Canada's democratic institutions.

As all members of the House are aware, threats to Canada's democracy do not affect only some Canadians; they affect all Canadians. This is why the enhancements to safeguard Canada's democratic systems and processes against foreign interference set out in Bill C-70 are supported across party lines. Indeed, the Government of Canada's ongoing work to protect Canada's electoral systems and democratic institutions includes efforts to maximize public transparency while protecting what and how government documents are shared. This is because the nature of some records, as well as how they are intended to be used, is fundamental to the functioning of our democratic system of government.

I would like to take this opportunity to make clear what cabinet confidences are and why they are treated so carefully by the government. In this way, any misunderstanding along these lines can be put to an end. Cabinet confidences are documents prepared for members of cabinet. They include memoranda to cabinet, discussion papers, records of cabinet deliberations or decisions, records of communications between ministers, records to brief ministers and draft legislation.

The Canadian government is a Westminster system of government and has been since Confederation. This means that the principle of keeping cabinet confidences secret is older than Canada itself. It originates from the United Kingdom's Westminster Parliament, which dates back many centuries. Cabinet confidences are central to how the Westminster system functions because of another foundational principle called “cabinet collective responsibility”. The two principles complement each other. Members of cabinet consider all material at their disposal; they deliberate freely, and even disagree, around the cabinet table. Once the deliberations are finished, cabinet makes a collective decision, and all members are responsible for it.

Therefore, the secrecy of these deliberations and of the materials that are used to make cabinet decisions is paramount to the system functioning as designed. This has long been understood by successive Canadian governments, which have upheld the principle of cabinet confidences.

In addition to the government, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government. Protecting Canada's democracy also means protecting our democratic institutions and ensuring that they can function as intended. Protecting cabinet confidences is not a nefarious act; rather, it is a fulfillment of the government's duty to uphold the long-established principles of Canada's system of government.

While fulfilling this duty, the Government of Canada continues to support the ongoing work of the public inquiry into foreign interference, which it has done since the inquiry was established last year. The set of cabinet confidences specified in the terms of reference for the commission were already provided during the commission's first phase of work, and those terms were developed and agreed to by all recognized parties in the House.

As it has done all along, the government will continue to provide thousands of classified documents to the commission and to make government witnesses available to answer the commission's questions. The Government of Canada looks forward to the commission's final report in December, and it will consider how its recommendations can further help to enhance Canada's measures against foreign interference in its electoral systems and its democratic institutions.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you.

All kinds of suggestions have been made over the past few months. We're talking about adding parliamentary committees on Indian interference, for example. There's the independent Hogue commission that's going on. There have been studies at the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs. Right here, we're doing one on Russia. There was Bill C-70, and I think everyone agrees that good work was done, but that all of this is evolving extremely quickly.

In addition, we know, as Mr. Alexander said earlier, that social media platforms are the main media used, and they certainly don't do enough. All of this is evolving so quickly that Bill C‑70 may already be obsolete. All these suggestions and all these studies in parliamentary committee are therefore very interesting, but do we really need to create other committees to study the matter?

Of course, it's interesting to hear from witnesses who, like you, come to talk to us about all this and share their expertise with us, but at some point, the government will have to take action.

So what do you suggest? I can ask the other two witnesses as well, but what should the government do at this point?

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Housefather.

Mr. Bardeesy, I'd like to draw on your experience, which you mentioned a little earlier.

You said that Bill C‑63 and Bill C‑70 were very useful measures for countering disinformation and foreign interference. However, as you know, Bill C‑63 hasn't been passed. Bill C‑70 is not yet in force.

A federal election is expected in less than 12 months. What can be done in terms of those measures since they may not be in effect by then?

RCMP Allegations Concerning Foreign Interference from the Government of India

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, we have seen not just one instance of media; we have seen a former Indian army official who literally stated that $100 million should be spent to elect a Conservative government. It is clear that we have not heard the Conservatives really talk today about how we are going to tackle these issues they raise. They were talking about our Prime Minister and what he is not doing, when the Liberals are doing these things, with Bill C-70 and making arrests; the RCMP is actively engaged; and quite frankly, we have uncovered some of the most nefarious incidents we could ever think of.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with my dear colleague from Brampton North.

This past week, Canadians were taken aback, as we heard in the different speeches throughout this emergency debate, by the scope and seriousness of the Government of India's ongoing efforts to interfere in Canadian affairs. Last Monday, the RCMP made public its findings that Indian government diplomats have been engaged in serious criminal activities in Canada. These activities target Canada, Canadians and individuals residing in Canada, as well as Canadian interests. They are covert, deceptive and illegal. They threaten all levels of government, the private sector, academia, diaspora communities and the general public.

Through Canada's national task force and other investigative efforts, the RCMP has obtained evidence that demonstrates these agents supported violent extremism in both nations and links agents of the Government of India to homicides and violent acts. It demonstrates they were using organized crime to create a perception of an unsafe environment for the South Asian community in Canada and interfering in democratic processes. The most serious of these criminal acts took place in June 2023 when proxies were used to murder Hardeep Singh Nijjar in front of the Guru Nanak Sikh Gurdwara in Surrey, B.C., a holy place.

This government is determined to protect Canadians from these attacks. To push back against foreign interference, this government passed Bill C-70, amending the CSIS Act and the Security of Information Act for the first time in 40 years.

In May, I spoke to and seconded my colleague from Surrey—Newton's motion, Motion No. 112, about the real threats posed by foreign governments that seek to intimidate diaspora communities in Canada. Motion No. 112 specifically references the sharing of information and security intelligence to protect democratic institutions, maintain the rule of law and prevent violence and extremism. Information sharing with key allies is critical to pushing back against hostile actors. Since the Government of Canada made these allegations, Canada's Five Eyes allies have come out in support of Canada, because we share intelligence.

In response to the shocking revelations that Indian diplomats including India's high commissioner were actively undermining Canadian law, the Government of Canada expelled the commissioner along with five other diplomats. Evidence also shows that a wide variety of entities in Canada and abroad have been used by agents of the Government of India to collect information. Some of these individuals and businesses were coerced and threatened into working for the Government of India.

This is not the first time foreign governments have worked to intimidate diaspora communities in Canada. I mentioned this before in questions asked today. Under the previous government, the now Leader of the Opposition and Stephen Harper allowed Chinese police stations to set up shop in Canada. These became hubs where Chinese agents could intimidate, harass and even repatriate Chinese residents, claiming they were criminals.

Regrettably, efforts by Mark Flynn, the deputy commissioner of federal policing, to meet with his Indian law enforcement counterparts and discuss violent extremism occurring in Canada and India were unsuccessful. I call again on all levels of the Government of India to co-operate with these investigations. It is the only way forward.

This is a particularly sad time for the Commonwealth and all allied nations. Together, Canadians and Indians resisted the forces of 20th-century dictatorships in both the First and Second World Wars. They did this not to conquer but to preserve their way of life and build a better, more peaceful world based on co-operation, respect and a mutual commitment to a rule-based international order.

The beginning of the Commonwealth Charter reinforces:

the commitment of member states to the development of free and democratic societies and the promotion of peace and prosperity to improve the lives of all the people of the Commonwealth.

I was born and raised in Canada, but this would not have been possible if it were not for members of my family, Sikhs who served in both India's and Canada's armed forces to fight for the safety and freedoms we enjoy. The Government of India's actions represent a gross breach of international law and also of its commitment to the principles that bind the Commonwealth of Nations together.

These are difficult revelations. I know that there is a real concern in the South Asian community. I urge anyone who has been victimized by threats or knows of others who have been threatened to come forward and report these threats to the RCMP. The safety of Canadians, regardless of their background or beliefs, is the top priority of the RCMP and of this government.

The actions being perpetrated by India and other foreign states are a threat to Canada's national interests. They undermine Canadian sovereignty and social cohesion, diminish trust in our institutions and degrade the rights and freedoms to which all Canadians are entitled. This is why the Government of Canada will continue to denounce these actions as deplorable and unacceptable in the strongest possible terms.

Up to 30 arrests have already been made, and our public safety agencies will not stop working. We will not be intimidated. We will not be harassed, and we will have justice and answers for the flagrant disregard of Canadians as well as of international law. We need to remain united on all sides of the aisle and show leadership to protect our nation and our way of life.

[Maninder Sidhu, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Export Promotion]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the member for Surrey Centre.

The constituents in my riding of Brampton East are very anxious. They are anxious about acts of violence targeting the Sikh and broader South Asian community, about foreign interference in our democratic processes, and about these being directly tied to agents of the Government of India, as the RCMP commissioner publicly and clearly stated last week.

The rule of law must be respected, and our citizens must be protected. We will not tolerate any form of harassment, intimidation or violence targeting Canadians. I know that all parliamentarians in this chamber would agree with that.

There is a lot of misinformation flying around, and I have had constituents reach out to me with questions, so please allow me to state some facts on the record for those watching at home. There were 22 individuals who were arrested and charged in relation to extortion and eight arrested and charged in relation to homicides. This is thanks to the hard work of the RCMP and law enforcement agencies across Canada.

Back in February 2024, the RCMP created a multidisciplinary team to coordinate and investigate public threats. Through very active investigations, it has come across very serious findings, and it felt the public needed to know, which led to the press conference it initiated last Monday. I want to ensure that words are not mixed up, so I would like to read what the RCMP commissioner very clearly stated on the record last week.

He stated:

Investigations have revealed that Indian diplomats and consular officials based in Canada leveraged their official positions to engage in clandestine activities, such as collecting information for the Government of India, either directly or through their proxies; and other individuals who acted voluntarily or through coercion.

Evidence also shows that a wide variety of entities in Canada and abroad have been used by agents of the Government of India to collect information. Some of these individuals and businesses were coerced and threatened into working for the Government of India. The information collected for the Government of India is then used to target members of the South Asian community.

This evidence was presented directly to Government of India officials, urging their cooperation in stemming the violence and requesting our law enforcement agencies work together to address these issues.

I would like to note that the United States, the U.K., Australia and New Zealand have all urged the Government of India to co-operate with our law enforcement agencies. This is a very serious matter and we all need to stand together to show a united front against any form of foreign interference. There are people out there who want to divide communities, but as leaders here in the House, it is our job as parliamentarians to bring communities together. Four out of the five party leaders represented in this very chamber have either received their security clearance or are in the process of getting it. There is only one party leader who chooses to close his eyes and remain oblivious to foreign interference and continues to refuse to get a security clearance. That is the leader of the Conservative Party of Canada.

The Prime Minister stated, under oath I may add, “I have the names of a number of parliamentarians, former parliamentarians and/or candidates in the Conservative Party of Canada who are engaged, or at high risk of, or for whom there is clear intelligence around foreign interference”.

Is that what the leader of the Conservative Party of Canada is afraid to confront, Canadians being threatened, coerced with violence and even murdered? As a leader, would he not want to know about the risks that impact the safety and security of Canadians? Would he not want to know if someone in his party is engaged in or at risk of foreign interference? Would he not want to stand up for the protection of democracy? These are the important questions being asked by Canadians across the country with respect to the leader of the Conservative Party of Canada. Having a top-level security clearance would allow him to receive classified briefings on foreign interference.

Of Conservative Party voters, 60% said that all leaders, including the Conservative leader, should get a security clearance. He is not even listening to his own party. What is he hiding? He needs to wake up, get his clearance and start taking foreign interference seriously.

I would like to thank the Minister of Public Safety for his commitment to disrupt and counter foreign interference risks. This past June, Bill C-70 received royal assent, bringing a significant update to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, among several other legislative amendments. These amendments enhance Canada's collective resilience and uphold these values that we know are pivotal to maintaining a healthy and strong democracy.

With accountability comes transparency. That is why our government, through the public safety ministry, has established a new Canada foreign influence transparency registry. This registry imposes an obligation on individuals and entities to register their arrangements with any foreign principal and disclose any foreign influence activities in relation to governmental or political processes in Canada. Activities such as communication with a public office holder, communication or dissemination of information to the public by any means, as well as the disbursement of money or items, including providing a service or use of a facility, would result in a registration requirement.

Not reporting can lead to penalties and fines of up to $5 million and up to five years in prison. Although this is a new policy for Canada, other allied countries, such as the United States and Australia, already have foreign registries in place that require those acting on behalf of a foreign state to register their activities. The United Kingdom has also announced its plans to introduce a similar process.

Our government knows that now is not the time to sit back on our heels and wait for things to happen. Now is the time to be proactive in our efforts to ensure that policies and mechanisms we have in place protect Canadians and our institutions. With these measures in place, our government is better able to hold those in positions of influence to account by ensuring that they report on matters of importance regarding foreign principals. As the age-old saying goes, knowledge is power, which is why the proper procedures and policies must be in place so that Canadians are aware and informed.

I, like many of my hon. colleagues, have received a heightened number of emails, calls and letters from constituents who are scared and who are worried about their families and friends. Attending prayer, gathering with loved ones or attending community events should not be coupled with worrying about one's safety or the fear of being a target. Canadians have the right to express their religious beliefs, thoughts and ideas freely, without fear of persecution, without inciting any type of violence or hate.

I hope that what I have spoken to today can provide my constituents and all Canadians with reassurance that our government will always uphold their rights and freedoms and impose serious consequences on anyone who decides to infringe upon them.

I also want to take this opportunity to thank the Peel Regional Police and all of the law enforcement agencies across our country who have been vital in keeping our communities safe. Their bravery, dedication and unwavering response to answer the call of duty should be recognized and commended.

No matter what our political stripes are, I know that all members of the House can agree upon condemning any acts of foreign interference. In the essence of unity, I know that we will continue to stand together in the pursuit of justice. As the RCMP's investigation continues, maintaining a united front is paramount, and any act that impedes the pursuit of justice will not be tolerated.

I close today by saying that whether we are Buddhist, Catholic, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, Sikh or agnostic, at the end of the day, we are all Canadians. As Canadians, regardless of our political leanings, we need to continue to stand together against foreign interference that targets our communities, that wants to divide our communities, that wants to instill fear in our communities. We are united as Canadians. Let us continue looking out for each other and lean on each other, because that is what Canadians do.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Madam Speaker, I think I will be lucky. I think this is the fifth time that I am asking a member of the Liberal Party this question. What is more, I get along fairly well with my colleague who just gave an excellent speech. We have the good fortune of being able to serve together on the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, and we work really well together. It is the only subcommittee that operates by consensus and where no voting takes place. Perhaps it would do the House some good to look at how this subcommittee operates.

I will ask him the question because I know that he will answer me. Can he explain to me why, despite the fact that a motion was adopted in the House on November 18, 2020, calling on the government to create a foreign agent registry, the government waited until March 2023 before beginning the public consultations that led to the drafting of Bill C-70, which was passed in 2024? Can my colleague tell me why the government took three years to begin consultations after the motion was adopted in November 2020?

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Madam Speaker, I have asked my Liberal colleagues a question a few times. They have yet to respond.

I just listened to the minister's speech. She was very passionate and emphatic. I could tell she really believed in what she was saying. Someone on the Liberal side will have to explain to me, then, why it took so long.

A motion was adopted here in the House of Commons in November 2020 to establish a foreign agent registry. The Liberals who are here tonight speaking so passionately took three years to begin public consultations to come up with Bill C‑70, which finally passed in 2024.

My question is simple. If the government takes its responsibilities seriously, why did it wait three years to begin consultations and take four years to come up with a bill, since the motion dates back to November 18, 2020?

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, I do not want to say whose experiences are worse than others, but I can say that certainly during the testimony on Bill C-70, we did hear from Canada's Tibetan community. Witnesses certainly relayed the transnational repression that the community is feeling from the People's Republic of China and the fact that family members who are still in mainland China regularly receive threats. The family members here in Canada are told to stay in line and to not misbehave, because their family is vulnerable in China.

Whatever nationality is being affected by whatever country, we need to stand united and call out foreign interference, especially the criminal kind, for what it is. This is a moment that demands all members of Parliament to stand firm and united, and to say to our foreign adversaries that we see them, that they are on notice and that we will no longer put up with this.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to rise for the very serious emergency debate that has seized the House of Commons, which was brought forward by the leader of the NDP, the member for Burnaby South. What we are talking about tonight is, of course, the very serious allegations that have come forward over the last week, presented by the RCMP.

Before I get into the crux of my speech tonight, I want to say that as the member of Parliament for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, I represent a fairly large South Asian population. I want to tell them directly that we are taking this issue seriously. I know there is a lot of fear in that community, and I know there are some very complicated relationships with the Indian government.

I also want to say that I bear no personal ill will toward the country of India or the Government of India, but the circumstances that have presented themselves to us demand that we as parliamentarians stand up and act. No self-respecting country would let these types of allegations slip by without a firm and serious response. That is precisely what we in the NDP are doing.

Let us go back to the bombshell RCMP announcement that came on Thanksgiving Monday, October 14, which presented evidence that agents of the Government of India were involved in “serious criminal activity in Canada”: homicides, extortions and other criminal acts of violence; the use of organized crime to create a perception of an unsafe environment targeting the South Asian community in Canada; and, of course, interference in the democratic process.

This is not new. This is something our country has been exposed to for over a year. It started in September 2023 when the Prime Minister stood in this chamber and used the power given to him as a member of cabinet to make an explosive statement about the Government of India's interference in our internal processes. Since then, the Hogue commission has released an interim report, and in that report, we see references to India's clandestine activities littered throughout. That was followed, of course, by the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, which detailed everything India has been doing, from election interference to the use of criminal activity to terrorize the South Asian population.

This is not just coming from hearsay. Both of these reports are based on credible and solid intelligence gathered by the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. It is from the men and women out there in the field working on our country's behalf, and they are ringing the alarm bell of what India and other countries are currently doing in Canada.

I think the most worrying part of the NSICOP report is in paragraph 73. I am going to quote it because it was quite the revelation: “This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described India’s alleged interference in a Conservative Party of Canada leadership race.”

We know those tentacles are running deep. We know that members of Parliament for several months now have been operating under a cloud of suspicion because some members have been named as witting or semi-witting participants in foreign interference. They are taking direction and sometimes monetary resources from a foreign power to do that power's bidding and to influence the processes in this place. Canadians have a right to be concerned about that.

We came together in a rare moment at the end of June as the spring session was running out and passed Bill C-70. The Senate then passed it in short order and it found its way to the Governor General to receive royal assent. I was directly involved in that bill. I serve as the NDP's public safety critic and serve on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. The bill gave our law enforcement and intelligence agencies the important legislative tools they need in order to do their jobs. In fact, I talked with many CSIS members, and they felt that with the previous law, they were operating under an analog law that was out of sorts with what is required in the digital world. It is not enough, though, because we find ourselves here today following October 14 and the RCMP's announcements.

I briefly want to go over what the NDP has been doing since then, because we are the party in this place demonstrating to Canadians a solid commitment to uncovering the truth on this issue.

We started off last week by spearheading a call for an emergency meeting of the public safety committee. I led the way in getting unanimous support for that, which is very rare. We had a meeting on Friday and were able to pass a motion to start a study on this. We are going to call upon the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Public Safety, national security experts and members of the RCMP to come before our committee to provide us with the answers that Canadians deserve.

That motion successfully passed, and I would like to thank members from all parties for passing it, as it was unanimous. I followed that motion up with another one, which basically called on the committee to report to the House the need for “all federal party leaders to apply for the appropriate security clearance level in the next 30 days in order to review classified information and take necessary actions to protect Canadians.” However, the Conservatives immediately started filibustering that motion, and I suspect they are going to continue tomorrow. They are the only party in this place whose leader has refused to get the necessary security clearance to protect Canadians, and that is absolutely shameful. I will get back to that near the end of my speech.

Today, our leader asked for unanimous consent to establish a special committee on Canada-India relations, and unfortunately the Liberal member for Winnipeg North rushed in to shout out no. At a time like this, when we need to focus our attention on the fraught relationship between our two countries, it is absolutely unbelievable that the Liberals would say no to the formation of a special committee to investigate this very serious issue.

That brings us to the emergency debate tonight, which was spearheaded by the leader of the NDP and has allowed members of Parliament to stand in this place and report back on the serious things that are happening in our communities. We will not waiver on this issue. We will continue to show the leadership necessary to get to the bottom of it. When the Liberals and the Conservatives are too busy throwing insults at each other, the country needs moral clarity. It needs to see leadership that stands up on behalf of all Canadians, and the NDP will continue to do that.

I have been listening to the Conservatives dodge, weave and provide the most flimsy excuses for their leader not getting security clearance. Let me note what some of the top national security experts in Canada have said. I am talking about former CSIS executives and former advisers to prime ministers, both Liberal and Conservative. They have described the Conservative leader's position as nonsense, as ridiculous and as nonsensical, as there is no reasonable justification.

We are at a point where the Leader of the Opposition's continued refusal to get security clearance is raising far more questions than necessary at this time. This is a time when need to present a united front. We need to show our foreign adversaries that in this place, we may have our partisan differences, but when they mess with our internal affairs, we stand united, we are unshakable and we are unbreakable. It is absolutely shameful that the Conservative leader, who aspires to be prime minister, continues to refuse to get his security clearance. He is putting the partisan interests of his party over the interests of the country. He needs to be held to account. It is time for him to step up to the plate and get the security clearance that is necessary so we can tackle this issue with the united front it deserves.

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Mr. Speaker, tonight we are talking about foreign interference. After listening to all of my colleagues' speeches and concerns, it occurred to me that the word “interference” rhymes with the words “negligence”, “indifference” and “complacence”.

Consider water as an analogy. When water seeps in, when it erodes a road or shoreline, it does not happen suddenly. It happens gradually. We are here, tonight, debating foreign interference because of the previous governments' negligence and, I would say, their indifference, with one consequence being the assassination of a Sikh Canadian on Canadian soil. India considered this person a terrorist, but the RCMP questioned him and did not see fit to extradite him. Nevertheless, international regard for Canada is so low that India, through its representatives, managed to send contract killers to murder a Sikh Canadian. This is no trivial matter.

Tonight we can also talk about the fact that, when it comes to interference, the Conservative leader is more interested in being free to promote his video clips than in discovering the truth. A respectable and careful attitude would involve going to the source to find out what the whole thing is about, especially since it also appears that people in certain parties were involved in foreign interference or may have been targeted by it.

I would like to clarify something so that people understand. A Conservative member said earlier that Conservatives deserve the credit for the fact that we have a foreign agent registry and that the government was unwilling to create a foreign agent registry.

The member for Trois-Rivières tried to make that happen. His name was chosen in the private members' draw and he drafted a bill to create such a registry. In the end, the government introduced a bill in that regard, Bill C-70, but not until four years later. The government reacted. I have to give it credit for that, but it did so four years later, or as we say in my riding, an hour later in the Maritimes, which shows that the government did not really take this seriously.

There is a conflict between India and Punjab. Punjab is a province of India that borders Pakistan and India, and the Sikh community in India would like to create a country, a state, called Khalistan. The Sikh separatists are claiming their corner of the world, based on their religion, and the Indian government has totally prevented the Sikhs from obtaining that recognition since the partition of India in 1947.

This conflict, which has been going on since that time, has been marked by acts of extreme violence perpetrated by both Indian governments and Sikh representatives. These include the assassination of Indira Gandhi and the bombing of an Air India flight.

The conflict finally reached Canada's shores in 2023, when Mr. Nijjar was assassinated. The absolute worst thing a country can do is fail to defend and protect the people who live there. That is the absolute worst thing, from a disrespected G7 country. People are coming here to commit their crimes.

Canada then decided to react by expelling diplomats. We supported that. The Indian government also retaliated. What is important to remember in this story, however, is that interference in a country does not happen overnight. Give them an inch, they will take a mile. The more the government loosens the reins, the more it will come to realize that it has zero control at any given time.

I identify first and foremost as a Quebecker, as everyone knows, but I find it embarrassing as a parliamentarian in this place that we have reached this point. What I also find embarrassing is how long it took the government to be transparent. It did not want a commission on foreign interference. It appointed a special rapporteur to buy some time. The rapporteur then said what we thought he would say, namely, that there was nothing there.

There is nothing there? Come on. Perhaps we were talking about foreign interference based on election results, but interference is much broader than that, and we wanted a commission to clear up the issue of foreign interference in all its forms once and for all.

When I say that “interference” rhymes with “indifference”, “complacence” and “negligence”, that is what I am talking about. I do not think many people would tell me I am wrong. Even on the government side, I would find it hard to believe that they did not realize they were asleep at the switch.

This issue was raised by my colleague from Lac-Saint-Jean when he said that the government was dragging its feet. I do not understand. During his first four years in power, when his government had a majority, the Prime Minister seemed to be focusing only on matters of foreign policy and neglecting domestic matters.

Then he had to deal with a pandemic that revealed all the Conservative government's failures that he should have addressed, but did not. He did not care. The Prime Minister travelled around the world, but what for? Given the state of foreign interference, we have to wonder what it was all for. He took a trip to India and took some nice photos for the upcoming election, but he could not even thoroughly, properly and respectably address an issue like the one that ended in the murder of a Canadian national.

I am a little ashamed of that, not because I care that much about the Prime Minister and his indifference, but because if Quebec were a country, this type of thing would certainly never happen there.

[Alexis Brunelle-Duceppe, Bloc, Lac-Saint-Jean, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the member who spoke before my hon. colleague did not answer the question I put to him. I would like to ask my question again in the hopes of getting an answer from his colleague from the Liberal Party.

We are talking about taking action against foreign interference, and we are talking about government responsibility in relation to this scourge. My question is about government responsibility. On November 18, 2020, the House passed a motion calling on the government to create a foreign agent registry. The federal government did not begin public consultations until March 2023, and Bill C‑70 was not introduced until 2024.

My question is very simple. Why did it take four years when everyone was aware of the problem?

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, committee members.

First of all, I want to start by thanking everyone who joined with me in signing the Standing Order 106(4) letter. As you can imagine, it's pretty rare that we get unanimous support for an emergency meeting, but I think the revelations from the RCMP that were delivered to the Canadian public on Thanksgiving Monday were nothing short of explosive, and I think they demand this committee's attention.

I will be moving a motion, Mr. Chair. I know that the clerk has both French and English copies available—hard copy and digital—for members who are participating in person and online.

Before I move the motion, I think it's important to add a bit of brief context, because of course this is not the first time that we have been witness to serious allegations involving the Government of India and its agents in Canada. In fact, it was more than a year ago, in September of 2023, that the Prime Minister stood in the House of Commons and levelled these accusations against the Government of India, accusing it and its agents of nefarious criminal activity, election interference and a whole host of things. Needless to say, the Prime Minister's rising in the House of Commons and making such a statement did make headlines around the world.

Since then, the Hogue commission has released an interim report. That was in May of 2023. If you read that report, you can see that there are broad mentions of India's interference in Canada throughout. Then, of course, in June 2024, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians released its special report on election interference, which again mentioned the activities of the Government of India throughout.

That brings us, Mr. Chair, to October 14, 2024, this past Monday. For the RCMP—indeed, for any police force that is conducting an active investigation—to come out with such explosive revelations I think underscores just how serious this is, and I think the RCMP made a point that they were doing this because some individuals in Canada have their lives directly in danger. The threat had reached such a level that they felt compelled to ignore the traditional way of going through the judicial process and made these accusations public so that particularly the members of the South Asian community whose lives might be in danger could be forewarned and so that we could remain extra vigilant.

I also think, Mr. Chair, that the House of Commons and the Senate came together quite quickly in June of this year to pass Bill C-70, which contained important legislative measures to deal with foreign interference.

With all of these events coming together and culminating in what we saw on Monday, I think it is quite appropriate for this committee to be seized with the matter. With that in mind, I would like to move the following motion:

That, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), the committee undertake a study concerning the electoral interference and violent criminal activities carried out by agents of the Government of India, as identified by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians' report and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police's report from October 14, 2024, and the subsequent expulsion of six diplomats from the Government of India.

As a part of this study, the committee hold no less than six meetings, ensuring an equal distribution of time for witnesses, and invite the following ministers, senior officials, and expert witnesses from impacted communities and academia to provide briefings:

1. Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Honourable Mélanie Joly.

2. Minister of Public Safety, the Honourable Dominic LeBlanc.

3. RCMP commissioner, Mike Duheme.

4. National security and intelligence adviser, Nathalie Drouin.

5. Experts from Canada's South Asian community.

6. Brampton mayor Patrick Brown and any former leadership candidates of the 2022 Conservative Party leadership race.

7. National security subject matter experts.

With that, Mr. Chair, the motion is moved. I hope that copies have been distributed to members.

I will give my time back to the chair. Thank you very much.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you for that.

It is my time and I can use it as I wish. I noted that the truth hurts for the Liberals. Mr. Gerretsen spread blatant disinformation for his political gain. As a result, he had to settle in a legal action that was taken against him.

We saw further disinformation from none other than a network that claims that it is the most trusted news network in Canada, which fraudulently doctored a video of Pierre Poilievre. We had ministers in this government, including Minister St-Onge and MP Noormohamed actually defend the doctoring of that video. It just goes to show that, when it comes to the Liberals, they're very much in favour of disinformation just so long as it isn't against them. In any event, the point is made.

Mr. Kushwaha, you spoke a little bit about Bill C-70. One of the tools in Bill C-70 is a foreign influence registry. Is that something that you see as being a useful tool to counter misinformation and disinformation from hostile foreign states?

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Pickering—Uxbridge, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Seaboyer, one of the other areas of concern.... You mentioned some recommendations. In Canada, with the passage of and royal assent on Bill C-70, we were able to create a foreign agent registry.

Certainly, one of the things that came out of the U.S. indictment that actually initiated platforms to act was their Foreign Agents Registration Act. As our registry rolls out, could you speak to some of the sanctions models that you would like to see to punish those who break those rules?

[Neal Kushwaha]

I can speak to the justice side of things. My opinion is that I feel some positive work has been done there. I commend the work that was done on C-70, especially on the ability to deal with that in a legal form as well as expanding some capacity for CSIS to perform in certain ways.

To get into the intricacies, I feel it would be best to tear that apart another time, if you choose. There's some content in there that still limits Canada, but we have to take steps and we're taking good steps. That's positive, so I commend everyone who participated in that to make that happen.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

You may be aware of the recently passed Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference. One provision of the act was to expand the preparatory acts offence. If you have knowledge of this, can you expand on how it will help address espionage or new foreign interference offences?

[C/Supt Denis Beaudoin]

Exactly. The biggest difference with Bill C-70 is that if it's a campaign of disinformation with the purpose of affecting government processes, it may become criminal. You won't find these terms under the Security of Information Act; they're not defined in there.

As the member alluded to, it may be something for the committee to see if there's value in defining them, but for police services, we're dealing with harassment, intimidation and threats. For disinformation, if somebody goes through this but at some point he crosses the path and there's a threat, then all of a sudden we investigate the threats, but not necessarily the "lying", as you called it, because oftentimes it may not be a crime.

[C/Supt Denis Beaudoin]

Let's look at misinformation activities targeting ethnic communities. As I mentioned, any such activities undertaken prior to an election or during the electoral process could be considered criminal.

We've publicized some of our community engagement activities. We try to educate communities and show them that Canadian police services are open and accessible. In other countries, the public can have a negative impression of police or a less favourable view of them.

We try to break the silo culture within communities. We try to educate them on new laws and criminal activity, which they can fall prey to. We also try to educate communities on Bill C‑70.

[C/Supt Denis Beaudoin]

I'm not familiar with the study, but there are several best practices that we use. One of them that we're trying to do right now on foreign interference is breaking the silos between police services. When I say "silos", it's really raising awareness of transnational repression, because officers on the street may not realize that they're dealing with such a crime, and they may just see it as a threat. For example, we're trying to utilize some of these committees that are already in existence to spread this information, including Bill C-70, to all our colleagues across Canada. That's one example of sharing information.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our respective director generals for joining us today.

I want to talk about Bill C-70. I think you mentioned that it's a welcome legislative change with some measures that it brought in. Can you talk about cybersecurity and how it intersects with security of information and signals intelligence? Do you feel sufficient improvements have been made through that legislation? Does it allow you to have more powers and more ability to do the work of targeting misinformation, disinformation or any foreign threats through information specifically?

[C/Supt Denis Beaudoin]

It's hard for the RCMP to comment on the government, Mr. Chair.

What we can say is that we welcome the new legislation, Bill C-70, which was recently enacted on August 19. We look forward to working with our partners at PPSC and testing this new legislation.

Your earlier question was on cybercrime, national security and foreign-actor interference. We received funding recently through the SIAMACT. Nonetheless, with the rise of violent extremism in Canada, it's certainly competing with our ability.

[C/Supt Denis Beaudoin, Director General, National Security and Chief Superintendent, Federal Policing, Royal Canadian Mounted Police]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My name is Denis Beaudoin, and I am a chief superintendent and the director general responsible for foreign actor interference for the federal policing national security program at the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, RCMP. I am joined today by Richard Baylin, chief superintendent of federal policing criminal operations on cybercrime, and Greg O'Hayon, director general of federal policing security intelligence.

First, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss this issue. The malicious intrusion into Canada’s democratic processes by hostile foreign actors is one of the RCMP's highest priorities.

To be clear, foreign interference affects every aspect of society. This includes the very foundations of our democracy, the fundamental rights and values that define us as a society, our economic prosperity, the critical infrastructure essential to our well-being, and our sovereignty.

Foreign actors seek to advance their objectives through several tactics, including state-backed harassment and intimidation of communities in Canada, manipulating the discourse at every level of our political system, and using malicious and deceptive tactics to influence our democracy.

Make no mistake—foreign governments are conducting campaigns of online disinformation to undermine our democratic processes and institutions, as well as to erode citizens’ faith in democracy.

The RCMP has a broad mandate related to national security and cybercrime to ensure public safety by investigating, disrupting and preventing foreign interference. It draws upon provisions from various pieces of legislation, including those recently enacted in Bill C‑70, as well as other offences under the Criminal Code. When investigating disinformation campaigns, the RCMP works closely with domestic and international partners to identify relevant evidence but sometimes disinformation campaigns may not constitute criminal conduct.

With these considerations in mind, I will briefly summarize the RCMP’s role in contributing to the protection of Canada, its citizens, residents and elected officials from foreign interference activities.

In 2019, the Government of Canada announced its plan to protect democracy, to defend Canadian democratic institutions. This included measures to strengthen elections against various threats, including cyber threats and foreign interference. From the outset, the RCMP has been a committed contributor to these whole-of-government efforts.

Elected and public officials are central figures in our democracy's political system, as they shape our policies and laws. This role makes them key targets for foreign states, which may try to influence or coerce them to take policy positions that align with their interests. As such, the RCMP recently briefed parliamentarians, in partnership with other government agencies, on the threat of foreign interference. The RCMP is also leading initiatives to raise awareness with police forces across the country on the new legislation included in Bill C-70, as well as on the threat of foreign interference.

The RCMP is also an active member of the security and intelligence threats to elections task force—otherwise known as SITE—a working group that coordinates collection and analysis efforts concerning threats to Canada's federal election processes. This group is Canada's principal mechanism for monitoring threats of hostile state interference during elections and also consists of experts from CSIS, the CSE and Global Affairs Canada.

The RCMP's federal policing of cybercrime focuses investigative efforts on the highest level of cybercriminality and works closely with domestic and international partners to identify, disrupt and prosecute the most serious threats within the cybercrime ecosystem, which cause significant economic or other impacts to Canadian interests at home and abroad. The RCMP's federal policing cybercrime investigative teams and cyber liaison officers abroad focus on the prevention, enforcement and disruption of high-value threat actors and prolific cybercrime enablers who facilitate sophisticated crimes, such as malware, ransomware, espionage and foreign interference, as well as attacks against government institutions, key business assets and critical infrastructure of national importance.

As members of this committee are well aware, there has been an increase in threats to public officials in recent years. Because we recognize the personal impact of this trend, as well as the harm it causes to our democracy, this issue remains a key priority for the RCMP, and we will continue to counter these threats through our federal policing responsibilities, as well as through our engagement with other police forces and the diaspora communities.

With threats of this magnitude, collaboration between the public, the police of jurisdiction and the Government of Canada partners will continue to be an important aspect of protecting Canada against foreign interference.

The protection of Canada's democratic processes and the safety of its citizens and residents is paramount for the RCMP. It will be important for all aspects of society to work together to protect against foreign interference in this space.

Thank you.

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

Thank you for the question, Mr. Motz.

I could preface my answer by saying that I wear as a badge of honour the fact that I'm on the Russian sanctions list. That is not our list of sanctioned individuals, but theirs. I think I'm on that list partly because I have advocated for much more aggressive activity on the part of the Government of Canada in terms of Russian diplomats, who are engaging in activities that are not commensurate with their Geneva Convention duties, being declared persona non grata.

As Mr. Motz probably knows, Canada is almost unique among NATO and EU countries in not having expelled a single Russian diplomat from its establishment in Canada since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Frankly, I think there is no good argument to be made for that lack of action. I would distinguish that activity, which is fully within the federal government's capacity, from the broader question of dealing with Russian potential agents of influence, proxies and so on, in Canada.

Here, I think there is a twofold problem. One is that up until very recently, in Bill C-70, we really haven't had the legal tools to respond to that problem.

Secondly, I think there is, as I indicated in response to Madame Michaud's question, a genuine institutional lack of capacity, both on the intelligence side and the law enforcement side, to be able to respond to these threats.

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

Thank you, Madame Michaud. I'll respond in English.

In terms of tools, I think the first tool is the ability to detect these kinds of serious activities. That goes to the intelligence capacity. It goes to the disinformation monitoring capacity, which is too weak at the moment in Canada—and that was the burden of some of my remarks in the opening presentation.

In terms of responding to them—if you can detect them—I think the tool kit has been very limited up until recently. Bill C-70 will improve things. Bill C-59, before that, with its new powers given to CSE, may improve our capacities to respond to these disinformation campaigns and try to render them null and void.

The last thing that has to be said is that in no real universe will we be able to detect or counter all disinformation campaigns. At the end of the day, it comes down to Canadian citizens and consumers being able to respond to them in a sensible way.

[Kristina Michaud, Bloc, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I thank the witnesses for being here.

I'll continue in the same vein; my questions are for Mr. Wark.

I wanted to get your opinion on Bill C‑70 that the House passed a few months ago to deal with foreign interference. I was asking the witnesses in the previous hour whether they thought Canada had the same tools at its disposal as the Americans with the FBI, for example, to uncover schemes like the one behind Tenet Media. I'd like to know what you think.

Do you think we have the same tools as the Americans to deal with this interference? Do we also have the right legislative tools in a context where everything is evolving so rapidly, technologically speaking?

We know that social networks are a powerful tool for disinformation. Right now, are these legislative tools to be found in Bill C‑70, or do we need to go further?

Will we have to constantly renew ourselves to be on the cutting edge of new tactics or stratagems used by people who want to make disinformation or propaganda for Russia's benefit? I imagine so.

[Dr. Wesley Wark]

Mr. Erskine-Smith, that's a great question.

Much will depend on how the foreign influence transparency registry is rolled out. We have the legislation. We don't have the registry, yet. The registry would have the capacity to do two things if it is effectively instituted. One would be to provide some degree of deterrent against so-called grey zone actors, and you might consider Tenet Media founders as an illustration of that. The other would be to pursue either monetary or criminal sanctions under either that legislation, or changes to the Criminal Code that were introduced, particularly changes to the Security of Information Act that were introduced in Bill C-70.

Hypothetically, in future, we might have a better capacity, as the United States has had for some time, to use criminal sanctions against such activities. At the moment, we don't really have that.

[Dr. Wesley Wark, Senior Fellow, Centre for International Governance Innovation]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm grateful to appear before the committee on this important study.

There are two concerning aspects of Russian disinformation targeting Canada. One is real. It's the effort to manipulate Canadian attitudes towards the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The other is what I call a “potentiality”. It's the use of Russian intelligence and cyber-capabilities, which are significant, to interfere in Canadian elections and democratic processes in the future. These elements were captured in the CSIS intelligence assessment of May 2023, which was recently released to PIFI.

The conclusion to the CSIS assessment reads:

While the Russian diaspora and its organizations may not have a broad impact on Canadian society, their influence becomes more apparent when consolidated with other organizations and their online presence, pro-Russian proxies or agents of influence, and [the Russian Federation's] global disinformation efforts.

There is also, of course, the blowback potential of Russian disinformation operations targeting other countries, especially the United States.

The question I want to address concerns Canadian governmental capabilities to detect and counter Russian-directed online information operations.

The first is on detection. This involves attack attributions back to a Russian state or proxy source, the tracing of methodologies of attack—especially technical ones—and an understanding of intended targets. Canadian capabilities for detection of malicious online information operations are nascent and were created in an evolving and reactive way. This is the history of the rapid response mechanism, or RRM Canada, in a nutshell.

I'll very briefly go over that history. The RRM, as I'll call it, was created following the 2018 G7 meeting in order to perform a coordination function that can respond to a variety of shared threats to democracy. It was only after the Russian invasion of Ukraine that the Prime Minister announced, in August 2022, the establishment of a dedicated unit in RRM Canada at Global Affairs to address Russian and other state-sponsored disinformation. In essence, RRM Canada's disinformation unit is brand spanking new. Its resources are minuscule and its capacity to engage with a range of expert, private sector media-monitoring and open-source intelligence organizations is very limited. It was an innovative idea and has potential, but its “engine room”, as I call it, is far too small, and its fit as a Global Affairs Canada unit within the broader security and intelligence community is very problematic. Our detection side is weak.

What about countering? There are various tools. I'll list them: engaging with foreign state actors directly; working with allies, which is an important one; naming-and-shaming campaigns, as they're sometimes called; helping to strengthen the resilience of targeted communities, not least by giving them the means to be the eyes and ears against disinformation; and providing broader public education through published threat assessments from organizations like CSIS and CSE. At the pointy end, there are two things. One is using CSE powers to what could be called, colloquially, “hack back”. This is, in essence, using powers provided to CSE in 2019 for offensive cyber-operations. The other is criminal sanctions, which should be boosted by some of the provisions in Bill C-70. No one tool will suffice. All are necessary.

What about the foreign influence transparency registry, newly established through Bill C-70? Here I would urge the committee to have realistic expectations. FITR—the acronym—will mostly be a registry for good guys. It won't stop covert bad actors, but it might have a deterrent effect on grey-zone activities and open up a criminal sanctions path, such as the one utilized in the recent United States Department of Justice indictment against two Russia Today actors.

What do we need? First, I would argue that we need upgrades to RRM Canada's capacity and changes to its placement in government. One suggestion would be to move it to Public Safety's office for countering foreign interference. It's in the wrong place at Global Affairs.

We also need—and this is critical to any understanding of foreign malign influence operations—a much stronger open-source intelligence capability in the Canadian S and I community.

There is some capability. The function is far too widely distributed within the S and I community and subject to too many diverse mandates and sets of authorities. We saw some of this at work with regard to the government's efforts to respond to the freedom convoy protests. A central OSINT—open source intelligence—agency with a clear mandate is needed.

Finally, I would encourage the committee to give some serious thought to creating an equivalent of Sweden's Psychological Defence Agency, which was established by Sweden in January 2022. This agency combines an operations role in detecting and countering foreign malign influence operations, especially over social media, with a public role to strengthen societal resilience. A psychological defence agency may sound a little Orwellian, but that's the world we live in.

Thank you, Chair.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you very much for enlightening us, Dr. Giles. I understood very clearly from your opening remarks what the distinction is between need to know and right to know.

What concerns me when it comes to parliamentary privileges is actually whether I can get access to the information that is going to be useful to me in my role as a legislator. You have reassured me tremendously on that point.

Where you worried me is when you talked about international relations, particularly with the Five Eyes member countries, about CSIS's image and about potentially sullying its reputation. I heard that clearly.

I also heard clearly that Bill C‑70, which lacks teeth, in my opinion, has also contributed to providing us with more information in order to potentially avoid what we are experiencing in our legislative menu, which is going to last a very long time and is coming back to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

So I am trying to understand what benefit is provided by Bill C‑377 when I could get the information I need by making a request, unless the government decides not to authorize access, obviously.

I would like to get your opinion.

Since there is some delay in answering me, I am thinking my question was a very good one, Mr. Chair.

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

Mr. Chair, I think those are excellent observations, and I have perhaps two comments to offer.

First of all, one of the changes that was made to section 19 of the CSIS Act as part of Bill C-70 really removed what essentially was a prohibition from CSIS sharing any information or analysis outside the federal government, including unclassified information. Those amendments enable us to also provide a lot more unclassified information, advice and expertise in a way that we couldn't before.

That's enabling us, for example, to participate with allies in multibranded security advisories in a way that perhaps we couldn't before. It's also to enable sharing unclassified information that we previously couldn't provide. As the member mentioned, this gives us a great opportunity to have a far more sophisticated national security conversation.

Now, in some particular cases there will be specific pieces of information that are classified that we would like to be able to share outside the federal government to those who have the appropriate clearance. For example, there could be a situation where a parliamentarian is representing a particular constituency where we know a foreign interference actor might be interested, given the natural resources in the area or a particular ethnic or minority community that makes up the riding.

What we would like to be able to do is provide that specific and perhaps classified information to the parliamentarian to enable the parliamentarian to build their resiliency by being able to recognize and then, as a result of that, manage the threat.

That's the purpose of the changes to the CSIS Act. It is to allow us to do those resiliency disclosures.

Sometimes it will be unclassified information. Sometimes it would be classified, but classified information would be provided to only those who do have the requisite clearance.

In each of those cases there would need to be a determination by the owner of the information as to whether there was a specific need to know for that particular specific piece of information.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thanks, Chair.

Thanks, Ms. Giles, for the opening remarks.

Thanks to everybody here for what you do on a daily basis to help keep our country safe. There are some very familiar faces sitting at the table.

Ms. Giles, you talked about the threats, about the need to up our game and about the important changes that Bill C-70 allows that will allow CSIS, in particular, to share additional information. However, one of those conditions upon sharing additional classified information—and we're talking only at the secret level here, with my bill—is that you're still going to want those people to have a clearance before you share that information. That could be other levels of government. That could be—in particular here with Bill C-377—parliamentarians, so that's MPs and senators. That's a necessary safeguard that they're going to need in order to get that information.

Is that correct?

I would just ask if that is part of the reason this was evident and brought forward by CSIS—whether to NSICOP through reporting up to the government—and why it was included in Bill C-70.

Is it that there is that recognition that more classified information needs to be shared at a much wider level in order to address the ongoing security threats?

[Dr. Nicole Giles, Senior Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Good morning, Chair and members of the committee. It's an honour to join you today and to have the opportunity to discuss Bill C-377.

We hope to provide some insight to this committee on government security screening processes and policies, as well as on access to classified information and the importance of protecting it.

In the interest of time, as the chair mentioned, I have the honour of providing opening remarks on behalf of the entire panel of witnesses.

Security screening is a fundamental practice that makes it possible to establish and maintain a relationship of trust within the government, between the government and Canadians, and between Canada and foreign countries.

Security screening involves the collection of personal information from individuals with their informed consent, as well as information from law enforcement, intelligence sources and other sources, using methods to assess their reliability and loyalty to Canada. My colleagues here from TBS and PCO will be very pleased to expand upon these issues.

A security clearance is sometimes misunderstood or portrayed as a special designation, a set of privileges or an earned qualification like a rank. It is none of these. Simply put, in the Government of Canada, it is an administrative decision taken by the deputy head of an organization that an individual is an acceptable security risk when accessing government information, assets and facilities, and when working with others in government.

The deputy head makes their decision based on the information and advice provided by the police and intelligence services, including the RCMP and CSIS. A security clearance may be granted, denied or revoked by the deputy head at any time.

Since clearance holders work in every part of government, a security clearance does not automatically grant the holder access to all information or assets at that level of clearance.

Safeguarding sensitive information is critical to the Government of Canada's ability to function and to keep Canada and Canadians safe. There are rigorous measures in place to prevent the release of classified information to anyone who does not strictly require it.

These measures are imposed with very good reason. The inadvertent release of sensitive information can result—and, very sadly, has resulted—in serious harm to individuals, even costing lives, Canada's national interest and our international relations. Mitigating this risk underpins everything that members of the security and intelligence community do. The release of information could mean risking the safety of human sources, exposing the tradecraft and other methodologies used to conduct investigations, and threatening the stability of indispensable allied relationships upon which Canada depends so heavily for intelligence. Put simply, if partners cannot trust Canada with their information, they will no longer provide it to us.

Similarly, if human sources do not trust that CSIS can protect them by safeguarding the information that they provide to us, our ability to recruit sources and collect information vital to Canadian security will be seriously impeded. We could also lose access to a valuable technical collection source that took years and expensive investments to develop.

What may appear in the first instance as information that's not especially sensitive or harmful, when viewed in conjunction with other publicly released information, can be used by adversaries to make inferences with very serious consequences. This is called the mosaic effect. Our adversaries carefully watch and track every word we say and release publicly, and we're very confident that they are watching now. They put together many pieces of information to identify our sources, our methodologies, our tradecraft and intelligence gaps. Many adversaries are very good at their jobs.

There are important principles that reinforce this system and that lie at the foundation of safeguarding all sensitive information. This is the need-to-know principle. An individual's specific duties and functions and the files they were working on at that particular moment in time are what establish their need to know for relevant sensitive information. Even the most senior officials at CSIS, who have the highest possible clearance levels, do not receive sensitive information that is not relevant to the current job and files that they're working on. In other words, there is no deemed need to know.

We need to ensure that sufficient information is disclosed to hold the government to account while also ensuring that classified information is protected. There are several critical avenues for review and oversight of classified information, including the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, the National Security Intelligence Review Agency, the intelligence commissioner and the Federal Court, among others.

The people who work for these organizations have the necessary security clearances; they will receive the information classified as secret that they need for performing their specific jobs.

There are safeguards in place to ensure that no national security injury occurs as a result of disclosure of that information. These individuals are bound to secrecy under the foreign interference and security of information act, formerly known as the Security of Information Act, SOIA, and they must not knowingly disclose any information they obtained or to which they had access in the course of their duties and that a department is taking measures to protect.

At the same time, CSIS is making efforts to enhance its transparency, including in its public annual reports, which now say more than ever about its operations and the threat overview, and in its discussions with the media and the information it communicates to the public proactively.

We have taken extensive efforts to “write for release” information, for example in the proactive provision of chronologies of events to parliamentary committees. We've done that in the last couple of months.

Recent amendments to the CSIS Act through Bill C-70 further enhance CSIS's ability to share information, and we look forward to working more closely with parliamentarians as we up the national security conversation in this country.

We will be happy to answer your questions.

[Benjamin Fung]

One example is that it is not just focusing on social media disinformation. When we talk about disinformation, we often talk about social media, but the CCP is not just working on social media. It also works with traditional media, which is the Chinese media running in Canada. There are newspapers. There are radio stations in Vancouver and Toronto. They are collaborating with the CCP and different Chinese organizations running in Canada.

One of the questions raised previously was about the difference between Russian disinformation and this Chinese disinformation here. It is the economic power, because China can use advertisements to directly control what radio stations and newspapers put out in their content and how they invite different commentators to the radio stations. It can use its local economic power to control that, which is not the same in the Russian case.

To fight against this type of collaboration, I think Bill C-70 will play a part of the role by trying to identify the foreign agents in this case.

[Heath MacDonald, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

Thank you for those comments.

One you've left out—and I think I'll just touch on it briefly—is that around this table, we need to work together. This is a turning point for Canada. It's a scary situation that we find ourselves in. You talk about our future. You're talking about our children. I think it's extremely important that partisan politics, not only around this committee table but also in the House of Commons.... When we do come to votes, we've seen what we can do with Bill C-70, and I will get to that in a second. I think the more pressure that people like you put on politicians of all stripes is certainly important as well.

In saying that, apply Bill C-70 to this case—the foreign interference. How could Bill C-70 help in this type of situation that we find ourselves in?

[Marcus Kolga]

I'll try to be brief.

I think that the government has made some progress, even significant progress, in terms of addressing foreign influence operations. I think a shining example of that is the rapid response mechanism at Global Affairs Canada. It started out rather slowly, some six or seven years ago, but has really become quite bold in its efforts to expose foreign information narratives and those tactics to Canadians to build that awareness. That is exactly what is needed. It's that boldness in clearly exposing those narratives and tactics that will help build awareness.

Bill C-70, as you mentioned, is a step in the right direction. We still don't know how that's going to be implemented.

The previous panel mentioned the fact that there have been major changes to the CSIS Act. Allowing CSIS to communicate threats that they are detecting and observing to vulnerable ethnic community groups, for example, is extremely important. It's incredibly important for them to be able to communicate with civil society organizations like DisinfoWatch to let us know what they're seeing, so that we might be able to expose some of those narratives and tactics.

Making sure that the foreign influence transparency registry is properly implemented will be critically important as well, to help protect Canadians against these sorts of operations as well as against transnational repression.

The last thing I will say is that we need to be enforcing our sanctions legislation. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, with the Tenet Media case we know now, thanks to the United States and the Department of Justice, that two Canadians received financing and funds directly from RT—well, through some U.K. shell companies. They received this funding in 2024, according to that indictment.

As I mentioned in my opening remarks, RT was placed on our sanctions list in 2022 already. That raises a number of questions in terms of the Special Economic Measures Act, which allows us to place sanctions on these entities. There are questions as to whether that legislation has been violated.

Enforcing our sanctions legislation is the first thing we need to be doing.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to both witnesses for being with our committee today.

Foreign interference has obviously been a hot topic this year. We had the explosive revelations in the NSICOP report, and we also saw the House of Commons come together in a rare show of unanimous support for an important piece of legislation in Bill C-70. We certainly are looking forward to updates on how our intelligence and security agencies are going to make use of that legislation to beef up their capabilities.

I want to go back a bit further, because, of course, Mr. Kolga and Mr. Shull, you were both really good witnesses for our previous study looking into Canada's security posture vis-à-vis Russia. Certainly your testimony back in 2022 aided this committee in making a lot of the recommendations to the government. It's in that context that I would like for both of you to weigh in.

Is there anything else you would like to tell this committee about? If you compare the recommendations we made in that report, which was tabled in the House of Commons in March 2023, and where we are now, is there anything more you would like to see this committee focus on, where some of those recommendations are still a work in progress? Is there anything that we should be highlighting in that context?

Mr. Kolga, I'll start with you and then move to Mr. Shull.

[Marcus Kolga]

I completely agree that an agency, a unit within government, to support the victims of transnational repression would be extremely helpful.

When these sorts of attacks happen, it is psychologically taxing. It is very difficult to deal with them. Reputations are harmed. There are impacts on family members. At the moment, there is zero support for the victims.

I would also argue that there are hundreds, possibly thousands, of victims of transnational repression in Canada right now. We have seen how the Chinese government has targeted its own diaspora, and how it has targeted Uyghur and Tibetan activists in this country.

The only support they have is when we talk to each other. We have an informal network, and we try to do as much as we can to support each other. The government really does have a role here to support those victims, but also to enforce the laws that we have by implementing Bill C-70, which will provide some degree of protection for the victims of transnational repression.

I would also argue that Canada has a role to play in creating an international network of nations where there are victims who are targets of transnational repression. Canada is not the only country where there are victims. We know that citizens of the U.K. and Sweden, among others, have been targeted. Working together, maybe within the framework of the G7 or NATO, might be helpful in creating that international network and an international front, like a coalition, to push back on transnational repression.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

You don't get access to it if you don't have the clearance, and that was the challenge, even in an imminent threat in this scenario. Again, this wasn't about ensuring that parliamentarians had the information—obviously, the government had it—but actually all the different levels of government. When you're dealing with a massive....

Again, I'm using the example of a security threat, not something like consequence management of an earthquake, a flood or a fire, but when it comes to a security threat and the scenario to play it out. I mention this because I wrote the scenario and ran the exercise. It wasn't about the initial improvised explosive device having gone off, which overwhelmed the system and required the military to help support different levels of resources in Nova Scotia, and our being dependent on allies, like the Americans, to bring in capabilities. I wrote an inject into the exercise that said, “Now we have another potential improvised explosive in Montreal. We now have a threat. How are we going to brief the appropriate authorities in Montreal?” Guess what? Half of the provincial government people and nobody in the hospitals or the transportation system had the right clearances.

That's the good thing about Bill C-70, which will help fix some of that, since now CSIS finally has the authority to share classified information with levels of government other than just the federal government. We're moving the needle in the right direction on the sharing of certain information.

This is just an extension to it, in a parliamentary case, that should.... A great example Ms. Romanado brought forward is that the defence committee, the foreign affairs committee and the public safety committee all had studies in which they brought this forward and said, “Look, we'd like to know more here so that we can actually make good, solid recommendations to Parliament and the government of the day, to fix and address threats and shortfalls within Canada.”

[Marcus Kolga, Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for the privilege and opportunity to testify before you today. I want to begin by expressing my gratitude for your recognition of the serious threat that Russian information and influence operations pose to our democracy and society.

For the past 15 years I've dedicated myself to monitoring and exposing Russian information warfare and influence campaigns targeting Canada and our allies. This is not a partisan issue. Safeguarding Canada's cognitive sovereignty and the integrity of our information environment is essential to defending our democracy and maintaining social cohesion.

The September 4, 2024 indictment from the U.S. Department of Justice highlights the extent of this threat, but it is just the tip of a much larger iceberg. For over a decade, Canadians have collaborated with Russian state media outlets like RT and Sputnik news, and with platforms like Montreal's Global Research, which the U.S. state department has identified as a key pillar of the Russian disinformation ecosystem. They also enable and collaborate in Russian transnational repression, targeting Canadian activists like me, communities and even parliamentarians.

Furthermore, Canadians continue to engage with sanctioned Kremlin-aligned think tanks such as the Valdai club and the Russian International Affairs Council, which played pivotal roles in the laundering of disinformation and in efforts to affect policy and opinions in Canada through the influencers connected to them. These Kremlin-controlled entities, including RT, are not merely propaganda tools. They are designed to weaponize information in order to manipulate our understanding of the world around us, undermine our democracy and erode our social fabric. They are not bound by any physical borders, either.

An FBI affidavit released alongside the DOJ indictment of September 4 provides detailed minutes of high-level Russian meetings and strategy documents. One of Vladimir Putin's closest advisers, Sergey Kiriyenko, was involved in these meetings, underscoring the personal importance of these operations to Putin. Among the documents in the affidavit are instructions to Russian propaganda agents to monitor western information environments for domestic conflicts, friction points and crises, and to artificially create and intensify tensions in countries allied with the United States. The documents instruct agents to create false narratives and lies. They are delivered through western influencers and state media platforms like RT to achieve this. Global Affairs Canada has now identified RT as an arm of Russia's intelligence apparatus engaging in psychological operations and disinformation, while its cyber-actors target western nations, including Canadian critical infrastructure.

The U.S. indictment exposes the significant involvement of Canadians in RT's activities. It alleges that a company established by two Canadians received $10 million from RT to create a platform for transmitting these narratives to Canadian and American audiences. While this may seem like a large sum, it is only a fraction of the $3 billion that Russia spends annually on information operations globally. The indictment claims that Canadians were producing content for RT as early as March 2021 and that RT funnelled money to these individuals through U.K. shell companies as recently as this year. RT was added to Canada's sanctions list in July 2022, which raises serious questions about potential violations of Canadian sanctions laws. This committee should inquire as to whether the RCMP is investigating these Canadians and others collaborating with Kremlin-controlled entities.

Both the DOJ indictment and the FBI affidavit are smoking guns. They provide clear evidence of Russian operations targeting Canada, a threat that has persisted for nearly 90 years. Perhaps the most alarming case of Russian intelligence operations in Canada, and one that's been largely ignored, is of GRU Colonel Mikhail Mikushin. For over a decade, Mikushin attended Carleton University and the University of Calgary. He even wrote an article for the Canadian Naval Review journal and volunteered on a Canadian political campaign. Shockingly, it wasn't CSIS, CSE or the RCMP that uncovered Mikushin's identity as a GRU colonel recently. It was Norwegian intelligence. That's Norway, not Canada. The service Mikushin provided to Russia's intelligence operations was so important to Vladimir Putin that he was included in the August prisoner swap, returning to Russia alongside Putin's other GRU assassins and hackers.

It's unlikely that Mikushin was the only Russian intelligence agent working in Canada, nor are the Canadians behind Tenet Media the only Canadians collaborating with RT and other Kremlin media. If we seek to disrupt, stop and deter such operations, we must hold those behind them and their Canadian collaborators to account by investigating and exposing them, enforcing our existing laws, properly implementing new ones like the foreign influence transparency registry and BillC-70, and simply ending our willful ignorance to this threat.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

At this committee we have often had the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service before us as witnesses to update the committee on their activities. Of course, a lot of what they do by its very nature goes unreported. They have to operate in a very clandestine world. They have to be very mindful that their sources could be compromised and their lives even put in danger if they reveal too much information.

However, in the spring session, there was a rare moment of unity when the entire House of Commons came together in very short order to pass Bill C-70, which among other things pretty much brought an analog law up to date in a digital world. It has allowed CSIS to be a bit more proactive in how it shares information with other entities. Certainly I've had meetings with CSIS officials since that act received royal assent. The service is still coming to terms with how it's going to implement some measures, but it certainly is being a bit more proactive.

When it comes to the work that our security and intelligence agencies are doing—and this includes the officials at Public Safety Canada—and you compare it to some of the European examples, are there any wishes that you have for how maybe those agencies could be a little more proactive with the Canadian public in a non-political way in underlining the gravity of the threat and the measures that need to be taken to counteract it? Could they maybe be a bit more proactive when we actually have some success in stopping some of these campaigns?

Maybe I'll start with you, and we can ask everyone to comment on it quickly.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I understand the need to know. I also understand its impact, especially in the case of foreign interference. There is a reason so many recommendations came out of the study on Bill C‑70.

On the flip side, what are the negative effects? What can happen following a request like that? There are considerations related to security and the protection of parliamentarians, to say nothing of the information itself, which has to be known and disclosed, but at what cost?

What would the risk be?

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Chair, we're here today to speak to my private member's bill, Bill C-377 , an act to amend the Parliament of Canada Act, by adding the following subclause:

A member of the Senate or the House of Commons who applies for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada is, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information in respect of which the application is made.

Really, what does this mean? It means that for the purposes of applying for the security clearance, parliamentarians have a need to know. The most important aspect to understand is that this bill would only allow parliamentarians to apply for a secret security clearance. The government would, then, not be able to deny, regardless of which party is in government, a parliamentarian from applying. That's all it would do; it would allow them to apply.

The bill does not guarantee that a parliamentarian's application would pass, should they apply. They still must go through the same government security vetting and clearance process. I've had a secret level security clearance for decades now. I've had a top secret security clearance for over 15 years. Having a clearance does not guarantee that one gets access to whatever classified information they want whenever they want, or on any classified issue. One still must demonstrate the need to know to the government to get access to the classified information. This is, really, the second safeguard of the “need to know” principle on how the system protects classified information.

Why is it so important to allow parliamentarians a secret security clearance? The preamble of my bill, Bill C-377, states:

in the face of threats to world peace and security posed by nefarious state and non-state actors, the Government of Canada needs to make challenging decisions relating to national security, which it must do in a manner that is consistent with its constitutional duty to be accountable to Parliament and that respects the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Canadian Bill of Rights;

This highlights the need to improve transparency, accountability and education with respect to the ever-changing threats to Canada and our democratic institutions and processes, but ultimately for Parliament to rebuild the trust in those same democratic processes and institutions.

Let's look at some testimony that you have heard at this PROC committee in just the last year. You had Vincent Rigby here. He served as the national security and intelligence adviser from January of 2020 to June of 2021. He stated that transparency needed to be increased by producing annual public threat assessments, responding to the NSICOP reports, publishing intelligence priorities and, most important, sharing more intelligence with members of Parliament.

In the conclusion of Top Secret Canada: Understanding the Canadian Intelligence and National Security Community, edited by Stephanie Carvin, Thomas Juneau and Craig Forcese, it states:

Canadians (and indeed, their political leaders) must have context to avoid swinging wildly from indifference to panic when security events occur. Likewise, transparency and national security literacy help citizens tease apart real scandals from the noise. More generally, Canadians shall need to develop a renewed understanding of the hard dilemmas that frequently arise in securing a free and democratic state.

Let's look at a few real-life parliamentary examples where access to classified information has become a political hot potato both under this current Liberal government and under the former Conservative government, respectively, the Winnipeg labs and, under the previous Conservative government, the Afghan detainee file issue. How did Parliament ultimately address both of those issues? They formed ad hoc committees at the last minute and created a whole lot of undue politicization of the whole process, whereas, if Parliament had members already cleared, this would have sped up the process and helped downplay the politicization.

More recently, let's look at foreign interference. We know that parliamentarians are being targeted—and this isn't new. We can go back to the 2019 annual report by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, where they recommended that parliamentarians needed to be briefed on the threats they face from foreign interference. This, again, has been further emphasized and highlighted by the most recent and ongoing public inquiry into foreign interference, the NSIRA review, in their report, and in the most recent NSICOP report on public interference that was just tabled in May.

The point I'm trying to make here, and we've heard some of this feedback from parliamentarians who have received some of the generic defensive briefs on foreign interference, is that it's not specified and it doesn't have enough detail to actually make them understand the threats that parliamentarians are facing.

In response to these reports, the government tabled Bill C-70, and kudos to Parliament for fast-tracking that bill with all-party support, because there's one relevant aspect of Bill C-70 that made changes to the CSIS Act. These changes now allow CSIS to share classified information beyond the federal government with other levels of government—provinces and territories, municipalities and first nations—and with industry and other stakeholders.

However, one key caveat that still needs to be cracked is that those individuals still must gain a security clearance to be briefed. If they're not cleared, they cannot get access to that information unless it's an imminent threat, if it's going to save somebody's life or if it's a grave public threat. There are all sorts of caveats that allow our national security agencies, including CSIS, to help out.

Finally, I'd like to remind the committee of your own unanimous consent recommendation from earlier this year during the report on the question of privilege related to the member for Wellington—Halton Hills and other members. Recommendation 3 states:

That the government work with recognized parties' whips to facilitate security clearances, at Secret level or higher, of caucus members who are not Privy Councillors (particularly those who sit on committees with mandates concerning foreign affairs, national defence and national security), who shall be taken as satisfying [the] requirements for a “need to know,” to ensure that they may be adequately briefed about important national security matters, including foreign intelligence threat activity directed toward Parliament, or their party or its caucus members.

Basically, this committee has already recommended and supported what Bill C-377 is trying to achieve.

I look forward to any questions from my honourable colleagues.

[Marcus Kolga]

I think it will have a tremendous impact if it's properly implemented, and, again, if it's enforced. That update in Bill C-70 to the Security of Information Act will go a long way to helping defend vulnerable communities, activists, journalists and of course parliamentarians who are being targeted with transnational repression. I think that's positive.

There's the update to the CSIS Act and the fact that the update will allow CSIS to now communicate with non-governmental organizations when it's relevant, perhaps to warn individuals and groups when they are being targeted by these sorts of operations and to let civil society organizations know when they detect these sorts of operations, so that we can be better prepared to defend Canadian democracy and society against them. That's a major improvement.

As part of Bill C-70, we also saw the adoption of the foreign influence transparency registry, which will also be critically important. The implementation we'll have to keep an eye on, but this will also be an incredibly important measure in defending against these sorts of operations in the future. I hope that the legislation will be implemented very quickly and that it will be enforced.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for joining us on this very important study.

I'll draw your attention to Bill C-70. Are you familiar with motion 112, which was also introduced in the House? What we're talking about here is information.

Some important recommendations came out of this study. On the misinformation piece, what Mr. Cooper ended with in his question was that there was misinformation. The Liberal Party did not amplify the claims that he's talking about. We've seen evidence of him drawing different conclusions earlier in this study today as well.

However, I will stick to the important matters here—namely, the solutions and what you're talking about in terms of what we can do better. On the issue of information that's being shared, we can look at the Security of Information Act. In fact, a former director of CSIS came into the study and talked about how important it was to use that as an enforcement tool. I talked about motion 112 and sharing information with hostile nations and some agreements we have that already exist and that need to be reviewed. Motion 112 is something I co-authored with MP Dhaliwal.

Can you expand on how important the Security of Information Act is, within your scope of knowledge on that? What impact can the fact that it hasn't been updated for over 20 years have?

[Marcus Kolga]

Thank you so much for that question.

We have Bill C-70 coming into place now. Ultimately, it comes down to ensuring that it is implemented properly to ensure that we are enforcing the legislation that's already in place.

I mentioned during my opening remarks that Canadians were working directly with RT. The U.S. DOJ indictment about that case clearly indicated that Canadians received payment into Canadian bank accounts. The timelines that were presented in that indictment would indicate that those payments were made during a period when RT was under Canadian sanctions. Services were delivered to RT and payment was made from RT to Canadian bank accounts. That, to me, would indicate a potential violation of our sanctions legislation.

My question would then be this: What is the Canadian government doing about that? Is there an investigation into sanctions violations? Are we going to enforce the legislation that we already have in place? If we don't do that, that will send a message to all of these foreign regimes that engage in foreign influence operations and information operations that it's the Wild West: They can do anything in this country.

We need to begin right now by enforcing the current legislation that we have in place.

[Marcus Kolga]

I would agree. I think it's at all levels. For quite some time, I've been advocating greater transparency when it comes to collaboration with foreign governments, especially authoritarian foreign governments. I think Bill C-70 will go a long way to helping with that, so yes, I would agree with you—

[Marcus Kolga, Director, DisinfoWatch]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for the privilege to speak about the threat of disinformation, specifically Russian information and influence operations targeting our democracy.

Over the past decade, we've witnessed a disturbing increase in the Kremlin's efforts to undermine our democratic institutions, erode our social cohesion and advance its geopolitical interest through state media, proxies and collaborators within Canada. While significant attention has been directed toward Chinese government interference in recent years, we've not fully addressed the equally dangerous and sophisticated information campaigns waged by the Kremlin.

The threat to Canada is real, and it cannot be ignored, as recent actions to disrupt these operations by the U.S. government have highlighted. The U.S. Department of Justice recently indicted two employees of Russia Today, RT, a Russian state entity that operates not merely as a media outlet but, as the U.S. Department of State and Global Affairs have noted, as an important component of Russia's intelligence apparatus. This indictment, which implicates Canadians in RT's operations and as its targets, is nothing less than a smoking gun. Canada is a key target of Russian information warfare.

An FBI affidavit that was published at the same time as the indictment details Kremlin documents and minutes from meetings with one of Vladimir Putin's top advisers, highlighting the regime's commitment to weaponizing information. The tactics exposed include developing and spreading lies and conspiracies, manipulating social media algorithms and using Russian and North American influencers to amplify them in efforts to destabilize democratic societies, and that includes Canada.

The objectives are clear: to ignite domestic conflicts, to deepen social divisions, to weaken nations that oppose Russian aggression in Ukraine and to erode public support for Ukraine.

Canadian parliamentarians have also been targets of these operations over the past decade. Following our government's strong stance against Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and our leadership of NATO's enhanced forward presence mission in Latvia, we witnessed Russian information and influence operations targeting Canadian officials and policies. Prime Minister Harper's government was an initial target, including during the 2015 federal election. This was followed by the targeting of then foreign minister Chrystia Freeland and other outspoken parliamentarians.

It's important to note that the Kremlin does not favour any specific Canadian political party. Instead, as the Kremlin documents clearly outline, they seek to exploit existing divisions and create conflict to undermine our democracy and further their interests. This includes diminishing support for Ukraine and weakening international alliances like NATO that oppose Russia's aggression. We've now learned that RT invested $10 million in a company founded by two Canadians aimed at advancing Russian narratives in the U.S. and within our own borders.

A recent poll we conducted at DisinfoWatch with the Canadian Digital Media Research Network indicates that most Canadians have in fact been exposed to Russian disinformation about Ukraine and are vulnerable to it. Canadian influencers play a key role in advancing the Kremlin's narratives in Canada and in the U.S., as do the Canadian academics and activists who collaborate with Kremlin-controlled think tanks like Vladimir Putin's Valdai Club and the Russian International Affairs Council, which are on Canada's sanctions list.

To disrupt and deter these well-documented Kremlin operations and to protect Canadians, the Canadian government, law enforcement and the intelligence community must acknowledge the seriousness of the threat they pose to our democracy and society. We must conduct thorough investigations into Russian collaborators and proxies operating within Canada and hold them to account under our laws. This includes any sanctions laws that may have been violated, including the foreign influence transparency registry and Bill C-70.

Given Russia's ties to foreign intelligence services, Canada must follow Europe's lead in banning all Russian state media from public airwaves and the Internet. This should be extended to Chinese and Iranian state media and state-controlled outlets as well. We should also introduce new legislation based on Europe's Digital Services Act, holding social media companies accountable for the content on their platforms and the algorithms that amplify it.

By enforcing transparency, content moderation and reporting requirements, we can make it significantly harder for hostile actors to weaponize these platforms to spread disinformation in Canada.

Finally, we need to acknowledge and address the rise of foreign authoritarian transnational repression targeting Canadian activists, journalists, diaspora communities and, indeed, parliamentarians.

The persistent efforts of foreign authoritarian regimes to undermine our democracy and social cohesion must be met with equally persistent measures and resources to confront, disrupt, deter and, ultimately, prevent them from succeeding.

Thank you again for this privilege. I look forward to your questions.

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

There are several models, but they're not all infallible. I repeat that, at present, there is certainly a lack of collaboration between parliamentarians and intelligence agencies.

For a very long time, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, and the Communications Security Establishment, or CSE, weren't even allowed to inform anyone except the prime minister or the Minister of Public Safety. Bill C‑70 looks set to change all that. It remains to be seen how this will play out in practice.

One thing is certain: prevention is needed. Equipment can't do everything, and it can't stop everything. We need to develop a new business culture. I'm not talking about spyware or James Bond, but a business culture. We need to acquire new reflexes, because we're still very vulnerable. If we create a breach, we're literally letting everyone into the house.

The TikTok app has been cited as an example. Why is TikTok problematic? If someone blindly signs the terms and conditions and gives access to his or her phone, contact list, camera and microphone, which can be activated remotely, it becomes nothing less than clandestine wiretapping equipment.

Let's say I'm a teenager going to CEGEP or school. I'm not necessarily the target of cyber-attacks, but my contact list may contain information about my uncle, who works for the Department of National Defence, my mother, who works for the government, or my sister, who works for a very important strategic company. So we've just given a foreign power, like China, access to all this information.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Look, we have a lot to get done. This motion simply provides for the minister to appear for one meeting of two hours. That hardly pushes back our schedule. In fact, I would submit that it might help move our schedule forward by probing the minister on certain matters that the committee is seized with.

Yes, the minister will appear on Bill C-65, otherwise known as the “loser Liberal pension protection act”, but that might not be for several weeks from now. In the meantime, we have a minister who has a lot to answer for on matters relating to the government's continued obstruction of Madam Justice Hogue's inquiry by refusing to turn over documents. We have the steps the government has taken to counter foreign interference with the passage of Bill C-70, which we fully supported and called on the government long ago to pass in order to create a foreign influence registry. We have the failure or refusal of the minister to name the compromised members of Parliament, as well as his refusal to provide the assurance, when I put it to him at the public safety committee in June, that not one of those 11 sits on Justin Trudeau's cabinet. He refused to answer that straightforward question, which is very telling.

All of these issues are pressing and fall within the broader study we have been undertaking on foreign interference. This ties in as well to the question of privilege before this committee, which takes precedent over all other matters.

For all of those reasons, it is important that we have the opportunity as a committee to probe the minister, not just on the loser Liberal pension protection act, but on many of these other issues relating to foreign interference: the government's continued obstruction and efforts to cover up what the Prime Minister knew, and who is compromised in his caucus and in his cabinet.

[Dr. Charles Burton]

With Bill C-70 there does seem to be more provision for CSIS to be able to advise elements outside of CSIS of information they have derived from intelligence about Chinese espionage activities and other ways that China is engaging in activities to obtain intelligence and undermine our democracy.

It's a very complicated issue. I think the Chinese government would like to drive a wedge between Canadians of Chinese heritage and the Canadian mainstream by on the one hand creating suspicion about Chinese researchers—that they might be collaborating with China—and on the other hand wanting to get persons of Chinese origin, who are Canadian citizens and therefore should be loyal to Canada only, to serve the Chinese interest in various ways, particularly if they have access to information that could serve the regime. There's a degree of coercion that's used if these people have family inside China who can be leveraged by the Chinese Communist regime.

It's a serious issue. I think we should be doing much more to expel agents of the Chinese regime under diplomatic cover who are coordinating this massive approach through the Chinese Ministry of State Security and the Chinese Communist Party's United Front Work Department.

I suspect that our intelligence agencies know a lot about these agents and people but that we are reluctant to expel diplomats even if they're engaged in activities inconsistent with their mandate as diplomats under the Vienna Convention. I'm just puzzled as to why we don't address this issue much more seriously and protect our Canadians of Chinese origin from harassment and coercion by a foreign state.

[Dr. Charles Burton]

I think it's the implementation of the legislation that has been problematic. In one case, some clothes that were seized, alleged to have been using Chinese cotton produced by forced labour, were eventually released. The determination was that there wasn't justification for withholding those on a forced labour basis. As you say, other countries are seizing a lot of stuff from China by identifying the forced labour and putting the responsibility and incumbency on the importer to demonstrate that there is no forced labour involved.

I feel a lot of regret that Canada is so far behind on this, but this is perhaps characteristic of Canada's being behind other nations in terms of recognizing Chinese malign activities and coming into compliance with the United States, the U.K., Australia and so on in forming legislation and regulations and practices that meet the challenge. We need to put many more resources into our intelligence and CBSA to try to realize the will of Parliament to stop these kinds of activities from occurring.

We'll face the same thing with Bill C-70. It's nice legislation, but will we be able to implement it effectively?

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

For the kids, we're bringing in Shakespeare as we talk about the disinformation spread by the Liberal government. We saw it, and that's a great example.

We're lucky to live next door to our friends in the United States, because they've provided great cover to the incompetence of these Liberals on matters of terrorism and foreign interference. We're so fortunate that they brought it to light for Canadians, because it would have died in darkness with Ms. Khalid and her colleagues.

We very much look forward to more information about the effects of misinformation. It would be interesting to get some of the people cited in the article—not just the authors, but those who intentionally and without evidence spread false information. That's a damning indictment of this Liberal government after their nine years. They're unapologetic about it.

Ms. Khalid talked about wanting to strip partisan politics out of it. I have an amendment that looks to achieve some of that. I also have an amendment that looks to solve some of the scheduling challenges it creates. The quantity of the meetings is of no issue. The broad substance of the subject is important.

My goodness, look at the ineptitude and failures of the Liberal government on foreign interference and its intentional spreading and amplification of disinformation. We know it should be more concerned about exposition potentially than foreign governments. I think that domestic interference or domestic deception is a giant problem with these Liberals, who also want to seek, of course, to censor what Canadians see on the Internet.

They create the disinformation, limit the channels or the ways Canadians can receive it and then say anything that's offside with their narrative is a lie, when we've seen countless examples that these Liberals are, in fact, the perpetrators of the very thing they claim to detest. It's very timely that we're going to deal with this. I think it's important that we do it.

In paragraph (a), the motion reads, “The devastating impact of malicious, artificially generated online bots used by foreign and domestic actors.” That's fine. It continues to read, “This includes Russia's propaganda machine to manipulate....”

I'll ask the clerk to take note of this. My amendment would strike the word “the” and continue to leave in “public discourse and fake bot accounts”. Then strike all of the words after that up to paragraph (b). That way, we're capturing all incidents of this, not just the one that was already studied. It would include it, of course, and it would allow us to call the witnesses and the experts from the Canadian Digital Media Research Network who created this report.

The last two changes to the motion are in the final paragraph, where it reads, “that the committee”. I would strike the word “immediately”, leave the word “devote” and strike the words “the next”. I would leave the words following that, including “three meetings”.

I think you've probably been able to capture that. It expands the scope in paragraph (a), so it's actually more substantive in its amended form, including the incident that's cited, but it goes beyond that as well.

Because we have a subcommittee meeting after this to talk about scheduling.... Oh, we don't. We have a meeting scheduled Thursday. It would step on that meeting and probably also not give us enough time to spool up witnesses for it. We'll be able to schedule that as part of the other study and for the three meetings that are requested.

Let's get to the bottom of this. Let's do that. I think it's important as part of the public discourse. People are concerned about this. Canadians are rightly concerned about it. They've asked and been begging the government for action on foreign interference. We dragged them, kicking and screaming, to bring in Bill C-70, and though it doesn't go far enough and is not a perfect bill, it got some things right. We're pleased that it's moving forward—and, indeed, with no thanks to the Liberals—so let's do that. Let's have this conversation. Hopefully, these amendments can be included so that we can get the speedy passage of the motion.

Note, Chair, that side conversations didn't require any kleenex over here.

[Michael Barrett, Conservative, Leeds—Grenville—Thousand Islands and Rideau Lakes, ON]

Thanks very much, Chair.

I want to share with the committee an example of real-life disinformation, and it's been propagated by Ms. Khalid and her colleagues: disinformation while talking about disinformation. I'm going to share a Canadian Press story from August 28, 2024. It deals exactly with some of the contents of the motion and what Ms. Khalid talked about before.

It reads:

There is no evidence that indicates the federal Conservatives were behind a bot network on social media that praised a Pierre Poilievre rally, a new study has found.

The Canadian Digital Media Research Network launched an investigation after hundreds of X accounts posted about the Conservative leader's July rally in Kirkland Lake, Ont., all using the same language with phrases like “buzzing with energy” and “as a northern Ontarian.”

The fact that the posts were so similar immediately raised questions about who was behind the network of bots, with the NDP and Liberals pointing the finger at the Conservatives.

The Conservative Party denied having any involvement.

Results from the investigation were published on Wednesday.

“Despite this significant speculation and associated accusations, we find no evidence that indicates a political party or foreign entity employed this bot network for political purposes,” said Aengus Bridgman, Director of the Media Ecosystem Observatory and a contributor of the report.

Instead, the researchers said they believe it was an amateur experimenting with a bot pipeline by sourcing content from news stories, and the Poilievre event was caught in the mix. The rally had been reported on in mainstream media in the days leading up to the mass posts.

“This is not done with intent to manipulate, it's with intent to experiment,” Bridgman said.

Very few Canadians saw original bot posts and the report said their impact was considered to be insignificant, but Bridgman said the narrative about the bots was “hijacked”.

The followup conversation about the posts ended up getting millions of views on X, and millions more through amplification by media, the report shows.

Many of those posts attacked the Conservative party and Poilievre for attempting to mislead Canadians about his popularity.

It also says:

Liberal MP Mark Gerretsen, too, pointed the finger at the Tories, claiming without evidence that the Conservative Party of Canada purchased the bots on social media.

...Ultimately, nearly half of the Canadians who heard about the bots believed a political party was to blame, with a vast majority of them thinking it was the actions of the Conservatives....

Bridgman described the political discourse around the bot campaign as “toxic” and said it should serve as a lesson for future Canadian elections.

Also, this quote is really important:

“The finger-pointing without evidence is actually quite destructive and leans into the hyper-partisan, hyper-polarized information ecosystem that we find ourselves in today in Canada....

Here we have the Liberal MPs who are talking about disinformation actually propagating it. They actually spread disinformation. The false claim they made was disproven by experts, and the report went on to say that it's only because of their disinformation campaign that the effect of these bots was amplified—hook, line and sinker.

Ms. Khalid has said that she wants to put partisan politics aside, but they've put them in the shop window. They've put them to the forefront. We heard her say we're better than this. No, they're actually not. They are actually called out for spreading disinformation.

Let me tell you that I have a few minor amendments to the motion, but we think this is an excellent study. We think it's terrific. I think there are some great witnesses who are listed in this Canadian Press report.

We think the impact of foreign interference in our democracy is troubling. We think that, irrespective of the country, any foreign meddling in our democracy is unacceptable. That's why we've had to drag the Liberals, kicking and screaming, to implement legislation like Bill C-70 on foreign interference or a foreign agent registry. My goodness, it was worse than pulling teeth to try to get the Liberals to do it.

Also, like in many such cases, we needed the FBI to tell Canadians what these Liberals deny and, actually, the public safety minister, a minister in Trudeau's Liberal government, lied about Beijing-operated Chinese police stations in Canada. He lied about it.

Again, that's disinformation—

[Vanessa Lloyd]

Mr. Chair, I will start by responding to the honourable member's comments with regard to what I can and cannot say at committee. Unfortunately, I'm unable to answer in detailed specifics about the capabilities, methodologies and tradecraft that we employ in this or in any other case. To do so would jeopardize the integrity of our operations and our ability to conduct our operations securely.

I do thank the honourable member for referencing the changes to legislation that we received through Parliament under Bill C-70, which is an act countering foreign interference. The honourable member is quite right. There were changes to the permissions to and authorities to the service under the act, both with respect to our dataset regime and also with regard to information sharing.

Perhaps I would suggest that it is the latter piece of the change that may be most helpful in this instance, because the permissions that are given there are for the organization to share, beyond the federal government, classified information in order to increase resiliency against threats. As such, the information sharing provisions that we will move forward on under those changes will allow us, in fact, to inform Canadians more about the threats that exist and to be able to equip them to be resilient with regard to those threats.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I think I'll send my first question to Interim Director Lloyd of the service.

Again, on this video, I'm not going to get into the specifics because I understand the limitations you have in answering in a public forum.

My question is more on the process, and it's going to be related also to the recent changes that Parliament enacted through Bill C-70 and to the complete overhaul that we did with the dataset regime that is under the CSIS Act.

I have a couple of questions for you, Interim Director Lloyd.

Many Canadians are not very familiar with the dark web and the millions of images and videos that are present there. Could you tell the committee about the magnitude of what it's like and about the challenge of sifting through those images and videos in terms of finding that important data that you can then share with relevant agencies to determine whether there are any security threats that have a potential of entering Canada?

Also, what about recent changes in Bill C-70, notably the computational analysis of datasets? We essentially took an analog law and brought it up to speed in a digital era. What do those changes allow the service to do now in sifting through those images and videos in order to make these kinds of important determinations?

I think, on behalf of Canadians, this committee is serving a very important role. While we may not be able to ask you about the specifics of this case, I think Canadians also deserve to know about the kinds of tools the service is employing, about the strategies going forward and about the lessons you've learned from this so that these kinds of instances are not going to happen in the future.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Beauséjour, NB]

Ms. Damoff, thank you for the question.

I'm happy to see you as well at this committee again. You did important work here, in your role as a parliamentary secretary, on many of these issues.

Our government has sought to increase resources, for example, to CSIS. One of the most significant investments in both technology and capacity at CSIS happened in budget 2024 a few months ago. I think all of us should be very proud as parliamentarians and of our colleagues in the other place as well for adopting Bill C-70, which gave, for the first time in decades, new authorities to CSIS in a digital age.

To the comments about the existence of videos on the dark web, I think it's important, Ms. Damoff, for people to understand that I hear this from the security agencies. I have never, myself, been on the dark web, looking for these kinds of videos. It's called the dark web precisely because these kinds of videos don't normally come with credits and contact information at the end of them, so the idea that there's some simple way that security agencies and partners around the world are able to have access to the sickeningly thousands and millions of images of this kind of thing is why partnerships are so important. That's why working with the 150 other countries that Vanessa described is the best way for CSIS and for its partners in the RCMP and CBSA to do this work.

They need access to the technology. They need legislative authorities, which this Parliament gave them a few months ago, which is terrific, and they need their government to support them with the funds necessary to modernize. I believe that work is being done.

I'm lucky enough, with this super interesting job I have, to see that work up close every week and every month. As I said in my opening comments, Ms. Damoff, I was briefed by CSIS on July 24. When Deputy Commissioner Larkin and his colleagues, Mark Flynn and Commissioner Duheme, updated me on July 28 that these people were in custody and that a successful arrest had been made, it reminded me of the remarkable work done by these women and men in the agencies represented here, of the danger of their work and of the value of working constructively with partners around the world.

If we're not constructive and if we're reckless in releasing information, discussing origins of information and commenting on media reports of certain images and on the existence of evidence that may end up forming part of a criminal prosecution, we'll increasingly be unable to get that information, and we won't look like the reliable partner that we are with those agencies.

I heard from the director of MI6 himself, the chief, in London, about how much he values the work that CSIS does and the information that CSIS gives MI6. I thought it was reassuring for Canadians to know that somebody as interesting in the world as the chief, who would be C in the films we've all seen.... When Sir Richard Moore told me that MI6 is absolutely dependent on CSIS and other partners, it told me the system is working quite well.

[Nathalie Drouin]

Let me start with something that you as parliamentarians have just done. You have just adopted Bill C-70. Bill C-70 will give us new tools to address new realities—for example, being able to talk about foreign interference with other levels of government, the private sector and academics. That alone is a new tool that is very important.

Through the commission, we have also worked very hard in terms of trying to sanitize and do summaries when it comes to foreign intelligence documents. This is a new reality for us. We haven't done that before. This is in order to make those documents more accessible and transparent.

Other countries, yes, it's true, are doing declassification. We've heard many times the U.S. talking about the fact that they declassified information before the invasion of Russia in Ukraine. We can also learn from that and do that differently in a more regular manner.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

Chair and colleagues, thank you for inviting me and my colleague, Ms. Drouin, to speak to you about the important work of the Hogue commission.

Mr. Chair, I give a particular thank you to you. I had a real moment of panic yesterday that you might cancel this meeting this morning. Nathalie and I would have been devastated had you chosen to do so. We really appreciate the efforts you made, Mr. Chair and colleagues, to not go home after five weeks of sitting but to stay here to have this opportunity. It means the world to Nathalie and me, and I just wanted all of you to know that. Thank you.

Mr. Chair, the government recently introduced Bill C‑65, which will strengthen the Canada Elections Act, and Bill C‑70. I actually just spoke with our colleagues about the importance of this bill, and I thank the House of Commons and our colleagues in the Senate for passing it. Bill C‑70, as you well know, will strengthen the ability of the government and our intelligence and security services to detect and disrupt foreign interference threats, as well as protect Canadians.

As these measures show, the government is constantly improving safeguards to protect Canada's democracy and democratic institutions. It is also with this in mind that the government has taken significant steps to support the Commission on Foreign Interference, chaired by the Honourable Marie‑Josée Hogue. This is a testament to the seriousness of our commitment to combatting foreign interference.

Last year, I worked with my colleagues from all recognized parties in the House of Commons to develop the mandate of the Commission on Foreign Interference. At that time, Ms. Drouin was the deputy clerk. She also worked with me when she was deputy minister of justice, as you also know very well. We were able to benefit from her advice and support as a senior official at the Privy Council Office. It has helped us a great deal, as well as our colleagues, the House leaders of the other political parties. I want to acknowledge her role in this process last summer.

We also worked together to secure the appointment of Ms. Hogue as commissioner. I'm proud of the work we've done together on a non-partisan basis.

What we agreed to in the terms of reference that set up the Hogue commission was that a special exemption would be made to release certain cabinet confidences, specifically the same set of documents that was provided to the independent special rapporteur on foreign interference. These cabinet documents were provided early on to the commission as part of its initial phase of work. These documents, of course, were also shared with the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, as well as the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.

In addition to those documents outlined in the terms of reference specifically, the Government of Canada has provided over 46,000 documents to the commission and is processing thousands more documents as we speak. The majority of these documents, as you can imagine, are highly classified; to be clear, they are some of the most sensitive and top secret documents in the Government of Canada's possession.

The Government of Canada committed to ensuring the commission has access to all the material it requires to fulfill its mandate, and we continue to work with the commission collaboratively to this effect. Between the tens of thousands of documents and the dozens of government witnesses who have appeared before the commission, both in private, in camera hearings and in public sessions, I am confident that this remains the case.

I look forward to the commission's final report and recommendations. That report, as you know, will be tabled before December 31, 2024. I want to note that Commissioner Hogue has agreed to review the allegations regarding the parliamentarians named in the recent report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

I am confident that the commissioner's report will help strengthen Canada's democracy, democratic institutions and electoral processes. As you know very well, the recommendations—I hope—will also provide food for thought for our colleagues in the provinces, territories and, possibly, municipalities.

The Government of Canada, Mr. Chair, will continue to support the important work of Justice Hogue and her team. They are beginning a series of interviews with senior government witnesses. I'll have the privilege of being back in Ottawa in the coming weeks to meet with the lawyers of the Hogue commission. Their work is very much on track and continuing. We'll continue, as I said, in a collaborative way.

Madame Drouin spoke to me a few minutes ago about the ongoing dialogue that exists between senior officials of the Privy Council Office, who would be responsible for the management of cabinet documents and such. There is an ongoing active conversation between the commission, the commission's lawyers and the Privy Council Office. This work will continue. We very much believe it will result in the commission having exactly the information it needs to do this work.

I look forward to the discussion, Mr. Chair, and the questions from colleagues.

Once again, let me thank you profoundly for scheduling this morning's meeting. It means the world to me and Madame Drouin that we're able to be here with you.

Electoral Participation Act

[Vance Badawey, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport]

Madam Speaker, it is a pleasure to speak to Bill C-65 this evening in the House, the electoral participation act. As the title of this bill suggests, one of its key priorities is to encourage participation in the electoral process. We know that democratic engagement rests on trust in our electoral system, and that is why Bill C-65 proposes to enhance safeguarding measures in the Canada Elections Act.

As we all know, Canada's democracy is among the strongest and most stable in the world thanks in large part to the Canada Elections Act, which is the fundamental legislative framework that regulates our elections in this great nation. We have every reason to be proud of this legislation, but we are not immune to the global challenges that modernized democracies face. The integrity of the electoral process in the lead-up to, during and after elections is a prerequisite for trust in our democracy. This is why it is essential that we continue to address evolving threats to our democracy through regular improvements to the Canada Elections Act. This helps ensure that our system remains robust, resilient and equipped to keep pace with the issues of our time.

It should come as no surprise that safeguarding our elections includes measures to mitigate foreign interference. Foreign interference can take many forms, including social media campaigns designed to sow disinformation. The Communications Security Establishment's latest report highlights that online foreign influence activities have become a new normal, with adversaries increasingly seeking to influence our elections. We and all Canadians have a right to be concerned about these threats. This is why the government has been proactive in taking steps to counter foreign interference.

Our government's work to protect our democracy began as early as 2016, when we tabled Bill C-22. It led to the creation of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, a committee that assembles members from both chambers of Parliament to review matters concerning national security and intelligence.

In 2018, the government put forward Bill C-59, which enacted the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, giving the agency the mandate to review and investigate all Government of Canada national security and intelligence activities. That same year, we also introduced Bill C-76, which modernized the Canada Elections Act and introduced a number of prohibitions, including a prohibition preventing foreigners from unduly influencing electors, a prohibition against foreign third parties from spending on election-related activities and a prohibition against third parties from using any foreign funds.

In 2019, we put in place the plan to protect Canada's democracy, which included the security and intelligence threats to elections, or SITE, task force. The plan was subsequently updated in advance of the 2021 general election.

Most recently, we introduced Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act, which complements measures to further safeguard our federal elections and mitigate foreign influence in Bill C-65, which I am speaking to today. Finally, last September, our government launched the public inquiry into foreign interference. We look forward to receiving the commissioner's final report as well as recommendations.

These substantial government-wide initiatives demonstrate this government's commitment to remaining vigilant in our efforts to protect our electoral system. This commitment is further reflected in the safeguarding measures proposed through Bill C-65. I would like to highlight how this bill proposes to better protect our elections from foreign influence, disinformation campaigns and the misuse of technology, all of which seek to erode trust in our institutions. We do this so that Canadians can feel safe and confident when participating in our democracy.

First, we know that election interference can happen at all times and not just during elections. This is why Bill C-65 proposes to extend the application of the existing ban on undue foreign influence at all times, rather than being limited to the election period. This means, for example, that the ban on foreign entities unduly influencing voters to vote a certain way or influencing them to refrain from voting would extend to all times.

Second, Bill C-65 would create a clearer and more consistent definition of foreign entity activities under the act to close any and all gaps. For example, currently foreign entities can circumvent the law by having more than one purpose, where the ban on undue influence is limited to a foreign entity whose only purpose is to unduly influence voters. That would no longer be possible under Bill C-65. The bill proposes that foreign entities who have even just one of their primary activities as unduly influencing electors would be captured.

Third, Bill C-65 proposes important new financing rules to increase transparency and prevent anonymous foreign and dark money from entering our elections. This includes banning the use of crypto asset contributions, money orders and prepaid instruments such as prepaid credit cards or store gift cards for regulated activities by third parties and political actors.

Bill C-65 would introduce important new financing rules for third parties. Allow me to explain. Bill C-65 would allow third parties to use only contributions they have received from Canadian citizens and permanent residents to pay for regulated election expenses. This includes partisan activities, partisan advertising, election advertising and election surveys. This means that third parties would no longer be able to use funds received from any other third parties, such as corporations or businesses, for regulated expenses. For greater transparency, third parties would also need to report on the details of the individuals who contributed in total over $200, including names, addresses and amounts of each contribution.

We understand that third parties may not all receive contributions and may have their own revenue they wish to use for regulated expenses. In those instances, third parties who meet the threshold of 10% or less of their overall annual revenue and contributions would also be able to use their own revenues to pay for regulated activities. In addition, third parties would be required to provide financial statements to Elections Canada proving the revenue is their own.

The amendments to enhance transparency on the source of third party funding are important. Under the current rules, third parties are required to report only on contributions given to them for election purposes. Contributions received for other purposes may be mixed into the third party's general revenue, leaving a transparency gap as to where the funds came from.

The Chief Electoral Officer spoke to this concern in his June 2022 recommendations report tabled here in Parliament. He noted that the proportion of third party reporting on the use of their own funds for regulated expenses increased significantly, from 8% in 2011 to 37% in 2019 and 63% in 2021. This increasing trend in third party financing is concerning, which is why the government is taking action through Bill C-65. Let me reiterate, however, that third parties who do not meet the threshold would still be able to participate in regulated activities, but they would have to do so with the contributions they received as donations from Canadian citizens and permanent residents.

The next element I would like to speak on is disinformation. Disinformation, a key tactic by malign actors, aims to fuel discord and erode public trust in the electoral process. It seeks to manipulate voters and electoral processes through intentional falsehoods, often spread online, as well as, quite frankly, intimidation at times.

In 2022, the Chief Electoral Officer called disinformation about the electoral process the most important threat to Canada's election mandate. Security agencies have noted that disinformation is a persistent threat to election integrity. In the 2021 national electors study conducted by Elections Canada following the 44th general election, 71% of electors were concerned that the spread of false information online could have a moderate or major impact on the electoral outcome. This included 37% who thought it could have a major impact. As noted by the Chief Electoral Officer, intelligence officials and leading academics, the use and impact of disinformation is not limited to the election period.

Bill C-65 aims to build confidence in our electoral process and our democratic institutions through new and expanded prohibitions to address these threats. In particular, the bill would introduce a ban on false statements about the voting process that are deliberately made to disrupt the conduct or the results of an election, all while respecting the principles of free expression and open dialogue.

Amendments provide clear guidance on the type of intentional false statements that could be made or published to ensure that contraventions of the act are clear and enforceable. This includes making or publishing false or misleading statements relating to who may vote in an election; the voting registration process; when, where and how to vote; whom to vote for; the process to become a candidate; how votes are validated or counted; or the results of an election.

Another element I would like to address is the potential misuse of technology. Technology, as we all know, has helped revolutionize democracy, but it also gives rise to risks. For example, content generated by artificial intelligence is becoming harder to distinguish from reality. When paired with disinformation, artificial intelligence such as deepfakes poses a significant threat. Today, with a computer and a few keystrokes, malicious actors can generate highly realistic videos, audio and text content that can depict people saying or doing things they never said or did.

To address this emerging issue, Bill C-65 would amend existing prohibitions in the act that can lend themselves to the misuse of artificial intelligence, namely false statements, impersonation and misleading publications, to provide clarity that they apply regardless of the means used. This would mean, for example, that the prohibition on impersonating the Chief Electoral Officer, an election official, or a candidate would apply regardless of the technology that might be used now, to include deepfakes or other technologies that may evolve in the future.

Bill C-65 would also extend the scope of the existing ban on using a computer to affect the results of an election, to now apply to the use of a computer to disrupt the conduct of an election.

The last element I would like to speak about and highlight is the importance of the personal safety of those people who participate in our electoral process. As my hon. colleagues know well, the threat environment continues to evolve. There has, sadly, been a surge in vandalism at constituency offices, increasingly violent online discourse and threats made against party leaders, candidates and election officials, as witnessed during the 2021 general election.

Bill C-65 therefore seeks to address some of these concerns by providing increased privacy and safety to electoral participants. For example, returning officers' personal information would be better protected by removing the requirement for them to publish their home address in the Canada Gazette; rather, only their municipality and province of residence would be published.

We have also seen reports of or have personally experienced a growing uncivil discourse and behaviour targeting members of Parliament, including me. Members from all parties have spoken out against unacceptable harassment and threats, as well as intimidation.

Indeed, the Sergeant-at-Arms and Corporate Security Officer of the House of Commons recently noted that harassment of people elected to serve this very institution has skyrocketed, increasing 800% in the last five years. To respond to this alarming trend, Bill C-65 proposes two changes to the disclosure of requirements for regulated fundraising events over $200 that include a prominent attendee, such as a party leader. To ensure the safety of all participants, the requirement to provide five days' advance public notice of such regulated fundraising events would be repealed. To ensure ongoing transparency, precise location details for events would continue to be provided to the Chief Electoral Officer as part of the party's postevent reporting requirements under the act.

However, to protect the security of hosts of events who engage in politics or book a political event, the requirement for a public-facing postevent report 30 days later would only include the municipality and the province of the event. This approach aims to prevent bad actors from undermining the safety of participants and hosts at these events. It aims to strike an appropriate balance between the very real security threats faced and the ongoing need for transparency.

In closing, I know that safeguarding our democracy is a priority shared by all of my hon. colleagues in this House. The amendments to the Canada Elections Act proposed in Bill C-65 build on existing safeguards and propose a number of targeted but critical improvements to continue to build trust in our democratic processes.

I am confident that all members of Parliament can work together to ensure that Bill C-65 is studied and passed in time for all measures to come into force before the next fixed-date general election.

Democratic Institutions

[Justin Trudeau, Liberal, Prime Minister]

Mr. Speaker, we just passed Bill C-70 in the House, with the support of the Bloc Québécois, and sent it to the Senate for further study. This bill will allow for more rigorous and regular information sharing with the premiers of the provinces and territories on issues of foreign interference and national security that involve them.

We are working in a respectful and collaborative way to fight to protect our democracy together.

Electoral Participation Act

[Lisa Marie Barron, NDP, Nanaimo—Ladysmith, BC]

Mr. Speaker, if anything has come to light in the last few months, it is the importance of all legislation looking at the potential of foreign interference, the prevention of and identification of foreign interference. This needs to be implemented in all legislation. Yes, there are some components within this bill that look at addressing that, as the member mentioned, such payments or donations that are not allowed to be made through money orders or cryptocurrencies, as well as looking at who can donate and ensuring they are permanent residents and Canadian residents. These components are part of a bigger puzzle of work that we need to be doing together to ensure that foreign interference is identified, prevented, avoided altogether and that there be accountability when it does happen.

I was happy that all members of Parliament voted together on the recent foreign interference bill, Bill C-70. My hope is that we will see that work, and this work, strengthened, so this is no longer as problematic as has come to light in the last few months.

Democratic Institutions

[Randeep Sarai, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Veterans Affairs and Associate Minister of National Defence]

Madam Speaker, it is my pleasure to rise today to speak to the vital, ongoing work that the Government of Canada is doing to protect Canada's democratic institutions.

As all members of this House are aware, threats to Canada's democracy do not affect only some Canada; they affect all Canadians. That is why the enhancements to safeguard Canada's democratic systems and processes against foreign interference that are set out in Bill C-70 are supported across party lines.

Indeed, the Government of Canada's ongoing work to protect Canada's electoral systems and democratic institutions includes efforts to maximize public transparency while protecting what and how government documents are shared. This is because the nature of some records and how they are intended to be used is fundamental to the functioning of our democratic system of government.

I would like to take this opportunity to make clear what cabinet confidences are and why they are treated so carefully by the government so that any misunderstanding along these lines can be put to an end.

Cabinet confidences are documents that are prepared for members of cabinet. They include memoranda to cabinet, discussion papers, records of cabinet deliberations, records of communications between ministers, records to brief ministers and draft legislation.

The Canadian government is, and has been since Confederation, a Westminster system of government. This means that the principle of keeping cabinet confidences secret is older than Canada itself. It originates from the United Kingdom's Westminster Parliament, which dates back many centuries.

Cabinet confidences are central to how the Westminster system functions because of another foundational principle called cabinet collective responsibility. These principles complement each other, as members of cabinet consider all material at their disposal, deliberate, and even disagree freely around the cabinet table. Once the deliberations are finished, cabinet makes a collective decision, and all members are responsible for it.

The secrecy of these deliberations and of the materials that are used to make cabinet decisions is therefore paramount to the system functioning as designed. This has been long understood by successive Canadian governments, which have upheld the principle of cabinet confidences. In addition to the government, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized, “Cabinet confidentiality is essential to good government.”

Protecting Canada's democracy also means protecting our democratic institutions and ensuring that they can function as intended. Protecting cabinet confidences is not a nefarious act, but rather a fulfillment of the government's duty to uphold the long-established principles of Canada's system of government.

While fulfilling this duty, the Government of Canada continues to support the ongoing work of the public inquiry into foreign interference. Since the inquiry was established last year, the set of cabinet confidences specified in the terms of reference for the commission have already been provided during the commission's first phase of work. Those terms of reference were developed and agreed to by all recognized parties in the House. As it has done all along, the government will continue to provide thousands of classified documents to the commission and will continue to make government witnesses available to answer the commission's questions.

The Government of Canada looks forward to the commission's final report in December and will consider how its recommendations can further help to enhance Canada's measures against foreign interference in its electoral systems and democratic institutions.

[David Morrison]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The issue, as it has just been stated, is of central concern to all of us. It featured heavily in my visit to Beijing, and I know all of the issues around foreign interference will be part of my dialogue with the incoming ambassador.

The government, as I think the committee is aware, has recently tabled legislation in Bill C-70 that will shore up the home game. It will help Canada's more domestically oriented ministries and institutions protect themselves from foreign interference from whichever country it emanates. We in the foreign ministry will play a supporting role, including by making this part of our ongoing dialogue with our Chinese counterparts at all levels.

Opposition Motion—Government's Economic Analysis on Carbon Pricing

[Han Dong, Independent, Don Valley North, ON]

Madam Speaker, on a point of order. I apologize for the interruption.

I missed the earlier vote on the third reading of Bill C-70. I humbly ask for the unanimous consent of the House to allow my vote to be recorded as in favour.

Countering Foreign Interference Act

[The Speaker, Greg Fergus]

It being 3:18 p.m., pursuant to order made on Wednesday, June 12, the House will now proceed to the taking of the deferred recorded division on the motion at the third reading stage of Bill C-70.

Call in the members.

The House resumed from June 12 consideration of the motion that Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, be read the third time and passed.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Those protocols will be strengthened, in my opinion, by Bill C-70. I want to focus on part 2 to Bill C-70, which would amend the Security of Information Act to, among other things, create a number of new offences, as follows:

(a) committing an indictable offence at the direction of, for the benefit of, or in association with a foreign entity;

There would be some elements of foreign interference.

(b) knowingly engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity for a purpose [that is] prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State or being reckless as to whether the conduct is likely to harm Canadian interests; and

(c) engaging in surreptitious or deceptive conduct, at the direction of or in association with a foreign entity, with the intent to influence, among other things, the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.

I've summarized those offences.

Do you believe, Mr. Dolhai, that those additional provisions will help provide additional tools to law enforcement, including the PPSC, for the purposes of protecting our national security?

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Dolhai, congratulations on your nomination. You have had a distinguished career, underpinned by the values, in your own words, of hard work, but also a real commitment to the law, which is a vehicle to serve people, including to protect our communities. I listened very carefully to the outline of your own journey through the PPSC—starting at its inception; taking on a senior role; contributing to the drafting of national security legislation, in what ultimately became the Anti-terrorism Act; and overseeing prosecutions, including one in which I was involved, the Toronto 18.

I raise that case because it was a seminal case. It was a case that involved a conspiracy around a self-radicalized domestic terror cell. It implicated a number of different agencies, not only the PPSC and conventional law enforcement but equally intelligence agencies. I raise this in the current climate because one of the important debates that is occurring right now is how we use intelligence and convert intelligence into admissible evidence for the purposes of prosecuting individuals who have been charged under national security provisions.

Having had the benefit of seeing Bill C-70, and understanding that it is currently making its way through Parliament, can you, in your own extensive experience, shed some light on how we can improve the protocols around taking intelligence and converting it into evidence for the purposes of prosecuting individuals who are charged under national security provisions?

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker, Carol Hughes]

Pursuant to order made earlier today, all questions necessary to dispose of the third reading stage of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, are deemed put and a recorded division deemed requested and deferred until Thursday, June 13, at the expiry of the time provided for Oral Questions.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Madam Speaker, it is an honour to rise in this place to speak to Bill C-70. A foreign influence registry is something we have wanted to have, but we also recognize that there are concerns that overbroad application of such a registry could in itself inadvertently result in stigmatization of diaspora communities within Canada. The bill needs to be carefully administered, and much of what remains of what we would be passing, in a breathtakingly expedited fashion, would be be left to further regulations.

There are still a lot of questions as the bill moves forward. I have to say that, having the right, as any member of this place did, to say no to unanimous consent, I could have insisted that we have greater study. I have to say that I wish we did have greater study, but there was the timing and the consensus, and I am always inspired when I see members across party lines work together, because we do not see it often enough.

I know that the member for Vancouver East in the NDP is working with the Conservative and very hon. member for Wellington—Halton Hills. We are working together, as was the member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, also a New Democrat, so I stand here today very pleased that we are going to see the bill pass into law, but I am increasingly unnerved by the number of groups that have approached all of us.

Certainly, as the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands, I have received numerous concerns from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, from the National Council of Canadian Muslims and from Democracy Watch, and their points are important. However, especially given the climate in which we find ourselves and the numerous delays in implementing changes to actually confront foreign interference, we have perhaps moved too quickly.

I am going to say for the record that I feel concerned that a number of these concerns are quite valid. For instance, when we consider that in subsection 20(3), the penalties for violating the act, and we still have to deal with the fact that there is some vagueness in how we are describing the offences, can amount to as much as imprisonment for life, these are very serious consequences and have a potential for a charter violation problem, as identified by some of the lawyers and legal organizations that have reviewed the bill and are asking whether it was wise to so infringe on the time in committee.

The hon. member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford mentioned some amendments that the NDP would have liked but the Bloc did not like, but that is how democracy works in committee. As Greens, we were given a very short window, so short that we were not able to submit amendments in time to even have them voted down, with the expedited fashion in which we have studied the bill.

I want to put on the record that we will continue to monitor it closely. There is an improvement, as mentioned, from the first reading version where the bill would have received parliamentary review five years after passage. It would now be much sooner. However, having made the decision that it was very important given the degree of efforts at foreign interference in this country, which are well documented, the expedited passage of the bill is important because we are increasingly aware of the threat.

I should pause to say we are increasingly aware of the threat because of some excellent work that has been done by colleagues from all parties in this place and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. Their work is critical, and they have also been calling for measures such as those that are in Bill C-70.

As we go forward though in the development of regulations, and as the bill would be further implemented, let us be mindful that the bill has received precious little study. I think it is important to say that I do not think I have ever seen a bill with so many substantial changes to critical areas of law pass so very quickly as this one.

The concerns are also not just that the bill would have potentially charter-violating implications, as raised by the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. I was also taken by the commentary from Democracy Watch that we have left too many loopholes. If we want to deal with foreign interference, why have we left it possible for such issues as a foreign agent's using lobbyists as proxies and slipping past some of the scrutiny that would apply in other contexts? There are a number of points that Democracy Watch has made in relation to loopholes that should be closed.

We are looking at concerns about the way in which the legislation would be rolled out. We do hope that it will receive royal assent and get through the Senate, but we have asked the Senate also to expedite it. Again, as much as I support implementing a foreign influence registry and keeping track of the activity of hostile governments, I am left disquieted by, and we must actually pay attention to, the fact that we have gone perhaps recklessly quickly in bringing the bill forward and getting it all the way through to third reading and over to the Senate.

That, I have to say, I am concerned about even though I had the ability to object, and one member's objecting ends unanimous consent. I did not want to take that step, but I want to put on the record that we are going to have to be very careful from here and take every opportunity to ensure that we are not violating charter rights and that we are not creating additional hazards for members of diaspora communities that we had not considered before we moved so very quickly.

Why are we concerned about foreign interference? Well, it is very clear that foreign interference, as in the case of the hon. member for Wellington—Halton Hills, has resulted in actual threats and intimidation of family members, things that any member of this place should not have to be concerned about as a Canadian citizen. Nor, for that matter, should a foreigner visiting our shores be concerned about them. We are not the only country, obviously, that is now recognizing that foreign governments interfere in our domestic affairs.

Recently, of course, reading over the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians put something back in mind. It was so long ago I had almost forgotten it, in 1983. It was European money that interfered in the Conservative Party leadership race in 1983, with Karlheinz Schreiber delivering a lot of cash to the anti-Joe Clark forces to secure a nomination more palatable to the forces from Europe providing that money, by nominating and electing Brian Mulroney as the leader of the Progressive Conservative Party.

That was 40 years ago, and we still have not closed that loophole, even with the legislation before us. We need to pay a lot of attention to how foreign governments interfere in our affairs.

I take the point from the member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford and wish to agree that it is one of the bill's strengths that it would be agnostic as to whether a foreign government is one we like or one we do not like. It is important to ensure that Canadian democracy for Canadians operates in the interests of Canadians. We will obviously have to take more steps going forward, but certain countries rise up in our concerns based on CSIS concerns, based on our intelligence operations. Those countries we know; they are named and they are understood by us as being interested in undermining Canadian democracy.

However, Canadian democracy is also undermined if we ignore our own values, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We must make sure that we have not gone too far with draconian measures in an effort to ensure that we control foreign interference.

I know this speech reflects my ambivalence, and for that I apologize. I know that I am very pleased that we would have a foreign influence registry. I would like to ensure that it would be effective but also would not accidentally trespass into areas that we would later regret.

I thank my colleagues for the time to address these issues with regard to Bill C-70.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House today to join my colleagues and share a few remarks on Bill C-70, a bill that I have become intimately familiar with over the last couple of weeks, given that I am a member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Of course, that committee was seized with this bill last week, where we had meetings over four days, Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of last week, with extended hours so that we could hear from witnesses, because of a programming motion from the House. I think that programming motion, and the fact that we have seen all parties in this place, usually a pretty partisan environment, put those differences aside to come together, I think underscores how important this legislation is and the realization from all political parties that this is a moment in time in Canadian history when we must meet the challenge united and with a clear purpose, because the threat is certainly there.

To put it into context, last week, of course, the report from NSICOP, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, landed with the force of a bomb and, of course, has been dominating the news cycle ever since. I will not talk about the allegations toward members of Parliament in that report. I think the other parts of the report that are especially pertinent to tonight's debate are the fact that NSICOP has found, through its briefings with intelligence officials, that our intelligence community feels that our foreign adversaries regard Canada as a “low-risk, high reward” place in which to operate and pursue their strategic objectives. There are a number of reasons for this. That same report was also quite scathing of the Liberal government's response to the dire circumstances surrounding foreign interference: too little, too late.

That aside, we are at this moment and we do have Bill C-70 before us. It is important to understand that the bill has some pretty consequential amendments to existing statutes while also setting up a stand-alone law.

It is important to remember that when we are talking about foreign interference, it can be broadly separated into the interference or influence that we see publicly, coming not only from our adversaries but also from our allies, and the malicious and very pernicious aspect of foreign interference, which is the parts that happen in a clandestine way, the parts that are deceptive and underhanded, where adversaries are trying to use all tools at their disposal to influence how our democracy functions, sometimes to cause chaos, sometimes to pursue strategic objectives. It really depends on the circumstances and the country involved.

While we have had a slow response from the Liberal government, it is also very clear that our outdated national security laws are not up to the challenge of meeting that threat as they are currently written. I have used the phrase a couple of times over the last few days, as well as today, that essentially many of our laws were created in an analog era and that we need to bring them up to speed to meet the threat in what is a digital era. That is a big part of what Bill C-70 does.

What is in Bill C-70? The bill is divided into four parts. Part 1 deals with amendments to the CSIS Act. Many of those are in response to a pretty scathing report from NSIRA, which showed that CSIS has regularly broken its own statute's legislative guidelines in how it handles datasets. Again, when that law was crafted, back in 1984, the most advanced piece of technology in people's offices was probably a fax machine. We are a far cry from those days.

I think the other really consequential amendment to the CSIS Act is that it is now going to equip CSIS with the ability to share information with other interested parties, with parties that have a need to know some of this information. Under current laws, CSIS is very constrained in how it can share information. Again, if we are going to counter this threat with the seriousness it deserves, we need to equip our agencies with the tools that allow them to share this information.

Part 2 is also a very consequential update to the Security of Information Act. This part of the bill is really targeting the deceptive, clandestine nature of foreign interference. We all know that violations of any provision of the Security of Information Act come with hefty penalties, and in the bill before us, they are also there, because it underscores, again, how serious a nature these offences are. So, there are offences now for any foreign principals who are using violence, intimidation or threats to pursue strategic interests at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign principal, and there are hefty penalties going after anyone who is trying to influence governmental or legislative processes. Those are all spelled out in the Security of Information Act. Again, this is the part of the bill that is designed to go after the foreign interference that is not publicly known about, that is not going to be affected by the registry, which comes later on in the bill.

In part 4, there are also important updates to the Canada Evidence Act to really try to streamline the process. Evidence is often of a very sensitive nature and, again, we have heard a lot over the last two weeks of the gulf that exists between intelligence and evidence. However, when intelligence gets to a point where it can be used as evidence, we still need to handle it in a very secure way, and in a way that does not expose where our sources are, because, of course, that is of national interest to our country.

However, part 4, I think, is probably the part that has gotten the most attention in the bill. It would set up a registry so that we would have more accountability and transparency. It would be country agnostic, an important part to underline in this, so that even people who are working on the direction of, or in association with, friends and allies of Canada would still have to register if they are communicating with elected officials and if they are trying to influence some type of governmental process. It involves elected officials at the federal, provincial and municipal levels, and also with indigenous governments and organizations.

It is an important part, and I think the country agnostic feature of the bill is also important. Canadians definitely have an interest in how our adversaries are behaving here on Canadian soil. We would like to see those persons registered, but we might also have a very legitimate interest to see how our friends and allies are operating here on Canadian soil, because we would be deluding ourselves if we did not think that our friends and allies, in some way or another, are trying to influence how Canada makes its decisions, which has been a part of statecraft ever since there were states.

In the brief time that I have left, I realize that there still are concerns out there from some members of the community. I highlighted earlier the National Council of Canadian Muslims that has concerns about some of the aspects of the bill that are not very well defined. However, in my opinion, the bill does achieve a balancing act. Again, because of how dire the situation is with foreign interference, we need to meet this moment with a strong legislative response. I think that this is us, in the House of Commons, and later on in the Senate, but the Parliament of Canada as a whole, giving notice to our adversaries that their activities are now on our radar. We are aware of what they have been doing in Canada for quite some time now, and we are going to meet that challenge with a challenge of our own. This is really putting our cards on the table and showing people that we are serious about meeting this.

I am happy that there was a pretty collaborative effort at committee with amendments. The Bloc did not get all of the amendments that it wanted passed, neither did the NDP, but that is the way democracy works at committee. However, all in all, I am quite happy with the product that has been reported back to the House. I am glad to see that the House has come together to see the bill passed through by the end of tomorrow. I hope that the Senate will take the bill under way with the seriousness that it deserves.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Madam Speaker, I cannot begin my speech without thanking the member for Wellington—Halton Hills. Without him, many of these issues would not be on our radar. He led the way. I should also say, by the way, that he basically gave the speech I wanted to give.

Soon there will be a new law. We all agree that it was necessary. It is a good law. Is it a great law? I am not so sure. Is it excellent? I am really not sure. In other words, this is the kind of law I applaud, but with only one hand.

This was an intense exercise undertaken in a very short period of time. The process included reviews of a number of laws, including some that amend the Criminal Code. There is no doubt that the need to get the legislation in place before the next election sometimes took precedence over the desire for a more in-depth or thorough reflection. Decisions were made by reflex rather than reflection in this case. At the same time, we have to be careful, knowing that this is a very serious issue. We are not doing this just for the sake of doing it.

I will briefly sum up the bill because it amends four acts. Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Act with respect to data collection. Part 2 amends the Security of Information Act to add new criminal offences. Part 3 amends the Canada Evidence Act. Part 4 creates the foreign agent registry, to ensure transparency, of course.

Again, it is good legislation, but getting to this point has been tough. There have been several reports over the years. There was the Rosenberg report. There were CSIS alerts before that. Then there was the special rapporteur who claimed to be independent. Finally, there was the Hogue commission, which all four parties unanimously chose to engage with in order to shed light on this situation. Actually, it is more than a situation. It has become its own world.

What disappointed me when we got to that point was just seeing the culture of avoidance that is typical of the Liberal Party. If there is a problem, they close their eyes, turn away and pretend it is not there anymore. This culture of avoidance has caused major problems for us today, because while the Liberals were avoiding solving the problem, it was getting worse. Foreign interference is here today, it exists and it is still happening, even as we speak.

Still, there are elements to consider. Of course, the recent NSICOP report was a wake-up call for everyone. However, these revelations are the sum total of years' worth of observations. On April 30, the parties held a press conference, again nearly unanimously, with members of the diaspora here in the lobby of the House. On that occasion, I myself disclosed the fact that the Bloc Québécois was preparing a registry of foreign agents. Suddenly, as if by magic, Bill C-70 appeared. I think we kind of helped avoid the avoidance.

Still, when the bill was being studied, the Bloc Québécois had a few amendments to propose. There were not many, because, as I said before, the substance of the legislation is good. We presented a few points, four of which I am going to discuss here. The first had to do with what is known as two-party registration, meaning that both the foreign principal and the public office holder must register. That makes it possible to establish the relationship between the two. Obviously, if only the foreign principal registers, we have to take his or her word about who is at the other end. I do not think that is practical. I think the registry would have been simpler and more effective if it included two-party registration. Unfortunately, the public servants told us that it was a bit too complicated. However, we were studying the issue of foreign interference. To say that something is a bit too complicated is hardly an acceptable response. Considering the scope of the threat, I think that saying this would be too complicated is wrong.

We also wanted the legislation to apply to universities and Crown corporations. I must say that the universities were not enthusiastic about the idea. I think that certain foreign countries have a significant influence when it comes to research funding. Obviously, that amendment was not accepted. We also proposed a cooling-off period. The funny thing is that when we were discussing the amendment in question and the chair ruled it inadmissible, I could tell from the look on their faces that so many people were thinking about their post-election future. That made me smile.

I believe that a cooling-off period is part of the culture in the business world. These are people who do not give anything for nothing. It is smart to say that a foreign country may want to invest in someone as a public office holder, but they cannot be there for three years. I think that would have provided extra protection.

The crux of the matter is the independence of the commissioner. The commissioner will definitely be independent, but not entirely, and that is a problem. It is a problem that was raised by CSIS and several witnesses. During a study on interference at the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, several witnesses pointed out that if the commissioner is not independent, that is a problem. The commissioner will come under the Department of Public Safety. I am not suggesting that there was any bad faith, but I would have preferred the commissioner to be truly independent.

Whenever we talk about independence, I get the impression that the Liberal Party has a hard time with that term. I know that it is generally not fond of it. It had a hard time with the independent rapporteur. It had a hard time with the independent commissioner, too. As for Quebec's independence, we had better not discuss it. These amendments were rejected by the Liberals and the Conservatives. That bothers me a bit, because we had a common understanding of this bill. These four suggestions sought to amend and improve it.

However, we did manage to make one important improvement. The bill provided for a review of the act every five years, and we were able to change that to have the act reviewed one year after an election. When there is a minority government, like the one we have had for the past little while, there can be two or three elections in five years. We therefore had to move faster because the threat, like technology, is ahead of us. I think it would be rather foolish not to take note of the threat that is ahead of us.

One thing that is quite funny about the bill is that it is entitled the “Countering Foreign Interference Act”, but it does not define foreign interference. What is foreign interference? It is when one nation interferes in the affairs of another nation. It is as simple as that.

It would have taken courage to accept the suggestions I put forward earlier. I was told that it was complicated, expensive, and many other things. That said, let us not forget that interference costs us billions of dollars a year. Courage can be a real issue at times. I am not saying there was no courage in this case, just not enough. That is not the same thing. “Reason and respect make livers pale and lustihood deject”, as Shakespeare wrote in Troilus and Cressida. I think we would do well to take a lesson in courage from some of our predecessors.

There is no definition of foreign interference in the bill. In my opinion, we have to name it, or it does not exist. Naming it gives it meaning.

In the same vein, I want to touch on the motion that was adopted yesterday, almost unanimously. The Bloc Québécois motion asked Commissioner Hogue to look into the recent revelations in the NSICOP report.

We cannot dissociate these two elements because we are talking about foreign interference in both cases. I was pleased to see that, in light of this major threat, the House showed a lot of courage and decided to grab the bull by the horns, tackle the problem head-on and move forward.

In this case, I think that the decision made by the House yesterday was an honourable one. Unfortunately, Bill C-70 is somewhat lacking in ambition, and I am worried that that will come back to haunt us later.

Finally, there is the matter of overclassification. In the Winnipeg lab case, we saw that the redactions could have been reversed on many elements without harming national security. I always struggle with knowing that documents may have been overclassified.

I can say right away that the Bloc Québécois will support Bill C‑70. We will support it, but we will applaud it with only one hand, because it is not great, but it is better than nothing.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Madam Speaker, now that Bill C-70 is back in the House for third reading, I would like to take this opportunity to outline the long journey it took to get to this point.

In 2018, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, David Vigneault, advised the government about threats presented by the People's Republic of China. That year, he warned the Prime Minister that PRC activities related to the threat of foreign interference were an existential threat for Parliament and the elections.

Also in 2018, the government was advised that the measures then in place were not sufficient to counter these threats to Parliament and to our elections. We know that because it was the second finding of fact on page 73 of the NSICOP report.

Also back in 2018, national security agencies advised the government to introduce a range of measures to counter these threats, including new legislation.

It is also notable that in 2018, the CSIS director also advised the government of another threat from the PRC, which was the threat of espionage. We know that because, for the first time ever, the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service gave a public speech in December of that year. In that speech, he warned of serious threats from the PRC closely related to foreign interference, which were those of espionage. These threats came in the form of espionage targeting Canadian companies and Canadian universities in the five sensitive areas he outlined at that time: artificial intelligence, quantum computing, 5G telecommunications technology, biopharma and clean tech.

Subsequently, in 2019, the Clerk of the Privy Council sought the Prime Minister's approval for an action plan to protect Parliament and our elections. The Prime Minister did not approve that plan.

Again, a year later, in December 2020, the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister sought the Prime Minister's approval again for that action plan to protect Parliament and our elections. Again, the Prime Minister did not approve the plan.

For the third time, in February 2022, the national security and intelligence adviser resurrected this initiative, and again, the Prime Minister did not approve an action plan.

In all three occasions over several years, the Prime Minister did not approve actions that would have protected Parliament and our elections.

On November 18, 2020, the House adopted a motion calling on the government to produce a robust plan to counter foreign interference threat activities here on Canadian soil. Despite all of this advice, despite the call of the House of Commons to the government to enact a robust plan to counter foreign interference and to take additional measures to protect Canadian democracy, little was done.

Then, because the Prime Minister did not approve actions to protect Parliament and our elections, and because the government failed to heed the call of the House in the motion adopted on November 18, 2020, foreign interference threats increased from 2018 to present.

As Justice Hogue said in her initial report of May 3, the risk from the impacts of foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken.

Then, subsequent to all of this, in the fall of 2022, explosive media reports about foreign interference threats broke. These reports raised questions about what the Prime Minister knew, when he knew it and why he did not act on the intelligence and the advice he was given by the senior civil service. Further explosive revelations in the subsequent months followed in the media. Finally, on March 6, 2023, the government promised to look at introducing measures in law to counter these threats.

It took years for the government to take the advice of CSIS, the senior civil service and countless reports. It took years for the government to introduce legislation. Finally, after much urging, many controversies and a lot of work done by a great many people, the government reluctantly introduced Bill C‑70.

That brings us to the debate today on Bill C-70 at third reading. Bill C-70 is a much-needed response to the existential threat to our democracy from foreign interference. It would modernize the CSIS Act, allowing CSIS to better obtain preservation and production orders, and national security warrants for obtaining information, records or documents, through a single attempt. It would better allow CSIS to collect, retain and analyze data for intelligence purposes. It would allow CSIS to collect foreign intelligence and to disclose classified information outside of the Government of Canada to provinces, municipalities, universities, companies and individuals being targeted.

It would create new criminal offences for those who would engage in foreign interference here in Canada on behalf of a foreign state, ensuring that we could better protect Canadians against these corrosive, clandestine, corrupting and coercive activities, especially Canadians in diaspora communities who have suffered for so long in silence and isolation. It would also make it easier to prosecute these offences by removing the requirement to prove harm to the interests of Canada when a Canadian is targeted by foreign interference.

It would create a new criminal offence that would better protect essential infrastructure in Canada, including stiff penalties for those who would sabotage essential infrastructure on behalf of a foreign state or a foreign government. It would amend the Canada Evidence Act and would make consequential to other acts so that it would allow information relating to foreign affairs, national defence or national security in Federal Court proceedings to be better handled.

Finally, the bill would establish a foreign influence, transparency and accountability act, which would create a foreign influence registry and a new foreign influence transparency commissioner. The new foreign influence transparency commissioner would oversee a public registry containing information on individuals in Canada engaged in legitimate influence activities on behalf of a foreign principal.

The bill was strengthened in committee, particularly with respect to the appointment of a commissioner. The commissioner would be appointed by the Governor in Council after consultation with leaders in the House of Commons and in the Senate, and after resolutions in the House of Commons and in the Senate are adopted. This would ensure that while the commissioner is situated within the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, within the machinery of government, the commissioner would have a degree of independence to manage and to interpret the act, to issue notices of compliance, to issue administrative monetary penalties and to refer matters to law enforcement for criminal prosecution.

Time is of the essence. We must ensure that our democratic institutions and elections are protected from the threats of foreign interference. Inaction and delay cannot continue. As Justice Hogue noted in her initial report, the risk of the impacts from foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken. She also concluded that “foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 [general] elections” undermined “public confidence in Canada's democracy”.

As the general election draws closer, time is running out to strengthen the confidence Canadians have in our elections. Time is running out to combat the rising threat of foreign interference. Canadians need to be able to go to the polls in the next election and to be confident not only in the integrity of the overall election but also in the integrity of each of the elections that take place in each of the 338 electoral districts in Canada. This bill must pass, and I encourage all of my parliamentary colleagues, in this place and in the other place, to support this bill and to see its adoption into law before we adjourn for the summer.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, it was a long slog through committee last week with Bill C-70, and ultimately this legislation is needed. We need to bring up to speed our analog laws so that they can thrive in a digital era.

My question to my hon. colleague is this: The National Council of Canadian Muslims is publicly releasing a concerning statement about the definition of “intimidation” in the Security of Information Act amendments in the bill. I am just wondering if the parliamentary secretary could reply here on the floor of the House to those concerns from NCCM.

[Monique Pauzé, Bloc, Repentigny, QC]

Madam Speaker, the member talked about priorities. She said that it was very important for the government to take action on this issue.

Let us go back in time a bit. A year ago, the Prime Minister did everything he could to slow things down. Instead of calling for a public inquiry, which all parties in the House were asking questions about, he launched an investigation into the CSIS leaks, calling them racist.

The bill we are studying, Bill C-70, is interesting. The Bloc Québécois brought forward some amendments that were adopted. We will be supporting the bill.

I have one question, though. Why was the security of Canada's democratic system not a priority for the government for six, seven, eight months?

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to speak in support of Bill C-70, which proposes, among other things, to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

I hope that the report stage amendment offered today has the support of all parties. The amendment would permit CSIS to disclose, as part of a disclosure for the purpose of building resiliency against threat to the security of Canada, information specifically about a company with that company. The amendment would allow CSIS to be more candid and transparent with Canadian corporations and entities by disclosing information around specific threats and vulnerabilities affecting them. An example of this would be information about a foreign state's interest in acquiring the company's unique and proprietary information or technology. The reason the amendment is important is that this precision would ensure that companies, community organizations and universities have parity with individuals. The amendment is needed to ensure that the information sharing provisions found in the bill are the same for individuals and entities.

As members know, on May 30, we passed a motion that sped up the committee's study and clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-70 at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Events moved quickly, and when one part of the bill was amended to provide enhanced information sharing authority for individuals, the same was not done for companies or community organizations and universities, as there was not enough time to properly craft the appropriate amendment. As such, there now exists an imbalance in the legislation, and this important amendment addresses it. It is essential that we pass this report stage amendment to ensure that CSIS can make authorized disclosures to both individuals and entities to better equip Canadians and Canadian society with the information and tools they need to build resiliency against foreign threats. We know that state actors exploit Canada's vulnerabilities by targeting federal, provincial, territorial, municipal and indigenous governments; our open academic systems; private enterprises; and even communities and individuals.

The government has no obligation more important than the protection of its citizens. Unfortunately, we have seen a rise in the number of Canadians being threatened and harassed by foreign state actors, as well as a rise in foreign interference in our democratic institutions and our economy. The government's priority remains to protect Canada and Canadians against activities that undermine democratic values, economic interests, sovereignty and national security. In order to combat foreign interference, a whole of government and society response is required. The first step to combatting foreign interference is detecting it, which is why the bill introduces amendments to the CSIS Act.

CSIS is mandated to protect Canada's national security. The CSIS Act came into force in 1984, well before the prolific use of digital technology that we see today. Technological innovations make it more difficult to detect and identify threat actors, including those engaged in foreign interference activities. These innovations have created new avenues for threat to interfere in Canadian society and institutions, especially in the online space. The bill introduces several new powers to assist CSIS in its investigation of foreign interference. These will close gaps in CSIS's authorities, which have become more acute with the global shift towards digital communication and technology.

Throughout the consultation process, the government heard that we need to do more to protect vulnerable communities that are the targets of harassment and intimidation of foreign state actors. At the same time, we heard that any changes to the law need to be based on a real need and to continue to respect Canadian values. These changes do just that. In addition to the safeguards built into the bill itself, there are still robust review and oversight measures to which CSIS is subject. These were brought in by the government in 2019.

Both the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians provide a robust review function of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's activities to ensure they are effective and compliant with the law. The two objectives of effectiveness and compliance with the law are guiding the government's response.

While technology has brought enormous benefits to society, it has also changed the way threat activity is conducted and how information flows. That is why, in addition to these new powers, the government is making other changes to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to ensure we have the intelligence we need. This means updating the foreign intelligence provisions of the CSIS Act to account for changing technology. It also means we are making sure that CSIS can effectively use data to identify patterns of hostile activity, which may not be immediately obvious.

Finally, this means introducing a requirement that Parliament review the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act every five years. This would ensure that we are continually evaluating the tools we have and the ones we may need, as well as that we have a robust and open public debate about them. Such a debate would allow Canadians to weigh in regularly to ensure that we are meeting our two objectives of effectiveness and compliance with the law.

The threat of foreign interference is complex, but in order to counter it, we must detect it first. That is why these changes to the CSIS Act, when considered as part of a whole-of-government response to foreign interference, are so important.

[Randy Boissonnault, Liberal, Edmonton Centre, AB]

moved that Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, be read the third time and passed.

Business of the House

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Housing]

Madam Speaker, there have been discussions among the parties and, if you seek it, I believe you will find unanimous consent for the following motion:

That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order, or usual practice of the House, when Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, is called later today, it shall be disposed of as follows:

(a) the report stage motion in amendment, standing on the Notice Paper in the name of the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, be deemed adopted;

(b) the bill, as amended, be deemed concurred in at report stage with a further amendment;

(c) the bill shall be taken up immediately at the third reading stage and a member of each recognized party and a member of the Green Party each speak for not more than 10 minutes followed by five minutes for questions and comments, provided, if required, that Government Orders be extended to complete the said stage of the Bill; and

(d) at the expiry of the time provided for the debate at third reading later today, or when no member wishes to speak, whichever is earlier, any proceedings before the House shall be interrupted, and in turn every question necessary for the disposal of the said stage of the bill shall be put forthwith and successively, without further debate or amendment, and a recorded division shall be deemed requested and deferred until tomorrow after Oral Questions.

[Marie-Hélène Gaudreau, Bloc, Laurentides—Labelle, QC]

I'm somewhat worried about how long the legislative process takes. We are now working on Bill C‑70. By the time the amendments come into force, will the act still be effective and will it still address our needs?

It's urgent to do something right now. I believe we all agree on that. Can we succeed in providing measures as quickly as possible so that you have the tools you need?

At our most recent meetings, witnesses told us that they were all restricted to their respective sandboxes, in isolation, without being able to speak to the others. I even told a few of them last week that I'd like to be their client, because then I'd be able to get some information. I'm certainly not getting it now from House Administration, and I don't know if they're ever going to give us any information.

We need recommendations because I feel that Bill C-70 will be outdated by the time it's adopted.

What do you think?

[David Vigneault]

Mr. Chair, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, the House is indeed currently studying a bill to modernize certain aspects of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, Bill C‑70.

It's interesting to look at things with a bit of hindsight. The act came into force in 1984, in the middle of the Cold War, following a commission of inquiry whose role was to review certain activities of the organization that had been responsible for national security at the time. To me, it looked like a rather defensive bill. Its purpose was to prevent certain lapses from recurring.

In my humble opinion, the circumstances that existed in 1984 no longer apply in 2024. The world has changed. Canada's image has changed and the threats we are facing have changed, not only in terms of complexity and the number of stakeholders responsible, but also the impact they have on the everyday lives of Canadians and Quebeckers.

The sharing of information amendments proposed in Bill C‑70, which is currently being studied by Parliament, are absolutely essential. Their purpose is to simplify part of our data system, and the way we obtain orders from the Federal Court, while maintaining judicial authorizations. I'm sure that these changes will have a very direct impact on Canadians.

As Minister LeBlanc said, it was a first step, and other efforts would be required in future to modernize the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. Once again, when the time comes to protect Canadians against threats, it's important to know that the methods used by those who contrive them can change very quickly. We therefore have to make sure that we're not lagging behind these changes.

[David Vigneault]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

The issues of cybersecurity, their nexus to national security, and attempts by adversaries to interfere in Canada, are becoming ever more complex. These issues require the full attention of the Government of Canada and all Canadians.

Increasingly, threats to the security of Canada take the form of cyber-threats. Malicious cyber-activity targeting Canada is growing in scale, complexity and sophistication, with cyber-threat actors seeking to advance their economic, political, security and ideological interests to the detriment of Canada and its allies. In short, the digital ecosystem has transformed the nature and conduct of warfare, espionage, diplomacy and trade.

Cyber-threat actors include those affiliated with foreign states, including military and intelligence services, as well as non-state actors.

CSIS actively investigates a variety of cyber-actors, including those from or associated with China, Russia, Iran and India. Regardless of who is directing their activities, cyber-threat actors employ a range of technologies and techniques to exploit weaknesses in information systems, target individuals to gain unauthorized access to systems and networks, or leverage infrastructure in Canada to achieve their broader strategic and geopolitical goals to the detriment of Canada.

CSIS is mandated to collect intelligence on threats to the security of Canada, to advise the government on those threats and, when appropriate, take measures to reduce them. This includes threats that emanate from the cyber-domain.

More specifically, when CSIS identifies national cybersecurity threats, it uses a variety of investigative techniques, including human sources, warranted collection and other methods to determine the scope, motivation, target and source of the threat.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, engages broadly with industry, academia, governments, and indigenous groups to help strengthen Canadians' alertness and resilience to a growing cyber-threat environment. For example, since 2021 alone, over 70 briefings have been provided to parliamentarians on foreign interference and espionage, in which security awareness, including cyber-hygiene, was a key discussion point.

Additionally, CSIS routinely provides intelligence assessments to our government partners, allowing them to make informed policy and operational decisions. CSIS also shares these assessments and investigative leads with our trusted foreign partners in order to assist them in ensuring the integrity of the global information infrastructure upon which Canadian security relies.

However, I would like you to know that CSIS is part of a community of agencies and departments seeking to protect Canada from cyber-threats. While CSIS plays a vital role in the team, it works closely with other key players such as the cybersecurity experts at the Communications Security Establishment, the cyber centre, Public Safety Canada and the RCMP, just to name a few. Together we work to safeguard Canada and its assets, information and national security from an array of cyber-threats.

Regarding the committee's specific study, our colleagues and cybersecurity experts at the CSE and CCCS, with CSIS, produced a chronology of events detailing the interactions between our organizations and the House of Commons.

I will note that CSIS learned of any issues with the House of Commons IT system from CSE in January 2021. Following this, our agency directly briefed the House of Commons IT staff with CSE. From there, we worked with CSE and the House of Commons from January through April 2021 to investigate this activity.

This work outlined that IPAC members were targeted, but importantly, it found no instance of compromise on the system, nor any follow-on activity.

CSIS broadly disseminated intelligence products to clients across the Government of Canada detailing APT31's email tracking attempts on IPAC members in Canada. CSIS's work with the House of Commons predates the FBI reporting that was shared with both CSIS and CSE on any information that was released to the public by the U.S. in 2024.

When this incident was uncovered in early 2021, CSIS followed the protocols that were in place at the time. CSIS worked directly with CSE and the House of Commons to better understand the incident and its impact. Our investigation, alongside CSE's work, helped to inform the House of Commons on the specific technical measures that could be taken to mitigate the incident.

In 2023, the Prime Minister issued a ministerial directive to CSIS, which outlined and clarified CSIS’s role and responsibilities in relation to the investigation, notification and reduction of threats to parliamentarians. The directive outlines that, wherever possible within the law, CSIS must ensure that parliamentarians are informed of threats to the security of Canada directed at them.

This is uncharted territory for CSIS, and is providing an opportunity for reflection, learning and improvement. What is different today under this directive is that it compels us to have the conversation with our partners on how best to ensure that parliamentarians are informed on the potential threats they face. It may not be CSIS, for example, when we are not the lead department responsible for the issue at hand, but because the ministerial directive was issued to CSIS, we will lead the discussion on the process.

Mr. Chair, I think I will skip the recap of the chronology because of time. I will speak quickly to some legislative authorities.

Members of the committee, I think you all understand that the CSIS mandate is guided by legislation that is nearly 40 years old. In the face of rapid technological change and an increasingly complex cyber-ecosystem, gaps in CSIS authorities that limit its ability to detect, investigate and respond to foreign interference, including by sharing information, have become more pronounced.

Bill C-70, which currently sits before the House, proposes a set of focused amendments that will improve CSIS's operational response to foreign interference.

Among these amendments is a proposal to enable information sharing outside the federal government to build resiliency to national security threats, including foreign interference. This will help to build resilience before the threats materialize and will directly enable parliamentarians to make decisions that are more informed.

More broadly, Bill C-70 will ensure CSIS investigations are nimble and responsive, resulting in better collection of intelligence and advice, including for parliamentarians.

The last thing I would say, Mr. Chair, is that in reflecting on this situation in preparation for this appearance, I think my analysis with my colleagues is that everybody did the work they were supposed to do. However, the outcome for parliamentarians is not, I think everybody will agree now, in hindsight, what was desired.

I welcome the work of this committee. I welcome the work that CSIS can do to make sure that in the future we learn from this, and that the outcome for parliamentarians and for Canadians is a different one.

Thank you.

Opposition Motion—Foreign Interference in Democratic Institutions

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question and the context she provided. As we can see, the government did take steps to set up the Hogue commission and ensure that the mandate it was given had parameters.

These parameters are numerous, and they are being followed. We will leave it to Commissioner Hogue to continue to write her report and make recommendations. The government is taking action. We see that with the introduction of Bill C‑70 and Bill C‑65.

[Mona Fortier, Liberal, Ottawa—Vanier, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House to discuss the government's efforts to protect our democratic institutions. As members know, Canada has an enviable international reputation because of the stability of its system and democratic institutions. It is important to remember that we have a strong electoral system built on a proven legal framework, and that Elections Canada is a high-calibre election administration agency that is the envy of many.

Obviously, we do not take the threat of foreign interference lightly, and it is essential that we continue to improve our approach. Last year was eventful to say the least, and a lot of attention was drawn to these important concerns. Just in the last few weeks, in addition to the Hogue commission's initial report, reports were also published by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency.

I would like to remind members that these two agencies began their respective studies following the Prime Minister's announcement in March 2023. These accountability mechanisms are essential to ensure transparency and contribute directly to the government's commitment to continue to improve its response to this threat, which is also constantly evolving.

In that same announcement, the Prime Minister asked the hon. Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs and Janice Charette, the former clerk of the Privy Council, to present a report on the government's approach to implement certain recommendations on foreign interference. That report was presented to the Prime Minister a month later. The approach set out in that report centres on four specific themes.

The first of these themes is communication with the Canadian public, meaning the need for transparency and the need to equip citizens with knowledge in this area. Communication is a key element in the fight against attempted interference in Canadian democracy. The government recognizes the importance of better communicating information about the threat of foreign interference and the measures taken by the government to deal with it. Much has already been done in this regard. For example, intelligence agencies have been publishing reports on foreign interference in elections since 2017. In addition, one component of the plan to protect Canada's democracy is the digital citizen initiative, overseen by Canadian Heritage, which aims to build the resilience of citizens and Canadian society against online disinformation.

Our work did not stop there. Since the release of this report, rapid response mechanism Canada, located at Global Affairs Canada, has released two reports exposing foreign actors' disinformation campaigns targeting elected members of the House. The Minister of Public Safety also announced details on the funding for the Canadian digital media research network to further strengthen Canadians' resilience to the increasingly complex information ecosystem. The minister also released tool kits to resist disinformation and foreign interference for elected officials, public servants and community leaders. These tools have been shared with several partners, including provincial and territorial ministers.

These initiatives are just a few examples of how the government is communicating with Canadians on these important issues. We recognize that more work needs to be done in this regard, and we are continuing our efforts. It is important to remember that this kind of communication comes with significant challenges. While we recognize the need for transparency, it is important that it not come at the expense of national security and the safety of those who risk so much, sometimes even their lives, to enable the collection of intelligence that is essential to our efforts to combat foreign interference. In her recent report, Commissioner Hogue aptly explains how difficult it is to strike a balance.

As members of the House can see, we have already made considerable progress on this first theme, as highlighted by the minister and Ms. Charette. The same is true for the second theme, which concerns governance and legal frameworks. This report demonstrated the government's commitment to considering improvements to the legal framework supporting the capacity of intelligence agencies, in particular the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, and our electoral process.

The Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs recently introduced two important bills in the House in support of these commitments.

First, Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, proposes important measures, including an update to CSIS' mandate. I would like to highlight the addition of offences related to foreign interference in democratic processes to the Security of Information Act.

The minister also introduced Bill C-65, an act to amend the Canada Elections Act. This bill continues to improve our electoral processes, including by implementing many of the Chief Electoral Officer's recommendations. This bill builds on the 2018 Elections Modernization Act as part of our efforts to counter foreign interference in our elections. I hope that all members in the House will support this bill.

The minister promised to advance these priorities and he did. Now it is up to members of the House and the representatives at the other place to ensure that these bills are adopted swiftly. The government continues to advance the commitments in the report discussed this evening that was submitted to the Prime Minister in March 2023. Our work continues.

This brings me to the report's third theme. It highlights the requirement for the government to have the ability to evaluate risks and vulnerabilities resulting from the growing threat posed by foreign interference in order to be able to adapt the government's tool kit to the evolving threat.

The recent reports, as well as the deliberations of the public inquiry into foreign interference in federal electoral processes and democratic institutions, provide valuable information that we can use to further improve existing measures for countering the threat of foreign interference. Among other things, this includes measures introduced under the plan to protect Canada's democracy.

As the report states, our government will continue to explore further enhancements to this plan. This will include an examination of making the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force a permanent entity, with a mandate to conduct regular reporting on foreign interference activities.

Lastly, I would be remiss not to mention the final theme of the report, which involves engagement to raise awareness and improve resilience to foreign interference. I have already mentioned some of the government's efforts in this regard, including the publication of information kits to resist disinformation and foreign interference. The work on this is also ongoing, and resources have been invested to ensure active progress on these efforts.

The Government of Canada also created the Protecting Democracy Unit within the Privy Council Office to coordinate, develop and implement government-wide measures. These teams are working with other agencies and partners within government and with stakeholders to advance these efforts.

Perhaps I should remind my colleagues that, when we swear our oath or affirmation of allegiance, we are swearing allegiance to democratic institutions and the principle of democracy. That means we have to take our responsibilities seriously, and I find it reassuring that the government is committed to better informing partners about the threat of foreign interference.

I am ready for questions.

[Francesco Sorbara, Liberal, Vaughan—Woodbridge, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is always an honour and privilege to rise in this honourable House. I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for the very near, and I say near because it is geographically near, riding of Ottawa—Vanier, who is a dear friend and great member of Parliament in the House.

We are having a debate on a very important topic, a topic none of us should take lightly and a topic we all need to think about, co-operate and opine on, because it impacts democracy in the country we live in. It is a topic that I know is very, very important to all of us and all of our citizens.

As the members opposite and all hon. senators know, the Government of Canada is firmly committed to combatting foreign interference.

Today, foreign interference poses one of the greatest threats to Canadian society, our economic prosperity, and our sovereignty. By giving law enforcement and intelligence agencies enhanced tools and powers, the countering foreign interference act will strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference threats to our national security.

Activities such as the dissemination of false information and misinformation through traditional and digital means undermine public trust and sow doubt in our fundamental institutions, traditional media, and the legitimacy of elections. Not only do these activities spread misinformation, but, as we learned from testimony heard during the foreign interference commission's public hearings, foreign state actors are monitoring, intimidating, and harassing diaspora communities across Canada.

We also know from Canada's security and intelligence community that a growing number of states have developed and deployed programs to exert influence online as part of their day-to-day activities. Public Safety Canada is leading the work of this community to identify and develop the right solutions for Canada.

We are also aware of numerous reports, such as the “CSIS Public Report 2023”; the initial report of Justice Hogue's commission; and, more recently, the studies by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

Through their insidious online campaigns, foreign actors are trying to realign our decision-makers' choices, our government relations, along with our politicians' and our country's reputations. The countering foreign interference act will strengthen Canada's ability to counter the threat of foreign interference while defending Canadian values and interests and respecting the need for transparency.

One of the key pillars of the act and its commitment to transparency is the creation of a foreign agent registry to ensure transparency when it comes to foreign influence. This registry will require the public registration of the activities of any person or corporation entering into an agreement with a foreign official and engaging in activities to influence a government or political process in Canada. The purpose of a foreign agent registry is to promote transparency for all those who advocate on behalf of foreign governments or entities, as well as to ensure accountability for those who seek to do so in secret. This will reinforce how seriously we take our political and democratic processes, and will align Canada's process with international best practices

By aligning ourselves with international best practices, we can assure our allies that our mutual security will be respected and that our shared values of democracy, openness and human rights will be defended.

Canada has remained open to learning from the experiences of our international partners. Many other countries have already adopted a similar foreign registry. For instance, foreign agent registries already exist in other Five Eyes countries, such as the United States and Australia.

With Bill C‑70, the government is proposing that Canada's registry be overseen by an independent foreign interference commissioner to independently administer and promote compliance with the act. The act is by no means a single solution to foreign interference. This is a complex national threat that requires a multi-pronged approach. That said, a foreign registry would build on our government's long-standing and ongoing efforts to protect our democratic institutions from the threat of foreign interference.

While our security intelligence community is working to identify and counter threats and develop strategies to protect our country and our citizens, we cannot become complacent or overly optimistic about mitigating these threats in the current geopolitical context. Targeted amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act would enable the government and other Canadian institutions and entities to better strengthen their resilience and counter the modern threats that Canada is facing today.

When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was established in 1984, the federal government was our adversaries' main target. However, as members know, foreign interference is now omnipresent in all spheres of Canadian society. Our adversaries boldly target not only the federal government, but also the provinces, territories, indigenous governments, industry, academics, community groups and individuals, both online and in person.

Among other changes, Bill C‑70 would allow wider disclosure of CSIS intelligence to those outside of the Government of Canada. With appropriate safeguards, this intelligence would help Canadians build resilience to threats. The bill would also allow CSIS to be more agile and effective in its investigations by introducing new Federal Court orders and warrants, and it would also improve the ability of CSIS to use data sets.

The proposed changes take into account the feedback received during consultations with individuals and entities from across Canada, and from various communities, industries and entities. Canadians have high expectations when it comes to the protection of personal information, including protection under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is with this in mind that these proposals have been developed. CSIS already has several layers of protection in place to ensure accountability and respect for the rights of Canadians.

I welcome any questions and comments that my colleagues may have.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Amendment BQ‑16 concerns the Commissioner's annual report and specifies that this report must be tabled in the House of Commons and the Senate instead of being given to the minister, in order to ensure greater transparency. This is a recommendation made by several witnesses, including Mr. Thomas Juneau, who said it would be a good practice.

The amendment proposes therefore that Bill C‑70, in clause 113, be amended by replacing lines 22 to 28 on page 85 with the following:the end of each fiscal year, prepare an annual report on their activities during that year and submit it to the Speakers of the Senate and the House of Commons, who must each table it in the House over which they preside without delay after receiving it or, if that House is not then sitting, on any of the first 15 days on which that House is sitting after they receive it.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Amendment BQ‑11 deals with the removal of the Commissioner. We propose to involve both the House of Commons and the Senate in the removal process.

Amendment BQ‑11 proposes:That Bill C‑70, in Clause 113, be amended by replacing line 22 on page 78 with the following:“at any time on address of the Senate and House of Commons.”

We therefore propose to add the Senate and the House of Commons to the revocation process.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

Madam Speaker, regarding the question from the hon. member for Mirabel, I already answered it when the member from Calgary East raised the issue.

I can tell the member what the Prime Minister and the government have done. We set up the national security and intelligence committee, which is made up of parliamentarians. Members from all parties sit on it, do the work, know exactly who these people are and know their boundaries. I have introduced Motion No. 112, which the Bloc Québécois supported, and our government put forward Bill C-70 to further protect Canadians and Canadian democratic institutions from foreign interference.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

Madam Speaker, as the members opposite and all hon. colleagues know, the Government of Canada is deeply focused on combatting foreign interference. Today, foreign interference poses one of the greatest threats to our Canadian society, our economic prosperity and our sovereignty.

Following the tragic killing of Mr. Hardeep Singh Nijjar at a place of worship in my riding of Surrey—Newton, a Canadian who was assassinated on Canadian soil, I introduced private member's Motion No. 112, which called for the government to protect diaspora communities from acts of political interference, violence and intimidation on Canadian soil by persons or agents of foreign states.

With Motion No. 112 receiving support from all members who had voted, our government also introduced Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act, to further combat foreign interference. By giving our law enforcement and intelligence agencies enhanced tools and authorities, the countering foreign interference act would strengthen our ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference threats to our national security.

Activities such as spreading misinformation and disinformation through traditional and digital means undermine public confidence and spread doubt in our fundamental institutions, mainstream media and the legitimacy of elections. Not only are they spreading misinformation, but, as we know from testimony at the public hearings of the foreign interference commission, foreign state actors are monitoring, intimidating and harassing diaspora communities across Canada.

We also know from our security and intelligence community that a growing number of states have built and deployed programs dedicated to undertaking online influence as part of their everyday activities. Public Safety Canada is leading work across this community to identify and develop the right solutions for Canada. As well, we have this knowledge from numerous reports, such as from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service entitled “CSIS Public Report 2023”, Justice Hogue’s interim report of the foreign interference commission and, most recently, studies from the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

Through their deceptive online campaigns, foreign actors are attempting to reshape our policy-makers’ choices, our government relationships, and the reputation of our politicians and our country. The countering foreign interference act would further strengthen Canada’s ability to counter the foreign interference threat, while upholding Canadian interests, values and the need for transparency.

One of the main pillars of this bill and its commitment to transparency is the creation of a foreign influence transparency registry. This registry would require that all individuals or entities who enter into an arrangement with a foreign principal and who undertake activities to influence a government or political process in Canada would be required to publicly register these activities. The goal of a foreign registry would be to promote transparency from all people who advocate on behalf of foreign governments or entities, as well as to ensure accountability from those who would seek to do so in secret ways.

This would reinforce the seriousness with which we take the protection of our political and democratic processes and would align Canada with international best practices. This is what we would like to see for Canada. By aligning with international best practices, we could reassure our allies that our mutual security would be upheld and our shared values of democracy, openness and human rights would be defended.

Canada has remained open to learning from the experiences of our international partners. Many other nations have already adopted a similar foreign registry of their own. For example, foreign agent registries already exist in other Five Eyes countries, including the United States and Australia.

In Bill C-70, the government proposes Canada's registry be overseen by an independent foreign influence transparency commissioner, who would be responsible to independently administer and promote compliance with the act. However, the act is by no means a single solution to foreign interference. It is a complex national security threat that requires a multipronged approach.

This said, a foreign registry would build on the government's ongoing and long-standing efforts to protect our democratic institutions against the threat of foreign interference. While our security and intelligence community has been doing the hard work of detecting and countering threats and developing strategies to protect our country, we cannot become content or overly optimistic that these threats will decrease given the current geopolitical environment.

Targeted amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act would better equip the government and other Canadian institutions and entities to build resilience and to counter the modern threats Canada faces today.

When the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was first created in 1984, the federal government was the primary target of our adversaries. However, as we know today, foreign interference is widespread across all facets of Canadian society. Our adversaries boldly target not just the federal government, but provincial, territorial and indigenous governments, industry, academics, community groups and individual Canadians, both online and in person.

Among other changes, Bill C-70 would enable a broader disclosure of Canadian Security Intelligence Service information to those outside the Government of Canada. With appropriate safeguards, this information would help Canadians build resiliency to threats. This legislation would also increase the ability of CSIS to be more agile and effective in its investigation, by introducing new Federal Court orders and warrants. It would also enhance the capacity of CSIS to use datasets. These proposed changes incorporate the input we received during the consultations with individuals and entities across Canada and from diverse communities, industries and entities.

People in Canada have a high expectation of privacy, including the protection provided by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. These proposals have been developed with that in mind. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service already has multiple layers of protection to ensure it is accountable and that the rights of people in Canada are protected. The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians also provide an important review function for CSIS activities.

I want to reassure my colleagues in the House and Canadians the government is and will be using every possible tool at our disposal to keep them safe.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Fine.

Shall the decision of the chair be sustained?

(Ruling of the chair sustained: yeas 6; nays 4)

That brings us to BQ-6.

Mr. Villemure, you can move it, but I also have to rule on this one.

Bill C-70 amends several acts and so on and so forth. Once again, the amendment creates a new concept that is beyond the scope of the bill as adopted by the House at second reading.

Therefore, I rule the amendment inadmissible.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. Villemure.

I meant to interrupt you after you moved this amendment. I have to make a ruling on it.

Bill C-70 amends several acts and enacts a foreign influence transparency and accountability act. The bill provides that persons who enter into an arrangement with a foreign principal under which they undertake to carry out certain activities are required to provide the commissioner with the information specified in the regulations.

The amendment seeks to add that even if no arrangement has been entered into, any individual other than a public office holder must file a return with the commissioner if that individual receives a communication from a foreign principal requesting that the individual take certain actions.

In the opinion of the Chair, the amendment adds a new concept that is beyond the scope of the bill as adopted by the House at second reading. Therefore, I rule the amendment inadmissible.

Go ahead, Mr. Villemure.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Yes, Mr. Chair.

Overall, even if Bill C‑70 is, in my opinion, aimed at solving a problem, it is difficult to apply in certain cases and we will have to discuss its application. Furthermore, we are told that the aim of the bill is to increase transparency in order to reduce, if not eliminate, foreign interference, which seems a little ambitious to me.

The fact remains that universities that receive federal funding are currently targets of foreign interference, despite the presence of programs like those named by Mr. Bilodeau. If we want to reduce the damage done by foreign interference, then we can't ignore universities.

[Richard Bilodeau]

Thank you, Chair, for that question.

On the proposed amendment in relation to paragraph (d), “the political or governmental processes of a federal or provincial Crown corporation”, the intent and interpretation is that the current definitions in Bill C-70 include Crown corporations, so our interpretation—which would be subject to the commissioner's interpretation, obviously—is that those are already included in the definition.

In terms of “the political or governmental processes of a university or government research centre”, I would say that the proposed amendment goes beyond what we intended in terms of the transparency registry. It was intended to increase transparency in activities related to governmental and political processes, whether processes of the federal, provincial-territorial or indigenous governments, but this would go far beyond that.

I would say that in terms of research in universities, again, it would significantly expand the scope. I would say that there are already a number of initiatives and programs in place, such as the safeguarding science initiative, the outreach program at the service and new national security guidelines for research partnerships that are aimed at tackling the problem of research security.

The transparency proposals here as they relate to the government would be very difficult to apply in the context of a university, because they would target the governmental and political process of the university, which is very different from the governmental or political process of a government.

[Julie Vignola, Bloc, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Mr. Speaker, democracy is a very meaningful word. It signifies power by the people, and I would add that it is also power for the people. Democracy has gone through changes since its very early days in ancient Greece, but the foundations remain. The people should be the ones making choices about their own future.

In light of the report on foreign interference, it behooves us to ask which people we are talking about, when we get right down to it. We may think that Quebec and Canadian parliamentarians represent the people of Quebec and Canada, but the report on foreign interference raises an important question: Are some members here for their constituents on Quebec and Canadian soil, or for foreign countries?

I think it is important first and foremost to clarify the difference between diplomacy and interference. Next, I will discuss certain troubling parts of the report. I will not discuss all of them, because we would be here until tomorrow morning. Lastly, I will go over some of the repercussions of this report.

Diplomacy is the branch of politics that concerns relations between nations. It involves representing a government's interests abroad, administering international affairs, and leading and conducting negotiations between nations. Diplomacy is the ability to resolve disputes. Diplomacy is also a skill. It is the tact involved in conducting state business effectively. Both definitions are important in our current situation. When we travel abroad for bilateral meetings with parliamentarians from other countries, we engage in diplomacy. We talk together to explain our realities. We share points of view and emphasize the important items to consider during negotiations between the governments concerned. Our ambassadors have the same duty to discuss and negotiate. Diplomacy serves the interests of nations and their people.

Interference occurs when one nation attempts to influence the domestic affairs of another nation. This definition illustrates the difference between diplomacy and interference. Interference is when one foreign state intervenes in another's domestic affairs. If we were to look a little closer at the history of humanity as a whole, we would see that several wars over the centuries have come about because of one country interfering in the affairs of another. Whereas diplomacy serves the interests of nations and their people, interference serves the interests of just one nation, and sometimes not the interests of any citizens.

With these two definitions in mind, we can only conclude that Canada has truly been a victim of interference, as have other countries around the world. Certain people have attempted to influence this country's domestic affairs, either wittingly or unwittingly. The report contains a number of elements, but I will focus on two or three of them. On page 25, paragraph 55 states:

Some elected officials, however, began wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after their election. [*** Three sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described examples of members of Parliament who worked to influence their colleagues on India's behalf and proactively provided confidential information to Indian officials. ***]

It says that they provided confidential information. That is worrisome. Despite the redactions, we understand that members helped facilitate Indian interference. We also found out that consulates and embassies would coordinate the actions of their networks. During the 2019 federal election, 11 candidates and 13 campaign staffers had close ties to China, including several who appeared to be wittingly working for the People's Republic of China. Despite the redactions, we understand that candidates and staffers had close ties to China. In this particular case, the involvement of consulates and embassies is worrisome since they breached their duty, which is to promote diplomacy.

How does interference happen? There is a list of methods, including the use of social media. Countries can intimidate the diaspora. Disinformation and misinformation are also used. Countries can use clandestine networks. They can even buy influence. That is just a short list of methods that can be used.

What worries me about all this is the lack of interest from successive governments of all stripes. The current Prime Minister's entourage dismisses intelligence reports on the pretext that they contain only unproven allegations, while the Prime Minister himself admitted when he appeared before the commission that he did not even read intelligence reports. That is worrisome. The least they could have done would have been to meet with the people who were mentioned, to ask for some explanations. How can they know that the allegations are unproven if the reports are systematically dismissed? If the RCMP or CSIS are not being questioned, how can they be sure that they are just allegations? How can they be sure, when the Prime Minister does not even read the reports?

When I first entered politics, one old-timer told me that a person cannot be accused of what they do not know. My own view is that, if I know about a problem, then I can act and improve it. Unfortunately, I see that the Prime Minister's team is very old school when it comes to a duty to act. They are like the three wise monkeys: see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil. However, now we all know, or at least, we know some things. The Minister of Public Safety raised an important point. We cannot mention people's names without making sure that the alleged offences are facts and not just unproven allegations. However, it is up to the RCMP and CSIS to determine that. It is not up to us.

I would like to know that these people will never again have the opportunity to facilitate foreign interference, either wittingly or unwittingly. I would like to know that real action is finally being taken to ensure the vitality of our democracy, without interference, without foreign interference. I want to be clearly, meaningfully and officially assured that the people of Quebec and Canada can have full confidence in their democracy. The current situation is just one more factor fuelling cynicism towards members who put their heart and soul into their work. The government is taking last-minute, urgent action because the report was released. The government quickly cobbled together Bill C-70. Here again, there was no planning, no preparation and no long-term vision.

In short, it is important to make sure that the people's elected representatives represent the people who elected them. They must be free from any collusion resulting in interference. This is essential to protecting our democracy. We are requesting that the terms of reference of the Hogue commission be expanded because we have a duty to protect our democracy. In doing so, we protect all the interests of our fellow citizens. In other words, we protect their confidence in us, and we protect our economy and its ability to provide good jobs and a bright future. We protect those who chose to make their home in Canada, far from strife. We protect people who left countries where they were being treated poorly.

Protecting our democracy transcends the walls of this House; it transcends politics. We must recognize that. I have said it before, and I will say it again: True statesmen and stateswomen protect human dignity, particularly the dignity of people of lesser means.

[Richard Bilodeau, Director General, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

The intent of the legislation is to be fairly broad with political processes. It is our interpretation and intent that those things would be captured under the current drafting of Bill C-70.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Good afternoon, everybody. Welcome to meeting number 114 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents. Please take note of the following preventative measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, particularly the interpreters.

Use only the approved black earpiece. The former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from the microphone at all times. When you're not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose. Thank you all for your co-operation.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.

Pursuant to the order of reference referred to the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.

I would like to provide members of the committee with a few comments on how the committee will proceed with the clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-70. This will take a couple of minutes, so grab a cup of coffee.

As the name indicates, this is an examination of all the clauses in the order in which they appear in the bill. I will call each clause successively, and each clause is subject to debate and a vote. If there are amendments to the clause in question, I will recognize the member proposing it, who may then explain it.

I would like to remind committee members that pursuant to the order adopted by the House on Thursday, May 30, all amendments had to be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m. on Friday, June 7. As a result, the chair will only allow amendments submitted before that deadline to be moved and debated. In other words, only amendments contained in the distributed package of amendments will be considered.

When no further members wish to intervene, the amendment will be voted on. Amendments will be considered in the order in which they appear in the package of amendments.

In addition to having to be properly drafted in a legal sense, amendments must also be procedurally admissible. The chair may be called upon to rule amendments inadmissible if they go against the principle of the bill or beyond the scope of the bill—both of which were adopted by the House when it agreed to the bill at second reading—or if they offend the financial prerogative of the Crown.

Amendments have been given a number in the top right corner to indicate which party submitted them. There is no need for a seconder to move an amendment. Once moved, you will need unanimous consent to withdraw it.

During debate on an amendment, members are permitted to move subamendments. Approval from the mover of the amendment is not required. Subamendments must be provided in writing. Only one subamendment may be considered at a time and that subamendment cannot be amended. When a subamendment to an amendment is moved, it is voted on first and then another subamendment may be moved or the committee may consider the main amendment and vote on it.

Pursuant to the order adopted by the House, if the committee has not completed the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill by 6:30 p.m., the chair shall allot each party no more than five minutes for each of the remaining amendments and clauses. The committee shall not adjourn the meeting until it has disposed of the bill.

Finally, if members have any questions regarding the procedural admissibility of amendments, the legislative clerks are here to assist the committee. However, they are not legal drafters and cannot respond to legal questions.

I thank the members for their attention and wish everyone a productive clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-70, no matter how long it shall take.

I would like to now welcome the officials who are with us.

From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have Sarah Estabrooks, director general, policy and foreign relations.

We also have Maria R., senior analyst, strategic policy.

From the Department of Justice, we have Jennifer Poirier, senior counsel; Mark Scrivens, senior counsel; Karine Bolduc, counsel, and Kieran Dyer, counsel.

From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have Richard Bilodeau, director general; Saskia Van Battum, director; David McIntyre, acting director; and Fenton Ho, acting director general, who is in the public gallery, apparently.

We're at clause-by-clause consideration.

Pursuant to Standing Order 75(1), on the consideration of clause 1, the short title is postponed.

The chair calls clause 2.

There have been no amendments submitted for clauses 2 through 33. Do we have unanimous consent to group them?

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Madam Speaker, the hon. member for Cowichan—Malahat—Langford made reference to Bill C-70 on a foreign interference registry, which we fast-tracked and which I supported. I have since heard from many concerned groups, and I wonder if he has as well, that in our collaborative spirit, which is so rare in this place, to get the bill through and be heard so that we would have a foreign interference registry, I think we made a mistake in not allowing the bill to be properly studied. There are a lot of concerns being raised now.

I wonder if the hon. member has any concerns as well, as a member of the committee, as to how we might be able, in a future Parliament, to hear expert witnesses and amend the bill.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, “I...do solemnly, sincerely and truly declare and affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II.” I have uttered those words three times now: once in 2015, once in 2019 and again in 2021. Of course now our allegiance lies with His Majesty King Charles II.

It is important to note we are not giving our oath to the person. It is really given to the embodiment of the Crown as an institution, which is, of course, a symbol of the Canadian state, a ship that continues to sail on despite the occasional changing of its captain.

I never thought I would arrive at a moment in time when I had to seriously doubt the sincerity of that affirmation or oath from fellow members of Parliament, but given the astounding report we received last week from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, that is the moment we have all arrived at.

I do want to note that I am incredibly proud to be a member of a caucus that has consistently led the way on trying to get results on the file we are considering. I take members back to just over a year ago, when, on May 30, 2023, my hon. colleague, the member for Vancouver East, used our opposition day in the House of Commons to make sure we debated a motion calling for a public inquiry.

As members will recall, at that time, the government had set up a special rapporteur, the right hon. David Johnston, but it was quite clear the faith in Mr. Johnston's abilities had become compromised because of his close relationship with the Prime Minister and the Liberal Party. That is why we felt at the time, as New Democrats, it was necessary for the House to call on Mr. Johnston to step aside in his role and for the government to finally get serious about the matter of foreign interference and urgently establish a public commission of inquiry.

I am pleased to report that, thanks to all of the opposition parties, the motion brought in by my party passed by a vote of 174 to 150; unfortunately, the Liberals were the ones who voted against it. It did have results, because Mr. Johnston resigned the following week. He understood at that moment in time that it was simply untenable for him to continue in his role while not enjoying the full confidence of the House of Commons. As well, we know that finally the foreign interference commission was set up on September 7, 2023.

I am a member of a caucus that has seen its leader, the NDP leader, the member for Burnaby South, being directly impacted by foreign interference. We know that my colleague, the member for Vancouver East, has also suffered the same. In our small, close-knit NDP caucus, we know all too well how pernicious foreign interference is, because we have seen it directly implicate, constrain and negatively affect two of our members. It is very personal for our caucus.

That brings me to the motion the Bloc Québécois has brought forward on its opposition day for the House to consider and eventually vote on. I want to break up my speech into several parts, looking at the various components of the motion.

Let us take a look at the first part of the motion, “that the House take note of the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.” Let us take note of the report. First of all, I want to note that in the opening paragraphs, the following appears: “the Committee noted the intelligence community’s consistent assessment that threat actors continue to consider Canada a permissive environment, viewing interference activities as a low-risk, high reward way to pursue strategic interests.”

At the end of the report, there is a litany of scathing conclusions against the Liberal government, complaining that the delays in developing policy demonstrated a lack of urgency commensurate with the gravity of threat, that delays in actions undermined the government's operational responses to the threat, and that a slow response to a known threat was a serious failure and one from which Canada may feel the consequences for years to come. Let that sink in, “for years to come”.

We are very much behind the eight ball on this issue. The warnings have been there, our country has been slow to act and those are the findings of NSICOP. Furthermore, we know now too that the Liberal government is withholding more than 1,000 pages of documents from the committee, just as it has withheld documents from the public inquiry. Those are hardly the actions of a government that is dedicated to transparency. I would argue that at this moment in time, what we need is transparency, we need to rebuild trust and we need accountability. This is an issue that rises above any one political party. This comes to the foundations of our democratic system itself. That is not full of hyperbole; that is the actual truth.

There is a real deficit in trust in the Canadian public right now and underpinning all of that is trust that we have faith that our democracy will continue through the turbulent times, that we can have faith that the people we elect to this place are doing their job honourably, on behalf of their constituents and in the best interests of the country we call Canada. It is clear that we have arrived at a moment where we must forcefully push back against hostile foreign powers that seek to undermine our democracy.

Let us go to the second part of the motion, which states that the House “express concern that certain elected officials may be wittingly or unwittingly working in the interests of foreign powers”. The NSICOP report landed with the force of a bomb last week. Its allegations that sitting members of Parliament are working on behalf of foreign interests is an incredibly serious issue that this House must be seized with. For example, paragraph 55 in the report talks about “Some elected officials...wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after their election.” The paragraph was heavily redacted, but the description of the redacted elements make mention of “members of Parliament who worked to influence their colleagues on India’s behalf and proactively provided confidential information to Indian officials.”

Paragraph 56 talks about a foreign state, and it does not mention which one, supporting a witting politician. Again, it is heavily redacted. Paragraph 57 talks about the People's Republic of China establishing a quid pro quo relationship with MPs where it would mobilize its network in Canada in the members' favour in return for positive engagement with the PRC. On and on it goes, detailing clandestine networks influencing the political process, the use of proxies, covertly buying influence with candidates and elected officials, etc.

I want to take a moment to ask a question that I think is on a lot of Canadians' minds, and it is certainly on my mind. What is going on with the leader of the Conservative Party's ongoing refusal to get the clearance necessary for a top secret briefing on this matter? The NDP leader already has the clearance and is going to get the briefing on who these compromised politicians are. For the life of me, I cannot understand why there is ongoing refusal on the part of the leader of the Conservative Party. The only thing I can derive from that fact is it seems he would rather talk about things he does not know rather than know things that he cannot talk about. The report, specifically paragraphs 72 and 73, talks about where the People's Republic of China allegedly interfered in the leadership races of the Conservative Party of Canada and India allegedly interfered in the Conservative Party's leadership.

That is a five-alarm fire. That is something that all parties need to take seriously. We know, of course, of the allegations that exist out there with the Liberal Party. It has already impacted one of their sitting MPs, who is now sitting as an independent. Again, this is an issue that I think every single leader in this place needs to get up to speed on. I will tell us why.

Last week, as a member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, we were doing a thorough review of Bill C-70, which I will talk about later, which is designed to deal with foreign interference. One of our witnesses was David Vigneault, who is the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I asked him about this, about whether it is in the intelligence community's interest that key members of Parliament, i.e., leaders of parties, get briefed on this information. He said yes, that it is in their interest to make sure that as many key members of Parliament, of the whole Parliament of Canada, are briefed on this.

Again, I understand that there is a wide gulf between intelligence and evidence but there are other mechanisms that party leaders can make use of within their own caucuses, so that if a party leader learns the identity of a compromised MP, there are actions that leader can take within their caucus to make sure that the Canadian people do not have a compromised person on the ballot in the next election. That is one avenue that can be taken.

It is shameful, I think, that, so many times, there is a deliberate choice to play partisan games rather than become informed. In my opinion, that is simply not leadership. There is a veil of ignorance on the Conservative side, but on the Liberal side, their continued reliance on judicial process and the RCMP investigating is also a cover, because, again, there is that gulf between intelligence and evidence. The intelligence does not always meet the high standard that is necessary in a court of law. Often, intelligence agencies are very loathe to share that intelligence because it could compromise their sources that gathered the information in the first place. Again, to the CSIS director's point at committee, there are actions that party leaders can take, but they can only take them if they make the conscious choice to become properly informed. We have yet to see that from the Conservative Party leader.

The final part of the motion from the Bloc Québécois is asking that the terms of reference for the foreign interference commission, known as the Hogue commission, be expanded to investigate Canada's federal democratic institutions, including members of the House of Commons elected in the 43rd and 44th Parliaments, as well as senators.

I have listened to some of the debate thus far, and some members believe that the existing terms of reference already cover this. I would say that given the heightened attention and interest that there is on this issue and the very real concern that Canadians have with it, if there is any way we could ask the government to give more specificity and direction to what the terms of reference should be to the commission, then I, for one, would be in favour of it. I do think it is reasonable to ask for that because, again, we need to make sure that the inquiry has full access to all of the classified material. We cannot have cabinet confidences blocking the inquiry's search for the truth. That is very much a fact, and I think most Canadians would very much agree with that.

I think we are all very well aware of how serious this issue is and the attention that we need to pay to it from this point forward. The next question is: where do we go from here? I love reviewing Canadian statutes, and the statute, of course, that is most at play in these circumstances is the Security of Information Act. Anyone, under that act, who is permanently bound to secrecy commits an offence when they intentionally and without authority communicate or confirm special operational information.

In this case, that would be the names of these MPs. We are in a conundrum here. On one hand, we have the Security of Information Act, SOIA, with very stiff penalties. If one committed an offence under the SOIA, one could be found guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not more than 14 years. That is a serious punishment for breaching these conditions in the act. Again, members of NSICOP are members of Parliament, but, looking at the act that created that committee under section 12, no member of that committee can “claim immunity based on parliamentary privilege”. They have waived their parliamentary privilege to be a part of that committee. As a result, they are also bound by secrecy. They cannot utter the names because they would be found liable to imprisonment as well.

I must return to the rights of the House of Commons itself, because I think we are setting up a battle here between the rights of the House versus existing statutes. We all know that two of the most powerful mechanisms that the House of Commons has are the regulation of its own internal affairs and the power to discipline. Those are the dominant rights and powers, among a few others, that the House of Commons has. I would submit to colleagues that breaking the oath of allegiance or the affirmation that we all made to have the privilege of sitting in this place is probably the most serious offence that I can think of. It is something that I think the House would be well-versed to seize itself with and to find the appropriate punishment. I am not sure where this battle is going to go, again, because we have rights as members of Parliament in that anything we say here on the floor of the House is protected by parliamentary privilege. We literally cannot be held liable for the things that we say on the floor of the House, because there can be no impediment to an MP doing their job. Members of Parliament cannot fear prosecution to be able to do their job. We have to find a way where this information becomes known. The ultimate goal I want is for no Canadian to face a possibility where there is a compromised politician on the ballot who may be working on behalf of a foreign power, rather than the interests of the community they represent or to our country as a whole.

In this last two minutes I have, I do want to mention that, in terms of where we go from here, Bill C-70 is going to go through clause-by-clause this afternoon. I am going to be there, at committee, reviewing every single one of those clauses. It is going to be reported back to the House, hopefully by Wednesday. I think there are some substantive measures in that bill. We are certainly happy to be supporting it. I think it is important that we set up a registry. I think it is important that the CSIS Act gets updated so that it can work in a digital world. I also think it is important that the Security of Information Act gets important updates so that for clandestine interference, we have appropriate punishments for people who are engaging in those kinds of activities.

However, let me say this. With every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. I think that foreign governments need to hear the message that their meddling in our internal affairs is now clearly on our radar and we are going to act. This is an item that the country is seized with, that this Parliament is seized with, and we are now prepared to take measures to make sure we root this problem out and get the perpetrators the justice that they so clearly deserve. The allegations that MPs knowingly received help from a foreign government are deeply disturbing. No one with those interests in mind should be sitting in this House of Commons. They should not be welcome in the Parliament of Canada. Canadians ultimately do deserve to know who these MPs are, who they are in undermining our democracy, and the government must find a way forward with this. All parliamentarians have an obligation to do everything they can to address foreign interference.

With that I will conclude by saying that we will support this motion. We will always be on the side of supporting efforts to get to the bottom of this issue and treating it with the seriousness that it deserves.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague from Laurentides—Labelle for raising this matter. Last week's special report from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians followed the testimony given by many witnesses at the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security and the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, as well as numerous other reports. Communication was identified as a problem, along with siloing.

Bill C-70 seeks to solve part of this problem, but we will study that tomorrow. For now, I feel we should allow a culture of intelligence sharing, but above all, we should develop a culture of protecting ourselves and realizing that interference exists in 2024, that it is already here and that, whether we like it or not, it is spreading. I am in complete agreement with my colleague. I hope this type of procedure can be put in place.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague. We had the opportunity to work together to examine Bill C-70 in depth. His comments were always insightful.

At this time, we know that the NDP leader has gotten security clearance, that the Prime Minister has automatically received the information and the leader of the Bloc Québécois is completing the process to receive security clearance. Of course the Conservative Party does not want to do so. I like my colleague's expression, when he talks about a veil of ignorance. It reminds me of my studies in philosophy with John Rawls.

I think that we cannot afford not to push together. I repeat, interference has no political stripe. It is a real threat. It is financial, it is democratic. It is steamrolling everyone. Parliaments all over the world are interested in foreign interference. Last week, a law was passed unanimously in the European community. I think we cannot be against it. If we are against, I have serious doubts and I have a problem with that.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Madam Speaker, first of all, it was a real pleasure working with the member for Trois-Rivières at committee last week. It was four days in a row of long sessions. I appreciated sitting next to him and getting through the important work of looking at Bill C-70.

When we look at the Liberal Party and the Conservative Party, we see that the Liberals seem to be hiding behind judicial process and the need for the RCMP investigation. We know there is a big gulf between intelligence and evidence; we know intelligence cannot always make its way to satisfy judicial requirements.

The Conservatives seem to be hiding behind a veil of ignorance. Their party refuses to get briefed, the leader in particular. The member answered the questions of my Liberal colleague earlier about getting party leaders briefed. When the director of CSIS was before our committee, he talked specifically about the actions that party leaders can take with respect to who gets to sit in caucus and who is allowed to run under the party banner.

I would like my colleague to share his thoughts on the power of party leaders and the actions they can take here now if they are all properly briefed. This is a very serious issue, and we want the issues to be resolved as quickly as possible so we do not have compromised candidates on the ballot in the next election.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

moved:

That the House:

(a) take note of the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians;

(b) express concern that certain elected officials may be wittingly or unwittingly working in the interests of foreign powers; and

(c) request the terms of reference of the foreign interference commission (the Hogue Commission) to be expanded to allow it to investigate Canada's federal democratic institutions, including members of the House of Commons elected in the 43rd and 44th Parliaments as well as Senators.

Mr. Speaker, I am very proud to rise today to give the opening speech for today's Bloc Québécois opposition day, which is about foreign interference. I would like to take this opportunity to say hello to my constituents in Trois-Rivières. I often discuss this subject with them because they find it interesting. People are curious, and today we are going to try to satisfy that curiosity.

Here is the motion:

That the House:

(a) take note of the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians;

(b) express concern that certain elected officials may be wittingly or unwittingly working in the interests of foreign powers; and

(c) request the terms of reference of the foreign interference commission (the Hogue Commission) to be expanded to allow it to investigate Canada's federal democratic institutions, including members of the House of Commons elected in the 43rd and 44th Parliaments as well as Senators.

One week ago today, Canada, the Parliament of Canada and, undoubtedly, many of Canada's national security and intelligence allies lost their innocence. Despite the Liberal government's repeated denials, despite the ill-advised optimism of the so-called independent special rapporteur, despite the report by the ineffectual Rosenberg commission, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, published a devastating report on June 5. The report is not devastating in its tone. It is devastating because of what it contains, which was unknown to most although suspected by many.

Despite the redaction that comes with this type of report, it is obvious that there is a problem, that we are at risk. Throughout its 178 paragraphs, the report describes the concept of foreign interference. Incidentally, I would like to point out that the concept of foreign interference is not defined in Canadian law, nor is it included in Bill C‑70, which we are currently studying. The report also describes the identity of the rogue states, their tactics, their use of cybertools and the absence of a coordinated response to these threats by the Canadian government.

Paragraph 50 and the paragraphs that follow are the ones that make the reader's hair stand on end.

First, we learn that some parliamentarians have communicated “frequently with foreign missions before or during a political campaign to obtain support from community groups or businesses which the diplomatic missions promise to quietly mobilize in a candidate's favour”.

Second, we learn that some parliamentarians have accepted “knowingly or through willful blindness funds or benefits from foreign missions or their proxies which have been layered or otherwise disguised to conceal their source”.

Third, we learn that some parliamentarians have provided “foreign diplomatic officials with privileged information on the work or opinions of fellow Parliamentarians, knowing that such information will be used by those officials to inappropriately pressure Parliamentarians to change their positions”.

Fourth, we learn that some parliamentarians have responded “to the requests or direction of foreign officials to improperly influence Parliamentary colleagues or Parliamentary business to the advantage of a foreign state”.

Fifth, we learn that some parliamentarians have provided “information learned in confidence from the government to a known intelligence officer of a foreign state.”

These are five devastating findings. This report confirms that, right now, there are members of the House who have, in one way or another, colluded with rogue states against our national interest. It is right there in black and white. If that is not foreign interference, then what is?

We cannot and must not remain indifferent in light of such a revelation. I promise that we will not remain indifferent. Of course, the government did warn us. I will give three examples of what it said. The government told us that intelligence is not truth. That answer has merit. Intelligence is not necessarily the truth. The government also told us that sometimes we have to look at the whole picture to understand the meaning, the direction and the path and to know where we are going.

That is not wrong. It is an interesting point. The report also states that the information was top secret and could not be revealed upon penalty of life imprisonment, which is also true. These three points are factual. We can agree on that.

I would like to hear and understand the justifications or answers but, in the end, the report is clear. There is currently interference in our Parliament. Instead of trying to reassure us with empty rhetoric, what did they do? What are they doing? What are we going to do? These questions remain unanswered.

After hearing the lame justifications concerning the Trudeau Foundation given before the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, after reading the complacent report of the so-called independent special rapporteur and the damning report of the committee of parliamentarians, what are they doing? What will it take for them to do something?

Currently, the situation is tense. There is a sense of distrust. That is no good for anyone, for any party. Then, to add insult to injury, the committee of parliamentarians mentioned something very interesting in its 2023 report. The committee said that the government submitted only four of the thousand documents requested. That is four out of one thousand. That has to be read to be believed. In all fairness, I would say that some of the 996 missing documents were submitted in redacted form. Okay, but still, it is a curiously small sample.

Once the parliamentarians read the report of the Special Committee on the Canada–People's Republic of China Relationship on the Winnipeg laboratory, there were all sorts of debates in the House, and approximately 600 pages of the report were redacted, including the footnotes and page numbers.

A special committee was struck to analyze the situation alongside arbitrators, who used to serve as Federal Court judges. The arbitrators found that the redaction was excessive. It may have been preventive, but it was excessive. We saw that the report's redactions were nearly eliminated. They were not entirely eliminated because there was sensitive information in the report, but all in all, most of the redactions were done away with. We often come up against over-classification, which is to say that information is classified in too high a category. It goes from “confidential” to “secret”, from “secret” to “top secret”, and so on. It is done for preventive reasons, but perhaps not very accurately.

I would just echo the remarks of the Information Commissioner, who told us at a meeting of the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, that this government clearly prefers darkness to light.

It is in that spirit that the Bloc Québécois is moving its motion today. The situation is worse than we could have possibly imagined to date. The report tells us not only that foreign states are interfering in our democratic process, but that parliamentarians are colluding with these states. These elected representatives are not publicly named, and the members who serve on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, are bound to secrecy forever, as I was saying earlier, under penalty of imprisonment.

In other words, the names of the individuals working for foreign interests may not be revealed by the NSICOP, but they can be through other avenues, such as a broader inquiry by the Hogue commission. The commission could dig deeper and obtain new testimony as part of a broader investigation.

The Liberal government must understand that its duty is to protect us, not protect itself. It must cease its strategy of dodging serious questions and remove its rose-coloured glasses, because the year is no longer 2015. The government must also stop trivializing the situation, as the parliamentary secretary and member for Pickering—Uxbridge did last week. Before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, she replied, “Boo hoo, get over it” to a parliamentarian who was querying the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs about the foreign interference.

This trivialization is unacceptable and will not be tolerated any longer. The Liberal government must also understand that not everyone is nice, that not everyone is telling the truth and that the interference is real. To get to the bottom of things, some explanations are in order. It is a given that the “top secret” security classification binds parliamentarians to secrecy for life. This is a real thing.

There is also something called cabinet confidence. Its purpose is codified in the Westminster Parliament, and that is not a bad thing in and of itself. It allows participants to perhaps be more honest with each other, with no filters and without the risk of being smeared or whatnot.

Secrecy is not a bad thing in and of itself. Cabinet confidence is not a bad thing in and of itself either. The problem lies in cabinet confidence being abused, in a way that could be described as unethical, in this instance. To make sense of it, we have to be able to distinguish between secrecy and concealment, which are very different notions. Without going into the origin of the word, secrecy is that which must not be shared. It is in a different category. Concealment is simply deception to conceal what could be shared. Concealment is a form of manipulation, a type of lying that implies a certain superiority over others, based on the fact that one knows and believes the other does not need to know. It is not very egalitarian. However, lying is mostly making people believe something and do what they would not have done had they known. That is fundamental in an election.

All lies are secret, but not all secrets are lies. This is an important distinction, and I encourage my friends across the aisle to think about it. Concealment and lies are the enemies of trust, which, I would remind members, consists in putting one's future in someone else's hands. In an election, citizens put their future in the hands of their elected candidates and they have the right to expect those candidates to earn that trust. Citizens expect that the government will protect their interests, not those of a foreign power or, worse yet, partisan interests.

However, as it stands, when one looks at everything the Liberal government has done to address foreign interference, one can only be surprised by its casual approach and its elevation of concealment as a way of life. That is why we must push harder to do away with concealment and lies and restore the trust that Canadians deserve from elected officials.

After the failure of the so-called independent special rapporteur, the Bloc Québécois placed its trust in the Hogue commission. The Hogue commission was established by the four main parties, who worked together and unanimously agreed on the commissioner and the scope and nature of the commission's terms of reference.

For the benefit of those who may not know, I will list a few elements of those terms of reference. The commission will “examine and assess the interference by China, Russia and other foreign states or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, in order to confirm the integrity of, and any impacts on, the 43rd and 44th general elections”. It will also “examine and assess the flow of information to senior decision-makers, including elected officials”. Thirdly, it will “examine and assess the capacity of relevant federal departments, agencies, institutional structures and governance processes to permit the Government of Canada to detect, deter and counter any form of foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada's democratic processes.”

That is an extraordinary mission, and as they say, extraordinary problems require extraordinary remedies. The Hogue commission has extraordinary powers: It can adopt any procedures or methods it sees fit to effectively conduct the public inquiry, and it can receive and examine all pertinent documents, classified or not. That is the problem, because the commissioner admitted that she had not received certain documents or that she received redacted documents when they should not have been redacted, which brings me back to the issue of over-classification. We need to stop being afraid of being afraid. The four parties unanimously appointed a commissioner and gave her a mandate. The commissioner should be able to obtain these documents.

Foreign interference has no political stripe. Foreign interference affects every parliamentarian here in the House, every political party and every citizen. Tens of billions of dollars are stolen every year. Members of many diasporas are threatened on Canadian soil every year. The threats are real, now, here in the House. Doing nothing is not an option anymore. We must stop looking the other way and believing that the danger will go away on its own.

That is why the Bloc Québécois “request[s] the terms of reference of the foreign interference commission…to be expanded to allow it to investigate Canada's federal democratic institutions, including members of the House of Commons elected in the 43rd and 44th Parliaments as well as Senators.”

We must choose to make history rather than endure it. Great danger calls for great courage. The Bloc Québécois is moving this motion so that trust can be restored. I ask all my colleagues to have courage.

Democratic Institutions

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate that the Bloc members on the committee have been working hard and diligently with us, in good faith, on foreign interference. It is disappointing when Conservative mis-characterization of meetings takes place.

What is most important is that we are working hard to ensure that our democratic institutions are resilient and that we are combatting foreign interference. This is not a partisan issue, and it is why we have introduced a number of measures to strengthen our democratic institutions. This includes Bill C-70, which we are working on in committee.

[Jennifer O'Connell, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, Conservative members know what actually happened at committee that day, but when it comes to foreign interference, this is something we take incredibly seriously. It is something we have taken seriously since we formed government, something that unfortunately Mr. Harper's government did not do. We have put in place measures like the NSICOP committee. We are currently debating Bill C-70 at committee, which will bring forward more provisions to help strengthen our democratic institutions.

I hope Conservatives will stop playing political games and instead focus on resilience in our democratic institutions.

Business of the House

[Steven MacKinnon, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, there is indeed a secret in the House, and that is the Conservative Party's true intentions when it comes to cuts. “Chop, chop, chop,” as my colleague from Gaspésie—Les Îles-de-la-Madeleine so aptly puts it. That party wants to cut social programs and the programs that are so dear to Quebeckers and Canadians: women's rights, the right to abortion, the right to contraception. The Conservatives want to scrap our government's dental care and pharmacare plans. The secret is the Conservative Party's hidden agenda, which will do great harm to all Canadians.

With our government's usual transparency, this evening we will proceed to report stage consideration of Bill C-20, an act establishing the public complaints and review commission and amending certain acts and statutory instruments, and Bill C-40, an act to amend the Criminal Code, to make consequential amendments to other acts and to repeal a regulation regarding miscarriage of justice reviews, also known as David and Joyce Milgaard's law.

Tomorrow, we will begin second reading of Bill C-63, an act to enact the online harms act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Human Rights Act and An Act respecting the mandatory reporting of Internet child pornography by persons who provide an Internet service and to make consequential and related amendments to other acts.

I would like to inform the House that next Monday and Thursday shall be allotted days. On Tuesday, we will start report stage of Bill C-69, the budget implementation act. On Wednesday, we will deal with Bill C-70, concerning foreign interference, as per the special order adopted last Thursday. I wish all members and the House staff a good weekend.

Democratic Institutions

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to think that all parliamentarians take democracy seriously, that everyone who is fortunate enough to be elected to the House to serve their constituents and Canada takes democracy seriously.

That is why I am very pleased to have worked with my colleague from La Prairie on establishing the Hogue commission, for example. I really enjoyed working together last summer. I look forward to seeing the Hogue commission's report. I look forward to working with members to pass bills like Bill C-70, which will strengthen our ability to resist foreign interference.

We will continue to pursue this approach.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.

I'd like to thank the witnesses for being here today and joining us on such short notice. Your contributions are most helpful. They will help us move forward in our study. You may withdraw at this point if you wish to do so.

I would like to remind the committee that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk by 4 p.m. Eastern Standard Time tomorrow. It's important for members to note that pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee.

The clerk has advised me about the amendments package and when it will be distributed. If there are fewer than 20 amendments, we will probably get it by six o'clock on Friday. If there are more than that, there's an open question of when we will get it.

I would also remind the committee that we'll meet again on Monday at 3:30, and we will sit here until we're done. That will depend on the amendments.

I'd like to thank all of the committee personnel who have stuck with us through all of this. I'm particularly thankful for the ongoing endurance of our analysts, who have been here hour upon hour, and the perseverance of our clerk. A week ago we dumped a massive list on his lap.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you.

My next question is for Mr. Al Qadi.

The government has released a charter impact statement, which notes a number of protected rights and freedoms that are potentially engaged by Bill C-70, including freedom of expression, the right to peaceful assembly, the right against unreasonable search and seizure and others. Do you feel that the charter rights of Canadians are adequately protected by this legislation? Are there any adjustments you would recommend?

You have also highlighted some civil liberties concerns that your organization is raising with the text. Can you explain that?

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thanks to all of the witnesses for appearing before the committee.

My first question is for Mr. Noël.

We have seen in the past that national security legislation, especially when passed quickly, can lead to unintended consequences, especially for members of minority communities. These same communities, which are most often targeted by state actors or foreign repression, have often felt unfairly targeted by intelligence and security agencies.

Could you share what the intelligence agencies are doing to build trust with these communities, especially as they seek expanded powers in Bill C-70?

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you. I appreciate that.

I want to direct my next questions to the NCCM.

I appreciate the concerns you outlined with this bill. From the committee's perspective, this has been a busy week for us as we dive deep into Bill C-70.

I take note of your concern about the definition of the term “intimidation” in the proposed amendments to the SOIA. I had a chance to ask the Minister of Justice a question about that. I don't think I got a direct answer to my concerns, though he said—and I'm paraphrasing—that it would only be for when there's an element of foreign interference, not lawful and proper protests. It has to be something attempting to influence Canada and subvert Canadian interests. I would also note that in the existing SOIA, under section 24, the consent of the Attorney General is needed to prosecute any SOIA offence.

From your perspective, what definition of intimidation would the NCCM like to see put into this bill?

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Commissioner Noël, I'd like to direct my first questions to you.

The first part of Bill C-70 makes some pretty consequential amendments to the CSIS Act, notably massive upgrades to the CSIS dataset regime. We've been describing it as bringing an analog law up to speed so that it fits in a digital age. However, I've read the NSIRA report on CSIS's use of the dataset regime and it's littered with comments like this: “CSIS's current application of the dataset regime is inconsistent with the statutory framework”, “CSIS did not comply with the dataset provisions in the CSIS Act”, non-compliant information was held and “CSIS has failed to adequately operationalize the dataset regime.” That's a pretty scathing report. Now I'm being asked as a legislator to fix the dataset regime and give CSIS more powers, but that's in the context of them failing to act by their current statutory obligations.

From your point of view as the commissioner, what can you tell me, a legislator, that would put my mind at ease so that a few years down the road from now, I'm not going to read another NSIRA report that shows CSIS has blown past the statutory limitations I'm being asked to give them here and now?

[Marcus Kolga, Senior Fellow, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and honourable members of the committee.

I'm a journalist and civil society activist who's been researching and exposing foreign information and influence operations targeting Canada and our allies for nearly 15 years. I'm also a human rights activist. Through this work, I've had the privilege of supporting and collaborating with extraordinarily courageous champions of democracy and human rights, some of whom testified before this committee earlier this week. Others have faced intimidation or detention for speaking out against the totalitarian regimes in Beijing, Moscow and Tehran. Some have been poisoned and others have been brutally murdered for their activism and advocacy.

For my work in supporting many of those brave activists and our common causes, I've directly witnessed and experienced the chilling effects of foreign authoritarian transnational repression. These effects include death threats, harassment and defamatory articles regularly published by Kremlin-controlled media outlets against me. Kremlin-aligned influencers and proxies in Canada have attempted to discredit and silence me through psychological intimidation and whisper campaigns.

While my personal experiences are less severe than those of witnesses you heard from earlier this week, such as the brave members of the Uyghur, Tibetan and Hong Kong communities, the objectives of these influence operations are universal: to repress the free and open expression of regime critics within the Canadian political and media environment, and ultimately to undermine our democracy.

These operations aim to cast doubt on the credibility of their victims. Tactics may include malicious online articles or poisoned letter-writing campaigns containing false accusations about the target, sent to media, government officials and even the victim's employers. In my case, such campaigns were carried out by Canadians working with Russian companies, trade promotion organizations and Kremlin-controlled think tanks.

The psychological impact of being targeted and defending against such foreign influence operations is, by design, exhausting. Victims feel isolated and defenceless. Concern for the safety of family members creates additional psychological stress, all of which is made worse when these campaigns include threats of physical violence. This can lead to significant psychological trauma and further problems. Ultimately, the target becomes so overwhelmed that they give up and silence themselves, limiting their ability to freely express themselves.

The lack of a coherent support system for vulnerable communities compounds the problem. In 2019, when my family and I were targets of death threats sent from a Moscow-based IP address and on social media, no law enforcement organization was equipped to deal comprehensively with the issue of transnational repression. When I called my local law enforcement unit, they told me to contact the RCMP. When I contacted the RCMP, they told me to contact CSIS. CSIS is, of course, a dead end.

When Bill C-70 comes into force, all parliamentarians need to support the development of policies that provide meaningful support for vulnerable communities and the brave activists and journalists who become victims of transnational repression. For Canadians vulnerable to transnational repression, Bill C-70 is a welcome ray of hope in our common cause to defend our democracy against authoritarian regimes that seek to undermine it.

The transparency and accountability required by the foreign influence transparency registry will help ensure that dishonest Canadians who are lured into the service of foreign authoritarian regimes with lucrative opportunities are identified. This will allow government officials, media and vulnerable communities to be aware of who and what these individuals publicly represent. When properly enforced, this new law will help prevent them from manipulating our political and information environment.

However, I believe the act would be further strengthened by a definition of both physical and digital transnational repression. Such activity targeting vulnerable diaspora communities and human rights and pro-democracy defenders should be included in the act and the foreign influence transparency registry.

Our foreign adversaries spare no expense in their efforts to undermine our democracy. Until now, they've manipulated our information spaces, influenced policy and intimidated our brave frontline defenders of democracy with relative impunity. Properly implemented and enforced, Bill C-70 will end their impunity and provide a new bulwark to defend our democracy.

Thank you.

[Nusaiba Al Azem, National Council of Canadian Muslims]

Thank you very much.

Ahmed is indeed right that a number of provisions require further study. For example, under part 2, for section 20 of the Security of Information Act, SOIA, there is an amendment to add the language of intimidation:

Every person commits an offence who, at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with, a foreign entity or a terrorist group, induces or attempts to induce, by intimidation, threat or violence, any person to do anything or to cause anything to be done.

However, as has been raised before for this committee today, “intimidation” is not defined in the SOIA, and this is hugely problematic. Are we using the tort definition or relying on parallel Criminal Code uses of the concept of intimidation or another definition entirely? This ambiguity could be used by this or future governments to target different kinds of protest activities that some have accused of being foreign-funded, whether they involve convoy protesters, Black Lives Matter protesters or others. We recommend that this section be deleted in its entirety or that “intimidation” be clearly defined in the act to ensure there is a civil liberties carve-out similar to the proposed carve-outs in subclause 60(2) and clause 61 of Bill C-70.

The bill also, in part 1, expands substantively CSIS powers. The expansion of CSIS powers to, as proposed, help it adapt to changing technology beyond Canada is a significant change that deserves study. Changes around surveillance and warrant procedures deserve significant study as well.

We are also concerned about the expansion of the inadmissibility provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, IRPA, the sabotage provisions and many others. The new IRPA provision, for example, suggests that the minister may be able to find someone inadmissible if the minister deems that they are bad for Canada's “international relations”. How would this impact dissidents from dictatorships that Canada has diplomatic relationships with?

This legislation has many complex implications. Appropriate due diligence is not being exercised when it appears that all parties, with what we view as good intentions, are inadvertently rushing to make significant changes to our national security infrastructure without adequate checks and balances through longer, rigorous and informed study.

Subject to any questions, those form our submissions. Thank you.

[Ahmad Al Qadi, National Council of Canadian Muslims]

Thank you, Chair.

Good morning. My name is Ahmad Al Qadi. I'm joined by Nusaiba Al Azem, director of legal affairs for the National Council of Canadian Muslims. We're here to offer submissions on Bill C-70.

Let us begin by noting that many of the goals in the act are laudable. In fact, more than four years ago we testified in front of the foreign affairs committee about the need for Canada to crack down on foreign agents from any nation, given the clear intimidation that Uyghur Canadians were facing from Chinese state agents. We are deeply troubled by the numerous reports of interference by foreign states, including the governments of India, China and others, which have a pattern of engaging in crackdowns on minority communities

We are in full agreement with what many others have stated before you in this committee: Canada must take action to challenge foreign interference. That's why we have clearly supported parts of this legislation, such as the call for a foreign agents transparency registry.

That being said, while there is much that is good about this act, we must first note as clearly as we can that rushing to pass this bill in its entirety would be problematic. When we are rushing to make changes to our national security legislation that have fundamental impacts on privacy legislation, when we are further empowering agencies like CSIS that numerous judges have cited for their problematic behaviour and when there has been no time for academics or civil society actors to review the legislation, respectfully, there is a high likelihood that unintended consequences will result. Even today, as we are offering our initial response to the legislation, we doubt we will be able to provide fulsome answers to all of the questions posed given that we received a technical briefing on the legislation from government officials only yesterday.

Moving too fast can impact everyone negatively. Our national security agencies have in the past erroneously targeted Christian social conservatives, environmentalists, Sikh communities, indigenous communities, Muslims, progressives and everyone in between. That's why we believe more time is needed to conduct a fulsome study with academics and experts that isn't crammed into one week. Our first and most important recommendation to this committee, therefore, is to split the bill, pass part 4, which most have considered to be strong and relatively uncontroversial, and study the rest of the important suggestions laid out in the bill in a far more thorough fashion.

I will turn it over to my colleague Nusaiba.

[Simon Noël, Intelligence Commissioner, Office of the Intelligence Commissioner]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Chair, members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to discuss Bill C‑70 with you.

Joining me today is Justin Dubois, executive director and general counsel of my office.

The role of the Intelligence Commissioner was created in 2019. I've been in this role since October 2022. In one sentence, my mandate is to approve or not approve certain national security and intelligence activities planned by the Communications Security Establishment, or CSE, and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS.

More specifically, CSIS and CSE may sometimes engage in activities that could involve breaking the laws of Canada or interfering with the privacy interests of Canadians. These activities are authorized by the minister. The intelligence commissioner, whom I will refer to as the IC, reviews the minister's reasons to determine whether they meet the test of reasonableness as recognized by the Canadian courts. If reasonable, the IC approves the authorization, and the agency can proceed with the planned activity. My written decisions are binding, and redacted versions are published on our website.

A number of ministerial authorizations subject to the IC's review relate to the use of datasets. The IC's main role relating to the dataset regime ensures that CSIS exercises its authority to collect non-threat-related information about Canadians and persons in Canada in a balanced manner. That the minister has given proper consideration to privacy interests and independent oversight is, in my mind, crucial.

Bill C-70 proposes certain amendments to this dataset regime. Most of the changes are intended to facilitate the use of the dataset regime for CSIS. Overall, I am of the view that the proposed amendments will not change the nature of my role when conducting independent oversight.

Having said that, I want to highlight a few proposed amendments that would nonetheless impact the work of the commissioner.

First, Bill C‑70 would authorize CSIS to collect and retain datasets for the purposes of section 15 of the CSIS Act. This section allows CSIS to conduct investigations to provide security assessments to the Government of Canada. In addition, it would broaden the scope of the datasets affecting Canadians that it can collect. The addition may raise new concerns that I will have to consider during my quasi‑judicial review.

Second, this bill would allow CSIS to disclose foreign datasets authorized for retention. The conditions for disclosure of the package would need to be clarified. It is conceivable that this element would be considered by the commissioner when examining the reasonableness of ministerial findings.

Third, this bill includes amendments related to the validation period for ministerial authorizations.

I highlight these changes because I think they are the most consequential and help me explain how the dataset regime is operationalized. The IC's oversight role is limited to datasets falling within part 1—that is, the collection of personal information not directly and immediately related to a threat to the security of Canada.

Bill C-70 makes it clear that CSIS will make use of the dataset regime only when the dataset cannot be collected through other jurisdictional means. I'm here as the intelligence commissioner, but I carry my baggage of experience—you can see my age—as a designated judge of the Federal Court for 21 years, as well as counsel involved in national security matters and commissions—the first one being the 1979 McDonald commission on the FLQ crisis in Quebec—and the reform that brought about the CSIS we know today.

I will add this before I finish. As a judge, I was involved in the dataset regime, the within and outside Canada regime—something you have in front of you today—and fine-tuning the special advocate's role and involvement in proceedings on section 38 of the Canada Evidence Act.

Having said that, I'm open to any questions you may have, if that's helpful to you. I look forward to it.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting back to order.

I would like to welcome the witnesses for our last panel on Bill C-70. From the office of the intelligence commissioner, we have the Honourable Simon Noël, intelligence commissioner, and Justin Dubois, executive director and general counsel. From the National Council of Canadian Muslims, we have Ahmad Al Qadi and Nusaiba Al Azem by video conference. Finally, as an individual, we have Marcus Kolga, senior fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute, also by video conference.

Welcome to you all.

I will invite Mr. Noël to make an opening statement of up to five minutes, please.

Go ahead, sir.

[Sarah Estabrooks, Director General, Policy and Foreign Relations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Bill C-70 includes a new provision that would clarify an ability to disclose personal information when it's “in the public interest” and when “that interest clearly outweighs any invasion of privacy that could result from the disclosure”. This is a corollary to the broader provision that would allow for the disclosure of information to build resiliency to threats to the security of Canada. It doesn't exist now. It's in this bill.

[David Vigneault]

I think this is one of the most fundamental questions we can talk about. The world is getting more and more complex. The threat environment is making Canada less safe and less prosperous than before. We need different tools and different mindsets when approaching threats to national security.

In a democracy, it's fundamental that elected members of the House and members of the Senate, in an organized way, have access to the right information to inform themselves, hold the government to account and hold agencies to account through NSICOP, for example. My colleagues and I have had to appear many times in front of NSICOP to speak at the top secret level, to share details and to be questioned and challenged on this issue, and I believe it's fundamental in a democratic environment to do that.

There is one line in the NSICOP report that I think is very important, which is the challenge of intelligence and evidence. It's about the ability to use the intelligence collected by CSIS, by CSE and by other partners, or shared with us by international partners, in a judicial proceeding that will hold people accountable. That is extremely complex. There are some improvements through Bill C-70, and the government has spoken to the need to do more, but if you're not able to find accountability and create an element of deterrence through a judicial process, then there are the other mechanisms that have been referred to, including for leaders to have information and make decisions. It's not going to be a judicial process. It's not going to be someone charged by a court of law. It's someone who may not be allowed to run or may not be allowed to sit in a caucus because of the classified information being used.

We absolutely need to find better ways of using intelligence in judicial processes, but it also needs to be used for other types of decision-making. One of the most important elements for foreign actors when they look at us is to see whether there are enough consequences for their activities. If there are not, they will be emboldened to do more. I think your question is critical.

[Richard Bilodeau]

Mr. Chair, thank you for the question.

I would add that this model already exists in the federal government. I'm thinking, for example, of the Commissioner of the Competition Bureau, who acts independently in enforcing the act. The act also provides for consultations with parliamentarians, either in the House of Commons or the Senate. Lastly, ultimately, once a Governor in Council appointment is made, the commissioner may only be removed from his or her position for a valid reason. So there's a certain obligation to be accountable.

However, we understand that Bill C‑70 can be amended. We can discuss the amendments and analyze them, and it will be up to you to decide. However, we believe that it provides for a great deal of independence in the commissioner's key work. That independence is also reflected in his reports to Parliament, which are not sent to the minister for approval; rather, they are sent to the minister for tabling in the House.

[Nathalie Drouin]

In terms of information sharing and being able to communicate more with universities in Canada, for example, the provisions in Bill C‑70 would really go further to help us prevent situations like that. The same is true of exchanges with our leading scientists.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

My next question is for both you and Mr. Vigneault.

I participated in the committee's work analyzing the report on the Winnipeg lab. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service was asked to conduct background checks on this file. If we took that situation as it existed at the time, with scientists in the lab, would Bill C‑70 make it possible to do things differently from what was done at the time?

[Nathalie Drouin]

There has always been foreign interference. Unfortunately, there always will be some. The objective is to be able to detect it.

Furthermore, we know very well that as we refine our legislative processes, foreign actors, on the other hand, refine their methodology. That's why the work you're doing in connection with Bill C‑70 is absolutely fantastic and necessary.

This is a first step, but we'll always have to continue working on this together to keep our body of legislation modern and effective.

[Nathalie Drouin]

There are a number of small elements that would make significant changes.

One is the ability of CSIS to engage with different levels of government and universities. Being able to provide more information to these various stakeholders will lead to better defence of all our Canadian institutions.

Then, the various criminal offences that Bill C‑70 adds could capture the kind of information that can be read in the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. This provides more clarification, which will facilitate the work of police forces and criminal prosecution.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

I believe that transparency is a tool to build trust, and trust is what we're looking for, isn't it? Right.

If Bill C‑70 were in effect today, as it stands, could something be done differently in response to the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians?

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

When I look at Bill C‑70, the three words that come to mind are very positive: “trust”, “transparency” and “exemplarity”. If we try to compare this bill to the situation my colleagues are discussing this morning, the report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP, we find a paradox, the paradox between the need for secrecy and the need for transparency.

Ms. Drouin, how do you reconcile the two elements of this paradox?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you very much, Chair.

Thank you, Ministers.

Given the importance of Bill C-70, we know that Parliament has been doing its job. Now we want the government to do theirs. Will each of you ministers commit today to having Bill C-70 in place and fully implemented before the next election, yes or no?

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'll try to do my best in two and a half minutes.

Mr. Virani, I would ask you to give me short answers, please.

You've had many consultations on Bill C‑70. How much time did you spend on it?

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

I think I have time to get one more question in.

When I read through Bill C-70, there's obviously a thematic nature to most of the amendments. We have important amendments to the CSIS Act, the SOIA and the Canada Evidence Act, and, of course, it enacts a new act to deal with a foreign registry. What seems to stick out, though, are the amendments to the Criminal Code, particularly as they relate to sabotage. I'm wondering if you could provide some rationale to this committee as to why it seems so important to update the definition of “sabotage” in the Criminal Code in a bill that's primarily dealing with foreign interference.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you for your answer.

In the past, solutions have sometimes been a long time in coming, which has undermined public confidence. I think Bill C‑70 can be summed up in three words: trust, transparency and exemplarity. That's what we're looking for.

I'm going to ask you a question that's more related to the bill. Oddly enough, the bill doesn't seem to define foreign interference. There are a few occurrences in a part where it can be inferred, but it isn't defined at the outset. What isn't defined doesn't exist.

What are your comments on that?

[Iqwinder Gaheer, Liberal, Mississauga—Malton, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

I want to focus on foreign interference and its impact on diaspora communities. We've had different groups come here and raise that concern. One of the groups was the World Sikh Organization. They were largely in favour of this bill. They said that more needs to be done to counter foreign interference and that, in that respect, Bill C-70 is a step in the right direction. They did want to highlight, however, that CSIS would have the ability to disclose information to any person or entity should CSIS deem that relevant. This would be a great step, but they are concerned about whether foreign consular officials in Canada would count as entities, what kind of information could be disclosed to them and whether diaspora communities could be put at risk because of that disclosure.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

I'm not done my question, Minister.

Do you think Canadians have the right to know, when they cast an X next to the name of somebody in the next 15 months—the very thing that we're dealing with here in Bill C-70—whether a member is under the influence of a hostile foreign state, yes or no?

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Minister of Justice]

Thank you very much, Chair.

I'm very pleased to be here today to speak to you about the threat of foreign interference in Canada and how this bill, Bill C-70, aims to help detect, disrupt and protect against the threats to our country and its institutions by foreign actors.

Bill C-70 modernizes Canada's laws to better protect our democracy and protect people in Canada against new and evolving threats. We are particularly concerned about members of diaspora communities who are disproportionately targeted by those who engage in foreign interference. The reforms to our criminal laws proposed in the bill are strong, measured and direct.

Looking first at the Security of Information Act, this bill would amend the existing offence of using intimidation, threats or violence on behalf of foreign states against Canadians and people living in Canada. It would simplify prosecutions by removing the requirement to prove that the prohibited act resulted in harm to Canadian interests or helped a foreign state. All that would be required is that the threat or violence was done on behalf of or in association with a foreign state.

The bill would also ensure that these protections extend to people working outside the country or travelling to visit loved ones. It would ensure that the law addresses threats by foreign states against family members of Canadians. This captures instances where family members are being threatened to exert pressure on someone to do or not do something, like protesting a foreign government. This is a significant step in addressing transnational repression and some of the fears we heard from community groups and stakeholders during the consultations we have already undertaken.

The bill would create a new offence for committing an indictable offence for a foreign entity, as well as a new general foreign interference offence when a person knowingly engages in surreptitious or deceptive conduct for a foreign entity. We are also strengthening protections for our democratic institutions. The new offence of political interference for a foreign entity criminalizes interfering with a democratic process and would apply at all times to all levels of government—this is a significant change—and, importantly, to the nomination process of political parties.

In terms of the Criminal Code, the bill proposes to modernize the existing offence of sabotage, which hasn't been revised since 1951. We also propose adding two offences to protect critical infrastructure and to criminalize the creation and distribution of devices intended for sabotage.

This is to clarify that the offence applies to the public and private infrastructure that is essential to the health, safety, security and economic well-being of people in Canada—for example, the private and public infrastructure systems that enable transportation or communications, or support the delivery of health and food services.

During public consultations, Canadian association and industry stakeholders made clear the need to protect critical infrastructure. The proposed amendments would expressly recognize the right to freedom of expression and the right to peaceful assembly, protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and confirm that individuals acting under these rights without the intent to commit an act of sabotage do not fall within the scope of the offence.

I will now speak to part 3, which amends the Canada Evidence Act and the Criminal Code.

This section of the bill would create a new, standardized mechanism with robust procedural protections to ensure the protection of national security information in the judicial review of government decisions.

Through these important legislative proposals, our government is taking concrete action to protect all people in Canada, our institutions and our democracy from foreign interference. These changes have been built with the input of Canadians, including members of many diaspora communities. They are balanced, they are fair and they are necessary.

At this point, along with Minister LeBlanc, I would be pleased to answer your questions.

Thank you very much.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Chair and colleagues, good morning. Thank you for inviting me to be with you this morning for Bill C-70. It's a vital part of our government's and Parliament's efforts to counter foreign interference.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, for introducing the senior colleagues from the department, the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service who have joined me this morning.

I think we can all agree that the government and, by conclusion, Parliament have no greater obligation than the protection of the Canadian people and our democracy.

Like us, Canadians are aware of and rightly concerned about the pervasiveness and increasing complexity of foreign interference. They also know that foreign interference poses a real and serious threat to our country, our democratic processes and our institutions.

State actors seek to exploit Canada's vulnerabilities by targeting governments at all levels, our open academic systems, private enterprises, and even communities and individuals. And we must close those vulnerabilities in the face of ever‑increasing and, as many others have said before me, ever more complex threats.

Our response includes engaging with those directly affected on potential solutions. That's why the Government of Canada engages with private companies, researchers and the health sector, for example, to inform them of threats and help them better understand how they can protect their work. It provides mechanisms for public reporting through various websites and national security threat phone lines. It engages with at-risk communities in Canada to help them better protect themselves against foreign threats. It helps critical infrastructure operators defend the critical cybersecurity systems that Canadians properly rely on. It coordinates and shares information with the Five Eyes and other allies, such as G7 and NATO partners, on foreign interference and other threats. It also enhances collective resilience to disinformation by helping Canadians and individuals in Canada become better informed about disinformation tactics and actors and by enhancing transparency.

Based on what we heard through a diverse and robust consultation process, we introduced Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, earlier last month. In order to bolster our ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference threats, Bill C-70 proposes important and necessary amendments to modernize the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Security of Information Act, the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act.

Moreover, Bill C-70 introduces the foreign influence transparency and accountability act, which is designed to increase transparency by creating a foreign influence transparency registry for individuals and entities acting on behalf of foreign principals that are seeking to influence activities within our political and governmental processes. All individuals or entities who enter into an arrangement with a foreign principal and who undertake activities to influence a government or political process in Canada would be required to publicly register these activities.

To be clear, the registry creates a positive registration obligation for individuals or entities who are in a foreign influence arrangement with a foreign principal. Individuals and entities would be required to show more transparency about their connections to foreign states and support Canada's national security objectives.

However, we recognize that the foreign influence transparency and accountability act is by no means a single solution to foreign interference. That's why Bill C-70 also introduces measures and tools to help our law enforcement and intelligence agencies detect, deter, decrease and disrupt threats of foreign interference at their early stages, while of course being mindful of the rights and privacy of Canadians. The foreign influence transparency and accountability act would build on the government's ongoing and long-standing efforts to protect Canada against the threats of foreign interference.

I can assure the committee that the government will continue to work with all our partners, including those in other jurisdictions in Canada, affected communities, academia and civil society, to address foreign interference together.

Mr. Chair, I want to thank you and your colleagues on this committee for the work you've been doing so exhaustively over recent days with respect to this legislation. We look forward to your deliberations on amendments that might improve and strengthen this legislation.

I want to acknowledge what I think is an important, non-partisan, collective effort from all parties in the House of Commons to work together on something important to Canadians. I thank all of you for your efforts in this regard.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 113 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Pursuant to the order of reference referred to the committee on Wednesday, May 29, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.

Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines on preventing audio feedback incidents. Please take note of the following preventative measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, particularly the interpreters. Only use an approved black earpiece. The former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you're not using the earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. All comments should be addressed through the chair.

I have some specific comments on Bill C-70. I would like to remind members that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m. Eastern Standard Time tomorrow, Friday, June 7. It is important for members to note that, pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee.

I would like now to welcome our first witnesses today. We have with us the Hon. Dominic LeBlanc, PC, MP, Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs. We also have the Hon. Arif Virani, PC, MP, Minister of Justice.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

If, in a bill like Bill C‑70, I find four significant semantic differences between the French and English versions, should I be concerned?

[Emmanuelle Rheault]

Based on my knowledge of Bill C‑70, the list you mentioned would not have any consequences on the Criminal Code or the Canada Evidence Act, logically, since the Criminal Code applies to offences committed in Canada, with certain exceptions. In addition, it focuses primarily on individuals, not entities. You can't prosecute a country under the Criminal Code.

As for the rest, I apologize, but it's somewhat outside my area of expertise.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Okay. Thank you for that.

I also want to recognize that, from your comments, you see Bill C-70 as a bare minimum, and you did mention other statutes that you wish could have been enacted.

We're limited by what's before us. We can't go beyond the scope of the bill, but in the amendments to the CSIS Act, you did make mention of the fact that a lot more could have been done with section 16. However, are you happy with what the government is proposing here in its amendment to section 16 as an addition? Do you see any improvements that we can make as a committee?

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

I would like to move to Mr. Neiman.

Mr. Neiman, in a letter to the previous minister of public safety, the Business Council of Canada stated that you wanted to see, and I'll quote this, amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to allow CSIS to proactively share threat intelligence with employers where it is in the public interest and subject to all necessary safeguards and oversights.

Can you speak to these new information-sharing powers in C-70, and if they meet your requirements?

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

I appreciate that. That's a good start. It's a little disheartening to hear, but at least we're doing something now to try to correct it a bit.

I'd like to stick with you, sir, if I could, because we've heard different perspectives in favour and opposed to Bill C-70's country-agnostic approach to the foreign registry list. I think in the beginning you mentioned that you definitely see a benefit to listing countries. Expand on why you see that being a benefit, and you mentioned persons too.

[Trevor Neiman, Vice-President, Policy, and Legal Counsel, Business Council of Canada]

Mr. Chair and committee members, thank you for the invitation to take part in your study of Bill C-70.

We're an organization representing Canada's most innovative and successful businesses, so I will restrict my comments today to the portion of the bill that has the most direct relevance to the Canadian private sector. That is subclause 34(3), which seeks to amend the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to enable CSIS to disclose threat intelligence to stakeholders outside the Government of Canada for the express purpose of increasing their awareness and resiliency against foreign interference.

However, before commenting on this clause, I want to make clear that Canada's business community is broadly supportive of Bill C-70. From the establishment of a foreign influence transparency regime to the creation of updated offences for attacks directed against essential infrastructure, this urgently needed bill will help protect Canadians' lives and livelihoods by providing our government with the tools it needs to better protect our economy and society.

I'll start my substantive remarks by noting that, while the current discussion in Canada surrounding foreign interference has been rightly focused on the integrity of our democratic processes and the safety and security of targeted ethnic and cultural groups, it is important for us all to acknowledge that state actors actively target all aspects of Canadian society to advance their strategic interests. This includes the Canadian economy.

Indeed, in an era of growing geopolitical rivalry, in which supply chains, infrastructure networks and technological innovation increasingly determine strategic advantage, Canadian businesses are often the primary target of our adversaries. This should concern all Canadians. Economic security threats are not abstract, nor do they exist in a vacuum. These threats target the critical infrastructure needed to heat and power our homes. They target the supply chains that provide our families with low-cost medicine and food. They target the intellectual property that creates good jobs and pays our bills. In short, these threats put Canadians' very safety, security and prosperity at risk.

To be sure, Canadian businesses and governments invest billions each year to keep Canadians safe from these and related economic attacks. However, if we want to be truly effective in protecting our way of life, we must replace our independent efforts with collective action. Key to building this partnership is the sharing of threat intelligence. Unlike the domestic security agencies of Canada's Five Eyes partners, such as the United States' FBI or the United Kingdom's MI5—which possess modern authorities that allow them to share detailed threat intelligence with their respective business communities—CSIS is presently prohibited from sharing all but the most generalized information with the Canadian private sector. This represents a significant gap in Canada's defences.

Despite CSIS having both the knowledge and expertise to help companies withstand growing threats, its outdated legislation means Canadian businesses are left fending for themselves. It is for this reason that the Business Council strongly supports subclause 34(3).

With new threat-sharing authorities, CSIS could communicate more specific and tangible information with Canadian companies. This would give business leaders a clear understanding of the growing threat and the protective measures that could be taken to better safeguard their employees and customers, as well as the communities in which they operate.

The use of these new authorities could also benefit the Government of Canada by helping CSIS build greater trust with the Canadian private sector. This would encourage Canadian business leaders to share more with Ottawa about the threats they're seeing on the ground, which would better inform government policy as well as improve CSIS's ability to respond to emerging threats.

Of course, the granting of any new authorities must be consistent with the values we share in our democratic society, including respect for individuals' rights and freedoms. On this front, we are very pleased to see that the Government of Canada has incorporated rigorous standards and safeguards into subclause 34(3), such as those ensuring that individual disclosures protect Canadians' privacy interests.

Before concluding, I want to stress the need for urgency. The Business Council of Canada agrees with many lawmakers that the protections contained within Bill C-70 must be put in place before the next general election. The preservation of our democratic system is of utmost importance.

However, I will add that, when it comes to strengthening the resiliency of our economy, Canada is falling well behind our allies. This exposes everyday Canadians to unnecessary risks. By failing to move in lockstep with our closest allies, we risk being perceived as a weak link. This could jeopardize our country's relationship with our closest allies, especially the United States, at a pivotal moment when the global order is being reshaped and partnerships matter most.

I'll conclude by noting that Bill C-70 is just one of many economic security reforms that must be undertaken urgently to protect Canadians. As a priority, the Business Council urges the Government of Canada to complement subclause 34(3) with a formalized threat exchange to securely receive and disseminate Bill C-70's threat intelligence broadly across the Canadian economy. This and nearly 40 other much-needed reforms are included in the Business Council's recent report, “Economic Security is National Security”. That report is available on our website.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak. I look forward to your questions.

[Emmanuelle Rheault, Attorney, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Members of the committee, I want to begin by thanking you for the opportunity to speak to you.

I have been a lawyer for 10 years and I exclusively practise criminal law, on the defence side. The Criminal Code and certain sections of the Canada Evidence Act are therefore part of my daily life. Therefore, I will focus most of my remarks on these two acts, but I will make a brief incursion into the Security of Information Act to talk about some of the provisions you wish to add to the Criminal Code.

First, I have several observations to make with respect to the proposed amendments to the sabotage offence, which is currently dealt with in section 52 of the Criminal Code. Some efforts are commendable, but many others are alarming.

First of all, as far as I know, the offence of sabotage does not exist in Great Britain. In the United States, federal laws restrict the scope of the offence. In New Zealand, sabotage is also a much more limited offence than what is intended by Bill C‑70.

Subsection 52(1) of the current Criminal Code defines the offence of sabotage as “a prohibited act for a purpose prejudicial to …”. In all transparency, I say to the committee that I think the way this paragraph is formulated right now is incomprehensible. The proposed amendment is therefore very commendable and welcomed by the law clerks, because the proposed wording is much clearer. In addition, proposed subsection 52(5), which provides an exception for certain groups, is an advantage compared to the current version of the Criminal Code. However, I feel the clarification is too restrictive.

The proposed new subsections 52(1) and 52(2) are much more problematic.

Subsection 52(1) that the bill proposes to add to the Criminal Code creates a new sabotage offence in relation to essential infrastructure. First of all, I want to say that this is far too broad. Under proposed subsection 52.1(1)(c), the offence applies to anyone who intends to “cause a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any segment of the public”. However, the concept of “segment of the public” could be interpreted as meaning two individuals. So it wouldn't have to be the majority of the population. In addition, the bill is far too broad when it talks about a serious risk to safety. I say this because the broader the provisions are, the less they will stand up to the test of the courts as far as constitutionality and Canadian criminal law are concerned.

Next, proposed subsection 52.1(2) defines essential infrastructure. However, I'd like to point out that this definition includes facilities or systems belonging to private companies. If we push the interpretation of this proposed subsection, the facilities or systems of a private video game company like Ubisoft could be considered essential infrastructure, since they are information and communication technology infrastructure. So you're not only targeting public entities, and even companies owned by the federal government or a provincial government, but also private companies, which is very problematic.

Furthermore, the concept of economic well-being, which is added in proposed subsection 52.1(2), is also problematic because it's very broad. It's not restrictive enough and, to my knowledge, it's not defined anywhere in the Criminal Code.

In addition, the safeguard that's added by proposed subsection 52.1(5), which excludes from the definition of the offence acts committed in the course of advocacy, protest or dissent, is not sufficiently restrictive, because it's conditional on the lack of intent to cause any of the harms referred to in proposed paragraphs 52.1(1)(a) to (c). In New Zealand, for example, the exception applies purely and simply to acts committed as part of a protest or as part of a claim, with no conditions attached. Proposed subsection 52.1(5) could lead the courts to interpret it very broadly, even speculatively, in certain situations.

Another thing I note in the proposed provisions is the concept of mischief. The offence of mischief already exists in section 430 of the Criminal Code. However, you want to include in these new provisions almost any type of mischief committed for one of the purposes intended. As a result, mischief will become an even more serious offence, with a maximum sentence of 10 years' imprisonment, rather than two years, or five or 10 years in some cases. You want to make that offence much more serious.

As for proposed section 52.2, there are some issues. I'm thinking in particular of the definition of “device” in proposed subsection 52.2(3). The term “device” is not limited to computer programs. This term is defined in a number of places in the Criminal Code, and the definition includes many more things than computer devices. Devices can be explosives or weapons, for example. That could be a problem in court.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I'd like to echo my colleagues in thanking all the witnesses for being here today to help us through this study.

I don't think you're going to find anyone around this committee table who doesn't understand the importance of the issue before us. That's why, with respect to Bill C-70.... You know, it is quite rare to see a moment of unanimous consent to get a bill through committee this quickly. That being said, it puts a lot of pressure on us committee members because it is a fairly large and consequential bill. We need to do our thorough review of it because it still has to go through the Senate. Of course, if the Senate finds that we didn't do our job properly, they'll amend it and send it back to us, adding to further delay, so we want to make sure we're doing our job properly here.

Mr. Fadden, I'd like to start with you.

I took note of your comment that putting in a registry is not going to stop the clandestine nature of so much foreign interference. Of course, we have various consequential amendments to the Security of Information Act, otherwise known as SOIA. However, putting a law in place is one thing. Making sure we use that law to prosecute and convict is another. I know there's often quite a wide gulf between what is considered intelligence and what is considered evidence—what would stand up in a court of law.

What we haven't talked about a lot is how there are some pretty consequential amendments to the Canada Evidence Act to set up a framework to safeguard sensitive information. I know CSIS has to, by the very nature of its raison d’être, be quite careful with the intelligence it has, because you don't want to get rid of an intelligence source. At the same time, in addition to its detection and disruption activities, we also want to see some prosecutions and convictions happen.

As you look through this bill, are you satisfied that we have the legislative changes in place that can lead us down that path?

[Gloria Fung]

First of all, I am not a lawyer. However, we have been working with a lot of lawyers with respect to the act. All of our coalition member organizations consider Bill C-70 to be a good and strong bill.

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, St. Catharines, ON]

I appreciate simplicity. Despite being a lawyer and the excitement of a make-work project for lawyers, simplicity is generally the best way to go.

With the changes proposed in Bill C-70, how, in your mind, does this compare us with our Five Eyes allies, especially the U.S.?

[Katherine Leung, Policy Adviser, Hong Kong Watch]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I'm the policy adviser for Hong Kong Watch in Canada, and I am before the committee today to speak to Bill C-70.

Hong Kong Watch supports the speedy passage of the countering foreign interference act such that it will be in place before the next election. We support the bill as a whole, but I will use my time to speak with emphasis on suggested amendments that would ensure that the scope of the bill would thoroughly address foreign interference.

We support the proposed amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, especially amendments related to equipping national security partners to build resiliency to threats by enabling broader disclosure of CSIS information to key partners beyond the Government of Canada. Foreign interference is not limited to governmental targets but rather affects individuals and organizations across various sectors.

We know, from media reports and previous committee testimony, that there are considerable foreign interference activities targeting Canadian universities, businesses and technology. This is why broadened information disclosure will allow institutions to better understand and anticipate potential threats and to take proactive measures to safeguard their operations and intellectual property.

We're also supportive of the proposed measures to counter foreign interference under part 2 of the bill. The creation of new offences for foreign interference, including deceptive acts that undermine democratic processes and harm Canadian interests, is much needed. These amendments address the reality that foreign interference often targets individuals at the grassroots level, thereby indirectly influencing democratic processes and Canadian interests.

While intimidation, threats and violence are tactics used by foreign entities to silence dissent within diaspora communities, discrimination is another method employed to suppress opposition. We have seen cases in which individuals in Canada have faced job loss or eviction from their homes due to their political opinions.

We would be supportive of proposed amendments that acknowledge the tactic of discrimination and provide mechanisms to counter it effectively. We also support the creation of the foreign influence transparency registry. By imposing obligations on individuals and entities to register arrangements and disclose foreign influence activities, the Government of Canada can increase transparency and accountability.

However, it is important to expand the scope of the act beyond political processes. Much of foreign interference occurs at the community level, where it can suppress public discourse and indirectly influence democratic processes.

Let me illustrate how transnational repression as a form of foreign interference can have an impact on political processes. This is from a case study of a Hong Konger in Canada, which I heard about through my work at Hong Kong Watch. A pro-democracy activist from Hong Kong fled to Canada in 2020, after participating in the 2019 protests and encountering police altercations that led to the detention of her friends. She claimed asylum, settled in Calgary and continued her advocacy for democracy in Hong Kong. She is one of the founding members of a group of volunteers who assist persecuted Hong Kongers seeking asylum in Canada.

Since publicly criticizing the Chinese government, she has received anonymous threats on Telegram, including harassing messages about her appearances and advocacy, and graphic videos, including a bloody video of a woman suffering severe blunt force trauma to the head and a video of a beheading, with captions referencing her involvement in pro-democracy organizations. The sender also disclosed personal details about her life, including her boyfriend's name, her employer and her workplace address. She has reported these threats to CSIS and the RCMP.

As Bill C-70 is written, the anonymous sender in this case would not trigger a requirement to register as a foreign agent. This is not an activity directly related to parliamentary or legislative proceedings, development of a legislative proposal, development or amendment of a policy or program, decision-making by a public office holder or government body, elections, referendums or nomination contests. Rather, this is something that has silenced this individual. Due to fears for her safety, she no longer participates in pro-democracy advocacy for Hong Kong, despite permanently living in Canada.

Foreign states use transnational repression to discourage dissent by diaspora communities, thereby undermining democratic participation and the ability of elected officials to represent their constituents fully. Expanding the act to encompass all levels of foreign interference activities, including transnational repression and intimidation, will provide a more comprehensive safeguard against these threats.

With that, I conclude my remarks here.

[Gloria Fung, Immediate Past President, Canada-Hong Kong Link]

Mr. Chair and distinguished members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity to comment on Bill C-70, the countering foreign interference act.

I'm the immediate past-president of Canada-Hong Kong Link and convener of the Canadian coalition for a foreign influence transparency registry. The coalition established in 2021 consists of 33 multicultural community organizations, think tanks and human rights groups across Canada. Our mission is to advocate for a foreign influence registry to be enacted in Canada to enhance transparency in the democratic process.

Over the past two decades, both CSIS and Canadian civil society have repeatedly warned our government about foreign interference and transnational repression in Canada, but they have remained complacent. The transnational repression faced by diaspora communities includes telephone threats, cyberbullying and smearing of Canadians through disinformation campaigns, surveillance, coercion and harassment through counterprotests and physical attacks.

The Chinese Communist Party is by far the most active state player in this interference operation through its sophisticated network involving hundreds of proxies, posing a major threat to our national security, sovereignty and democracy. Canada is at the back door to the U.S., China's adversary. By infiltrating Canada, China can access sensitive intelligence information of the U.S., the Five Eyes allies and NATO.

CCP agents capitalize on the openness of our democratic system to infiltrate community, media, academic and business sectors. They are active in undermining our democratic institutions at all levels of government.

As we recently brought together eight MPs from all five federal parties to call for the immediate introduction of legislation to counter foreign interference, our coalition welcomes the bill and strongly supports the emerging non-partisan consensus to get the registry passed and to get it up and running before the 2025 election call. We hope the House can send it to the Senate before it rises for the summer.

I would like to make the following recommendations.

Number one, the government should set up an independent commission to coordinate and monitor the implementation and future periodic reviews of the act.

Number two, the act and corresponding regulations should be reviewed and updated within one to two years after the 2025 federal election. After this, they can be reviewed once every five years in accordance with the rapidly evolving foreign threats.

Number three, for the purpose of the registry, “political activity” defined in the act needs to be expanded to include elections to internal political offices; political party leadership contests; appointments of individuals to public offices; government hiring decisions; third party political advertising; decision-making within parliamentary and legislative caucuses, such as the selection of officers, expulsion of members and removal of leaders; law enforcement decisions; and decisions of tribunals and regulators.

Number four, legislation should allow authorities to be proactive in implementing the registry. In Australia, for instance, authorities can send a request for information to determine whether or not individuals or entities need to register.

Thank you.

[Richard Fadden, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak to you on Bill C-70. I am especially grateful for this opportunity because it addresses a number of issues that I and many others have advocated on for some time.

Bill C-70 is a relatively complex and, in some cases, quite technical piece of legislation. However, its overarching thrust goes a considerable distance towards dealing with the threat of foreign interference—again, a threat that has been with us for some time. In particular, the creation of offences relating to foreign interference and the creation of the foreign influence transparency commissioner and of the registry he or she will be required to maintain will provide tools that Canada is lacking. These measures will not make foreign interference go away, but they will help deal with the threat.

As well, the provisions amending the CSIS Act, permitting the service to disclose information much more broadly than is currently the case, will assist government institutions, as well as the private sector and civil society, in understanding and dealing with threats to our national security. In this respect, these amendments will help deal not only with foreign interference but also with other threats to national security.

I have two last comments. The first deals with concerns that I have seen reported in the media to the effect that some provisions in the bill risk charter compliance issues. I am not a charter lawyer. Indeed, I am a lapsed lawyer. However, I do not see this risk in the actual words of the bill. Is there a possibility that its implementation might increase the risk? Possibly.

Having said this, it seems to me that this is frequently the case with any law that creates offences. However, I do not believe—and I hope you will agree with me—that such concerns should prevent you from approving Bill C-70. I think that there are four reasons for this. First is the certificate of the Minister of Justice, which the chair just referenced. I also think that Parliament is entitled to believe in the good-faith implementation of the law by ministers and officials. If there is a real problem, there is always recourse to the courts. Finally, if there are really serious problems, you can change the law.

My last comment relates to what I understand is the view of some: that Bill C-70 should not be dealt with on a fast track. I would suggest to the contrary that the expeditious review and passage of Bill C-70 is in the national interest. I can see no possibility that our geopolitical adversaries will in any way in the foreseeable future modify their behaviour so as to lessen threats to our national security. These threats are real and affect virtually every part of our country: the private sector, civil society, individuals and governments at all levels. NSICOP, NSIRA and the Hogue inquiry all clearly support the view that the threats you are considering are real and require action. To not deal with Bill C-70 in the days and weeks ahead and—if you'll forgive me for saying so—in an environment increasingly affected by the possibility of an election could mean the demise of Bill C-70.

My last thought is that, even if Bill C-70 were to receive royal assent next week, implementation will take some time, and I hope you will take this into account as you consider time frames relating to the bill.

Thank you for your attention, and in due course, I'd be more than happy to try to answer your questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 112 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Pursuant to the order of reference referred to the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.

Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents.

Please take note of the following preventative measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters in particular. Only use a black, approved earpiece. The former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you're not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose. Thank you all for your co-operation.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format. I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. I will remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

I have specific comments to make on Bill C-70. I would like to remind members that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m., eastern standard time, on Friday, June 7, 2024. It is important for members to note that, pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee.

I will also note, for all members of the committee, that the charter statement on Bill C-70 has been distributed, and you should find it in your inboxes.

I'd like to now welcome our witnesses for today.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from La Prairie for his question and for his contribution to the implementation of the Hogue commission. I would also like to thank him, his party and all the other partners for the important work being done today to support Bill C-70, for example. This bill will strengthen our national security institutions and our collective ability to recognize and counter foreign interference. For that, I sincerely thank him.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Chair.

I'll read it into the record officially. I move:

That, in relation to its study of Bill S-210, An Act to restrict young persons' online access to sexually explicit material, and pursuant to Standing Order 97.1(1), the committee request the approval of the House for a 30-sitting-day extension in order to properly and adequately study the bill, hear from witnesses, and conduct clause-by-clause consideration of the bill with amendments, before it is otherwise deemed reported back to the House without amendment on June 7, 2024.

I'll be very brief here, Mr. Chair. This is a simple housekeeping motion. If we get to June 7, this bill will be deemed reported back to the House. I think it would be a dereliction of duty for us to not study the bill and hear from additional witnesses.

I'm not going to speak any further on this motion. I have canvassed the room. I believe the majority of this committee is willing to vote, and vote in the affirmative, on this motion. I'd appreciate it if we could keep our remarks to a minimum and arrive at a quick vote so that we can then proceed with the business of Bill C-70 for the remainder of the week.

Thank you.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Stanton, in your opinion, would the passage of Bill C‑70 have prevented the situation that occurred at the National Microbiology Laboratory located in Winnipeg?

[Dr. Thomas Juneau]

It's a good question, and I have to admit, in all humility, that it's not an aspect I understand well. So I don't have a firm position, either for or against. I think I'd need more details on how the process works.

I know you put this question last week to officials from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness during a meeting of this committee, and their response referred to the workload it would involve.

As I said, I don't understand this specific issue well enough to take a position and say I'm for or against it. However, I must still express some sympathy, in general, for the answer they gave you, insofar as this department, like the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, like other departments or community agencies, suffers from a serious lack of human, financial and other resources, and not only in terms of their powers; this is what Bill C‑70 will improve, in part.

Any new initiative, such as Bill C‑70, and particularly this notion of dual registration, implies an additional burden, and it's a very real problem.

In general, I'd like to point out to the committee that this issue of resources is a major problem.

[Daniel Stanton]

I think that's the hope. I think one thing that's saddened me a bit in the last few years, with all the talk on foreign interference in committees and media and things like that, is that some Canadians are going to start profiling communities, which is fundamentally wrong.

I think that's why the more education we have, the more we're talking, and the more we have things like this initiative, Bill C-70, and the reviews we've had, the less likely we are to see stereotyping and profiling. We've now had, I think, five commissions or inquiries related to national security, and Canadians are actually learning more about it.

That has always been my concern. That's part of the reason I speak out publicly on this. I don't want Canadians to think , because of what we're hearing through the media, that a particular group or community is in any way of questionable loyalty or reliability.

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

In your opinion, do you believe that Bill C-70 does enough to ensure that the diaspora communities are not stigmatized and victimized by the efforts to combat foreign interference?

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

It's my understanding that agents of foreign governments may have played through a chain of command. It may be very difficult to trace that chain of command to individuals abroad. Does Bill C-70 do enough to address and deter foreign interference and to penalize those who are not in Canada but overseas, or would we do something to do that?

[Sukh Dhaliwal, Liberal, Surrey—Newton, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank the witnesses for appearing today on this very important matter.

My questions will be for Mr. Stanton.

Mr. Stanton, following the tragic killing of Mr. Hardeep Singh Nijjar—a Canadian on Canadian soil, my constituent—at a place of worship in my riding of Surrey—Newton, I introduced a private member's motion, M-112, for the government to take action to deal with foreign interference, whether it's intimidation, violence or interference that they create.

Following that, the government brought in Bill C-70 to combat foreign interference. It is clear that there have been, and likely currently are, agents in Canada working on behalf of foreign states in order to undermine our sovereignty and our democratic institutions.

Do you believe that the amendments to the Criminal Code and the Security of Information Act will sufficiently address concerns related to transnational threats and violence to Canadians? If not, what else can be done?

[Daniel Stanton, Former Operations Manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual]

Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon, committee members.

I'm going to talk about the disclosure of intelligence, the new regime that's proposed in Bill C-70, as well as the criminalization of foreign intelligence. I'm going to echo in some ways Thomas Juneau's remarks with respect to transparency, and I do confess we didn't have time to collaborate on this. It's purely coincidental.

The proposal to amend section 19 of the CSIS Act is going to amplify the range and scope of disclosures from where they are currently. It is something I had some personal experience with. I was an intelligence officer in CSIS for 32 years and I was seized with the disclosure regime.

The proposal, of course, under the rubric of building resiliency against threats, is that the service may disclose intelligence to those outside federal departments. We're hearing about the private sector. We're hearing about universities, particularly those engaged in sensitive research. We're hearing about other levels of government, including indigenous government bodies as well, and municipal government and law enforcement. A wider orbit is being proposed where intelligence will be shared in the interests of national security.

This is going to be a significant overhaul in terms of both the mandate of CSIS and of national security. I do say that this is way beyond foreign interference. This covers other programs that CSIS collects intelligence on. The government is going to decide in some ways how this intelligence is going to be shared.

Nobody's going to be opening taps and turning on spigots and declassifying information, but I think there's a lot of expectations in various sectors in Canada that this is actually going to be happening. We're still going to have the need-to-know principle. We're still going to have to have people who are security cleared to receive that intelligence. They're going to actually have to have a clearance. They're going to have to have background checks. We're going to have to ensure that this intelligence has the physical and IT protection to safeguard it. You can't have intelligence being provided to new partners and then a week later be reading it on social media.

I'm enthusiastic about it. I think it's going to really enhance the government's more holistic view and assessment of threats. It gives CSIS a lot more leverage as well. Echoing my colleague's remarks, it makes more transparency clearly with government.

The other aspect I wanted to make reference to is the criminalization of foreign intelligence and the measures to counter foreign intelligence. We're talking about clause 50. We're talking about the foreign interference and security of information act for the amendment. I'm very enthusiastic about this. When I testified at a committee a year ago in March, one of the comments I made was that unlike for terrorism and for espionage, there actually is no legislative hammer. There actually are no legal consequences of any significance for enablers of foreign interference. That's changing with this new legislation. I'm very excited about it. This will allow the government to basically prosecute, whether it's transnational repression or whether it's interference in our democratic processes.

I also find it interesting that in this bill there's an extraterritorial application going into this foreign interference and transnational repression. This makes a lot of sense, because CSIS's mandate in security intelligence is not limited to Canada; CSIS works around the world. In many ways this will complement their subsection 2(b) activities in terms of intelligence collection on transnational repression as well as interference in an election so that it can actually be prosecuted.

I'm going to quote specifically. They're saying that “Despite subsection 26(1), a person who commits an act referred to in subsection (1) while outside Canada is deemed to have committed it in Canada if...the victim is in Canada” or if the victim is abroad.

Let's say they're in India or they're in the People's Republic of China; they can still be prosecuted in Canada. There's no sanctuary in the fact that this activity or an aspect of this activity is taking place outside of Canada.

The legislation also calls for the same thing with consequences on influencing political government processes. Proposed subsection 20.4(1) reads:

20.‍4 (1) Every person commits an indictable offence who, at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign entity, engages in surreptitious or deceptive conduct with the intent to influence a political or governmental process

and continues:

2) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1) is liable to imprisonment for life.

This is serious. This is what you get with espionage and this is what you get with terrorism. I'm delighted to see this coming into the foreign interference file. The particular SOIA amendments will offer criminal sanctions against clandestine foreign interference designed to benefit a foreign state in actions against the Canadian state, its interests or the exercise of democratic rights. This will open the way to laying foreign interference charges in Canada—something we have not seen and that I think we'd all agree is fairly relevant these days.

Lastly, I want to mention that there have been some adjustments to CSIS authorities in section 16. That's the non-threat-related foreign interference. I'm very enthused about that. I know it's giving CSIS a lot more of a holistic view in terms of the foreign intelligence mandate they have. I know the bill has its limitations, but I would like to see, at some point, the government scrap section 12 and section 16, because it's an anachronistic classification we have from the Cold War. I think this change signifies that the government is recognizing that we don't need collection within Canada of what is considered to be foreign intelligence.

That's it, and thank you.

[Dr. Thomas Juneau, Associate Professor, Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Today, I'm going to analyze Bill C‑70 from the perspective of transparency.

For three years, I chaired the National Security Transparency Advisory Group, an independent body that advises the deputy minister of Public Safety Canada and the intelligence community.

We produced three reports between 2019 and 2022, one of which focused on relations between security and intelligence agencies and minority communities. This is a relevant topic for the committee. I have stepped down as chair of the group, but am continuing my research into transparency issues.

In general, transparency is a tool that democracies underuse in the fight against their adversaries. More transparency, up to a point, of course, improves our national security. It's not an obstacle, quite the contrary.

In the context of the fight against foreign interference, transparency must occupy a central place. Our first line of defence against interference is often societal resilience. Public trust in institutions is an essential ingredient of this, and transparency is key to building that trust. Transparency is also essential to raise awareness among the public, civil society and the private sector, all of whom have a role to play in the face of the threat of interference. Lack of transparency, a major issue today, undermines our ability to protect ourselves against interference.

In Canada, the situation regarding transparency and national security is much better today than it was 10 or 20 years ago, but we can do much better.

I will address part I of Bill C‑70 on the modernization of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, or CSIS Act.

The first element I'm interested in is enabling CSIS to better communicate with actors outside the federal government. The service is seriously handicapped, given that the targets of foreign interference are often outside the federal government. However, greater transparency is essential in the exercise of these potential new powers. As part of the work of the National Security Transparency Advisory Group, we heard from a number of civil society activists. Mistrust of CSIS remains very high. We must patiently build bridges.

Concretely, what does this mean? Transparency must be practised more broadly. Communication with new partners, particularly in civil society, must be proactive and sustained, not just reactive or passive. This communication will be the result of exercising these new powers. We need to build trust, understand these new partners, and actually pass on information, not just symbolically. After the fact, CSIS must be transparent with Canadians and clearly explain what was done, why it was done, and disclose the results.

It's easy to say, but I recognize that it's very difficult to put into practice. It takes additional resources, which CSIS is sorely lacking at the moment. It also takes a change of culture, without which it will only partially work at best, because CSIS, despite the progress it has made, remains today far too insular an organization.

Bill C‑70 would also confer new powers on CSIS in terms of investigations, data collection and data management. Transparency is essential here, too. We must ensure that the relevant accountability mechanisms are adapted to the new powers. For example, the CSIS annual report should include as much information as possible on the use of these new powers. CSIS could also communicate proactively not only with the public and its partners, notably in civil society and the media, but also with parliamentarians, about the use of these new powers. This is essential, once again, to gain the public's trust and to enable accountability mechanisms to function properly.

Next, Bill C‑70 will also lead to the creation of the position of foreign influence transparency commissioner. Here again, transparency is essential. In concrete terms, the procedures to be followed to register will have to be transparent, clear and simple, and not cumbersome and bureaucratic, including in terms of possible mechanisms for receiving and managing complaints. The National Security Transparency Advisory Group has often heard the criticism, particularly from minority communities, that various mechanisms of this kind are not sufficiently accessible. There will also need to be an important dimension of public education, for example, through newsletters and notices.

Once again, it's much easier said than done. You need the right people with the right skills, authority and mandates. In reality, this isn't always available in Ottawa. All of these elements are essential for the proper functioning of accountability mechanisms, especially to help build awareness and, again, to improve societal resilience.

Finally, it will be essential to review this law every five years to improve and adapt it. In addition, ideally, the review process will include a public and transparent element to satisfy, again, all the societal resilience and awareness objectives, which were mentioned earlier. This commitment must be binding, if possible, and respected.

In the case of Bill C‑59 and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, we passed the five-year period two years ago, and this review has still not taken place, which is very unfortunate.

Thank you for your attention.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 111 of this House of Commons standing committee.

Pursuant to the order of reference referred the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.

Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents.

Please take care to note the following preventive measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters: Use only the approved black earpiece. The former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you're not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose.

Thank you all for your co-operation.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format.

I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking, and I remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair.

I have some specific comments on BillC-70.

I would like to remind members that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Friday, June 7, 2024. It is important for members to note that pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses for today.

With us we have Mr. Thomas Juneau, associate professor of public and international affairs at the University of Ottawa. We have Mr. Dan Stanton, former manager, Canadian Security Intelligence Service. By video conference, we have Mr. Benjamin Fung, professor and Canada research chair at McGill University. We also have Mr. Javad Soleimani, director, Association of Families of Flight PS752 Victims, also by video conference.

Welcome to you all, and thank you for joining us today. Your interventions will be most helpful to us, I am certain.

I now invite Mr. Juneau to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Please go ahead, sir.

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

We can legislate to make sure that he or she has access to all of the information that is needed for the investigation. That is a sine qua non for the success of their investigation and a deterrent that we want to apply to foreign agents.

Rest assured, foreign interference will not finish with the passing of Bill C-70. It will continue. It has been in place for a long period of time. We dragged our feet for so long now that they have been capable of embedding themselves within all levels of government. It will continue.

My problem is with the execution. Are we giving tools to law enforcement to be capable of working adequately?

That's especially when we have evidence and testimony now that tell us that influence from the higher office has been exercised many times.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Shull, I'd like to start with you.

I'm glad you brought up the consistency between SOIA and the new foreign influence transparency and accountability act. When I questioned Department of Justice officials last week, they said, to paraphrase them, that the definitions used in SOIA are within the context of SOIA, and there's a reason for this difference.

It can be confusing because the definition of "public office holder", specifically in part 4, does reference other acts that are more comprehensive.

I guess you're arguing to this committee that, for harmony's sake, SOIA and this act should have the exact same list.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Juneau‑Katsuya.

Mr. Shull, I'll now turn to you.

Earlier, you talked about including municipalities. Could we not also consider including universities and Crown corporations, for example? That's because part I of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act authorizes CSIS to transmit information to universities. However, part 4 of Bill C-70, which concerns the registry, is silent on universities and Crown corporations.

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya]

Yes, indeed, and that is where a new culture of national security must be developed, as I mentioned a moment ago. I believe that Bill C-70 is a step in the right direction to begin shaping the operational framework for investigators, who will be able to determine whether there are threats.

In fact, I tip my hat to the government for including educational institutions. That is a very good idea, as they've been the site of the largest theft of intellectual property for decades.

[Chris Bittle, Liberal, St. Catharines, ON]

Thank you so much.

I'll go back to Mr. Shull.

How do the provisions in C-70 compare with legislative schemes enacted in other Five Eyes countries to counter foreign interference and influence?

[Tim McSorley, National Coordinator, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group]

Mr. Chair, thank you very much for the invitation to appear today to speak to Bill C-70.

I'm with the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, a Canadian coalition of 46 civil society organizations that works to defend civil liberties and human rights in the context of national security and anti-terrorism activities.

Bill C-70 has been presented as legislation to address the threat of foreign interference. We recognize the importance of addressing this issue, particularly as we've heard in instances where governments are threatening individuals or their close ones in order to repress their ability to exercise their fundamental rights or engage in democratic processes. However, the changes proposed by this legislation go much further.

If adopted, this bill would have wide-ranging impacts on Canada's national security, intelligence and criminal justice systems. As such, it would also have significant impacts on the lives and fundamental rights of people in Canada. For example, providing CSIS with new forms of warrants, granting it extraterritorial reach for foreign intelligence activities and allowing the service to disclose information to any person or entity in order to build resiliency could lead to increased surveillance, diminished privacy and racial, religious and political profiling.

Powerful new offences for actions taken secretly at the behest of foreign entities, including foreign governments and terrorist organizations, while necessary, are punishable up to life in prison. Those could infringe on freedom of expression and association and raise questions of proportionality in sentencing.

The bill would also transform how federal courts handle sensitive information that can be withheld from appellants or those seeking judicial review undermining due process in courts through the use of secret evidence.

A bill of such breadth requires in-depth study. We're very grateful for the work that committee members are doing and recognize the amount of time and effort being put into these hearings which, as was pointed out, are extending long today and throughout the week.

However, we're still deeply concerned with the hastiness with which this legislation is being considered. Introduced barely a month ago, with a foreign interference inquiry ongoing, it will have gone through committee study within a week. This is even faster than the rushed 2001 study of the first Anti-terrorism Act, which was in committee for a month.

We're grateful for today's invitation; however, we only found out about our appearance on Friday afternoon. Colleagues from other organizations who would have asked to appear or submitted written briefs have said they will be unable to do so on such short timelines, let alone develop specific amendments to suggest for Friday's deadline.

Rushing the parliamentary process, supported by a state of suspicion and ardent calls to protect national security, can lead to serious negative and long-lasting consequences. An expedited study also risks missing ways the bill could be improved to better address issues of foreign interference. We are therefore urging the committee to work with your colleagues in the House of Commons to extend your study of this very consequential bill.

Apart from the process of this study, we have some specific areas of concern.

First, modifications to CSIS's dataset regime are only tangentially related to foreign interference. Many of these changes relate to significant problems that the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency identified in a scathing report on the regime. The necessity and potential consequences of these changes remain unclear and should have been addressed during a statutory review of 2019's National Security Act. We would recommend removing these changes until such a review happens. I'd be happy to speak to this further during the discussion.

We're also concerned around the powers of disclosure in section 19 of the CSIS Act. While we understand the goal of ensuring appropriate information can be shared, journalists and NSIRA have raised serious questions about how CSIS has handled the disclosure of sensitive information in the past. Bill C-70 also grants CSIS significant new production order and warrant powers. The changes come after years of the courts admonishing CSIS for misleading them in their warrant applications. Warrant requirements exist to protect our rights. They shouldn't be lessened and especially not while CSIS's problems of breaches of duty of candour to the courts have not been resolved.

Bill C-70 also changes the Security of Information Act, including new indictable offences for the carrying out of any indictable offence, including relatively minor transgressions, if done for the benefit of a foreign entity. This, along with other new or modified offences, would be punishable by either life in prison or consecutive sentences that could amount to life in prison, provisions that are normally reserved for the worst forms of crimes and raise concerns of proportionality in sentencing.

Finally, we also have concerns about the new sabotage offences and the proposed foreign influence registry.

I will finish by commenting on changes to the Canada Evidence Act. Our coalition is fundamentally opposed to expanding the use of secret evidence in Canada's courts under the guise of protecting national security, national defence and international affairs. Introducing a standardized system for withholding information from those challenging government decisions that have significant impacts on their lives will normalize this process and is likely to facilitate the spread of the use of secret information further into our justice system.

Thank you. I'm looking forward to the discussion and questions.

[Michel Juneau-Katsuya, Former Chief of the Asia-Pacific Desk, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the members of the committee for the opportunity to share my thoughts and recommendations on Bill C-70.

I'll begin by sharing the premises that guided my analysis.

A strong and healthy democracy must be protected by three fundamental concepts: transparency, accountability and independence, free from interference, of dependants.

The debate over the threat of foreign interference has raged for nearly two years. What has emerged is the extent to which there was dysfunction, scheming and control games in the arena of foreign interference. Yes, we have been targeted by foreign powers, but their work was facilitated by actors in key positions in our government, past and present, who have facilitated and even taken advantage of the situation for their personal and partisan gain. To that effect, I bring your attention to a report that was just released by the parliamentary committee on national security, which again blames severely some elected officials for willingly and consciously collaborating with foreign states, hence the need to recall the three basic concepts for protecting our democratic system: transparency, accountability and independence, free from all interference from people in office.

Bill C-70 is an opportunity to correct these errors and manipulations in order to aim for a Kantian ideal of our system.

I have only had 48 hours to prepare my formal presentation, so I will quickly mention a few key points. My concerns are mainly related to the implementation of the proposed reforms.

First, I welcome the proposals to expand communication between the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, and organizations other than the Prime Minister's Office.

Having said that, if we're going to talk about a real national security agenda, we must include the provinces and persuade the premiers to appoint national security advisers. They are already targeted by foreign agents and are completely unaware of it.

I welcome the efforts to clearly define criminal actions taken by agents acting for the benefit of foreign powers. However, I fear the execution of that because, to successfully contain the problem, the RCMP and CSIS will have to collaborate. Unfortunately, history tells us that, since its creation, CSIS, out of concern and due to formal instruction received a right at its outset—and I was there when it took place—not to testify ever in court or to prevent its going to court as much as possible, which has led to intentional obstruction of RCMP investigations. This happened in the files of Air India, Ahmed Ressam, Adil Charkaoui and Jeffrey Deslisle, to name only the few that are known publicly. So it is normal to fear that the system will reproduce the same deficient mechanisms.

In support of that apprehension, the director of CSIS, Monsieur Daniel Vigneault, testified before the commission of inquiry into foreign interference that he had, on two occasions, following a meeting with the Prime Minister, modified the reports to accommodate this last. This clearly demonstrates that our national security does not have the necessary and desired independence.

In that vein, I will remind committee members that prime ministers, from Mr. Mulroney to Mr. Trudeau, have all been briefed on the issue of foreign interference and have all chosen to ignore it for personal or political gain. This systemic problem is not new. Again, this is an issue of intelligence monitoring and accountability.

In the time I have left, I will continue with my analysis of the registry. The main purpose of the registry is to maintain the integrity of the system by keeping everyone transparent and accountable.

First of all, I note a lack of concordance between part 1 and part 4 of the bill. When we look at the new powers being devolved to CSIS—and even to the RCMP, in a certain perspective—they do not seem to work to maintain the efforts that will possibly be deployed by the new commissioner's office.

Second, the new position of commissioner must be independent and report to the House of Commons, not to the minister. As the Auditor General currently does, they should report directly to the House of Commons. Reporting to the minister will only replicate or perpetuate the existing problem.

Independence of the office of the commissioner must be also financial. The protection of our democracy must be protected from—

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.

That brings this panel to a close. Before we suspend for the next panel, members of the committee, the clerk distributed on Friday, May 31 a project budget for Bill C-70 in the amount of $53,250. Is it the pleasure of the committee to adopt this budget?

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

While the United States is prosecuting people for the offences you mentioned, here we are still trying to establish a law.

Is Bill C-70 sufficient? Is there anything missing?

[Mehmet Tohti]

Yes.

It is really important to have a clear definition. The U.S. Senate introduced Bill S. 831 for what will be called the transnational repression policy act. That bill on transnational repression clearly defines what transnational repression is.

There are names and numbers for definitions of offences. Most of those definitions are amended as a result of consequential amendments. When you add one thing, the related bills need to be updated, consequently. For that reason, we need, as part of this important bill—Bill C-70—to clearly define what transnational repression is.

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all of the witnesses for joining us today as we take a deep dive into Bill C-70.

I want to start with Mr. Therchin and Mr. Tohti.

I was taking notes when you both made your opening statements, particularly with regard to the need for a definition of “transnational oppression”. I'm trying to figure out, when we come to a stage where we're considering amendments, where to best fit this in. This bill amends a number of different existing statutes and also creates a new one. However, I want to draw your attention to the fact that, in this bill, there are important amendments to the Security of Information Act. There are going to be new clauses to go after intimidation, threats or violence committed on behalf of a foreign entity. There are going to be amendments about committing an indictable offence on behalf of a foreign entity, about omitting the fact that you are working for a foreign entity, or about interfering in the political process on behalf of a foreign entity. A lot of these—in fact, all of them—have quite serious punishments associated with them.

If you want to submit a brief to this committee, that's great. We can get it later on. However, is there anything you want that is missing in those I covered? What are we missing? This seems to cover a lot of what you said in your opening statements. I want to make sure we're getting all of our bases covered.

I'll start with you, sir.

[Sherap Therchin]

Again, with colleagues from Hong Kong leading this discussion, one of the points raised in our discussion was the definition of proxies in the foreign influence registration act. If possible, that needs to be clearly defined.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our guests, Mr. Tohti, Mr. Therchin and Mr. Singh.

I'll start with you, Mr. Tohti, and then go to Mr. Therchin.

You have actively supported the creation of a foreign influence registry. Does the government's proposal in Bill C-70 meet your expectations?

[Balpreet Singh, Legal Counsel, World Sikh Organization of Canada]

Good afternoon. My name is Balpreet Singh. I serve as legal counsel for the World Sikh Organization of Canada, which is also known as the WSO.

The first week of June is a particularly sombre time for Sikhs, as we remember the 1984 Sikh genocide and the Indian government's brutal attack on the Darbar Sahib complex and approximately 70 other gurdwaras across Punjab. I mention the horrific acts of June 1984 to remind committee members of the price that Sikh community members have paid due to state-sponsored violence, foreign interference and surveillance, simply for practising our faith.

For the past 40 years, India has consistently sought to intimidate Sikhs in Canada and stifle Sikh advocacy for Khalistan, which is a sovereign state governed according to Sikh principles and values. This interference has included disinformation campaigns, visa denials, intimidation of family members and, as we know now, even assassinations. Discussing or promoting Khalistan is protected under freedom of expression and political discourse. Attempts to draw attention to ongoing Indian interference targeting Sikhs have fallen largely on deaf ears, as India constantly maligns Sikh activism as extremism and worse.

The Sikh community is currently at a pivotal moment in its history. In June 2023, Bhai Hardeep Singh Nijjar was assassinated while leaving the Guru Nanak gurdwara in Surrey, where he served as president. The community, including our own organization, the WSO, recognized that this was an assassination at the hands of the Indian state. This was later substantiated as information emerged of Indian plans to kill Sikh activists here in Canada and across the world.

This weekend, I met with two Sikhs who have been given duties to warn. They have been provided with no details on the source of the threat they face or any resources to protect themselves. In short, they feel that they are on their own and pretty much abandoned.

Foreign interference has had deadly consequences for Sikhs in Canada. We believe more needs to be done to counter foreign interference. In that respect, Bill C-70 is a step in the right direction.

I would like to highlight the ability of CSIS to now disclose security information to any person or entity, should CSIS deem it relevant. This will be a positive step. However, we are also concerned about whether foreign consular officials in Canada might also be considered an entity. Also, India regularly supplies false and misleading intelligence about Sikh activists in Canada. There would need to be some sort of controls to ensure that this isn't further disseminated.

We know that the framework for co-operation on countering terrorism and violent extremism between Canada and India is still active. We have grave concerns over intelligence sharing between Canada and India. Vigilance needs to be ensured, so that new powers created by this legislation are used to counter foreign interference and not turned around against communities here. India has falsely claimed that Khalistan activism in Canada is directed by foreign state actors. Could accusations like that trigger the provisions in this bill?

The sabotage provision being added to the Criminal Code makes it an offence to interfere “with access to an essential infrastructure...with the intent to”—and this is in (b)—“endanger the safety or security of the naval, army or air forces of any state other than Canada that are lawfully present in Canada”. Sikhs have often protested in front of Indian consulates and the embassy here in Ottawa. The Indian embassy staff includes a military, naval and air attaché. Last year, the Indian media falsely reported that the Indian embassy in Ottawa was targeted with “two grenades” by a Sikh protester—a story covered today in the Journal de Montréal. India's NIA, the National Investigation Agency, also filed charges against a Montreal-based Sikh based on these accusations. Could this new Criminal Code provision be used to stifle Sikh protests?

With the short amount of time I have left, I'd like to highlight the reference to international relations between countries in Bill C-70.

We're concerned that this language and provision could go against the overall purpose of the legislation. Judges are given discretion to not release records following a trial if they believe that doing so “would be injurious to international relations or national defence or national security”. Additionally, subsection 82.31(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act gives the minister the ability to intervene if they believe that matters could damage international relations.

The reason foreign interference against Sikhs has gone unchecked for the past 40 years is the desire of successive Canadian governments to increase trade relations with India. This has been at the expense of the Sikh community. A report by Sam Cooper in The Bureau revealed that “CSIS planned a major intervention in 2017” to dismantle “Indian intelligence networks in Vancouver that were monitoring and targeting the Sikh community”. According to this report, this operation was obstructed by the government, citing potential repercussions for Canada-India relations.

Canada needs new tools to counter foreign interference, no doubt. However, our organization and the Sikh community fear that the international relations clause may be used as an excuse to ignore ongoing interference by India against Sikhs in Canada and might even create tools that would persecute Canadian Sikh activists.

That's my time.

I look forward to the questions you might have.

[Mehmet Tohti, Executive Director, Uyghur Rights Advocacy Project]

Thank you, Chair and distinguished members.

I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify today about the critical and pressing issue that we have been advocating on for nearly decades: countering foreign interference. As a fervent advocate for the Uyghur people and against the Chinese Communist Party's ongoing genocide, I can say that foreign interference by the Chinese state has had a marked impact on my personal life here in Canada.

Chinese repressive and innovative efforts to silence dissidents have attempted to shackle my activism and intimidate me into retreating from speaking out about the devastation of my family, friends and community. I have received numerous times threatening phone calls from the state police directly and messages about the most wild things being said about my loved ones. I'm a Canadian, and my rights to exercise free speech and freedom of assembly are attempted to be curtailed by the Chinese government all the time.

Bill C-70 is a heartening response by the Canadian government to my community's experience of transnational repression. Bill C-70 is a significant step forward in addressing foreign interference and protecting Canadian citizens from transnational repression. We talk about transnational repression because, on a personal level, we do not experience interference. We experience repression by the hijacking of our family members just for our speaking up in Canada. For that reason, both Tibetans and Uyghurs use the term “transnational repression”.

As a human rights defender, I do believe that the broader application and the coverage of certain acts of transnational repression against human rights activists afforded by the proposed amendments in Bill C-70 will allow for greater protection of the full and uninhibited exercise of our democratic rights in Canada. The proposed amendments in Bill C-70 will foster a joint strength among us Canadians to effectively counter threats to the security of Canada and safeguard the diaspora communities in Canada and abroad.

The expansion of information disclosure to anyone, not just a public official, if deemed to be essential in the public interest, will allow for enhanced bureaucratic transparency. Enhancing CSIS's ability to carry out its important functions serves to strengthen Canadians' trust in the agency and its capacity to detect, prevent and respond to threats from foreign agents, including those from China.

Necessarily, Bill C-70's emphasis on international co-operation underpins a crucial and powerful tactic in countering the global reach of authoritarian regimes such as China.

I applaud the proposed creation of a foreign influence transparency registry, which will enhance the effectiveness of protecting vulnerable diaspora communities, and the proposed appointment of a commissioner of foreign influence transparency; however, I am a little bit concerned about the absence in Bill C-70 of proposing the addition of specific foreign interference offences to the Criminal Code, nor does it propose that refugee espionage, online harassment or digital violence be criminalized. Further, given the limited amendments to the Criminal Code, there are deficient means for the victims of foreign interference to seek redress for the impacts of transnational oppression.

It is crucial that the government go beyond interference that activists carry out in relation to certain political and government processes in all aspects of Bill C-70. The Chinese government's reach extends far beyond attempts at directly interfering with Canadian institutions. My experience of transnational oppression is unrelated to political or governmental process, yet it is an assault on my democratic rights, warranting protection as much as upholding the integrity of our democratic process.

Crucially, addressing foreign interference must take a victim-centric approach. Chinese transnational oppression and interference in Canada pose a significant threat to the Uyghur communities and the Canadian values of freedom and democracy. With the introduction of Bill C-70, Canada is making a strong statement against those oppressive tactics. It is imperative that we remain vigilant, stand in solidarity with those affected and take concrete steps to counter these challenges.

Thank you.

[Sherap Therchin, Executive Director, Canada Tibet Committee]

Thank you, Chair and committee members.

I deeply appreciate this opportunity to speak with you today on the important matter of countering foreign interference. I would like to thank everyone involved for taking this matter seriously and for the detailed process to develop countering measures.

I would like to focus my presentation on part 1 of Bill C-70 with reference to the review of the bill by Sarah Teich and Hannah Taylor. While the review finds many of the amendments encouraging, it points to a limitation, which is that Bill C-70 does not propose the addition of a definition of “transnational repression” to any pieces of legislation that the bill proposes to amend or enact.

Defining transnational repression is essential to recognize and address the specific tactics used by foreign states to silence dissent among diaspora communities. This repression can take various forms, including harassment, surveillance, threats, coercion and physical violence. Authoritarian states, such as the People's Republic of China, routinely use these tactics to control dissent and opposition beyond their borders.

The PRC's transnational repression is a well-documented phenomenon affecting several groups, including the Tibetan diaspora. The Chinese Communist Party employs various methods to exert control and suppress Tibetan activism and identity worldwide.

I'd like to describe some of the key tactics here.

One is surveillance and intimidation. The CCP gathers personal information on exiled Tibetans through cyber-attacks and spyware and by questioning relatives in Tibet. This information is used to intimidate and coerce Tibetans abroad, often through direct threats or by harming their families back home.

Two is coercion by proxy. The Chinese authorities frequently threaten or harm relatives of exiled Tibetans in Tibet to exert control over the diaspora. This method ensures that exiled activists are silenced or forced to conform to the CCP's demands out of fear for their loved ones.

Three is infiltration and disinformation. The CCP infiltrates the Tibetan diaspora communities and organizations, using spies and co-opted individuals to sow distrust, spread disinformation and undermine solidarity networks. These activities severely disrupt the community's ability to organize and advocate for Tibetan rights.

Four is economic and social coercion. Tibetan exiles often face economic and social pressure from the CCP, including blackmail and efforts to sabotage their livelihoods. Such tactics aim to destabilize the diaspora and reduce its capacity to support the Tibetan cause.

There is a need for a clear definition in Bill C-70. Incorporating a clear definition of transnational repression in Bill C-70 would enhance Canada's ability to combat such foreign interference effectively. It would provide a legal basis for identifying and prosecuting transnational repression activities, thereby protecting diaspora communities from foreign state harassment and coercion.

With this, I'd like to offer some recommendations for Bill C-70.

Recommendation one is to define “transnational repression”: Include a comprehensive definition of transnational repression that encompasses all forms of extraterritorial control and coercion used by foreign states against diaspora communities.

Recommendation two is to enhance surveillance and prosecution mechanisms: Strengthen provisions within the CSIS Act and the Criminal Code to allow for robust monitoring and prosecution of transnational repression activities, ensuring that perpetrators are held accountable.

Recommendation three is to support victims and communities: Establish mechanisms, including specialized funds, to support and protect diaspora communities, providing resources and assistance to those affected by transnational repression.

Finally, recommendation four is international co-operation: Foster international collaboration to address transnational repression, working with allies to develop coordinated responses and share best practices.

In conclusion, defining transnational repression in Bill C-70 is a crucial step towards effectively countering the PRC's tactics against the Tibetan diaspora and other affected communities. By recognizing and addressing these activities, Canada can better protect the rights and freedoms of all its residents, ensuring a safe and supportive environment for those fleeing authoritarian oppression.

Thank you.

[Julie Dzerowicz, Liberal, Davenport, ON]

Well, I think there's been excellent testimony today about the need for a culture shift, not only because of Bill C-70 but also, I think, because of the world we live in and the threats we face.

Mr. Kempa, in a number of recent articles, you discussed the serious problem that foreign interference represents, particularly in local nominations. Of course, there's a minority government under way right now. Lots of nominations are under way and will continue to be under way.

To what extent do you think Bill C-70 will protect the legitimacy of upcoming nominations in the next election?

[Heath MacDonald, Liberal, Malpeque, PE]

Thank you, Chair.

Dr. Burton, I want to touch base on the transparency issue that you addressed in your preamble, possibly relevant to foreign governments and individuals. What's missing or what should we be doing to enhance that level of transparency in Bill C-70, or is it appropriate as it is?

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

Thank you for that. Hopefully, a lot of it works in the good way and not the poorly way.

Mr. Burton, I had a whole bunch of questions here specifically on Bill C-70, but you've mentioned a few things that I need to get a little more clarification on or it's going to bother me for a while.

You mentioned that some of your colleagues have left to join other entities. You mentioned specifically China. Could you give me some examples? What do you mean by that?

[Doug Shipley, Conservative, Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

I'd like to start with Mr. Kempa, if I could.

In your opening remarks, you mentioned that Bill C-70 was a good platform or a basis to get started with this. I tried to scribble down quickly what you said here. You mentioned there was definitely a lack of RCMP capabilities to investigate, and that really needed to be built on or this legislation wasn't going to be that good. I didn't quite get completely what you meant there. If you could expand on that, I'd appreciate it.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you.

It's a pleasure to be back at the public safety committee for a bit.

Thank you to both of our witnesses for being here on this really important piece of legislation.

Dr. Burton, in particular, I want to thank you for bringing your expertise. I think that when it comes to China, we'd be hard pressed to find anybody else in Canada who has your level of expertise on this subject.

You mentioned working with Australia, but I wonder if you could compare Bill C-70 to our Five Eyes partners and how it compares to the legislation they have in place in dealing with foreign interference.

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Okay.

Professor Kempa, you spoke about the “country-agnostic” nature of Bill C-70, which is something that, at first blush, I would be supportive of.

Now, one of the reasons why I suppose we would deal with this is that we have a changing world, and different governments are going to have different mandates. Is there a compelling reason why we wouldn't apply the same standard—and a high standard at that—when it comes to transparency and the registry of any foreign agents?

[Frank Caputo, Conservative, Kamloops—Thompson—Cariboo, BC]

Mr. Genuis isn't here. He's in a lot of places, but right here, right now, isn't one of them. He will be joining us later, I'm sure.

Let's take his example about the Attorney General. I assume this would involve a foreign entity having a dossier of some sort about an attorney general or something like that. In that instance, based on what you just said, what positive impact would Bill C-70 have on information sharing or the ability to alert?

[Dr. Charles Burton, Senior Fellow, Sinopsis, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My area of expertise is Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy. I was educated in China, and I've worked in the CSE, in the Canadian diplomatic service and as an academic. I have published several articles and reports on Chinese influence operations in Canada.

I will focus my remarks on part 4 of Bill C-70, the foreign influence transparency and accountability act part, as it impinges on the activities of agents of the Chinese Ministry of State Security targeting politicians, civil servants and others involved with shaping Canada's relations with the People's Republic of China regime.

Justice Hogue's report earlier this month noted that her mandate is to investigate potential foreign interference with “Executive decision-making by Cabinet and its ministers in relation to their departments, including indirect foreign interference with ministerial decisions when such decisions are based on information originating at a lower level of government covertly influenced by a foreign state (or its proxy, agent, etc.).”

I'm not sure why Justice Hogue's mandate is limited to “a lower level of government covertly influenced by a foreign state”. In the previous meeting of this committee, Mr. Genuis raised the possibility of a future Attorney General of Canada being in a conflict of interest because he or she had benefited from foreign interference in his or her riding. My knowledge of China's united front strategy around the world is that there is enhanced Chinese Ministry of State Security early targeting of politicians deemed likely to, in future, assume influential positions such as Attorney General of Canada.

We know from a leaked December 2021 CSIS report how China's Ministry of State Security uses three colour-coded political interference tactics to gain influence over Canadian government officials here in Canada and those travelling to China. Blue refers to sophisticated cyber-attacks on targets' computers, smart phones and hotel rooms for possible blackmail. Gold refers to bribes. Yellow is what CSIS described as “honey pots”. That's how China employs sexual seduction to compromise a target.

Bill C-70 and existing legislation should go a long way to addressing this kind of concern, but I would put forward that there are more sophisticated operations by the Chinese regime here in Canada and other countries that are more challenging for us to counter.

For example, former Australian prime minister Bob Hawke recalls in his biography that shortly after he retired from politics, he travelled to Beijing and met with Chinese leader Jiang Zemin, who told him, “Mr. Hawke, China never forgets its friends. I want you to know that we regard you as one of our best friends.” In the years that followed, Mr. Hawke took on several directorships and consultancy positions relating to China, which enabled him to achieve considerable financial success.

Here in Canada, we observe former cabinet ministers, former ambassadors to China and people retired from senior roles in our foreign ministry who have assumed lucrative opportunities relating to China after leaving government. Government career options in law firms, businesses and other sectors with associations with business networks identified with the Chinese Communist Party would, clearly, not be open to those identified as unfriendly to China while in a position of public trust, because we know that the Chinese regime keeps extensive files on all of us. They know who their friends are.

A concern is whether Canadian officials, because of the very subtle Chinese influence process of implied future benefits after retirement for Canadian policy-makers, which Bill C-70 cannot track, would perhaps not act immediately on intelligence assessments they receive that would call for Canadian government action that goes against Chinese interests in Canada, but leave these for others to respond to, for fear of being identified with actions the Chinese embassy would not feel well disposed towards.

If I could just conclude, I would say from this that just as government officials cannot exploit classified information to serve personal interests after retirement and have to keep the secrets that they derive in the course of their service secret for life, perhaps we need to restrict public servants from receiving benefits from foreign entities for life as well.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 110 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Pursuant to the order of reference referred to the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee resumes its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.

Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents.

Please take note of the following preventative measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters. Only use a black, approved earpiece. The former, grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you're not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose. Thank you for your consideration.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.

Regarding specific comments on Bill C-70, as indicated in the memo that was sent out on May 31, I would like to remind members that amendments to Bill C-70 must be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Friday, June 7, 2024. It is important for members to note that, pursuant to the order adopted by the House on May 30, the 4 p.m. deadline to submit amendments is firm. This means that any amendments submitted to the clerk after the deadline and any amendments moved from the floor during the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill will not be considered by the committee.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses for the first panel today.

We have Mr. Charles Burton, senior fellow, Sinopsis. We also have Mr. Michael Kempa, associate professor of criminology at the University of Ottawa.

Welcome, gentlemen, and thank you for joining us today.

I now invite Mr. Burton to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Parliament of Canada Act

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Madam Speaker, I want to thank everybody who participated in this important debate because it actually achieved one of my aims, which I talked about in my initial speech when I introduced this bill, and that is education. I will get into the reasons why that is so important.

I am not shocked by this, but after listening to members, there seems to still be a level of misunderstanding of what exactly this bill is. I am going to talk about what it is, what it is not, and why it is so important. I will read the crux of what this bill is into the record one more time because then it will be easy to break down. It is subclause 13.1(1) of this need to know legislation, which reads, “A member of the Senate or the House of Commons who applies for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada is, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information in respect of which the application is made.” That is the important clause.

My point is that the only thing this bill would do would be to allow parliamentarians to apply for a secret security clearance. The government would not be able to deny, regardless of who is in government, a parliamentarian from applying. That is all that it would do. It would allow them to apply. I would dare say that every speaker who spoke to this during the debate on my PMB highlighted two key examples: the Winnipeg labs, most recently, and the Afghan detainee file.

A colleague just spoke to what this bill does not do. This does not guarantee a parliamentarian will pass, should they apply. They still have to go through the same security vetting and clearance process that we have been doing for decades. I have had a secret level clearance for likely 25 to 30 years now. I have been at the top secret level for 15-plus years. The clearance does not guarantee one has a need to know or that one gets access to the information because that is how the system protects it. One still has to demonstrate that to the government.

Why is this so important? We have heard a little bit about this. The world is more complicated. We have listed a couple of historical examples. The most important one, which has been highlighted numerous times, is foreign interference. When we look at foreign interference, there are lots of cases. I do applaud the government about Bill C-70. It is going to come and address some of that because it allows changes to the CSIS Act, which then allows CSIS to actually share information beyond just the federal government, not just to potential parliamentarians. Again, if they are not cleared, they still cannot get that information, but it will potentially allow CSIS to share information to other levels of government, to industry and stakeholders, but they have to have the clearance.

We have heard testimony and speeches here, so we know that parliamentarians are being targeted. We have seen the original NSICOP annual report of 2019. What was one of the key takeaways? Parliamentarians need to be briefed on the threats that they face from foreign interference. We have seen Madam Hogue's public inquiry into foreign interference. Just recently we saw the NSIRA report that came out. We are only a few days away from seeing NSICOP's latest report. However, it is not just from those agencies. I would like to read again from the recommendations that came out of PROC, with unanimous consent, just a few weeks ago. Recommendation 3 reads:

That the government work with recognized parties’ whips to facilitate security clearances, at Secret level or higher, of caucus members who are not Privy Councillors (particularly those who sit on committees with mandates concerning foreign affairs, national defence and national security), who shall be taken as satisfying requirements for a “need to know,” to ensure that they may be adequately briefed about important national security matters, including foreign intelligence threat activity directed toward Parliament, or their party or its caucus members.

The point is that this has already unanimously passed at PROC to basically implement what my bill is trying to achieve.

In conclusion, I have not heard a single criticism of the bill that is based on what the bill would do and what is contained within it. I know members from all parties who I have talked to are going to support this bill. I am hoping that, when it does come up for a vote, it will pass unanimously.

Business of the House

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Madam Speaker, if you seek it, you will find unanimous consent for the following motion.

I move:

That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order, or usual practice of the House, in relation to the consideration of Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference:

(a) during the consideration of the bill by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security,

(i) the committee shall have the first priority for the use of House resources for committee meetings,

(ii) the committee shall meet for extended hours on Monday, June 3, Tuesday, June 4, Wednesday, June 5 and Thursday June 6, 2024, to gather evidence from witnesses,

(iii) the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, the officials from the RCMP and CSIS, the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, the officials from the Department of Public Safety, and other expert witnesses deemed relevant by the committee be invited to appear,

(iv) all amendments be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 4:00 p.m., on Friday, June 7, 2024,

(v) amendments filed by independent members shall be deemed to have been proposed during the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill,

(vi) the committee shall meet at 3:30 p.m. on Monday, June 10, 2024, to consider the bill at clause-by-clause consideration, and if the committee has not completed the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill by 6:30 p.m., each party shall be allotted no more than five minutes for each of the remaining amendments and clauses, and the committee shall not adjourn the meeting until it has disposed of the bill,

(vii) a member of the committee may report the bill to the House by depositing it with the Clerk of the House, who shall notify the House leaders of the recognized parties and independent members, and if the House stands adjourned, the report shall be deemed to have been duly presented to the House during the previous sitting for the purpose of Standing Order 76.1(1); and

(b) the bill shall be ordered for consideration at report stage on Wednesday, June 12, 2024.

[Damien Kurek, Conservative, Battle River—Crowfoot, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

We find ourselves in an interesting position here today. As Mr. Barrett has expanded on in the last number of minutes, we are first....

I believe that this bears highlighting. At a meeting a number of weeks ago, the NDP actually requested that some documents be provided. Those documents had a timeline on them. There is a requirement for the committee to deal with those documents. That timeline has passed, and this committee has not yet had an opportunity to deal with that, although both the meeting today and the meeting this past Tuesday did have committee business, as was listed publicly, in camera.

I am very curious about why we are in the situation we're in when we hear often from Liberals and New Democrats that somehow it is Conservatives who are to blame for everything that is held up in committees and in Parliament. We hear this at length, especially in the House.

What I would highlight before I get into the substance of my remarks is that, because of Liberal actions backed up by the NDP, this committee has not had a chance to deal with some of the important business that sits before it, whether that be some information that was related to a request that was made at the end of a committee meeting.... It was about three weeks ago now, if my memory serves me correctly. The deadline was at two weeks. Obviously, that has passed. Because the committee has not had a chance to substantively sit in camera and deal with the business at hand, we still don't have a resolution to that.

Then we have what is talked about in the public declaration, that there was a consideration of a draft report on the federal government's use of technological tools capable of extracting personal data from mobile devices and computers.

Part of the important work the committee does has to do with these reports. We do studies. We move motions that do studies. We call witnesses. Then the committee has a chance, or should have a chance, to go through those reports and edit them. The fine work that our analysts and staff do to help compile these reports.... The committee goes through it, and then that's what.... Often there's disagreement, discussion and very frank conversations, and I actually often share with constituents about how there is....

People often think that the only thing that happens in Parliament is question period. However, there are often frank discussions that take place, and sometimes those are in camera. The report that the committee has put together is what was planned to be dealt with today, as was mentioned in the notice of meeting. However, here we are, debating a motion that I'll get into here in a second.

It's troubling that while the Liberals are quick to complain about anything that doesn't go their way, they forget about who, ultimately, we are here to serve.

What I'll attempt to do—and share with the committee and those who are watching—is highlight how the actions and the place that we have come to today truly are an attempt by the Liberals, with the support of the NDP, to silence critics. That's what it comes down to: an attempt by the government, ultimately, to silence anyone who would dare to ask them tough questions.

I would further suggest that they are attempting to weaponize tools and protections that are meant to ensure that all MPs, not just members of the opposition.... I'll get into more detail on the specifics of what that looks like in our Westminster democratic system if I have the opportunity. However, there are specific tools that are granted to members of Parliament that protect us so that we can ask tough questions.

I would note, specifically when it comes to the topic at hand, which is foreign election interference, there is this thing called “privilege”, and those watching may not be aware of the nuances and the history of what parliamentary privilege is.

There is a long history dating back centuries to what we refer to as the mother of parliaments, at the Palace of Westminster in the United Kingdom, which ensures that parliamentarians—those who are elected to the House of Commons—have protection.

I'm going to read some quotes into the record that specifically speak to why that is significant, but ultimately the Coles Notes version of what is an extensive conversation about why we got to this point is that there had to be an understanding that parliamentarians had to be able to have those tough conversations. At the time, when some of these were called into question, lives were literally on the line. When you look back at some of the big battles that took place in parliamentary history, there were lives on the line about whether or not the king could take the life of a parliamentarian because of a parliamentarian's opposition to something a king was doing. These are questions that had life-or-death consequences.

They were hard-fought to the point that today it allows MPs, both opposition and government, to ask tough questions without fear of reprisal.

What privilege clearly does not do, was not designed to do, should not do and, I would suggest, cannot do is silence critics from being able to ask tough questions. All of us around this table and all 338 members of Parliament who have the honour of occupying and of being temporary tenants in seats in the House of Commons...because we don't own those seats. No, they're owned by the people. We need to take seriously that need to represent them, yet what we have before us is an attempt specifically to silence Mr. Brock, who is very effective.

There is no question. I don't think anybody from any party would suggest that Mr. Brock is anything but effective when it comes to prosecuting important issues, whether that be in his previous career as a Crown prosecutor or whether that be here in Parliament. He does ask tough questions. For anyone who has ever heard or listened to him, he asks tough questions, and, quite frankly, I'm glad he does, because that is why privilege exists.

In fact, page 57 of the third edition of House of Commons Procedure and Practice describes parliamentary privilege as the following, and this emphasizes the point that I have just attempted to make:

...the rights and immunities that are deemed necessary for the House of Commons, as an institution, and its Members, as representatives of the electorate, to fulfill their functions.

That's key. What we have here is an attempt by a member of the government that was undoubtedly a subject that had come up in the course of discussion. In fact, it was my friend from the Bloc Québécois who, at one point, brought forward a concern to this committee asking whether or not it was an actual conflict—it certainly appeared to be a conflict of interest—that the member for Steveston—Richmond East was sitting at the table. It wasn't Conservatives who brought that forward. I didn't hear the Liberals demand an apology from the Bloc Québécois for suggesting there might be an appearance of a conflict of interest.

I have no doubt that if that member wanted to be a witness at committee to talk about some of those things, I'm quite confident there would have been allowance for him to be able to do that. However, is that what the focus is? No. The focus of this motion is to try to silence the member for Brantford—Brant for being effective at asking tough questions.

Did those questions offend somebody? Maybe. Did those questions call into question a member's conduct? Maybe. What I think we need to remember is that we have to be allowed to ask those tough questions.

One thing that I believes bears mentioning is that, over the course of the close to four and a half years that I've had the honour of serving as a member of Parliament for the constituency of Battle River—Crowfoot—a beautiful area of east-central Alberta—I've been able to ask some of those tough questions and to do my best to represent the people who sent me here, understanding full well that it doesn't make everybody happy. I've faced some criticisms at different points in time, as I suggest we all have if we're honest about the role we play.

As a member of the opposition, one of the fundamental roles of that.... In fact, it was Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre, when asked by President Biden about what it was to be the leader of His Majesty's loyal opposition.... It was an interesting conversation. It was picked up on camera. Mr. Poilievre made mention of the fact that, in Canada, the act of opposition is an act of loyalty. I think that's very profound: Just because we disagree, or we have disagreements, different policy ideas or whatever the case is—you can really fill in the blank—that doesn't mean we aren't passionate about the future of our country.

What has been a troubling trend that we've seen under the Liberals is that, with the support of the NDP, it seems at any cost—which is a troubling metric in and of itself, especially because that's not what Canadians voted for—the Liberals do not want an opposition. They make that clear on a regular basis. Instead, they seem to want only an audience. What's so disconcerting about that is that the very fundamental basis of the institution of which we are all a part, the House of Commons, was built upon that idea that you could have opposition, whether that was eight-plus centuries ago when it was the people wanting to hold the Crown to account and, instead of fighting a battle—which would have seen death and destruction—coming to a point at which they could have arguments; or whether that was one of the many instances throughout the history of our Parliament when we have been able to have disagreements.

Then there are, Chair, times when we do come together. My colleague Mr. Barrett talked about how, when it comes to Bill C-70, which was introduced to substantively address aspects of foreign election interference—it's fitting and very relevant to the topic at hand here—Conservatives were quick to make the suggestion that there was the ability for us to come together and figure out a way to ensure that it is passed so that, prior to the next election, our intelligence apparatus in this country will be prepared to ensure that the integrity of our electoral framework is, in fact, protected.

I know, and I'm sure those watching will often see those highlighted examples when MPs oppose each other, and that's fair. Certainly, my constituents have made it very clear to me that I am to oppose the Liberal agenda—oppose it and do so loudly. In fact, I hear that on a regular basis. However, there are those instances when we do work together. It's not to suggest that it doesn't happen, but what is so important is for that freedom to take place, which leads me into some of the conversation around the idea of privilege.

We have before us a motion that suggests there was a violation of a member's privilege. I'll get into some of the substance of the motion here in a moment, but I just note for Mr. Bains—and maybe he would like to address the reason—that there's actually a factual error in the motion, I believe. It's suggesting that the conversation took place on a day when, I don't believe, there was actually a meeting, May 23. I believe that the committee was previously occupied during that day. I may stand to be corrected on that. I will certainly appreciate it if Mr. Bains has the opportunity, when he is able, to take the floor to address the specifics of that day.

What Mr. Bains is suggesting is that asking tough questions is somehow a violation of his privilege as an MP. I mentioned page 57 of House of Commons Procedure and Practice, third edition, and its descriptor of parliamentary privilege. I would like to further read from page 88:

Members individually have the responsibility to not abuse their rights and immunities, particularly freedom of speech.

What I would suggest is being highlighted in the debate we're having here is the fact that we have the responsibility, as members of Parliament, to not abuse the privileges, but we also cannot abuse the ability and the idea of privilege to be able to weaponize that sort of thing for the purposes of silencing one's critics. It leads me to the inevitable conclusion that, as I mentioned before, it is not about whether or not that member's rights and privileges were violated but about, I would suggest, that member facing pressure because of the conversation that took place.

Quite frankly, I would say that is a good thing. That's what democracy is supposed to be about. It is meant to be a space where we can ask and have those tough conversations, but here we are, and there is an attempt through a procedural mechanism....

For those watching who might be wondering what a procedural mechanism is, it's using the rules that exist for us to be able to fulfill our functions...using it for something it was not intended to be used for. In this case, the member from Brantford—Brant is a very effective prosecutor in terms of calling out some of the things the government has done wrong. A procedural mechanism is used not for their purpose, for the ability of committees to function properly, and not for the purposes of protecting members' freedom of speech, but rather to narrowly interpret privilege as something to silence an opponent.

Now, just imagine for a moment what it would be like if during an election you had a national party leader tell one of his opponents that they can or cannot talk about something. It would be a national scandal. It would be truly a national scandal. We have free, fair and open discourse, because that's what Canadians expect us to be able to have. That is something that needs to be extended to committee.

Now, there have been some accusations made about intent. There have been further suggestions that somehow it is incorrect for members to call out these certain things. I've faced the consequences personally of calling out things that I have deemed to be absolutely egregious, including the conduct of the Prime Minister. In that case, I respected the Speaker's ruling on that matter. While I disagreed, and I stand behind what I said, I understood the consequences of that.

This is where we have come to today. Are we going to set a precedent that suggests that instead of having these tough conversations, we are going to allow for procedural mechanisms to take away the ability for any member of this place to do their work?

I want to highlight something here that I think is often forgotten. We have a principle that is unique to the Westminster system, actually. Those I've had the opportunity to engage with on the matter know that part of the reason I like the Westminster system of Parliament so much is the idea of parliamentary supremacy. It's key, because it ultimately ensures that people have the ultimate say.

Although there's an extensive conversation that could be had about that, I want to park that larger conversation, because it can get fairly philosophical. There are differences of opinions about when and where and how some of the mechanisms that exist have been brought to bear, both in the context of the Canadian circumstances, where we have both written and unwritten aspects of our Constitution, versus the United Kingdom, where it is still largely unwritten in terms of the constitutional frameworks that exist.

I've talked a bit about that here and at other committees in the past, but what is key is that it is members of Parliament who make up a Parliament.

Again, for individuals who might be watching, Mr. Chair, I believe it's worth highlighting something that is often forgotten. We are in the 44th Parliament. “Well,” one might ask, “What is a Parliament?” We often refer to that as a building—in the case of the House of Commons, the chamber with its green floors and question period and the debates and whatnot.

What's interesting, Chair, is the description of it as the place where a group of MPs are able to come together to form that Parliament. Then, out of that, in the case of our tradition—this is tradition and it has become constitutional convention—the party that gets the most seats is able to form the government. The government includes the cabinet, led by the prime minister. The history of that is that the prime minister was the first minister among ministers, and, referring to the Latin history of the word, the first among equals, although that's certainly then something that's been long since abandoned.

What's interesting—and this is an important point that is applicable not simply to members of the opposition. When I describe our democratic system to classes, whether they're in junior high, high school or even some elementary schools, I talk about every Canadian being allowed to have that one ballot on election day. That is an incredible thing. That right we have is an incredible privilege, hard-fought for and won over history.

The fact is that the current Prime Minister, or the leader of a political party, any political party, gets that same number of ballots on election day. Every Canadian gets that one ballot. The power to choose your government is incredible.

When I ask the question about how many ballots you get on election day, some of the conversations that ensue in classrooms about that are interesting, because it is that distribution of authority among the people that is truly fundamental in the way that our democratic system operates.

Now, I would be the first to admit it's not always equitable in terms of the number of individuals per electoral district, and there are always some nuances in the conversation, but fundamentally it comes down to every Canadian getting that one ballot on election day. It's a powerful thing.

I know for you, Chair, that this would be the same thing. You and I and all members of this committee, including staff and technical folks, get to have that one ballot to make a choice about who gets to represent them in the House of Commons.

However, here's the extension of that, and the reason parliamentary supremacy is so key. That one ballot translates, in the case of our current Parliament, into 338 seats.

Another question I ask students, when I have the chance to speak with them, is how many seats the Prime Minister occupies in the House of Commons. Some of the responses I get are interesting, but it comes down to one.

I ask the same about the Leader of the Opposition. They occupy one seat in the House of Commons.

In the case of our current Parliament, there are 338 members of Parliament who sit and make decisions and empower the government to act on their behalf. The opposition plays a key role in that against the government and the governing party. In the case of a minority Parliament or a hung Parliament, as it's often referred to in the United Kingdom, ultimately it comes down to the fact that there are members of Parliament, 338 of them. While we have whips and there are conventions when it comes to voting and voting for confidence measures—in the case of the opposition, we vote non-confidence in the government on a very regular basis—every MP occupies that one seat in the House of Commons, and the power of that, I would suggest, emphasizes the foundational idea of what privilege is in this place and in this specific context around this table.

I'd like to emphasize how fundamental it is that any attempt to silence members of Parliament from being able to ask the tough questions, to silence members of Parliament from being able to represent their constituents, is not simply an attack on the idea of privilege in this place, but rather is an attack on the fundamental tenets of democracy—

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Yes, Chair.

Given how heavy our workload is going to be next week, and given the timelines we're dealing with on Bill S-210, I'm just wondering if we have unanimous consent from this committee to ask for a formal extension so that we can give Bill S-210 proper study, because Bill C-70 is obviously going to take priority in this committee.

Can I get unanimous consent for that?

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Always. Thank you, Mr. Caputo.

One gap in terms of the response here has been around people facing coordinated discrimination based on political activity and people in diaspora communities who are involved in pro-democracy activity, for example, who then face various forms of discrimination that may be officially or unofficially coordinated from abroad. One instance I heard of recently was someone involved in pro-democracy activism related to Hong Kong who faced negative consequences from their landlord as a result of it.

Now, I have a private member's bill, Bill C-257, that would add political belief and activity as prohibited grounds of discrimination, which I think is one solution. That wouldn't apply in provincial jurisdiction, but it would apply in federal jurisdiction. You can imagine similar models being adopted provincially.

However, I think this is one problem that Bill C-70 does not solve. I'd be curious for your feedback—especially the Department of Justice officials' feedback—on this and what steps could be taken to protect people from discrimination that may be coordinated from abroad and may respond to political activities they're involved in here in Canada.

[Heather Watts]

As is the normal practice, the Minister of Justice will be tabling a charter statement that will outline the potential implications on rights and freedoms protection under the charter from Bill C-70. I don't believe it's been tabled yet, but as per the practice, that would be our expectation.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

Winston Churchill apparently once quipped, “You can always count on Americans to do the right thing, only after they’ve tried everything else.” In this case, the Liberal government has definitely tried everything else to avoid action on foreign interference over nine years. With Bill C-70, they've finally responded to pressure from the opposition and from the public. Conservatives don't want to let the government get away with sitting on this bill. After nine years, we've had enough delays. We will push for anti-interference measures to be passed and in place as soon as possible.

One important flashpoint for the foreign interference conversation is Hong Kong. Hong Kong's national security law makes absurd claims of universal jurisdiction, even claiming that if a Canadian in Canada makes statements that are deemed to violate Hong Kong's national security law, they could be charged and even rendered to Hong Kong while travelling in a third country. The manager of the Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office in London has been charged with spying. I've heard concerns from the Canadian Hong Kong community about the activities of the ETO in Canada. Hong Kong is no longer meaningfully separate from the mainland, which raises questions about whether these offices have any legitimacy anyway.

Is the government reviewing the activities of the ETO as they relate to foreign interference?

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Aubertin‑Giguère and Mr. Bilodeau, I know that some choices will be made by regulation. However, when you wrote the work of poetry that is Bill C‑70, you must have had in mind a certain skill set for choosing the person who would become the transparency commissioner.

Can you comment on the experience and expertise the commissioner should have?

[Heather Watts]

Thanks, Sarah,

As my colleagues have said, the idea in Bill C-70 is to really build the tool kit for the government to respond to foreign interference. The work that Public Safety Canada has done to establish a registry is one piece, and obviously the proposed offences we have in the Security of Information Act are another part of that.

Some of the activity that we've seen reported in the media may already be conduct that is criminal activity, but some of it may not. One of the things that Bill C-70 is trying to do is to bridge that gap a little bit.

In particular, I would point you to the new proposed offence that would be in 20.3 of the SOIA, which is conduct or an omission or committing an offence for a foreign entity. The underlying conduct there doesn't itself already have to have been a criminal offence. There's a distinction between two of the offences we're proposing. Part of what we seek to do is make things that are tied to foreign entities, that are a threat to Canada, that harm communities, offences in a way that is not currently captured by the law.

[Salma Zahid, Liberal, Scarborough Centre, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to all the witnesses for appearing before the committee on this important legislation.

My first question is for the CSIS department.

Bill C-70 proposes amendments to the CSIS Act that would, among many other things, expand its warrant capabilities. I have some concerns about this expansion of authority, given concerns regularly raised by the courts about CSIS not abiding by its duty of candour in warrant applications.

Could you please outline reforms you have taken around your duty of candour to the courts and building trust with minority communities, who have in the past felt targeted by CSIS and are the very communities often targeted by the foreign interference we are trying to guard against in this legislation?

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

I will direct my questions to the Public Safety officials.

How long will it take to implement the foreign influence registry after Bill C-70 receives royal assent?

[Heather Watts, Deputy Assistant Deputy Minister, Department of Justice]

Good morning. Thank you very much, Chair.

I'm here to speak to the Department of Justice Canada proposals in Bill C-70 that amend the Security of Information Act, the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act.

The Security of Information Act, or the SOIA, as I'll call it, is the primary legislation dealing with foreign interference. Part 2 of Bill C-70 would create three new offences in the SOIA.

The first is a general foreign interference offence. This would make it an offence to do any surreptitious or deceptive act for a foreign entity knowing that it would cause harm to Canadian interests.

The second is the commission of an indictable offence for a foreign entity, which would apply when someone commits an indictable offence for a foreign entity. It could be any indictable offence, such as extortion or bribery.

The third proposed offence is an interference with democratic processes offence. The bill would create a new offence of committing a surreptitious or deceptive act at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign entity to influence a political process or educational governance in Canada. This offence would apply to all levels of government—territorial, provincial, indigenous and municipal—and would apply to the nomination processes of political parties. This offence would apply at all times, including outside of the formal election period.

The bill also amends some of the existing offences that we already have in the SOIA. Section 20 already deals with threats or violence in relation to a foreign entity. Bill C-70 would make it easier to prove this offence by removing the necessity for prosecutors to prove the offence was committed for the purposes of aiding a foreign entity or was likely to harm Canada. This is a significant modification to section 20 that would aid in the investigation and prosecution of persons involved in transnational repression, because the intimidation of critics of foreign regimes doesn't always engage the interests of the Canadian state in a direct way.

There is also a proposed amendment to section 22 of the SOIA, which deals with preparatory acts.

The bill would increase the maximum penalty for the commission of a preparatory act from two years to five years and would expand the application of that penalty to most of the offences in the SOIA, including the new ones proposed in this bill. For all of the SOIA offences, including the new ones, there will be a requirement to obtain the Attorney General's consent before commencing a prosecution.

Bill C-70 also contains a proposed amendment to the definition of “special operational information” in the SOIA to address the inappropriate sharing of military technology and knowledge.

I'll turn now to the Criminal Code, which currently contains an offence of sabotage that has not been revised since 1951.

The amendments in Bill C-70 would modernize this offence. The bill would create a new sabotage offence, focused on conduct directed at essential infrastructure, and it contains a list of what would constitute essential infrastructure for this purpose, including transportation, energy, health and communications infrastructure, among other categories. The current sabotage offence already provides for exemptions from criminal liability for work stoppages related to labour action or safety concerns; the proposed new offence would also recognize, for greater certainty, the right to advocacy, protest and dissent.

Finally, the bill would add a new companion offence to criminalize making, possessing, selling or distributing a device to commit the offence of sabotage. The maximum penalty for these three sabotage offences is 10 years.

As with the new offences in the SOIA, the bill would add an additional safeguard by requiring the Attorney General's consent before a prosecution for the offence of sabotage can be commenced.

Turning now to the amendments to the Canada Evidence Act and the Criminal Code in Bill C-70, currently the Canada Evidence Act provides a regime that protects sensitive information from disclosure in court proceedings but generally does not allow the courts to consider that information when deciding the matter before them.

However, there are some stand-alone regimes that allow for the protection and use of sensitive information in administrative proceedings. Judges can take the sensitive information into account when making their decision.

Such stand-alone regimes exist on judicial review—for example, in connection with charities' registrations and revocations, terrorist entity listings, the passenger protect program and some passport revocations and refusals.

The bill repeals these existing stand-alone regimes and establishes a universal process.

This is a universal procedure for the use of information and administrative proceedings that we call a secure administrative review proceeding. This would apply to federal administrative proceedings, such as judicial reviews and appeals to the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal when sensitive information is part of the record.

Finally, with regard to criminal proceedings, the bill makes two specific changes involving interlocutory appeals and sealing orders to improve efficiency and limit delays in the criminal process.

Thank you for having us, and I'm happy to take any questions.

[Sarah Estabrooks, Director General, Policy and Foreign Relations, Canadian Security Intelligence Service]

Good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to be here in support of this important study.

Since its creation 40 years ago, CSIS has had to adapt to major changes in the threat landscape to protect Canada and Canadians. From our inception at the height of the Cold War to today's era of global cyber-enabled threats, CSIS has had to continuously evolve its operations.

Although foreign interference is not new, the complexity of the modern threat, fuelled by technology, highlights the need for appropriate tools and authorities.

Gaps in the authorities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, which have become more acute with rapid technological change, limit CSIS’s ability to detect, investigate, and respond to, foreign interference in a timely way to protect Canada’s interests.

Bill C-70 proposes a set of focused amendments that will improve CSIS’s operational response to foreign interference with three objectives.

First, the targets of foreign interference extend well beyond the federal government. They include Canada's diverse communities; democratic processes at all levels of government; Canada's rich research system; our private sector, which drives the innovation economy; and the critical infrastructure upon which we rely. Amendments would authorize CSIS to equip national security partners outside the federal government.

We have learned from Canadians—especially other levels of government, businesses, diaspora and minority communities—that they would like more information about the threats they face so they can build resilience against them.

Second, amendments seek to ensure that CSIS can operate successfully in a digital world. CSIS has adapted to and embraced technology through its history, but the pace of technological development today is creating blind spots and vulnerabilities that foreign state adversaries and violent extremists are exploiting every single day.

Finally, amendments would enable CSIS to keep pace with emerging and rapidly evolving threats.

The proposed amendments address five areas of the CSIS Act.

Amendments to current disclosure authorities would authorize information sharing outside the federal government to build resiliency to national security threats.

New judicial authorizations are proposed that are tailored to the requirements of modern digital investigations.

To better leverage data in investigations, amendments are proposed to CSIS's existing data authorities.

A tactical amendment to CSIS's foreign intelligence collection mandate to account for the borderless nature of data would better equip CSIS to collect on the intentions and capabilities of foreign states.

Finally, a review of the CSIS Act by Parliament every five years would ensure that CSIS can continue to adapt to emerging threats and changing technology.

All of the proposed amendments were designed with strong safeguards in mind. We heard the importance of this from Canadians during our consultations.

As well, CSIS remains accountable to the Minister of Public Safety, who can issue specific direction on any aspect of CSIS’s activities.

Certain CSIS activities will also continue to be reviewed and approved by the intelligence commissioner.

All CSIS activities can also be subject to review by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency or the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

By maintaining strong review and oversight, including the vital role of the Federal Court, the legislation would ensure that all CSIS activities to protect Canada and Canadians comply with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

With that, I welcome the opportunity to discuss any aspect of the proposed amendments to the CSIS Act.

Thank you.

[Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère, Associate Assistant Deputy Minister, National and Cyber Security, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

As you know, Canada and allies face numerous geopolitical challenges that threaten to destabilize democratic nations and the global economy. Every day, the strength of Canada’s national security and public safety is being tested. Notably, threats from China, Russia and Iran continue to threaten our national security and social cohesion.

What has captured the attention of many Canadians is the insidious threat of foreign interference. This remains a critical threat to our national security.

Foreign interference encompasses malign activities undertaken by foreign states, or those acting on their behalf, to advance their own strategic goals to the detriment of Canada's national interest and that of our allies.

Foreign interference targets the integrity of our political system, democratic institutions, social cohesion, academic freedom, economy and long-term prosperity.

The threat of foreign interference is not new, but it has increased in recent years as the world becomes more competitive, interconnected and digital.

The Government of Canada is best served when engaging with those directly affected by national security threats on potential solutions. For this reason, we consulted with a diverse group of Canadian stakeholders and partners on potential updates to modernize our counter-foreign interference tool kit in a way that balances various important considerations, such as privacy and charter-protected rights and freedoms.

On May 6, 2024, the Government of Canada introduced an act respecting countering foreign interference, known as Bill C-70, that reflects the valuable input received through consultations with stakeholders across Canada.

The changing global threat landscape and the way in which foreign interference materializes necessitated a modernization of Canada's tool kit for countering foreign interference in all its forms. While others will speak to the various amendments to the CSIS Act, to the Security of Information Act and to the Criminal Code aimed at better detecting and disrupting the strategic threat, I would like to highlight part 4 of the bill for you, the foreign influence transparency and accountability act.

As mentioned, foreign interference takes many forms, but malign foreign influence, a subset of foreign influence, remains particularly difficult to detect and counter. Some governments and their proxies may leverage individuals or entities to undertake non-transparent influence activities that are intended to shape Canadian policy outcomes or public opinion, deliberately obfuscating the foreign ties.

The intent of the foreign influence transparency and accountability act is to promote openness and transparency around ties to foreign states and, in doing so, to deter and to introduce robust consequences for those who seek to exert influence in non-transparent ways.

Foreign influence transparency registries are increasingly considered an international best practice. We've engaged with our closest allies and like-minded partners to learn from their experiences in designing our own registry.

There are three criteria that, when taken together, would trigger the requirement to register under the FITAA.

The first is when an individual or an entity enters into an arrangement with a foreign principal and the individual or the entity acts at the direction of, or in association with, a foreign principal to engage in foreign influence activities.

Second is when that person or entity undertakes any of the following foreign influence activities: communication with a public office holder, communication or dissemination of information to the public, or disbursement of money or things of value.

Third is when activities are undertaken in relation to a political or government process.

I want to be clear that it's not the foreign principals who would be required to register. Instead, those individuals or entities acting at the direction of or in association with those foreign principals would have the registration obligation. There's no registration obligation imposed on anyone who is the subject of this influence activity either.

Before turning to my colleague, I would note that the registry was designed to be country-agnostic, and it's a tool to protect, not persecute, communities of diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds in Canada.

With that, I look forward to your questions.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Ron McKinnon]

I call this meeting to order.

Welcome to meeting number 109 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Pursuant to the order of reference referred to the committee on Wednesday, May 29, 2024, and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, May 27, 2024, the committee commences its study of Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference.

Before we begin, I would like to ask all members and other in-person participants to consult the cards on the table for guidelines to prevent audio feedback incidents.

Please take note of the following preventive measures in place to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters: Use only an approved black earpiece; the former grey earpieces must no longer be used. Keep your earpiece away from all microphones at all times. When you are not using your earpiece, place it face down on the sticker placed on the table for this purpose.

Thank you all for your participation.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders.

I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of members and witnesses. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.

I would now like to welcome our witnesses today.

From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère, associate assistant deputy minister, national and cybersecurity, and Richard Bilodeau, director general.

From the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, we have Sarah Estabrooks, director general, policy and foreign relations, and René Ouellette, director general, academic outreach and stakeholder engagement.

From the Department of Justice, we have Heather Watts, deputy assistant deputy minister; Mark Scrivens, senior counsel; and Karine Bolduc, counsel.

I thank you all for coming here on such short notice.

I now invite Public Safety Canada to make an opening statement of up to five minutes.

Go ahead, please.

Countering Foreign Interference Act

[The Assistant Deputy Speaker (Mrs. Alexandra Mendès), Alexandra Mendes]

It being 6:20 p.m., pursuant to order made earlier today, Bill C-70, Countering Foreign Interference Act is deemed read a second time and referred to a committee.

Accordingly, the bill stands referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

(Motion agreed to, bill read the second time and referred to a committee)

[Peter Julian, NDP, New Westminster—Burnaby, BC]

Madam Speaker, this is the motion:

That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order or usual practice of the House, Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, shall be disposed of as follows:

(a) at the expiry of the time provided for government orders later today, the bill be deemed adopted at second reading and referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security;

(b) during the consideration of the bill by the committee: (1) the committee shall have the first priority for the use of House resources for committee meetings; (2) the committee shall meet for extended hours on Monday, June 3; Tuesday, June 4; Wednesday, June 5; and Thursday, June 6, 2024, to gather evidence from witnesses; (3) the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, the officials from the RCMP and CSIS, the national security adviser to the Prime Minister, the officials from the Department of Public Safety and other expert witnesses deemed relevant by the committee be invited to appear; (4) all amendments be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 9 a.m. on Monday, June 10, 2024; and (5) amendments filed by independent members shall be deemed to have been proposed during the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill.

This was drafted by the member for Wellington—Halton Hills. I hope it will receive unanimous consent.

[Maxime Blanchette-Joncas, Bloc, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Madam Speaker, I commend my colleague from Trois-Rivières for his excellent speech. It is always a pleasure to listen to him. It is like a university lecture condensed into a speech, and we keep coming back for more. It is a nice change from some other speeches that tend to be more vague, with watered-down points.

Canada's national security policy dates back to 2004. This policy does not even include the words “China” and “Russia”. The government wants to counter foreign interference while being manipulated. I think the government is going about it the wrong way, which demonstrates the need to update the national security policy specifically for the purpose of countering foreign interference.

My colleague mentioned the issue of naivety, which clearly no longer applies to this government now that it has introduced Bill C‑70. However, there is the issue of transparency. When it was elected in 2015, the Liberal government promised to be transparent. With the Hogue commission, we are not seeing any transparency from the government of the day.

I would like my colleague from Trois-Rivières to explain the importance and necessity of having a transparent government when it comes to releasing documents to ensure public confidence in democratic institutions in order to counter foreign interference.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Drummond. All those voices were rather distracting.

As I was saying, the Chinese government arrested two Canadian citizens in China and took trade actions against Quebec and Canadian farmers, all to influence Canadian policy and force the government to give in. These dramatic actions, which were taken openly, constitute aggressive diplomacy. However, to be very clear, China also took more discreet measures and those are the types of measures that Bill C‑70 seeks to counter.

Russia is saber rattling to mask its decline. China is in the final stages of its big project to transform an empire into a country. They are both projecting their power and need to weaken international resistance, hence the interference campaigns abroad, including in Canada. We need the necessary antibodies to prepare ourselves and to guard against that.

The second reason, in addition to the international situation, is the national situation. I am going to share a secret: Do not tell anyone, but an election is coming. I do not know when, but it is coming. Sometimes the leader of the NDP does this funny dance before he grovels or goes into bravado mode. His rhetoric suggests that there will be an election any day now. However, that is not the case. The reality is that we do not know for sure, but it could happen at any time. I am just joking around with my NDP friends, of course.

On election day, the politicians keep quiet and the citizens do the talking. For that to happen, in order for citizens to speak freely, they cannot be targeted by pressure or interference. That is what democratic expression is all about. That said, an election is the ideal time for interference. It can be tempting for a foreign actor to try to replace a hawk with a dove, for example. It is therefore essential that we develop tools for countering foreign interference before the election period, and time is running out.

The third reason is the legislative situation. Canada does not currently have the antibodies to fight off the virus of foreign interference. There is no foreign agent registry, for example, and the various laws governing the operation of the intelligence agencies date back 40 years, before the digital age. Some of our members were not even born yet.

Those laws do not make it possible to analyze the huge amount of information that can be gathered today and process it within a useful time frame. Those laws do a poor job of protecting secret operational intelligence. Those laws do not adequately protect people against threats or intimidation by foreign states. The rules of the justice system have not struck a balance that allows for prosecution, a fair trial and the protection of sensitive intelligence. All of this is what Bill C‑70 seeks to correct. That is why we support it in principle.

In practical terms, Bill C‑70 amends four acts. Part 1 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, which governs the organization better known as CSIS. The amendments clarify data collection and analysis, provide for preservation and production orders, and authorize new search and seizure powers. David Vigneault, director of CSIS, has long been calling for the act's modernization. It was enacted in 1984, before the Internet existed, and has not been amended since. Technology has obviously evolved, and such a legislative change is long overdue. According to David Vigneault, too many authorizations are required, including the approval of the Minister of Public Safety, to analyze the data and decide whether to retain, process or archive them.

In fact, here is the government's description of the Kafkaesque current process:

The totality of this process could require up to five separate submissions for review by the Minister, Intelligence Commissioner, and/or the Court, resulting in a delay of up to six to nine months before CSIS can exploit the data, by which time its intelligence value may have diminished significantly. If CSIS cannot evaluate and apply to retain the dataset within the statutory time limit, it is required to destroy all the data.

It could take six to nine months, but information can be sent instantaneously. Something is not right there. I would remind the House that the election period lasts five weeks. A six- to nine-month delay is not very helpful. That is not all. Currently, CSIS cannot share intelligence outside the federal government. Bill C‑70 would allow that, which is very good. Once the bill comes into force, the provinces, municipalities and territories will be able to receive certain information.

Imagine for a moment that Hydro‑Québec is the victim of foreign interference or espionage. CSIS could disclose certain information to Hydro‑Québec to help the publicly owned corporation protect its critical information. The same goes for warrants under the current CSIS legislation, which are not adapted to the digital age and can sometimes paralyze investigations.

All these aspects of Bill C‑70 seem to be good ideas. We will have to look at it carefully in committee, because the devil is in the details.

We know that total security would require total surveillance. I do not think that we want to go that far.

The restrictions and silos that are paralyzing CSIS, and that this government wants to relax, are there for a reason. Much of this stems from the work of the McDonald commission that examined the RCMP's actions during the October crisis in Quebec. Members will recall the events of October 1970. We certainly remember. The federal government had imprisoned hundreds of people in Quebec, including politicians, intellectuals and artists, causing a true national trauma. In order for the federal government to regain Quebeckers' trust, the Mulroney government replaced the War Measures Act with the Emergencies Act, which had much stricter limits. It eliminated the RCMP's intelligence role with the creation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS. In doing so, it created a wall between intelligence and law enforcement, so as to limit abuses. Now these safeguards are preventing us from combatting foreign interference, and we are being asked to relax them. Okay, we understand that.

I repeat, the Bloc Québécois will support Bill C‑70 in principle, but not at the cost of civil liberties. This is an absolutely fundamental issue that demands the utmost vigilance on the part of legislators. We are in favour of passing the bill quickly at second reading, but we would be remiss if we did not conduct a serious study in committee. This must not be rushed through.

I would remind the House that the inefficiencies of the current legislation were designed to protect the people of Quebec from the excesses of the federal government. In light of the current rise in international tensions and the aggressiveness of certain countries, we must not diminish the protection our people enjoy from potential government abuses. Therefore, our work must be guided by a search for balance.

Bill C‑70 also protects certain operational secrets. Again, this is a necessary safeguard against foreign states with hostile intentions. We should not weaken our democracy in the name of protecting it. We saw this happen with the Winnipeg lab incident and, 15 years ago, with the Afghan detainees.

It is very difficult for Parliament to exercise the oversight that it must exercise when it requires access to classified information, not to mention frequent overclassification—as we saw with the Winnipeg lab—which makes sometimes innocuous information secret and hard to obtain. Even the Hogue commission, which was set up to shed light on foreign interference and help counter it, has complained that it did not have access to all the documents it requested because the Prime Minister's Office was reluctant to release them.

Morever, Bill C-70 seeks to better equip the justice system to fight foreign interference, so this bill sets out new offences that cover a broader range of harmful acts. It sets out new procedures that we hope will make it possible to prosecute offences, grant a fair trial and protect intelligence that would be harmful if disclosed.

Again, we are in favour of this in principle. However, these are fundamental issues of justice, and our work must be guided by a quest for balance. I repeat that a lot, because it is very important.

Bill C‑70 will also eliminate the requirement to prove that a criminal act benefited a foreign state or harmed Canada. Simply put, intimidation by a foreign state could become punishable, even if it does not produce the desired result. We are talking about attempts here. That means it will be possible to charge people who intimidate Canadian citizens or their families. People who are originally from totalitarian countries are particularly vulnerable.

Bill C‑70 also provides for consecutive sentences and even life imprisonment for certain offences. I understand the desire to impose harsher sentences, but listen to what the Canadian Civil Liberties Association had to say. It said, and I quote:

The availability of life imprisonment for certain offences introduced under Bill C‑70 is disproportionate and excessive. For example, a person convicted of an indictable offence under the Criminal Code, even as minimal as theft under $5,000, could be sentenced to life in prison if they acted for the benefit of a foreign entity.

I could cite numerous other examples of measures that will need to be closely scrutinized before they are approved or allowed to come into force.

I will end my speech by talking about the foreign agent registry. This registry should have been created a long time ago. The United States created theirs in 1930. Everyone agrees that a registry alone will not prevent foreign interference, but it is an essential tool to have in our tool box. The director of CSIS has said that a registry would be very useful. The European Union is currently working on a transparency register, and there are registries in other countries too. With a registry, it is easier to demonstrate that someone is working on behalf of a foreign state than to prove that the state interfered. Refusal to join the registry would become an offence in itself and it would be easier to punish than the crime of interference.

I am therefore pleased that the government is moving forward with the registry. It will improve the identification of people trying to influence public policy and of persons acting on behalf of a foreign state. I have spent a lot of time studying this topic. In fact, I drafted a bill to create this registry and I was about to introduce it before Bill C‑70 was tabled. However, the registry put forward in Bill C‑70 has gaps that I would like to try to fill in committee.

For example, although foreign agents are required to register, public office holders are not required to declare their interactions with foreign agents. The two-party registration of foreign agents and public office holders would allow for more thorough checks and enhance the registry's effectiveness. Furthermore, foreign agents have to report their contact with certain categories of people, but the list is too narrow to protect things like government-funded research activities, for example. In short, at committee stage, I intend to propose an expansion of the registry's scope to improve its effectiveness.

As a final point, I would like to take a closer look at the very concept of interference. Let us imagine, for example, that a foreign state sent a bunch of people to fill the room during a nomination to influence the choice of candidate. The foreign state would not have intervened directly with the government to influence public policy, but it would have obviously intervened in public political life. Would that situation be covered by the registry? I doubt it.

Another example is the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg. The Chinese agents working there had no desire to influence public policy. Rather, they wanted to monopolize the fruits of research paid for by Canadian taxpayers. Does Bill C-70 protect us from that? I doubt it.

I will conclude with a bit of a broader reflection. Protecting our constituents against interference is a profoundly democratic act. People have the right to control their political life and their social, economic and cultural development. This expression of democracy, which must be exercised freely, without undue pressure or interference, is fundamental to peoples' right to decide for themselves and assert their inalienable right to self-determination.

In committee, we will have disagreements on this or that clause of Bill C‑70, but I think that all the members of the House are united on the need to protect the inalienable right of the Canadian people to control their development without foreign interference. Under Bill C‑70, foreign states will be required to respect that right and stop interfering.

As long as we are requiring respect from others, we need to be honest about being respectful ourselves. Twenty-nine years ago, my people, the people of Quebec, were called to democratically exercise their own right to self-determination in a referendum on independence. What happened? Canada, the federal government, spent more on its campaign than the Yes and No camps combined in Quebec. That is serious interference. I am pleased to see that everyone in the House is, I note, unanimous in agreeing that interference in a people's choice is not good. We are making progress. We are getting somewhere.

I hope that the desire to protect Canadian democracy from foreign interference will engender the same respect for Quebec's democracy, because my people also need to be able to experience their democracy without interference.

The House resumed consideration of the motion that Bill C‑70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Madam Speaker, in small doses, candour can have a certain charm. It says that someone does not mean any harm. However, naivety is always a flaw because it stems from lack of judgment.

When it comes to foreign interference, the government has been very naive in recent years. This naivety is coupled with the government's standing flaw: pride. Pride prevents it from quickly admitting to and correcting its mistakes, and going so far as to hide what should be disclosed, even at the expense of the common good.

I am also pleased that Bill C‑70 represents a change in direction. I will say right off the bat that the Bloc Québécois supports the principle of Bill C‑70, countering foreign interference act. With this bill, the government is telling us, or trying to tell us, that it has finally shaken its naivety. That is a good start.

As always at the federal level, there is concern that efficiency is not the government's priority. These are things that can and should be corrected in committee and will not change the principle of the bill. As I was saying, the Bloc Québécois will vote in favour of Bill C‑70 at second reading. We hope it will be sent to committee quickly. Once we get to committee, we will have to be vigilant and careful, because this bill deals with fundamental issues

In fact, there are three main reasons for moving this update of Canadian laws along. The first reason is the international situation. These are tense times. There is a new cold war—not entirely cold, but more complex, with more players. Russia and China are more aggressive. Influence campaigns, lobbying and disinformation campaigns are on the rise.

We saw this five years ago with the case of the two Michaels. In December 2018, at Washington's request, Canada arrested Meng Wanzhou, the CFO of telecoms giant Huawei. Rather than go after the Americans, China preferred to go after its defenceless little brother, Canada. In retaliation, the Chinese government arrested two Canadian citizens in China and took trade measures against Canadian and Quebec farmers—

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak to Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference. My colleague, the member for Wellington—Halton Hills, has done a good job outlining some of the key measures provided for in the bill, which I will not repeat. Needless to say, on the whole, the measures and safeguards provided in the bill, including establishing new foreign interference-specific offences, as well as a foreign influence registry, are welcomed and, frankly, long overdue.

It is on that basis that Conservatives are committed to seeing the bill move through the legislative process expeditiously. It is disappointing to see that, in our efforts to do this, we were blocked by the NDP members, who seem to want to hold up the legislation. It is imperative that the bill move forward as quickly as possible; officials have indicated that it may take up to one year to fully implement the bill upon it receiving royal assent. We need to have these measures. We need to have these safeguards in place for the next election. Time is of the essence.

While the bill is welcomed, I must ask why it has taken the government so long to introduce legislation to counter foreign interference. For years, the Prime Minister has been warned by CSIS and other agencies about the threat of foreign interference. The fact is that foreign interference is on the rise; it threatens our sovereignty, our democracy, and the safety and security of Canadians, particularly those in diaspora communities.

The Prime Minister has repeatedly and very specifically been briefed about the most significant foreign interference state threat, namely, the Beijing-based Communist regime. As far back as 2017, the Prime Minister's national security and intelligence adviser briefed the Prime Minister that agents of Beijing were assisting Canadian candidates running for political offices. That was eight years ago; it has taken the government eight long years to finally come around to introducing legislation to counter that type of foreign interference.

In the 2019 election, four top Liberals who were closely connected to the Prime Minister received a classified CSIS briefing, warning them that one of the Liberal candidates, now the member for Don Valley North, was assisted by Beijing in winning the Liberal nomination in Don Valley North. One of the top Liberals who was briefed, who had the requisite security clearance, informed the Prime Minister of the contents of that brief immediately, which was quite appropriate.

What did the Prime Minister do with that information? Let us think about it.

The Prime Minister is informed that there is CSIS intelligence that one of his candidates was being assisted by Beijing, presumably because Beijing viewed that individual as someone who would best advance Beijing's interests in Ottawa. Did the Prime Minister seek to inquire with CSIS to learn more about the situation and what intelligence it had? Did he ask any questions? No, the Prime Minister turned a blind eye, allowing that individual to stand as a candidate and to be elected to the House of Commons.

In her first report, Madam Justice Hogue concluded that there was no evidence that the Prime Minister asked any questions or provided for any follow-up. Even worse than that is the conclusion that Madam Justice Hogue drew, which is that the Prime Minister decided against disallowing that candidate on the basis of direct electoral consequences.

In other words, the Prime Minister put his political interests and the interests of the Liberal Party ahead of countering Beijing's interference in our elections and in our democracy. I would submit that this is a damning indictment of the Prime Minister by Madam Justice Hogue.

However, there is more. Following the 2019 election, the Prime Minister was repeatedly told by CSIS that Beijing interfered in the 2019 and 2021 elections. What did the Prime Minister do upon being briefed? Once again, the Prime Minister turned a blind eye, doing nothing. Worse than that, the Prime Minister sought to hide Beijing's interference, to cover it up. In contrast to the very advice that he had received from CSIS, that the policy of the Government of Canada to counter foreign interference ought to be based on sunlight and transparency and that the government should make foreign interference activities known to the public, the Prime Minister's policy was one of cover-up.

The degree of interference in the 2019 and 2021 elections ought not be minimized, but the Prime Minister has repeatedly attempted to do so. Members need not take my word for it. They can take the words of Madam Justice Hogue in her first report from the foreign interference inquiry. She concluded unequivocally that there was interference in the last two federal elections and that such interference was serious insofar as it “diminished the ability of some voters to cast an informed vote”. Although foreign interference did not change the overall result of the election, Madam Justice Hogue noted that it may have impacted the results in certain ridings and that this interference had a negative impact on the “broader electoral ecosystem”.

Those are very concerning findings. The fact is that the Prime Minister had been repeatedly briefed before the 2019 election, after the 2019 election and after the 2021 election but took no action and downplayed Beijing's interference after it was revealed, thanks to reports from The Globe and Mail and Global News. This demonstrates that the Prime Minister bears some level of responsibility for Beijing's attack on our democracy in the last two federal elections.

That brings us back to the timing of the proposed bill: Why have the Liberals finally seen fit to introduce legislation to counter foreign interference now? There is only one reason. It is that the Prime Minister got caught turning a blind eye to Beijing's interference and attempting to cover it up. Had he not been caught, the legislation would never have seen the light of day. This is demonstrated by the fact that the bill was introduced on the first sitting day following the issuance of Madam Justice Hogue's report. The Liberals knew that the report was going to be incredibly damaging to the government, which it most certainly was, and this was their way of providing political cover for themselves.

Therefore, while the bill is welcome, the government deserves absolutely no credit for having been dragged, kicking and screaming, to introduce it after the Prime Minister turned a blind eye to Beijing's interference in our elections. Under the Prime Minister's watch, foreign interference has increased, and it is part of the sad record of a failed Prime Minister.

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Mr. Speaker, my father came here in 1952 from Hong Kong as a Chinese immigrant, several years after the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed. However, even though that legislation had been repealed, the sentiments that underpinned it still remained in Canada.

We have to be acutely sensitive to diaspora communities. I note that this bill is agnostic when it comes to foreign states and foreign governments. It would require all persons to register, regardless of the foreign entity or foreign principle they are acting on behalf of, in association with or at the direction of. It is a fair bill that would ensure there is greater sunlight and transparency, which also makes it an important tool to ensure that diaspora communities are not unfairly targeted. When information is made public, bad actors are made known and everyone else is understood to be innocent.

Mr. Speaker, I believe if you seek it, you will find unanimous consent for the following motion, which would see the bill voted on at third reading by Wednesday, June 12, at end of day.

That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order or usual practice of the House, Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, shall be disposed of as follows:

(a) at the expiry of the time provided for government orders later today, the bill would be deemed adopted at second reading and referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security;

(b) during the consideration of the bill by the committee: (1) the committee shall have the first priority for the use of House resources for committee meetings; (2) the committee shall meet for extended hours on Monday, June 3; Tuesday, June 4; Wednesday, June 5; and Thursday, June 6, to gather evidence from witnesses; (3) the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, the officials from the RCMP and CSIS, the national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister, the officials from the Department of Public Safety and other expert witnesses deemed relevant by the committee be invited to appear; (4) all amendments be submitted to the clerk of the committee by 9 a.m. on Monday, June 10; (5) amendments filed by independent members shall be deemed to have been proposed during the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill; (6) the committee shall meet at 3.30 p.m. on Monday, June 10—

[Michael Chong, Conservative, Wellington—Halton Hills, ON]

Mr. Speaker, Canadians expect their institutions to protect them from the malign threat activities of authoritarian states. Canadians expect the whole of the Government of Canada, including its intelligence agencies and law enforcement, to protect our elections and democratic institutions from the coercive, clandestine and corrupt foreign interference threat activities of authoritarian states. That is what Canadians expect, and that is why Canadians were so shocked when the extent of foreign interference in our democracy was revealed to Parliament and to the public.

Justice Hogue, who was leading the foreign interference public inquiry, concluded in the inquiry's initial report that “interference occurred in the last two general elections” and became so serious that it “diminished the ability of some voters to cast an informed vote”. She also concluded that foreign interference had a negative impact on the broader electoral ecosystem in the 2019 and 2021 elections, and that it undermined public confidence in Canadian democracy.

The government was slow to act on the advice from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and other national security bodies, who had identified these threatening activities years ago, before the two general elections that followed.

The Prime Minister was first warned in 2018 by the director of CSIS of the existential threat from foreign interference threat activities of the People's Republic of China here in Canada. National security agencies advised the government to introduce a range of measures to counter these threats, including legislation. It took years for the government to introduce Bill C-70, an act respecting countering foreign interference, but finally it has been introduced. Let me outline our views on this bill.

The bill is divided into four parts. Part 1 proposes amendments to the CSIS Act. These amendments are the most significant changes to the act in decades. As my hon. colleague, the minister, pointed out, the CSIS Act was introduced in 1984, just after disco but before the introduction of the Internet, social media, smart phones and many other technologies. The amendments would allow CSIS to obtain preservation and production orders as well as warrants to obtain information, records or documents through a single attempt. They would allow CSIS to better collect, retain and analyze data for intelligence purposes. They would allow CSIS to collect foreign intelligence for the first time and would allow CSIS to disclose classified information outside of the government, to provinces, municipalities, universities and companies.

Part 2 would amend the Security of Information Act and the Criminal Code to create new foreign interference offences. The bill would create a new offence of up to life in prison for a person who commits any indictable offence under the Criminal Code or under any other act of Parliament at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity. The bill would also create new offences for a person who engages in clandestine activities at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity that is prejudicial to the safety or interests of Canada or to influence the exercise of a democratic right in Canada.

The bill facilitates foreign interference proceedings by eliminating the need for the Crown to demonstrate that the purpose of the foreign interference is to harm Canadian interests if the person who committed the offence or the victim has a link to Canada.

Finally, part 2 would amend the Criminal Code to broaden the offence of sabotage to include sabotage against essential infrastructure, which is defined as transportation, information and communication technology, water and waste water, energy and utilities, health care, food supply, government operations and financial infrastructure. Sabotage is defined as anyone who “interferes with access to essential infrastructure” or anyone who “causes an essential infrastructure to be lost, inoperable, unsafe or unfit for use” with the intent to “endanger the safety, security or defence of Canada” or the armed forces of an ally in Canada, or to cause “serious risk to the health or safety of the public”. As the minister pointed out earlier, the minister's view is that essential infrastructure includes the construction of essential infrastructure.

The sabotage offence provided for in the bill is punishable by up to 10 years in prison, and for greater certainty, part 2 makes it clear that it exempts legal advocacy, protest or dissent that does not intend to cause harm.

Part 3 would amend the Canada Evidence Act and would make consequential amendments to other acts to create a general scheme to deal with information related to foreign affairs, national defence or national security in Federal Court proceedings. It proposes amendments that would permit the appointment of a special counsel to protect the interests of non-governmental parties in those proceedings.

The fourth and final part of the bill would establish the foreign influence transparency and accountability act, which creates a foreign influence registry and a new foreign influence transparency commissioner. Any person under the direction of or in association with a foreign state or foreign government, or any entity controlled by that state or government, and who communicates with a public office holder, who communicates or disseminates information to the public about political or governmental processes, or who distributes money or items of value, or provides a service or the use of a facility, must register.

The bill would create an indictable offence of up to five years in prison and up to $5 million in administrative monetary penalties for failing to register, for providing false or misleading information to the commissioner or for obstructing the commissioner's work. These are tough penalties for failing to register, and they will have a deterring effect on those thinking about acting on behalf of a foreign state or a foreign-controlled entity in a corrupt, coercive and clandestine manner.

For those who do act in such a manner and, as I expect, do not register, tools are available to law enforcement and other enforcement entities, such as the commissioner, to hold these individuals accountable for their activities, either through the new administrative monetary penalties of up to $5 million, which have a much lower threshold for use, or through a referral to the appropriate police of jurisdiction for criminal prosecution.

The new foreign influence transparency commissioner would oversee a public registry containing information on individuals engaged in influence activities on behalf of a foreign principal. The act provides that the commissioner is to provide reports to the public safety minister and Parliament. The commissioner is appointed by Governor in Council, effectively by the Prime Minister, after consultations with the leaders of the House of Commons and Senate. However, ultimately the decision to appoint the commissioner is a decision of the Prime Minister's alone.

In principle, we support Bill C-70. Now that it has finally been introduced, the government, the official opposition and other recognized parties in this House must work together to ensure that our democratic institutions and elections are protected from the threats of authoritarian states. Inaction and delay cannot continue. As Justice Hogue noted, the risk from the impacts of foreign interference will only increase as long as “sufficient protective measures to guard against it” are not taken.

As our general election draws closer and as the life of this Parliament draws to an end, time is running out to strengthen the confidence Canadians have in our elections through legislation.

That is why the Conservatives are proposing to work with the government and the other parties in the House to fast-track the adoption of Bill C‑70 in the House of Commons and in committee, leaving enough time to implement foreign interference protection measures before the election.

Conservatives will work in good faith to ensure the rapid progress of Bill C-70 through the House while ensuring sufficient scrutiny of its provisions. We are willing to consider amendments to the bill, but we want it to pass.

The government has often asked the official opposition to work with it, and this is an instance in which we will.

[Martin Champoux, Bloc, Drummond, QC]

Mr. Speaker, the Bloc Québécois is in favour of sending Bill C‑70 to committee.

I heard the minister talk in his speech about the broad consultations with Canadians on this issue and his intention to work in a very inclusive manner with the opposition parties in the House. My colleague from Trois-Rivières introduced a similar bill to protect Quebec and Canada from foreign interference. There are two things that I feel are particularly important and should be included in Bill C‑70.

One of them is that public office holders should not be allowed to work for a foreign government after they leave office, especially if their new job is to influence decision-makers on site. I wonder why that is not in the current bill.

The other thing we feel is very important and would be very interesting to debate in committee is two-party registration. Foreign agents must disclose their contact with public office holders in Canada. Should Canadian public office holders not also have to disclose their contact and relationships with foreign agents in the course of their duties?

I would like to hear the minister's opinion as to whether there are any amendments he would be open to supporting if the bill goes to committee.

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

moved that Bill C‑70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, be read the second time and referred to a committee.

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to have the opportunity to rise in the House today to speak to Bill C‑70, which will enable the government to take other measures against the growing threat of foreign interference.

The countering foreign interference act will strengthen the government's ability to detect and disrupt foreign interference and to better protect all Canadians against the threats posed by hostile states. As an open and free democracy, Canada has long been the target of hostile states that are seeking to obtain Canadian intelligence to defend or advance their own interests. Foreign interference is a deliberate attempt to undermine the fundamental values and freedoms that we cherish as Canadians and that are at the very core of our free and open society. By so doing, hostile states seek to promote their national interests to the detriment of our own.

Today, foreign interference poses one of the most important threats to our Canadian way of life, our economic prosperity, our national security and our sovereignty. As stated by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, “foreign interference threatens the fundamental values of our country” and our national security.

Over the years, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service has observed and investigated multiple instances of foreign states targeting Canada and Canadian interests. We know that foreign states target our country using any means possible. This includes, of course, human intelligence operations, state-sponsored or foreign-influenced media and sophisticated cyber-attacks to name just a few. These hostile actors also engage in other activities, such as spreading misinformation and disinformation to undermine public confidence in public institutions, in mainstream media or in electoral processes. How do they accomplish this? They do so by cultivating witting or, in some cases, unwitting individuals to assist them. This not only helps to achieve their aims, but also enables foreign states to operate with plausible deniability on Canadian soil.

We have also heard this recently at the public hearings of the Hogue commission, the Foreign Interference Commission, which was set up with the support of all recognized parties in the House. We heard from witnesses that some foreign state actors monitor, intimidate and harass diaspora communities in Canada. They attempt to silence dissidents and to promote narratives that are favourable to their own autocratic regimes. Members from diaspora communities testified that either they have directly experienced, or they know others who have experienced, the effects of foreign interference. This includes threats to them or to their families back home.

While traditional interference in human intelligence operations remains the greatest danger to Canada, interference through hostile cyber activities is of growing concern.

Thanks to the work of the security and intelligence community, we know that an increasing number of states have built and deployed programs dedicated to online influence as part of their day-to-day operations. For example, the 2022 CSIS public report indicates that foreign states “exploit social media to influence their intended targets. For example, state actors leverage it as a means to spread disinformation, divide public opinion and generally interfere in healthy public debate and [public] discourse.”

Some foreign states are using these malicious activities to try and delegitimize the concept of democracy and other values that may run counter to their own ideological views.

These are fundamental values that we hold dear as Canadians and, of course, as parliamentarians.

Through their various attempts to influence Canadian elections and opinions, these hostile states seek to bias our policy development and our decision-making. In so doing, they also seek to divide Canadians and to sow discord in Canadian society. As parliamentarians, we all know that we are vulnerable to these very attempts as well.

As we have heard during many debates in the House on this topic, foreign interference is a non-partisan issue that is of deep concern to all parliamentarians. Indeed, foreign interference is a cross-cutting issue for all members of the House, not simply as parliamentarians, but as Canadians, and I want to thank the many colleagues in the House who have worked with me and who have talked to me about how we can collaborate, not only on this legislation, I hope, but on other issues as well that would strengthen our democracy and the ability of our security and intelligence agencies to protect Canadians.

These activities threaten the integrity of our political systems, democratic processes and social cohesion. While the threat of foreign interference is not new, these activities have increased in recent years, and as we know, all too well, they continue to grow. The former national security and intelligence adviser to the Prime Minister, Jody Thomas, said, “We cannot paint an overly optimistic picture. Things change. Tools and methods change. Our adversaries adapt quickly and find innovative ways to interfere in our affairs”.

With a quickly changing landscape, we must ensure that Canada is in a position to keep up with those who wish us harm, and we must ensure that we can hold accountable those individuals who threaten Canada, our national security or Canadian sovereignty.

All the examples I have given today show that this is a matter of the utmost urgency.

For all these reasons, I am pleased to rise to speak to Bill C‑70, an act respecting countering foreign interference for the first time. This new legislation will enable us to further strengthen Canada's tool kit against foreign interference. Combatting this threat while defending Canada's interests, values and principles is a top priority for our government and, I believe, for all parliamentarians. Transparency is a top priority in our government's approach to combatting foreign interference.

To further increase transparency, this legislation would create a foreign influence transparency registry. Through this registry, all individuals or entities who enter into an arrangement with a foreign principle and who undertake activities to influence a government or political process in Canada would be required to publicly register these activities. By registering, individuals and entities would be more transparent about their connections to foreign states, and this would obviously support Canada's national security objectives.

The goal of a foreign registry would be to promote transparency from all people who advocate on behalf of a foreign government or entity as well as accountability from those who would seek to do so in a non-transparent or clandestine way. Under Bill C-70, the government proposes to have Canada's registry overseen by an independent foreign influence transparency commissioner. This commissioner would be responsible for independently administering and promoting compliance with the act.

Foreign interference is a complex national security threat that requires a multi-faceted response.

We recognize that the registry is just one more tool to help Canada adopt an approach to combat this interference. A foreign influence registry would build on our government's long-standing and ongoing efforts to protect our democratic institutions from this threat.

CSIS continues to investigate threats and to advise the government on appropriate actions. Many members here today have benefited from briefings from CSIS officials, which continue to be held with different caucuses, both in this place and in the Senate. These briefings are delivered to all parties at the federal level, and we are working with provincial and municipal orders of government to ensure that the best practices and defensive postures can also be adopted by these legislators as well. The RCMP continues to play an important and effective role in investigating criminal offences related to foreign interference, including those targeting democratic institutions.

To equip CSIS to combat emerging global threats and to keep pace with technological developments, further investments in intelligence capabilities and infrastructure are also being made. Budget 2024 proposes to provide $655 million over eight years, and $114 million ongoing, to CSIS to enhance its intelligence capabilities. The previous year's budget, budget 2023, also provided almost $50 million to the RCMP to protect Canadians from harassment and intimidation by foreign actors, to increase its investigative capacity and to co-operate more proactively with communities that are obviously at the risk of being targeted.

I have a lot of confidence in the work that the RCMP and CSIS do with their partners across the country, but I think we can all do more to continue to support these brave women and men who serve our country in this important way. We have also made investments of $5.5 million to build capacity in civil society partners to prevent disinformation, to promote democratic resilience and to raise awareness about foreign interference.

Bill C-70 is the result of consultations with Canadians. Obviously, that includes community organizations, diaspora communities, academics, the private sector, indigenous governments and provincial and territorial stakeholders.

One of the key themes emerging from these consultations was that a registry is no panacea. It has to combine other initiatives that strengthen Canada's response to foreign interference.

For example, targeted amendments to the CSIS Act would better equip the Government of Canada to build resilience and to counter modern threats that Canada and Canadians face. The CSIS Act was enacted in 1984 at a time when the prolific use and the expansion of technology may have meant someone had two fax machines: one for incoming faxes and one to send faxes. Today, digital technologies are part of every aspect of our lives and the critical infrastructure of our country. CSIS must be able to operate in a digital world that is constantly and rapidly changing.

This legislation would also increase CSIS's ability to be more agile and effective in investigations by introducing tailored warrants for specific investigative techniques. It would also enhance CSIS's capacity to collect and to use datasets. Among other changes, it would enable a broader disclosure of CSIS information to key partners outside the Government of Canada. With the appropriate safeguards, this information would help our partners, provincial governments, universities and the private sector to build resilience to emerging national security threats.

It is important to underscore that these legislative amendments would continue to respect Canadians' fundamental rights and freedoms, with strong review, oversight and transparency measures still in place and unchanged. Judicial oversight remains unchanged, including for all new authorities that we are asking Parliament to consider. These proposals have been developed while also considering the high expectation of privacy that the people of Canada properly have, including respecting all of their protections under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency and the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians also play an important role in the activities of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Some activities, like dataset collection and retention, are subject to review and approval by the intelligence commissioner as well.

While Canada may be no stranger to foreign interference, Canadians can rest assured that our government is using every tool at its disposal at every opportunity to protect them.

The government remains committed to enhancing a whole-of-society resilience against malicious foreign interference and hostile foreign state actors. We will do so through continued transparency and by upholding the confidence of Canadians in our democratic institutions.

This is, I hope, a moment when the House and our colleagues in the other place can come together to work in a non-partisan, constructive way to reinforce the legislative instruments that the national security agency should have to properly protect the national security of Canadians and to detect, disrupt and defeat attempts at foreign interference.

We think that the legislation would benefit from, obviously, the study in a committee of the House and in the other place. I have said to colleagues on both sides of the aisle here who have talked to me that we would work collaboratively with colleagues in terms of amendments that might strengthen the legislation. Canadians, I think, are expecting us to act in the national interest. It is certainly our intention to work in an collaborative way with all parties in the House and our colleagues in the other place to see whether we can take a significant step forward in terms of modernizing the legislative tool kit to counter foreign interference.

We are moving forward with clear hindsight and a clear-eyed view of the road ahead. I look forward to the debate in the House and the discussion in committee. I look forward to working, obviously, with all those who are interested, in a constructive and positive way, so that we can reinforce national security institutions.

I will conclude by saying that it has been, for me, as the public safety minister, an extraordinary privilege to see the remarkable work done by the women and men who currently serve in CSIS, who work for the RCMP, who work at the public safety department and who work at the border services agency. These are agencies that are focused on national security and the security of Canadians.

They are doing very effective work to detect and disrupt foreign interference. They have worked with our government and will be happy to work with parliamentarians, of course, if there are ways that we can modernize and strengthen the legislative instruments that govern their important work. I think that today's discussion is an important start of that process.

Justice

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we are listening constantly to communities that are being affected by extortion, particularly South Asians in the B.C. region and in the GTA. What we hear from them is that they need supports. We are providing those supports through aggressive responses under the Criminal Code. Extortion is against the law. Extortion with a weapon attracts a very significant penalty under Canadian criminal law.

What we also understand from them is that organized criminality, including foreign interference and organized crime, is behind these extortion attempts. That is why bills like Bill C-70 will make an important difference. So will the budget measures on money laundering and cracking down on organized crime.

[Parm Bains, Liberal, Steveston—Richmond East, BC]

Thank you.

As I stated, I'm raising a question of privilege with regard to statements made last week in committee. I want to respond to some of the accusations that have been made in the committee. I'd like for the committee to decide if it should go to the Speaker of the House.

Page 57 of the third edition of House of Commons Procedure and Practice describes parliamentary privilege as follows:

the rights and immunities that are deemed necessary for the House of Commons, as an institution, and its members, as representatives of the electorate, to fulfill their functions.

Page 88 outlines that:

Members individually have the responsibility to not abuse their rights and immunities, particularly freedom of speech.

On page 112, a quote from Speaker Fraser in 1987 says:

The privileges of a Member are violated by any action which might impede him or her in the fulfilment of his or her duties and functions. It is obvious that the unjust damaging of a reputation could constitute such an impediment.

Furthermore, Mr. Chair, on page 619 it states:

Remarks which question a Member's integrity, honesty or character are not in order. A Member will be requested to withdraw offensive remarks, allegations, or accusations of impropriety directed towards another Member.

During our last meeting, Mr. Brock made false claims and allegations of collusion towards me in an effort to intimidate and bully me and to impede my work as a member of Parliament. This raises a prima facie case of intimidation and threat to my reputation.

In 2021 I was approached by members of the community and encouraged to run for office. I'm very honoured to be representing the people of Steveston—Richmond East. I stood for office to speak to my values and my vision for Canada. I was elected by the community where I've lived my entire life, because they know me and they trust me. They know I can represent them here in Canada's Parliament. I ran to help build a better Richmond, a better B.C. and a better Canada for present and future generations, with things like building trade links, greening the economy and improving government efficiency.

That was one of the key reasons I chose—I think I was one of two people who chose—to sit on the mighty OGGO committee. I know other members sit on the committee with me. It was to improve the management of taxpayer dollars. I was motivated at the time to do a spending review and apply it to how taxpayer funds are used by departments, but also here on Parliament Hill, to find savings without impacting services on programs by closing loopholes.

I say that sincerely, Mr. Chair. This was the spirit behind the motion that I tried to raise at the last committee meeting. I gave notice on Friday, May 17 of a motion to study a clear abuse of taxpayer dollars, in this case committed by dozens of members of the Conservative caucus, including the members opposite.

However, last week Mr. Brock filibustered his own motion and abused his parliamentary privilege to issue a flurry of allegations against me, intended to intimidate, impede and commit character assassination rather than accept the slightest measure of accountability for his personal and unethical actions, and to avoid voting on an issue that would place him and others in a clear conflict of interest.

Having known about Mr. Chiu's claims for three years, the member opposite had plenty of opportunities to bring this motion forward. Only when I, in the course of carrying out my work as an MP, attempted to shed light on a spending loophole and a potential unethical abuse of taxpayer dollars did he come forward with these accusations.

Mr. Chair, I think you can also attest to my participation in this committee. I try to work with everyone. I try to be non-partisan as much as possible. I work honestly and try to get to the heart of the matter in all the issues that we raise in this important committee.

The timing of their motion confirms that it has been made in bad faith, motivated purely by partisanship and malicious intent.

Mr. Brock's accusations.... The attacks were not aimed just at me but also at Justice Hogue and her findings. When he repeats the falsehood that “They”—the CCP—“got the outcome they wanted: They got the Liberal government in power again,” these statements couldn't clash more with Justice Hogue's findings.

The report indicated clearly that Canada's electoral system “remains...sound”. The evidence shows that foreign interference did not impact the integrity of Canada's electoral system in 2019 and 2021. Justice Hogue also said that none of “the evidence [she's] heard to date” suggests that officials acted in “bad faith”, yet this is what Mr. Brock accused me of.

These findings hold with what Mr. Chiu said at the committee last year. He made no accusations of my being involved. He only went so far as to allege that I benefited from the supposed interference, and now he himself is also changing the story. He actually went on the radio during his many interviews after losing, especially on CKNW, and said that he knows about the work I've done in the community and that he knows me to be a good man.

Ironically, while at committee, my former opponent engaged in the very conduct that he and Mr. Brock indict me and accuse me of: impropriety in doing nothing to counter, and even purposely spreading, CCP misinformation and disinformation. Specifically, Mr. Chiu now claims, as part of his evidence, that I labelled his bill and his leader as racist and that I was spreading CCP misinformation. It's an attempt to damage my reputation and, quite frankly, to try to bully me.

This is a lie. I never spoke about Mr. Chiu during the election. I didn't have to. I spoke about myself. I was raised in Richmond. I'm a local guy, a local community guy. I don't work against people; I work around them. I only talked about myself and what I could do.

On the matter of the registry, I said that I couldn't support something that is viewed to be discriminatory, and this was during a wave of anti-Asian hate. You all recall that this was a post-COVID time when anti-Asian hate was on the rise. In the city of Richmond specifically, there was a case in which a hot coffee was spilled, and it was well known, documented across Canada or covered across Canada. A hot coffee was spilled on an elderly Chinese lady. That case went to court, and it was proved to be a hate crime. This was happening at the same time. Having been through.... At the same time, many members of the community came to me and said that no one ever stands with them, including Mr. Chiu. I never mentioned his name, but they told me that Mr. Chiu and other leaders in the community don't stand with them and don't help them.

Having been through the report, and assuming that Justice Hogue examined the 2021 Steveston—Richmond East election in some detail, I know of no such conclusions made by Justice Hogue that match the ones made in the sensationalist and fundamentally false statements made by Mr. Brock in the committee last week.

After three years of Mr. Chiu making his claims, including numerous appearances at committees on the inquiry, where he reluctantly admitted to not collecting or retaining any of the supposed evidence from the election—he also said that CSIS never got back to him and that the RCMP never got back to him—as well as over 10 months of investigations by Johnston and Hogue, nothing in the way of serious evidence has emerged.

This is why the statements in the report referring to Steveston—Richmond East are qualified with “could” and “possibly”. While I may not be a lawyer, I can be certain that if the member opposite—we know he's a very experienced litigator; he's told us many times—walked into the chambers and told the judge that they needed to convict somebody based on “could” and “maybe” and “possibly”, I think he knows that the result would be that he'd be sent out very quickly.

The fact is that serious claims require serious evidence, and neither Mr. Chiu nor Mr. Brock has been able to provide even ordinary evidence to support their very serious claims.

This case is not without precedent, as evidenced by a decision of Speaker Milliken in November 2010. In response to a point of order raised by the member for Scarborough—Rouge River about a negative attack delivered by the member for Brant against the member for Ajax—Pickering, the Speaker found that this violated parliamentary procedure and previous rulings of the Speaker.

Speaker Milliken concluded that:

For all of these reasons, after careful review of the Statement of the member for Brant, the Chair finds that it constituted a personal attack on the member for Ajax—Pickering and that it was an inappropriate use of a statement made pursuant to Standing Order 31. Therefore, I call upon the member for Brant to withdraw his comments.

It's clear, Mr. Chair, that personal attacks against members are out of order and should not be allowed to proceed. However, if Mr. Brock is looking for evidence of intimidation and disregard of the Chinese community, he needs to look no further than the previous government. I think I've made these comments before as well. Conservative prime minister Stephen Harper approved CCP police officers coming onto Canadian soil and allowed them to police their community here, ultimately through intimidation, and repatriate Chinese Canadians back to their home country, striking fear into the heart of the community. This happened. The Conservatives did this to curry favour with the dictatorship in Beijing at the time, which they now claim to oppose.

I do believe the registry has merit. I'll make some comments on that.

We heard from Mr. Stanton, a former CSIS executive manager, that they are also limited, as they cannot target the proxies. I proactively reached out to CSIS after the election, and I said, “Hey, I need your help. I want to know a bit more about these issues that have been coming up.” They also said that the registry doesn't have teeth and doesn't address the issue of the proxy.

Instead, Mr. Stanton recommended that Parliament focus more on the Security of Information Act as the best way to tackle foreign interference, and this has been a focus of mine during my time as an MP. I also collaborated with MP Dhaliwal on drafting motion M-112 to combat foreign intimidation against diaspora communities, which recently passed unanimously in the House of Commons.

Rather than simply imposing a reactionary tool to address foreign interference and expecting it to fix the problem, Bill C-70 has also been put forward to modernize Canada's security establishment, and I'll be speaking on that as well. It will more actively pursue foreign actors bent on causing harm to Canadians.

We're dealing with misinformation and disinformation. It's information, and the focus should be on the security of information. My former opponent also claimed I was spreading misinformation and misleading voters by saying that the Conservative Party would eliminate the assault rifle ban if elected, but this was not misinformation; this was actually part of the CPC platform.

At the same time, Mr. Chiu was actively spreading misinformation by disseminating actual flyers. I never spoke about Mr. Chiu, as I mentioned earlier, throughout the whole campaign. I never said his name once, and I didn't talk about him; I didn't have to. He actually handed out flyers saying I was going to legalize hard drugs in Richmond. This was not part of the 2021 Liberal Party platform, nor is it the law of the land today.

Rather, Mr. Brock and the CPC have been sitting on their hands while claims of foreign interference run rife in the Conservative Party. I think I've raised some of these issues before as well. Mr. Brock frequently made reference to former leader Erin O'Toole's claims that up to eight ridings were affected by foreign interference in the 2021 election, but Mr. Brock doesn't seem to think Mr. O'Toole's recent claims of interference by the government in China contributed to his being ousted as the leader of the Conservative Party. Mr. O'Toole even suggests that a CPC member and former member of the CPC's national council, Bert Chen, who was suspended from the party's national council after launching the petition to recall O'Toole as leader, was involved.

It gets worse: More than 100 Iranian Canadians sent a letter to Conservative leader Pierre Poilievre on Tuesday, calling for an investigation of the party's handling of allegations—

Request for Office of Speaker to be Vacated

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is a pretty critical point in the legislative agenda that has come up.

I agree with the Bloc Québécois member and her argument that there are many bills we would like to discuss.

I appreciate that this is a critical time right now. We have a lot of legislation that we need to discuss in the House, legislation that our constituents have sent us to this place to get through. It is serious things that are so important, such as Bill C-49, Bill C-59, Bill C-70 and Bill C-64. We have two opposition day motions just this week. We are trying to deliver the help that Canadians so desperately need, including through legislation like the fall economic statement, which the official opposition has filibustered at committee for months and which is something that would deliver a great deal of support in terms of housing.

Something I am particularly proud of as a part of that piece of legislation is actually the removal of the HST on psychotherapy and counselling services. It is something that would help those who are working within that profession, and something that I actually had a conversation about just yesterday with a psychotherapist who asked me when we would be getting the legislation passed. I said we are working on it and trying to make sure it goes through. The person I spoke to needs the fairness for the removal of the federal tax to occur. She spoke to me about how important it was for her clients to have equality within the services that are provided to them. We know, of course, that we are in a mental health crisis and that every bit of assistance helps in that regard. That is one piece of legislation that the official opposition has filibustered at the committee.

There are, of course, amendments to the Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia accord act that we need to get through. There is the foreign interference act, which is of course becoming more and more important as we move through this parliamentary session.

I do not know how many times New Democrats have to talk about how incredibly important pharmacare is. We certainly know that the official opposition does not believe that. I think about the millions of Canadians who rely upon that piece of legislation to help them afford the medications they need, diabetics in this country, and I believe there are 3.7 million of them, who need the legislation to go through so they would not have to worry about the cost of their diabetes medications and devices. So many constituents have written to me thanking me for moving that forward.

Those are the key pieces of law that we need to get moving in the House. Yes, we are sitting until midnight most nights to do that. New Democrats believe in that absolutely because it is for people that it is important. There is an opposition party determined to delay every single one of the bills. Time again, the Conservatives have obfuscated, filibustered, screamed and yelled in outrage and then attempted to delay and stall all of that progress, all of those supports. I find it unacceptable.

The fact is that what the Conservatives are now calling out, in terms of their outrage, is that the Speaker seems to have been caught up in supposed partisan activity that clearly was not of his doing. He did everything he was supposed to do, ran through the permissions that he was supposed to get, and yet mistakes were made. The partisanship that the Conservatives are so outraged about actually fuels their own partisanship fire of trying to find yet some other thing that they can hold on to, so much so that it will delay again all of the incredible supports that we need to get to people.

I see this every day, whether I am at the procedure and House affairs committee or here in the House. The Conservatives are desperate to cling on to anything they can, and destroy whatever we are trying to do in the process, to show that this place does not work, because that fits into their communication strategy. I am sorry, but I am not going to allow something to fit into their communication strategy to disrupt what needs to happen for my constituents.

The member across the way for Winnipeg North did quote the letter, but I want to mention it again. We are here, in this case, over a tweet that was sent out by the Liberal Party without having consulted the Speaker. The letter is very clear. It is from the national director of the Liberal Party, apologizing very clearly to the Speaker. It states, “The Liberal Party of Canada unequivocally apologizes to you for this mistake, and we take full responsibility.”

Was there a mistake made? Absolutely. Is it horribly unfortunate? Absolutely. Are we punishing the right person in this instance? No. Should there be more vigilance on this issue? Absolutely, of course. However, calling for the Speaker's resignation is clawing to the communication strategy that benefits one group. It does not benefit the entire House. I do not agree with that. We on this side of the House do not agree with that.

We have to work on the legislation that the people have sent us to work on. We have a very important job, and I have no time for all of the bickering and squabbling. Canadians need this place to work. They need us to get to work. We can make this all about ourselves or we can make it about them. Canadians deserve that. New Democrats want to help deliver the supports they need. The work is urgent, and the official opposition just wants to delay. That is all I have to say on this matter.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Yes, Mr. Chair.

I think there's an agreement that we distribute the draft Bernardo report, that an auto theft report be drafted and distributed, that investigation of Bill C-70 begin on Thursday, and that we proceed with the hearings as scheduled today.

Department of Justice—Main Estimates, 2024-25

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

Madam Chair, extortion is a Criminal Code violation currently and there is already a mandatory minimum penalty that applies to repeat extortion with a firearm. The mandatory minimum is seven years. The maximum penalty for extortion is life imprisonment. With respect to not tolerating extortion, what we are doing is looking closely and trying to work with law enforcement officials to understand the nature of the problem, particularly in the South Asian community in B.C. and in Ontario, to target this in a more robust manner.

I would also encourage the member to look at what we are doing with Bill C-70, the foreign interference legislation that we recently tabled in this House, which looks at organized criminality that is being orchestrated by criminal elements that are operating abroad but manifesting here.

Business of the House

[Steven MacKinnon, Liberal, Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I am always entertained by my hon. colleague across the aisle, with whom I work regularly. With gas at about $1.50 a litre in Ontario, if I am not mistaken, it is a lot cheaper than it is in Alberta, where Premier Danielle Smith unilaterally hiked the cost of gasoline by 13¢. She did not provide, of course, the very substantial rebates on the price on pollution we have put on and that the Conservatives would take away.

Of course, that was not his question. Tomorrow, we will call Bill C-58, concerning replacement workers, at report stage and at third reading. On Monday, we will resume third reading debate of Bill C-49, the Atlantic accord implementation act.

Wednesday, we will begin debate at second reading of Bill C‑70 on countering foreign interference, which is already a strong response to the issues being investigated by the Hogue commission. We will hear from the Minister of Public Safety at second reading of Bill C‑70.

I would also like to inform the House that Tuesday and Thursday will be allotted days.

Finally, as is only proper, there have been discussions among the parties, and if you seek it, I believe you will find unanimous consent of the House for the following motion:

That, notwithstanding any standing order, special order or usual practice of the House, during the debate on the business of supply pursuant to Standing Order 81(4) later today:

(a) the time provided for consideration of the Main Estimates in committee of the whole be extended beyond four hours, as needed, to include a minimum of 16 periods of 15 minutes each;

(b) members speaking during the debate may indicate to the Chair that they will be dividing their time with one or more other members; and

(c) no quorum calls, dilatory motions or requests for unanimous consent shall be received by the Chair.

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

Thank you very much for the question, and it's nice to see you again, although virtually.

The fundamental challenge is that the CSIS Act tool kit is old and predates the digital age. That's why it urgently needs to be updated. The conversation we've been having, where the milieu, for example, of misinformation is focused on social media, speaks to how big those gaps are and the challenge in having it predate the digital age. The information sharing to build resilience on threats outside the government in Canada is one of the largest gaps that we see, and that's also what we heard from Canadians. That, we believe, is very well addressed in Bill C-70.

The other challenge that we're experiencing is that there are some gaps in CSIS's ability to operate in a digital world. For example, we are missing some modern investigative techniques that most of our Five Eyes intelligence partners have in addition to law enforcement, such as production and preservation orders. Those are also being proposed as part of Bill C-70, as well as closing the foreign intelligence gap that's currently created by the borderless nature of data.

We'd be very happy to give a more in-depth briefing to parliamentarians on the elements of the CSIS Act that are included in Bill C-70. We did so a couple of weeks ago, but we'd be very pleased to have another session.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

I'd like to pick up on my friend Mr. Villemure's line of questioning. Ms. Giles, you mentioned that there are some policy gaps in Bill C-70 and that Bill C-70 had addressed some of those. Can you identify what the gaps are, what gaps you feel have been addressed, and which gaps remain?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

We would be very pleased to provide you with that information.

Much of what you'll see is the advice that has been manifested, both from CSIS as well as from what we heard from Canadians when we conducted consultations over several months on proposed changes to the CSIS Act. That's reflected, currently, in Bill C-70. The changes that are being proposed to the CSIS Act, especially as they relate to enhancing our ability to provide information and intelligence outside the federal government, will help further build the resilience of parliamentarians and Canadians.

[René Villemure, Bloc, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Could you send us some written examples of public policies that we could study in order to reduce the impacts? Bill C‑70 has not yet been passed. What does CSIS suggest?

[Dr. Nicole Giles]

That's another very good question.

Again, I will highlight the importance of ensuring that public information is properly understood and properly used.

This in order to ensure that parliamentarians understand the threats and are able to ensure their protection against them.

I would also encourage the continued engagement between the security and intelligence sector and the Government of Canada with parliamentarians to ensure those briefings continue to take place. That is certainly a focus for CSIS. There are some public policy gaps that exist, including in the CSIS Act and the legislation that the government has introduced. Bill C-70 will go some way in helping to address those gaps.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

It's very kind of you to let me know that I'll have the opportunity to speak until 2 p.m., but I'd prefer that we come to a solution based on common sense, that is, that we adjourn the debate on this motion so that we can take advantage of some downtime to discuss the next steps and begin the study that was requested by the House of Commons following the question of privilege on the fact that 18 of our colleagues were targeted by foreign hackers.

I would very much like us to do this and not use the resources of the House unnecessarily until 2 p.m. However, unfortunately, it seems that the NDP is opposed to this, despite everything that was said in the House yesterday. This worries me a great deal, given the statements I've heard. This morning, I listened to our colleague Jenny Kwan, who gave a very thoughtful speech about how people, including herself, had been victims of foreign interference by having their email accounts hacked. For her, it was a no-brainer that this question of privilege needed to be addressed as soon as possible in the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

Ms. Niki Ashton, who is a member of the NDP caucus and represents the Churchill-Keewatinook Aski riding, posed the following question to my colleague Mr. Bezan:

Mr. Speaker, given the severity of issues like this, would the member agree to sending the matter to PROC? It is obviously the body that is best equipped to deal with it. Would the member agree that it should be sent to PROC as soon as possible?

This was a request made by the NDP itself, Mr. Chair, last night during the debate. This opportunity was offered as soon as the House passed the motion unanimously. This means that the Conservatives voted for the motion to refer this question of privilege to the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs, that the Bloc Québécois voted for the motion, that the NDP voted for the motion and that the independent members voted for the motion. Everyone agreed that the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs should quickly study this issue, because it's a very important one.

We now propose to adjourn the debate so that we can move on to this very important study, but unfortunately, for some political or partisan reason I don't know, the Liberals refuse to let us do so. What's even more surprising is that the NDP refuses to adjourn the debate and set this aside for two minutes so we can talk about our schedule, our business, the witnesses and how we're going to operate over the next few weeks, so we can then talk as quickly as possible about this question of privilege.

As I was mentioning, the NDP members, who proposed amendments to a Liberal motion, can, at any time, bring the debate back to Ms. Romanado's motion, because there are quite a few of them. I know that numbers and Liberals don't always go together, but that's another story. I don't want to start another debate, Mr. Chair, because you could call me to order for any number of reasons. That said, the figures speak for themselves.

So, we could quickly return to this study. If, for example, we don't have any witnesses, or the witnesses we want to invite to talk about the question of privilege aren't available, we can start this study. There are many opportunities for us to move forward and do what is important both to the House of Commons, which has asked this committee to address this question of privilege as quickly as possible, and to the members of the committee, who would like to address other topics in a completely reasonable way.

We don't oppose the Liberals' motion, but like the Bloc Québécois, we may have some amendments to propose regarding the content and process. We are not fundamentally opposed to the motion, though. We were willing to undertake a dual study.

Meanwhile, since Tuesday, the Speaker of the House of Commons has ruled that the question of privilege raised by the member for Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, Garnett Genuis, did constitute a prima facie case of privilege. We spent all last night debating the matter. Every parliamentarian I heard agreed that the interference in our Parliament and electoral system by the Communist regime in Beijing was an important issue.

Everyone wants the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs to examine the matter as quickly as possible. The committee members have to decide how best to go about it, how quickly to do the study and which witnesses they want to hear from.

I really don't understand what the Liberals are trying to stop right now. When we are all in the House, everyone is in agreement, but when we are here as a committee to discuss the issue, the NDP-Liberal coalition government emerges and opts to vote against us. Those are the facts.

Mr. Chair, the matter before us is extremely important. We found out through the FBI that Canadian parliamentarians were targeted by Chinese hackers in 2021. What's more, the FBI didn't tell us. We read it in the papers, which learned about it from the FBI.

Apparently, someone in Canada was informed. Someone in Canada means either someone in the government or someone in the House of Commons. That's why we need to conduct the study. We have to uncover who was informed and when.

Again, as we saw in Michael Chong's case during the study we just finished, which came on the heels of another question of privilege, members were the last to find out.

It is completely unacceptable that hostile foreign interests are targeting members, people elected to represent their ridings, because they expressed their views on a topic as important as foreign interference or because they stood up for diaspora communities living in Canada—Chinese, Ukrainian or whatever they may be.

In this case, we are talking about hackers, as mentioned by Mr. Genuis, who was very shocked to read in the papers that he had been the target of those hackers.

What harm was done? We don't know. What were the consequences? We don't know. Was there a breach of information? We're being told there wasn't, but I don't know because no one told me so, personally.

It is precisely the committee's role to get to the bottom of this and to ask the right people the right questions. The committee needs to get a clear understanding of what happened, and ensure that Canadian parliamentarians aren't the targets of foreign cyber-attacks and that, if they are, they are alerted at once, not just when it suits someone's interests.

On the issue of foreign interference, we saw that the decision to notify the parties or members wasn't made by CSIS or the RCMP. It was made by a group of individuals who were supposed to make a judgment as to the information they received, individuals who met to determine whether the situation crossed the line they had drawn to say when something was serious enough to warrant notifying the persons concerned. As a result, everything came out later rather than sooner.

The report Justice Hogue released last week clearly shows that a review of that whole process is necessary. As my fellow member rightly pointed out, the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs met 70 times to discuss foreign interference. That shows how important the study was to the committee. It shows how important foreign interference was to the members of the committee. Many have been here since the beginning. Along the way, some joined the committee, while others left—70 meetings is a lot, after all.

However, we can't stop there because foreign interference has not stopped. It would have been nice if, miraculously, we could wave a magic wand and make it so that Commissioner Hogue's appointment stopped all foreign interests, including the Communist regime in Beijing, from doing what they were doing because Canadians had appointed a commissioner to examine foreign interference. That's not what happened, though, and that's not going to happen. That's why we need to better protect ourselves. That is why the government needs to make the right decisions. That is also why we're going to have to examine Bill C-70 when it's sent to committee. One of the key roles of the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs is ensuring that parliamentarians are protected.

Thanks to a motion in the House of Commons, we called on Justice Hogue to produce a preliminary report, and we didn't do so just to put more on her plate. We did so to find out as much as possible as soon as possible leading up to the election.

This issue also requires urgent attention because we are dealing with a so-called minority government and as long as the government is in a coalition with the NDP, there will be no election. Is it possible to know when the NDP will pull its support for the Liberal government? I can hear Liberals wishing that will never happen, but I have news for them. When the time comes and the NDP drops them, it will leave their side. The Liberals don't need to worry. Actually, they do, I should say. That's the reality. This is a minority government that has the support of the NDP, a government that currently controls, or is trying to control, what people do or don't find out about foreign interference. That is unacceptable.

I want to come back to Justice Hogue's preliminary report because it revealed many things. Justice Hogue confirmed what everyone knew, that foreign actors did interfere in the last two elections. Justice Hogue confirmed that foreign interference did not directly impact the overall result of the last election. The Conservatives said it. Everyone said it.

Most importantly, we learned something about our fellow member Kenny Chiu's claims that the Communist regime in Beijing and its disinformation campaign had a significant—perhaps even decisive—impact on his loss in the last election. We found out that his claims were founded. There was evidence showing that it certainly could have impacted the election result in his riding.

There was a reason Justice Hogue felt it necessary to share that information with parliamentarians and Canadians before her final report.

I'm sure she wants to prevent this from happening again during the next election. She, too, is very aware that an election could be called at any time.

The other very troubling thing is the Chinese Communist regime's interference in the candidate nomination process. On that subject, I disagree with my Bloc Québécois colleague.

Reference to Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

[Mike Morrice, Green, Kitchener Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we are fortunate to have debate in this place like we just heard from the member for Vancouver East. We are lucky that we can reflect on the words she shared with us this morning.

I am deeply concerned to hear about the double standard that exists for members in this place when it comes to foreign interference, and I would really appreciate hearing more from her. I understand that she wants to see Bill C-70 move ahead quickly. However, my concern is that the government is going to say that it is no problem at all, that it will all be solved, that Bill C-70 will fix the issues we have shared when it comes to foreign interference.

Could the member share with us the extent to which she feels that is or is not the case? Could she also share more, elaborating on the question from our colleague, the member for North Island—Powell River, on the extent to which she would like to see the government do more, and do it faster, to address the deep concerns she shared with respect to foreign interference?

Countering Foreign Interference Act

[Dominic LeBlanc, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety]

moved for leave to introduce Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference.

(Motions deemed adopted, bill read the first time and printed)