Bill C-51 (Historical)

Anti-terrorism Act, 2015

An Act to enact the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, to amend the Criminal Code, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and to make related and consequential amendments to other Acts

Part 1 enacts the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which authorizes Government of Canada institutions to disclose information to Government of Canada institutions that have jurisdiction or responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. It also makes related amendments to other Acts.
Part 2 enacts the Secure Air Travel Act in order to provide a new legislative framework for identifying and responding to persons who may engage in an act that poses a threat to transportation security or who may travel by air for the purpose of committing a terrorism offence. That Act authorizes the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to establish a list of such persons and to direct air carriers to take a specific action to prevent the commission of such acts. In addition, that Act establishes powers and prohibitions governing the collection, use and disclosure of information in support of its administration and enforcement. That Act includes an administrative recourse process for listed persons who have been denied transportation in accordance with a direction from the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and provides appeal procedures for persons affected by any decision or action taken under that Act. That Act also specifies punishment for contraventions of listed provisions and authorizes the Minister of Transport to conduct inspections and issue compliance orders. Finally, this Part makes consequential amendments to the Aeronautics Act and the Canada Evidence Act.
Part 3 amends the Criminal Code to, with respect to recognizances to keep the peace relating to a terrorist activity or a terrorism offence, extend their duration, provide for new thresholds, authorize a judge to impose sureties and require a judge to consider whether it is desirable to include in a recognizance conditions regarding passports and specified geographic areas. With respect to all recognizances to keep the peace, the amendments also allow hearings to be conducted by video conference and orders to be transferred to a judge in a territorial division other than the one in which the order was made and increase the maximum sentences for breach of those recognizances.
It further amends the Criminal Code to provide for an offence of knowingly advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general. It also provides a judge with the power to order the seizure of terrorist propaganda or, if the propaganda is in electronic form, to order the deletion of the propaganda from a computer system.
Finally, it amends the Criminal Code to provide for the increased protection of witnesses, in particular of persons who play a role in respect of proceedings involving security information or criminal intelligence information, and makes consequential amendments to other Acts.
Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act to permit the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to take, within and outside Canada, measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada, including measures that are authorized by the Federal Court. It authorizes the Federal Court to make an assistance order to give effect to a warrant issued under that Act. It also creates new reporting requirements for the Service and requires the Security Intelligence Review Committee to review the Service’s performance in taking measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada.
Part 5 amends Divisions 8 and 9 of Part 1 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to, among other things,
(a) define obligations related to the provision of information in proceedings under that Division 9;
(b) authorize the judge, on the request of the Minister, to exempt the Minister from providing the special advocate with certain relevant information that has not been filed with the Federal Court, if the judge is satisfied that the information does not enable the person named in a certificate to be reasonably informed of the case made by the Minister, and authorize the judge to ask the special advocate to make submissions with respect to the exemption; and
(c) allow the Minister to appeal, or to apply for judicial review of, any decision requiring the disclosure of information or other evidence if, in the Minister’s opinion, the disclosure would be injurious to national security or endanger the safety of any person.

[Evan Light]

It's not negotiable. It's not debatable.

I think the preamble you read is really fascinating because to me it speaks to—if you remember—Bill C-51, which was a Harper government law that created a brand new level of data sharing between government agencies.

The preamble sort of lays out how that happens. It shows you how this information flows between agencies and how it has become quite a normal thing to do. That dates back a very long time. It's not a new thing. It has probably been going on since before the Harper years, but I think it's something that maybe was informal and now has become quite formalized.

It does scare me. As somebody who used ArriveCAN when it came out because I found it easier—I wasn't provided with paper on a plane to fill out—I think that our technologies at airports and borders are quite invasive. They're also quite invasive everywhere in the world. I've been to airports in Europe where I couldn't get a connection without having my face and my hands scanned.

I think our levels of invasion are not necessarily at that high level here, but yes, I think it's problematic.

[Michael Wernick]

The context is always different. I was deputy clerk and helped the Harper government pass Bill C-51 late in its mandate. A little bit later, I helped the Trudeau government amend it through Bill C-59.

At the time, in 2015-16, there was still a great deal of focus on anti-terrorism. This is the time when Daesh had overrun most of northern Iraq. There were all kinds of issues in the Middle East at the time.

As Mr. Jean and others can explain to you, there are a range of threats that the Government of Canada worries about, from terrorism to domestic terrorism to cybersecurity to foreign interference and so on. That's why we have a national security adviser. That's why we have a cabinet committee on security and intelligence, and that's why the government wanted NSICOP created.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Thank you for that.

Yes, it was mentioned within that same lawsuit, in the documents that the BC Civil Liberties Association came out with, the glossary of terms of unselected data and publicly available data and how they are used. Do laws like Bill C-59...? That lawsuit was before Bill C-59. It addressed more the old Bill C-51 problems. Specifically as we look at Bill C-26, do those laws adequately address the threats that civil libertarians are worried about in terms of taking advantage of publicly available data?

Telecommunications Act

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

Mr. Speaker, there is a lot to think about in what the member for Kildonan—St. Paul had to say, and I agree with many things she said, including her concern about the oversharing of Canadians' personal information between government departments. I know that was a significant issue in the 41st Parliament with Bill C-51, when the government of the day introduced security legislation at that time.

I wonder if the Conservative Party today is in a mood to actually protect Canadians against the oversharing of information between government departments and if we might try to find an opportunity in the course of this bill's passage through the House to correct, as we go, some of the defects in that legislation from many years ago.

[Laurel Collins, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I also want to thank Mr. Therrien for all the work he's done. I remember the Harper government's Bill C-51 in 2015. I so appreciated your criticism and commitment to upholding Canadians' privacy rights. That has been ongoing. Thank you for your service.

In your departmental plan, you indicated that your office is reviewing potential structural and operational changes. Can you describe what changes you're considering and what impact they might have?

[Wendy Jocko, Chief, Algonquins of Pikwakanagan First Nation]

Meegwetch, Chair.

[Witness spoke in Algonquin and provided the following text:]

Anishinabe aking ate awso kikina-wadji-chigun.

[Witness provided the following translation:]

This land we are upon, the spot where you sit now, is the traditional territory of the Algonquin people.

[English]

The Anishinabe Algonquin people are one heart and one soul, and have lived for thousands of years on this unsurrendered territory. We thank and honour the land.

We acknowledge the enduring presence of all first nations, Inuit and Métis people who call the Algonquin territory their home, along with other nations. We acknowledge all of the residential school survivors and children who never made it home. We acknowledge the survivors and all they have endured.

We honour the important contributions of all veterans in the service of Canada. We remember those who lost their lives and those whose lives were forever changed.

I would like to begin by thanking the committee for inviting me to discuss expanding the parliamentary precinct to include sections of Wellington Street and Sparks Street.

On October 22, 2014, a man evaded security and entered the Hall of Honour with a rifle and a knife after fatally shooting Corporal Nathan Cirillo of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada. He threatened the very lives of parliamentarians and personnel at the Hill. Before he was stopped, he injured a constable. That day, it was as if the very democratic principles of our country were under attack. Our country was unified then in its condemnation of this heinous act, vowing “never again”.

On November 2014, the joint advisory working group on security identified a lack of communication among security groups on Parliament Hill as a significant problem and recommended combining the existing security forces under the Senate, the House of Commons and the RCMP detachment in charge of the grounds into one integrated security service. Parliament subsequently passed Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, which, among other things, amalgamated the Senate Protective Service, House of Commons Security Services and Parliament's RCMP detachment into the Parliamentary Protective Service.

In late January to mid-February 2022, demonstrators occupied the downtown core of Ottawa, including much of the parliamentary precinct. The Ottawa Police Service acted as the lead agency, with a number of other agencies from across Canada providing support. The Parliamentary Protective Service was responsible for security on Parliament Hill and at the Senate of Canada building.

The polite—some would say even mild-mannered—police response to the blockade of downtown Ottawa by thousands of protesters revealed to indigenous people a double standard in how law enforcement agencies treat civil disobedience. Had indigenous activists made the same threats, broken the same laws and engaged in the same level of disruption, history has shown they would probably have been met with a very heavy-handed crackdown.

To some, it leaves little doubt that there was racism involved. Many have asked why people were allowed to threaten the life of the Prime Minister, especially after the promises made after the death of Corporal Nathan Cirillo. While there were some in the group who claimed to be indigenous, they did not respect the protocols of the Algonquin nation in respecting ceremony. They were asked by the rights holders and the chiefs of Pikwakanagan, Kitigan Zibi and the Algonquin Anishinabeg Nation Tribal Council to respect our territory and customs, to no avail.

We wondered about that, because if it had been an indigenous person, they would most certainly be sitting in jail.

Social media users shared images of flags bearing icons of fascism, white supremacy and hate, including Nazi swastikas and Confederate flags that garnered shock, horror and outrage. My own father and mother, both military veterans of the Second World War, would have been saddened by the presence of these deplorable symbols of hate.

Video also circulated showing demonstrators appropriating first nation drumming as they danced, drank beer and chanted “yabba dabba doo” and nonsense while shouting obscenities to the Prime Minister, Justin Trudeau. The drum is a sacred ceremonial item whose handling is governed by specific cultural protocols. These episodes happened only steps away from the Centennial Flame, where throughout the summer stood a memorial to residential school victims. It was an absolute insult.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Thank you.

I want to begin by acknowledging that today is March 21, which marks the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. It was some 60 years ago, in 1960, in fact, when the Sharpeville police massacre happened in South Africa against workers.

I want to take a step back from the specificity around the tools and talk about the systems for a moment, and draw a direct line between what I believe occurred under C-51 and the implementation of anti-terrorism protocols provincially that led to the analog version of facial recognition, which was the practice of street checks and racial profiling, otherwise known as “carding” by local police services. I'll pick up from there, because I believe that practice of racial profiling, the analog version, has been in a very sophisticated way ruled out and then reimplemented as has been identified here through private sector contracts that allow companies like Clearview to do indirectly what police services were doing directly.

I want to also situate the conversation in the system, which is this notion of predictive policing as the basis of my questions, because I believe that the topic of facial recognition may be overly broad to get any kind of real coverage on this.

My questions will be to Ms. Khoo, who had laid out in an extensive report some of the bases for recommendations moving forward. I would like Ms. Khoo to comment on the evolution of predictive policing, its inherent racial bias and this notion of creating de facto panoptic prisons within our communities that are often over-surveilled, over-policed and underserviced.

Ms. Khoo, would you care to comment on that, and perhaps draw any lines that you may have come across between the practices of street checks and carding to populate data in things like CPIC, which would obviously be replaced by more sophisticated data such as AI and facial recognition?

Emergencies Act

[Dane Lloyd, Conservative, Sturgeon River—Parkland, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I was disappointed to see the stand that the leader of the NDP and the party have taken on an issue that deals with the fundamental civil liberties of Canadians. What has happened to the party of Tommy Douglas? What has happened to the party of Jack Layton that fought against Bill C-51 and the War Measures Act? What has changed?

The NDP is trying to split hairs. Why has it abandoned one of its fundamental principles?

Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Madam Speaker, while I can appreciate where the hon. parliamentary secretary is trying to go on this, it is not lost on me that this is a government that allowed our military to spy on Black Lives Matter movement protests while simultaneously being out and actually participating in them.

There is a long and storied history of the way in which government actively surveils citizens in the country, including the ways in which Bill C-51 allowed for the targeting and criminalization of indigenous land defenders, environmentalists, social justice folks and basic people out there trying to advocate for their own civil rights.

Public Safety

[Justin Trudeau, Liberal, Prime Minister]

Mr. Speaker, the member who asked the question was a part of Stephen Harper's Conservative government, which regularly refused to allow any oversight whatsoever on issues of national security. Many Canadians will remember the excesses of Bill C-51 that the Harper government put forward, which is why we made changes to Bill C-51 when we got into office, which is also why we created the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, to provide a forum for parliamentarians to oversee national security work. That is an improvement we made that Conservatives voted against.

[Justin Trudeau, Liberal, Prime Minister]

Mr. Speaker, there are many questions that need to be pursued, and that is exactly why we created the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

The fact that the Conservative leader just referred to it as “the Prime Minister's secret committee” goes to part of the problem of why the Conservative government, under Stephen Harper, for 10 years refused to bring in any oversight by parliamentarians of our national security apparatuses. We all remember the real concerns about Stephen Harper and Bill C-51 and labelling terrorists in Canada.

We brought forward a committee of parliamentarians who have the security clearances necessary to do this work.

[Brian Masse, NDP, Windsor West, ON]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I had another question, but I'm going to go back to Professor Attaran with regard to capacity.

Here's the reality. The vaccine promise is starting to roll in there with child care, pharmacare, electoral reform, Bill C-51, climate change, fossil fuel subsidies, a whole series of things that have been promised and never acted upon. However, this one is really dangerous in particular. The other ones are equally difficult to deal with as well, but this one's really bad.

I want to know. If we are able to ramp up and catch up with what's going on, do we have the infrastructure for the administration of the vaccine? Do we have the physical capacity being put in place right now by the task force to make sure that, if we are going to play catch-up, we can do so with the proper administration of the vaccine to our population?

Opposition Motion—Official Apology from the Prime Minister

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I was here during the debate on Bill C-51. In fact, I was sitting not too far from where the member would have been sitting back in Centre Block.

There were many aspects of Bill C-51 that deserved our support as the third party at the time, for example, the establishment of a security committee. If we look at the Five Eyes countries of the world, Canada was the only one that did not have a parliamentary committee to deal with security related issues. We have one today as a result of this government. That was one of the things we talked about during the debate of Bill C-51.

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we heard the history of the October crisis in its historical context and heard members from the government's side talk about how the Charter of Rights and Freedoms was implemented since then. This is also a government that supported the draconian Bill C-51, which of course defined economic disruption as a form of domestic terrorism. This extended government overreach to indigenous communities seeking their inherent sovereign treaty rights, and to environmentalists and trade unionists.

What does the party that in fact named the person responsible for G20 as the Minister of Public Safety have to say for its continued support on Bill C-51, which has resulted in situations such as lethal over-watch on the Wet'suwet'en territory and rubber bullets being fired at Haudenosaunee peaceful land defenders today?

Public Safety

[Matthew Green, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Madam Speaker, the Liberals propped up the Conservatives' draconian Bill C-51, which essentially included economic disruption as a form of domestic terrorism. The Prime Minister ran and was elected to amend Bill C-51 and protect Canada's civil liberties, but he broke that promise. Indigenous communities, environmentalists, workers and anybody standing up for social justice are still the target of anti-terrorism protocols.

Will the Prime Minister acknowledge that people peacefully protesting in Canada are not in fact terrorists?

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is essential that Canadians have confidence in the agencies that have extraordinary powers over them.

It was in the debate during the 41st Parliament on Bill C-51, legislation which made a major overhaul of national security law under the Harper administration, and it was very clear from legal analysts like Craig Forcese that we need to have oversight agencies, like the security intelligence review committee, but we also need to have agencies that can do on the spot, in real-time response.

What we have at this point in Canada is an improvement but the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency is at the level of oversight. We do not have that quick response that we get when we have what we have now in the complaints commission. We have a bit of this and a bit of that. We do not have a full and comprehensive system to ensure both oversight and review.

Motion in relation to Senate amendments

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I want to take this opportunity to give a little ad at the beginning of my speech. Tomorrow is an important day. June 12 is Philippines Independence Day. I want to invite all members from all sides of the House to come out after their caucus meetings and walk across the street from West Block to SJAM to participate in the Filipino heritage event.

I want to add my thoughts in regard to Bill C-59 and I will approach it in two ways. First I will speak to the process that has brought us to the bill before us today and then I will provide thoughts in regard to some of the content of the bill itself.

To say that the issue of security and freedom is a new debate in the House of Commons would be a bit of a stretch. I can recall the debates surrounding Bill C-51 several years ago when Stephen Harper was the prime minister. He brought in that piece of legislation. At the time, the Liberal Party, as the third party, actually supported that legislation.

However, we qualified that support in a very clear way. We indicated throughout the debate that there were some fundamental flaws in Bill C-51, and that if we were to ultimately win in the election of 2015, we intended to bring forward some changes that would rectify some of those fundamental flaws.

I can recall the hours of debate that took place inside the chamber by members of all political parties. I can remember some of the discussions flowing out of the committees at the time. There was a great deal of debate and a great deal of controversy with the legislation. Even while campaigning during the last federal election, it was a topical issue for many people. It dealt with issues of an individual's rights versus having that sense of security. I always made reference to the fact that Liberals understand how important individual rights are. That is one of the reasons I often highlight that we are the party that brought in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

If we take a look at the original Bill C-51, even though the principles were very admirable and we supported it and voted for it, even though at the time we received some criticism, we made it very clear that we would make changes.

This is the second piece of legislation that has attempted to make good on commitments we made to Canadians in the last election. I really enjoy is being able to stand up in this place and provide comment, especially on legislation that fulfills election commitments, starting with our very first bill, Bill C-2. That is a bill I am very proud of, and I know my caucus colleagues are very proud of that bill. It concerns the tax break for Canada's middle class. There is the bill we are debating today, Bill C-59, the second part of a commitment we made to Canadians in the last federal election, which talks about the issue of public safety and privacy rights. Yet again, we have before us another piece of legislation that ultimately fulfills another commitment we made to Canadians in the last federal election.

I mentioned that I wanted to talk a bit about the process. In bringing forward Bill C-59, I do not think we could come up with a better example of a minister who has really understood the importance of the issue, or who has gone far beyond what any other minister in the Stephen Harper era ever did, in terms of consultation.

Even before the bill was introduced, we received input from thousands of Canadians, whether in person or through the Internet. We also received input from members of Parliament, particularly from many of my Liberal caucus colleagues. We were afforded the opportunity to share with the minister and the caucus some of the issues and concerns that came out of the last election. A great deal of consultation was done. The minister on several occasions indicated that the comprehensive dialogue that took place allowed for a substantial piece of legislation at the first reading stage.

Shortly after that, the bill was sent to committee prior to second reading, which allowed for a more thorough discussion on a wider scope of issues. The bill was debated at report stage and then at third reading. It was sent to the Senate, which has sent back amendments, which is where we are today. That process indicates that we have a government, as the Prime Minister has often indicated, that thinks the roles of our standing committees and the Senate can improve legislation. We have seen many changes throughout this process. This bill is a stronger and healthier piece of legislation than it originally was at its first reading stage.

I wanted to give that bit of background and then do a comparison regarding why the government had to move closure just an hour ago. I want to make it very clear to those individuals who might be following the debate, whether it is on Bill C-59 or other pieces of legislation.

We have an official opposition party that is determined to work with the NDP, and I often refer to it as the unholy alliance of the Conservatives and the New Democrats. They work together to try to prevent any legislation from passing. They will do whatever they can to prevent legislation from passing. It does not take much to do that. At the end of the day, a few members can cause a great deal of issues to prevent legislation from passing. There is no sense of responsibility coming from the opposition side in regard to working hard for Canadians and recognizing the valuable pieces of legislation that would be for the betterment of our society. In fact, those parties will put up speaker after speaker even on non-controversial legislation, because they have no real interest in passing legislation. If it were up to the Conservative opposition, we would still be debating Bill C-2. The opposition members have many different tools, and they have no qualms about using them. Then—

Motion That Debate Be Not Further Adjourned

[Guy Caron, NDP, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to remind the minister and the House that, when Bill C-51 was introduced in the previous Parliament, the Liberals who were in opposition at the time voted in favour of Bill C-51, regardless of all the freedom of expression and privacy issues it might cause, not to mention other measures that endangered Canadians more than they protected them. In contrast, the official opposition New Democrats voted against Bill C-51.

Bill C-59 makes some improvements, but as civil liberties groups have said repeatedly, it fails to resolve a number of major problems related to use of data and privacy protection.

I would like to know why the government was in such a hurry to move forward without properly addressing the major issues with Bill C-51 that are still present in Bill C-59.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, with all due respect, I do not feel, as leader of the Green Party, that I had adequate opportunity to debate what has happened with Bill C-59, particularly since it went to the Senate.

However, I want to say on the record that although it is not the perfect bill one would have wished for to completely remove the damage of Bill C-51 from the previous Parliament, I am very grateful for the progress made in this bill. What I referred to at the time as the “thought chill sections” of the language were removed. One example was the use of the words “terrorism in general” throughout Bill C-51.

The bill was tabled January 30, 2015, which was a Friday. I read it over the weekend, came back to Parliament on Monday and asked a question in question period about whether we were going to stop this bill that so heavily intruded on civil liberties.

Bill C-59 is an improvement, but I do not think I have had enough time to debate it. I wish the hon. minister could give us more time. I want to see it pass in this Parliament, but I wish there was a way to allow time for proper debate.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

Mr. Speaker, it is clear in the amendments included in Bill C-59 that the right to civil protest, the right to demonstrate and the right to express one's point of view within the normal laws and procedures of Canada are all clearly protected. That was an issue under Bill C-51, and we have corrected that by virtue of this legislation.

I point out as well that both the government and parliamentary committees have consulted about this legislation with the Privacy Commissioner, and the Privacy Commissioner's advice has been taken very seriously in the crafting of this legislation. As I say, the debate has been an extensive one. Every dimension of this new law has been thoroughly ventilated through one House of Parliament or the other.

I point out that the debate has gone on for so long that certain previous provisions of national security law have expired while waiting for the new law to come into effect, so it is time to vote and to take a decision.

National Security Act, 2017

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Madam Speaker, with respect to privacy, I refer the member to the comments of the Privacy Commissioner, who has provided testimony that directly contradicts what the member is saying. At least the NDP has been intellectually consistent with respect to the elements of Bill C-51. The Liberals voted for it, and now they are undoing it. The Liberals praised some of the elements on preventative arrest and now are caving on them. I think that is due more to electoral fortunes that anything else.

I refer the member for Kootenay—Columbia, and anyone protesting in his riding, to look at the testimony of Patrice Vincent's sister, Louise Vincent, from March 2015, who said:

It would have probably been able to prepare even more material for the attorney general who, with a lower burden of proof, would have agreed to issue a warrant. On October 20 of last year, Martin Couture-Rouleau very likely would have been in prison, and my brother would not be dead.

Law enforcement knew that this young man, Mr. Rouleau, was a threat, and in fact, they had discussed with the Crown whether the burden for preventative arrest could be met.

We are not requiring no burden, but we are also not saying to law enforcement that they have to be ready to go to trial if they fear that there is an imminent risk to public safety and security. Patrice Vincent had not done anything to Mr. Rouleau. He had a uniform on, and law enforcement could not protect him. That is why our laws have to reflect the world we live in, not a perfect world, not a dream world. We have to balance rights and liberties alongside public safety and security.

Putting the threshold too high puts Canadians at risk, and that is why we have been consistent on this point. The Liberals have not been. At least that member has been consistent, and I respect that, but we, forming the next government, will have to make sure that we can tell Canadians that we will always make their safety a priority.

[Wayne Stetski, NDP, Kootenay—Columbia, BC]

Madam Speaker, in the 2015 election Bill C-51 was front and centre in my riding. There were rallies held across the riding against Bill C-51. People were really angry with the Conservative government for putting it forward. They were almost equally angry with the Liberals for supporting it at that time.

Regarding this current bill, Bill C-59, I want to quote from Cara Zwibel, acting general counsel, Canadian Civil Liberties Association. She said:

All Canadian laws must comply with the Charter. Bill C-59 tries harder than its predecessor, but fails to fix some of the unconstitutional elements...contested in...Bill C-51. Troublingly, C-59 also allows intelligence agencies to engage in conduct that threatens freedom of expression, freedom of association, privacy, and public safety. The government has taken a first step, but a great deal more is needed. Canada must get it right on national security.

I am interested in my colleague's comments on this statement that Bill C-59 continues to threaten freedom of expression, freedom of association, privacy and public safety.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Madam Speaker, I always enjoy my friend from Winnipeg North. I know he loves my using his assault-on-democracy quote with respect to omnibus bills. The frequency of the Liberals' time allocation and closure in the last few weeks of Parliament would really make Peter Van Loan blush. He should review some of his speeches of outrage in the previous Parliament.

Let me address the member's issues. As I reminded him when he railed on about Bill C-51, he voted for it. The Prime Minister, at that time the leader of the third party, praised the preventive-arrest measures. Now the Liberals are throwing those out the window. Much like everything with this Prime Minister, it is just not as advertised. I have heard that a few times.

We generally support intelligence oversight, as the member will note from my remarks. That was difficult to do in a minority government at times. During the majority government it was not something that was looked at, but we have spoken in favour of it at times. I have spoken of it, and in fact Peter MacKay spoke in favour of it back around 2006.

The final piece the member said about rights is critical. Public safety is a balancing between our important freedoms, liberties and rights and our public safety and security, and we certainly should be very careful. However, as I said, there are legal thresholds required for preventive arrest, and baked into them are evidence, a threshold and a trust in law enforcement to follow in conjunction with the Crown.

We have the best legal system in the world. We have the best law enforcement in the world. It can always be better and we can make it better, but we cannot tie law enforcement agencies' hands. If someone is killed in a mosque or while guarding the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, his or her rights are erased, so let us not bind the hands of law enforcement agents, who have a tough job in keeping Canadians safe. That is why we do not support the provision in Bill C-59.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Madam Speaker, I was here when Stephen Harper brought in Bill C-51. We voted for it, even though we recognized back then that it needed significant changes, and part of this legislation deals with some of those changes. We brought in legislation earlier dealing with what was a major flaw in Bill C-51, which was not having the parliamentary oversight committee. This government rectified that problem. We made a commitment to Canadians.

The difference between us and the Conservatives is that we look at individual rights and charter rights and privacy as being as important as security and safety, and in fact we can do both at the same time. This legislation is a good example.

When my friend was talking about the no-fly list, it was as if the Conservatives know how to get it right, when in fact Bill C-51 set up the environment that put many children onto the no-fly list. It was Stephen Harper who complicated it and made it more difficult, such that more children were put on the no-fly list.

In the future, are some of my colleague's proposed changes going to rectify the problems that Stephen Harper put in, which in good part this legislation and previous legislation have already addressed?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, we will have to disagree on information sharing. Both Bill C-51 and now with a slight rejigging or perhaps cosmetic change at best in the bill before us is not going to necessarily increase public safety, but certainly forces us to run the risk of finding ourselves in a situation where human rights might be violated.

I will go back to the example I gave in my speech. On the surface, it might make sense to Canadians who are watching to think that we are going to share information between agencies. However, we said at the time of the debate on Bill C-51 that the RCMP, CSIS and any other agency in Canada that worked to ensure public safety needed more resources to more effectively do their work to keep us safe.

We see some unintended consequences. If Consular Affairs has to share information with CSIS, for example, when CSIS might be engaged in a different type of activity or with different objectives, we know that is where we can find situations like the one Maher Arar went through when he was detained abroad and subject to torture, as well as many others, tragically and disturbingly. That is where we disagree.

Information sharing, as it existed pre-Bill C-51, the Conservative legislation in the previous Parliament, was adequate. Again, additional resources to these agencies would have been the way to go. That is what we said at the time and that is what we continue to say today.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to rise in the House today.

I ask for the indulgence of the House and I hope no one will get up on a point of order on this, but because I am making a speech on a specific day, I did want to shout out to two of my biggest supporters.

The first is to my wife Chantale, whose birthday is today. I want to wish her a happy birthday. Even bigger news is that we are expecting a baby at the end of July. I want to shout out the fact that she has been working very hard at her own job, which is obviously a very exhausting thing, and so the patience she has for my uncomparable fatigue certainly is something that I really do thank her for and love her very much for.

I do not want to create any jealousy in the household, so I certainly want to give a shout-out to her daughter and our daughter Lydia, who is also a big supporter of mine. We are a threesome, and as I said at my wedding last year, I had the luck of falling in love twice. I wanted to take this opportunity, not knowing whether I will have another one before the election, to shout out to them and tell them how much I love them.

I thank my colleagues for their warm thoughts that they have shared with me.

On a more serious note, I would like to talk about the Senate amendments to Bill C-59. More specifically, I would like to talk about the process per se and then come back to certain aspects of Bill C-59, particularly those about which I raised questions with the minister—questions that have yet to be answered properly, if at all.

I want to begin by touching on a more timely issue related to a bill that is currently before the House, Bill C-98. This bill will give more authority to the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP so that it also covers the Canada Border Services Agency. That is important because we have been talking for a long time about how the CBSA, the only agency that has a role to play in our national security, still does not have a body whose sole function is to review its operations.

Of course, there is the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, which was created by Bill C-22, and there will soon be a committee created by Bill C-59 that will affect the CBSA, but only with regard to its national security related activities.

I am talking about a committee whose sole responsibility would be to review the activities of the Canada Border Services Agency and to handle internal complaints, such as the allegations of harassment that have been reported in the media in recent years, or complaints that Muslim citizens may make about profiling.

It is very important that there be some oversight or further review. I will say that, as soon as an article is published, either about a problem at the border, about the union complaining about the mistreatment of workers or about problems connected to the agency, the minister comes out with great fanfare to remind everyone that he made a deep and sincere promise to create a system that would properly handle these complaints and that there would be some oversight or review of the agency.

What has happened in four whole years? Nothing at all.

For years now, every time there is a report in the news or an article comes out detailing various allegations of problems, I have just been copying and pasting the last tweet I posted. The situation keeps repeating, but the government is not doing anything.

This situation is problematic because the minister introduced a bill at the last minute, as the clock is winding down on this Parliament, and the bill has not even been referred yet to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

I have a hard time believing that we will pass this bill in the House and an even harder time seeing how it is going to get through the Senate.

That is important because, in his speech, the minister himself alluded to the fact that in fall 2016, when the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, of which I am a member, travelled across the country to study the issue and make recommendations ahead of introducing Bill C-59, the recommendation to create a committee tasked with studying the specific activities of the CBSA was one of the most important recommendations. As we see in Bill C-98, the government did not take this opportunity to do any such thing.

It is certainly troubling, because Bill C-59 is an omnibus piece of legislation. I pleaded with the House, the minister and indeed even the Senate, when it reached the Senate, through different procedural mechanisms, to consider parts of the bill separately, because, as the minister correctly pointed out, this is a huge overhaul of our national security apparatus. The concern with that is not only the consideration that is required, but also the fact that some of these elements, which I will come back to in a moment, were not even part of the national security consultations that both his department and the committee, through the study it did, actually took the time to examine.

More specifically, coming back to and concluding the point on Bill C-98, the minister does not seem to have acted in a prompt way, considering his commitments when it comes to oversight and/or a review of the CBSA. He said in his answer to my earlier question on his speech that it was not within the scope of this bill. That is interesting, not only because this is omnibus legislation, but also because the government specifically referred the legislation to committee prior to second reading with the goal of allowing amendments that were beyond the scope of the bill on the understanding that it did want this to be a large overhaul.

I have a hard time understanding why, with all the indicators being there that it wanted this to be a large, broad-reaching thing and wanted to have things beyond the scope, it would not have allowed for this type of mechanism. Instead, we find we have a bill, Bill C-98, arriving at the 11th hour, without a proper opportunity to make its way through Parliament before the next election.

I talked about how this is an omnibus bill, which makes it problematic in several ways. I wrote a letter to some senators about children whose names are on the no-fly list and the No Fly List Kids group, which the minister talked about. I know the group very well. I would like to congratulate the parents for their tireless efforts on their children's behalf.

Some of the children are on the list simply because the list is racist. Basically, the fact that the names appear multiple times is actually a kind of profiling. We could certainly have a debate about how effective the list is. This list is totally outdated and flawed because so many people share similar names. It is absurd that there was nothing around this list that made it possible for airlines and the agents who managed the list and enforced the rules before the bill was passed to distinguish between a terrorist threat and a very young child.

Again, I thank the parents for their tireless efforts and for the work they did in a non-partisan spirit. They may not be partisan, but I certainly am. I will therefore take this opportunity to say that I am appalled at the way the government has taken these families and children hostage for the sake of passing an omnibus bill.

The minister said that the changes to the no-fly list would have repercussions on a recourse mechanism that would stop these children from being harassed every time they go to the airport. This part of the bill alone accounted for several hundred pages.

I asked the government why it did not split this part from the rest of the bill so it would pass sooner, if it really believed it would deliver justice to these families and their kids. We object to certain components or aspects of the list. We are even prepared to challenge the usefulness of the list and the flaws it may have. If there are any worthy objectives, we are willing to consider them. However, again, our hands were tied by the use of omnibus legislation. During the election campaign, the Liberals promised to make omnibus bills a thing of the past.

I know parents will not say that, and I do not expect them to do so. I commend them again for their non-partisan approach. However, it is appalling and unacceptable that they have been taken hostage.

Moreover, there is also Bill C-21.

I will digress here for a moment. Bill C-21, which we opposed, was a very troubling piece of legislation that dealt with the sharing of border information with the Americans, among others. This involved information on citizens travelling between Canada and the United States. Bill C-59 stalled in the Senate, much like Bill C-21.

As the Minister of Public Safety's press secretary was responding to the concerns of parents who have children on the no-fly list, he suddenly started talking about Bill C-21 as a solution for implementing the redress system for people who want to file a complaint or do not want to be delayed at the airport for a name on the list, when it is not the individual identified. I think it is absolutely awful that these families are being used as bargaining chips to push through a bill that contains many points that have nothing to do with them and warrant further study. In my view, those aspects have not been examined thoroughly enough to move the bill forward.

I thank the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness for recognizing the work I did in committee, even though it took two attempts when he responded to my questions earlier today. In committee, I presented almost 200 amendments. Very few of them were accepted, which was not a surprise.

I would like to focus specifically on one of the Senate's amendments that the government agreed to. This amendment is important and quite simple, I would say even unremarkable. It proposes to add a provision enabling us to review the bill after three years, rather than five, and make amendments if required. That is important because we are proposing significant and far-reaching changes to our national security system. What I find intriguing is that I proposed the same amendment in committee, which I substantiated with the help of expert testimony, and the Liberals rejected my amendment. Now, all of a sudden, the Senate is proposing the same amendment and the government is agreeing to it in the motion we are debating today.

I asked the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness why the Liberals were not willing to put partisanship aside in a parliamentary committee and accept an opposition amendment that proposed a very simple measure but are agreeing to it today. He answered that they had taken the time to reflect and changed their minds when the bill was in the Senate. I am not going to spend too much of my precious time on that, but I find it somewhat difficult to accept because nothing has changed. Experts appeared before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, and it was very clear, simple and reasonable. Having said that, I thank the minister for finally recognizing this morning that I contributed to this process.

I also want to talk about some of what concerns us about the bill. There are two pieces specifically with regard to what was Bill C-51 under the previous government, and a few aspects new to this bill that have been brought forward that cause us some concern and consternation.

There are two pieces in Bill C-51 that raised the biggest concerns at the time of debate in the previous Parliament and raised the biggest concerns on the part of Canadians as well, leading to protests outside our committee hearings when we travelled the country to five major cities in five days in October 2016. The first has to do with threat disruption, and the second is the information-sharing regime that was brought in by Bill C-51. Both those things are concerning for different reasons.

The threat disruption powers offered to CSIS are of concern because at the end of the day, the reason CSIS was created in the first place was that there was an understanding and consensus in Canada that there had to be a separation between the RCMP's role in law enforcement, which is making arrests and the work that revolves around that, and intelligence gathering, which is the work our intelligence service has to do, so they were separated.

However, bringing us back closer to the point where we start to lose that distinction with regard to the threat disruption powers means that a concern about constitutionality will remain. In fact, the experts at committee did say that Bill C-59, while less unconstitutional than what the Conservatives brought forward in the previous Parliament, had yet to be tested, and there was still some uncertainty about it.

We still believe it is not necessary for CSIS to have these powers. That distinction remains important if we want to be in keeping with the events that led to the separation in the first place, namely the barn burnings, the Macdonald Commission and all those things that folks who have followed this debate know full well, but which we do not have time to get into today.

The other point is the sharing of information, which we are all familiar with. We opened the door to more liberal sharing of information, no pun intended, between the various government departments. That is worrisome. In Canada, one of the most highly publicized cases of human rights violations was the situation of Maher Arar while he was abroad, which led to the Arar commission. In such cases, we know that the sharing of information with other administrations is one of the factors that can lead to the violation of human rights or torture. There are places in the world where human rights are almost or completely non-existent. We find that the sharing of information between Canadian departments can exacerbate such situations, particularly when information is shared between the police or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Department of Foreign Affairs.

There is an individual who was tortured abroad who is currently suing the government. His name escapes me at the moment. I hope he will forgive me. Global Affairs Canada tried to get him a passport to bring him back to Canada, regardless of whether the accusations against him were true, because he was still a Canadian citizen. However, overwhelming evidence suggests that CSIS and the RCMP worked together with foreign authorities to keep him abroad.

More information sharing can exacerbate that type of problem because, in the government, the left hand does not always know what the right hand is doing. Some information can fall into the wrong hands. If the Department of Foreign Affairs is trying to get a passport for someone and is obligated by law to share that information with CSIS, whose interests are completely different than those of our diplomats, this could put us on a slippery slope.

The much-criticized information sharing system will remain in place with Bill C-59. I do not have the time to list all the experts and civil society groups that criticized this system, but I will mention Amnesty International, which is a well-known organization that does excellent work. This organization is among those critical of allowing the information sharing to continue, in light of the human rights impact it can have, especially in other countries.

Since the bill was sent back to committee before second reading, we had the advantage of being able to propose amendments that went beyond the scope of the bill. We realized that this was a missed opportunity. It was a two-step process, and I urge those watching and those interested in the debates to go take a look at how it went down. There were several votes and we called for a recorded division. Votes can sometimes be faster in committee, but this time we took the time to do a recorded division.

There were two proposals. The Liberals were proposing an amendment to the legislation. We were pleased to support the amendment, since it was high time we had an act stating that we do not support torture in another country as a result of the actions of our national security agencies or police forces. Nevertheless, since this amendment still relies on a ministerial directive, the bill is far from being perfect.

I also proposed amendments to make it illegal to share any information that would lead to the torture of an individual in another country. The amendments were rejected.

I urge my colleagues to read about them, because I am running out of time. As you can see, 20 minutes is not enough, but I would be happy to take questions and comments.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his question.

Bill C-59 is an omnibus bill. That will make it easy for the government to claim that the Conservatives voted against the bill as a whole, but that is completely untrue. I made that clear in my speech. For example, we agree with part 6, which makes changes to air travel legislation to fix problems with the no-fly list. There are also other parts where certain elements were changed. The fact remains that, overall, Bill C-59 is a political document designed to attack Bill C-51. In our opinion, the primary objective of fixing things that were problematic in the eyes of the Liberals or others has not been met, or has been met in a way that caters to certain interests.

As for security, this bill makes it harder for our agencies to do their job, especially the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS. It is wrong to say that we oppose Bill C-59 as a whole, but we cannot support it, because it is an omnibus bill and the problematic provisions are simply unacceptable.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my NDP colleague.

Our visions are often very different. However, our common goal is to succeed in making things better. Bill C-59 is a 260-page omnibus bill with more than nine parts. The NDP originally suggested splitting the bill so that we could work on it in a different way. All of its requests were denied. That was the government's ideology. The Liberals had their hearts set on attacking Bill C-51, and never mind everything else. Yes, I agree with my NDP colleague that our visions were different, but our objective was the same. Sadly, the Liberals were not willing to listen.

[Omar Alghabra, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Trade Diversification]

Madam Speaker, I remember when the Conservative Party was in government and passed Bill C-51. There was a lot of criticism by legal experts that the definition of counselling to commit terrorism was too broad and opened up a door to a lot of questionable practices. Then, lo and behold, the Conservative Party promoted an ad that quotes a video from a terrorist organization. Ironically, a lot of legal experts said that the Conservative government was violating its own law.

I have two questions for my colleague. First, does he think it is wise to quote a terrorist organization in an ad? Second, does he agree with me that having a clearer definition is better?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Madam Speaker, I rise this morning to speak to Bill C-59, an omnibus bill that is over 260 pages long and has nine major parts. I listened to the minister's speech, which addressed the Senate amendments, but I would first like to focus on Bill C-59 itself.

As I have been saying from the outset, the problem is that most parts of Bill C-59 are administrative in nature. They make changes to the various intelligence and communications agencies. That is fine, but the main goal of Bill C-59 was to respond to Bill C-51, which was implemented by the Conservatives following the attacks that took place here in Ottawa. Bill C-51 was specifically designed to counter terrorism and ensure that anyone seeking to commit terrorist acts in Canada was stopped to avert disaster.

Overall, the omnibus bill has some parts that are fine. They contain the sort of changes that need to be made from time to time. However, other parts are very administratively heavy and will be very costly for the public purse. Essentially, this is a bill on national security. The public expects the government to protect people properly and ensure that the offenders and would-be terrorists of this world are stopped.

Despite what the minister says, we believe that Bill C-59 limits CSIS's ability to reduce terrorist threats. It also limits the departments' ability to share information in order to protect national security. It removes the offence of advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general and raises the threshold for obtaining terrorism peace bonds and recognizance with conditions.

At the end of the day, Bill C-59 is going to make life difficult for CSIS agents and telecommunications services people. The bill makes it harder to exchange information. It will once again clog up a system that is already burdensome. People working on the ground every day to ensure Canada's security and safety will be under even more restrictions, which will prevent them from doing their jobs.

Here is a snapshot of the nine parts. Part 1 establishes the national security and intelligence review agency.

Part 2 enacts the intelligence commissioner act. It deals with everything pertaining to the commissioner and the various tasks he or she will have, but abolishes the position of the Commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment and provides for that commissioner to become the intelligence commissioner. It transfers the employees of the former commissioner to the office of the new commissioner and makes related and consequential amendments to other acts. In other words, it shuffles things around.

Part 3 enacts the Communications Security Establishment act. CSE's new mandate includes the ability to conduct preventive attacks against threats in addition to its role in signals intelligence and cyber defence. We really do not have a problem with that, provided it remains effective. That is an important point.

Part 4 amends the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act. It changes the threat reduction powers by limiting them to seven types of measures, one of which gives rise to the issue of whether non-invasive actions require a warrant. The measure in question is described as interfering with the movement of any person. This could mean that a CSIS officer requires a warrant to give misleading information to someone on the way to meeting with co-conspirators.

During operations, officers will sometimes provide individuals with false information to be passed on to those organizing terrorist or other plots. That is one of the work methods used in the field. Henceforth, warrants will have to be obtained, making the work more complicated. The officers will have to spend more time in the office doing paperwork and submitting applications instead of participating in operations.

Part 5 amends the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which was enacted by the Conservative government's Bill C-51. Individuals and privacy groups were unhappy that government institutions could, on their own initiative or at the request of another institution, share information on activities that undermine the security of Canada. Bill C-51 was criticized for permitting the sharing of citizens' personal information.

Although Bill C-59 maintains part of the departments' ability to share information, it is much more restrictive. This means that the departments operate in silos, which was harshly criticized by the national security experts who testified.

Part 6 is the most positive part, and we fully support it. This part deals with the Secure Air Travel Act and the problems with the no-fly list. When travellers have the same name as a terrorist, they encounter major problems, especially when it happens to children and they are not allowed to travel. This part will help fix this problem, and we fully support it.

Part 7 amends the Criminal Code by changing the offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences in general to one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, which carries a maximum sentence of five years.

I will read the next part, which does not pose any problems:

Part 8 amends the Youth Criminal Justice Act to, among other things, ensure that the protections that are afforded to young persons apply in respect of proceedings in relation to recognizance orders, including those related to terrorism, and give employees of a department or agency of the Government of Canada access to youth records, for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order.

Finally, here is the last part:

Part 9 requires that a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of this enactment take place during the sixth year after section 168 of this enactment comes into force.

These are additional administrative measures.

In short, of the nine parts of Bill C-59, we fully support part 6 on the no-fly list. The other parts contain a lot administrative provisions that will make the system more cumbersome. Part 7 is the most problematic.

We believe that the Prime Minister and the minister are weakening Canada's national security agencies and their ability to keep Canadians safe. This legislative measure will make it more difficult for law enforcement and security agencies to prevent attacks on Canadian soil because it takes away their authority to counter threats. The information silos this bill will create within our federal agencies are dangerous and foolish. Rather than countering radicalization, the Liberals are creating loopholes that could be exploited by those who want to radicalize our young people.

The Conservatives take the safety of Canadians very seriously. That is why the previous government brought Canada's national security laws into the 21st century and aligned them with those of our allies. While all of the Five Eyes allies are taking measures to strengthen national security, this government is bringing in legislation that will eliminate our intelligence service's ability to reduce terrorist threats. The Liberals' irresponsible approach will put Canadians' safety at risk.

I was pleased with the four amendments proposed by the senators, who also took the time to work on Bill C-59 and hear witnesses. We know that the independent Liberals have a majority in the the Senate, so we would not normally expect to see amendments that reflect the Conservatives' views. This time, however, we think all four amendments are excellent and deserve our support. We waited for the government's response.

Two of the amendments had been proposed by me and my Conservative colleagues on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, but the Liberals had rejected them. One of them sought to clarify the definition of the phrase “counselling commission of terrorism offence”. This short phrase really embodies the problem we have with Bill C-59. For the benefit of our viewers, I would like to quote the specific wording.

The bill would amend the Criminal Code by changing the following existing definition:

Every person who...knowingly instructs, directly or indirectly, any person to commit [a terrorist] offence...is guilty....

The bill would change it to the following:

Every person who counsels another person to commit a terrorism offence...is guilty....

What is the Liberals' real goal here, if not to just strike out the Conservative government's Bill C-51 so they can say they made a change?

Did they make this change with the intention of improving the legislation? No. Even the senators advised the government to preserve the essence of the definition set out in the Conservatives' Bill C-51.

The minister says that in 2015, when Bill C-51 was introduced by the Conservative government, no charges were ever laid. Is it not possible that no charges were laid because people got scared and decided not to run any risks, in light of the legislation and resources that were in place, as well as the enforcement capability?

Maybe that was why nothing happened. Does watering down and changing this—

[Colin Carrie, Conservative, Oshawa, ON]

Madam Speaker, I want to thank the minister for his clarification, but there was one thing he did not really clarify. My colleague asked about part 7. I want to ask him about threat disruption. Part 7 raises the threshold for recognizance orders and peace bonds, making it more difficult for law enforcement to disrupt threats before they occur.

This section proposes to change the Criminal Code from “the peace officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the detention of the person in custody is likely to prevent a terrorist activity” to “the peace officer suspects on reasonable grounds that the detention of the person in custody is necessary to prevent a terrorist activity.”

This is an extremely high bar when times are very short. Our Conservative Bill C-51 aligned with our allies, including countries like Norway and Finland. Why has the minister made it more difficult for information sharing and also taken away the reasonableness that is in agreement with our allies, as far as that point is concerned?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Madam Speaker, I would like to thank the minister for his explanation.

However, I am still skeptical about part 7. I listened carefully when the minister explained the part about the commission of a terrorism offence. In the broader conversation, people are comparing Bill C-59 to Bill C-51.

Bill C-59 is 260 pages long. Many parts of it are very administrative and relate to structural changes. I will talk about that later.

Everyone agrees that the government's approach here is wrong. National security experts say so. Conservatives sent the same message with our amendments. Even the Senate's amendment confirmed that the government's approach is wrong. Despite all that, the minister insists that he has the right solution.

Is the government butting heads with everyone just because it wants to keep its election promise to change Bill C-51 at any cost?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

moved:

That a Message be sent to the Senate to acquaint Their Honours that, in relation to Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters, the House:

agrees with amendments 3 and 4 made by the Senate;

respectfully disagrees with amendment 1 made by the Senate because the intent of the legislation is to ensure ministerial responsibility and accountability, and the legislation provides that the Intelligence Commissioner must review whether or not the conclusions of the Minister of National Defence, when issuing a foreign intelligence authorization, are reasonable; additionally, subsection 20(1) already requires the Commissioner to provide the Minister with reasons for authorizing or rejecting a foreign intelligence authorization request;

respectfully disagrees with amendment 2 made by the Senate because it would limit the scope of subsection 83.221(1) and would create inconsistencies with the general counselling provisions contained in section 22 and paragraphs 464(a) and (b) of the Criminal Code.

Madam Speaker, as many external experts have said, Bill C-59, which is before the House once again, is of extraordinary importance to Canada and the security and intelligence agencies that work every day to keep Canadians safe.

During the 2015 election, we promised to correct certain problematic elements in the previous government's national security legislation, Bill C-51. In making that promise, we pledged that a government must be able to protect individual rights while at the same time keeping Canadians safe. This is not about striking a balance whereby rights and safety are traded off one against the other; this is about achieving and protecting both simultaneously.

Work on this legislation began very shortly after our government was first sworn into office in late 2015. The time and effort it has taken to get Bill C-59 to the point it is at today have ensured that this is the right bill at the right time for Canada.

We began by examining landmark court rulings, such as those issued by Justices Iacobucci, O'Connor and Major, as well as past reports of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, the Senate and the House of Commons. We sought to implement their advice and their rulings.

We then looked at the legal authorities and powers our security and intelligence agencies have from a modern technological standpoint.

The Communications Security Establishment has been part of the Department of National Defence since the end of World War II, with its authorities embedded in the National Defence Act. In 2011, the CSE became a stand-alone agency. However, to this day, it still does not have its own enabling legislation with clear, delineated powers and authorities that reflect the necessary capabilities of signals intelligence in the modern era. Bill C-59 would fix that.

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act was written in 1984, following the Macdonald Commission report. It has been largely left in its original form since that time. To put that in perspective, in 1984, the Mac computer was first introduced to the public. If one had a PC instead of a Mac, one ran it on DOS, because Bill Gates had not released the first version of Windows yet, back in 1984. If one wanted to be one of the first people to buy a cellphone, one had to pay, in today's dollars, about $10,000, back in 1984. If one wanted to go online, one used a dial-up modem to access a bulletin board system, or BBS, because the Internet, with browsers, was still a decade away.

As Federal Court Justice Noël wrote in 2016, “the CSIS Act is showing its age”. Suffice to say, as we looked at the enabling legislation for our security and intelligence agencies, we realized that they needed a lot of updating just to catch up to technology.

In September 2016, having done our basic research and homework, we launched a national security green paper outlining the challenges and the opportunities, and we asked Canadians to share their views. As it turned out, we heard back from them in spades. Over 75,000 submissions were received, and all of them are now summarized in an open and transparent manner on the Public Safety Canada website. During that process, we held town halls and public consultations from coast to coast. The public safety committee of the House of Commons also undertook a study and submitted its recommendations to the government.

Then, on June 20, 2017, after analyzing and synthesizing all of that input, Bill C-59 was tabled in Parliament.

We put it in the public domain before the House rose for the summer so that MPs and the public could truly digest the bill's contents before debate began in Parliament later that fall.

Once the House resumed that fall, the bill was referred to the public safety committee before second reading, allowing it to have more scope for possible amendments. The committee made numerous changes, improving the legislation, including a new requirement for public ministerial directives on receiving or sharing information that may have been tainted by torture. The House passed Bill C-59 on June 19, 2018, and sent it to the Senate, where it received even greater scrutiny and several more amendments.

Among them, the Senate has amended the legislation to require parliamentary review of the legislation three years after royal assent rather than five years, as originally proposed. The original intent of the review after five years was to take into account that some of the provisions of Bill C-59 may come into force quite a bit down the road, and those parts may not have had the time to mature enough for a fulsome review after just three years. However, as I said at the outset, this is a vitally important piece of legislation, and the majority of it will be fully in force in the near term, so a review after three years, as proposed by the Senate, is just fine with me. Plus, a review this quickly would ensure that any changes that may be required as a result of the review could happen sooner.

The Senate also improved part 1.1 of the legislation, the new avoiding complicity in mistreatment by foreign entities act. While the bill lists five specific agencies involved in national security and intelligence operations that would have to comply with the provisions of the new act, the Senate added a schedule so that in future, new departments or agencies might be added by Governor in Council. This could include existing departments with a new national security component or future agencies that might be created.

I would also note that the Senate made eight observations about Bill C-59, which we will, of course, very carefully examine. I especially like the idea of the Senate undertaking a study it is proposing on converting intelligence to evidence in a court of law. This is a point that has bedevilled policy-makers for years, as well as Crown prosecutors and security and intelligence operators, and it is a topic that could benefit from detailed Senate examination.

The Senate also amended part 2 of the bill, which creates the new position and office of the intelligence commissioner. I thank the Senate for their consideration of this part, but will be asking my colleagues here in the House to respectfully decline this amendment.

The intelligence commissioner, under the new legislation, would have a vital role to play in determining whether the standard of reasonableness had been met in a foreign intelligence authorization. However, it would not be the role of the intelligence commissioner to determine how that standard should be met. There may be various methods to meet the standard, and the choice of which method is to be used would be at the discretion of the minister. There should be no confusion about ultimate accountability. It is important to ensure that the authority and accountability for a foreign intelligence operation would rest squarely with the Minister of National Defence.

My staff consulted very carefully on this point with the current Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, which will ultimately become the office of the new intelligence commissioner under Bill C-59, about this particular amendment. The office of the current commissioner indicated a very strong preference for the existing language in clause 20 of the future intelligence commissioner act.

The future clause 20 was amended by the House public safety committee to require the commissioner to provide reasons as to why he or she had approved any proposed authorization scheme or rejected it. That is the right step to take. The Minister of National Defence will consider those reasons when crafting any new authorization application. This approach allows the new commissioner to express his or her views very clearly, while the Minister of National Defence will retain the proper authority and accountability.

If, in the future, there were to be a situation where an authorization is ever challenged in court, it would be the Minister of National Defence, not the intelligence commissioner, who would be accountable to the court. The minister's argument in court should not be that the authorization scheme was explicitly what the intelligence commissioner told him to authorize in order for the CSE to undertake an important activity. In other words, the burden of responsibility should not be shifted to the intelligence commissioner; it must remain with the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of National Defence needs to account for that.

With respect to the Criminal Code amendment that has been proposed by the Senate, I very much appreciate what the senators have attempted to do here. I understand very clearly the point they are trying to make, and we have heard the same point from a number of other stakeholders that have come forward with similar questions and concerns.

However, I make this point. The courts have set an extremely high bar for convicting individuals of counselling offences, which is why the language in the Criminal Code needs to be clear and consistent. It must be just as clear for section 83, terrorism offences, as it is for section 22 and section 464, which cover the counselling of other Criminal Code offences. This will help public prosecutors when they make a decision as to whether there is a reasonable chance of conviction in order to proceed to trial.

Unfortunately, the changes made by the previous government's Bill C-51, back in 2015, had made the terrorist counselling provisions so obscure that they were never actually used. When Bill C-59 was tabled, the intent was to model the section 83, terrorism counselling offences, on the other Criminal Code counselling offences, which have been well used, successfully and are very familiar to police, prosecutors and judges alike.

The courts have already ruled that the terrorism counselling provisions in the Criminal Code, which refer to counselling “another person”, do not require the accused to have counselled a specific individual or even someone he or she knows. In practice, this broad principle will apply in section 83 as well.

If Parliament were to make the wording changes on counselling being suggested by the Senate, that could have unintended consequences for the rest of the Criminal Code's counselling provisions, such as counselling to commit a hate crime. A loophole could inadvertently be created, which I am sure some very assiduous defence attorney would attempt to exploit for a client facing a charge under section 464, for example.

Further, the use of the term “terrorist activity” in the amendment, rather than saying “terrorist offence” actually narrows the scope of what will be illegal under the terrorism counselling provisions. Terrorist activity is defined in the interpretation section of part II.1 of the Criminal Code, and that definition does not include all terrorism offences.

As an example, leaving Canada to join a terrorist group is an offence under the Criminal Code, but it is not contained within the definition of terrorist activity. As a result of the proposed amendment, it would be legal to counsel someone to travel to Syria to join Daesh. I am sure that is not what is intended by the proposed amendment, but that would be the actual consequence, and it is a consequence we need to avoid.

As I mentioned, I appreciate the spirit of the amendment and I have heard other representations to the same effect. However, what prosecutors have clearly told me is that if our goal is to have the terrorism counselling provisions used as frequently and effectively as possible, the best way to achieve that is to mirror the language used in the other counselling provisions in the Criminal Code where the notion of counselling “another person” already includes the counselling of an unknown individual.

I would like to remind all my colleagues of what Parliament is being asked to approve under Bill C-59 generally. We are looking to establish a single national security review body with a government-wide mandate to follow leads from one agency to another, such as from CSIS to the RCMP or elsewhere. This has long been recommended by experts, academics and parliamentary committees. Sometimes it is referred to as the super SIRC, and Bill C-59 does it.

We are creating a new act to govern the Communication Security Establishment, which includes a new regime for authorizing its activities for the first time ever. We are creating a closed list of threat reduction activities that CSIS may undertake so the service has clear direction from Parliament and knows what it can do, what it cannot do, and where the fences are. We are creating a justification regime for CSIS that will provide the lawful authorities it needs to perform the activities required to investigate threats and to keep Canadians safe. The same concept with respect to police officers has existed in the Criminal Code for many years.

We are also creating a dataset regime for the service that will allow it to collect, retain and query datasets subject to stringent safeguards. We are fixing the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, ensuring that it does not diminish lawful advocacy, protest and dissent. It will also have greatly improved safeguards to ensure federal departments share national security information only when it is necessary to do so, following appropriate procedures and keeping proper records.

Then there is the no-fly list, and I know we have all been lobbied on this one. Bill C-59 would enable the creation of a recourse mechanism for people whose names coincidentally match or closely resemble names that are listed in Canada's passenger protect program. This is the infamous problem of false positives, sometimes affecting small children.

I want to thank the members of the group known as the “no-fly kids”, whose tenacious efforts have kept this issue in the forefront for many parliamentarians, and Bill C-59 is part of the solution.

I can assure my colleagues that officials at Public Safety have compressed the timelines as much as humanly and physically possible. The required Treasury Board submissions and other orders in council required after royal assent of Bill C-59 will be moving as quickly as possible to get that recourse system up and running to deal with that issue for the no-fly kids.

That summary does not quite encapsulate everything that is in Bill C-59. However, as my colleagues can see, it is very comprehensive legislation that would strengthen and modernize our national security apparatus and architecture.

I want to thank all of the public servants across multiple departments who have worked on this and have appeared before many committees to provide technical answers to parliamentarians. I want to thank the tens of thousands of Canadians who participated in our green paper consultation process and the many individuals who continue to provide advice as Bill C-59 moves through the parliamentary process.

Most of all, I want to thank my parliamentary colleagues who have given this bill the thorough scrutiny that it most certainly deserves, including Senator Gold and his colleagues in the other place who have sent us the report we are dealing with at this moment and to which we are responding.

With this comprehensive legislation, we are in fact achieving our original goal and obligation to keep Canadians safe and secure, while simultaneously safeguarding their rights and freedoms and the precious democratic qualities and values that make Canada, Canada.

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parkdale—High Park, ON]

That's generous. Thank you, Ms. Khalid.

There are about four minutes left.

First of all, thank you to all of you.

It's good to see you again, Shahen, in Toronto. Thank you for being here. Your contributions are invaluable.

I have a few points.

Thank you for the reference to Bill C-51 and the amendments that were made. There have also been amendments by the government in respect of the security infrastructure funding, which is the funding we provide to increase surveillance capacity and security in places of worship. Unfortunately, these things have all been triggered by horrific events. It was doubled after the Quebec mosque shooting. It was doubled again after the New Zealand shooting. However, I think that's important.

Mr. Neve, you also mentioned that the anti-racism secretariat money in budget 2019 is dedicated to developing a robust anti-racism strategy. There are issues that all of us care about. I, in particular, care deeply about these kinds of issues.

Mr. Schutten, I want to ask you a question, because it's really germane to what we're studying here. Is the issue with section 13 a problem—you seem very well-versed legally, so I'm going to put to you a very strict legal question. The analogue to that provision was tested by the Supreme Court of Canada in its Whatcott decision, and section 13 was upheld. There was a minor amendment about how you should be able to belittle. Belittling is in the domain of free speech.

However, is your issue with the text of section 13 as it then was, which has effectively been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, or is the issue you raised—and raised poignantly—with the decision-making that took place? As a lawyer, I know that inconsistent decision-making is the bane of any litigation lawyer. Where's the rub there?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

One thing that Bill C-59 does with respect to the threat reduction measures is to create a very clear procedural, as well as legal and constitutional, frame that will ensure more transparency and more accountability. Exactly how the powers can be used is laid out now more explicitly in legislation than ever before.

The one major criticism of the old Bill C-51 was that the way those powers were worded in the old law implied that you could somehow exercise those powers in violation of the charter. We have clarified in the law explicitly that it is not the case, and that indeed, if and when those powers are ever exercised, they must be exercised in a manner consistent with the charter, not in violation of the charter.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Yes, Minister, of course.

With the announcement that was made, I believe the threat disruption powers that were first conferred by what was then Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament are one tool that CSIS may use in that event, and even with CSE's role will obviously significantly change once Bill C-59 gets royal assent. They have a large role to play in the election interference piece as well.

What happens for the whole-of-government approach if and when Bill C-59 gets royal assent, just with regard to the elections?

Opposition Motion—Terrorism

[Alupa Clarke, Conservative, Beauport—Limoilou, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to speak this evening. I want to acknowledge the people of Beauport—Limoilou watching us in real time or watching a rebroadcast on Twitter or Facebook.

Dear citizens, this evening we are debating a very important motion on a topic that is very sensitive for all Canadians given that we are talking about other Canadians. We are talking about Canadian combatants who have joined the Islamic State since 2013. More than 190 Canadians have made the solemn decision to join the ranks of the Islamic State, sometimes unwittingly, sometimes fully consciously. We condemn their decision to go overseas to join Daesh, better known as the Islamic State, which shrank in size considerably following the western coalition attacks. The group is located primarily in Syria and Iraq, in the Middle East.

These 190 Canadians decided to go overseas to join the Islamic State, which fights western countries and their values, including liberal democracy and gender equality. These are values that are dear to Canadian parliamentary democracy.

Today, the member for Winnipeg North and a number of his Liberal colleagues stated that these 190 Canadians were radicalized on the Internet, by reading literature or by ISIS propagandists on social networks. The Liberals are telling us that we should help Canadians who went to fight against Canada's military members and liberal democracy. Who knows. Perhaps they went to fight in order to one day destroy Canada's political system because they espouse different views. Every time, the Liberals tell us that we need to take pity on them and hold their hands because they were radicalized.

Today, we have moved our motion to address the following reality. Some of them were radicalized. However, I would venture that the vast majority of Canadians who went overseas to join Daesh did so of their own volition and for reasons that are rational, objective and politically motivated and that they believe are good reasons. They did not do so because they were alienated or radicalized. They perhaps want to destroy liberal democracy and gender equality around the world. They had several reasons for joining ISIS. They are not necessarily crazy or alienated.

How are we going to deal with those Canadians who return to Canada? I am not talking about those who left because they were suffering from mental illness or alienation, but rather those who went to the areas where ISIS attacks and counterattacks were taking place, and went of their own free will, to fight Canadian soldiers and soldiers of our allied military partners.

Today the Liberals are saying that the Conservatives are inventing numbers. Journalist Manon Cornellier, a director with the parliamentary press gallery, is highly regarded in the journalism community. She is very professional. In her article in Le Devoir this morning, she writes:

Some 190 Canadians are active in overseas terrorist groups such as Islamic State, also known as Daesh, mostly in Syria and Iraq. About 60 have returned to Canada, but only four have faced charges to date.

A professional journalist, employed by a highly respected newspaper that has been around for decades in Canada, must check her sources and facts before publishing any articles. Ms. Cornellier is reporting exactly the same figures as the official opposition. These are concrete numbers: 190 Canadians left; 60 of those terrorists, who have deliberately committed horrific crimes like raping women and killing children, have returned to Canada; four of them have faced criminal charges; and no one knows where the other 56 are.

What we are asking for is perfectly reasonable and normal in a country governed by the rule of law like Canada. We are asking the government to bring forward a plan within 45 days for determining the whereabouts of the 56 terrorists, both known and unknown, and others who may be coming, finding out what they are doing, and making sure that in the days, weeks or months to come, they are formally charged for what they did. Many of them did what they did for objective, political reasons. They were on a kind of campaign or crusade that went against Canadian and international law.

I will continue quoting from Ms. Cornellier article's in Le Devoir:

Daesh meets the definition of a terrorist organization, and its actions meet the definition of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Under the international law that Canada helped formulate, a country can prosecute anyone who committed such crimes and is physically present on its territory, regardless of where the acts were committed. Furthermore, Canada passed its own universal jurisdiction law in 2000 after ratifying the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. It used that law in 2005 to prosecute Désiré Munyaneza for crimes against humanity for his role in the Rwandan genocide.

This is not a first. She also writes:

According to Kyle Matthews, executive director of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies, Canada must not allow Canadian fighters to return to Canada or be repatriated without holding them responsible for the atrocities they helped perpetrate. They must be prosecuted to deter others from committing such crimes.

In other words, Ms. Cornellier and the executive director of the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies are saying exactly what we, Her Majesty's loyal opposition, are saying: these crimes must be punished by the courts.

Here is one final excellent quote from her article that shines a light on what we are saying today:

Investigations and the gathering of admissible evidence are indeed difficult, but the government is responsible for finding a solution. It must devise a legal process that operates in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice and overcomes the unique constraints that interfere with punishing these crimes. Without that, there can be no justice, and barbaric acts will continue to go unpunished.

That was written by Manon Cornellier, who is with a rather left-wing paper, Le Devoir, and is a director of the Parliamentary Press Gallery here in Ottawa.

That was not the Conservatives talking. It was a professional journalist who provided the same figures we did and who, like us, says that these 190 Canadians who participated in attacks in Syria or Iraq with ISIS committed barbaric acts. She is saying that the government must absolutely bring these people to justice when they return to Canada, that it is a matter of fundamental principles and Canadian history.

I would like to read the motion we moved today and that the Liberals have agreed to support. That said, they have decided to support our motion on a number of occasions and then failed to produce any meaningful action. The motion reads as follows:

That the House support the sentiments expressed by Nadia Murad, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, who in her book entitled The Last Girl: My Story of Captivity, and My Fight Against the Islamic State, stated: “I dream about one day bringing all the militants to justice, not just the leaders like Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi but all the guards and slave owners, every man who pulled a trigger and pushed my brothers’ bodies into their mass grave, every fighter who tried to brainwash young boys into hating their mothers for being Yazidi, every Iraqi who welcomed the terrorists into their cities and helped them, thinking to themselves, Finally we can be rid of those nonbelievers. They should all be put on trial before the entire world, like the Nazi leaders after World War II, and not given the chance to hide.”; and call on the government to: (a) refrain from repeating the past mistakes of paying terrorists with taxpayers’ dollars or trying to reintegrate returning terrorists back into Canadian society; and (b) table within 45 days after the adoption of this motion a plan to immediately bring to justice anyone who has fought as an ISIS terrorist or participated in any terrorist activity, including those who are in Canada or have Canadian citizenship.

That is the motion that we moved this morning and that we will soon be voting on.

Starting next week, if possible, we want the Liberal government to focus on bringing perpetrators of genocide and terrorist acts to justice and ensuring that courts have access to evidence gathered against suspected terrorists.

We want the Liberal government to keep Canadians safe from those who are suspected of committing acts of terrorism and to take special measures, like our previous Conservative government did in the wake of the terrorist attacks that took place here on Parliament Hill and nearby in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu. We responded by bringing forward Bill C-51.

We want the Liberals to encourage greater use of the tools to place conditions on those suspected of committing terrorist acts or genocide, as we did with Bill C-51.

We want the Liberals to institute processes for bringing perpetrators of atrocities to justice, since the current process is too slow, fails victims and prevents them from going home.

Lastly, we want the Liberals to support initiatives like those proposed by Premier Doug Ford, to ensure that terrorists returning to Canada are restricted from taking advantage of Canada's generous social programs as part of their reintegration.

In my riding, every weekend, whether I am at a spaghetti dinner or going door to door, my constituents ask me how it is possible that the Liberal government's primary goal continues to be helping people who are not yet citizens or helping Canadians who have fought against our own soldiers.

In Canada, above all we should help Canadians who are struggling to make ends meet or to find employment, as well as those having a hard time joining the workforce because of disability or other reasons.

We hope that beyond their support for our motion, the Liberals will come up with a real plan to address the problem of returning Islamic combatants, those Canadians who sadly decided to fight our values and our country.

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Speaker, one of the first things the Liberals did was to throw out Bill C-51. The bill would have provided the tools to take action in such cases.

My colleague would like me to talk about the past but instead I will ask him what the Liberals will do today and in the future.

In English or in French, what is the government's plan? How will the Liberals act on this?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I do not need a copy of Bill C-59 because I have read it. What it does is water down our national security and RCMP and policing agencies' ability to do exactly that, which is to fight terrorism. It makes it a lot more difficult for police to share information from one agency to another agency in Canada on terrorists, on those returning, on those activities within the country.

Bill C-75 and other acts have made it a hybrid offence to participate in these sorts of activities. For anyone to suggest that Bill C-59 is an improvement across the board over Bill C-51 has missed the swing of the pendulum when it comes to protecting Canadians and national security.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, the entire debate today is premised on the narrative that there are welcoming arms for ISIS fighters in this country. I do not think that is true. The other thing that the hon. member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner said was that it is no longer the case that it is illegal to promote terrorism in Canada or join a terrorist organization. Unless I misheard him, which is why I wanted to ask the question, that is certainly not true.

I worked hard on Bill C-59 as it went through the House. I also worked on Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament. It created an offence that is unknown in law, promoting terrorism “in general”. It is not something that anyone could identify, it was basically “thought chill”. It was a dangerous provision that would actually make it harder to fight terrorism in Canada under Bill C-51, under the Harper administration.

The new bill absolutely makes it an offence to promote terrorism, not in general, but to promote terrorism. I am wondering if the member could clarify. If he genuinely believes that it is not illegal to promote terrorism in Canada, I will bring him a copy of Bill C-59.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I join with colleagues across the aisle and here on this side of the House today. My hon. colleague who just spoke mentioned Nathan Cirillo. I echo the sentiment expressed and pay homage to his memory, his service. I also wish to express gratitude for the work done in the House on the part of the Parliamentary Protective Service and certainly the RCMP. I am fortunate enough to be the member for London North Centre, where “O” Division Headquarters is based.

I am very pleased to have the opportunity to speak to the motion. Members in the House do not always agree on everything, but I know we can always stand united in denouncing the depraved and barbaric acts committed by Daesh. We can salute courageous women such as Nadia Murad, who I have had the honour of meeting twice, the Yazidi Nobel Laureate who suffered unspeakable horrors under the Daesh rule and survived to tell her story. Mercifully this group's reign of terror is all but over.

Through defeats on the battlefield, it has lost the land it once controlled in Iraq and Syria, However, Daesh terrorists began returning to their countries of origin even while the so-called caliphate still existed. More of them may try to do so now that the group has been defeated.

We and our allies are well aware that our success on the battlefield has not eliminated the problem entirely. To an extent, we have only displaced it. Virtually every democratic country in the world is grappling with this issue. Some of our allies are dealing with hundreds or even thousands of potential returnees. The number we have to deal with is thankfully much smaller, but that is not cause for complacency.

In 2015, our security agencies were aware of about 60 people who had returned to Canada after engaging in terrorist activity abroad. That number has remained relatively stable since. While some of these people returned from former Daesh strongholds in Syria and Iraq, most of them were actually involved with other terrorist groups in other parts of the world.

Today, according to the most recent public report from CSIS, about 190 Canadians have left our country to join terrorist groups, Daesh or others, and remain abroad. Some of them may be dead. Some of them may not want to come back. However, we must be ready for those who do, and we are.

The professionals in Canada's national security agencies are working extremely hard to track these individuals, to bring criminal charges whenever possible and to carefully monitor them to keep us all safe. Here are a few facts. Facts are always important, but particularly in a debate such as this.

First, if extremist travellers attempt to return to Canada, there is a very high likelihood that our agencies will know about it. That is because of the information-sharing we do domestically and with our Five Eyes allies, on an ongoing basis, to identify individuals seeking to return. When Canadian authorities become aware of such travel, a process is activated to control and indeed to manage their return. Even before they are back on our soil, Canada's intelligence, security and law enforcement agencies actively assess and monitor the threat each individual poses. Threat assessments, monitoring and investigations continue for as long as necessary after their return. If evidence supports charges, terrorism charges under the Criminal Code can and will be laid upon their return. Since last year, in fact, four individuals have been charged for terrorism-related offences after their return to Canada and two have been convicted. It is also worth pointing out that under the Harper government that number was zero.

The task of collecting enough evidence about activity in a war zone on the other side of the world to support charges in a Canadian court is certainly a challenging one. While police and prosecutors go about the difficult work of collecting it, our security and intelligence agencies make full use of a broad range of tools at their disposal. For instance, they can issue peace bonds. They can cancel, revoke and refuse Canadian passports on national security grounds.

Under the passenger protect program, they use the no-fly list to ensure that people are prevented from travelling for terrorism-related purposes. They also engage in surveillance and legally authorized threat-reduction measures to keep Canadians safe.

At the same time, we should recognize that people do not travel to join a terrorist group and then become radicalized. Indeed, the radicalization happens at home. We should therefore be doing everything we can to prevent Canadians, mostly Canadian youth, from becoming radicalized in the first instance. The Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence supports community-based organizations that do this important work.

While I am on the subject, the Conservatives should stop denigrating counter-radicalization work. For example, think of parents whose teenage son has started bringing home extremist literature and visiting extremist websites. What would those parents prefer I ask? Would they rather the government have nothing to offer but handcuffs once it is too late? Or would they rather the government's support programs at their son's school, local community centre or place of worship to help extricate him from the clutches of extremism before he did something violent? I think we all know the answer to that question or ought to know it.

None of us should pretend this can only happen to other people's kids or only to Muslim kids. Counter-radicalization programs help prevent all our children from being victims or perpetrators. Of course, once someone does cross the Rubicon and engages in terrorist activity, we need a modern national security framework our agencies can use to keep us safe.

That is the purpose behind our landmark national security legislation, Bill C-59, which is currently being debated in the Senate. Bill C-59 would overhaul Canada's national security framework and bring it into the 21st century. It would modernize and enhance Canada's security and intelligence laws to ensure our agencies would have the tools they would need do their jobs. This would be achieved within a legal and constitutional framework that would be charter-compliant. For example, it would clarify definitions that are vague or overly broad. This includes the term “terrorist propaganda”.

The former Bill C-51 created a new offence of knowingly advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general. Currently, the maximum punishment for it is a five-year prison sentence, but this provision is so unclear that it has hardly been used. That is why the government is revising the definition by using the clearer and more precise legal concept of counselling the commission of terrorism offences. This change would make it more likely that charges would be laid and successfully prosecuted.

It is crucial we get all this right, the legal authorities, the counter-radicalization programs and all the work our agencies do at home and overseas, because extremism of all kinds remains a real threat to our security. That includes extremism inspired by Daesh and al Qaeda, extremism inspired by white supremacists and all the other varieties that exist in our country and around the world. Canada is, by and large, a safe and peaceful place. We should not get hyperbolic about the threat of terrorism, but we must take it seriously.

I am not entirely convinced the Conservative motion takes this seriously enough. This motion seems to me more of a political game than anything else. However, we can all support the statement in it by Nadia Murad. I join all colleagues in their desire to see the villains of Daesh brought to justice.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, today we mark the fourth anniversary of the horrific attack here, on Parliament Hill. We lost corporal Nathan Cirillo. Two days ago was the anniversary of the attack in which Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent lost his life in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, not too far from my riding. I think this is fitting, in light of today's debate on terrorism—a difficult, complex issue that too often leads to loss of life—and on Canada's response to terrorism in order to maintain public safety. We remember these two men who served their country and who lost their lives in horrible circumstances not too long ago.

I would also like to take this opportunity to remind the House that the NDP was proud to support the motion moved by the Conservatives just over a year ago to recognize that these horrific, heinous crimes committed by ISIS constitute genocide. There is no doubt about the real nature of this horrific violence perpetrated against minorities, women, the LGBT community and all other victims. We support the Conservatives' motion.

We know that all parties want the to achieve the same end. Regardless of what we say, regardless of our differences of opinion as to the means to that end, our objective is to put criminals, to put terrorists, behind bars.

The question before us today is how a democratic, law-based society should go about achieving that end. We are facing a number of challenges, which I will address during my speech. Obviously, the fact that we acknowledge those challenges and that we have no easy ways to overcome them does not mean we are being soft on the issue or that we want these individuals, who may be living in Canadian communities, to threaten public safety.

I think it is worth looking at the two key pieces here in this motion. However, before I go any further, I would be remiss to not congratulate Nadia Murad for receiving the Nobel Peace Prize for the extraordinary work that she has done to bring this issue to the forefront.

The one thing I can agree on with my colleague for Calgary Nose Hill, although we do not agree on everything, is that the deafening silence that sometimes follows this kind of advocacy, that someone like Nadia Murad engages in, is troubling. We always want to do better as parliamentarians and as a country.

In that vein, I think it is also important to recognize that we cannot even begin to imagine the strength and courage required to go through the type of ordeal and horror that she has witnessed. However, it takes even more courage to relive that horror, to be an advocate and be part of the political process in seeking justice and change in the way that different countries engage in these difficult issues.

With that being said, I do want to address the two parts of this motion. I want to start with part (a) that specifically goes into this issue relating to rehabilitation.

I think the issue here is that we have to look at the fight to combat radicalization. It has been made clear by many national security experts and many experts who have worked in connected fields that one of the key challenges that is facing this era of social media, for example, where it is easy for an individual and in many cases individuals with mental health issues who are easily being manipulated through social media and other means by different individuals related to ISIS and others, is that a proper, comprehensive anti-radicalization strategy is required to tackle this issue. It is not an issue that is exclusive to ISIS. It is also when we see white supremacists or when we see other extremism that leads to violence.

I think that is the key is to counter radicalization that leads to violence. That is the key piece of how we ensure public safety with regard to these matters.

It is something the New Democrats brought up in the previous Parliament when we were debating then Bill C-51. We said to the government of the day that although there was an issue of addressing public safety, rather than adopting new, draconian legislation that does not actually address the issue and keep communities safe, why not give additional resources to the policing community, for example?

In 2012, the police recruitment fund was cut. It allowed provinces and municipalities to have additional resources to hire police and, in some cases, put together special units that could tackle, for example, organized crime and street gangs. It provided the kinds of resources that could allow police to do their work and complement the efforts being deployed by the RCMP to tackle the issue of terrorism and other forms of extremism that we unfortunately see in Canada and other countries today. We raised that issue.

We also raised the issue of radicalization and being preventative. I know sometimes “preventative” has a certain meaning, and rhetoric can be construed around it to make it mean something that it does not. The reality is that prevention is not about trying to use kid gloves with individuals who may commit heinous crimes. It is about making sure Canadians are safe and that these crimes and terrorist attacks are not being committed in the first place. After all, we can deploy all of the resources and legislative tools we can after the fact, but there is already a failure when we talk about things after the fact. How do we avoid getting to that point whenever possible? Countering radicalization is one way to do so.

Of course there are challenges. For instance, Montreal's Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence lacks funding. I will not get into detail because there is also an internal management issue related to Government of Quebec programs. However, Montreal's mayor, Valérie Plante, raised an important point in this debate. She said that Montreal's government is reluctant to provide ongoing funding to the centre because the population it serves extends well beyond the greater Montreal area. It is, after all, the only organization in North America whose mission is to prevent radicalization leading to violence.

As part of a study by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, we met with representatives of the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence. They told us they are getting calls from all across Canada and even the American east coast. For example, parents and members of a vulnerable community in New York have been calling the centre for assistance. This shows that there is a desperate need, not only in Canada but also in the U.S. and around the world. Strategies have been deployed in Europe to solve the problem, but here in Canada and North America, there is an appalling lack of initiatives.

Of course I welcome the funding allocated by the federal government to try to address the issue, but obviously, it is not enough. If that were the case, there would be more than just one centre. If I am not mistaken, the government will fund only individual projects. What we need are broad, generalized efforts.

Let us also not forget the importance of providing additional training to our police forces and especially the RCMP to support their work with communities that are vulnerable to all kinds of extremism, whether from ISIS or the far right. Right-wing extremism is a growing threat, according to an article published by the Toronto Star a few weeks ago. I encourage all my colleagues to read it.

All of this shows that we must not only do more, but also think about the types of strategies being used. This is essential to ensuring public safety. When we talk about crime and terrorism, some people and some political parties might think that the word “prevention” means being gentle with those who are about to commit the most horrendous crimes in the history of humanity. Let us be clear: prevention means ensuring public safety and avoiding the loss of more lives like that of Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent and Corporal Nathan Cirillo, whom we lost four years ago.

The other element of course concerns the intelligence-to-evidence gap, more specifically dealing with part (b) of this motion, which is the issue of how we prosecute these individuals, particularly those who are returning to Canada. It is a huge challenge that we face, and we are not alone in facing it.

There are different reasons why this intelligence-to-evidence gap exists. One of the reason is the additional powers given to CSIS. When we look at the threat-reduction powers given to CSIS under Bill C-51, they continue to exist despite the amendments I presented at the public safety committee during debate on Bill C-59, which essentially represents the Liberals' attempt at correcting and failing to correct many of the outstanding issues. The big issue is that those threat-reduction powers are, in a word, and I am sure some lawyers will cringe hearing me say this because it is probably not the correct terminology, essentially extra-constitutional powers. CSIS is going to judges and asking them for judicial authorization to use its threat-reduction powers in a way that can contravene the charter.

What we saw in Bill C-59 is that while those powers still exist, they have become, as I like to put it, less unconstitutional than they were under Bill C-51. However, the big problem in the debate today is the issue relating to information that is gleaned through the powers CSIS is using, because at the end of the day, the RCMP, in its responsibilities as a law enforcement entity in working with Crown prosecutors to bring these returning foreign fighters to justice and making sure they find themselves behind bars, cannot use the information CSIS has. Therefore, it is deploying its own own efforts. It cannot simply cherry-pick what CSIS has obtained through a whole different regime of judicial authorization than using its own powers as the RCMP under the Canada Evidence Act and, of course, nationally under the Constitution, first and foremost.

The other challenge relating to that is not just the powers being exercised by CSIS and the RCMP in their own individual silos but also how we use information obtained through international conflict, the consequences of that conflict, and how we use that in a constitutional way in fair trials. It is interesting when we say “fair trials”, because I am sure many Canadians listening to us and some members of other parties might say, “Who cares about fairness? These people have perpetrated some of the most horrible crimes known to humanity. They have committed genocide.” However, fairness is important in ensuring public safety, because it ensures the sanctity of the proceedings. Therefore, if we want successful proceedings that properly prosecute and convict these individuals, and hopefully in the cases where obviously it is appropriate and the findings are such, we need fairness, or else the proceedings will get thrown out and we will be right back to square one.

There are a few elements to that. One was brought up. Here I will refer my colleagues to the fantastic podcasts by Craig Forcese and Stephanie Carvin called “Intrepid”, where there was an interview with Solomon Friedman, a criminal defence attorney. As he put it in the interview, these people are not always the most popular individuals when it comes to considering the victims of horrible crimes. However, he brought up an important point. When we look at the fantastic reporting by Stewart Bell, for example, on what is going on with these fighters who have been detained in Kurdish facilities, we will see that those facilities have abhorrent conditions and that the RCMP cannot just walk into facilities that are potentially engaging in less-than-savoury practices, whether it is torture or other things, or where the conditions are far below the standards that Canadians would expect for incarcerated offenders in our corrections facilities. The big issue there is that it would be easy for a judge, as a result of the arguments of a defence attorney, to look at that Kurdish facility and say that there clearly is an argument to be made as to whether the information before the court is true or not, because it is a result of confessions obtained under duress. Certainly that is not for me to say, but I want to make sure, as a legislator, that we are ensuring the maximum fairness in a process to maximize the success rate so that we find ourselves in safer communities and achieve the public safety and the justice objectives of our system based on the rule of law.

I admit, that is not always what the public wants to hear.

Ultimately, we have to acknowledge that we all want the same thing. The big question is how to go about fixing this problem. It is a challenge.

A reporter asked me a question following an excellent Global News report by journalist Stuart Bell. The reporter asked me whether the government should be taking steps to bring these people back to Canada.

It is a question for which I have no answer. Obviously, as the minister mentioned, I do not want diplomats to put themselves in danger to bring back these individuals. Nor do I want individuals to come back to Canada and be a threat to public safety.

That said, we also have a responsibility towards those people who hold Canadian citizenship. If they have committed horrible crimes, we must ensure that they are prosecuted in Canada and put behind bars in Canada. Not only do we have a responsibility to protect law-abiding citizens, but we also must prosecute those who are not. It is not always a very popular concept, but it is one of the underlying principles of Canadian citizenship.

We are not just talking about the cartoonish characters the Conservatives have made up, usually frightening men in their twenties who return home and threaten our safety. There are also extremely complex cases, such as the women who went abroad. In some cases, because of their movements and activities with ISIS, they could be prosecuted.

Those kinds of cases are much more complicated, because they may involve women who have gone through rape, spousal violence, and all sorts of other, more nebulous situations abroad, which we may not have information about. These are highly complex cases. Women are, of course, one of the groups that has been victimized by ISIS. Why would we want to abdicate our responsibility towards Canadian women who have been victimized by ISIS?

I can understand how, in some cases, some women may be found guilty of certain offences under the Criminal Code provisions regarding travelling and supporting a terrorist group. However, we must not neglect the women who are victims.

The government has a job to do. It needs to use the information at its disposal to make sure everything possible is being done to protect victims who are Canadian citizens.

That goes for children as well. I think all Canadians, everyone tuning in at home and everyone here in the House, would agree that it is unacceptable for Canadian children, some under the age of five, to end up in camps in a conflict zone abroad. By failing to bring these women back to Canada, we are also leaving their children stranded in a foreign country under execrable conditions.

I will come back to the quote from Nadia Murad included in this motion. She mentions brainwashing. Children as young as five years old, sometimes younger, can be turned into child soldiers abroad, as we often see in war zones where genocide is committed. Radicalization can turn them into future threats to public safety in their own right, and we do not want that to happen.

Protecting a child and also protecting public safety are extremely commendable goals that anyone can get behind, even though this is happening in war zones where situations can become extremely tricky and difficult to handle.

In conclusion, while I certainly recognize Canadians' concerns in wanting to ensure public safety, let me be clear that while we might differ on the methods to be deployed and how we hone the tools that we have to prosecute returning foreign fighters and to counter radicalization, all in the House agree that more can be done to close the intelligence-to-evidence gap to ensure public safety. However, we do ourselves a disservice when we do so in a way that sometimes brushes aside the fact that not all of these individuals are coming from the same situation. There is a huge challenge when it comes to women and children, in particular, which cannot be ignored. For that reason, more needs to be done. We look forward to collaborating with the government as it tries to seek solutions to this issue.

It would be naive to say that this is not the most complicated public safety issue we are currently dealing with. We therefore have to tackle it head on. I am pleased to work with my colleagues from all parties to try to resolve this issue and keep the public safe.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, I want to ask my colleague a question about threat disruption powers. She rightly highlighted the flaws in Bill C-51, which was tabled in the last Parliament by the Conservatives. Despite my efforts to make amendments to Bill C-59 in committee, CSIS will keep its threat disruption powers. One of the major issues, besides the fact that a judge is essentially being asked to green-light unconstitutional disruption activities, is the comparison of information and evidence that would be admissible in court.

One of the problems pointed out by experts is that, with the threat disruption powers used by CSIS, which are obtained through a very specific system, with approval from a judge, the RCMP must then take its own measures to gather the same information in order for it to be admissible as evidence.

Would my colleague agree that giving this kind of power to CSIS exacerbates an existing problem with streamlining the work of intelligence agencies and the work of police forces?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague from the NDP for the question.

I believe that is the challenge. We both sit on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security and we got through Bill C-59, which amended Bill C-51. Bill C-59 will make it even harder for law enforcement to lay charges.

It is certainly a challenge abroad. There are international agreements and opportunities to work on this. I believe there is nothing stopping us from sending intelligence teams and the RCMP there to find evidence and work in collaboration with the forces on the ground.

We should have the means to do this, but if we do not, then that is why we are calling on the government to take action and find legal avenues to make this happen.

It is the government's responsibility to solve this problem, but that is not what we are seeing right now. It seems like the Liberals do not feel like solving this problem.

[Daisy Kler]

I would like to thank the committee for inviting me to speak. I thought I had 10 minutes, so I will have to be faster than I'd like.

First of all, the Vancouver Rape Relief and Women's Shelter is Canada's first rape crisis line. We opened in 1973, and we operate a transition house for battered women and their children. We receive about 1,300 new calls per year and house about 100 women and their children who are escaping violent men. We offer advocacy and accompaniment to police, court, and hospital, as well as oftentimes to immigration and welfare.

In the course of their stay, we assist women with finding housing, obtaining a lawyer for family law matters such as custody and access, making a police statement, finding day care, and almost everything they need on a daily basis. Also, if needed we find translation and assist with immigration and refugee issues.

Vancouver Rape Relief is a collective of paid and volunteer members. Our membership includes former battered women, women who have exited prostitution, and sexual assault survivors. Our members vary in age, race, and class.

Our 40 years of front-line work informs our understanding of all forms of male violence against women, including wife assault, incest, rape, sexual harassment, and prostitution.

We have been widely consulted for our expertise and our understanding of male violence against women, locally, nationally and internationally. For example, we've also been contributing our expertise on violence against women in provincial and federal consultations, most recently to this committee on trafficking and prostitution, and for Bill C-51.

We also participate widely in the women's movement. Since 1997, we have held an annual all-day event in the form of a public conference in memory of the Montreal massacre. Rape Relief has led in-depth facilitated discussions on key issues regarding male violence against women. The participants include local, national, and international equality-seeking women's groups and feminist front-line women's service workers, and the event is highly attended by members of the public and other feminists in the city.

In 2011 we were part of the global Women's Worlds conference in Ottawa, and with CLES—Concertation des luttes contre l'exploitation sexuelle—we organized an international trilingual discussion among women experts who discussed prostitution as male violence against women. We hosted discussants from first nations and from 15 countries around the world.

We also work in coalition with other anti-violence workers and organizations, such as the Canadian Association of Sexual Assault Centres, the Canadian Network of Women's Shelters and the BC Society of Transition Houses.

Vancouver Rape Relief has advanced and pursued public cases where there is a women's equality interest. For example, Rape Relief was a party with standing in the institutional and expert hearings for the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls. We're part of a national coalition of front-line workers that has been granted intervenor status in the appeal of Bradley Barton, who was found not guilty for the murder of Cindy Gladue. Our oral submission will be heard in the Supreme Court of Canada on October 11.

What does our front-line experience tell us? Most women who have experienced male violence do not engage with the criminal justice system. Roughly 30% of the women who call us have done so. That is high, because most rape crisis centres are only dealing with sexual assault, for which the numbers are lower. However, because we're dealing with battered women as well, sometimes the police are called for them by neighbours and other people. They're not the only ones calling, so that makes our numbers a bit high.

Oftentimes the women we work with in the transition house have the police called on them, but if they themselves call, they don't see their cases get to court, and even fewer of those cases result in criminal convictions. Our work shows that most of the women who've stayed in our house and who have tried to use the police don't get more than a police file number. It's uncommon for there to be any arrest or charges. It's extremely unlikely that there will be a conviction.

Women don't have faith in the criminal justice system. They don't have faith that it'll work in their favour because history has shown that it doesn't. Although we welcome some of the changes in the bill, it must be acknowledged that these changes will affect a small portion of women who have experienced male violence.

I'm hopeful that some of the measures will have a positive impact. We believe that protecting women's equality rights does not have to come at the expense or violation of men's charter rights. We do take the position that it's battered and sexually assaulted women who rarely find justice or have their charter rights upheld. We argue that the existing laws must be applied as they relate to battered and raped women.

We recognize that it's poor, racialized, and indigenous men who fill the prisons, not because they commit more crimes against women but because the criminal justice system unfairly criminalizes these populations and lets rich white men off the hook. It's a poor, racialized, and indigenous woman who is most likely to be arrested if the violent man calls the police on her.

We don't believe that prisons successfully reform men, and we don't call for longer jail sentences. However, communities do not hold men accountable for the violence men commit. Therefore, women will continue to need the criminal justice system for protection, and we feminists must fight for women's access to the rule of law.

We welcome some of the changes in the language, such as the change from “spousal” to “intimate partner” and the expansion of the definition to include former partners and dating partners because it better reflects the range of relations women are in outside of marriage. This change also allows for a broader and deeper interpretation of the continuing power that abusive men exert over women after the relationship has ended since a woman is most at risk in the first 18 months after leaving an abusive man. We see that men use violence towards women at all different stages of a relationship, including after it ends, so the change to “intimate partner” violence is good because it could mean a higher chance of him being held responsible for his behaviour.

However, this language change does nothing to correct the fundamental flaw in this bill. Nowhere in this bill is male violence against women acknowledged. It is understood worldwide that male violence against women is a social reality that cannot be denied. This bill does nothing to reflect or acknowledge the fact that the perpetrators of violence are overwhelmingly men and that the victims of that violence are women.

The change to the reverse-onus bail in cases of male violence is an encouraging step to help reduce the number of men who immediately reoffend and attack their female intimate partners. It's a positive step because the onus is on him to prove why he should be let out if he has a history of domestic violence. It sends a message that violence against women is a serious crime.

It is, however, unfortunate that this reverse onus will not apply to those men without a criminal record for domestic violence. This includes convicted persons who have received an absolute or conditional discharge. In a case in which I was working with a battered woman, her abuser was a lawyer. He argued to the judge that he needed to go to the States to visit family. Even though he admitted that he was guilty, she granted him a conditional discharge. If he batters again, which he likely will, he won't be held on this reverse onus.

We think that eliminating the mandatory use of preliminary inquiries is a positive step. We know from our own experience of accompanying women to court that preliminary inquiries are used by the defence as an attempt to discredit the women's testimonies by pointing out minute discrepancies between their police statements, their preliminary inquiry evidence and their trial testimonies. As a recent example, in a trial I attended last month, the woman was testifying, and she said in her pretrial, “I think I wore a cardigan,” in one statement, and in another statement she said, “I was wearing a cardigan.” The defence cross-examined her gratuitously on the difference, implying that because she didn't use the exact same wording, she was lying. This misuse of preliminary hearings in sexual assault trials is common, and we're glad to see its use limited.

Bill C-75 makes strangulation a more serious level of assault, equal to assault causing bodily harm. Since strangulation is an indicator of the likelihood of increased and more severe violence, including wife murder, this change better reflects the seriousness of the crime—

National Security Act, 2017

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Madam Speaker, no. In fact, I would invite that member to consult the testimony made by the last head of CSIS who, before he left his post about a year ago, had testified in front of one of our committees—I cannot remember which one—saying that powers of preventative arrest from tools in Bill C-51 had been used several dozen times. There had never been an incident where a situation of a charter violation was going to be used at all.

What this was about, and why I referred to the Prime Minister's own comments, is that this was about my three major concerns. Changes to preventative arrest, raising the burden for peace bonds or protective orders, actually went contrary to what we heard from victims and those impacted by these attacks. The tools are not unique to terrorism.

As I have said, the terrible case of the mosque shooting, the Bissonnette case, is a case where the tools could have been applied if they had thought social media rantings went to a “likely to commit”. By using a “necessary” standard, we are handcuffing law enforcement and they are struggling to maintain the high level of safety and security they want to deliver for Canadians.

Why do we not trust law enforcement in a way that is balanced and backed up by our court and charter? The Liberals are taking our system and not balancing it. They are putting our police at a disadvantage.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Madam Speaker, I wonder if that member would invite the same approach that the British use? Literally, if they walk out of their house, they are on television in Britain. With CCTV, the intrusion into lives is unparalleled. Is that what that member might be suggesting? Their security forces have a totally different landscape, which cannot even be connected to our law enforcement and the tools they have here. To compare it to the United Kingdom is quite frankly irresponsible.

Law enforcement has asked for tools with respect to preventative arrest. There needed to be an evidentiary threshold. Allegations that we were going to have some police state, and ridiculous arguments that I heard around Bill C-51, were embarrassing. Why I quoted the Prime Minister was because he supported these preventative arrest powers in Bill C-51. As I said, the Liberals criticized Bill C-51 in a bland and undetailed way, but they voted for it. One of the specific areas where the Prime Minister was willing to stand up and say “where necessary” was on preventative arrests.

This is about balance. Some on the left have used an unbalanced approach to talking about public safety and security, and I think it diminishes responsible debate in this chamber.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Madam Speaker, to the last point made by my hon. friend from Durham, that Bill C-51 in the 41st Parliament, the Anti-terrorism Act, was there to make us safe, again, the expert evidence we heard, even before that bill passed, was that Bill C-51 under the previous government made us less safe.

For that, I cite the evidence of Joe Fogarty, an MI5 agent doing security liaison between Canada and U.K. When asked by the U.K. authorities about what Canadian anti-terrorism legislation they might want to replicate in the U.K., he answered “not a thing”, that they have created a situation which is akin to an accident waiting to happen. It has made Canadians less safe, through the failure to ensure that one agency talks to the other. In the example that the member just gave, agencies have a proactive requirement to talk to each other and not guard their information jealously.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Madam Speaker, vigilance is right, and that is why I brought real examples into my speech here tonight. This is not about howling at the moon that I am a tough-on-crime guy. These are real cases, and they represent the reality that parliamentarians must face in balancing liberty with protections in society as threats change.

I refer him, and my Liberal friends listening, to the testimony of Louise Vincent, sister of Patrice Vincent, in the context of Bill C-51. She said, “The RCMP did its job and built a case, but unfortunately, the burden of proof was not met. That’s unacceptable.” It is unacceptable. Law enforcement knew Couture-Rouleau was a risk and that he was likely to commit an attack, but they did not feel the case met the standard of “necessary” or that he “would” commit an attack, so he was not preventatively detained.

These are real cases. I have always said that we should not overstate the risk, but we have a responsibility to work with law enforcement to give them tools to keep us safe. By taking these tools back, the government is indirectly telling parliamentarians and Canadians that it does not trust the very people we charge with keeping us safe. On this side, we do trust them.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Madam Speaker, with respect to the major misgivings that he talks about, I highlighted the Prime Minister's remarks regarding preventative arrests. He supported the moves with respect to preventative arrests in Bill C-51, and I am sure he knew they did not offend the charter.

As I said, people seem to forget that these powers are not viewed in isolation. These are tools given to law enforcement that require an evidentiary burden before serious tools like peace bonds or preventative arrests are used. This cannot be done on a whim. There is a difference between the case involving Mr. Habib, the guy who travelled to be radicalized by ISIS and was convicted in a Montreal court the day before the government tabled this bill, and that of Mr. Couture-Rouleau, for example. Mr. Couture-Rouleau did not even leave Canada to be radicalized and trained by terrorist forces. He did it through his own social media feeds and through his network on the ground.

It reflects the charter when we ask law enforcement to meet a standard. This bill would make the standard so high that authorities would not be able to carry out preventative arrests. They would have to wait until the aftermath. We are catching the terrorist, as opposed to preventing the terrorism.

[Erin O'Toole, Conservative, Durham, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is a real pleasure for me to rise and speak to an important bill and issues related to public safety and security in general.

I would like to begin my remarks with a positive word of thanks for those men and women who are charged with keeping our communities safe, certainly the front-line police officers and first responders, but a lot of the people in the intelligence networks from CSIS, to CSE, to think tanks that analyze these things, to engaged citizens who are constantly advocating on issues related to public safety and security. These are probably some of the most important debates we have in this chamber because we are charged with making sure we have a safe community and finding the right balance between the remarkable freedoms we enjoy in a democracy like ours and the responsibility to ensure that there is safety for Canadians. We thank those who are charged with doing that both in uniform and behind the scenes and sometimes under the cloak of secrecy. All Canadians respect that work.

I am going to talk about Bill C-59 from a few vantage points, some of the things that I thought were positive, but I am also going to express three areas of very serious concern I have with this legislation. In many ways, Bill C-59 is a huge step back. It is taking away tools that were responsibly provided to law enforcement agencies to be used in accordance with court supervision. In a lot of the rhetoric we hear on this, that part has been forgotten.

I am going to review some of it from my legal analysis of it, but I want to start by reminding the House, particularly because my friend from Winnipeg, the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader is here, that here we are debating yet another omnibus bill from the Liberal Party, something that was anathema to my friend when he was in opposition. Omnibus bills of this nature that cobbled together a range of things were an assault on democracy, in his words then, but here we are in late night sittings with time already allocated debating yet another Liberal omnibus bill. The irony in all of this is certainly not lost on me or many Canadians who used to see how the Liberals would howl with outrage whenever this happened.

Bill C-59 came out of some positive intentions. My friend from Victoria, the NDP's lead on the parliamentary security oversight committee of parliamentarians is here. I want to thank him for the work that we did together recommending some changes to the minister ahead of what became Bill C-59. The NDP member and I as the public safety critic for the Conservative Party sent two letters to the minister providing some general advice and an indication of our willingness to work with the government on establishing the committee of parliamentarians for security and intelligence oversight.

My friend from Victoria ably serves on that committee now and as a lawyer who has previously practised in the area of national security and finding the right balance between liberty and security, he is a perfect member for that committee as are my friends from the caucus serving alongside the Liberal members. That is very important work done by that committee and I wish them well in their work. We indicated pre Bill C-59 that we would be supportive of that effort.

In those letters we also indicated the need for a super-SIRC type of agency to help oversee some of the supervision of agencies like CSIS and CSE. We were advocating for an approach like that alongside a number of academics, such as Professor Forcese and others. We were happy to see an approach brought in that area as well.

It is important to show that on certain issues of national safety and security where we can drive consensus, we can say we will work with the government, because some of these issues should be beyond partisanship. I want to thank my NDP colleague for working alongside me on that. It took us some time to get the minister to even respond, so despite the sunny ways rhetoric, often we felt that some of our suggestions were falling on deaf ears.

I am going to commit the rest of my speech tonight to the three areas that I believe are risks for Canadians to consider with Bill C-59. I am going to use some real-world examples in the exploration of this, because we are not talking in abstract terms. There are real cases and real impacts on families that we should consider in our debate.

The first area I want to raise in reference to the fact that when Bill C-59 was introduced, it was one day after a Canadian was convicted in a Quebec court in a case involving travelling abroad from Canada to join and work with a terrorist organization. Mr. Ismael Habib was sentenced the day before the government tabled this omnibus security legislation, and I think there is a certain irony in that. In his judgment, Justice Délisle said, “Did Ismael Habib intend to participate in or knowingly contribute to a terrorist activity? The entirety of the evidence demonstrates the answer is yes.” There is such an irony in the fact that the day before this debate there was a conviction for someone who was leaving Canada to train and participate with a terrorist organization.

Only a short time before Mr. Habib left Canada to do this, the previous government criminalized that activity. Why? Really, there was no need to have in the Criminal Code a charge for leaving Canada to train or participate in a terrorist organization, but this was a reaction to a troubling and growing trend involving radicalized people and the ability for people to go and engage in conflicts far from home. Mr. Habib's case was the first of its kind, and the charge he was convicted of by a Quebec court was for an offence that just a few years before did not exist. This is why Parliament must be seized with real and tangible threats to public safety and security. Unfortunately, a lot of the elements of Bill C-59 are going to make it hard for law enforcement to do that, to catch the next Mr. Habib before he leaves, while he is gone, or before he returns and brings that risk back home.

The first area that I have serious concerns with in the bill relates to preventative arrest. This was a controversial but necessary part of Bill C-51 from the last Parliament. Essentially it moved a legal threshold from making it “necessary” to prevent a criminal activity or a terrorist act instead of “likely” to prevent. By changing the threshold to “necessary”, as we see in this bill, the government would make it much harder for law enforcement agencies to move in on suspects that they know present a risk yet do not feel they have enough proof to show that it is necessary to prevent an attack. I think most Canadians would think that the standard should be “likely”, which is on balance of probabilities. If we are to err on the reality of a threat that there is violence to be perpetrated or potential violence by someone, then err on the side of protection. We still have to have the evidentiary burden, but it is not too hard.

It is interesting who supported the preventative arrest portions of Bill C-51 in the last Parliament. The Prime Minister did as the MP for Papineau. I loved Bill C-51 in so many ways, because it showed the hypocrisy of the Liberal Party at its best. The Liberals were constantly critical of Bill C-51, but they voted for it. Now they are in a position that they actually have to change elements of it, and they are changing some elements that the Prime Minister praised when he was in opposition, and they had this muddled position. My friends in the NDP have referred to this muddled position before, because now they think their Liberal friends are abandoning the previous ground they stood on.

What did the Prime Minister, then the leader of the third party and MP for Papineau, say about preventative arrest in the House of Commons on February 18, 2015? He said:

I believe that Bill C-51, the government's anti-terrorism act, takes some proper steps in that direction. We welcome the measures in Bill C-51 that build on the powers of preventative arrest, make better use of no-fly lists, and allow for more coordinated information sharing by government departments and agencies.

What is ironic is that he is undoing all of those elements in Bill C-59, from information sharing to changing the standard for preventative arrest to a threshold that is unreasonably too high, in fact recklessly too high, and law enforcement agencies have told the minister and the Prime Minister this.

The Prime Minister, when he was MP for Papineau, thought these important powers were necessary but now he does not. Perhaps society is safer today. I would suggest we are not. We just have to be vigilant, vigilant but balanced. That is probably why in opposition he supported these measures and now is rolling them back.

Nothing illustrates the case and the need for this more than the case of Patrice Vincent. He was a Canadian Armed Forces soldier who was killed because of the uniform he wore. He was killed by a radicalized young man named Martin Couture-Rouleau. That radicalized young man was known to law enforcement before he took the life of one of our armed forces members. Law enforcement officers were not sure whether they could move in a preventative arrest public safety manner.

The stark and moving testimony from Patrice's sister, Louise Vincent, at committee in talking about Bill C-51 should be reflected upon by members of the Liberal Party listening to this debate, because many of them were not here in the last Parliament. These are real families impacted by public safety and security. Louise Vincent said this:

According to Bill C-51, focus should be shifted from “will commit” to “could commit”, and I think that's very important. That's why the RCMP could not obtain a warrant from the attorney general, despite all the information it had gathered and all the testimony from Martin Couture-Rouleau's family. The RCMP did its job and built a case, but unfortunately, the burden of proof was not met. That's unacceptable.

It is unacceptable. What is unacceptable is the Liberals are raising the bar even higher with respect to preventative arrest. It is like the government does not trust our law enforcement agencies. This cannot be preventative arrest on a whim. There has to be an evidentiary basis for the very significant use of this tool, but that evidentiary basis should not be so high that it does not use the tool, because we have seen what can happen.

This is not an isolated case. I can recite other names, such as Aaron Driver. Those in southwestern Ontario will remember that thanks to the United States, this gentleman was caught by police on his way to commit a terror attack in southwestern Ontario. He was already under one of the old peace bonds. This similar power could be used against someone like Alexandre Bissonnette before his horrendous attack on the mosque in Quebec City. This tool could be used in the most recent case of Alek Minassian, the horrific van attack in Toronto.

Preventative arrest is a tool that should be used but with an evidentiary burden, but if the burden is too high necessary to prevent an attack, that is reckless and it shows the Prime Minister should review his notes from his time in opposition when he supported these powers. I suggest he did not have notes then and probably does not have notes now.

The second issue I would like to speak about is the deletion of charges and the replacing with a blanket offence called counselling commission of a terrorism offence.

What would that change from BillC-51? It would remove charges that could be laid for someone who was advocating or promoting a terrorism attack or activity. Promotion and advocation are the tools of radicalization. If we are not allowing charges to be laid against someone who radicalized Mr. Couture-Rouleau, do we have to only catch someone who counsels him to go out and run down Patrice Vincent? Should we be charging the people who radicalized him, who promoted ISIS or a radical terrorist ideology, and then advocated for violence? That should be the case. That actually conforms with our legal test for hate speech, when individuals are advocating or promoting and indirectly radicalizing.

Therefore, the government members talk about the government's counter-radicalization strategy, and there is no strategy. They have tried to claim the Montreal centre, which was set up independently of the government, as its own. The government would not tour parliamentarians through it when I was public safety critic, but it tours visiting guests from the UN and other places. That was an initiative started in Montreal. It has nothing to do with the Liberals' strategy. I have seen nothing out of the government on counter-radicalization, and I would like to.

The same should be said with respect to peace bonds, another tool that law enforcement agencies need. These have been asked for by law enforcement officials that we trust with their mandate. They are peace officers, yet the government is showing it does not trust them because it is taking away tools. The peace bond standard is now in a similar fashion to the preventative arrest standard. Agencies have to prove that it is necessary to prevent violent activity or terrorism, as opposed to the Bill C-51 standard of “likely to prevent”. A protection order, better known as “a peace bond”, is a tool, like preventative arrest, that can set some constraints or limitations on the freedom of a Canadian because that person has demonstrated that he or she is a potential threat. To say the individuals have to be a certain threat, which a “necessary” standard promotes, is reckless and misguided.

I wish the MP for Papineau would remember what he said a few years ago about the reduction of the high burden on law enforcement in preventative arrest situations. Sadly, there are going to be more Aaron Drivers out there. I always use the case of Aaron Driver, because sometimes members of specific groups, some Muslim Canadians, have been unfairly targeted in discussions about radicalization. This is a threat that exists and not just in one community. Aaron Driver's father was in the Canadian Armed Forces, a career member of the military. Their son was radicalized by people who advocated and promoted radical ideology and violence. With this bill, we would remove the ability to charge those people who helped to radicalize Aaron Driver. However, this is a risk that exists.

Let us not overstate the risk. There is not a bogeyman around every corner, but as parliamentarians we need to be serious when we try to balance properly the freedom and liberties we all enjoy, and that people fought and died for, with the responsibility upon us as parliamentarians to give law enforcement agencies the tools they need to do the job. They do not want a situation where they are catching Aaron Driver in a car that is about to drive away. We have to find the right balance. The movement of standards to “necessary” to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence shows that the Liberals do not trust our law enforcement officers with the ability to collect evidence and lay charges, or provide a peace bond, when they think someone is “likely” to be a threat to public safety and security.

I started by saying that there were elements I was happy to see in Bill C-59, but I truly hope Canadians see that certain measures in this would take away tools that law enforcement agencies have responsibly asked for, and this would not make our communities any safer.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Madam Speaker, I guess I am disappointed, because I remember that the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands was one of the few members in the last Parliament who was courageous enough to stand with New Democrats and fight against Bill C-51, even when public opinion polling initially said that something like 79% or 80% of the people wanted action in this area. Eventually, that tide turned, because people were not prepared to sacrifice their rights for this mythical improvement in security.

Yes, I agree that there is one significant improvement in Bill C-59, and that is the narrowing of the provisions around criminal terrorism speech to say that one has to actually counsel someone to commit a terrorist act. However, when we stack that up against all the other things from Bill C-51 that remain, it is a fundamental diminishment of this country to have our fundamental rights so limited.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Madam Speaker, I would say this to the hon. member for Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke. I remember the fight we had in the 41st Parliament with respect to Bill C-51, the so-called Anti-terrorism Act, which I believe made Canada much less safe. It is hard for me to actually vote for Bill C-59 now, especially when I hear his very good arguments.

However, I will tell him why I am going to vote for Bill C-59. I am very relieved to see improvements to what I thought were the thought-chill provisions in Bill C-51, the rules against the promotion of unexplained terrorism “in general”. There are big improvements to the no-fly list. However, there are not enough improvements, for my taste, to the ability of CSIS to take kinetic action. The big failure in Bill C-59 in front of us is the information sharing around what Canadians are doing with other governments.

The irony for me is that the Liberals voted for Bill C-51 in the 41st Parliament and voted against the destruction of environmental assessments in Bill C-38. Ironically, I think they have done a better job now of fixing the bill they voted for than of fixing the bill they voted against, at least as far as environmental assessments go. Therefore, I am voting against Bill C-69 on environmental assessments. However, I am voting for Bill C-59. I am influenced a lot by Professors Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, who overall think this is an improvement. I do too, overall. However, it does not fix everything Bill C-51 did to make us less safe.

I appreciate the member's thoughtful analysis, and I am going to vote for it, but with misgivings.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Madam Speaker, the question gets right at this question of the broad definition of national security Bill C-51 brought in and that Bill C-59 really maintains. It says in Bill C-59 that dissent and advocacy will be protected unless they are carried out in concert with other activities that are likely to challenge national security. Since for national security, critical infrastructure is included, if the current government is saying that the Kinder Morgan pipeline is a piece of critical infrastructure, is the right to protest and advocate against Kinder Morgan still protected under the Anti-terrorism Act? I would argue that it is not.

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his well-researched speech. The reason I say that is that I have been listening to many of the speeches, and he is the one who actually highlighted all the differences between Bill C-51 and Bill C-59 and where attention needs to be paid.

He raised the issue of the national interest, which is the core concern with respect to Bill C-51. We now have a situation where the government claims that the purchase from Kinder Morgan of this 65-year-old pipeline is in the national interest. The former governor of the Bank of Canada stated that “people...are going to die in protesting...this [Trans-Mountain] pipeline.”

I would like the member to analyze that statement with respect to the situation we have vis-à-vis the national interest in the pipeline and Bill C-59.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Madam Speaker, the Minister of Public Safety talked about how important it is that we get the right mix. I believe that within this legislation, there is the right mix of dealing with human rights and protecting the public from potential threats down the road.

What is interesting is that on the one hand, we have the Conservatives saying that they are going to vote against this legislation, because they believe that we are giving too heavy a balance or mix toward civil rights. We have the NDP members sticking with their outright opposition to anything and everything about Bill C-51, saying that we have not gone far enough.

If we look at what we have presented, which is fulfilling an election commitment, it seems to me that we have the right mix. I think Canadians will recognize that. Maybe it is not hand in hand, but it is ensuring that we are safe in our communities and that our rights and freedoms are protected at the same time.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Madam Speaker, certainly the hon. member and I did a lot of work together on opposite sides of Bill C-51. I will start by disagreeing with him that Bill C-51 is the gold standard of anything. What I have yet to see is anyone present the evidence.

It is very interesting that the Liberals had a good chance to do that when they presented Bill C-59 and to say that if they were going to keep major parts of Bill C-51, how they made us safer. Where is that report? That report is nowhere to be seen.

I do not believe it is a gold standard. I do not believe it made us safer. The hon. member fell once again into this idea that somehow giving up part of our rights will make us more secure. To me, that is a fundamental fallacy. Rights, freedoms, and security go together. I do not want to say hand in hand, because the government has devalued the currency of that phrase. However, I would say that we must do both. We must protect rights and freedoms. Full rights and freedoms do not make us less secure. They make us more secure and more united as a country.

[Ted Falk, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

Madam Speaker, the member and I worked together on the public safety committee when Bill C-51 was discussed. I am intrigued this evening in this House, listening to the debate, by how many times Bill C-51 is referenced. I can only assume that it is referenced because it is the gold standard, and the Liberals are trying to improve on that.

I want to ask my hon. friend from the NDP a question. True to his position at that time on Bill C-51, as I think he has very clearly articulated again this evening, the NDP have an overly aggressive position and ideology on rights and freedoms versus security. I do not think he got the balance quite right. I think we nailed it in Bill C-51. He and I do not agree on that, but we are still friends.

I think it was the member for Malpeque who lobbied very hard on the part of the Liberals, saying that we needed an oversight committee to complement Bill C-51. I am wondering if the NDP member could comment on that a little further and on whether that has been achieved in this bill. The Liberals agreed at that time with Bill C-51. They supported it. They voted in favour of it. Their one concern was an oversight committee. I want to know if they have really fixed that.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Madam Speaker, I rise tonight to speak against Bill C-59 at third reading. Unfortunately, it is yet another example of the Liberals breaking an election promise, only this time it is disguised as promise keeping.

In the climate of fear after the attacks on Parliament Hill and in St. Jean in 2014, the Conservative government brought forward Bill C-51. I heard a speech a little earlier from the member for Bellechasse—Les Etchemins—Lévis, and he remembers things slightly different than I. The difference is that I was in the public safety committee and he, as the minister, was not there. He said that there was a great clamour for new laws to meet this challenge of terrorism. I certainly did not hear that in committee. What I heard repeatedly from law enforcement and security officials coming before us was that they had not been given enough resources to do the basic enforcement work they needed to do to keep Canadians safe from terrorism.

However, when the Conservatives finally managed to pass their Anti-terrorism Act, they somehow managed to infringe our civil liberties without making us any safer.

At that time, the New Democrats remained firm in our conviction that it would be a mistake to sacrifice our freedoms in the name of defending them. Bill C-51 was supported by the Liberals, who hedged their bets with a promise to fix what they called “its problematic elements” later if they were elected. Once they were elected in 2015, that determination to fix Bill C-51 seemed to wane. That is why in September of 2016, I introduced Bill C-303, a private member's bill to repeal Bill C-51 in its entirety.

Some in the House at that time questioned why I introduced a private member's bill since I knew it would not come forward for a vote. In fact, this was an attempt to get the debate started, as the Liberals had already kept the public waiting for a year at that point. The New Democrats were saying, “You promised a bill. Well, here's our bill. It's very simple. Repeal all of C-51.”

Now, after more than two years and extensive consultations, we have this version of Bill C-59 before us, which does not repeal Bill C-51 and fails to fix most of the major problems of Bill C-51, it actually introduces new threats to our privacy and rights.

Let me start with the things that were described, even by the Liberals, as problematic, and remain unfixed in Bill C-59 as it stands before us.

First, there is the definition of “national security” in the Anti-terrorism Act that remains all too broad, despite some improvements in Bill C-59. Bill C-59 does narrow the definition of criminal terrorism speech, which Bill C-51 defined as “knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general”. That is a problematic definition. Bill C-59 changes the Criminal Code wording to “counsels another person to commit a terrorism offence”. Certainly, that better captures the problem we are trying to get at in the Criminal Code. There is plenty of existing case law around what qualifies as counselling someone to commit an offence. Therefore, that is much better than it was.

Then the government went on to add a clause that purports to protect advocacy and protest from being captured in the Anti-terrorism Act. However, that statement is qualified with an addition that says it will be protected unless the dissent and advocacy are carried out in conjunction with activities that undermine the security of Canada. It completes the circle. It takes us right back to that general definition.

The only broad definition of national security specifically in Bill C-51 included threats to critical infrastructure. Therefore, this still raises the spectre of the current government or any other government using national security powers against protesters against things like the pipeline formerly known as Kinder Morgan.

The second problem Bill C-59 fails to fix is that of the broad data collection information sharing authorized by Bill C-51, and in fact maintained in Bill C-59. This continues to threaten Canadians' basic privacy rights. Information and privacy commissioners continue to point out that the basis of our privacy law is that information can only be used for the purposes for which it is collected. Bill C-51 and Bill C-59 drive a big wedge in that important protection of our privacy rights.

Bill C-51 allowed sharing information between agencies and with foreign governments about national security under this new broad definition which I just talked about. Therefore, it is not just about terrorism and violence, but a much broader range of things the government could collect and share information on. Most critics would say Bill C-59, while it has tweaked these provisions, has not actually fixed them, and changing the terminology from “information sharing” to “information disclosure” is more akin to a sleight of hand than an actual reform of its provisions.

The third problem that remains are those powers that Bill C-51 granted to CSIS to act in secret to counter threats. This new proactive power granted to CSIS by Bill C-51 is especially troubling precisely because CSIS activities are secret and sometimes include the right to break the law. Once again, what we have done is returned to the very origins of CSIS. In other words, when the RCMP was both the investigatory and the enforcement agency, we ran into problems in the area of national security, so CSIS was created. Therefore, what we have done is return right back to that problematic situation of the 1970s, only this time it is CSIS that will be doing the investigating and then actively or proactively countering those threats. We have recreated a problem that CSIS was supposed to solve.

Bill C-59 also maintains the overly narrow list of prohibitions that are placed on those CSIS activities. CSIS can do pretty much anything short of committing bodily harm, murder, or the perversion of the course of democracy or justice. However, it is still problematic that neither justice nor democracy are actually defined in the act. Therefore, this would give CSIS powers that I would argue are fundamentally incompatible with a free and democratic society.

The Liberal change would require that those activities must be consistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That sounds good on its face, except that these activities are exempt from scrutiny because they are secret. Who decides whether they might potentially violate the charter of rights? It is not a judge, because this is not oversight. There is no oversight here. This is the government deciding whether it should go to the judge and request oversight. Therefore, if the government does not think it is a violation of the charter of rights, it goes ahead and authorizes the CSIS activities. Again, this is a fundamental problem in a democracy.

The fourth problem is that Bill C-59 still fails to include an absolute prohibition on the use of information derived from torture. The member for Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan made some eloquent statements on this with which I agree. What we have is the government saying that now it has included a cabinet directive on torture in Bill C-59, which gives the cabinet directive to force of law. The cabinet directive already has the force of law, so it absolutely changes nothing about this.

However, even worse, there is no absolute prohibition in that cabinet directive on the use of torture-implicated information. Instead, the prohibition says that information from torture can be used in some circumstances, and then it sets a very low threshold for when we can actually use information derived from fundamental rights violations. Not only is this morally repugnant, most likely unconstitutional, but it also gives us information that is notoriously unreliable. People who are being tortured will say precisely what they think the torturer wants them to say to stop the torture.

Finally, Bill C-59 would not do one of the things it could have done, and that is create a review agency for the CBSA. The CBSA remains without an independent review and complaints mechanism. It is one of our only law enforcement or security agencies that has no direct review agency. Yes, the new national security intelligence review agency will have some responsibility over the CBSA, but only in terms of national security questions, not in terms of its basic day-to-day operations.

We have seen quite often that the activities carried out by border agencies have a major impact on fundamental rights of people. We can look at the United States right now and see what its border agency is doing in the separation of parents and children. Therefore, it is a concern that there is no place in Canada, if we have a complaint about what CBSA has done, to file that complaint except in a court of law, which requires information, resources, and all kinds of other things that are unlikely to be available to those people who need to make those complaints.

The Liberals will tell us that there are some areas where they have already acted outside of Bill C-59, and we have just heard the member for Winnipeg North talk about Bill C-22, which established the national security review committee of parliamentarians.

The New Democrats feel that this is a worthwhile first step toward fixing some of the long-standing weaknesses in our national security arrangements, but it is still only a review agency, still only an agency making recommendations. It is not an oversight agency that makes decisions in real time about what can be done and make binding orders about what changes have to be made.

The government rejected New Democrat amendments on the bill, amendments which would have allowed the committee to be more independent from the government. It would have allowed it to be more transparent in its public reporting and would have given it better integration with existing review bodies.

The other area the Liberals claim they have already acted on is the no-fly list. It was interesting that the minister today in his speech, opening the third reading debate, claimed that the government was on its way to fixing the no-fly list, not that it had actually fixed the no-fly list. Canada still lacks an effective redress system for travellers unintentionally flagged on the no-fly list. I have quite often heard members on the government side say that no one is denied boarding as a result of this. I could give them the names of people who have been denied boarding. It has disrupted their business activities. It has disrupted things like family reunions. All too often we end up with kids on the no-fly list. Their names happen to be Muslim-sounding or Arabic-sounding or whatever presumptions people make and they names happen to be somewhat like someone else already on the list.

The group of no-fly list kids' parents have been demanding that we get some effective measures in place right away to stop the constant harassment they face for no reason at all. The fact that we still have not fixed this problem raises real questions about charter right guarantees of equality, which are supposed to be protected by law in our country.

Not only does Bill C-59 fail to correct the problems in Bill C-51, it goes on to create two new threats to fundamental rights and freedoms of Canadians, once again, without any evidence that these measures will make it safer.

Bill C-59 proposes to immediately expand the Communications Security Establishment Canada's mandate beyond just information gathering, and it creates an opportunity for CSE to collect information on Canadians which would normally be prohibited.

Just like we are giving CSIS the ability to not just collect information but to respond to threats, now we are saying that the Communications Security Establishment Canada should not just collect information, but it should be able to conduct what the government calls defensive cyber operations and active cyber operations.

Bill C-59 provides an overly broad list of purposes and targets for these active cyber operations. It says that activities could be carried out to “degrade, disrupt, influence, respond to or interfere with the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization or terrorist group as they relate to international affairs, defence or security.” Imagine anything that is not covered there. That is about as broad as the provision could be written.

CSE would also be allowed to do “anything that is reasonably necessary to maintain the covert nature of the activity.” Let us think about that when it comes to oversight and review of its activities. In my mind that is an invitation for it to obscure or withhold information from review agencies.

These new CSE powers are being expanded without adequate oversight. Once again, there is no independent oversight, only “after the fact” review. To proceed in this case, it does not require a warrant from a court, but only permission from the Minister of National Defence, if the activities are to be domestic based, or from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, if the activities are to be conducted abroad.

These new, active, proactive measures to combat a whole list and series of threats is one problem. The other is while Bill C-59 says that there is a still a prohibition on the Canadian Security Establishment collecting information on Canadians, we should allow for what it calls “incidental” acquisition of information relating to Canadians or persons in Canada. This means that in situations where the information was not deliberately sought, a person's private data could still be captured by CSE and retained and used. The problem remains that this incidental collecting, which is called research by the government and mass surveillance by its critics, remains very much a part of Bill C-59.

Both of these new powers are a bit disturbing, when the Liberal promise was to fix the problematic provisions in Bill C-51, not add to them. The changes introduced for Bill C-51 in itself are minor. The member for Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan talked about the changes not being particularly effective. I have to agree with him. I do not think they were designed to be effective. They are unlikely to head off the constitutional challenges to Bill C-51 already in place by organizations such as the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. Those constitutional challenges will proceed, and I believe that they will succeed.

What works best in terrorism cases? Again, when I was the New Democrats' public safety critic sitting on the public safety committee when Bill C-51 had its hearings, we heard literally dozens and dozens of witnesses who almost all said the same thing: it is old-fashioned police work on the front line that solves or prevents terrorism. For that, we need resources, and we need to focus the resources on enforcement activities at the front end.

What did we see from the Conservatives when they were in power? There were actual cutbacks in the budgets of the RCMP, the CBSA, and CSIS. The whole time they were in power and they were worried about terrorism, they were denying the basic resources that were needed.

What have the Liberals done since they came back to power? They have actually added some resources to all of those agencies, but not for the terrorism investigation and enforcement activities. They have added them for all kinds of other things they are interested in but not the areas that would actually make a difference.

We have heard quite often in this House, and we have heard some of it again in this debate, that what we are talking about is the need to balance or trade off rights against security. New Democrats have argued very consistently, in the previous Parliament and in this Parliament, that there is no need to trade our rights for security. The need to balance is a false need. Why would we give up our rights and argue that in doing so, we are actually protecting them? This is not logical. In fact, it is the responsibility of our government to provide both protection of our fundamental rights and protection against threats.

The Liberals again will tell us that the promise is kept. What I am here to tell members is that I do not see it in this bill. I see a lot of attempts to confuse and hide what they are really doing, which is to hide the fundamental support they still have for what was the essence of Bill C-51. That was to restrict the rights and freedoms of Canadians in the name of national security. The New Democrats reject that false game. Therefore, we will be voting against this bill at third reading.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Madam Speaker, this is one of two pieces of legislation that would assist the government in fulfilling an election promise: making changes to Bill C-51. The other piece of legislation dealt with the parliamentary oversight committee. I realize it is the other component of the legislation. I would be interested in the member opposite explaining specifically why the Harper government would not have included that in Bill C-51. I know the member was involved in those days with Mr. Harper.

[Robert Aubin, NDP, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague for his comments.

I would like to clarify with him, if possible, a discussion that I began with my colleague from Bellechasse—Les Etchemins—Lévis on the use of torture. He said he was without a doubt against torture. He was clear and to the point.

However, my question is on the information obtained. Whether we are talking about the previous Bill C-51 or Bill C-59 before us today, does the hon. member think it is acceptable to use information obtained through torture by countries other than Canada, countries that engaged in torture to obtain intelligence?

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Madam Speaker, I thank the member for Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan for striking a blow for members being recognized by the Speaker as they rise to speak.

I want to suggest we had a confusion in some of the debate here tonight between the concept of oversight and review. I have the advantage, although I do not think at the time I thought it was an advantage, to be participating as much as I could in the legislative review of the parliamentary committee that was looking at Bill C-51 in the 41st Parliament.

Justice John Major who chaired the Air India inquiry testified at that committee his opinion it was not, as my friend from Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan has suggested, a lack of tools that meant intelligence agencies did not share information. Judge Major said it was human nature. He said they just will not share the information. His experience from the Air India inquiry led him to believe that CSIS could have the information and out of its own inclinations, would not share it with the RCMP.

This was confirmed for us by a witness who testified, an MI5 agent from the U.K. who has been a security liaison with Canada, Joe Fogarty, who gave numerous examples. He used the ones that were in the public domain, by the way. He said he knew of more that we could not talk about, that the RCMP were deliberately kept in the dark by CSIS because it chose not to share the information.

I heard my hon. Conservative colleague speak of the cost of developing the security intelligence review agency. If the cost will save lives, then there is no point in not having a properly sourced security intelligence review agency. Review and oversight are quite different from review at the end of the year. We desperately need oversight of what our agencies are doing.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, before I get into the substantive remarks, I want to respond to an interesting comment made by my friend from Hull—Aylmer, who was asking in a question about actions taken by the previous government. There were many provisions in Bill C-51 that were aimed at making Canadians safer. However, one thing I do not think has come up yet in the debate was a specific proposal that the Conservative Party put forward in the last election to make it illegal to travel to specific regions. There were certain exceptions built into the legislation, travel for humanitarian purposes, and for journalistic purposes perhaps. That was a good proposal, because when people are planning to travel to Daesh-controlled areas in Syria and Iraq, outside of certain very clearly defined objectives, it is fairly obvious what the person is going there to do. This was another proposal that we had put forward, one that the government has not chosen to take us up on, that I think eminently made sense. It would have given prosecutors and law enforcement another tool. Hopefully, that satisfies my friend from Hull—Aylmer, and maybe he will have further comments on that.

Substantively on Bill C-59, it is a bill that deals with the framework for ensuring Canadians' security, and it would make changes to a previous piece of legislation from the previous Parliament, Bill C-51. There are a number of different measures in it. I would not call it an omnibus bill. I know Liberals are allergic to that word, so I will not say it is an omnibus bill. I will instead say that it makes a number of disparate changes to different parts of the act. I am going to go through some of those changes as time allows, and talk about some of the questions that are raised by each one. Certainly some of those changes are ones that we in the Conservative Party do not support. We are concerned about those changes making us less safe.

Before I go on to the particular provisions of the bill, I want to set the stage for the kinds of discussions we are having in this Parliament around safety and security. We take the position, quite firmly, that the first role of government is to keep people safe. Everything else is contingent on that. If people are not safe, all of the other things that a government does fall secondary to that. They are ultimately less important to people who feel that their basic security is not preserved. Certainly it is good for us to see consensus, as much as possible in this House, on provisions that would genuinely improve people's safety. Canadians want us to do it, and they want us to work together to realistically, in a thoughtful and hard-headed way, confront the threats that are in front of us.

We should not be naive about the threats we face, simply because any one of us individually has not interacted with a terrorist threat, although many people who were part of the previous Parliament obviously have interacted directly with a terrorist threat, given the attack that occurred on Parliament Hill. In any event, just because there are many threats that we do not see or directly experience ourselves, it does not mean they are not there. Certainly we know our law enforcement agencies are actively engaged in monitoring and countering threats, and doing everything they can to protect us. We need to be aware that those threats are out there. They are under the surface, but they are having an impact. There is a greater potential impact on our lives that is prevented if we give our security agencies and our law enforcement the tools that they need.

Many of these threats are things that people are aware of. There is the issue of radicalization and terrorism that is the result of a world in which the flow of information is much more across borders than it used to be. Governments can, to some extent, control the entry of people into their space, but they cannot nearly as effectively control the ideas of radicalization that come easily across borders and that influence people's perceptions. People can be radicalized even if they have never had any physical face-to-face interactions with people who hold those radical views. These things can happen over the Internet much more easily today than they did in the past. They do not require the face-to-face contact that was probably necessary in the past for the dissemination of extreme ideas. People living in a free western society can develop romanticized notions about extremism. This is a challenge that can affect many different people, those who are new to Canada, as well as people whose families have been here for generations.

This growing risk of radicalization has a genuine impact, and it is something that we need to be sensitive to. Of course, there are different forms of radicalization. There is radicalization advanced by groups like Daesh. We also need to aware of threats that are posed from extreme racist groups that may advocate targeting minorities, for instance, the shooting we saw at the mosque in Quebec City, or the attack that just happened at a mosque in Edson. These come out of extreme ideas that should be viewed as terrorism as well. Therefore, there are different kinds of threats that we see from different directions as the result of a radicalization that no longer requires a face-to-face interaction. These are real, growing, emergent threats.

There is also the need for us to be vigilant about threats from foreign governments. More and more, we are seeing a world in which foreign authoritarian governments are trying to project power beyond their borders. They are trying to influence our democratic system by putting messages out there that may create confusion, disinformation, and there may be active interference within our democratic system. There is the threat from radical non-state actors, but there are also threats from state actors, who certainly have malicious intent and want to influence the direction of our society, or may attack us directly, and want to do these sorts of things to their advantage. In the interest of protecting Canadians, we need to be aware and vigilant about these threats. We need to be serious about how we respond to them.

As much as we seek consensus in our discussion of these issues, we sometimes hear from other parties, when we raise these real and legitimate concerns, the accusation that this is spreading fear. We should not talk in these sorts of stark terms about threats that we face, as that is creating fear. The accusation is that it also creates division, because the suggestion that there might be people out there with radical ideas divides us. However, I think there is a difference between fear and prudence. We need to know that difference as legislators, and we need to be prudent without being fearful.

Fear, I think, implies an irrational, particularly an emotional response to threats that would have us freeze up, worry incessantly, stop going about our normal activities, or maybe even lead to the demonization of other people who someone might see as a threat. These are all things that could well be manifestations of fear, which is not good, obviously. However, prudence is something quite different. Prudence is to be aware of threats in a clear-headed, factual, realistic way. It is to say that thoughtfully, intellectually, reasonably, we need to do everything we can to protect ourselves, recognizing that if we fail to be prudent, if we do not take these rational, clear-headed steps to give our law enforcement agencies the tools they need to protect us from real risks that exist, then we are more liable to violence and terrorism. Also, obviously from that flows a greater risk of people being seized with that kind of emotional fearful response.

It is our job as legislators to encourage prudence, and to be prudent in policy-making. Therefore, when we raise concerns about security threats that we face, illegal border crossings, radicalization, and Daesh fighters returning to Canada, it is not because we are advocating for a fearful response, but rather we are advocating for a prudent response. Sometimes that distinction is lost on the government, because it is often typical of a Liberal world view to, perhaps with the best of intentions, imagine the world to be a safer place than it is.

Conservatives desire a better world, but we also look at the present world realistically. Sometimes one of the problems with Liberals is that they imagine the world to already be the way they would like it to be. The only way we get to a better, safer world, on many fronts, is by looking clearly at the challenges we face, and then, through that, seeking to overcome them.

It was variously attributed to Disraeli, Thatcher, or Churchill, but the line “the facts of life are conservative” is one that sticks out to me when we talk about having a prudent, clear-sighted approach to the threats we face. My colleague, the member for Thornhill, may correct me on who originally said that. Disraeli lived first, so we will say it was probably him.

Now, having set the framework through which we view, and I think we ought to view this bill, I want to speak specifically to a number of the changes that have been put forward. One of points we often hear from the government is about changes it has made with respect to the issue of torture. An amendment was proposed at committee. I understand that this was not part of the original bill, but came through in an amendment. It restates Canada's position that torture is obviously not acceptable. There is no disagreement in this House about the issue of torture. Obviously, we all agree that torture is unacceptable. Some of the aspects of this amendment, which effectively puts into law something that was already in a ministerial directive, is obviously not a substantial change in terms of changing the place or the mechanism by which something is recognized that was already in place.

Of course, when it comes to torture, it is a great opportunity for people in philosophy classrooms to debate, theoretically, what happens if there is information that could save lives that could be gained that way. However, the reality is the evidence demonstrates that torture not only is immoral, but is not effective at gathering information. A commitment to effectiveness, to giving our law enforcement agencies all the tools that are necessary and effective, while also opposing torture, are actually quite consistent with each other. I do not think there is anything substantively new with respect to those provisions that we are seeing from the government.

It is important to be clear about that. There are areas on which we agree; there are areas on which we disagree. However, there are areas on which we agree, and we can identify that clearly.

There are some other areas. In the beginning, the bill introduces a new national security and intelligence review agency. There is a new administrative cost with this new administrative agency. One of the questions we have is where that money is going to come from. The government is not proposing corresponding increases to the overall investment in our security agencies.

If a new administrative apparatus is added, with administrative costs associated with it, obviously that money has to come from somewhere. Likely it is a matter of internal reallocation, which effectively means a fairly substantial cut to the operational front-line activities of our security agencies. If that is not the case, I would love to hear the government explain how it is not, and where the money is coming from. It seems fairly evident that when something is introduced, the cost of which is about $97 million over five years, and that is an administrative cost, again that money has to come from somewhere. With the emergence and proliferation of threats, I know Canadians would not like to see what may effectively amount to a cut to front-line delivery in terms of services. That is clearly a concern that Canadians have.

Part 2 deals with the intelligence commissioner, and the Liberals rejected expedited timing requirements on the commissioner's office. This effectively means that security operations may be delayed because the commissioner is working through the information. There are some technical aspects to the bill, certainly that we have raised concerns about, and we will continue to raise concerns about them. We want to try to make sure that our security agencies, as my colleagues have talked about, have all the tools they need to do their job very effectively.

Now, this is something that stuck out to me. There are restrictions in part 3 to security and intelligence agencies being able to access already publicly available data.

Effectively, this bill has put in place restrictions on accessing that data, which is already publicly available. If security agencies have to go through additional hoops to access information that is already on Facebook or Twitter, it is not clear to me why we would put those additional burdens in place and what positive purpose those additional restrictions would achieve. That is yet another issue with respect to the practical working out of the bill.

Given the political context of some of these changes, one wonders why the government is doing this. It is because the Liberals put themselves in a political pickle. They supported, and voted for, Bill C-51. The current Prime Minister, as a member of the then third party, voted in favour of that legislation. However, the Liberals then wanted to position themselves differently on it, and so they said they were going to change aspects of it when they got into government. Some of those changes serve no discernible purpose, and yet they raise additional questions regarding the restrictions they would put on our law enforcement agencies' ability to operate effectively and efficiently.

Part 4 of the proposed legislation puts additional restrictions on interdepartmental information-sharing. Members have spoken about this extensively in the debate, but there are important points to underline here.

The biggest act of terrorism in our country's history, the Air India bombing, was determined to have been preventable by the Air India inquiry. The issue was that one agency was keeping information from another agency that could have prevented the bombing. Certainly, if information is already in the hands of government, it makes sense to give our agencies the tools to share that information. It seems fairly obvious that people should be able to share that information. It is clearly in the national interest. If it can save lives to transfer information effectively from one department to another with regard to files about individuals who may present a security threat, and if CSIS already has that information and is going to share it with the RCMP, I think all Canadians would say that makes sense. However, Bill C-59 would impose additional restrictions on that sharing of information.

Through taking a hard-headed look at the threats we face and the need to combat them, parliamentarians should be concerned about those particular provisions in this bill.

Another issue raised in this bill is that of threat disruption. Should security agencies be able to undertake actions that disrupt a security threat? Previously, under Bill C-51, actions could be taken to disrupt threats without a warrant if those actions were within the law. If there was a need to do something that would normally be outside of the law, then a warrant would be required, but if it was something ordinarily within the remit of the law, then agencies could proceed with it. It could be something like talking to the parents of a potential terrorist traveller, and alerting them to what was going on in the life of their child, or being present in an online chatroom to try to counter a radicalizing message. These things are presently legal under Bill C-51.

However, under Bill C-59, there would be a much higher standard with respect to the activities that would require a warrant, which include disseminating any information, record, or document. It seems to me that something as simple as putting a security agent in an online chatroom to move the conversation in a particular direction through the dissemination of information would require a warrant, which can create challenges if one wants to engage in an organic conversation so as to counter messages in real time.

All of us in the House believe in the need for parameters and rules around this, but Bill C-51 established parameters that allowed for intervention by law enforcement agencies where necessary. It did keep us safe, and unfortunately Bill C-59 would make this more difficult and muddies the waters. That is why we oppose it.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate that the hon. member for Bellechasse—Les Etchemins—Lévis has perhaps a more nostalgic and certainly more favourable view of what took place in the 41st Parliament, but I put it to him that my experience in studying Bill C-51 convinced me that it made us much less safe. I will give an example and hope my hon. colleague can comment on it.

Far from creating silos, Bill C-59 would help us by creating the security and intelligence review agency because, in the words of former chief justice John Major who chaired the Air India inquiry, we have had no pinnacle review, no oversight over all the actions of all the agencies. This is a real-life example. When Jeffrey Delisle was stealing secrets from the Canadian navy, CSIS knew about it. CSIS knew all about it, but it decided not to tell the RCMP. The RCMP acted when it got a tip from the FBI. We know that in the Air India disaster, various agencies of the Government of Canada—CSIS knew things as did the RCMP—did not talk to each other. The information sharing sections to which the member refers have nothing to do with government agencies sharing the information they have about a threat. They have to do it by sharing personal information of Canadians, such as what occurred to Maher Arar.

To the member's last comment that nothing has gone wrong since Bill C-51, my comment is: how would we know? Everything is secret. Rights could have been infringed. No special advocate was in the room. We have no idea what happened to infringe rights during Bill C-51's reign.

[Robert Aubin, NDP, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his comments, most of which I had already heard during the last Parliament. I had the pleasure of debating him from time to time and not sharing his opinions on Bill C-51.

One thing he said this evening struck me. He said that the authorities need all the tools. In his opinion, should this toolbox also include information obtained through torture?

We know that that kind of information is usually weak precisely because it was obtained through torture and that the use of such information violates international agreements.

[Steven Blaney, Conservative, Bellechasse—Les Etchemins—Lévis, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is privilege for me to rise today to speak to Bill C-59, which deals with the anti-terrorism measures put in place by the previous government.

For obvious reasons, I do not intend to support Bill C-59, which was introduced by the Liberal government. First, this bill weakens the measures that we have available to us as a society to fight terrorism. It is important to remember that Bill C-51 was introduced in the wake of two terrorist attacks that occurred here in Canada, the first in Saint-Jean-Richelieu and the second here in Ottawa. That was in October 2014.

At the time, the Quebec minister of public security, Lise Thériault, called me and told me that there had been an accident in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu. I responded that that was unfortunate. Then she told me that someone had died. I told her that that was tragic. Finally, she told me that it was tragic but that they also suspected we were dealing with a terrorist attack.

We sometimes think that terrorist attacks occur only in other countries, but sometimes they happen in our communities, like Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, in the heart of Quebec. Hatred prompted an individual to attack a member of the Canadian Armed Forces, in this case Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent.

I remember the ceremony I attended in November 2014, before entering the House. We honoured Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent with members of his family. I remember the words of his sister, Louise Vincent, who said, “Patrice Vincent, my brother, the warrant officer, was a hero.”

Mr. Vincent had a successful career in the Canadian Armed Forces, although by no means an illustrious one. He was a good serviceman nonetheless, always ready and willing to serve. His plans for a well-deserved retirement were dashed when he was run down in a restaurant parking lot by an individual driven by extremist Islamist ideology. His sister also said she was surprised that Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent was targeted specifically because he was in uniform. She said, “Losing a brother is one thing, but knowing that it was due to a deliberate act is something else entirely.”

The attacker had a specific intention. We know the criteria for determining whether an attack qualifies as an act of terrorism. There was a political desire to commit murder in the name of an ideology, which obviously goes against our Canadian values. At the time, Prime Minister Harper said that “our country will never be intimidated by barbarians with no respect for the maple leaf or any other symbol of freedom”. He added:

When such cowards attack those who wear our uniform, we understand they are attacking all of us as Canadians...We are going to strengthen our laws here in Canada to stop those intent on importing an ideology that incites hatred, cruelty, and death in other parts of the world.

It is important to note that regardless of the speeches we given in the House and the partisan positions we may take, one of the overriding responsibilities of Parliament is to ensure the safety of Canadians, especially since in the past decade we have witnessed the emergence of ideologies that are increasingly spread by social media. That is why the anti-terrorism act was put in place. It provided certain tools to ensure that we were better prepared.

Clearly, when we think of the death of Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent, who was struck down by the vehicle of a radicalized young man in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu in 2014, we realize that it is important to ensure that our police forces, intelligence service, and the RCMP have all the tools they need to intervene.

This also impacts the legal aspect. While acting within the limits of the law and respecting fundamental freedoms, the police, with the co-operation and authorization of independent people such as judges, must have the legal tools to prevent terrorist attacks. That was the objective of the anti-terrorism measures introduced by Bill C-51.

Unfortunately, the Liberals decided to weaken this law. That is not surprising. As we saw during question period, the Liberals are showing a degree of spinelessness and indolence that is truly worrisome. For example, some jihadists, in particular members of ISIS, have created sites to spread propaganda in Canada. One of the pillars of the anti-terrorism act was to shut down websites promoting ideas that incite violence.

Unfortunately, the Liberals want to weaken these tools. There was the example mentioned in question period of a known terrorist who went to the Middle East and has now returned to Canada. We would expect the government to increase surveillance of this individual. However, we have learned that he parades in front of television cameras and boasts about his relations with ISIS terrorists. Furthermore, he even admits that he lied to CSIS so he could continue to conduct his activities.

This man's name is Abu Huzaifa. He is in contact with ISIS and appears to be fully in thrall to Islamic ideology. He is hiding information from the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and operates in such a way that our police officers do not necessarily have the tools to lay charges. He openly admits to having lied to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

Here is our message to the government: we have these intelligence services, so the government has a political responsibility to signal zero tolerance for people who want to attack the pillars of our society. There have already been two tragic victims here in this country. We do not want that to happen again.

At this time, the government is lax and spineless, and that worries us. The individual in question, Abu Huzaifa, quotes the Quran and promotes all that hatred.

These people need to be kept under control. If charges are to be laid, that must be done so as to protect the people, because that is the government's job. A government's primary role is to protect its people. Unfortunately, Bill C-59 undermines the tools available to police forces and various other bodies to fulfill the state's primary responsibility.

For example, one of the provisions of the legislation would make it harder for the police to prevent a terrorist attack and would add red tape. When our intelligence services or police services are in the middle of the action and have sensitive information that could prevent a terrorist attack on Canadian soil, it is important that they can intervene. That is what the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, provides for. There has been no major problem regarding the enforcement of that legislation, which the Liberals supported, I might add. At no time were the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms or the different statues that exist in Canada affected by the anti-terrorism legislation.

The Liberals' idea of keeping a promise, as we saw with their approach to legalizing marijuana, is to force it down the throats of Canadians. They are using the same approach with Bill C-59.

It is too bad because Canadians' safety is at stake. Again, the measures in Bill C-59 do not address an actual problem. There is an adage in English that says:

“If it ain't broke, don't fix it.”

If something is working, we must leave it alone, because the day we need it, the day the police learn of a potential terrorist attack, they will need all of the necessary tools to prevent this attack, in accordance with Canadian laws, of course.

I want to talk about another aspect of the bill that will muddy the waters even more. In Canada, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, or SIRC, is responsible for overseeing the operations of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. This body is the envy of all western democracies when it comes to the review of intelligence activities. The Security Intelligence Review Committee is an example to the world because it has the ability to dig through every nook and cranny of our intelligence agency. In other words, there is no spy in Canada who does not have SIRC constantly looking over his or her shoulder.

The current government created a committee that is so far off base. Canada already has a framework that allows for in-depth review of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. I must point out that the Anti-terrorism Act strengthened this power, even for threat reduction activities. When the measures in the Anti-terrorism Act were adopted, we not only ensured that police officers and agents at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service had more latitude, but we also ensured that all of these provisions would be covered by the Security Intelligence Review Committee. The act provides more powers, but there is also increased oversight.

We have a well-established and well-functioning system that is the envy of the world. It would have been smart for the government to expand the scope of that organization. The Liberals are obsessed with creating organizations and, as a result, they have just duplicated the Security Intelligence Review Committee and, in a way, created a new organization. We are talking about a new organization that has basically the same mission as the previous one, but it is not the same. In the end, they are undermining an excellent system in place for oversight of our intelligence agencies, and creating a new system that will duplicate it and cover other areas. They are creating confusion and more bureaucracy. What does this actually mean? Police officers are going to have more eyes looking over their shoulders. This will create confusion, more bureaucracy, and more red tape. The goal is for police officers and intelligence officers to be more accountable, but their primary mission is to protect Canadians.

Unfortunately, the Liberal approach is going to create more red tape and more obstacles. Meanwhile, we are learning that guys like Abu Huzaifa are free to roam this country, openly bragging about their associations with ISIS, and the government says it wants to welcome these people.

I think the government should be sending an important message, one that should convey zero tolerance for incitement to hate, for hate speech, and for anyone willing to use violence to achieve their ends. That is one of the flaws of this bill.

I mentioned the red tape and the duplication of an organization that, at the end of the day, is going to create confusion in the oversight of our intelligence activities.

On top of that, the government produced a huge document because it wanted to show that it supported the bill, but that there was still work to be done. It therefore added all kinds of regulations to the bill. In other words, it is creating a law and will make the regulations afterwards.

The regulations clarify the act. The advantage of that for the minister or the executive branch is that the regulations can be changed. The disadvantage of putting this sort of thing in an act is that then the government has to obtain the authorization of Parliament to change it, and we know how many steps are involved in that process. There is first reading, second reading, and third reading in the House of Commons, then the same in the Senate, and then Royal Assent. That is not to mention elections every four years, appointments, prorogations, and summer breaks.

Rather than having more flexible tools, the government is making the process unnecessarily cumbersome by putting most of the regulations for the Anti-terrorism Act into the grab bag it calls Bill C-59. That moves us further way from the main goal, which is to develop effective, legal tools to protect Canadians. That is another flaw.

Speaking of websites, as I was saying, one of the pillars of the Anti-terrorism Act is that it attacks the source of the violence, the hate speech that incites violence. Violent words lead to violent actions. That is why it is important to crack down on online content that incites violence. Once again, the government should be more vigilant and provide additional tools to accomplish that goal. There are provisions in the Criminal Code that deal with this sort of online content. Incitement to violence was a crime even before the Anti-terrorism Act came into force. In fact, the Criminal Code has been around since the beginning of time, or at least since the beginning of our parliamentary system. Incitement to violence goes against Canadian values.

Why interfere with the work of those responsible for protecting us and reducing violence at its source, where it really begins, on extremist websites, whether they be extreme left or extreme right? Right now, we are talking mainly about Islamist extremist websites, but that could change. The government could develop a tool to identify websites that incite people to violence.

I was honoured to be with the family of Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent following his tragic death. During Patrice Vincent's funeral, Louise Vincent said that she hoped her brother's death would not be in vain. As parliamentarians, it is incumbent upon every one of us to ensure that the people who have sacrificed their lives so we can live freely and debate here in the House—always respectfully, whether we agree with one another or not—have not done so in vain. People have fought for our freedom. Some have even shed blood quite recently. As parliamentarians, we must ensure that those who are responsible for keeping us safe have the tools they need to take action. That is why the Anti-terrorism Act was enacted.

It is for those very reasons that I will oppose this Liberal bill. It undermines the tools we gave our police officers so they could protect the people of this country, which is the primary responsibility of any state.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased that so many changes have been made to our anti-terrorism legislation, which are reflected in Bill C-59. I have stood in this place a number of times and complained that the government held consultations but did not listen. I am happy to say that this is not one of those times.

I submitted an extensive brief to the joint consultation, headed by the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Public Safety. When I read Bill C-59, I felt very gratified that this legislation was drafted with an eye to the recommendations of the commission of inquiry into the Air India disaster and the failure of our security system at that point resulting from our agencies' inability to talk among each other to share information that could have prevented that terrible tragedy. It also appeared to me that the drafters paid attention to the results of the inquiry into the atrocious treatment of Canadian citizen Maher Arar.

There are still weaknesses in this bill. I would have preferred, as the hon. member knows, to remove any kinetic powers from CSIS. Its power to disrupt plots may still prove to make us less secure than we were, given that CSIS was originally intended to be about information collection only, and it left the RCMP to take action on the ground for kinetic activities.

Overall, this is a substantial improvement over the situation in which we found ourselves in 2015 with the speedy passage of what I still call the “secret police act” or what was then Bill C-51.

This is a comment, more than a question to my hon. colleague, just to say on the record that I am pleased to vote for Bill C-59, although I would have preferred we had gone further and removed more of the things launched in Bill C-51.

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to rise today to speak in this important debate on Bill C-59. I want to thank my colleagues on the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, both past and present, who contributed to the in-depth study of our national security framework, as well as those who provided testimony on this bill. Thanks to that work, over 40 amendments were adopted by the committee, and I would like to highlight some of them.

First, there is an amendment that would add provisions enacting the avoiding complicity in mistreatment by foreign entities act, which was introduced by my colleague, the MP for Montarville. Canadians find torture abhorrent and an affront to their values. In the past, the Minister of Public Safety, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of National Defence have issued directions to ensure that the Canadian government does not use, share, disclose, or request information that could put someone at risk of being tortured by a foreign entity. This amendment would enshrine in law a requirement for directions to be issued on using, disclosing, or requesting information. These directions would be made public and reported on annually to the public, to review bodies, and to the newly constituted National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians to ensure transparency and accountability.

I know that Canadians want to feel confident that their government is not complicit in foreign entities' use of torture, as it is well documented that information obtained through torture is unreliable. This amendment is a welcome reassurance, and I am proud that the committee adopted it, despite objections from the official opposition.

Second, the amended bill would strengthen privacy protections. Since referring the bill to committee before second reading, we have heard many stakeholders call for the strengthening of protections for information shared under the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, and we introduced rigorous new standards. The amended bill specifies that the receiver of information would be required to destroy or return any personal information that is not necessary for it to carry out its responsibilities related to national security.

I was personally proud to put forward an amendment that would formalize the relationship between the newly created national security and intelligence review agency and the Office of the Privacy Commissioner, which would ensure that the two agencies are not duplicating work. I was also proud to introduce an amendment that would require a ministerial authorization when CSE is collecting from foreign actors information that could inadvertently compromise a Canadian's privacy. I believe that these changes would help to get the mix right when it comes to ensuring Canadians' safety and security and preserving their rights.

Bill C-59 is a much-needed overhaul of our national security framework. The passage of this bill would mark the largest overhaul of our national security infrastructure since 1984, when CSIS was created. It is fair to say that we are at a critical turning point in how government approaches national security. That is why I am pleased that the government has introduced this bill, not only to add better protections for privacy but also to bring our framework up to speed with the realities of the 21st century. There is an urgent need to shed the old ways of doing business, integrate security efforts, and harness all the tools at our disposal to prevent and mitigate threats.

When Justice Noël released his decision last year on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's retention of associated data, he laid bare the challenge for us as parliamentarians. To quote Justice Noël, “the CSIS Act is showing its age. World order is constantly in flux...and priorities and opinions change. Canada can only gain from weighing such important issues once again.”

With Bill C-59, the government is showing that it is up to the challenge. It recognized that the CSIS Act of 1984 may have been an appropriate response at the time it was written, but it is outdated given the realities of today's world. Today, the government has recognized that appropriate, responsible, and comprehensive legislation for the 21st century would mean altering that act substantially.

Bill C-59 makes changes in three key ways: by addressing the collection of datasets, by making important amendments to threat reduction measures under the act, and by addressing outdated legal authorities.

First, on data analytics, acquiring large volumes of information for analysis, when it is relevant to an agency's mandate, is an indispensable tool in intelligence work. However, data collection and analysis require a strong framework, and this bill provides that framework.

The bill lays out a legal authority for CSIS to collect, retain, and use datasets, and, to ensure transparency, provisions would include safeguards on its collection and use. For example, the personal information of Canadians that is not publicly available would require Federal Court authorization to retain. When it comes to foreign datasets, approval from the proposed new independent intelligence commissioner would be required. The new national security and intelligence review agency would have the authority to refer its findings to the Federal Court if it takes the view that CSIS has not acted lawfully when querying or exploiting datasets. I also introduced an amendment to Bill C-59 that was adopted at committee stage, ensuring that CSIS could retain the results of a query of a dataset in exigent circumstances to protect life or acquire intelligence vital to national security.

Bill C-59 would provide the accountability and transparency on dataset collection that is needed in the technological reality of today. It would modernize the CSIS Act, enhance judicial oversight where needed, and strengthen review and accountability. The bill also addresses the fact that today's threats are fast, complex, dynamic, highly connected, and mobile. CSIS can and does play a role in addressing these threats, often behind the scenes, but the original CSIS Act could never have imagined the threats we face today. As Justice Noël noted, that leaves security bodies in an unreasonably difficult situation when it comes to interpreting the law while continuing to protect Canadians' rights.

Bill C-59 would more clearly define the current threat reduction mandate of CSIS. It lays out what types of measures could be authorized by judicial warrants to ensure full compliance with the charter. CSIS would be required to seek a warrant for any threat reduction measure that would put a charter-protected right or freedom at risk. What is more, a warrant would only be issued if a judge is satisfied the measure specifically complies with the charter.

Bill C-59 would also establish in law an authorization regime for certain CSIS activities required to investigate the complex threats we face today. This would be modelled on the regime that already exists in the Criminal Code for law enforcement officers, adapted to the particular context of security intelligence investigations. It would ensure more transparent, lawful, and modernized authorities for CSIS that would ensure effective intelligence collection operations, and it would it ensure robust accountability by clearly articulating reporting and review requirements.

Accountability, transparency, and respect for rights are at the heart of these proposals. That is what Canadians said they wanted; the government listened and it acted. During the consultation process, Canadians repeatedly emphasized the need for enhanced accountability and transparency. The Security Intelligence Review Committee, CSIS's current review body, pressed for enhancements as well. The new national security review agency and intelligence commissioner would ensure the most robust oversight and scrutiny possible.

We heard, loud and clear, from many witnesses and members of the public that protecting privacy and safeguarding human rights were missing under the Harper Conservatives' Bill C-51. With Bill C-59 further strengthened by amendments made at committee, I am confident that Canadians' privacy rights would be reinforced alongside the strengthening of our national security. Bill C-59 is a comprehensive and visionary plan for Canada in today's world. It is my hope that colleagues will join me in supporting Bill C-59.

[Arif Virani, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Canadian Heritage (Multiculturalism)]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the member for Oakville North—Burlington this evening.

I rise today to speak in support of Bill C-59. With this bill, our government is entrenching our commitment to balancing the primacy of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms with protecting our national security. We are enhancing accountability and transparency. We are correcting the most problematic elements of the Harper government's old Bill C-51.

Our government conducted an unprecedented level of public consultation with Canadians about our national security in order to effectively develop the bill. Canadians told us loudly and clearly that they wanted a transparent, accountable, and effective national security framework. That is exactly what we will accomplish with Bill C-59.

The minister took the rare step of referring Bill C-59 to the Standing Committee on Public Safety after first reading, underscoring our government's commitment to Canadians to ensure that we got this important legislation right. Prior to the bill returning to this chamber, it underwent an extensive four-month study, hearing from nearly 100 witnesses. I would like to thank the members of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for their hard work in studying the bill extensively and for their comprehensive report.

Fundamental to our promise to bring our national security framework into the 21st century, we are fixing the very flawed elements of the old Bill C-51, which I heard so much about from my constituents in Parkdale—High Park during the 2015 electoral campaign.

I am proud to support this evidence-based, balanced legislation, and I am reassured to see positive reactions from legal and national security experts right around the country, including none other than Professors Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, two of the foremost legal academics in Canada who have been at the centre of concerns about the overreach of the Harper government's old Bill C-51.

Professors Forcese and Roach have said, “Bill C-59 is the biggest overhaul in Canadian national security since the creation of the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) in 1984—and it gets a lot of things right."

Bill C-59 builds on our commitment to enhance accountability, which started with our government's introduction of Bill C-22 in 2016. Bill C-22, which has received royal assent established an all-party committee of parliamentarians, representatives elected by the Canadian public, to review and critically analyze security and intelligence activities. For the first time in history, a multi-party group of members of this chamber as well as the Senate are now holding Canada's security apparatus to account.

We are building on Bill C-22 with the current bill, Bill C-59, which would establish a national security and intelligence review agency. The NSIRA, as it would be known, would function as a new expert review body with jurisdiction across the entire government to complement the efforts of the recently established parliamentary oversight committee, which I just mentioned. This feature would incorporate one of the important recommendations of the Maher Arar inquiry, which called on the government to, and I am citing recommendation 16 from the Maher Arar inquiry, “develop a protocol to provide for coordination and coherence across government in addressing issues that arise” respecting national security.

With the establishment of a parliamentary oversight committee in Bill C-22, and a new arm's-length review body in Bill C-59, we would be addressing the glaring gap that exists in our review bodies for national security agencies. Currently, some agencies do not have a review body or are in charge of reviewing themselves. We cannot allow the lack of such fundamental oversight to continue, especially with regard to the safety and security of Canadians.

As Professors Forcese and Roach have observed, with respect to Bill C-59:

the government is finally redressing the imbalance between security service powers and those of the review bodies that are supposed to hold them to account. Bill C-59 quite properly supplements the parliamentary review committee...with a reformed expert watchdog entity. Expert review will be liberated from its silos as the new review agency has a whole-of-government mandate.

This is a critical piece in our government's work, providing my constituents in Parkdale—High Park and indeed Canadians right around this country, with a comprehensive and responsible national security framework.

In addition to establishing the NSIRA, Bill C-59 calls for increased and improved communication between this organization and other relevant review bodies, such as the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. This will not only boost efficiency and avoid duplication and unnecessary use of resources, but also promote a more holistic approach to protecting privacy and security at the federal level.

While speaking with the residents of Parkdale—High Park in 2015, I heard about the Harper government's old Bill C-51 over and over again at the doors. The major concern the residents expressed to me was about the threat posed by the previous government's Bill C-51 to their constitutional rights and freedoms. The residents of my community are an intelligent and engaged group of citizens, and they were on to something. The federal government, under the guise of “public security”, cannot be permitted to infringe on the rights and freedoms that are fundamental to our very society, to what it means to be Canadian.

Yes, ensuring public safety is the pre-eminent responsibility of any government, but it is simply not acceptable to pursue security at any cost. My constituents, and indeed all Canadians, expect a government that respects fundamental constitutional rights, a government that will put in place mechanisms and safeguards to protect those rights.

That is precisely what Bill C-59 would achieve. How? First, it would tighten the definition of what constitutes “terrorist propaganda”. The narrower and more targeted definition would ensure that the sacrosanct protection of freedom of expression under section 2(b) of our charter is observed, and that our security laws in Canada are not so overreaching as to limit legitimate critique and debate.

Second, as a corollary to this point, Bill C-59 would also protect the right of all Canadians to legitimate protest and advocacy. One of the most searing criticisms of the Harper government's old Bill C-51 was that bona fide protestors who dared to disagree with the government of the day could be caught up in a web of security sweeps, all in the name of public safety.

That is not how our Liberal government operates. We respect the charter and the right of all Canadians to engage in legitimate protest and advocacy, whether they represent a group with charitable status that opposes a government policy, or a gathering of students on a university campus who take up the call for more aggressive investment of federal funds to support the expansion of women's rights internationally.

That kind of advocacy is not a threat to our public security. To the contrary, it is an enhancement of our democracy. It is civil society groups and public citizens doing exactly what they do best, challenging government to do, and to be, better.

In Bill C-59, we recognize this principle. We are saying to Canadians that they have constitutional rights to free speech and protest, and that we are going to affirm and protect those rights by correcting the balance between protecting safety and respecting the charter.

Third, Bill C-59 would also upgrade procedures as they relate to the no-fly list. We know that the no-fly list is an important international mechanism for keeping people safe, but its use has expanded to the point of encroaching on Canadians' rights. In Bill C-59, we are determined to address this imbalance.

Our changes to the no-fly list regime would do the following. They would require the destruction of information provided to the minister about a person who was, or was expected to be, on board an aircraft within seven days following the departure or cancellation of the flight. It would also authorize the minister to collect information from individuals for the purpose of issuing a unique identifier to them to assist with pre-flight verification of their identity.

This is a critical step that would provide us with the legislative tools needed to develop a domestic redress mechanism. The funding for a domestic redress mechanism was delivered by our government this year, specifically $81.4 million in budget 2018. However, in order to start investing this money in a way that would allow Canadians, including children, who are false positives on the no-fly list to seek redress, we need legislative authority. Bill C-59 would provide that legislative authority.

Finally, with Bill C-59 we would re-establish the paramountcy of the charter. I speak now as a constitutional lawyer who practised in this area for 15 years prior to being elected. It is unfortunate that the paramountcy of the Constitution needs to be entrenched in law. As a lawyer, I know, and we should all know, that the Constitution is always the paramount document against which all other laws are measured. Nevertheless, the previous government's disdain for the charter has made this important step necessary.

Through Bill C-59, we would entrench, in black and white, that any unilateral action by CSIS to collect data in a manner that might infringe on the Constitution is no longer permitted. Instead, under Bill C-59, any such proposals would have to come before a judge, who must evaluate the application in accordance with the law, where protecting charter rights would be the paramount concern. Our party helped establish the charter in 1982, and our government stands behind that document and all the values and rights it protects.

As I and many others have said before in the House, the task is to balance rights and freedoms while upholding our duty to protect the safety of Canadians. That is not an easy task, but I am confident that Bill C-59, in partnership with Bill C-22, would provide a comprehensive and balanced approach to national security. It is respectful of the charter and our Constitution. That is why I support this bill, and I ask all members to do the same.

[Nathan Cullen, NDP, Skeena—Bulkley Valley, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, because he saw what the Liberals just attempted to do. The parliamentary secretary said the fact that the Liberals did not accept any of the substantive amendments from the NDP must mean that the amendments were wrong. That is, until the NDP was able to source where those amendments came from, which are the leading security and human rights experts, people from both the security establishments, and those who are looking to defend the rights of Canadians.

We all watched the fiasco of the Liberals in the last Parliament under Bill C-51 and the leadership of the current Prime Minister. They thought they could get away with just voting for the thing. The backlash that came their way caused the Liberals to introduce this mea culpa. They said that if they were elected, they would undo Bill C-51, which was a transgression, on multiple levels, of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Liberal Party wraps itself in the charter as often as it can—it is like a comforting blanket for it—except when it comes time to defending the charter.

My question for my friend is this. Of the significant damage done under Bill C-51 by the Harper government, supported by the Liberals at the time, what are the main things that will continue to exist if this bill were to pass and become law? What are the main contentions and concerns around privacy and human rights under Canadian law that will remain on the books under this Liberal leadership?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, if the member has a problem with the validity or the quality of the NDP amendments, he can take it up with the folks who offered us the exact wording we used, like the BC Civil Liberties Association, the Citizen Lab at Munk School at the University of Toronto, or Jean-Pierre Plouffe, who is the current commissioner of the CSE, and who will likely fill the role of the intelligence commissioner created by this legislation, or the RCMP Civilian Review and Complaints Commission. These are the organizations from which we took the wording that we used in our amendments. Therefore, on that front, I am very comfortable with the quality of the amendments, because they come from esteemed experts and folks who are fighting the good fight in civil society.

That being said, if I were to give the Liberals a report card on this issue, they would get two failures. The first failure is with respect to leadership in the previous Parliament. They were spineless with respect to Bill C-51 when the previous government brought in that draconian legislation. They can have all the revisionist history they want, but the reality is that real leadership is standing up for Canadian rights and freedoms. That is not what they did in the last Parliament. In conclusion, the second failure is with respect to what they have done with this legislation, which does nothing to fix any of the problems. Therefore, there was a failure to show leadership and to fix the problems that they allowed to happen in the first place.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, when the member was in the official opposition a number of years ago, and we were the third party at the time, there was a fairly significant debate that took place with respect to Bill C-51. Our Prime Minister made it very clear to Canadians, unlike the New Democrats, that we saw merit in Bill C-51. However, the commitment was that if we were elected, we would fix Bill C-51. There has been a great deal of consultation in every region of our country. There are two pieces of legislation, this one being the second part of it, that deals with and brings an end to Bill C-51. It fulfills an election platform commitment by this Prime Minister.

My question to my friend and colleague across the way is this. Does he recognize, and I am sure he does, that the NDP amendments went absolutely nowhere when Stephen Harper was Prime Minister? He might not like it, but it is quite possible that there were some problems with the amendments that the NDP were proposing. The point is this. Does he not agree that this is a commitment that the Liberal Party made in the last election, and that this legislation, in good part, is fulfilling that commitment?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues for their speeches. Here we are again, debating Bill C-59 at third reading, and I would like to start by talking about the process of debate surrounding a bill, which started not with this government, but rather during the last Parliament with the former Bill C-51.

Contrary to what we have been hearing from the other side today and at other times as well, the NDP and the Green Party were the only ones that opposed Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament. I have heard many people talk about how they were aware that Canadians had concerns about their security, about how a balanced approach was vital, and about how they understood the bill was flawed. They took it for granted that they would come to power and then fix the many, many, many flaws in the bill. Some of those flaws are so dangerous that they threaten the rights, freedoms, and privacy of Canadians. Of course, I am talking about the Liberal Party, which supported Bill C-51 even as it criticized it. I remember that when it was before committee, the member for Malpeque, who is still an MP, spend his time criticizing it and talking about its flaws. Then the Liberal Party supported it anyway.

That is problematic because now the government is trying to use the bill to position itself as the champion of nuanced perspectives. The government keeps trying to say that there are two objectives, namely to protect Canadians and to protect Canadians' rights. I myself remember a rather different situation, which developed in the wake of the 2014 attack on Parliament. The Conservative government tried to leverage people's fear following that terrible event to make unnecessary legislative changes. I will comment further on what was really necessary to protect Canadians.

A legislative change was therefore proposed to increase the powers given to national security agencies, but nothing was done to enhance the oversight system, which already falls short of where it needs to be to ensure that their work is done in full compliance with our laws and in line with Canadians' expectations regarding their rights and freedoms. Surveys showed that Canadians obviously welcomed those measures because, after all, we were in a situation where ISIS was on the rise, and we had the attack in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, which is not far from my region. We also had the attack right here in Parliament. They took advantage of people's fear, so there was some support for the measures presented in the bill.

To the NDP, our reflection in caucus made it very clear that we needed to stand up. We are elected to this place not only to represent our constituents, but also to be leaders on extremely difficult issues and to make the right decision, the decision that will ensure that we protect the rights of Canadians, even when that does not appear to be a popular decision.

Despite the fact that it seemed to be an unpopular decision, and despite the fact that the Liberals, seeing the polls, came out saying “We are just going to go with the wind and try and denounce the measures in the bill so that we can simultaneously protect ourselves from Conservative attacks and also try and outflank the NDP on the progressive principled stand of protecting Canadians' rights and freedoms,” what happened? The polls changed. As the official opposition, we fought that fight here in Parliament. Unlike the Liberals, we stood up to Stephen Harper's draconian Bill C-51. We saw Canadians overwhelmingly oppose the measures that were in Bill C-51.

What happened after the election? We saw the Liberals try to square the circle they had created for themselves by denouncing and supporting legislation all at the same time. They said not to worry, because they were going to do what they do best, which is to consult. They consulted on election promises and things that were already debated in the previous Parliament.

The minister brought forward his green paper. The green paper was criticized, correctly and rightfully so, for going too far in one direction, for posing the question of how we could give more flexibility to law enforcement, how we could give them more tools to do their jobs, which is a complete misunderstanding of the concerns that Canadians had with Bill C-51 to begin with. It goes back to the earlier point I made. Instead of actually giving law enforcement the resources to create their tools, having a robust anti-radicalization strategy, and making sure that we do not see vulnerable young people falling through the cracks and being recruited by terrorist organizations like ISIS or the alt right that we see in these white supremacist groups, what happened?

We embarked on this consultation that was already going in one direction, and nearly two years after the Liberals coming into power, we finally see legislation tabled. The minister, in his speech earlier today, defended tabling that legislation in the dying days of a spring sitting of Parliament before the House rises for the summer by saying that we would have time to consider and contemplate the legislation over the summer. He neglected to mention that the very same powers that stood on shaky constitutional ground that were accorded to agencies like CSIS by the Conservatives' Bill C-51 remain on the books, and as Michel Coulombe, the then director of CSIS, now retired, said repeatedly in committee, they are powers that were being used at that time.

It is all well and good to consult. Certainly, no one is opposed to the principles behind consultation, but when the consultation is about promises that were made to the Canadian people to fix legislation that undermined their rights while the very powers that undermined their rights are still on the books and being used, then one has to recognize the urgency to act.

The story continues because after this consultation the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security conducted a consultation. We made recommendations and the NDP prepared an excellent supplementary report, which supports the committee's unanimous recommendations, but also includes our own, in support of the bill introduced by my colleague from Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, which is on the Order Paper. He was the public safety critic before me and he led the charge, along with the member for Outremont, who was then the leader of the official opposition, against Bill C-51. The bill introduced by my colleague from Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke entirely repeals all of the legislation in Bill C-51.

Interestingly, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness defended the fact that he did not repeal it all by stating that several MPs, including the member for Spadina—Fort York, said that the reason not to do so was that it would be a highly complex legislative endeavour. My colleague introduced a bill that is on the Order Paper and that does exactly that. With due respect to my colleague, it cannot be all that complex if we were able to draft a bill that achieved those exact objectives.

Bill C-59 was sent to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security before second reading, on the pretext that this would make it possible to adopt a wider range of amendments, give the opposition more opportunities to be heard, and allow for a robust study. What was the end result? A total of 55 amendments were adopted, and we are proud of that. However, of those 55 amendments, two come from the NDP, and one of those relates to the preamble to one part of the bill. While I have no desire to impugn the Liberals' motives, the second amendment was adopted only once the wording met their approval. None of the Conservatives' amendments were adopted. Ultimately, it is not the end of the world, because we disagree on several points, but I hear all this talk about collaboration, yet none of the Green Party's amendments were adopted. This goes to show that the process was rigged and that the government had already decided on its approach.

The government is going to brag about the new part 1.1 of the legislation that has been adopted. Contrary to what the minister said when answering my question earlier today in debate, that would not create any new legal obligation in terms of how the system currently works. The ministerial directives that are adopted to prohibit—despite loopholes, it is important to note—the use of information obtained under torture will remain just that, ministerial directives. The legal obligation that the minister or the Governor in Council “may” recommend the issuing of directives to deputy heads of departments is just not good enough. If it were, the Liberals would have had no problem voting for amendments that I read into record at committee. Time does not permit me to reread the amendments into the record, but I read them into the record in my question for the minister. The amendments would have explicitly and categorically prohibited acquiring, using, or, in way, shape, or form, interacting with information, from a public safety perspective, that may have been obtained under the use of torture. That is in keeping with our obligations under international law conventions that Canada has signed on to.

On a recorded vote, on every single one of those amendments, every member of the committee, Liberal and Conservative alike, voted against them. I invite Canadians to look at that record, and I invite Canadians to listen to what the minister said in response to me. When public safety may be at risk, there is no bigger admission that they are open to using information obtained under the use of torture than saying that they want to keep the flexibility when Canadians are at risk. Let Canadians be assured that it has been proven time and again that information obtained under the use of torture is of the most unreliable sort. It not only does nothing to protect Canadians and ensure public safety, but most of the time it does the opposite, by leading law enforcement on wild goose chases with erroneous information that could put their lives at risk, and Canadian lives at risk, not to mention the abhorrent and flagrant breach of human rights here and elsewhere through having those types of provisions. Therefore, I will let the Liberals explain why they voted against those amendments to explicitly prohibit torture, and why they feel that standing on ministerial directives and words like “may”, that are anything but binding, is good enough.

The Minister of Public Safety loves to boast that he has the support of various experts, and I have the utmost respect for those experts. I took the process in committee very seriously. I tried to unpack the extremely complex elements of the bill.

My Conservative colleague mentioned the Chair's decision to apply Standing Order 69.1. In my opinion, separating the votes on the different elements of the bill amounts to an acknowledgement that it is indeed an omnibus bill. A former director of CSIS, who served as a national security advisor to Prime Minister Harper and the current Prime Minister, said that the bill was beginning to rival the Income Tax Act in terms of complexity. Furthermore, several witnesses were forced to limit their testimony to just one part of the bill. In addition, elements were added concerning the Communications Security Establishment, or CSE, and those elements fall within the scope of national defence, yet they were never mentioned during the consultations held by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security or by the Minister of Public Safety.

Before anyone jumps on me, I want to say that we realize the CSE's statutory mandate needs to be updated. We recognize that cybersecurity threats exist. However, when a government rams something through, as the government is doing with Bill C-59, we end up with flawed definitions, in particular with respect to the information available to the public, and with vague allocation of powers. Furthermore, the government is already announcing the position of a director of a new centre that is being created, under which everything will be consolidated, even though the act that is set out in the budget and, according to the minister, should be introduced this fall, has not yet been introduced.

This bill has many parts. The committee heard from some impressive experts, including professors Carvin, Forcese, and Wark, authors of some very important and interesting briefs, all of which are well thought out and attempt to break down all of the complicated aspects of the bill, including the ones I just mentioned. In their columns in The Globe and Mail, they say that some parts of the bill are positive and others require a more in-depth study. One of these parts has to do with information sharing.

Information sharing was one of the most problematic aspects of Bill C-51.

Information sharing is recognized by the experts whom the minister touts as those supporting his legislation, by civil liberties associations and others, as one of the most egregious elements of what was Bill C-51, and that is changed only in a cosmetic way in this legislation.

We changed “sharing” to “disclosure”, and what does that mean? When there are consequential amendments to changing “disclosure” everywhere else in all of these acts, it does not change anything. All experts recognize that. The problematic information-sharing regime that was brought in, which is a threat to Canadians' rights and freedoms, still exists.

If we want to talk about what happened to Maher Arar, the Liberals voted down one of my amendments to include Global Affairs as one of the governmental departments that Canadians could make a complaint about to the new review agency. Yet, when it comes to consular services, when it comes to human rights breaches happening to Canadians abroad, Global Affairs and consular services have a role to play, especially when we see stories in the news of CSIS undermining efforts of consular affairs to get Canadians out of countries with horrible human rights records and back here.

This has all fallen on deaf ears. The information-sharing regime remains in place. The new powers given to CSE, in clause 24, talk about how CSE has the ability to collect. Notwithstanding the prohibition on it being able to collect information on Canadians, it can, for the sake of research and other things, and all kinds of ill-defined terms, collect information on the information infrastructure related to Canadians.

Incidentally, as a matter of fact, it voted down my amendments to have a catch-and-release provision in place for information acquired incidentally on Canadians. What does that do? When we read clause 24 of part 3 of the bill related to CSE, it says that it is for the purposes of “disclosing”. Not only are they now exempt from the explicit prohibition that they normally have in their mandate, they can also disclose.

What have the Liberals done to the information-sharing regime brought in by the Conservatives under Bill C-51? It is called “disclosure” now. Members can do the math. We are perpetuating this regime that exists.

I know my time is very limited, so I want to address the issue of threat disruption by CSIS. As I said in my questions to my Conservative colleague, the very reason CSIS exists is that disruption is a police duty. As a result, leaving the power to disrupt threats granted in former Bill C-51 in the hands of CSIS still goes against the mandate of CSIS and its very purpose, even if the current government is making small improvements to the constitutionality of those powers. That is unacceptable.

I am not alone in saying this. As I said in my questions to my Conservative colleagues, I am talking about the excellent interview with former RCMP commissioner Paulson. He was interviewed by Professors Carvin and Forcese on their podcast. That interview raised concerns about that power.

In closing, I would like to talk about solutions. After all, I did begin my remarks by saying that we do not want to increase the legislative powers, which we believe are already sufficient. I am talking here about Bill C-51, which was introduced in the previous Parliament. We need to look at resources for police officers, which were cut by the previous government. The Conservatives eliminated the police recruitment fund, which allowed municipalities and provinces to recruit police officers and improve police services in their jurisdictions. I am thinking in particular of the Montreal police, or SPVM, and the Eclipse squad, which dealt with street gangs. It was a good thing the Government of Quebec was there to fill the gap left by the elimination of the funding that made it possible for the squad to exist. The current government is making some efforts in the fight against radicalization, but it needs to do more. The Conservatives are dumping on and ridiculing those efforts. The radicalization that we are seeing on social media and elsewhere targets vulnerable young people. Ridiculing and minimizing the government's efforts undermines the public safety objectives that we need to achieve.

We cannot support a bill that so deeply undermines the protection of Canadians' rights and privacy. Despite what they claim across the way, this bill does nothing to protect the safety of Canadians, which, let us be clear, is an objective all parliamentarians want to achieve. However, achieving that objective must not be done to the detriment of rights and freedoms, as was the case under the previous government and as is currently still the case with this bill.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the minister for his speech.

On June 20, 2017, almost a year ago to the day, the minister introduced Bill C-59 in the House. Shortly after that, he said that, instead of bringing it back for second reading, it would be sent straight to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security so the committee could strengthen and improve it. Opposition members thought that was fantastic. We thought there would be no need for political games for once. Since this bill is about national security, we thought we could work together to ensure that Bill C-59 works for Canadians. When it comes to security, there is no room for partisanship.

Unfortunately, the opposition soon realized that it was indeed a political game. The work we were asked to do was essentially pointless. I will have more to say about that later.

The government introduced Bill C-71, the firearms bill, in much the same way. It said it would sever the gun-crime connection, but this bill does not even go there. The government is targeting hunters and sport shooters, but that is another story.

Getting back to Bill C-59, we were invited to propose amendments. We worked very hard. We got a lot of work done in just under nine months. We really took the time to go through this 250-page omnibus bill. We Conservatives proposed 45 specific amendments that we thought were important to improve Bill C-59, as the minister had asked us to do. In the end, none of our amendments were accepted by the committee or the government. Once again, we were asked to do a certain job, but then our work was dismissed, even though everything we proposed made a lot of sense.

The problem with Bill C-59, as far as we are concerned, is that it limits the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's ability to reduce terrorist threats. It also limits the ability of government departments to share data among themselves to protect national security. It removes the offence of advocating and promoting terrorist offences in general. Finally, it raises the threshold for obtaining a terrorism peace bond and recognizance with conditions. One thing has been clear to us from the beginning. Changing just two words in a 250-page document can sometimes make all the difference. What we found is that it will be harder for everyone to step in and address a threat.

The minister does indeed have a lot of experience. I think he has good intentions and truly wants this to work, but there is a prime minister above him who has a completely different vision and approach. Here we are, caught in a bind, with changes to our National Security Act that ultimately do nothing to enhance our security.

Our allies around the world, especially those in Europe, have suffered attacks. Bill C-51 was introduced in 2014, in response to the attacks carried out here, in Canada. Right now, we do not see any measures that would prevent someone from returning to the Islamic State. This is a problem. Our act is still in force, and we are having a hard time dealing with Abu Huzaifa, in Toronto. The government is looking for ways to arrest him—if that is what it truly wants to do—and now it is going to pass a law that will make things even harder for our security services. We are having a hard time with this.

Then there is the whole issue of radicalization. Instead of cracking down on it, the government is trying to put up barriers to preventing it. The funny thing is that at the time, when they were in the opposition, the current Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and Prime Minister both voted with the government in favour of Bill C-51. There was a lot of political manoeuvring, and during the campaign, the Liberals said that they would address Bill C-51, a bill they had supported. At the time, it was good, effective counter-terrorism legislation. However, the Liberals listened to lobby groups and said during the campaign that they would amend it.

I understand the world of politics, being a part of it. However, there are certain issues on which we should set politics aside in the interest of national security. Our allies, the Five Eyes countries are working to enhance their security and to be more effective.

The message we want to get across is that adding more red tape to our structures makes them less operationally effective. I have a really hard time with that.

Let me share some examples of amendments we proposed to Bill C-59. We proposed an amendment requiring the minister to table in Parliament a clear description of the way the various organizations would work together, namely, the NSIC, CSE, CSIS, the new committee of parliamentarians, as well as the powers and duties of the minister.

In our meetings with experts, we noticed that people had a hard time understanding who does what and who speaks to whom. We therefore drafted an amendment that called on the minister to provide a breakdown of the duties that would be clear to everyone. The answer was no. The 45 amendments we are talking about were not all ideological in nature, but rather down to earth. The amendments were rejected.

It was the Conservative government that introduced Bill C-51 when it was in office. Before the bill was passed, the mandate of CSIS prevented it from engaging in any disruption activities. For example, CSIS could not approach the parents of a radicalized youth and encourage them to dissuade their child from travelling to a war zone or conducting attacks here in Canada. After Bill C-51 was passed, CSIS was able to engage in some threat disruption activities without a warrant and in others with a warrant. Threat disruption refers to efforts to stop terrorist attacks while they are still in the planning stages.

Threat disruption activities not requiring a warrant are understood to be any activities that are not contrary to Canadian laws. Threat disruption activities requiring a warrant currently include any activity that would infringe on an individual's privacy or other rights and any activity that contravenes Canada's laws. Any threat disruption activities that would cause bodily harm, violate sexual integrity, or obstruct justice are specifically prohibited.

Under Bill C-51, warrants were not required for activities that were not against Canadian law. Bill C-51 was balanced. No one could ask to intervene if it was against the law to do so. When there was justification, that worked, but if a warrant was required, one was applied for.

At present, Bill C-59 limits the threat reduction activities of CSIS to the specific measures listed in the bill. CSIS cannot employ these measures without a warrant. At present CSIS requires a warrant for these actions, which I will describe. First, a warrant is required to amend, remove, replace, destroy, disrupt, or degrade a communication or means of communication. Second, a warrant is also required to modify, remove, replace, destroy, degrade, or provide or interfere with the use or delivery of all or part of something, including files, documents, goods, components, and equipment.

The work was therefore complicated by the privacy objectives of Canadians. Bill C-51 created a privacy problem. Through careful analysis and comparison, it eventually became clear that the work CSIS was requesting was not in fact a privacy intrusion, as was believed. Even the privacy commissioners and witnesses did not analyze the situation the same way we are seeing now.

Bill C-51 made it easier to secure peace bonds in terrorism cases. Before Bill C-51, the legal threshold for police to secure a peace bond was that a person had to fear that another person will commit a terrorism offence.

Under Bill C-51, a peace bond could be issued if there were reasonable grounds to fear that a person might commit a terrorism offence. It is important to note that Bill C-59 maintains the lower of the two thresholds by using “may”. However, Bill C-59 raises the threshold from “is likely” to “is necessary”.

Earlier when I mentioned the two words that changed out of the 250 pages, I was referring to changing “is likely” to “is necessary”. These two words make all the difference for preventing a terrorist activity, in order to secure a peace bond.

It would be very difficult to prove that a peace bond, with certain conditions, is what is needed to prevent an act of terrorism. This would be almost as complex as laying charges under the Criminal Code. What we want, however, is to get information to be able to act quickly to prevent terrorist acts.

We therefore proposed an amendment to the bill calling for a recognizance order to be issued if a peace officer believes that such an order is likely to prevent terrorist activities. The Liberals are proposing replacing the word “likely” with the words “is necessary”. We proposed an amendment to eliminate that part of the bill, but it was refused. That is the main component of Bill C-59 with respect to managing national security.

Bill C-59 has nine parts. My NDP colleague wanted to split the bill, and I thought that was a very good idea, since things often get mixed up in the end. We are debating Bill C-59 here, but some parts are more administrative in nature, while others have to do with young people. Certain aspects need not be considered together. We believe that the administrative parts could have been included in other bills, while the more sensitive parts that really concern national security could have been dealt with publicly and separately.

Finally, the public and the media are listening to us, and Bill C-59 is an omnibus bill with so many elements that we cannot oppose it without also opposing some aspects that we support. For example, we are not against reorganizing the Communications Security Establishment. Some things could be changed, but we are not opposed to that.

We supported many of the bill's elements. On balance, however, it contains some legislation that is too sensitive and that we cannot support because it touches on fundamental issues. In our view, by tinkering with this, security operations will become very bureaucratic and communications will become difficult, despite the fact the the main goal was to simplify things and streamline operations.

The Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security heard from 36 witnesses, and several of them raised this concern. The people who work in the field every day said that it complicated their lives and that this bill would not simplify things. A huge structure that looks good on paper was put in place, but from an operational point of view, things have not been simplified.

Ultimately, national security is what matters to the government and to the opposition. I would have liked the amendments that we considered important to be accepted. Even some administrative amendments were rejected. We believe that there is a lack of good faith on the part of the government on this file. One year ago, we were asked to work hard and that is what we did. The government did not listen to us and that is very disappointing.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I want to applaud the minister for his efforts in trying to pull everything together. When we sat on the opposition benches during the debate on Bill C-51, a great divide was being created. Canadians had serious concerns about their rights and freedoms. At the same time, there was the issue of wanting to feel safe in changing times.

Could the minister provide his thoughts on how important it was to strike the right balance? In particular, could he give some attention to a previous legislation he brought forward regarding the parliamentary standing committee that was there to protect the rights of Canadians?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

moved that Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters, be read the third time and passed.

Mr. Speaker, as I open this final third reading debate on Bill C-59, Canada's new framework governing our national security policies and practices, I want to thank everyone who has helped to get us to this point today.

Historically, there were many previous studies and reports that laid the intellectual groundwork for Bill C-59. Justices Frank Iacobucci, John Major, and Dennis O'Connor led prominent and very important inquiries. There were also significant contributions over the years from both current and previous members of Parliament and senators. The academic community was vigorously engaged. Professors Forcese, Roach, Carvin, and Wark have been among the most constant and prolific of watchdogs, commentators, critics, and advisers. A broad collection of organizations that advocate for civil, human, and privacy rights have also been active participants in the process, including the Privacy Commissioner. We have heard from those who now lead or have led in the past our key national security agencies, such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the RCMP, the Communications Security Establishment, the Canada Border Services Agency, Global Affairs Canada, the Privy Council Office, and many others. While not consulted directly, through their judgments and reports we have also had the benefit of guidance from the Federal Court of Canada, other members of the judiciary, and independent review bodies like the Security Intelligence Review Committee, and the commissioner for the Communications Security Establishment.

National security issues and concerns gained particular prominence in the fall of 2014, with the attacks in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu and here in Ottawa, which spawned the previous government's Bill C-51, and a very intense public debate.

During the election campaign that followed, we undertook to give Canadians the full opportunity to be consulted on national security, actually for the first time in Canadian history. We also promised to correct a specific enumerated list of errors in the old Bill C-51. Both of those undertakings have been fulfilled through the new bill, Bill C-59, and through the process that got us to where we are today.

Through five public town hall meetings across the country, a digital town hall, two national Twitter chats, 17 engagement events organized locally by members of Parliament in different places across the country, 14 in-person consultations with a broad variety of specific subject matter experts, a large national round table with civil society groups, hearings by the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, and extensive online engagement, tens of thousands of Canadians had their say about national security like never before, and all of their contributions were compiled and made public for everyone else to see.

Based upon this largest and most extensive public consultation ever, Bill C-59 was introduced in Parliament in June of last year. It remained in the public domain throughout the summer for all Canadians to consider and digest.

Last fall, to ensure wide-ranging committee flexibility, we referred the legislation to the standing committee before second reading. Under the rules of the House, that provides the members on that committee with a broader scope of debate and possible amendment. The committee members did extensive work. They heard from three dozen witnesses, received 95 briefs, debated at length, and in the end made 40 different amendments.

The committee took what all the leading experts had said was a very good bill to start with, and made it better. I want to thank all members of the committee for their conscientious attention to the subject matter and their extensive hard work.

The legislation has three primary goals.

First, we sought to provide Canada with a modern, up-to-date framework for its essential national security activity, bearing in mind that the CSIS Act, for example, dates back to 1984, before hardly anyone had even heard of the information highway or of what would become the World Wide Web. Technology has moved on dramatically since 1984; so have world affairs and so has the nature of the threats that we are facing in terms of national security. Therefore, it was important to modify the law, to bring it up to date, and to put it into a modern context.

Second, we needed to correct the defects in the old Bill C-51, again, which we specifically enumerated in our 2015 election platform. Indeed, as members go through this legislation, they will see that each one of those defects has in fact been addressed, with one exception and that is the establishment of the committee of parliamentarians, which is not included in Bill C-59. It was included, and enacted by Parliament already, in Bill C-22.

Third, we have launched the whole new era of transparency and accountability for national security through review and oversight measures that are unprecedented, all intended to provide Canadians with the assurance that their police, security, and intelligence agencies are indeed doing the proper things to keep them safe while at the same time safeguarding their rights and their freedoms, not one at the expense of the other, but both of those important things together.

What is here in Bill C-59 today, after all of that extensive consultation, that elaborate work in Parliament and in the committees of Parliament, and the final process to get us to third reading stage? Let me take the legislation part by part. I noticed that in a ruling earlier today, the Chair indicated the manner in which the different parts would be voted upon and I would like to take this opportunity to show how all of them come together.

Part 1 would create the new national security and intelligence review agency. Some have dubbed this new agency a “super SIRC”. Indeed it is a great innovation in Canada's security architecture. Instead of having a limited number of siloed review bodies, where each focused exclusively on one agency alone to the exclusion of all others, the new national security and intelligence review agency would have a government-wide mandate. It would be able to follow the issues and the evidence, wherever that may lead, into any and every federal department or agency that has a national security or intelligence function. The mandate is very broad. We are moving from a vertical model where they have to stay within their silo to a horizontal model where the new agency would be able to examine every department of government, whatever its function may be, with respect to national security. This is a major, positive innovation and it is coupled, of course, with that other innovation that I mentioned a moment ago: the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians created under Bill C-22. With the two of them together, the experts who would be working on the national security and intelligence review agency, and the parliamentarians who are already working on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, Canadians can have great confidence that the work of the security, intelligence, and police agencies is being properly scrutinized and in a manner that befits the complexity of the 21st century.

This scrutiny would be for two key purposes: to safeguard rights and freedoms, yes absolutely, but also to ensure our agencies are functioning successfully in keeping Canadians safe and their country secure. As I said before, it is not one at the expense of the other, it is both of those things together, effectiveness coupled with the safeguarding of rights.

Then there is a new part in the legislation. After part 1, the committee inserted part 1.1 in Bill C-59, by adding the concept of a new piece of legislation. In effect, this addition by the committee would elevate to the level of legislation the practice of ministers issuing directives to their agencies, instructing them to function in such a manner as to avoid Canadian complicity in torture or mistreatment by other countries. In future, these instructions would be mandatory, not optional, would exist in the form of full cabinet orders in council, and would be made public. That is an important element of transparency and accountability that the committee built into the new legislation, and it is an important and desirable change. The ministerial directives have existed in the past. In fact, we have made them more vigorous and public than ever before, but part 1.1 would elevate this to a higher level. It would make it part of legislation itself, and that is the right way to go.

Part 2 of the new law would create the new role and function of the intelligence commissioner. For the first time ever, this would be an element of real time oversight, not just a review function after the fact. The national security and intelligence review agency would review events after they have happened. The intelligence commissioner would actually have a function to perform before activities are undertaken. For certain specified activities listed in the legislation, both the Canadian security intelligence agency and the Communications Security Establishment would be required to get the approval of the intelligence commissioner in advance. This would be brand new innovation in the law and an important element of accountability.

Part 3 of Bill C-59 would create stand-alone legislative authority for the Communications Security Establishment. The CSE has existed for a very long time, and its legislation has been attached to other legislation this Parliament has previously passed. For the first time now, the CSE would have its own stand-alone legal authorization in new legislation. As Canada's foreign signals intelligence agency, CSE is also our centre for cybersecurity expertise. The new legislation lays out the procedures and the protection around both defensive and active cyber-operations to safeguard Canadians. That is another reason it is important the CSE should have its own legal authorization and legislative form in a stand-alone act.

Part 4 would revamp the CSIS Act. As I mentioned earlier, CSIS was enacted in 1984, and that is a long time ago. In fact, this is the largest overall renovation of the CSIS legislation since 1984. For example, it would ensure that any threat reduction activities would be consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It would create a modern regime for dealing with datasets, the collection of those datasets, the proper use of those datasets, and how they are disposed of after the fact. It would clarify the legal authorities of CSIS employees under the Criminal Code and other federal legislation. It would bring clarity, precision, and a modern mandate to CSIS for the first time since the legislation was enacted in 1984.

Part 5 of the bill would change the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act to the security of Canada information disclosure act. The reason for the wording change is to make it clear that this law would not create any new collection powers. It deals only with the sharing of existing information among government agencies and it lays out the procedure and the rules by which that sharing is to be done.

The new act will clarify thresholds and definitions. It will raise the standards. It will sharpen the procedures around information sharing within the government. It will bolster record keeping, both on the part of those who give the information and those who receive the information. It will clearly exempt, and this is important, advocacy and dissent and protest from the definition of activities that undermine national security. Canadians have wanted to be sure that their democratic right to protest is protected and this legislation would do so.

Part 6 would amend the Secure Air Travel Act. This act is the legislation by which Canada establishes a no-fly list. We all know the controversy in the last couple of years about false positives coming up on the no-fly list and some people, particularly young children, being prevented from taking flights because their name was being confused with the name of someone else. No child is on the Canadian no-fly list. Unfortunately, there are other people with very similar names who do present security issues, whose names are on the list, and there is confusion between the two names. We have undertaken to try to fix that problem. This legislation would establish the legal authority for the Government of Canada to collect the information that would allow us to fix the problem.

The other element that is required is a substantial amount of funding. It is an expensive process to establish a whole new database. That funding, I am happy to say, was provided by the Minister of Finance in the last budget. We are on our way toward fixing the no-fly list.

Part 7 would amend the Criminal Code in a variety of ways, including withdrawing certain provisions which have never been used in the pursuit of national security in Canada, while at the same time creating a new offence in language that would more likely be utilized and therefore more useful to police authorities in pursuing criminals and laying charges.

Part 8 would amend the Youth Justice Act for the simple purpose of trying to ensure that offences with respect to terrorism where young people are involved would be handled under the terms of the Youth Justice Act.

Part 9 of the bill would establish a statutory review. That is another of the commitments we made during the election campaign, that while we were going to have this elaborate consultation, we were going to bring forward new legislation, we were going to do our very best to fix the defects in Bill C-51, and move Canada forward with a new architecture in national security appropriate to the 21st century.

We would also build into the law the opportunity for parliamentarians to take another look at this a few years down the road, assess how it has worked, where the issues or the problems might be, and address any of those issues in a timely way. In other words, it keeps the whole issue green and alive so future members of Parliament will have the chance to reconsider or to move in a different direction if they think that is appropriate. The statutory review is built into Part 9.

That is a summary of the legislation. It has taken a great deal of work and effort on the part of a lot of people to get us to this point today.

I want to finish my remarks with where I began a few moments ago, and that is to thank everyone who has participated so generously with their hard work and their advice to try to get this framework right for the circumstances that Canada has to confront in the 21st century, ensuring we are doing those two things and doing them well, keeping Canadians safe and safeguarding their rights and freedoms.

Criminal Code

[Harold Albrecht, Conservative, Kitchener—Conestoga, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I rise on behalf of the constituents of Kitchener—Conestoga to participate in the debate on Bill C-75, the omnibus Liberal justice bill.

This bill is over 300 pages long and amends several different acts. One does not have to look too far into the past to recollect some of the comments made by members of the Liberal Party in regard to omnibus legislation. I am sure that many of us in this House remember the promises made during the all-candidates debate in the 2015 election not to have more omnibus bills, and many others as well. I will refer to those a little bit later tonight in my comments. However, it seems as if the Liberals have kept their reputation and have changed their minds to suit their own interests. It is a reputation they have developed quite well.

Not only is it a very lengthy bill, but its timing is also suspect, given that on the eve of the Easter long weekend, the Liberal government tabled this piece of legislation that would drastically change our criminal justice system and how criminals and victims are treated. We see again in this bill that the needs of victims are discounted and the lighter treatment of criminals is a priority of the Liberal government.

Tabling Bill C-75 on the eve of the Easter weekend, just prior to the two-week parliamentary break, clearly shows that the government knew it would not go over too well with Canadians or members of the legal community. That, in fact, is definitely what has happened since the tabling of this bill, in spite of the best efforts of the Liberal Party to hide these facts from Canadians.

Another interesting fact about this piece of legislation is that it re-tables three bills already on the Order Paper: Bill C-28, Bill C-38, and Bill C-39 have all been rolled into this new bill, Bill C-75. If anything speaks to the government's inability to handle a legislative agenda, this is surely it. The government has proven to be so badly organized that it is now just combining several previously tabled pieces of legislation in order to make broader changes to our criminal justice system in less time with less scrutiny, and less debate. It is a real shame, especially, as I said earlier, when during the 2015 campaign they promised to allow all members of Parliament to have a voice, and that the government would not use omnibus bills. They also promised that that election would be the last first-past-the-post election, and that they would run small deficits and not use time allocation. All of those promises are out the window with no respect shown for Parliament.

A primary stated objective of Bill C-75 is to reduce delays in our justice system. The R. v. Jordan ruling, which imposes strict time limits on criminals, has made this objective very important. It is a crucial issue that needs to be addressed.

Thousands of criminal trials across Canada have been stayed, including those involving murderers who have been charged. The reason these charges have been stayed is that the time limits imposed by R. versus Jordan were exceeded.

However, we know that this legislation does not achieve the objective. Do not take my word for it. A number of members of the legal community and journalists have also written about this. For example, an opinion piece in the Toronto Star stated:

On Thursday, the federal government released Bill C-75, an omnibus bill aimed at reducing court delays. Unfortunately, good intentions stop at the preamble, especially for those of us who believed in the government’s pre-election promise to bring a principled approach to criminal justice reform.

The author goes on to state:

However, C-75 reclassifies a myriad of offences, giving the Crown discretion to prosecute them summarily. To further incentivize this option, the bill increases the maximum penalty for summary offences from six months to two years. Summary offence trials, like preliminary inquiries, occur in provincial courts, which are already the most congested courts in our system. C-75 may very well take many preliminary inquiries off the provincial court docket, but it will replace them with many more trials.

What has proposed here are more backlogs, more delays, longer time limits. This justice minister is abdicating her responsibility to ensure that there is a functional justice system in Canada.

We see this inability to ensure a functional justice system with this current legislation, as well as with this Liberal government's extremely poor record of appointing judges.

I have one more comment from a legal expert from McElroy Law, a firm located right in Ottawa. She notes, “Under Stephen Harper, the Conservatives justice policies drew a clear line in the sand between criminals and victims. It was an easy sell to promise law-abiding citizens that those convicted of criminal offences will be punished harshly, in order to keep the good guys safe.”

She goes on later to say:

...the government is tinkering with the guts of criminal trials themselves, such as seeking to have police provide evidence by way of affidavit and having an accused person apply to be able to cross-examine them. The changes, if the bill is passed, will not aid in reducing delay, but will instead undermine trial fairness and may adversely affect Indigenous and other marginalized communities that are so often over-represented in our justice system.

Taken from the Ottawa citizen is the following:

Bill C-75 promises to speed up court cases by eliminating preliminary hearings for all but the most serious matters. Also, quietly slipped into the bill is a provision that would allow Crown prosecutors to simply file written copies of police officers’ evidence instead of actually calling them at trial to testify. Not only will these changes waste more court time than they save, they will erode fundamental safeguards of trial fairness.

The number one responsibility of a government is to keep its citizens safe, and this bill is seriously failing in that responsibility. It seems the government, despite all of its comments about “rigid ideology”, is clearly implementing its own rigid ideology without proper consultation with experts and lawyers in the field who are actually going to be dealing with the ramifications of this poor legislation.

Mr. Speaker, I have just been informed that I am sharing my time with the hon. member for Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner. I thought I had 20 minutes, but I guess I will have to move quickly.

I have not yet addressed the aspects of the bill that my colleagues and I consider to be the most egregious. I am going to move to those now, as I see my time is elapsing quickly.

Some of the offences that would see penalty decreases include, but are not limited to, leaving Canada to participate in a terrorist group or participation in the activity of a terrorist group. The bill proposes to actually reduce the penalties for these crimes, and it is important that Canadians understand that.

There is a long list of criminal offences that the government appears to think are not worthy of indictable charges: leaving Canada to participate in the activity of a terrorist group; punishment of rioter and concealment of identity; breach of trust by a public officer; municipal corruption; influencing or negotiating appointments or dealing in offices; prison breach; infanticide; concealing the body of a child; neglect to obtain assistance in child birth that results in the permanent injury or death of the child; assisting a prisoner of war to escape; obstructing or violence to, or arrest of, an officiating clergyman; keeping a common bawdy house; causing bodily harm by criminal negligence; and impaired driving causing bodily harm. The bill proposes to reduce the sentences for all of these offences.

One of the hybrid offences that the bill adds to the sequence is the obstruction of, or violence toward, an officiating clergyman. This is in section 176. This is the same section that the government proposed to repeal in Bill C-51, the justice omnibus bill. However, eventually it caved in to public uproar and feedback that was carried by our opposition members. Clearly, the government is not listening to the thousands of Canadians who are very concerned by the softening of punishment for this crime. The government is trying to diminish the severity of this crime. The issue is of crucial importance, especially now, given there is an increasing concern about sectarian violence in our world.

I could go on and speak for another 10 minutes, but hopefully I will get a chance to finish later.

National Security Act, 2017

[Dan Vandal, Liberal, Saint Boniface—Saint Vital, MB]

Mr. Speaker, several times the member said that Bill C-59 was not an improvement over Bill C-51. Fortunately, the experts do not agree with him. University of Ottawa expert, Craig Forcese, said that this is “the biggest reform in this area since 1984, and the creation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).” He believes we have needed this for a while.

University of Toronto expert, Wesley Wark, said: “If Canada can make this new system work, it will return the country to the forefront of democracies determined to hold their security and intelligence systems to account”.

Could the hon. member comment on the experts' opinions?

[Arnold Viersen, Conservative, Peace River—Westlock, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin my speech this evening by talking about public safety and national security matters.

Whenever I stand up in this place, on whatever we are talking about, I always like to think about whether this is the job of the federal government. Typically, in broad sweeps, I can rarely get past the end of one hand when it comes to things the federal government should be dealing with. I usually think of things like border security, the justice system, and the military as things that definitely the federal government should be taking care of.

The issue we are dealing with tonight is one of those issues the federal government definitely needs to take care of. It is definitely something that is timely. Folks from where I come from, in Peace River—Westlock, in northern Alberta, often mention this to me when I am driving around meeting with folks. They are concerned about national security. They are concerned about terrorism issues. It is one of the top 10 things people talk to me about. Therefore, I think this is a timely debate.

I would hearken back to some of the speeches we heard earlier this evening. September 11 was a significant turning point in western civilization. I think every one of us in this place remembers that day. I remember listening to the news on 630 CHED in Alberta. My alarm clock had gone off, and I was listening to the news, when the normal broadcast was interrupted to tell us that the twin towers had been run into by an airplane. I remember that day well, as I am sure everyone in this place does. Since that day, the entire western world has had to look at how we defend our national security. Before that point, we were looking at our national security from the perspective of nation states. However, this brought a whole new protocol. We needed new laws. Frankly, I think we are still learning all of that.

I do not think the Liberals have necessarily taken serious consideration of public safety and national security in this bill. They basically looked at what we did when we were in government. They thought that the Conservatives were aggressive on this and took the bull by the horns, and they would just turn it back a notch. It does not seem to me that they are giving it adequate weight by saying that they just have to change a bunch of things in Bill C-51. The Liberals heard over and over again that Bill C-51 was bad, and they would just turn it back. That does not seem to me to be grappling with the issues we need to deal with.

Public safety and national security is hard work. We need to create a culture in Canada so that people feel safe. That is what I hear over and over again in my riding. They do not feel that the government is creating a culture in Canada where people feel safe. For example, advocating or promoting terrorism is something that has been touched on in this debate. We need to talk about that in terms of what it means when it comes to Bill C-75, which is another bill that will be debated tonight. I believe that in that particular bill, advocating or promoting terrorism, even if one is found guilty of it, would be downgraded as well.

When we look at the bill before us, I am disappointed that the Liberals have not grabbed the bull by the horns. Bill C-51 came out a number of years back, and the landscape has changed since then. I was looking forward to having a robust debate on this issue. I know that it was something in the LIberal campaign and something I was challenged on over and over again. I knew that after the election, Bill C-51 would be up for debate, and I was looking forward to having that debate on some substantive changes that could improve it.

I think we got it right with Bill C-51, but every piece of legislation is open to improvement and I was happy to come here to debate this. I do not think Bill C-59 improves on Bill C-51 at all. In fact, all it seems to do is to just turn everything back a few notches, which does not seem to make an effect. It is the exact same philosophy that we are seeing with Bill C-75. The Liberals say we have backlogs in the justice system, rather than their addressing some of the underlying causes and doing the hard work of digging into it. They say, turn the dial back a little, lower the thresholds, push people out of the system more easily rather than dealing with the actual justice system.

When I do surveys in my riding, people do not think the Liberals are taking our national security seriously. People do not think they are securing our borders properly. All of this plays into the world view of the Liberals.

Whenever I am discussing national security or justice issues, I say that people have the ability to do evil. That is a fact of life and we need to have a justice system that recognizes that. Most people lock their doors at night. Why? Because people are capable of evil. That is the truth. It would be great if we all could leave our doors open and nothing ever went missing. It would be great if we could all give up our firearms and everyone would be safe, but that is not the reality. That is the underlying philosophy that is lacking on the Liberal side. They are not convinced that people are capable of evil and they think that the justice system is being mean to people and that if we just hug the thug, so to speak, everything would be better.

There is a philosophy in this bill that if we just turn down the justice element, if we trusted people a little more, this country would be a safer place. That is definitely not the case. We need to ensure that our police officers and our intelligence community have the resources and tools they need to ensure that Canada is a safe place.

My riding is a long way from the border, and I cannot say that the border crossing issue has directly affected my riding, but it is amazing how many times people in my riding have asked, when is the government is going to do something about the border crossings? Why are the Liberals jeopardizing our public safety? We are seeing that here, as well with the terrorism issue.

One of the things people in my riding are concerned about is the growing threat of terrorism in the world. In this regard, in the bill we see that for advocating and promoting terrorism, the threshold is being lowered, and that in Bill C-75 the sentencing is being lowered. It is being taken from an indictable offence to a summary offence. The Liberals need to do the hard work that it takes to make sure that we have a national security regime that people in Canada trust. That is an important point that I wanted to make here tonight. Whatever the Liberals are doing, people need to have trust in that system that their safety is being upheld, that Canada will remain the safe place it has been in years past, and that people can sleep safely in their beds.

With that, I look forward to any questions that people may have.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I remember well the climate of fear that Bill C-51 created. I remember meeting with young, Canadian-born Islamic women who told me that for the first time in their whole lives, they felt afraid and did not feel welcome. That climate has been largely pushed back, and I give credit to everyone in this place, but it is on all sides and all parties to push back on Islamophobia.

Getting back to part 3 of Bill C-51, it is important that we not try to limit, in any way, the ability of, for instance, a local imam to reach out to people in that community and tell them, “Do not listen to so-and-so. That is a misunderstanding of Quran. This is the real Quran, which is one that has nothing to do with violence.” That is an important feature that Bill C-59 helps protect.

[Sean Fraser, Liberal, Central Nova, NS]

Mr. Speaker, it is always a pleasure when the hon. member for Saanich—Gulf Islands has the opportunity to partake in debate, particularly when it is one as important as this.

Over the course of the debate and in the consultations ahead of time, much attention has been given to the specific wording used in the legislation, but I would like to shift gears and consider the social context in which an important piece of legislation like this exists, as compared to Bill C-51.

My wife was working for a civil liberties organization at the time Bill C-51 was coming through the last Parliament, and one of the things that greatly disturbed me was that there were members of the Muslim community she had worked with who expressed that because of the measures included in Bill C-51, and the general tenor of the government at the time and the anti-Muslim bent it had, there were people who previously came to some of their public education seminars who refused to keep coming, because they feared that the government would be watching them.

These are the very people we should be engaging with to ensure that they are bringing positive messages about the good relationship the government can have with minority communities back to their communities to foster a healthy relationship.

I am curious if the hon. member has any commentary on the importance of public education and outreach to minority communities when we are dealing with legislation that could impact rights, particularly when racial profiling is so important in this case.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, this was a very troubling provision about what kind of information posted on social media could lead to criminal charges and jail. Bill C-51 talked about the previously unknown concept of “terrorism in general”. What did it mean? Nobody knew. The concept of promoting “terrorism”, on the other hand, or “counselling” terrorist activities, makes sense to anyone within a legal context. “Promoting” is vague; “counselling” is clear. “Terrorism in general” is vague; “terrorism” is clear.

Counselling terrorism is a clearly understood and defined offence and therefore useful for security and protecting public safety. The way it was phrased in Bill C-51 was thought-chill over who knows what, but it was essentially draconian.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I find myself surprised to have a speaking spot tonight. For that I want to thank the New Democratic Party. We do not agree about this bill, but it was a generous gesture to allow me to speak to it.

I have been very engaged in the issue of anti-terrorism legislation for many years. I followed it when, under Prime Minister Chrétien, the anti-terrorism legislation went through this place immediately after 9/11. Although I was executive director of the Sierra Club, I recall well my conversations with former MP Bill Blaikie, who sat on the committee, and we worried as legislation went forward that appeared to do too much to limit our rights as Canadians in its response to the terrorist threat.

That was nothing compared to what happened when we had a shooting, a tragic event in October 2014, when Corporal Nathan Cirillo was murdered at the National War Memorial. I do not regard that event, by the way, as an act of terrorism, but rather of one individual with significant addiction and mental health issues, something that could have been dealt with if he had been allowed to have the help he sought in British Columbia before he came to Ottawa and committed the horrors of October 22, 2014.

It was the excuse and the opening that the former government needed to bring in truly dangerous legislation. I will never forget being here in my seat in Parliament on January 30. It was a Friday morning. One does not really expect ground-shaking legislation to hit without warning on a Friday morning in this place. There was no press release, no briefing, no telling us what was in store for us. I picked up Bill C-51, an omnibus bill in five parts, and read it on the airplane flying home, studied it all weekend, and came back here. By Monday morning, February 2, I had a speaking spot during question period and called it the “secret police act”.

I did not wait, holding my finger to the wind, to see which way the political winds were blowing. The NDP did that for two weeks before they decided to oppose it. The Liberals decided they could not win an election if they opposed it, so they would vote for it but promised to fix it later.

I am afraid some of that is still whirling around in this place. I will say I am supporting this effort. I am voting for it. I still see many failures in it. I know the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Public Safety have listened. That is clear; the work they did in the consultation process was real.

Let me go back and review why Bill C-51 was so very dangerous.

I said it was a bill in five parts. I hear the Conservatives complaining tonight that the government side is pushing Bill C-59 through too fast. Well, on January 30, 2015, Bill C-51, an omnibus bill in five parts, was tabled for first reading. It went all the way through the House by May 6 and all the way through the Senate by June 9, less than six months.

This bill, Bill C-59, was tabled just about a year ago. Before it was tabled, we had consultations. I had time to hold town hall meetings in my riding specifically on public security, espionage, our spy agencies, and what we should do to protect and balance anti-terrorism measures with civil liberties. We worked hard on this issue before the bill ever came for first reading, and we have worked hard on it since.

I will come back to Bill C-51, which was forced through so quickly. It was a bill in five parts. What I came to learn through working on that bill was that it made Canadians less safe. That was the advice from many experts in anti-terrorism efforts, from the leading experts in the trenches and from academia, from people like Professor Kent Roach and Professor Craig Forcese, who worked so hard on the Air India inquiry; the chair of the Air India inquiry, former judge John Major; and people in the trenches I mentioned earlier in debate tonight, such as Joseph Fogarty, an MI5 agent from the U.K. who served as anti-terrorism liaison with Canada.

What I learned from all of these people was Bill C-51 was dangerous because it would put in concrete silos that would discourage communication between spy agencies. That bill had five parts.

Part 1 was information sharing. It was not about information sharing between spy agencies; it was about information sharing about Canadians to foreign governments. In other words, it was dangerous to the rights of Canadians overseas, and it ignored the advice of the Maher Arar inquiry.

Part 2 was about the no-fly list. Fortunately, this bill fixes that. The previous government never even bothered to consult with the airlines, by the way. That was interesting testimony we got back in the 41st Parliament.

Part 3 I called the “thought chill” section. We heard tonight that the government is not paying attention to the need remove terrorist recruitment from websites. That is nonsense. However, part 3 of Bill C-51 created a whole new term with no definition, this idea of terrorism in general, and the idea of promoting terrorism in general. As it was defined, we could imagine someone would be guilty of violating that law if they had a Facebook page that put up an image of a clenched fist. That could be seen as promotion of terrorism in general. Thank goodness we got that improved.

In terms of thought chill, it was so broadly worded that it could have caused, for instance, someone in a community who could see someone was being radicalized a reasonable fear that they could be arrested if they went to talk to that person to talk them out of it. It was very badly drafted.

Part 4 is the part that has not been adequately fixed in this bill. This is the part that, for the first time ever, gave CSIS what are called kinetic powers.

CSIS was created because the RCMP, in response to the FLQ crisis, was cooking up plots that involved, famously, burning down a barn. As a result, we said intelligence gathering would have to be separate from the guys who go out and break up plots, because we cannot have the RCMP burning down barns, so the Canadian Security Intelligence Service was created. It was to be exclusively about collecting information, and then the RCMP could act on that information.

I think it is a huge mistake that in Bill C-59 we have left CSIS kinetic powers to disrupt plots. However, we have changed the law quite a bit to deal with CSIS's ability to go to a single judge to get permission to violate our laws and break the charter. I wish the repair in Bill C-59 was stronger, but it is certainly a big improvement on Bill C-51.

Part 5 of Bill C-51 is not repaired in Bill C-59. I think that is because it was so strangely worded that most people did not ever figure out what it was about. I know professors Roach and Forcese left part 5 alone because it was about changes to the immigration and refugee act. It really was hard to see what it was about. However, Professor Donald Galloway at the University of Victoria law school said part 5 is about being able to give a judge information in secret hearings about a suspect and not tell the judge that the evidence was obtained by torture, so I really hope the Minister of Public Safety will go back and look at those changes to the refugee and immigration act, and if that is what they are about, it needs fixing.

Let us look at why the bill is enough of an improvement that I am going to vote for it. By the way, in committee I did bring forward 46 amendments to the bill on my own. They went in the direction of ensuring that we would have special advocates in the room so that there would be someone there on behalf of the public interest when a judge was giving a warrant to allow a CSIS agent to break the law or violate the charter. The language around what judges can do and how often they can do it and what respect to the charter they must exercise when they grant such a warrant is much better in this bill, but it is still there, and it does worry me that there will be no special advocate in the room.

I cannot say I am wildly enthusiastic about Bill C-59, but it is a huge improvement over what we saw in the 41st Parliament in Bill C-51.

The creation of the security intelligence review agency is something I want to talk about in my remaining minutes.

This point is fundamental. This was what Mr. Justice John Major, who chaired the Air India inquiry, told the committee when it was studying the bill back in 2015: He told us it is just human nature that the RCMP and CSIS will not share information and that we need to have pinnacle oversight.

There is review that happens, and the term “review” is post facto, so SIRC, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, would look at what CSIS had done over the course of the year, but up until this bill we have never had a single security agency that watched what all the guys and girls were doing. We have CSIS, the RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency, the Communications Security Establishment—five different agencies all looking at collecting intelligence, but not sharing. That is why having the security intelligence review agency created by this bill is a big improvement.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I believe that in most respects the sections in Bill C-51 are constitutional. Yes, they could be subject to challenge, but we have some serious concerns about the way in which the government has moved forward with amending several aspects of what had been Bill C-51. While I agree with the hon. member that there may be some concerns about certain sections and while in some cases it may be prudent to make some amendments and some changes, we do not believe that the government has done it the right way.

Another change that the government has introduced that causes us serious concern is with respect to promoting terrorist activity. That is another section that the Liberals have significantly reduced in scope, limiting it to counselling with respect to a specific act or a specific individual. Again, we think that the government has created a big loophole in that area. Instead of clamping down with those who are promoting terrorism, it is in fact going to give those on social media—

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I always enjoy the trenchant analysis and passion of my friend from St. Albert—Edmonton, with whom I have the honour to serve on the justice committee.

The member spoke about Bill C-59 in comparison to Bill C-51, the Conservatives' bill. He suggested, if I can summarize, that as a result of the changes the law would make us less safe. He cited a number of examples, including the requirement of a warrant for disruption activities and changes to the preventative detention sections, among others.

The legislation is being redrafted, and some of the changes would make it less likely to be struck down under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which, of course, was the critique of so many when the Conservatives' bill was before Parliament. I wonder if it would have been more prudent, in fact, to make those changes to avoid the cost and delay of having those cases go before the courts only to find that these sections are unconstitutional. I would like the member's thoughts on that.

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Mr. Speaker, before I address the question from the parliamentary secretary to the government House leader, I just want to make one correction. I made reference to Mike Chernyk from EPS and inadvertently said that he was killed, but he was injured, and I want to correct the record with respect to that.

With respect to Bill C-51, it is true that the Liberals supported it, and it is true that their support was conditional on bringing subsequent changes. The problem is that the changes the government has brought forward would make Canadians less safe and take away important tools from law enforcement and from our intelligence agencies.

We on this side of the House are quite happy to work with the government in a non-partisan way on an issue that should not be partisan, which is the safety and security of Canadians. However, instead of striking the right balance between protecting the collective security of Canadians and protecting the rights and freedoms of Canadians, this legislation would tilt the balance in a way that undermines the ability of law enforcement and our security agencies.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I was here during the debate on Bill C-51, and it was a very different public atmosphere in terms of the types of comments we were receiving. There was a great outcry from Canadians in virtually all regions of the country saying that the government had gone too far. As the opposition party, even though we supported Bill C-51, part of our election platform was to make changes to it, and that is what Bill C-59 is all about. We also added the parliamentary standing committee on oversight of our agencies. We see it as a positive thing.

When I reflect today on what the public is saying, the opposition to Bill C-51 is quite profound, and there appears to be a fairly good consensus across the country in support of the bill before us. Could the member provide his thoughts on why that might be the case?

[Michael Cooper, Conservative, St. Albert—Edmonton, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak to Bill C-59, an act respecting national security matters. This is a massive omnibus bill, more than 140 pages long. It seeks to amend five existing acts with significant amendments. It introduces four new acts. It overhauls Canada's national security framework.

Having regard for the breadth and scope of the bill and the important subject matter it touches, namely Canada's national security, it is extremely disappointing that the government has done just about everything to shut down debate in the House, to prevent and limit the ability of members of Parliament to speak and debate this piece of legislation.

Perhaps one of the reasons for this is that the government is really quite embarrassed by this piece of legislation. Before there was even a second reading vote on the bill, as a result of changes to our Standing Orders, it went to committee, where it was torn to shreds. It was such a sloppy bill that 235 amendments were brought forward at committee, including 43 amendments from Liberal MPs. The bill falls short in many respects.

The threat of terrorism is real. We know that September 11 really did change the world. While September 11 is now nearly 17 years ago and for many an increasingly distant memory, the threat of terrorism in Canada is as real today as it was the day after September 11.

We have seen terrorist attacks on Canadian soil, including here on Parliament Hill a few years ago. Just last year, an Edmonton police officer, Mike Chernyk, was killed when he tackled a terrorist, who then tried to run down Edmontonians. By the way, Edmonton is a city that I am very proud to represent, and this really hit home for many of my constituents.

We know that the threat of terrorism is real, and we know that we need to give our security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies all the tools possible to be able to disrupt terrorist plots, to stem the flow of financing to terrorist groups and terrorist actors, and ultimately to keep Canadians safe.

That is why our previous Conservative government brought Canada's anti-terrorism and national security laws into the 21st century with Bill C-51, legislation that, by the way, the Liberal Party, to its credit, supported. It is also true that the Liberals had some reservations about Bill C-51. During the last election, the Prime Minister promised that he would make revisions to Bill C-51, so we have Bill C-59, which is the government's response.

As I said, it falls short in a number of areas. Where it falls short is that instead of giving law enforcement and national security agencies more tools to keep Canadians safe, Bill C-59 takes away tools. What kinds of tools is Bill C-59 taking away that they otherwise had as a result of, among other measures, Bill C-51?

One of those tools is the ability of CSIS to carry out disruption activities without a warrant. Under Bill C-51, CSIS could undertake some very limited disruption activities, provided that those activities were consistent with Canadian law and respected the privacy rights of Canadians. Bill C-59 takes that tool away. In practical terms, what would that mean? One example would be that right now, as a result of Bill C-51, CSIS could contact the parents of a radicalized youth to seek parental intervention and advise them that their son or daughter has been radicalized. Under Bill C-59, CSIS would have to get a warrant. How does that make sense, and how does that make Canadians safer?

Another example would be to misdirect a potential terrorist who might be in the midst of carrying out a terrorist plot. Of course, in disrupting terrorist plots, time can so often be of the essence. It is not possible to run into court to get a warrant. Under Bill C-59, the government would be tying the hands of CSIS, even at a critical time when that could make a difference for stopping a terrorist attack by simply misdirecting the terrorist. How does that make sense, and how does that make Canadians safer?

There is another tool in the tool box that the government is taking away, namely preventive detention. It is true that it is not taking away the tool, in the sense that it is still there, but from a practical standpoint it is going to make preventative detention much more difficult. Preventative detention is an important tool. It is a tool that has been used and has kept Canadians safe. The threshold for law enforcement to use preventative detention is high. There must be evidence that using preventative detention would likely prevent a terrorist attack. Under Bill C-59, that threshold would be increased to detention being “necessary” to prevent a terrorist attack. Between “likely to prevent” and “necessary to prevent”, the threshold has increased considerably. There is a big difference in that regard. What it means is that it would be much more difficult for law enforcement to use preventative detention, even when there is evidence that preventative detention would likely prevent a terrorist attack. Again, how does that make sense, and how does that make Canadians safer?

Another tool the government is limiting in a significant way for law enforcement is the tool of a peace bond, where there are no reasonable grounds to charge someone with a criminal offence, but there is sufficient evidence that the individual needs to be monitored and subject to conditions whereby if the individual violates the order, he or she could be subject to criminal charges. The threshold is that a peace bond be likely to prevent a terrorist attack from occurring. Just as the government has done with respect to preventative detention, it has increased that threshold to “necessary to prevent” a terrorist attack. It basically defeats the entire purpose of a peace bond, because the evidentiary threshold that the government has set is more or less as high as reasonable grounds, which would result in delaying criminal charges. How does that make sense, and how does that make Canadians safer?

For these and other reasons, we cannot support this bill, because it would take too many tools away from our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and it would make Canadians less safe.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I also turn my mind back to September 11, 2001, where the member started his speech and I can share with him. He remembers that there were Canadians controlling NORAD. A constituent of mine in my Rotary Club, Captain Mike Jelinek, was in command of what they call “the mountain” in Colorado at NORAD. It is an extraordinary story. Can anyone imagine being in more of a crucible of decision-making stress and yet keeping control? One of the things that a lot of people do not know, but that he shared with me, and it is public information, was why those in charge did not scramble military jets to shoot down the planes the hijackers had taken control of to aim at buildings. They could not because the hijacking terrorists had turned off the transponders. Therefore, what they saw on their radar was just a sea of dots, but the ones that were actually the hijacked planes had disappeared from view. That is why they had to make all of the planes in the airspace land, so they could then see what was going on. It is a very complex story.

I differ with my friend on Bill C-59. I was here for the debates on Bill C-51. I learned a lot from the security experts who testified at the committee. None of that advice was taken up by the previous government, but I will cite one piece of testimony that came before the Senate. Joe Fogarty is the name of a British security expert, actually a spy for the Brits, who had been doing work with Canada at the time. He told us stories of things that had already happened, such as when the RCMP knew of a terrorist plotters' camp but did not want to tell CSIS, or CSIS knew of something and did not want to tell the RCMP.

John Major, the judge who ran the Air India inquiry, told us that passing Bill C-51 would make us less safe unless we had pinnacle control, some agency or entity that oversaw what all five of our spy agencies were doing. Bill C-59 would take us in the right direction by creating the security agency that will allow us to know what each agency is doing, because the way human nature is, and we heard this from experts, is that people will not share information, and Bill C-59 would help us in that regard.

[Robert Aubin, NDP, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I wish I could say that I am pleased to rise to speak to Bill C-59 this evening. However, I have to admit that what I am really feeling is more a sense of disappointment.

That is because, first of all, there is very little difference between the previous Conservative government's Bill C-51 and the Liberal government's Bill C-59. They certainly have a lot in common. Not only do they look disturbingly alike, but they were also handled much the same way.

Those who were here in the previous Parliament will remember that Bill C-51 was kind of rushed through, the better to capitalize on Canadians' strong emotional response to an increasing number of terrorist attacks, which continue to this day. There was hardly what could be considered a full debate.

As I recall, when discussions were in their infancy, the NDP was the only party resolutely opposed to Bill C-51. The government was trying to sell the idea that we had to compromise between keeping Canadians safe, which is every government's top priority, and protecting the Charter rights and freedoms we are all entitled to.

From the outset, the NDP said we should not be seeking a compromise. Rather, we should bring about an evolution with respect to these two fundamental aspects of Canadian rights that belong to every individual.

I feel like the government is taking a similar approach with Bill C-59 now. When we are debating a bill as important as this one, there should be no reason for a time allocation motion that limits MPs' right to speak.

The 338 members of the House represent 35 million Canadians. Each one of those MPs has something to say about this. They are all concerned about the prospect of terrorist attacks here and elsewhere, in people's workplaces, or while they are on vacation. This issue is on the minds of all Canadians, and the best and only way for them to be heard by the government is here in the House. Even so, the government is limiting the time for debate.

Members will also recall that when the NDP took a firm stand against Bill C-51, the Liberals, who were in opposition at the time, pulled a rabbit out of their hat by essentially saying that they would vote in favour of Bill C-51 in order to replace it when they formed the government. If they want to replace a bill, they should vote against it. I may have been inexperienced at that time. The Conservatives' position was clear, the NDP's position was clear, and the Liberals' position was clear.

Over time, and in light of what the Liberal government has done in the past, I can clearly see that they tend to do things a certain way. For example, during the election campaign, this same government sincerely promised to reform our electoral system. As the months passed, this changed to a minor revision of certain election rules, but the overhaul of the electoral system was forgotten.

These same Liberals promised to cut taxes for the middle class. I admit that we may not have been in agreement on what the middle class is, because where I come from, the median salary is about $32,000 a year. To access the tax cuts, the threshold is at least $45,000 a year. Those who really benefit are people like me, who have a salary that is more than decent. How have middle-class taxes been cut? I am still struggling to understand that. These same Liberals promised to axe the EI reform that the Conservatives put in place to give people some time to recover when tragedy strikes.

At the moment, the figures are the same as during the Conservative era. Roughly six out of 10 Canadians who pay into EI do not qualify for benefits when times get tough. I could keep listing examples in almost every field. It is clear that this is a Liberal way to approach the big issues.

We could talk about greenhouse gas reduction, for example. “Canada is back” was the message trumpeted at the Paris conference. I thought that meant Canada was back on the world stage, but I later realized it meant Canada is at the back of the pack and staying there. That is the Liberal approach.

To sum up the issue at hand, Bill C-59 still has many flaws. I will give you some examples. The Liberals are using this bill to establish a legal framework that would allow the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, to store sensitive metadata on completely innocent Canadians. This is a practice that has already been rejected by the Federal Court. To back up my statements, and to show that this is not just my personal opinion, but based on testimony from people far better informed than me, allow me to quote Daniel Therrien. For those who have not heard of him, he is the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. He testified before the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics on November 22, 2016, and said:

Think of the recent judgment by the Federal Court that found that CSIS had unlawfully retained the metadata of a large number of law-abiding individuals who are not threats to national security because CSIS felt it needed to keep that information for analytical purposes.

These are not theoretical risks. These are real things, real concerns. Do we want a country where the security service has a lot of information about most citizens with a view to detecting national security threats? Is that the country we want to live in?

We have seen real cases in which CSIS had in its bank of information the information about many people who did not represent a threat. Is that the country we want?

We can already see that things have gotten out of hand, and there is a question that has people increasingly worried, as it pertains not only to the issue being debated this evening, but also to all this personal data that is being asked of us and that we often send against our will on the Internet. The question is: how will we protect this personal information? Because if it is truly personal, that means that it belongs to someone, and that someone is the only person that can consent to its use.

That is not the only problem. I see that I am running out of time, so instead of naming the problems, I will summarize the proposals presented by the NDP. The first was to completely repeal Bill C-51 and replace the current ministerial directive on the matter of torture to ensure that Canada stands for an absolute prohibition on torture. Absolute means that we will not allow through the back door what we would not allow to enter through the front door.

Based on what I have heard in the House today, all the parties agree and everyone is against torture. However, some parties seem to be saying that they might use the information obtained through torture by other countries if that information seemed pertinent. History has made it abundantly clear that not only is torture inhumane, but in most cases, the information turns out to be false, precisely because it was obtained by torture. I imagine that I would be willing to say just about anything if I were being tortured.

In closing, between Bill C-59 and Bill C-51, we still have a long way to go. Under time allocation, I simply cannot vote in favour of this bill.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Mr. Speaker, there are some good things in Bill C-59. If we talk to those who took part in the creation of Bill C-51, the government moved sections around in Bill C-51, added some lipstick to it, and it became Bill C-59. One improvement is the oversight. If not handled appropriately, the oversight could become an administrative burden. Rather than money going to fight national security, it could go to administrative issues, like I explained. We should combine the committee of parliamentarians, which is part of the oversight for national security, and add the new layers in Bill C-59.

It talked to my former colleagues who were part of creating Bill C-51. They think that is a step in the right direction and we should be very supportive of this component. However, not everything in Bill C-59 will be supported by members on my side of the House.

[Kamal Khera, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Revenue]

Mr. Speaker, as members know, Bill C-59 is an act to enhance Canada's national security while safeguarding the rights and freedoms of Canadians. It is a bill that is extremely important to constituents in my riding of Brampton West, who were really concerned about the problematic elements of the Harper Conservatives' Bill C-51.

I held many consultations and town halls in my riding of Brampton West and heard the concerns of my constituents. This bill strikes the right balance between protecting the safety of Canadians and enhancing and protecting their rights and freedoms.

Does the hon. member or his constituents agree with at least some elements of this bill?

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, my hon. colleague from Calgary Shepard, whom I like a great deal, was not here in the 41st Parliament. Therefore, he does not recognize the fragility of the glass house in which he now stands when claiming that this bill has been forced through.

I remember Bill C-51. I remember when it was tabled at first reading on January 30, 2015, a Friday morning. I took it home on the weekend. I came back here on February 2 knowing that I had never seen anything quite as draconian introduced in the Canadian Parliament. We opposed it. We worked hard on it. At least I was the first member of Parliament to declare it to be a threat not just to our liberties, but also that made us less safe because it entrenched the worst effects of the separation of law, spy agencies, and law enforcement.

Bill C-51 is a dangerous piece of legislation that was forced through. There was no public consultation. It was introduced at first reading on January 30, it was through this place by May 6, and through the Senate by June 9. This piece of legislation has been before us a full year. Therefore, I am afraid that my hon. colleague is shooting at the wrong target when he thinks this bill has been forced through.

It is not as good as I would like it to be. The member is right that it does not do away with all of the things that were problematic in Bill C-51. However, I will be voting for Bill C-59, because it does a lot to redress the threat to our security from Bill C-51, which ignored all the recommendations of the Air India inquiry and the Maher Arar inquiry, and represented the worst entrenchment of the kinds of siloed agency thinking that, in the words of former Justice John Major, who chaired the Air India inquiry, make us less safe.

[Tom Kmiec, Conservative, Calgary Shepard, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join the debate on Bill C-59 now that the government has forced the final hours of debate and shut down the ability of members of Parliament to contribute to it.

The committee report on this legislation only came out on May 3, and we had one day of debate on May 28. It is interesting to note that the government now wants to rush this legislation as quickly as possible through Parliament now that this session is coming to a close.

I want to take the debate to a higher level and talk about the threat of terrorism, because it is one of the greatest threats of our time. I want to talk a bit about Canada's experience with terrorist cells and terrorist activity and then perhaps finish with a bit on committee procedure, committee deliberations, and the issue of free speech, since I asked the member for St. John's East for the definition of “terrorist propaganda”.

The definition I would like to use comes from one of the NATO handbooks, the AAP-06 glossary of terms and definitions, the 2014 edition. It says that terrorist propaganda is “The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.” Those last three criteria or considerations I have often seen defined in different ways. Each American agency defines them in a slightly different way, and our agencies do the same.

Basically, it is about non-state actors, non-states using violence for an ideological, religious, or political goal. These are always their objectives, which is why it was so easy to label al Qaeda a terrorist organization. Many governments around the world were also able to do so quite simply. Al Qaeda is not religiously inspired, but it used religion as an excuse for its political goal, which was the removal of American forces in Saudi Arabia and across the Middle East.

There are many other terrorist groups. In the past 150 years or so, non-state actors have played a role in terrorist activity. Oftentimes we say that terrorism is new, that this has never happened before. I want to dispel that idea.

Piracy on the high seas, piracy within territorial waters, can and has been compared a lot of times to a form of terrorism. They are not typically privateers. They do not exist nowadays. It is a form of political violence. It is sometimes motivated by economic factors and sometimes by political factors.

The Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany of the 1960s and 1970s was basically the Red Army Faction. It was a Marxist or communist-inspired terrorist cell that robbed banks and shot government officials in Germany. It was well recognized for using terrorist tactics and strategies to achieve its political aims.

In 1919-1920 the anarchist bombings in the United States took place. Too often we are quick to say that terrorism is a new thing, but at the turn of the 19th century and the beginning of the 1900s, anarchist cells and anarchist movements were a very popular source of political agitation, as well as violent agitation.

In these particular cases, cells were responsible for the postmaster general attacks on members of the U.S. cabinet. They were responsible for attacks on governors and state legislatures. There is actually quite a long list of attacks that were carried out by them.

In the 1920s, we had a bombing and arson campaign here in Canada by the Freedomites, also called the Svobodniki, which were Russian-inspired terrorist cells. It was a terrorist network that undertook violence on a large scale for political goals. It was put down at the time by the state security apparatus that we had back then.

Closer to today, the Palestine Liberation Organization, or the PLO, participated in airline hijackings. That was an issue in the sixties and seventies. Airline hijackings were taking place all over the world. They became a major issue. That was far before my time, but we can read about them in textbooks. Many documentaries have been written about them. It was a plague all across the European continent and in the Middle East. Stopping hijackers was always a concern of security agencies. They did not know how to tell a hijacker apart from a tourist, or someone on a business trip, or someone travelling for personal reasons, or any reason really. That was a great difficulty at the time.

We have always had to struggle between charter rights and civil liberties and the security needs of our citizens.

In the regard, I often hear Liberals say they are the party of the charter and that they are striking the right balance. In this country, we have a longer inheritance of natural rights that were formalized in the Magna Carta in 1215. Later, they were annulled by Pope Innocent III and brought back one more time. They stayed with us as rights given to us just because of who we are. Our inherent humanity gives us those rights.

I want to caution members on the other side when referencing the charter. Our rich tradition of liberty goes far beyond the last 30 or 40 years. Our rights are not given to us by the charter. They are guaranteed to us by our innate humanity. In this country, thanks to our British common law, they are guaranteed by the Magna Carta. We have to strike the right balance in Bill C-59, and I just do not see our having achieved that in the effort to assure ourselves of our own security.

The great leaps in technology allow our citizens to travel quite easily. They can be in another country within one day, even in Europe, and that ease of travel, ease of communication, and ease of financing and transferring funds has also made it possible for those who would do us great harm to take advantage of it in ways that can harm our fellow citizens, and harm the state property that we pay for and that exists for the public good, and damage our airports and malls. A very popular form of terrorism in eastern Africa is attacking shopping malls. Shoppers are the targets of terrorist cells, such as al Shabaab.

I have deep concerns that Bill C-59 would not achieve that goal. As I asked in a previous question about the specific definition of “terrorist propaganda”, I am concerned about protecting free speech. It is deeply important, but I feel it is very hypocritical of the government, on one side, to say it is going to protect free speech and modify the definition of “terrorist propaganda”, and, on the other side, with the Canada summer jobs program, say that if Canadians wish to apply for it but have a spiritual, intellectual, or ethical disagreement with the government, they will be denied funding from the beginning. That is hypocrisy, and it has to be called out.

In consideration of this bill at committee, there were 29 amendments moved by Conservative members. Every single one of those was voted down. In 2015, when Bill C-51 was being considered, the member for Bellechasse—Les Etchemins—Lévis, the member for Beauce, and two former members, Denis Lebel and Christian Paradis, all received threats at their offices. It speaks to how intense this issue was back in 2015 when this legislation was initially introduced as Bill C-51. I am glad that a great deal of it was kept by the Liberal government. Indeed, the Liberals voted for it at the time, although they sometimes seem to imply that they reject its content but accept mere modifications to it.

I am hoping, though, that the government will see the light and change its mind about trying to ram this through in the late hours of this spring session when there are only a mere few days to allow other members of Parliament to speak on behalf of their constituents. Public consultation is one thing, but it cannot replace the work we do here on behalf of our constituents.

I would be remiss if I did not end with this: When God wants people to suffer, he sends them too much understanding. It is a Yiddish proverb, and quite an old one. It says that the more knowledge we gain, the more problems we typically have, and the more suffering comes upon us, because when we know more, it is incumbent upon us to do better and take actions based on information that we have received. I do not believe the government is striking the right balance.

As I said, the new definition of “terrorist propaganda” that only mentions counselling a person to do so does not achieve the aim of getting social media companies to remove propaganda promoting terrorist ideologies that result in lone-wolf attacks. I am not as concerned about organized crime or organized terrorist cells as I am about lone-wolf attacks, the people inspired to act on behalf of an organization overseas that is not directly counselling them to do so, but promoting and advocating a system of beliefs of political violence for an ideological, religious, or political aims.

I will be voting against this bill because it has too many defects, whereas Bill C-51 has far fewer.

[Nick Whalen, Liberal, St. John's East, NL]

Mr. Speaker, perhaps I misheard and referred to Bill C-69 and not Bill C-59 when I rose to speak earlier.

I am pleased to rise again to support Bill C-59, the government's proposed legislation to update and modernize the country's national security framework. This landmark bill covers a number of measures that were informed by the views and opinions of a broad range of Canadians during public consultations in 2016.

It was in that same spirit of openness, engagement, and transparency that Bill C-59 was referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security before second reading, and the committee recently finished its study of this bill. I want to thank the committee members for their diligent and thorough examination of the legislation. An even stronger bill, with over 40 adopted amendments, is now before the House, thanks to their great work.

The measures would do two things at once. They would strengthen Canada's ability to effectively address and counter 21st-century threats while safeguarding the rights and freedoms we cherish as Canadians.

This is where I get into some new material. Rather than elaborate on any specific proposed measure, I will focus my remarks today on the high level of engagement, consultation, and analysis that contributed to the legislation we find before us today.

Bill C-59 is a result of the most comprehensive review of Canada's national security framework since the passing of the CSIS Act more than 30 years ago. That public review included unprecedented open and transparent public consultations on national security undertaken by Public Safety Canada and the Department of Justice. Canadians were consulted on key elements of Canada's national security laws and policies to ensure that they reflected the rights, values, and freedoms of Canadians. Several issues were covered, including countering radicalization to violence, oversight and accountability, threat reduction, and the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, which is the former Bill C-51.

All Canadians were invited and encouraged to take part in the consultations, which were held between September and December 2016. The response was tremendous. Thousands of people weighed in through a variety of avenues, both in person and online. Citizens, community leaders, experts and academics, non-governmental organizations, and parliamentarians alike made their views and ideas known over the course of the consultation period. In the end, tens of thousands of views were received, all of which were valuable in shaping the scope and content of Bill C-59.

With almost 59,000 responses received, the online consultation is what generated by far the largest volume of input, using a questionnaire consisting of more than 60 questions organized into 10 themes.

Nearly 18,000 submissions were also received by email. These consisted mainly of letters and other pieces of communication submitted by individuals. In addition, public town halls were held in five Canadian cities: Halifax, Markham, Winnipeg, Vancouver, and Yellowknife. This gave citizens across the country a chance to share their thoughts and opinions in person.

The Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security also held numerous meetings and consultations. It even travelled across the country to hear testimony not only from expert witnesses but also from members of the Canadian public, who were invited to express their views.

A digital town hall and two Twitter chats were also organized. Members of the public also had the opportunity to make their voices heard at 17 engagement events led by members of Parliament at the constituency level. In addition, 14 in-person sessions were held with academics and experts across the country, as well as one round table of civil society experts.

A total of 79 submissions were received from stakeholders, experts, and academics. The Canadian Bar Association, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Information Technology Association of Canada are just a few of the organizations that participated in the consultations.

A great deal of time, effort, and expertise was spent not only to ensure that engaged citizens and interested parties were heard, but also to painstakingly collect and consider all input received from the public. All data collected during the consultation process was reviewed and prepared for analysis. The next step was to carefully analyze every comment, submission, letter, and other forms of input.

These views have been published on the Government of Canada's open data portal, so anyone interested in learning more about what was said can see what was said.

In addition, an independently prepared report provides an overview of what was heard during the consultation. The results are summarized in 10 sections, one for each of the themes explored in both “Our Security, Our Rights: National Security Green Paper, 2016” and the online questionnaire.

While it would be difficult to summarize everything we have heard from Canadians, I can speak to a few key themes that emerged. First of all, I can attest that in any large volume of input, there will be widely different opinions. That was certainly the case in the public consultation on national security. However, the results made one thing perfectly clear. Canadians want accountability, transparency, and effectiveness from their security and intelligence agencies. They also expect their rights, freedoms, and privacy to be protected at the same time as their security.

Consistent with what was heard, Bill C-59 would modernize and enhance Canada's security and intelligence laws to ensure that our agencies have the tools they need to protect us. It would do so with a legal and constitutional framework that complies with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Taken together, the proposed measures in Bill C-59represent extensive improvements to Canada's national security framework. They also reflect thousands upon thousands of opinions expressed by this country's national security community, Parliamentarians across party lines, and the Canadian public writ large.

I firmly believe that it is important for all Canadians to be informed and engaged on Canada's national security framework. I am proud to stand behind a government that shares that belief.

The input received during the public consultation process in the pre-study period at committee was both considerable and instrumental in the development of Bill C-59 itself. There is no doubt in my mind that the legislation before this House today has been strengthened and improved as a result of the committee's close scrutiny and clause-by-clause consideration of the bill. To highlight just one example, the bill would now include provisions enacting the avoiding complicity in mistreatment by foreign entities act. This act would have to do with the ministerial directions issued last fall to Canada's national security and intelligence agencies. To ensure transparency and accountability, those directions would be made public under an amended Bill C-59. They would also be reported on annually to the public, to review bodies, and to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

I encourage all members of this House to vote in favour of Bill C-59. Should Bill C-59pass, this important piece of legislation would enhance Canada's national security, keep its citizens safe, and safeguard Canadians' constitutionally protected rights and freedoms. For all these reasons, I urge my honourable colleagues to join me in supporting Bill C-59.

With the bit of extra time that remains to me after my prepared remarks, I would just like to talk a little bit about my experience at the door during the election in 2015.

In the early part of June and July, many Canadians were concerned about Bill C-51. It was a hot topic of conversation. What the former Liberal third party opposition had attempted to do at committee in the previous session of Parliament was at least get some amendments into Bill C-51 to encourage and strengthen oversight and make sure that the bill not only protected security but made sure that Canadians' privacy and freedoms were being respected.

That led to a lot of difficult conversations, because during the campaign, the three parties were really divided on this particular issue. The Conservatives were adamant that they had struck the right balance. The New Democratic Party wanted to repeal it entirely. The Liberal Party stuck to its guns and said that it was a difficult conversation to have with people, but the legislation was needed. They said we needed this legislation but we needed to fix it, we needed to do it right, and we needed to make sure that it had the safeguards we promised and attempted to achieve at the amendment stage for Bill C-51 in the last Parliament.

That is what we have done. However, we have done even more than that. We have gone back to the drawing board and have let many different groups participate to make sure that we got it right.

I just want to provide one little quote, from national security experts Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, who have said that this legislation is “the real deal: the biggest reform in this area since 1984” and that it comes “at no credible cost to security.”

I believe that through all the consultations, the drafting of the bill by the minister and his staff, the review of the bill at committee, and the help of all members of the House, we now have a piece of legislation that strikes the right balance that will make Canadians safer and will also protect their rights and freedoms, which is what we promised in the 41st Parliament we would do if elected, and we are doing it now.

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is passing strange to hear the hon. member for Winnipeg Centre go to a dictionary definition of “repudiate” in the context of Bill C-51. Last I checked, to repudiate something means to reject it, not to vote for it. The Liberals voted for Stephen Harper's Bill C-51. While the Conservatives may have cheered, Canadians did not.

Could the member tell us what has changed since the Liberals voted for Mr. Harper's Bill C-51, the bill that did not get the balance correct between civil liberties and the need for security? Could the member tell us what is significantly different about this bill and maybe why her colleagues voted for Bill C-51 in the last Parliament?

[Yvonne Jones, Liberal, Labrador, NL]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my hon. colleague from Winnipeg Centre for his question and for his remarks on this bill, which were very comprehensive.

It goes without saying that this bill is our way of keeping our promise to Canadians to fix Bill C-51, which was brought forward by the Harper government and has been problematic in many ways.

A lot of people would say that this is taking a giant leap forward in terms of accountability for our national security and intelligence agencies. That is what we should be doing in the 21st century: modernizing this legislation. What the bill is also doing is protecting our democratic freedoms and our ability to have peaceful protests, to stand up for what we believe in this country without fear of prosecution.

[Robert-Falcon Ouellette, Liberal, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I was looking in the dictionary. It was interesting, having a chance to go through the dictionary. “Repudiate” means to “refuse to accept or be associated with”. The Canadian public repudiated the security policies associated with the Harper Conservatives, because they did not consult or talk to Canadians. They used old ways of thinking and put forward Bill C-51, which Canadians repudiated.

I was wondering if the hon. member for Labrador could talk about how this bill is going to improve our national security, how it is striking a balance, and how the consultations with thousands upon thousands of individuals from across Canada, including experts, actually improved it. It would make sure that we strike a balance, and not between the extremes of no security and the harsh measures put forward by the Harper Conservatives. The bill would actually strike a balance in our national security, ensuring the safety of Canadians and the protection of our most dear and protected value: our freedoms.

[Yvonne Jones, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak today to the bill. Bill C-59 is legislation that our government committed to prior to the last election. It came from a very disconcerting perspective that Canadians had with regard the legislation passed by the former government, Bill C-51.

Bill C-59 would enhance Canada's national security, while safeguarding the values, rights and freedoms of Canadians. That is very important. The bill before the House today would uphold our commitment to fix the problematic elements of the former Bill C-51, notably by tightening the definition of “terrorist propaganda”; protecting the right to advocate and protest; upgrading the no-fly list procedures; and ensuring the paramountcy of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It would also strengthen our accountability and transparency by creating the national security and intelligence review agency and a position of intelligence commissioner. These would complement the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, which was created by Bill C-22.

In addition, Bill C-59 would also bring our security and intelligence legislation into the 21st century. Much of that legislation was written in the 1980s, before the revolution of information technology, which has transformed the national security and the intelligence landscape. Bill C-59 would ensure that our agencies could keep pace with evolving threats and to keep us safe, and that our laws would also keep pace in order to protect Canadians' rights and freedoms in the digital world.

Canadians had asked for the bill. It is what Canadians wanted. It is the result of being able to modernize our national security system in the country, doing so with the input of Canadians and many experts from across the country.

Today, I am pleased to speak about the proposed amendments in the bill to the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which is included in part 8 of the National Security Act of 2017. Through this set of amendments, our government is taking action to ensure that all youth, who are involved in the criminal justice system, are afforded the enhanced procedural and other protections provided by Canada's Youth Criminal Justice Act.

Before addressing the substance of the proposed amendments, I would like to provide a bit of background about the Youth Criminal Justice Act so people understand this federal law. We call it the YCJA, and it is the law that governs Canada's justice system for youth. It applies to young people between the ages of 12 to 17 who commit criminal offences, including terrorism offences. They are dealt with under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The act recognizes that the youth justice system must be separate from the adult system and it must be based on the principle of diminished moral blameworthiness of youth. It emphasizes rehabilitation and reintegration, just and proportionate responses to offending, and enhanced procedural protections for youth. The act also recognizes the importance of involving families, victims, and communities in the youth criminal justice system.

The YCJA contains a number of significant legal safeguards to ensure that young people are treated fairly and that their rights are fully protected. For example, as a general rule, the privacy of youth who are dealt with under the YCJA is protected through publication bans on their identity and significant restrictions to access to youth records. Young people also have enhanced rights to counsel, including state-provided counsel, and the right to have parents or other guardians present throughout key stages of the investigative and judicial processes.

While many aspects of the criminal procedure are similar in the youth and adult criminal justice system, the YCJA establishes distinct legal principles, projections, and options for dealing with youth who are alleged to have committed a criminal offence.

If a young person is charged, all proceedings take place in youth court. As I previously noted, while youth court proceedings are open to the public, the YCJA imposes restrictions on the publication of a youth's identity.

In addition, the YCJA establishes clear restrictions on access to youth records, setting out who may access the records, the purpose for which youth records may be used, and the time periods during which access to the records is even permitted.

Generally speaking, the penalties that are set out in the Criminal Code do not apply to youth. Instead the Youth Criminal Justice Act sets out the specific youth sentencing principles, their options, and their durations. There are a broad range of community-based youth sentencing options and clear restrictions on the use of custodial sentences.

As we turn to Bill C-59, it is important to recognize that there have been very few cases in Canada in which a young person has become involved in the youth criminal justice system due to terrorism-related offences. Nonetheless, it is important to ensure that when this does occur, the young person is afforded all of the enhanced procedural and other protections under the Youth Criminal Justice Act as other youth criminals are afforded.

Part 8 of Bill C-59 would amend certain provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act to ensure that youth protections would apply in relation to anti-terrorism and other recognizance orders. It would also provide for access to youth records for the purposes of administering the Canadian passport order, which I will explain a bit further in a few moments, and would be subject to the special privacy protections set out in the act. This would eliminate any uncertainty about the applicability of certain provisions to a youth for whom a recognizance order is being sought, including provisions relating to a youth's right to counsel and to detention of the youth.

In addition, there is currently no access period identified for records relating to recognizance orders, so the YCJA would be amended to provide that the access period for these records would be six months after the order expires.

In addition, Part 8 of Bill C-59 would amend the act to specifically permit access to youth records for the purpose of administering Canada's passport program. The Canadian passport order contemplates that passports can be denied or revoked in certain instances of criminality or in relation to national security concerns.

For example, section 10.1 of the Canadian passport order stipulates that the Minister of Public Safety may decide to deny or revoke a passport if there are reasonable grounds, including that revocation is necessary to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence, or for the national security of Canada or a foreign country or state. Basically, the amendment would allow the Canadian passport office to access this information. Of course it would still fall within the privacy regulations of the country, but it would allow the office to assess an application and to determine if a youth would still be a security threat to Canada.

Canadians can be assured that our government is addressing national security threats, while continuing to protect the democratic values, rights, and freedoms of Canadians. We feel that along with other elements of the national security reform package that has been put forward by our government, these laws reform measures and demonstrate a commitment to ensuring that our laws are fair, that they are effective, and that they respect the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

As my colleagues look through Bill C-59, they will note that tremendous effort has been made on behalf of the minister and many in Parliament to ensure that the legislation responds to the safety and security needs of Canadians in a democratic way, in the way that Canadians have asked.

The bill has been through many hours of consultation. It has been through many hours of debate both in committee and the House of Commons. People from each end of the country have had an opportunity to provide feedback into the reforms of Bill C-51, which is now compiled as Bill C-59.

The Canadian Security and Intelligence Service Act ensures there is accountability of Canadian security and intelligence services for all Canadians. This legislation responds to what Canadians have asked for and it is supported by experts who study this field within Canada.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, the NDP is being downright silly. To give the impression that the Liberal government would even bring forward legislation that would not allow for peaceful demonstrations is just silly.

Quite frankly, it was a Liberal Party that put the rights and freedoms in our charter back in the early 1980s. It also put forward legislation that put together a group of parliamentarians to protect our rights and freedoms. There is nothing wrong with peaceful demonstrations. We have fought for that for many years.

Having been a member of the force and having had many discussions with war veterans in the past, I do not quite understand why the New Democrats have taken the position to not support the legislation. If that is the only reason they will vote against the legislation, they should go back to the drawing board and get a better appreciation of the legislation and what it would advance.

I voted in favour of Bill C-51 because I believed there needed to be a balance. This government committed to fix Bill C-51, and this bill would do that. It would improve the bill. Could the member expand on why he believes peaceful demonstrations would be disallowed under the legislation?

[François Choquette, NDP, Drummond, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is important to rise to speak to this fundamental bill. As I mentioned earlier, at 138 pages, Bill C-59, an act respecting national security matters, is a real omnibus bill. Unfortunately, there are still problems with this bill. That is why we are going to have to oppose it. It does not meet all our expectations.

We opposed Bill C-51. We were the only ones to support compliance with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms in order to safeguard Canadians' rights and freedoms in 2015. The Liberals and the Conservatives voted for that bill, which was condemned by all Canadians. That is the reason why the Liberals later stated in their campaign that the bill made no sense and that they would rescind it if they were elected. They have finally woken up three years later. Unfortunately, the bill does not deliver on those promises.

There are elements missing. For example, the Liberals promised to fully repeal Bill C-51, and they are not doing that. Another extremely important thing that I want to spend some time talking about is the fact that they should have replaced the existing ministerial directive on torture in order to ensure that Canada stands for an absolute prohibition on torture. A lawful society, a society that respects the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the UN Charter of Rights, should obviously not allow torture. However, once again, Canada is somewhat indirectly complicit in torture that is happening around the world. We have long been calling on the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to repeal and replace the 2010 directive on torture to ensure that Canada stands for an absolute prohibition on torture. More specifically, we want to ensure that, under no circumstances, will Canada use information from foreign countries that could have been obtained using torture or share information that is likely to result in torture. We have bad memories of the horrors endured by some Canadians such as Maher Arar, Abdullah Almaki, Amhad Abou El Maati, and Muayyed Nureddin. Canadians have suffered torture, so we are in some way complicit. It is very important that we resolve this problem, but unfortunately, the new directive, issued in October 2017, does not forbid the RCMP, CSIS, or the CBSA from using information that may have been obtained through torture in another country.

The new instructions feature not a single semantic change, since they authorize the use of information obtained by torture in certain cases. That is completely unacceptable. Canada should take a leading role in preventing torture and should never agree to use or share information that is likely to result in torture in other countries around the world. We should be a leader on this issue.

There is another extremely important file that I want to talk about that this bill does not address and that is the infamous no-fly list. This list and the unacceptable delays in funding redress mechanisms are regrettable. There is currently no effective redress mechanism to help people who suffer the consequences from being added to this list. Some Canadian families are very concerned. They want to protect their rights because children are at risk of being detained by airport security after mistakenly being added to the list, a list that prevents them from being able to fly.

We are very worried about that. We are working with No Fly List Kids. We hope that the Liberal government will wake up. It should have fixed this situation in this bill, especially considering that this is an omnibus bill.

Speaking of security, I want to mention two security-related events that occurred in Drummond that had a significant impact. The first was on May 29 and was reported by journalist Ghyslain Bergeron, who is very well known in Drummondville. A dozen or so firefighters from Saint-Félix-de-Kingsey were called to rescue a couple stranded on the Saint-François river. Led by the town's fire chief, Pierre Blanchette, they headed to the area and courageously rescued the couple. It is extremely important to acknowledge acts of bravery when we talk about the safety our our constituents.

I also want to talk about Rosalie Sauvageau, a 19-year-old woman who received a certificate of honour from the City of Drummondville after an unfortunate event at a party in Saint-Thérèse park. A bouncy castle was blown away by the wind, and she immediately rushed the children out of the bouncy castle, bringing them to safety. Not long after, a gust of wind blew one of the bouncy castles into Rivière Saint-François. Fortunately, Rosalie Sauvageau had the presence of mind, the quickness, and the courage to keep these children safe. I mentioned these events because the safety and bravery of our fellow citizens is important.

To come back to the bill, I must admit that there are some good things in it, but there are also some parts that worry us, in particular the new definition of an activity that undermines the security of Canada. This definition was amended to include any activity that threatens the lives or the security of individuals, or an individual who has a connection to Canada and who is outside Canada. This definition is pernicious and dangerous, because it will now include activities that involve significant or widespread interference with critical infrastructure.

The Liberal government just recently purchased the Kinder Morgan pipeline, a 65-year-old pipeline that the company originally bought for $500,000. The government bought it for the staggering price of $4.5 billion, with money from the taxes paid by Canadians and the people of greater Drummond, and claimed that it was essential to Canada.

Does that mean that the Liberal government could tell the thousands of people protesting against this pipeline that they are substantially obstructing essential infrastructure?

We are rather concerned about that. This clause of the bill creates potential problems for people who peacefully protest projects such as the Kinder Morgan pipeline. That is why we are voting against this bill. The Liberals have to go back to the drawing board. We must improve this bill and ensure that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is upheld.

[Robert-Falcon Ouellette, Liberal, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Mr. Speaker,

[Member spoke in Cree]

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to speak to this historic piece of legislation. The people of Winnipeg Centre were very concerned before the last election in 2015 about the manoeuvres of the Harper government with Bill C-51 and all of the things that it did to undermine our national security. We are committed to keeping Canadians safe while safeguarding rights and freedoms. After the largest and most transparent public consultation process on national security in our country's history—there were 58,933 online submissions, 17,862 email submissions, and more than 20 in-person events—I am very proud to see that our government has introduced this national security act in 2017 to undo and repair the damage done by the Harper Conservatives with Bill C-51.

I would like to thank the committee for its diligence in bringing forth amendments recommended by stakeholders, which have truly strengthened this bill. A collaborative approach was certainly our major intent when the government took the rare step of referring the bill to committee prior to second reading. I believe we need to thank the Privacy Commissioner, the chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, and individuals like Professors Craig Forcese and Kent Roach for their helpful testimony before the committee, which helped to ensure that the bill is the best and as sound as it could be.

Indeed, it is thanks to these many months of close scrutiny that we now have a new component of the bill, the avoiding complicity and mistreatment by foreign entities act. To be clear on this point, Canada unequivocally condemns in the strongest possible terms the torture or other mistreatment of any individual by anyone for any purpose. It is contrary to the charter, the Criminal Code, and Canada's international treaty obligations, and Canadians will never condone it. As members know, directions were issued to clarify decisions on the exchange of information with a foreign entity that, with public safety as the objective, could have the unintended consequence of Canada's contributing to mistreatment. As a former member of the Canadian Armed Forces, I feel it should always be foremost in our mind that these things can sometimes occur. Thanks to the committee's work on this bill, the new amendment would enshrine in law a requirement that directions be issued on these matters. They would be public, they would be reported on annually, and they would strengthen transparency and accountability.

I would also like to thank the committee and all those who testified for their important scrutiny of the privacy-related aspects of Bill C-59, particularly as they relates to the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act. Importantly, amendments would now cause institutions receiving information under the information sharing act to destroy or return any personal information received that does not meet the threshold of necessity. These are both welcome changes.

As a result of many months of close scrutiny, we have legislation that will ensure that privacy interests are upheld, clarify the powers of our security agencies, and further strengthen transparency and accountability beyond our initial proposals. This is important. It does not mean that legislation is forced upon people, but that we can actually ensure that legislation is strengthened through the work of this House in a collaborative process, which is a significant change from four years ago. These proposals, of course, also reflect the tens of thousands of views we heard from the remarkable engagements we had with Canadians from coast to coast to coast online and in person.

As I have noted, we followed up on our commitment to continue that engagement in Parliament. In sending the bill to committee before second reading, we wanted to ensure that this legislation is truly reflective of the open and transparent process that led to Bill C-59's creation. The bill is stronger because of the more than 40 amendments adopted by committee that reflect the important stakeholder feedback.

As we begin second reading, allow me to underline some of the bill's key proposals. Bill C-59 would strengthen accountability through the creation of a new comprehensive national review body, the national security intelligence review agency. This is a historic change for Canada. For the very first time, it would enable comprehensive and integrated scrutiny of all national security and intelligence activities across government, a whole-of-government approach. I should note that Justice O'Connor can be thanked for the first detailed blueprint of such a review system nearly a decade ago, and that this recommendation has been echoed by Senate committees and experts alike.

The government has taken these commitments even further. The creation of a new agency would mean ending a siloed approach to national security review through a single arm's-length body with a government-wide mandate. It would complement the work of the new National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, the multi-party review committee with unprecedented access to information that would put us in line with our Five Eyes partners and what other nations do around the world.

Through our new measures, Canadians will have confidence that Canada's national security agencies are complying with the law and that their actions are reasonable and necessary. The establishment of an intelligence commissioner would further build on that public confidence. The commissioner would be a new, independent authority helping to ensure that the powers of the security intelligence community are used appropriately and with care.

I was pleased to hear that the committee passed an amendment that would require the commissioner to publish an annual report that would describe his or her activities and include helpful statistics. Indeed, all of these measures complement other significant new supports that would promote Canadians' understanding of the government's national security activities.

These include adopting a national security transparency commitment across government to enable easier access to information on national security, with implementation to be informed by a new advisory group on transparency. Transparency and accountability are crucial for well-informed public debate, and we need them now after a decade of darkness under the Conservatives. Indeed, they function as a check on the power of the executive branch. As members of the legislative branch, it is our job to hold the executive branch to account. They also empower Canadians to hold their government to account.

I am confident the proposals that have been introduced in the form of Bill C-59 would change the public narrative on national security and place Canadians where they should be in the conversation, at its very heart, at its very centre, at the heart of Canada, like Winnipeg-Centre is the heart of Canada.

We also heard loud and clear that keeping Canadians safe must not come at the expense of our rights and freedoms, and that previous efforts to modernize our security framework fell short in that regard. Indeed, Canadians told us they place great value in our constitutionally protected rights and freedoms. These include the right to peaceful protest, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. They also told us that that there is no place for vague language when it comes to the powers of our security bodies or the definitions that guide their actions.

Once again, because we took the time to listen to Canadians in the largest public safety consultations ever held in Canadian history, and talked to stakeholders and to parliamentarians, we can now act faithfully based on the input we received. First, we all understand that bodies like CSIS take measures to reduce national security threats to Canada. Our proposals clarify the regime under which CSIS undertakes these measures, they better define its scope, and they add a range of new safeguards that will ensure that CSIS's actions comply with our charter rights.

However, to be clear, the amendments in Bill C-59 have not diluted the authority CSIS would have to act, but rather have clarified that authority. For example, the bill would ensure that CSIS has the ability to query a dataset in certain exigent circumstances, such as when lives or national security are at stake. Even then, there are balances in place in the bill that would mean that these authorities would require the advance approval of the intelligence commissioner.

The amendments by the committee would also strengthen key definitions. For example, they would clarify terms like “terrorist propaganda” and key activities like “digital intelligence collection”. All of these changes are long overdue and are of critical importance to this country.

National security matters to Canadians. We measure our society by our ability to live free of fear, day after day, with opportunities to thrive guided by the principles of openness, equality, and fairness for all. However, Canadians are not naive about the context in which we find ourselves today in a changing environment and a changing threat landscape.

It is incumbent upon us as parliamentarians to be vigilant, proactive, and thorough in making sure that our national security framework is working for all Canadians. That means making sure that the agencies protecting us have the resources and powers they need to do so. It also means making sure that we listen to Canadians, and making them a partner in our society and security. It also means building on the values that help to make our country safe, rather than taking away from them, and understanding that a free and open society enhances our collective resilience.

On all fronts, Bill C-59 is not just a step in the right direction, but a giant leap forward for Canada. I proudly stand behind this legislation. Once again, I would like to thank all members of the committee who have done important work.

[Member spoke in Cree]

[Gérard Deltell, Conservative, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to rise to speak to Bill C-59, which relates to issues of national security and how we deal with people suspected of terrorist acts.

This issue is quite different from those usually addressed. Usually, I have to talk about public finance. It is quite easy to say that the Liberals are wrong because they have a deficit and that we are right because we oppose deficits, which is very clear. In that case, this is very touchy. We are talking about so many great issues, and this issue should be addressed without partisanship. For sure, it is not easy.

That is why this really should be a non-partisan issue. This will not be easy, because obviously people are sharply divided on how this information should be dealt with in order to stop terrorism and how terrorists should be dealt with.

Bill C-59 is the current government's response to Bill C-51, which our government had passed. I remind the House that the Liberals, who formed the second opposition party at the time, supported Bill C-51, but said that they would change it right away once in power. It was supposedly so urgent, and yet they have been in power for two and a half years now, and it has taken the Liberals this long to bring forward their response to the Conservative Bill C-51 in the House of Commons.

As I was saying earlier, some questions are easier to answer, because they are based not on partisanship, but on your point of view. For example, when it comes to public finances, you can be for or against the deficit. However, no one is arguing against the need to crack down on terrorism. The distinctions are in the nuances.

That is why the opposition parties proposed dozens of amendments to the bill; sadly, however, with the exception of four technical amendments proposed by the NDP, the Liberals systematically rejected all amendments proposed by the Conservative Party and the Green Party, and Lord knows that there is an entire world between the Conservative Party and the Green Party.

This bill is meant to help us tackle the terrorist threat, whether real or potential. In the old days, in World War II, the enemy was easily identified. Speaking of which, yesterday was the 74th anniversary of the Normandy landing, a major turning point in the liberation of the world from Nazi oppression. It was easy to identify the enemy back then. Their flag, leader, uniform and weapons were clearly identifiable. We knew where they were.

The problem with terrorism is that the enemy is everywhere and nowhere. They have no flag. They have a leader, but they may have another one by tomorrow morning. The enemy can be right here or on the other side of the world. Terrorism is an entirely new way of waging war, which calls for an entirely new way of defending ourselves. That is why, in our opinion, we need to share information. All police forces and all intelligence agencies working in this country and around the world must be able to share information in order to prevent tragedies like the one we witnessed on September 11, 2001.

In our opinion, the bill does not go far enough in terms of information sharing, which is necessary if we are to win the fight against terrorism. We believe that the Communications Security Establishment, the RCMP, CSIS and all of the other agencies that fight terrorism every day should join forces. They should share an information pipeline rather than work in silos.

In our opinion, if the bill is passed as it is now, the relevant information that could be used to flush out potential terrorists will not be shared as it should be. We are therefore asking the government to be more flexible in this respect. Unfortunately, the amendments proposed by our shadow cabinet minister, the hon. member for Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, were rejected.

We are very concerned about another point as well: the charges against suspected terrorists. We believe that the language of the bill will make it more difficult to charge and flush out terrorists. This is a delicate subject, and every word is important.

We believe that the most significant and most contentious change the bill makes to the Criminal Code amends the offence set out in section 83.221, “Advocating or promoting commission of terrorism offences”. This is of special interest to us because this offence was created by Bill C-51, which we introduced. Bill C-59 requires a much more stringent test by changing the wording to, “Every person who counsels another person to commit a terrorism offence”. The same applies to the definition of terrorist propaganda in subsection 83.222(8), which, in our opinion, will greatly restrict law enforcement agencies' ability to use the tool for dismantling terrorist propaganda with judicial authorization as set out in Bill C-51. Why? Because as it is written, when you talk about counselling another person to commit a terrorism offence, it leaves room for interpretation.

What is the difference between a person and a group of people; between a person and a gathering; between a person and an entity; or between a person and an illicit and illegal group? In our opinion, this is a loophole in the bill. It would have been better to leave it as written in the Conservative Bill C-51. The government decided not to. In our opinion, it made a mistake.

Generally speaking, should we be surprised at the government’s attitude toward the fight against terrorism? The following example is unfortunate, but true. We know that 60 Canadians left Canada to join ISIS. Then, they realized that the war was lost because the free and democratic nations of the world decided to join forces and fight back. Now, with ISIS beginning to crumble, these 60 Canadians, cowards at heart, realize that they are going to lose and decide to return to Canada. In our opinion, these people are criminals. They left our country to fight Canadian soldiers defending freedom and democracy and return to Canada as if nothing had happened. No.

Worse still, the Liberal government’s attitude toward these Canadian criminals is to offer them poetry lessons. That is a pretty mediocre approach to criminals who left Canada with the mandate to kill Canadian soldiers. We believe that we should throw the book at these people. They need to be dealt with accordingly, and certainly not welcomed home with poetry lessons, as the government proposes.

Time is running out, but I would like to take this opportunity, since we are discussing security, to extend the warmest thanks to all the employees at the RCMP, CSIS, the CSE and other law enforcement agencies such as the Sûreté du Québec in Quebec and municipal police forces. Let us pay tribute to all these people who get up every morning to keep Canadians safe. I would like to take this opportunity to thank the 4,000 or more police officers from across Canada who are working hard in the Charlevoix and Quebec City regions to ensure the safety of the G7 summit, these people who place their life on the line so that we can live in a free and democratic society where we feel safe. I would like to thank these women and men from coast to coast to coast that make it possible for us to be free and, most importantly, to feel safe.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the member for her thoughtful question. It is an important one.

Canadians very much value their privacy, and today's use of metadata represents a significant risk to privacy in Canada. I want to assure my colleague that I strongly support efforts to ensure that data, including metadata, that is not critical to protect the national security of our country should be kept private. There are significant challenges to doing that today, especially with the use of social media. It is something that all governments have to take seriously.

That said, at the end of the day, when a bill like Bill C-51 is brought forward—a bill that undermines our national security by making it more difficult for government departments and government agencies to speak to each other to ensure that they have the critical information required to protect Canadians—we have a problem. That is why I am critical of Bill C-59.

Bill C-51 established a very good environment within which our security agencies could do the job Canadians have asked them to do. Again I note that the Liberals who are being critical of that bill today actually voted in favour of it back then.

[Ed Fast, Conservative, Abbotsford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity to speak to Bill C-59. Listening to our Liberal friends across the way, one would assume that this is all about public safety, that Bill C-59 would improve public safety and the ability of our security agencies to intervene if a terrorist threat presented itself. Nothing could be further from the truth.

Let us go back and understand what this Prime Minister did in the last election. Whether it was his youth, or ignorance, he went out there and said that he was going to undo every single bit of the Stephen Harper legacy, a legacy I am very proud of, by the way. That was his goal.

One of the things he was going to undo was what Bill C-51 did. Bill C-51 was a bill our previous Conservative government brought forward to reform and modernize how we approach terrorist threats in Canada. We wanted to provide our government security agencies with the ability to effectively, and in a timely way, intervene when necessary to protect Canadians against terrorist threats. Bill C-51 was actually very well received across the country. Our security agencies welcomed it as providing them with additional tools.

I just heard my Liberal colleagues chuckle and heckle. Did members know that the Liberals, in the previous Parliament, actually supported Bill C-51? Here they stand saying that somehow that legislation did not do what it was intended to do. In fact, it did. It made Canadians much safer and allowed our security agencies to intervene in a timely way to protect Canadians. This bill that has come forward would do nothing of the sort.

The committee overseeing this bill had 16 meetings, and at the end of the whole process, there were 235 amendments brought forward. That is how bad this legislation was. Forty-three of those amendments came from Liberals themselves. They rushed forward this legislation, doing what Liberals do best: posture publicly, rush through legislation, and then realize, “What have we done? My goodness.” They had 43 amendments of their own, all of which passed, of course. There were 20-some Conservative amendments, and none of them passed, even though they were intelligently laid-out improvements to this legislation. That is the kind of government we are dealing with here. It was all about optics so that the government would be able to say, “We are taking that old Bill C-51 that was not worth anything, although we voted in favour of it, and we are going to replace it with our own legislation.” The reality is that Bill C-51 was a significant step forward in protecting Canadians.

This legislation is quite different. What it would do is take one agency and replace it with another. That is what Liberals do. They take something that is working and replace it with something else that costs a ton of money. In fact, the estimate to implement this bill is $100 million. That is $100 million taxpayers do not have to spend, because the bill would not do one iota to improve the protection of Canadians against terrorist threats. There would be no improved oversight or improved intelligence capabilities.

The bill would do one thing we applaud, which is reaffirm that Canada will not torture. Most Canadians would say that this is something Canada should never do.

The Liberals went further. They ignored warnings from some of our intelligence agencies that the administrative costs were going to get very expensive. In fact, I have a quote here from our former national security adviser, Richard Fadden. Here is what he said about Bill C-59: “It is beginning to rival the Income Tax Act for complexity.” Canadians know how complex that act has become.

He said, “There are sub-sub-subsections that are excluded, that are exempted. If there is anything the committee can do to make it a bit more straightforward, [it would be appreciated]”. Did the committee, in fact, do that? No, it did not make it more straightforward.

There is the appointment of a new intelligence commissioner, which is, of course, the old one, but again, with additional costs. The bill would establish how a new commissioner would be appointed. What the Liberals would not do is allow current or past judges to fill that role. As members know, retired and current judges are highly skilled in being able to assess evidence in the courtroom. It is a skill that is critical to being a good commissioner who addresses issues of intelligence.

Another shortcoming of Bill C-59 is that there is excessive emphasis on privacy, which would be a significant deterrent to critical interdepartmental information sharing. In other words, this legislation would highlight privacy concerns to the point that our security agencies and all the departments of government would now become hamstrung. Their hands would become tied when it came to sharing information with other departments and our security agencies, which could be critical information in assessing and deterring terrorist threats.

Why would the government do this? The Liberals say that they want to protect Canadians, but the legislation would actually take a step backwards. It would make it even more difficult and would trip up our security agencies as they tried to do the job we have asked them to do, which is protect us. Why are we erring on the side of the terrorists?

We heard testimony, again from Mr. Fadden, that this proposed legislation would establish more silos. They were his nightmare when he was the national security director. We now have evidence from the Air India bombing. The inquiry determined that the tragedy could have been prevented had one agency in government not withheld critical information from our police and security authorities. Instead, 329 people died at the hands of terrorists.

Again, why are we erring on the side of terrorists? This proposed legislation is a step backward. It is not something Canadians expected from a government that had talked about protecting Canadians better.

There are also challenges with the Criminal Code amendments in Bill C-59. The government chose to move away from criminalizing “advocating or promoting terrorism” and would move towards “counselling” terrorism. The wording has been parsed very carefully by security experts, and they have said that this proposed change in the legislation would mean, for example, that ISIS propaganda being spread on YouTube would not be captured and would not be criminalized. Was the intention of the government when it was elected, when it made its promises to protect Canadians, to now step backward, to revise the Criminal Code in a way that would make it less tough on terrorists, those who are promoting terrorism, those who are advocating terrorism, and those who are counselling terrorism? This would be a step backward on that.

In closing, I have already stated that the Liberals are prepared to err on the side of terrorists rather than on the side of Canadian law enforcement and international security teams. The bill would create more bureaucracy, more costs, and less money and security for Canadians.

When I was in cabinet, we took security very seriously. We trusted our national security experts. The proposed legislation is essentially a vote of non-confidence in those experts we have in government to protect us.

Finally, the message we are sending is that red tape is more important than sharing information and stopping terrorism. That is a sad story. We can do better as Canadians.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to rise and speak to such an important piece of legislation. I do not say that lightly. While we were in opposition, Stephen Harper and the government of the day brought in Bill C-51. Many Canadians will remember Bill C-51, which had very serious issues. I appreciate the comments coming from the New Democrats with respect to Bill C-51. Like many of them, I too was here, and I listened very closely to what was being debated.

The biggest difference between us and the New Democrats is that we understand very clearly that we have to ensure Canadians are safe while at the same time protecting our rights and freedoms. As such, when we assessed Bill C-51, we made a commitment to Canadians to address the major flaws in the bill. At a standing committee on security, which was made up of parliamentarians, I can recall our proposing ways to address the whole issue and concerns about the potential invasion of rights and freedoms. It went into committee, and it was a really long debate. We spent many hours, both in the chamber and at committee, discussing the pros and cons of Bill C-51.

What came out of it for us as the Liberal Party back in 2015 was that we made a commitment to Canadians. We said we would support Bill C-51, but that if we were to form government we would make substantial changes to it.

That is why it is such a pleasure for me to stand in the House today. Looking at Bill C-59, I would like to tell the constituents I represent that the Prime Minister has kept yet another very important promise made to Canadians in the last election.

We talk a lot about Canada's middle class, those striving to be a part of it, and how this government is so focused on improving conditions for our middle class. One could ultimately argue that the issue of safety and rights is very important to the middle class, but for me, this particular issue is all about righting a wrong from the past government and advancing the whole issue of safety, security, freedoms, and rights.

I believe it is the first time we have been able to deal with that. Through a parliamentary committee, we had legislation that ultimately put in place a national security body, if I can put it that way, to ensure a high sense of transparency and accountability from within that committee and our security agencies. In fact, prior to this government bringing it in, we were the only country that did not have an oversight parliamentary group to look at all the different aspects of security, rights, and freedoms. We were the only one of the Five Eyes that did not have such a group. New Zealand, Australia, the U.S., and the U.K. all had them.

Today, Canada has that in place. That was a commitment we made and a commitment that was fulfilled. I look at Bill C-59 today, and again it is fulfilling a commitment. The government is, in fact, committed to keeping Canadians safe while safeguarding rights and freedoms.

We listen to some of my colleagues across the way, and we understand the important changes taking place even in our own society, with radicalization through the promotion of social media and the types of things that can easily be downloaded or observed. Many Canadians share our concern and realize that at times there is a need for a government to take action. Bill C-59 does just that.

We have legislation before us that was amended. A number of very positive amendments were brought forward, even some from non-government members, that were ultimately adopted. I see that again as a positive thing.

The previous speaker raised some concerns in terms of communications between departments. I remember talking in opposition about how important it is that our security and public safety agencies and departments have those links that enable the sharing of information, but let us look at the essence of what the Conservatives did. They said these agencies shall share, but there was no real clear definition or outline in terms of how they would share information. That was a concern Canadians had. If we look at Bill C-59, we find more detail and clarity in terms of how that will take place.

Again, this is something that will alleviate a great deal of concern Canadians had in regard to our security agencies. It is a positive step forward. Information disclosure between departments is something that is important. Information should be shared, but there also needs to be a proper establishment of a system that allows a sense of confidence and public trust that rights and freedoms are being respected at the same time.

My colleague across the way talked about how we need to buckle down on the promoting and advocating of terrorism. He seemed to take offence to the fact that we have used the word “counselling” for terrorism versus using words like “promoting” and “advocating”. There is no doubt the Conservatives are very good when it comes to spin. They say if it is promoting or advocating terrorism, that is bad, and of course Canadians would agree, but it is those types of words. Now they are offended because we replaced that with “counselling”. I believe that counselling will be just as effective, if not more effective, in terms of the long game in trying to prevent these types of actions from taking place. It will be more useful in terms of going into the courts.

There is no doubt that the Conservatives know the types of spin words to use, but I do not believe for a moment that it is more effective than what was put in this legislation. When it comes to rights and freedoms, Canadians are very much aware that it was Pierre Elliott Trudeau who brought in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. We are a party of the charter. We understand how important that is.

At the same time, we also understand the need to ensure that there is national safety, and to support our security agencies. It was not this government but the Stephen Harper government that literally cut tens, if not hundreds of millions of dollars out of things such as border controls and supports for our RCMP. This government has recognized that if we are not only going to talk the line, we also have to walk the line and provide the proper resources. We have seen those additional resources in not only our first budget, but also our second budget.

We have ministers such as public safety, immigration and citizenship, and others who are working together on some very important files. When I think of Bill C-59 and the fine work we have done in regard to the establishment of this parliamentary oversight committee, I feel good for the simple reason that we made a commitment to Canadians and the bill is about keeping that commitment. It deals with ensuring and re-establishing public confidence that we are protecting freedoms and rights. At the same time, it ensures that Canada is a safe country and that the terrorist threat is marginalized as much as possible through good, sound legislation. That is what this is.

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I was in the House in the last Parliament when the Conservative government brought in Bill C-51, which contained a number of provisions that were direct infringements on Canadian civil liberties and privacy rights. I was also in the House when the Liberals shamefully voted in favour of that bill. That bill did not strike the right balance, as was admitted by my hon. colleague when he said that Bill C-59 does strike the right balance. It is quite ironic that the Liberals stand here today acknowledging that Bill C-51 violated Canadians' rights but they voted for it.

The New Democrats, when presented with legislation in the House that violates Canadians' privacy, civil liberties, and human rights, stand up against it. We stood up against it in the last Parliament, and we are standing up against it now, with Bill C-59.

The New Democrats have at least four major concerns with this bill. First, there is nothing in this bill that repeals and replaces the current ministerial directive on torture, to ensure that Canada has an absolute prohibition on torture or using information gleaned from it. Second, we want to make sure that the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians has full access to classified information and oversight power. Third, we want to make sure that no warrant issued by CSIS will authorize a breach of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Finally, we want to make sure that this bill enshrines the bulk collection by CSIS of metadata containing private information on Canadians as not relevant to investigations.

I wonder if my hon. colleague can address any or all of those four points of concern by the New Democrats.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

Mr. Speaker, it is a privilege to rise to speak to Bill C-59, which has been led by the Minister of Public Safety.

As has been stated on many occasions, the objectives of the bill truly represent historic reform in the area of public safety and national security. They include fixing many of the problematic elements under the former Bill C-51, which had been debated quite extensively in the chamber; making significant leaps forward with respect to accountability for our national security and intelligence agencies; bringing Canada's national security framework into the 21st century so our security agencies can keep pace with the state of evolving threats; and ensuring the communications security establishment has the tools it needs to protect Canadians and Canadian interests in cyberspace.

Before I move into the substance of my remarks, the bill has received wide praise by academics and stakeholders across the continuum for the way in which it strikes the balance between ensuring that the rights of Canadians are protected under the charter, while at the same time making quantum leaps to protect our national security and sovereignty.

Today I will focus my remarks on the component of Bill C-59, which would make certain amendments to the Criminal Code and, in particular, with regard to some of the amendments that Bill C-59 would usher in as it relates to terrorist listings.

An entity listed under the Criminal Code falls under the definition of a terrorist group. “Entity” is a term that is broadly defined in the Criminal Code, and includes a person. Any property the entity has in Canada is immediately frozen and may be seized by and forfeited to the government. To date, more than 50 terrorist entities have been listed under the Criminal Code.

I will briefly outline the current listing process in the Criminal Code in order to set the stage for the amendments proposed by Bill C-59.

In order for an entity to be listed under the Criminal Code, first, the Minister of Public Safety must have reasonable grounds to believe that either (a) the entity has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in, or facilitated a terrorist activity; or (b) the entity is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or in association with such an entity. The Minister of Public Safety, upon forming such a reasonable belief, then makes a recommendation to the Governor in Council that the entity be listed.

The Governor in Council makes the ultimate decision to list, applying the same criteria which is used by the Minister of Public Safety. Once an entity is listed, it may apply to the Minister of Public Safety to be de-listed. If the minister does not make a decision on whether to de-list within 60 days after the receipt of the application, the minister is deemed to recommend that the entity remain a listed entity. The entity may seek judicial review of that decision.

In addition, two years after the establishment of the list of terrorist entities, and every two years thereafter, the Minister of Public Safety must review the list to determine whether there are still reasonable grounds for the entity to be listed as an entity. This review must be completed 120 days after it begins. The minister must publish in the Canada Gazette, without delay, a notice that the review has been completed.

Compared to other issues examined in the public consultation on national security areas, this one generated less feedback. Online responses were roughly evenly divided between those who thought the current listing methods met Canada's domestic needs and international obligations and those who thought they did not. However, Bill C-59 proposes changes to various aspects of the listing regime that are meant to increase efficiency, including substantive changes to the two-year review process.

I will first address the substantial changes that Bill C-59 proposes to the two-year review process.

Reviewing all of the entities on the list at the same time every two years is an onerous process. As more entities are added to the list, the greater the burden placed on the government to complete the review within the required time period. Bill C-59 proposes to alleviate some of this burden in two ways. First, it proposes to extend the review period from two years to a maximum of five years. Second, it proposes that instead of reviewing the entire list all at once, the listing of each entity would be reviewed on a staggered basis.

For example, Bill C-59 proposes that when a new entity is listed, the entity would have to be reviewed within five years from the date that it was first listed and within every five years thereafter. This kind of flexibility would also be built into the time frame as to when the notice of the review of the entity would be published.

Other proposed amendments focus on applications to delist. Ensuring that all delisting applications are dealt with in a procedurally fair manner requires engagement with the applicant prior to the minister making a decision. This includes providing the applicant with the opportunity to review and to respond to much of the material that will be put before the minister.

This engagement with the applicant can take time. Therefore, Bill C-59 proposes to extend the 60-day deadline within which the Minister of Public Safety must make a decision to delist to 90 days, or longer if agreed to in writing by both the minister and the applicant.

Another proposal is to amend Bill C-59 to ensure that where an entity has applied to the Minister of Public Safety to be delisted and the minister decides not to delist, then the minister's decision need not be further approved by the Governor in Council. In such a case, because the entity has already been initially listed by the Governor in Council on the recommendation of the minister, the minister will be confirming that the test for listing the entity continues to be met. However, if the minister does decide to delist the entity, then the final decision on the matter on behalf of the government will rest with the Governor in Council.

Bill C-59 also proposes a change in relation to changing the name or adding aliases of a listed entity. If a listed entity changes its name or begins to operate under a different alias, the current listing process requires that the Minister of Public Safety seek the approval of the Governor in Council to add the new name or alias to the list of terrorist entities. The delays inherent in this process can negatively impact the government's ability to freeze the property of terrorist groups in a timely manner, thereby preventing our capacity to reduce threats to our national security.

It is therefore proposed to allow the Minister of Public Safety to be granted the authority, by regulation, to modify the primary names of already listed terrorist entities and to add and remove aliases of entities already on the list. Similar changes have been made by the United Kingdom and Australia to their listing processes.

Another proposed amendment seeks to make a change to the verb tense in one of the thresholds for listing. The second threshold for listing, which is found in paragraph 83.05(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, requires reasonable grounds to believe the entity is knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or in association with a terrorist entity. In other words, it is phrased in the present tense.

Entities listed under this threshold whose property has been frozen following their original listing may, after two or more years, no longer be able to act on behalf of a terrorist entity as a result of their property having been frozen. Therefore, even if an entity still has the desire to support a listed terrorist entity that has carried out or facilitated terrorist activity, it can be argued that the current present tense test is no longer met. Bill CC-59's proposal to change this threshold to the past tense will resolve the problem.

Finally, the mistaken identity provision, which exists in the law now, was intended to be used by entities that might reasonably be mistaken for a listed entity because of having the same or a similar name. However, the current provision can be read as permitting any entity to make a request for a certificate confirming that it is not a listed entity, even if its name is not remotely similar to any entities on the list.

The proposed legislation will clarify that a certificate can only be issued for reasonable cases of mistaken identity; that is, where the name is the same as or similar to that of the listed entity.

The listing of terrorist entities is a tool that has been used by Canada, the United Nations, and other countries in our fight against global terrorism. Improving the efficiency of such a regime, as I have outlined in these amendments, while keeping it fair, can only enhance the safety and security of all Canadians.

I hasten to add that it is one of the many measures which are included as part of Bill C-59, which I said at the outset of my remarks, have been the focus of extensive consultations, have been the focus of extensive study by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, have been the focus of extensive debate in the chamber, and have received the wide critical praise of many individuals in academia, and stakeholders.

We have good evidence-based, principled legislation in Bill C-59, and we look forward to its passage in the House.

[Robert Aubin, NDP, Trois-Rivières, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my colleague for his speech.

I would like him to compare Bill C-51, which has been abundantly criticized, with Bill C-59 before us today. Obviously, we are all in favour of protecting our fellow Canadians, but we are facing a relatively new threat, since many terrorist attacks are not planned, controlled and ordered by a terrorist organization, but are rather thought up and carried out by a radicalized individual.

What was set out in Bill C-51 to help fight radicalization, and what is now set out in Bill C-59 to remedy the same problem, which is getting worse?

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Mr. Speaker, my colleague gave a very balanced speech. He totally understands the issues. The hypocrisy from the member from Kingston is unbelievable. His leader supported Bill C-51, and now they all try to pretend it never happened, which is not the case.

I would like to talk about pre-emptive detention. It is a preventative arrest tool in the Criminal Code that enables police to arrest a suspect without a warrant so long as the arresting officer believes an arrest would be crucial in preventing a terrorist act, and the case would be presented before a judge immediately. We are all well aware of the case of Aaron Driver, on August 10, 2016, in Strathroy, Ontario. With this tool, police were able to move quickly and prevent Driver's attempt to detonate explosives in public spaces.

If this legislation had been in place in 2014, we all know that Corporal Cirillo would still be alive as would Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent from Quebec. I would like the member to comment on that and the damage that has been done, or at least the limits that would be put on police, with this being removed in Bill C-59.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Mr. Speaker, perhaps my colleague from Kingston should talk to his Prime Minister, who, as the leader of the second opposition party, voted in favour of Bill C-51. We must never forget that intervention is required in some situations.

At the time, the Conservative government had to enact legislation quickly to make tools available to our law enforcement agencies. Let us not forget that when intervention is needed, as it is at the border these days, action must be taken. The problem has been going on for a year and a half, but the government is not doing anything. Put us in power, and we will fix the problem.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the comments made by my colleague across the floor in relation to this particular debate, but I took particular exception when he made reference to the Liberals using Bill C-51 as a political tool in the last election. The reality of the situation was that the Conservatives brought forward that piece of legislation in a timely manner to specifically start pitting Canadians against each other, driving division among Canadians. Liberals actually took a very difficult position, a position that said, “Yes, we need to give the resources and tools necessary, but at the same time, we need to protect Canadians' rights.” It was a position that was very difficult to explain and to take politically.

I take great exception to the fact that the member made that particular comment.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for her question.

We did indeed take several trips together for NATO meetings. During these trips, we learned that the 27 other member countries have the same kinds of concerns and that terrorism is a serious problem.

I spoke about Bill C-51 a bit in my speech. I know there was talk about how Bill C-51 is an attack on privacy rights. During the 2015 campaign, the Liberals and New Democrats made a lot of speeches against Bill C-51.

This is why the Liberals introduced Bill C-59, but at the end of the day, it is not much different from Bill C-51. The parts that were changed, as I mentioned, are the parts essential to obtaining strategic information against terrorism. At the end of the day, my colleague must not be happy with Bill C-59. I think the bill is acceptable, but it also lacks some fundamental elements.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to acknowledge that I also spend time with the member on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. What we have learned quite a bit about in that role are the difficulties and complexities around terrorism and the issue of people becoming radicalized. We understand that it is a complex issue that we must deal with very carefully.

However, what I really want to talk about is the fact that when I was knocking on doors when I was campaigning, people across Canada were disheartened about Bill C-51. It absolutely put people who wanted to speak about issues they felt were really important at so much risk.

I am just wondering how we can reconcile the reality of making sure that we look after the security of this country with making sure that people have the right to speak up on issues that matter to them in Canada.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Mr. Speaker, we are now at second reading of Bill C-59, an omnibus national security bill that the government introduced on June 20, 2017.

At the time, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness decided not to give Bill C-59 second reading and sent it directly to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. He said that committee meetings were needed to get additional information in order to improve the bill, so that is what we did.

During the committee's study of Bill C-59, 235 amendments were proposed. The Conservative Party proposed 29 and the Green Party 45. The Liberals rejected all of them. Four NDP amendments and 40 Liberal amendments were adopted. Twenty-two of the Liberal amendments had more to do with the wording and with administrative issues. The Liberals also proposed one very important amendment that I will talk about later on.

The committee's mandate was to improve the bill. We, the Conservatives, undertook that work in good faith. We proposed important amendments to try to round out and improve the bill presented at second reading. The Liberal members on the committee rejected all of our amendments, even though they made a lot of sense. The Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security held 16 meetings on the subject and heard from a number of witnesses, including people from all walks of life and key stakeholders in the security field. In the end, the government chose to reject all of our amendments.

There were two key points worth noting. The first was that under Bill C-59, our security agencies will have fewer tools to combat the ongoing terrorist threat around the world. The second was that our agencies will have a harder time sharing information.

One important proposal made in committee was the amendment introduced by the Liberal member for Montarville regarding the perpetration of torture. Every party in the House agrees that the use of torture by our intelligence or security agencies is totally forbidden. There is no problem on that score. However, there is a problem with the part about torture, in that our friends across the aisle are playing political games because they are still not prepared to tell China and Iran to change their ways on human rights. One paragraph in the part about torture says that if we believe, even if we do not know for sure, that intelligence passed on by a foreign entity was obtained through torture, Canada will not make use of that intelligence. For example, if another country alerts us that the CN Tower in Toronto is going to be blown up tomorrow, but we suspect the information was extracted through some form of torture, we will not act on that intelligence if the law remains as it is. That makes no sense. We believe we should protect Canadians first and sort it out later with the country that provided the intelligence.

It is little things like that that make it impossible for us to support the bill. That element was proposed at the end of the study. Again, it was dumped on us with no notice and we had to vote on it.

There are two key issues. The national security and intelligence review agency in part 1 does not come with a budget. The Liberals added an entity, but not a budget to go with it. How can we vote on an element of the bill that has no number attached to it?

Part 2 deals with the intelligence commissioner. The Liberals rejected changes to allow current judges, who would retire if appointed, and retirees from being considered, despite testimony from the intelligence commissioner who will assume these new duties. Currently, only retired judges are accepted. We said that there are active judges who could do the work, but that idea was rejected. It is not complicated. It makes perfect sense. We could have the best people in the prime of their lives who may have more energy than those who are about to retire and may be less interested in working 40 hours a week.

In part 3 on the Communications Security Establishment, known as CSE, there are problems concerning the restriction of information. In fact, some clauses in Bill C-59 will make capturing data more complicated. Our intelligence agencies are facing additional barriers. It will be more difficult to obtain information that allows our agencies to take action, for example against terrorists.

Part 4 concerns the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the privacy issue often come up in connection with CSIS. A common criticism of Bill C-51 is that this bill would allow agencies to breach people's privacy. Witnesses representing interest groups advocating for Canadians' privacy and people whose daily work is to ensure the safety of Canadians appeared before the committee. For example, Richard Fadden said that the agencies are currently working in silos. CSIS, the CSE, and the RCMP work in silos, and the situation is too complex. There is no way to share information, and that is not working.

Dr. Leuprecht, Ph.D., from the Royal Military College, Lieutenant-General Michael Day from the special forces, and Ray Boisvert, a former security adviser, all made similar comments. Conservative amendment No. 12 was rejected. That amendment called for a better way of sharing information. In that regard, I would like to remind members of the Air India bombing in 1985. We were given the example of that bombing, which killed more than 200 people on a flight from Toronto to Bombay. It was determined that this attack could have been prevented had it been easier to share information at the time.

The most important thing to note about part 7, which deals with the Criminal Code, is that it uses big words to increase the burden for obtaining arrest warrants to prevent terrorist acts. Amendments were made regarding the promotion of terrorism. Section 83.221 of the Criminal Code pertains to advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences. The Liberals changed the wording of that section with regard to unidentified terrorist offences, for example, ISIS videos on YouTube. They therefore created section 83.221.

That changes the recognizance orders for terrorism and makes it more difficult to control threats. Now, rather than saying “likely”, it says “is necessary”. Those are just two little words, but they make all the difference. Before, if it was likely that something would happen, our security agencies could intervene, whereas now, intervention must be necessary. It is a technicality, but we cannot support Bill C-59 because of that change in wording. This bill makes it harder for security agencies and police to do their work, when it should be making it easier for them.

We are not opposed to revising our national security legislation. All governments must be prepared to do that to adapt. Bill C-51, which was introduced at the time by the Conservatives, was an essential tool in the fight against terrorist attacks in Canada and the world. We needed tools to help our agents. The Liberals alluded to BillC-51 during the election campaign and claimed that it violated Canadians' freedoms and that it did not make sense. They promised to introduce a new bill and here it is before us today, Bill C-59.

I would say that Bill C-59, a massive omnibus bill, is ultimately not much different from Bill C-51. There are a number of parts I did not mention, because we have nothing to say and we agree with their content. We are not against everything. What we want, no matter the party, is to be effective and to keep Canadians safe. We agree on that.

Nevertheless, some parts are problematic. As I said earlier, the government does not want to accept information from certain countries on potential attacks, because this information could have been obtained through torture. This would be inadmissible. Furthermore, the government is changing two words, which makes it harder to access the information needed to take action. We cannot agree with this.

Now the opposite is being done, and most of the witnesses who came to see us in committee, people in the business of privacy, did not really raise any issues. They did not show up and slam their fists on the desk saying that it was senseless and had to be changed. Everyone had their views to express, but ultimately, there were not that many problems. Some of the witnesses said that Bill C-59 made no sense, but upon questioning them further, we often reached a compromise and everyone agreed that security is important.

Regardless, the Liberals rejected all of the Conservatives' proposed amendments. I find that hard to understand because the minister asked us to do something, he asked us to improve Bill C-59 before bringing it back here for second reading—it is then going to go to third reading. We did the work. We did what we were supposed to do, as did the NDP, as did the Green Party. The Green Party leader had 45 amendments and is to be commended for that. I did not agree with all her amendments, but we all worked to improve Bill C-59, and in turn, to enhance security in Canadians' best interest, as promised. Unfortunately, that never happened. We will have to vote against this bill.

Since I have some time left, I will give you some quotes from witnesses who appeared before the committee. For example, everyone knows Richard Fadden, the Prime Minister's former national security adviser. Mr. Fadden said that Bill C-59 was “beginning to rival the Income Tax Act for complexity. There are sub-sub-subsections that are excluded, that are exempted. If there is anything the committee can do to make it a bit more straightforward”, it would help. Mr. Fadden said that to the committee. If anyone knows security, it is Canada's former national security adviser. He said that he could not understand Bill C-59 at all and that it was worse than the Income Tax Act. That is what he told the committee. We agreed and tried to help, but to no avail. It seems like the Liberals were not at the same meeting I was at.

We then saw the example of a young man who goes by the name Abu Huzaifa. Everyone knows that two or three weeks ago, in Toronto, this young man boasted to the New York Times and then to CBC that he had fought as a terrorist for Daesh in Iraq and Syria. He admitted that he had travelled there for the purposes of terrorism and had committed atrocities that are not fit to be spoken of here. However, our intelligence officers only found out that this individual is currently roaming free in Toronto from a New York Times podcast. Here, we can see the limitations of Bill C-59 in the specific case of a Canadian citizen who decided to fight against us, to go participate in terrorism, to kill people the Islamic State way—everyone here knows what I mean—and then to come back here, free as a bird. Now the Liberals claim that the law does not allow such and such a thing. When we tabled Bill C-51, we were told that it was too restrictive, but now Bill C-59 is making it even harder to get information.

What do Canadians think of that? Canadians are sitting at home, watching the news, and they are thinking that something must be done. They are wondering what exactly we MPs in Ottawa are being paid for. We often see people on Facebook or Twitter asking us to do something, since that is what we are paid for. We in the Conservative Party agree, and we are trying; the government, not so much. Liberal members are hanging their heads and waiting for it to pass. That is not how it works. They need to take security a little more seriously.

This is precisely why Canadians have been losing confidence in their public institutions and their politicians. This is also why some people eventually decide to take their safety into their own hands, but that should never happen. I agree that that must not happen. That would be very dangerous for a society. When people lose confidence in their politicians and take their safety into their own hands, we have the wild west. We do not want that. We therefore need to give our security officers, our intelligence officers, the powerful tools they need to do their jobs properly, not handcuff them. Handcuffs belong on terrorists, not on our officers on the ground.

Christian Leuprecht from Queen's University Royal Military College said that he respected the suggestion that CSIS should stick to its knitting, or in other words, not intervene. In his view, the RCMP should take care of some things, such as disruption. However, he also indicated that the RCMP is struggling on so many fronts already that we need to figure out where the relative advantage of different organizations lies and allow them to quickly implement this.

The questions that were asked following the testimony focused on the fact that the bill takes away our intelligence officers' ability to take action and asks the RCMP to take on that responsibility in CSIS's place, even though the RCMP is already overstretched. We only have to look at what is happening at the border. We have to send RCMP officers to strengthen border security because the government told people to come here. The RCMP is overstretched and now the government is asking it to do things that it is telling CSIS not to do. Meanwhile, western Canada is struggling with a crime wave. My colleagues from Alberta spoke about major crimes being committed in rural communities.

Finland and other European countries have said that terrorism is too important an issue and so they are going to allow their security agencies to take action. We cannot expect the RCMP to deal with everything. That is impossible. At some point, the government needs to take this more seriously.

After hearing from witnesses, we proposed amendments to improve Bill C-59, so that we would no longer have any reason to oppose it at second reading. The government could have listened to reason and accepted our amendments, and then we would have voted in favour of the bill. However, that is not what happened, and in my opinion it was because of pure partisanship. When we are asked to look at a bill before second or third reading and then the government rejects all of our proposals, it is either for ideological reasons or out of partisanship. In any case, I think it is shameful, because this is a matter of public safety and security.

When I first joined the Canadian Armed Forces, in the late 1980s, we were told that the military did not deal with terrorism, that that was the Americans' purview. That was the first thing we were told. At the time, we were learning how to deal with the Warsaw Pact. The wars were highly mechanized and we were not at all involved in fighting terrorism.

However, times have changed. Clearly, everything changed on September 11, 2001. Canada now has special forces, which did not exist back then. JTF2, a special forces unit, was created. Canada has had to adapt to the new world order because it could also be a target for terrorist attacks. We have to take off our blinders and stop thinking that Canada is on another planet, isolated from any form of wickedness and cruelty. Canada is on planet Earth and terrorism knows no borders.

The G7 summit, which will soon be underway, could already be the target of a planned attack. We do not know. If we do not have tools to prevent and intercept threats, what will happen? That is what is important. At present, at the G7, there are Americans and helicopters everywhere. As we can see on the news, U.S. security is omnipresent. Why are there so many of them there? It is because confidence is running low. If Americans are not confident about Canadians' rules, military, and ability to intervene, they will bring everything they need to protect themselves.

That is why we need to take a position of strength. Yes, of course we have to show that we are an open and compassionate country, but we still need to be realistic. We have to be on the lookout and ready to take action.

Bill C-59—Time Allocation Motion

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Mr. Speaker, Bill C-59 is the government's answer to our Bill C-51 on national security, which we introduced in response to attacks that took place in Canada. The Liberal government said our bill was no good, so it introduced Bill C-59.

Recently, Abu Huzaifa al-Kanadi, who is known to have committed brutal crimes as an ISIS executioner, admitted to the CBC and the New York Times that he travelled for terrorist purposes. During a podcast interview, he proudly recounted what he did over there. It was from that podcast that CSIS and the RCMP learned what he did.

Can the minister tell us how Bill C-59 will improve situations like that now that these agencies have less power than before?

Extension of Sitting Hours

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is a pleasure to rise today to contribute to the debate on government Motion No. 22, which is an important motion. It addresses the manner in which the House will continue to work between now and when we eventually reach the summer break. It is important because it will allow us to make additional progress in advancing the agenda that Canadians have elected us to do in this place.

Motion No. 22 will also position the House to build on the good work that has already been accomplished by the committees and the work that the committees have put forward. I want to highlight that this is not just work that government members on the committees are doing; this is work that all parties and individuals on committees have been contributing to in order to get the legislation back to this place so it can be voted on before the summer break. That is really important.

A lot of the debate today has focused around government legislation, that it is only about what the government wants. Through my participation at committees and the work I have been able to do, I have seen that quite often committees have the ability to work really well together, to collaborate together, to work on a less hyper-partisan level than we seem to experience in this place, and quite often do come to compromises. I know that happens for me and my colleagues at the defence committee. We should all take great pride in that.

The problem is that if we do not have this motion, if we do not extend the sitting hours, we will be put into a situation where all the work we have done basically gets put on the table until the fall. That is why it is so important to do this.

I would like to highlight some of that important work the committees have done. Before I get to that, it is important to stress the fact that during the 2015 election, the governing party now, the Liberal Party at the time, of which I am a part of, made a commitment to strengthen parliamentary committees. In doing so, we were committing a new government's respect for the fundamental roles that parliamentarians played on committees in order to hold government to account.

This commitment included in the mandate letter of the government House leader that under the government, the parliamentary committees would be be freer and better equipped with legislation. One of the things out of a whole host of things that committees do differently now is the chairs are elected freely by the members. They are not appointed by the government. It is done with a secret ballot that allows members to freely express who they are putting forward as their selection for chair.

One of the other changes to committee recently was with respect to the addition of putting parliamentary secretaries on committees, but not in a voting capacity, in a capacity that they could be there to contribute when necessary. On the defence committee, parliamentary secretaries do not play a very active role, but they are there so they can stay informed about what the committee is doing. By not having a vote, it removes any potential interference that one might see coming from the minister's office into the committee.

The Standing Orders that enabled all this were passed in June 2017. In my opinion, and I think in the opinion of the majority of the people in the House, they have given committees the ability to genuinely act in a more open, transparent, and free manner.

I would like to quickly highlight some of the important legislation that is currently before Parliament that runs the risk of not being voted on and to be completed and enacted before the end of this session.

The first one I would like to speak to is Bill C-59, which was before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. The bill, the national security act, 2017, began in November 2017 and extended to clause-by-clause review in April 2018. This committee literally spent five or six months working on this legislation.

For anybody to suggest that the government somehow does not want committees to have full participation and input is absolutely ridiculous, when we consider the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security spent up to six months on the legislation.

Bill C-59 fulfill's the government's commitment to keep Canadians safe, while safeguarding the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

Members might remember the bill that was introduced by the previous government, Bill C-51, which ended up with massive public outcry and complaints about its infringement upon the rights and freedoms of individuals. During the election, a commitment was made to ensure new legislation would come forward. Now we have seen upward of five to six months of committee deliberation on that work. It is important to note that the committee adopted over 40 amendments to bring greater clarity, transparency, and accountability to the bill.

Another bill before the same committee is Bill C-71, an act to amend certain acts and regulations in relation to firearms. We know this is another thing about which Canadians are extremely concerned. Bill C-71 would enhance background checks on those seeking to obtain firearms. It would make background checks in the existing licensing system more effective. It would also standardize best practices among retailers to maintain adequate inventory and sales records that would be accessible to police officers.

Bill C-71 would also ensure that a classification of firearms would be done in an impartial, professional, and accurate manner, consisting of resorting to a system in which Parliament would define the classes of authorities, but leave would it to experts within the RCMP to determine firearms classification specifically. The most important part of that would be leaving the political influence out of it.

As we can see, Bill C-71 is an important bill that would contribute to public safety. That is why it is so critical to ensure it has an opportunity to come back to the House to be voted on before we break for the summer.

The biggest bill, and in my opinion the most important bill that would do the most for Canadians, is Bill C-74, the budget implementation act. This bill would affect every Canadian from coast to coast. It would increase the opportunities for people to have a fair chance at success, in particular those who are struggling.

The budget implementation act would specifically introduce things like a Canada workers benefit to assist low-income workers. It would index the Canada child benefit to help nine out of 10 Canadian families. It would lower the taxes on small business. It would put in better supports for veterans. It is absolutely critical to have the bill work its way through the finance committee and the deliberations it has with Canadians throughout the country, so it can come back to the House and we can vote on it in a timely fashion.

I have so many more examples of other legislation before committee right now. However, for all of these reasons, it is so important we pass the motion now to allow us to sit later into the evenings so we can ensure we complete the work Canadians have put us here to do.

I want to take two more minutes to speak specifically to the amendments that have come forward today. I know there has been a lot of discussion about the proportion of time being spent on government business versus the proportion of time being spent on opposition motions and opposition days. This is not about proportioning of government versus opposition. This is about ensuring we can put more items on the agenda. That is why it is important to ensure we sit later into the evenings so we can do exactly that. The items I am speaking about are ones that have been collaborated on in committees by all members of all parties of the House.

That is why I personally cannot support the amendments. I do not think that they are particularly good amendments, because they are not going after what we need to do, which is to examine more pieces of legislation, as opposed to proportionally growing the amount of time that each political party gets, which is unfortunately the partisan nature that this debate has been put into.

With that, I see that we are approaching the end of the debate on this matter. I would like to leave an opportunity for people to ask questions. I am happy to entertain those at this time.

Report stage

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, at this point in the proceedings, we can get back to the topic of Bill C-59 for what is really, under our procedures, both a report stage debate and a second reading debate.

I am very pleased today to rise in support of Bill C-59, as it has emerged from the standing committee, the government's proposed legislation to update and modernize our country's national security framework. This landmark bill covers a number of measures that were informed very throughly by the views and opinions of a broad range of Canadians during extensive public consultations in 2016.

It was in that same spirit of openness, engagement, and transparency that Bill C-59 was referred to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security before second reading. The committee recently finished its study of the bill.

I want to thank members of that committee for their diligent and thorough examination of the legislation, both during their consideration of the bill, and indeed, during their pre-study of this subject matter in 2016, which contributed significantly to the drafting of Bill C-59 itself.

An even stronger bill, with over 40 amendments accepted, is now back before the House. The amendments would bring greater clarity, transparency, accountability, and public reporting. One of the major changes made by the committee was the addition of a new act in the bill, entitled avoiding complicity in mistreatment by foreign entities act.

Last fall we undertook to enhance and make public a previously secret 2011 ministerial directive to both CSIS and the RCMP that dealt with how those agencies should share and receive information with and from foreign entities when there was a risk that the information may have been derived by, or could result in, torture or mistreatment. Obviously, it is important to have ministerial directives governing such a serious topic.

The goal of my directive was to establish strong safeguards to ensure that information shared by Canada would not lead to mistreatment and that Canada would not use any information that could be tainted by mistreatment, with one exception. That is when it is essential to prevent the loss of life or serious injury.

The new avoiding complicity in mistreatment by foreign entities act would go a step further than ministerial directives. It would create a statutory requirement for such directives to exist in the form of orders in council, and not just for CSIS and the RCMP but for all departments and agencies that deal with national security. It would also require that each of those directives in the orders in council be made public.

This amendment, which is now in Bill C-59, is another example of how this legislation would strive constantly to achieve two things simultaneously. This bill would strengthen Canada's ability to effectively address and counter 21st-century threats while safeguarding the rights and freedoms we cherish as Canadians.

Bill C-59 is the result of the most comprehensive review of Canada's national security framework since the passing of the original CSIS Act more than 30 years ago. That review included unprecedented open and transparent public consultations on national security undertaken by Public Safety Canada and by the Department of Justice.

Several issues were covered, including countering radicalization to violence, oversight, and accountability, threat reduction and the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, the former Bill C-51. All Canadians were invited and encouraged to take part in the consultations, which were held between September and December of 2016.

The response to the consultations was tremendous. Citizens, community leaders, experts, academics, non-governmental organizations, and parliamentarians alike made their views and ideas known over the course of that consultation period. In the end, tens of thousands of views were received, all of which were valuable in shaping the scope and the content of Bill C-59.

With almost 59,000 responses received, the online consultation was what generated by far the largest volume of input. In addition to that, there were nearly 18,000 submissions received by email. In addition, public town halls were held in five Canadian cities: Halifax, Markham, Winnipeg, Vancouver, and Yellowknife. This gave citizens across the country a chance to share their thoughts and opinions in person.

The Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security held numerous meetings on the consultations. It even travelled across the country to hear testimony not only from expert witnesses, but also general members of the public who were invited to express their views.

A digital town hall and two Twitter chats were also organized.

Members of the public also had the opportunity to make their voices heard at 17 other engagement events led by different members of Parliament at the constituency level.

In addition, 14 in-person sessions were held with academics and experts across the country, as well as a large round table with experts from civil society.

I simply make the point that there was an extensive effort to be open, to be inclusive, to ensure that every Canadian who had something to say on this topic could have the opportunity to do that. This was not a process reserved for politicians in Parliament or for experts in ivory towers. This was an open, public, inclusive process, and Canadians let their voices be heard.

After all of that information was collected, the next step was to carefully analyze every comment, every submission, every letter, and all of the other forms of input. All of the views that had been expressed to the various consultative mechanisms have now been published on the Government of Canada's open data portal, so anyone interested in actually seeing who said what to whom throughout the whole consultation process can look it up and see what the dialogue was like.

In addition to that, an independently prepared report provides an overview of what was heard during the consultations.

While it would be difficult to summarize everything that we heard from Canadians in a consultation process that massive, I can speak to a few of the key themes and ideas that emerged.

As one might expect, given the thousands of submissions, there were widely differing opinions. That is what we would expect from Canadians who are very engaged in an important discussion. Certainly that was the case in these consultations.

The results make one thing perfectly clear. Canadians want accountability. They want transparency and effectiveness from their security and intelligence agencies. They want all three of those things, accountability, transparency, and effectiveness, together. They want the government and Parliament to achieve all of those things at once. Bill C-59 goes farther and better than any other piece of legislation in Canadian history to accomplish those three things together.

Canadians expect their rights, their freedoms, and their privacy to be protected at the same time as their security is protected.

Consistent with what we heard, Bill C-59 would modernize and enhance Canada's security and intelligence laws to ensure our agencies would have the tools they needed to protect us and it would do so within a clear legal and constitutional framework that would comply with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

There is no doubt in my mind that the legislation before the House today has been strengthened and improved by the result of the close work that was done by the standing committee. All the scrutiny and clause-by-clause analysis and consideration, all the debate around all of those various amendments has resulted in a better product.

When we tabled this legislation, and before the committee did its work, many of the most renowned experts in the country said that it was very good legislation and that it accomplished more in the field of national security than any other proposal since the CSIS Act was first introduced. That was a great compliment coming from the imminent experts who made those observations. However, now, after the debate, after all of the input, after all of the amendments, the legislation is even better.

One of the things I am most proud of with respect to Bill C-59 is how it represents a dynamic shift in the review and accountability structure for our entire national security apparatus. Currently, some of our agencies that deal in national security have a review body that examines their work. CSIS of course has the Security Intelligence Review committee, SIRC. The RCMP has the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, CRCC. Those are a couple of examples. However, there is no unified review body that can look beyond one agency at a time and actually follow the evidence as it moves across government from agency to agency.

For the first time, Bill C-59 would fix this problem by creating the national security and intelligence review agency, or NSIRA. NSIRA is largely modelled on the often discussed idea of a “super SIRC”, which would have the authority to review all matters of national security, whether they are with CSIS, or CBSA, or IRCC, or the RCMP, or Global Affairs, or DND, or anywhere else in the Government of Canada.

When we link that to the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, which was recently created by the passage of Bill C-22, Canadians can be assured that we have a review architecture in place that is required for the 21st century. It involves parliamentarians, through the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. It involves expert review through NSIRA. In addition to that, it involves, for the first time ever, a brand new innovation that we have introduced, a new element of actual real-time oversight, which has never existed before, through the work of the new intelligence commission, which is also created by virtue of this legislation, Bill C-59.

We also worked to ensure that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the central principle behind Bill C-59. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than the changes we have made to the former Bill C-51's threat reduction measures.

When Bill C-51 created these threat reduction measures, it created an open-ended, seemingly limitless course of possible action for CSIS to take. This bill would create a closed list of specific actions that CSIS could apply to a federal court for permission to undertake. It is open, it is transparent, while at the same time gives CSIS the tools it needs to keep Canadians safe.

Another part of the former Bill C-51 that we have undertaken to dramatically improve is the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, or SCISA. After Bill C-59 is enacted, this new legislation will be renamed to the security of Canada information disclosure act, and it will not grant any new powers to collect information on Canadians. Rather it is a roadmap for how existing information related to a threat to the security of Canada can and should be shared between departments and agencies in order to mitigate or eliminate that threat.

It clarifies that advocacy, protest, dissent, or artistic expression are not activities that undermine the security of Canada, and it creates a robust review framework to ensure that information is being disclosed to other departments appropriately, with proper record-keeping at both ends of the process.

Next I want to touch on an issue that I believe almost every member of the House supports, and that is the fixing of the passenger protect program, or what is sometimes known as the “no-fly list”.

I imagine that virtually every member of the chamber has met with a member of the group called “No-Fly List Kids” at some point during this Parliament. To be clear, there are currently no children on Canada's passenger protect list. However, there are children and adults who may share a name with someone who is on the list. Former defence minister Bill Graham famously had to deal with this very problem when someone sharing his name was actually listed.

Fixing the problem involves both funding and new legislation. Bill C-59 will play an important role, allowing the government to collect domestic passenger manifests and screen the list itself, rather than sharing our passenger protect list with over 100 airlines around the world. What this means is that once the government is collecting the passenger manifests, it will be able to issue redress numbers to people who share a name with a listed individual. Anyone who has booked a flight to the United States in the past few years has probably noticed that their system has a box for a unique redress number. Once Canada's system is up and running, it will operate in a very similar fashion.

I would also note that we got the necessary funding to develop this new system this past March, in the most recent budget. This measure is another excellent example of ensuring that the rights of Canadians are respected while at the same time safeguarding national security.

There are many other important parts of Bill C-59 that I will not have the time in 20 minutes to go through in detail. However, I would like to just mention some of the others—for example, the new stand-alone legislation to modernize Canada's Communications Security Establishment. It has needed this modernization. It has needed this new legislation for a long time. Bill C-59 introduces that legislation.

There are also important changes to the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which ensures that protections are afforded to young Canadians in respect of recognizance orders.

Changes in the Criminal Code would, among other things, require the Attorney General to publish an annual report setting out the number of terrorism recognizances entered into during the course of the year. Also, there are very important changes to the CSIS Act that would ensure that our security agents are confident they have the legal and constitutional authority to undertake their essential work on behalf of all Canadians, including, for example, the complex matter of handling data sets, taking into account the advice and judgments of recent decisions in the federal courts.

Should Bill C-59 pass, this historic piece of legislation would enhance Canada’s national security, keep its citizens safe, and safeguard Canadians’ constitutionally protected rights and freedoms.

For all these reasons, I would encourage all hon. colleagues to join me in supporting Bill C-59. I am glad it enjoys strong support among Canadians generally and among some of our country's most distinguished experts in national security and civil liberties. We have been very fortunate to have the benefit of their advice as we have moved this legislation through the parliamentary process.

Motions in Amendment

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

moved:

Mlotion No. 1

That Bill C-59 be amended by deleting the short title.

Motion No. 2

That Bill C-59, in Clause 49.1, be amended:

(a) by replacing lines 13 to 15 on page 43 with the following:

“3 (1) The Governor in Council must issue written directions to all deputy heads prohibiting”

(b) by deleting line 25 on page 43 to line 2 on page 44.

Mr. Speaker, it is unfortunate that the third motion, which pertained to one of my amendments, was not selected by the Chair, but I will still come back to the important points about it in a few moments. Just because it was not selected does not mean we cannot talk about it.

We are near the end of what has been a very long road with this government on an issue that dates back to even before the Liberals took office. Obviously, we must recognize that Bill C-59 is the result of the Liberals' approach. On one hand, during the last Parliament they supported Stephen Harper's draconian bill, Bill C-51, and on the other, they claimed that there were a lot of problems with the bill. The Liberals told people not to worry, however, because when they took office they would fix all of those problems. That was problematic for obvious reasons. If the bill was so flawed, posed so many problems with regard to national security matters, and violated Canadians' rights and freedoms, the Liberals should not have voted to pass it, and yet that is exactly what was happening with Bill C-51.

Let us fast forward a little. After the Liberals were elected, they waited two years to introduce the legislation. They said that they had to hold public consultations. I will come back to that.

Meanwhile, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, or CSIS, used the power to disrupt threats bestowed upon it by Bill C-51. CSIS confirmed that in committee.

While we waited those two years for the government to consult, even though the election promise had been to consult on a specific piece of legislation, this was open consultation, or so it would seem. However the problem was, and many experts decried this, the fact that the government's green paper seemed to indicate, through some of the notions that were put forward, that some of these aspects were already a foregone conclusion. There was a definite bent more toward the side of intelligence gathering and law enforcement, and certainly a lack of substantive points being made in favour of the other side of that, which was protecting Canadians' rights and privacy.

Too often the Liberals, in the committee in particular, like to put the word “balance” forward. As we heard from representatives of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, when they presented at committee, balance implies that something is being taken away from one side or the other to achieve said balance. For us, the question of rights and liberties, and certainly the protection of Canadians' privacy, is not something that can almost be a victim of that type of compromise required to achieve said balance.

The other aspect that was not included in the public consultations, but that eventually became a central topic in our committee study, is the Communications Security Establishment, or CSE.

CSE, as members will know, is under the purview of the Minister of National Defence and its mandate is given to it by the National Defence Act. However, despite promises to no longer come forward with omnibus legislation, the Liberals have taken something that is the purview of the Minister of National Defence, something that the national defence committee has the institutional memory to study, all due respect to me and my colleagues on the public safety committee, and put it into this legislation.

That ended up taking up inordinate amounts, and rightly so, of time at the committee. These new powers being given to CSC and the huge change being made to CSC's mandate took up a lot of space and led to the most questions, not just from members but also from some of the experts who were there. Quite frankly, as far as we are concerned, many of those questions still remain without answers.

For example, there is the issue of CSE's cyber defence capabilities, as well as its offensive and active capabilities. The experts asked many questions on that subject. I introduced an amendment in committee to eliminate these powers, but it was not intended to compromise the safety of Canadians or our cybersecurity. We still kept CSE's defensive powers and capabilities in place. However, we had the right to ask questions, as I did with the senior CSE officials, though I did not get satisfactory answers, especially about what all this means for our country's military future.

CSE is governed by the National Defence Act, but it is a civilian agency, not a military one. However, Bill C-59, and now the federal budget and the legislation that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness says will be tabled this fall, is opening the door to capability sharing between CSE and Canadian Forces to improve our cyber capabilities in a military context or even in war zones.

I posed questions to the chief of the CSC and other officials who were present throughout different stages of the study. I said that there was some debate in the context of international law as to what sovereignty meant in this digital age. An act of war is when one infringes on someone's sovereignty, but is a server part of one's sovereignty? What is the role that data is playing in this? Certainly, colleagues who work on the trade file had similar concerns that they raised.

I asked these questions in the context of information-sharing capabilities with Canadian forces. All I was able to get as an answer was that this stuff was already being done and it was better that it be codified in the law with all the protections, oversight, and review. Pardon me for being glib, but that all comes with that. However, it is not enough. If a foreign state actor, as the bill describes, engages in some kind of activity, we are talking about the Minister of National Defence having the capability to interfere with intellectual property and to be engaged in an active way.

In this era, when the federal budget is talking about more and more capability sharing between police and intelligence services, which let us not forget is what CSC is, ultimately, as it is not any kind of offensive entity but rather deals with foreign intelligence, and then to involve the Canadian Armed Forces, we are going down a slippery slope. This is not an issue I raise. It was one that witnesses raised time and again throughout this study.

Part of the reason why I tabled amendments, which were unfortunately voted down by the Liberals at committee, was to remove these elements, not because we disagreed, although they certainly are concerning, but because they required proper study. They should not have been part of omnibus legislation. They had nothing to do with the previous Bill C-51. Nor were they part of the public consultations that both the minister did and the committee did.

That is important. I know the answer I will get is that all the issues relate to national security. That is not enough. We need to be able to examine these issues more thoroughly, and that is certainly not the feeling we got.

Lets continue to look at part three of the bill that has to do with CSE. One of my amendments was unfortunately deemed inadmissible by the Chair, because it was too similar to another amendment I had proposed and that my colleague, the leader of the Green Party, had also proposed. The motion was almost word for word what the experts had suggested. It had to do with publicly available information. We will come back to this concept.

The concept, as it currently exists, is important because it gives CSIS and CSE the power to collect publicly available information. With respect to CSE, we were told over and over again that its mandate does not concern Canadians, since the legislation explicitly prohibits it from targeting Canadians. We must be careful, though, and we have to read part three of the bill, subclause 23 and 24, and the next few subclauses.

Subclause 23 indicates that, despite the ban on targeting Canadians, the centre can collect publicly available information for study and research purposes. In short, it lists a number of things to advance its mandate. Even collecting information inadvertently is allowed. This is very problematic.

We tried to do a few things to fix that. The first was to change the definition of “publicly available information”. That is because when I asked representatives of the CSC if the information that Cambridge Analytica legally but immorally stole from Canadians and others throughout the world through Facebook would be part of publicly available information under the definition provided in this legislation, I got a one-word answer, which is rare in these parts. It was “yes”.

What does my amendment propose to do? The Liberals said not to worry, that they would deal with it. They put in the words “a reasonable expectation of privacy”. That is good. That was part of my amendment as well, as was it part of the amendment brought by the member for Saanich—Gulf Islands. However, there is a whole slew of information missing from that. Allow me to read it to the House, since unfortunately it was deemed inadmissible and voted down by Liberals at committee.

It states that it would also include, along with information where Canadians have a reasonable expectation of privacy, “information that is published or broadcast only to a selected audience or information that is subscribed to or purchased illegally”, in other words, the prohibition on information purchased illegally. That is the problem with these amendments sometimes when one is reading them without the rest of the text that follows. Why is that important? It is important because despite the assurances that we got, there are a lot of questions about this. These are questions and concerns that some of the foremost experts in the field all have as well.

I also proposed an amendment for a catch-and-release principle, for information acquired incidentally on Canadians by the CSC. If it truly does not need the information captured incidentally, I understand it. That happens sometimes when one is going to study the information infrastructure in Canada. Therefore, we had a reasonable compromise, which was that if it happens, the centre has a responsibility to get rid of it. That was another amendment that was voted down by the Liberals on the committee.

I could speak at length about the CSE aspects, but I have only 20 minutes for my speech. It just goes to show how complex and worrisome the new concepts are and how we are far from having enough time to address them today. I would even say that we had very little time in committee as well. I have been in Parliament for seven years, and for the first time since becoming an MP, even though I can be quite verbose, my mic was constantly cut off and not through any fault of the chair, but because we simply did not have enough time to get into the details. I am not blaming the committee chair, who does excellent work on this study. Unfortunately, we did not have enough time for this conversation.

I want to come back to something more specific that affects more than just CSIS. I am talking about one of my amendments that were deemed admissible. Amendments that go beyond the scope of a bill can be proposed when that bill is referred to committee before second reading, as this one was, and the Liberals took advantage of that.

The Liberals used that opportunity to essentially present a new bill into the legislation dealing with the question of information obtained under use of torture, which bafflingly the Conservatives voted against. However, we do not have time to get into that today.

I voted in favour of it, for two reasons, but it does not go far enough, and we are going to get to that. The first reason is because the fact that it was even on the table was an acknowledgement that the status quo is not good enough, that the ministerial directives right now are not good enough, and that having these concepts more explicitly enshrined in law is always a good thing. Even though some of these symbolic statements in legislation sometimes seem to be only that, symbolic, they guide the decisions made and the advice given when these agencies seek legal opinions and so forth. On that front, it is a good thing. The other reason I supported it was because it is better than nothing. However, the language that remains is that the Governor in Council “may” issue directives to deputy heads. At the end of the day, we remain in the same situation we were in before. These were all recorded votes, so Canadians can check them.

Let me say for the record that I offered more explicit amendments to nearly every section of the bill that dealt with one of these agencies, putting in an explicit prohibition on using information that may have been obtained under the use of torture. Every single Liberal and Conservative on the committee voted against them. That is absolutely shameful.

Here is the motion that is before us today: that “The Governor in Council must issue written directions to all deputy heads..”. At the very least, even though we are still dealing with ministerial directives, that obliges the government of the day to issue the directions, even though we already know that the directives themselves have loopholes. Even if the current directives, I will acknowledge, are stronger than the ones in the previous government, there are still holes in them, and those holes need to be addressed.

It is sad to see that my amendments, which would have at least done something to prohibit the use of that type of information, were defeated through the committee process.

Speaking of my amendments, I want to mention one thing I forgot at the beginning of my speech, since I think the Canadians watching us will find it interesting. The government said that it was open to suggestions from the opposition. I suggested 120 amendments, and just four of them were accepted by the Liberals Three were accepted on the condition that I use the Liberals' wording, and the other was accepted because it was just a preamble. Not a single one of the Conservatives' 25 or 29 amendments was accepted. Not a single one of the Green Party's 55 amendments was accepted either.

The Liberals proposed amendments. Anyone can look at them, they are public. The Liberals put forward one amendment and decided to withdraw the others because they had an inferior one to replace them. I therefore proposed the Liberals' amendments myself, and they voted against their own amendments. That speaks volumes about the process.

I have just three minutes left, and I have only spoken about one part of the bill. I just spent 20 minutes giving a speech on the flaws of a single part of a bill that has 10 parts. That tells you everything you need to know about the flaws in this bill, not to mention the fact that CSIS retains its power to disrupt and to detain without any right to counsel, as was the case with the former Bill C-51.

Without mentioning that apart from changing the word “sharing” to “disclosure”, even though the word “disclosure” was there, what was qualified by groups like the B.C. Liberties Association, among others, as a cosmetic change at best to the information sharing regime remains in place. It was one of the biggest criticisms we had, and a reason for voting against Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament.

We will get to that through a future point of order, but hopefully we can vote on different elements of the bill. There are two parts that are good, review and oversight. Despite the fact that we tried to make changes to the review body to make it more accountable to Parliament and less to the executive, it was rejected. With the real-time oversight of the intelligence commissioner, we tried to make that a full-time position. I was not able to propose those changes, as they would require royal prerogative, which I, as an opposition member, do not have. Perhaps I can enter a final plea, although at report stage it is probably too late for that.

It is all too clear that, on the one hand, the Liberals did not want the Conservatives to criticize them for standing up for the rights and freedoms of Canadians and, on the other hand, they wanted to try to protect their progressive image in light of our legitimate criticisms that they have failed in their duty to protect the rights and freedoms of Canadians. Despite all the time we were able to dedicate to the study, despite the public consultations, questions from experts, criticisms from members, and a grandiose announcement that the Liberals were going to do things differently in committee, still, all of our amendments were rejected. The same system will remain in place and not enough improvements are being made in terms of what the Conservatives proposed.

In conclusion, it is true that we are entering a brave new world. We certainly know that in this digital age. I acknowledge that the threats are evolving and we need to address them. There is no doubt about that. However, one thing is for sure: right now, the ability of these agencies to act is outpacing the protections that Canadians have for their rights and freedoms, and their privacy.

That, for me and my party, is completely unacceptable, because at the end of the day, if we truly want to defeat these threats and what they stand for, if we truly want to stand on the other side of that terror and on the right side of history, it means standing up for Canadians' rights and freedoms. This bill just would not do that, and we will continue to oppose it. It is absolutely unfortunate, because we heard that better is always possible, but it does not seem to be with this legislation.

[Alison Irons, As an Individual]

Good afternoon Mr. Chair, and members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me to speak today.

My name is Alison Irons. I'm the mother of Lindsay Margaret Wilson who, at the age of 26, was stalked and murdered by shotgun by her ex-boyfriend on April 5, 2013, in Bracebridge, Ontario, two weeks before completing her graduating semester at Nipissing University.

My daughter's killer drove from Kingston earlier that week and followed her car from her tiny campus to discover where she was living. The day of her murder, he drove up again, followed her, and hid behind the house. He took four videos of himself on his phone preparing to kill her, and waited until she emerged from the house. He confronted her in the driveway and shot her while she bargained for her life, with pellets and slugs from one of the two long guns he took with him to ensure that he got the job done. He then took his own life.

She was conscious for a few moments, but in no pain, and told EMS that she knew she was dying. Imagine living with that as a parent. Mortally wounded, she didn't know that her murderer had killed himself beside her. She died about 20 minutes later at the Bracebridge hospital.

According to the pathologist, there was extensive internal injury to my daughter's heart and lungs. Her killer knew what he was doing. I'll tell you, as an ex-RCMP officer myself, that this is a lethal target known as centre body mass. Her right shoulder was fractured, five ribs were shattered to pieces. Her left forearm was completely fractured and left hanging by a thread, with what the pathologist called an avulsion of most of her left forearm, likely a defensive wound.

She had minor gunshot wounds to the back of her head, likely from the first shot spinning her body around, and stippling wounds to the lower part of her beautiful face. I'm grateful to the pathologist's staff for concealing these facial injuries with makeup, so that I could kiss my daughter goodbye for the last time.

I don't apologize for being graphic about my daughter's injuries. This is what guns do in the hands of the wrong people.

My daughter met her killer sometime in 2009 or 2010. He hid his criminal past from her and had plausible explanations for why he, as an adult, was living with his parents and seemed to have no real job prospects or tangible income. He was charming, articulate, clean-cut looking, and a recreational hunter.

There was no violence in their relationship, although he could be controlling and manipulative. She left him for the first time in 2011 when she caught him drug dealing. He successfully lured her back with false promises of change, but a year later she caught him drug dealing again.

In 2012, she was devastated when he contracted meningitis and nearly died. She thought that his illness was her fault for having left him. When he survived, she, as a person trained in disability support and out of her sense of guilt, tried to help his recovery, but by Christmas the same manipulative, controlling behaviours recurred, and she severed all contact. He stalked her and murdered her three months later.

As a career-long investigator, I researched his history. He had concealed from my daughter that in 2000 he was arrested by one police force for drug trafficking. Seven days later, he and another male kidnapped a third male from a residence over what Kingston Police believe to have been a drug deal gone wrong. They bundled the victim into a car, drove him off down a secondary highway, while one of the two beat him up in the car. He escaped by rolling out of the moving car onto the side of the highway, where he was rescued by a passerby, and taken to police. Had he not done so, who knows if the victim would have been murdered.

My daughter's killer and the other kidnapper were charged with approximately five offences including forcible confinement, assault, threatening, and at least a couple of other charges, which Kingston Police told me were related to drugs. Through an apparent plea bargain, he was convicted in 2002 of only forcible confinement and assault, through summary conviction. The previous drug trafficking charge was withdrawn. His only sentence was two years' probation.

Immediately upon completing his probation in 2004, he applied for and was granted a possession and acquisition licence. He privately purchased several guns, one of which was the gun he used later to murder my daughter in 2013. Through my own sources, I learned he had been extensively interviewed about his PAL application under the self-reporting model. This meant that he had been red-flagged in the Canadian firearms information system, what is known as a stage A failure, but this flag was then discretionarily overridden in order to grant him the gun licence.

Before he met my daughter, and again concealed from her, he was warned by a person in authority, apparently due to a domestic violence incident, that if he didn't obtain a pardon for these prior convictions, his PAL would not be renewed. Although this incident is recorded in the Canadian firearms information system, it wasn't coded by police in such a way as to precipitate a firearms hit or trigger a review or revocation of his licensing. Yet this warning suggests to me that his licence should never have been granted in the first place. CFIS also contained a conviction for impaired driving.

As Lindsay's mother I ask you how someone with adult criminal convictions for forcible confinement and assault related to drug trafficking, as well as an impaired driving conviction and a CFIS entry for a domestic violence incident could ever get a gun licence in Canada. How does our gun licensing system fail to properly take into account and weigh the actual context of someone's convictions and other CPIC or CFIS history before granting them a licence? Did he obtain the PAL and the guns for hunting, as he likely purported on his application, or did he obtain them to protect his apparently ongoing drug-dealing career over 13 years?

Our gun licensing system and process, particularly in the area of background checks, definition and validation of references, treatment of criminal offences, and the apparent broad discretion to override stage A failures or red flags, clearly failed my daughter. Please don't tell me that he just fell through the cracks.

Justin Bourque killed three Mounties in New Brunswick using legally acquired guns. Alexandre Bissonnette killed six people at a Quebec City mosque using legally acquired guns. Mayor Tory of Toronto has recently written to the minister for help since, due to tighter border controls limiting the smuggling of illegal guns into Canada, trafficking in legally acquired domestic guns to criminals and gangs is on the rise.

Since we couldn't even protect my daughter, we cannot say that bills such as the former C-51 and C-59 protect Canadians from terrorist acts, mass shootings, or lone wolf gunmen like the one who killed Corporal Nathan Cirillo on Parliament Hill, if we do not correspondingly review and begin to strengthen our gun legislation, regulations, policies, processes, and systems and close the gaps.

In the case of an applicant with convictions for personal violence, especially when related to other serious crimes such as drug trafficking, background checks must be more comprehensive and must consider the applicant's adult lifetime criminal history and the context of any crimes of personal violence. Definition of appropriate references for PAL applications must be more stringent and should not include immediate family members or those with a criminal record. All references for those with a criminal record for personal violence should be validated as to suitability, CPIC and CFIS checked, and contacted. An appropriate level of skilled resources should be in place to ensure that more comprehensive background and reference checks can be conducted.

Do I have just one minute more?

Customs Act

[Pierre Nantel, NDP, Longueuil—Saint-Hubert, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to ask my colleague across the aisle to cast his mind back two or three years to the time when his party was outraged by several elements of Bill C-51. Regardless, he pledged to vote for the bill and amend it once his party came to power.

Now we are faced with Bill C-21, which is essentially an extension of that other bill. Bill C-21 could give Canadian citizens legitimate grounds to fear that their cellphones will be confiscated for the purpose of accessing their data and seeing if there is any information worth giving or disclosing to the Americans.

Is he aware that his own party promised to amend Bill C-51 and make it less intrusive?

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I would much rather see the Liberal government repeal Bill C-51. I think that is what Canadians wanted to see. However, we did not have that. Let us be clear about that.

With Bill C-21, there are concerns the Privacy Commissioner raised and brought to the attention of the committee. In terms of privacy and information sharing and the data that has been collected, what will happen with that data? At a time when we have so many concerns about data breaches and privacy, why would the government embark on a process that would allow for further information to be shared? If the minister and the government really want to address this issue in a fulsome way, they might actually start by repealing Bill C-51.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Mr. Speaker, would the hon. member not concede that the very thing she is complaining about in Bill C-51 is, in fact, being amended, improved, and changed in Bill C-59? Bill C-51 was the Conservative bill. Bill C-59 is the current bill that is being dealt with by this Parliament to correct the problems existing in C-51.

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, perhaps the member did not pay attention to my speech. If he had, he would realize the points I raised as to why the NDP is concerned about Bill C-21.

Specifically, at committee, this question was asked of the Privacy Commissioner. Let me repeat this for the member's clarity. During his appearance at the public safety committee on the study of Bill C-21, my colleague questioned the Privacy Commissioner on whether information-sharing programs implemented under the former, controversial Bill C-51 would apply to data collected at the border under Bill C-21. The Privacy Commissioner stated:

Yes, the information collected under Bill C-21 on people leaving Canada could very possibly be shared through the measures established under Bill C-51.

If that does not ring alarm bells for the member, it should. Canadians have already voiced grave concerns about Bill C-51, and now we would bring another provision that would very possibly allow further information sharing, which the Privacy Commissioner actually raised at committee.

[Jenny Kwan, NDP, Vancouver East, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am glad to have the opportunity to rise to raise my concerns in this place regarding Bill C-21.

New Democrats take the personal information and privacy concerns of Canadians very seriously. It is clear that since the bill was first introduced in June 2016, Canadians have become increasingly concerned about the privacy of their personal information, as we have seen numerous troubling situations of data breaches, unscrupulous data collection and mining, and targeted misinformation campaigns based on collected personal data, just to name a few things.

Just last month we learned that Facebook estimates that over 620,000 Canadian users had their data improperly shared with Cambridge Analytica. In 2017, we found out that Equifax, one of the three largest credit agencies in the world, had been hacked and that the personal, financial, and identification information of an estimated 19,000 Canadians had been stolen.

While these data breaches were in the private sector, we know that these kinds of data breaches can occur in the public sector as well. In 2016, we learned of an employee at the Canada Revenue Agency improperly accessing personal accounts. We learned as well of the loss of a DVD containing the confidential tax information of 28,000 taxpayers in the Yukon.

Canadian taxpayers also had to pay roughly $17.5 million when the government settled a class action law suit at the end of 2017 over the loss of personal information for roughly 580,000 Canada student loan recipients that had occurred five years ago.

Regarding the data that would be collected under Bill C-21, Professor Wesley Wark, a security intelligence expert, stated that “There's been a lot of concern over the years in Canada and elsewhere about data breaches where various malicious actors—criminal groups, hackers, foreign governments—are going after information held by the Canadian government, and this big database will be an attractive target.”

It is our duty as elected representatives to take the privacy and security of our constituents' personal information very seriously, and we must ensure the utmost care any time authorization is given for the collection of their data. We must be even more careful when we authorize that data to be shared if we have no jurisdiction or control over what other entities may do with it.

Bill C-21 does just that. I and my New Democratic colleagues are concerned that the Liberal government is not taking the privacy concerns of Canadians and the recommendations of experts on these matters as seriously as they should.

We saw this in Bill C-59 and again here in Bill C-21. This bill would amend the Customs Act to allow for the collection and sharing with United States authorities the exit information on all persons leaving Canada, including Canadian citizens. Currently no authority exists in the Customs Act to collect exit information from travellers, including Canadian citizens, and there is only limited authority to question travellers departing from Canada.

Bill C-21 would be a significant departure from the current situation. When he spoke on the bill, my esteemed colleague from Beloeil—Chambly spoke about how the government continues to suggest that there is nothing to worry about, that this is just the collection and sharing of basic information, just information that is found on page 2 of a passport.

However, as I said, any time we are expanding our data collection, we need to be sure that we actually need to do so, that this data will be adequately protected, and that it will not lead to any undue harm for Canadians. That third piece is the most important.

The role of the Canada Border Services Agency is not to hand over Canadian information to foreign authorities; the role of the Canada Border Services Agency, first and foremost, is to protect Canada. Once the CBSA turns over data to the United States, there is no way to know how the information will be used. There is no way to know how long those records will be kept. More troubling, there is no equivalent to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada in the United States.

In fact, when my hon. colleague, the member for Salaberry—Suroît, spoke to this bill, she pointed out the alarming surveillance that occurs in the United States, which the world learned about through the whistle-blower Edward Snowden.

As we debate this bill at third reading, given the length of time it has taken to reach this stage, we need to acknowledge and examine how things have changed in the nation with which we will be routinely sharing this information since this bill was first tabled. The election of Donald Trump has brought a very real anti-immigration, anti-foreigner streak to the highest level of office in the U.S. We see this not just with refugee claimants crossing into Canada at irregular intervals from the United States and hoping that the Canadian system will provide them a fair opportunity to hear their case, but in also in the numerous instances of Canadians being mistreated and profiled based on the colour of their skin when they were entering or attempting to enter the United States.

American authorities, emboldened by a president who pursues shutting down American borders to Muslims and building a wall to keep Mexicans out, have subjected Canadians to inappropriate questioning and profiling when Canadians attempted to make a routine border crossing. In fact, I rose in this place three times in February 2017, on the 9th, 13th, and 22nd, asking the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Prime Minister what actions will be taken to ensure Canadians will not be subjected to racial profiling while attempting to cross the border into the United States.

We heard about Fadwa Alaoui, a Muslim Canadian born in Morocco, whose Canadian passport was not enough. She was berated by the U.S. border guards about how often she attended her mosque and what her views were on the president, and was even asked if she knew the people killed in the Quebec City mosque attack. After four hours of feeling humiliated, she gave up and drove home.

The Liberals kept assuring parliamentarians and the public that Trump's travel bans and rhetoric would not impact Canadians, but the stories continued. We heard about 19-year-old Yassine Aber, who was a student at Sherbrooke University and a member of the school's track and field team. As part of the team, he was travelling into the United States to participate at a track meet. Mr. Aber was born in Canada and was travelling on a Canadian passport that did not expire until 2026. His parents came to Canada from Morocco over 25 years ago.

He was subjected to similar harassment for five hours. His phone was seized, and he was forced to give the agent his phone's password. He was the only person of the 20 to be subjected to this, and only Mr. Aber was ultimately refused entry. He was told he was not allowed to cross because he did not have a valid visa.

Canadian citizens with valid passports do not require visas to enter the United States. These were acts of discrimination and profiling, plain and simple.

It was also brought to my attention through the sharing of an access to information request that dozens of Canadians born abroad have had their card revoked for vague reasons. It is within this context that we would be passing and enacting Bill C-21.

In addition to the fact that there is no U.S. equivalent to our Privacy Commissioner, President Trump signed an executive order explicitly stating that persons who are not U.S. citizens are now excluded from the protections offered under United States privacy legislation. It is within this context that the CBSA will be turning over information on Canadian citizens to their American border counterparts.

Canada's Privacy Commissioner has expressed concerns regarding Canada's privacy framework. In 2016 he stated:

The issue is that if you allow greater information-sharing, the legal standards authorizing this activity should be such that law-abiding Canadians, ordinary Canadians who should have nothing to fear from surveillance activities of the state, are not caught by the information-sharing regime.

Canadians should also hear about the impact of certain surveillance measures on democratic rights and privacy. A more balanced and comprehensive national discussion is needed.

When it comes to the collection and sharing of their personal data, I believe that we would easily find that most Canadians have moved well beyond the idea that if they have nothing to hide, they have nothing to worry about. Canadians are wary of their personal information being shared among government agencies and Canada's foreign partners because of previous acts passed, such as the Harper government's Bill C-51.

The current government's plan to collect and share even more personal information, without proper independent oversight of our national security agencies, is of great concern to New Democrats. The Canada Border Services Agency was never required to collect information on those exiting Canada, as that was the responsibility of the agency where the individual was travelling to. There is a real concern that Canadian authorities are being asked by foreign governments to hand over the personal information of Canadians. That should not be the responsibility of the CBSA. Our border agency's full purpose is to protect Canada, not to hand over Canadian information to foreign authorities. In the case of extenuating circumstances, where such information needs to be shared, such as threats to national security or criminality, the relevant police agencies, such as the RCMP and CSIS, are already in contact with their international counterparts. In these cases, existing legislation and practices are already applicable. Therefore, in many ways, Bill C-21 is a solution in search of a problem.

To date, the government has failed to truly show this House why this legislation is needed and has failed to provide real assurances that the risks of this additional data collection and data sharing would be properly addressed and mitigated. Given the current context that we would be entering into this new level of data collection and sharing, it is my opinion, and my colleagues', that Bill C-21 needs to be opposed.

During his appearance at the public safety committee on the study of Bill C-21, my colleague questioned the Privacy Commissioner on whether information-sharing programs implemented under the former, controversial Bill C-51 would apply to data collected at the border under Bill C-21. The Privacy Commissioner stated:

Yes, the information collected under Bill C-21 on people leaving Canada could very possibly be shared through the measures established under Bill C-51.

The Privacy Commissioner went on to reaffirm the following, saying:

As you know, I have commented on Bill C-51 as to the standard under which information-sharing is permitted. In my opinion, the standard established under Bill C-51 is too permissive when it comes to information sharing. I stand by those comments.

Once again, we have no ability to control what American authorities do with this data once it is shared.

As I illustrated in examples earlier, we know that Canadians are being impacted at the border by President Trump's rhetoric and policies. Instead of standing up for Canadians who are being targeted and profiled by Canadian border agents on the basis of their skin colour and religion, the Liberal government appears, instead, to be committed to offering to make the agents' jobs easier by collecting for them and turning over more personal data.

It is the responsibility of the government to protect public safety and to defend civil liberties. The government has failed to show that Bill C-21 would do either of these things. Until it is able to do so, the government needs to shelve this bill.

Public Safety

[David McGuinty, Liberal, Ottawa South, ON]

Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order 36 I rise today to table a petition regarding the former Bill C-51. Although the petitioners are from southern Ontario and not from my immediate riding of Ottawa South, I am tabling this petition on their behalf.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

The committee passed it, and we all know that it's just a random coincidence that the same language was passed by every committee, because a committee is the master of its own procedures.

All I will say is that my motion is identical to that of Mr. Dubé. It is to have a more timely review of four years and not six. I'll just say, if you'll forgive me one little moment, that on January 30, 2015, a Friday, Bill C-51 was dropped for first reading. I took it home with me on the airplane and read it, and I came back to Parliament on the Monday and said, “This is the secret police act and we have to stop it.”

I am grateful for the many changes that are being made here today. I wish we could have made more, but remaining vigilant to make those changes, I'd like to see the review period set at four years instead of six.

Thank you very much.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

In the interest of trying to get one of my amendments passed, I'm a bit in a jam, so I'm going to state for the record that, because obviously out of principle for this issue that I think is very important for the bill, my preference would be to have a vote on my amendment.

If you're telling me the wording is identical to NDP-96, which I believe is what you're telling me, then I can withdraw my suite, stating on the record that I'll consider them de facto rejected, apart from NDP-96, because we're not going to see any of the other ones.

If we were going to see some of the other ones, they would have also been presented with this one that's identical to NDP-96, so I'm just going to restate that I believe the counselling offence is already built into the elements of the Criminal Code that talk about the counselling of an offence, so while this is definitely a minor improvement over what was in Conservative Bill C-51, it certainly doesn't go far enough.

In the interests of getting something out of that suite of amendments, I'll withdraw them and let the Liberals propose theirs.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I feel as if my amendment has gotten lost in relitigating the difference between C-51 and C-59. I just wanted to state, now that we've come back around, that the amendment I'm proposing that's before us right now is that I believe “promotion” is awful. I believe that the solution proposed by the Liberals of “counselling” is redundant, so I call for it to be repealed.

[Douglas Breithaupt]

Thank you. Quite a bit can be said.

The Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, did create a new offence of advocating or promoting terrorism offences and the commission of terrorism offences in general. This was to respond to a gap or uncertainty in the law. The pre-existing counselling provisions in the Criminal Code would not apply where what is being counselled was not a specific terrorism offence but any, some, or all of the full range of terrorism offences found in the Criminal Code.

In Bill C-51, the offence of advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general was criticized for using vague, overbroad, and potentially violating the charter because of its use of the phrase “advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general”. The government did a green paper consultation and has come back with a proposed reformed section 83.221 with the same intent but with wording to apply a well-known concept of counselling. Essentially it is the same thing. Counselling is the deliberate encouragement or active inducement of the commission of a criminal offence. Essentially advocating and promoting is the same thing, but counselling is clear to understand.

There were briefs and testimony before the committee trying to get clear on how the proposed revised section 83.221 would interact with the current offences of counselling in sections 22 and 464 of the Criminal Code. Some believed that the offence is superfluous and duplicates sections 22 or 464. There was some confusion as to the purpose of the proposed provision. The overlap was intended to give the prosecutor increased flexibility in deciding which offence to charge on a given case, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case.

Bill C-59 proposed, as you can see, a changed offence using a more familiar language, which is a counselling offence. I might just read it. Proposed subsection 83.221(1) says:

Every person who counsels another person to commit a terrorism offence—other than an offence under this section—is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years.

It continues, in proposed subsection 83.221(2):

An offence may be committed under subsection (1) whether or not

(a) a terrorism offence is committed; and

(b) the person counsels the commission of a specific terrorism offence.

Further to the discussions in the committee, and on further thought, the view that the overlap was intended to give the prosecutor increased flexibility was the initial design of the proposed offence or revision of the offence, but we've noticed that section 464 of the Criminal Code provides that, except where otherwise expressly provided by law, where one person counsels another to commit an indictable offence that is not committed, that person is liable to the same penalty as one who attempted to commit the offence, which is generally half the maximum penalty for the completed offence. In the case of life imprisonment, it would be 14 years, for example.

It would be potentially open to interpretation that, due to the exception in section 464, which is a counselling offence that is not committed, the proposed section 83.221 would cap any counselling related to terrorism offences that are not committed at a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment. This is a legal problem that could significantly limit the punishment available, but could be rectified by amending the bill.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

As Matthew was just saying, there is no need to fix the language that was so problematic in Bill C-51, on advocating terrorism offences or advocating terrorism in general, or all of that. In Bill C-59, we're attempting to fix language for a section that is completely unnecessary and is, in fact, redundant to what we already have in the Criminal Code. As you noted, Mr. Chair, a number of my amendments go to this point, but again, it was the Canadian Bar Association, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, and the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, among others, who asked why we want to insert a redundant provision in Bill C-59 to something that's already covered in the Criminal Code.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Okay, great. I don't mean to attempt to do your job for you.

As we've heard from a number of witnesses who came before the committee on this bill, and as we heard throughout the debate on Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament, the counselling terrorism offences are superfluous because, as we know, the counselling offence is already in the Criminal Code. Since we've been very keen to avoid perceived redundancies throughout this process, I'm hoping to see support for this particular amendment and to simply eliminate those redundant parts of the counselling terrorism offences that were introduced and are still here in Bill C-59.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Again, going back to the fact that C-59 has not repaired the damage done by C-51 as it relates to access for special advocates to all information in the government's possession about particular cases, this amendment is put forward on the advice of Professor Kent Roach, Alex Neve, and the Canadian Civil Liberties Association. This one is to amend those sections such that the special advocates have full disclosure to all the information in the government's possession relating to security certificates.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

This moves to a completely different area. This is to repeal the changes that were brought in by the previous government in Bill C-51, which removed protections for named persons in security certificate proceedings. This was adopted following a 2007 ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada in Charkaoui v. Canada.

The framework in place at the time allowed for non-disclosure of evidence in certificate hearings, and the court found that this did not impair the rights of people named in certificates. The legislative move by Bill C-51 was to reduce those protections for named persons in security certificate hearings. You'll recall that there was evidence for this from Alex Neve of Amnesty International and from Professor Kent Roach of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association.

The effect of my amendment—and I'm certainly not going to read it because it is quite long and extends over several sections—is to repeal the entirety of the changes made to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act in Bill C-51 of the previous Parliament, and to restore important protections to people who are affected by security certification proceedings.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Chair, I do believe that the evidence from many witnesses, as Mr. Dubé said, was that the disclosure requirements with the low threshold of “will contribute to the exercise of the recipient institution's jurisdiction” is far too low a threshold. For this kind of provision, the information sharing should be required to be necessary for the exercise of the recipient institution's jurisdiction. The testimony is very clear on this point, and this was one of the worst sections—although it's hard to pick the worst section of Bill C-51, but this is one of the least improved in C-59. I would hope that this amendment would meet with approval at this point.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Chair, there are several amendments, NDP-9.8 and so forth, which I believe, since they seek to repeal the SCIDA, will be ruled inadmissible. However, it was important for me to move these amendments to make the point that this is probably the most unchanged element of former Bill C-51. These are cosmetic changes at best.

I won't speak to and move all of them, but I want that on the record as the reason for presenting these amendments today. That is a key point for New Democrats with regard to Bill C-59.

[John Davies, Director General, National Security Policy, Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Sure. Just to echo that comment, the “threats to the security of Canada” are already defined in the CSIS Act, as was said. It's very clear in the CSIS Act.

The Security of Canada Information Sharing Act is not just about CSIS. It's about the entire national security community as already scheduled in the act and includes 16 other departments and agencies, including defence, border control, law enforcement, and so on. The issue with the SCISA definition in the concept of undermining threats to security is both that you would not want confusion with the CSIS Act and that it also needs to be broad enough to include the entire national security community.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Chair.

This is an amendment that seeks to change the definition of “activities that undermine the security of Canada” to “threats to the security of Canada”. This is a recommendation that came from the B.C. Civil Liberties Association, among others, and from Professor Roach as well. It's obviously something that's been at the core of this debate for a long time, and with regard to former Bill C-51 as well.

We believe this definition still gives the service the ability to do its work but will do more to protect rights and certain types of activities such as protests and things like that. There are a few consequential amendments to that as well.

It is so moved.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I propose—and the clerk can check if I've got this right—to deal with amendments PV-10, PV-11, PV-12, PV-13, PV-14, PV-15, PV-22 et PV-25.

I think those are all the amendments in this regard.

These amendments all speak to the same point, and I think those are all the ones that remain extant after the slaughter of Mr. Dubé's amendments. Sorry. It's a ritualized slaughter. We appreciate the effort.

I think those are the ones I could speak to all at once and, with the chair's permission, speak to the fundamental point these amendments are trying to achieve. I hope, because of the unusual nature of this process before second reading, that some of my words might reach ministers' offices as well, and that members of the committee might consider whether it isn't wise to actually have a fundamental rethink of the structure of our security intelligence legislation.

This is an important moment, as we all know. This is the most fundamental review we have had in years. It's really good legislation insofar as it sets up the national security intelligence and review agency. Having NSIRA is a big change, but in my view, Mr. Chair, it doesn't take away from the fundamental mistake that was made in Bill C-51.

Forgive me, but having been through the hearings at Bill C-51, I know there were witnesses this committee didn't hear talking about the risks of CSIS having kinetic powers at all. That's what I want to speak to. I will be brief.

This legislation reduces the wrongs that could be done by CSIS agents having these new powers to disrupt plots, but it doesn't deal with something quite fundamental that we grappled with in committee on Bill C-51. It was certainly raised by witnesses and experts like Craig Forcese and John Major, former Supreme Court justice, and also in the Senate. Actually one of the most important witnesses on Bill C-51 was heard on the Senate side. His name's Joe Fogarty. He was the U.K. security liaison with Canada. He was an MI5 agent from the U.K. What he pointed to was the big risk of the RCMP and CSIS not talking to each other, and when you then give CSIS powers to actually disrupt plots, you have an accident waiting to happen, basically.

In his evidence, he referred the committee only to those things that are publicly known, but he assured the committee that, from his work as a U.K. security liaison in the Five Eyes system with Canada, there were more examples of which he could not speak. He directed us to the 2009 case of R. vs. Ahmad where, on the evidence, CSIS discovered the location of a suspected terrorist training camp within Canada and decided not to tell the RCMP.

There's another example, which was in the Canadian Press, to which Joe Fogarty also referred. In the case of Jeffrey Delisle, which we all know—the navy officer who sold secrets—apparently CSIS knew of the spying operations of Delisle for a very long time and decided not to tell the RCMP. Delisle was arrested when the RCMP was tipped off by the FBI.

There's a fundamental problem here, which John Major at the time referred to in this committee and its predecessor in the 41st Parliament. It's human nature not to want to share information, so what have we done now? I think we've compounded the problem because CSIS now has the powers to take action, but we haven't dealt with the fundamentals that it still may not want to tell the RCMP.

The situation is much improved because NSIRA can supervise what's going on. If it sees a problem, it can maybe intervene, but there still has never been a public policy rationale put forward by anyone, ever, for why CSIS needs the power to disrupt plots. CSIS was created, as Mr. Dubé referred to moments ago, in order to create a security and intelligence gathering, to give that information to the RCMP. That's the purpose. It was to separate it out, so that you wouldn't have the RCMP burning down barns and so on.

I don't see to this day why we want CSIS agents to have the capacity to disrupt plots within Canada.

The RCMP and CSIS need to work together and NSIRA needs to supervise them. All my amendments take out of our legislation the right of CSIS agents to have kinetic powers. Again, Bill C-59 improves on Bill C-51 in important ways, reducing and better balancing what CSIS agents are likely to do. I know we don't have anyone here from the RCMP on our witness roster but the RCMP job of disrupting plots will be complicated by the fact that CSIS doesn't share information with the RCMP. That's a pattern. That's our history. Things are improved in what CSIS agents can do. Thanks to Liberal amendment 16, we won't be worrying about torture, but there's still no public policy rationale for CSIS agents having these new powers to take kinetic action to disrupt plots.

I'm raising a different issue. The issue of whether we are undermining our own security intelligence operations by having different intelligence agencies tripping over each other, not talking to each other, when they're taking active steps to disrupt a plot. I'd rather have CSIS continue to do what it's always done since its creation, which is to collect the information and give it to the RCMP in a timely manner, which is what they haven't always done, so that the RCMP can arrest the Jeffrey Delisles of this world, not wait to be tipped off by the FBI or trip over CSIS agents who are trying to do the same thing.

Thank you.

[John Davies]

Just talking about NDP-47, which is just one component in the broader threat reduction and elimination in the mandate, at least the warranted reduction, what NDP-47 does is take out the reporting that was already in Bill C-51. In subsection 6(5) of the CSIS Act, there already is threat reduction reporting required in law on pretty detailed things, in addressing issues or concerns that you've raised in terms of the number of warrants and so on. That's already in the act. That's traditional. It exists on the collection-side warrants as well, so I don't think there's a big issue here.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Yes, I'm okay with that, Chair. They do all deal with the same topic. At the end of the day, as much as people think that people in our profession like to hear ourselves talk, I'm okay making the point once.

Obviously, this amendment and the others you mention deal with the threat reduction powers that were given to CSIS by Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament. This is obviously one of the most controversial elements, in particular because the raison d'être of CSIS was initially to separate intelligence gathering and law enforcement from the RCMP after a number of scandals and problematic situations, which have been debated quite extensively in the different commissions that followed. This is one of the key points—which is why I'll ask for a recorded vote—on which the bill fails to correct the problems that were brought forward by the former bill, Bill C-51.

As to the powers of interference, while the purpose is clearly to protect national security through a wide range of existing mechanisms, including security certificates and police resources—or lack thereof, if I may say so—, there is a role for the police to play in that.

That is what we said in the last Parliament during debate on Bill C-51. We said that we must give the RCMP more support so it can do its work, and increase our capacity to fight radicalization. There is a whole range of national security measures available without having to turn back the clock and give CSIS powers that go against the agency's purpose. It is an intelligence service and, with all due respect, it should not be engaged in work that, as a result of these powers, gradually becomes police work.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Chair.

It's unfortunate not to hear the rationale of the government members—not technically government members, in the committee context, but Liberal members—for voting against some of these amendments.

At any rate, amendment 30 seeks to remove the word “disclosing”. As I mentioned yesterday in another context of the debate, disclosure is the new wording that's used as part of the information-sharing regime that was brought in during the last Parliament under Bill C-51.

This is a suggestion that the Citizen Lab made to ensure that the information that CSE is collecting in the context of any research it's doing under proposed section 24.... By removing “disclosing” we're limiting the risk that the information that's been collected in that context can be shared with other agencies. If the stated goal is to really be studying the information infrastructure in Canada and to be conducting that type of research, then this way we'll be limiting the potential sharing of information where profiles might have been created, even if inadvertently, of Canadians.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Thank you.

I'm required under the terms of your motion to be here to speak to my amendments, but since Pam has opened the door on the fact that these three are similar, we could talk about them as a cluster. I appreciate the chance to speak to that.

I'm really pleased—and I've seen this over and over in this committee—with the extent to which Liberal members have been listening to experts. With all due respect, I would never describe Professor Forcese as a stakeholder, but as one of the pre-eminent security and anti-terrorism law experts in Canada, he certainly played a very important role when the 41st Parliament was going through Bill C-51. He and Kent Roach both were involved in the Air India inquiry and have a lot of legal expertise. You've captured it quite well, Pam, but I want to go back to his evidence.

With all due respect to our experts here from the department, as he describes it, there's a technical problem, “the inevitability of incidental acquisition of Canadian information.” That's what we're looking at. We know that in CSE's access, it's only supposed to be looking at collecting foreign information. It's not supposed to be looking at Canadians at all, but when you're collecting metadata you just don't know. It's inevitable, as Professor Forcese says, that you will incidentally end up with Canadian information, so how do we protect Canadians from significant violations of our right to privacy and of section 8 of the charter?

I'm pleased with the language in LIB-30. I know the language in Matthew Dubé's and my amendments is stronger and covers off more of the possibilities, but certainly the legislation is stronger once any one of these three motions is accepted by the committee. That's my only comment on it. When we went through it with the drafters, we looked at the testimony from Craig Forcese and from Amnesty International and Alex Neve, and tried to satisfy the drafters and draft as closely as possible to the recommendation we had from those experts.

That's all I have at this point, Mr. Chair. Thank you for the time.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I think it's important. Mr. Spengemann spoke of the purpose of Bill C-59. As I said, this stems from a discussion that was long overdue about fixing the most egregious elements of the former Bill C-51, and in none of the consultations were we engaged properly on the cybersecurity aspect.

To Mr. Motz's point, that's exactly why I'm not seeking to remove the defensive capabilities with any amendment. This is the notion of active cyber operations.

The committee will recall that I asked several questions, including to the Minister of National Defence, related to this notion of what, in this digital age, represents an attack on a foreign actor or sovereignty. How will the capability sharing in this bill between the armed forces and CSE, a civilian organization, be taking place?

It's even more problematic to me in the context that we have a budget that's announced a creation of a cybersecurity centre. The minister has promised legislation to that effect in the fall. In that context, I think it's even more important to have a proper study of these elements that are far from leading to unanimity. I believe more studies are required.

As I said, with this amendment, I am not discounting the urgency of having measures in place to protect our cybersecurity to address these threats, nor am I inclined to say that we should never have any active capabilities. Given the way in which the committee and the ministry were engaged in the public consultations and the way the debate has evolved on this particular issue, starting in the last Parliament with Bill C-51, I don't believe we're properly equipped as parliamentarians to be offering this kind of new power with so many unanswered questions.

As I said, the amendment goes along with the statement that I believe it should have been a separate piece of legislation to begin with.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Chair.

NDP-27 seeks to remove any and all references to “active cyber operations”. I'm going to explain my motivation and reasoning for this.

Obviously, Bill C-59 is a response to a Liberal campaign promise, and something that the Liberals made hay of in the last Parliament, about supporting the then Conservative Bill C-51 in exchange for the promise that the most egregious elements would be fixed.

Now—and we'll get to some of those elements later—I don't believe the bill achieves that objective. That being said, in the consultations that both this committee and the minister did, and the debate on Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament, CSE was obviously never part of it, being enacted by the National Defence Act, which is something not normally dealt with by this committee. I understand that with the new cybersecurity reality and the different issues that we face on a day-to-day basis, that's become something that's necessary.

However, given that it hasn't really been part of the consultations, and as you know, Chair, you acknowledged that CSE took on a life of its own as part of this study. With all due respect to our colleagues here from CSE, that is very new. The committee didn't necessarily, as far as I'm concerned, have the institutional memory to appropriately address all those elements in this omnibus legislation. Several witnesses even made the comment saying that the remarks would have to be limited to one part of the bill given its size and scope.

For that reason, notwithstanding a position I may or may not take in the future on active cyber operations, we have just not had adequate reassurance as to the purpose of this nor have we had the chance to properly study it. I would welcome it as a stand-alone piece of legislation. In the meantime, while it's important to have the defensive capabilities, the active capabilities are a slippery slope that I don't believe this committee or parliamentarians are yet ready to be engaged on.

I move this amendment to remove that aspect from the bill.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I'm just wondering what those types of unintended consequences could be.

CSIS, in the legislation under Bill C-51 in the last Parliament, obtained the power to, through a warrant, infringe on the charter. If not, it was understood that they couldn't. I'm just making sure. Is there a situation where you wouldn't want to have this kind of safeguard in place?

Again, I feel we're in a situation where if these things are being done and the spirit is there, then why oppose it? The section that's being amended is related to the activities. I think there is a distinction that Canadians' rights and freedoms and directing at a Canadian or a person in Canada.... Your rights and freedoms can be violated even if CSE is conducting activities related to something or someone else who's not a Canadian or a person in Canada.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Perhaps just for the record as we debate the subamendment and the amendment, there are a few points that I again remain unconvinced on.

Proposed subsection 24(1) says that despite the subsections which lead to the prohibitions on obtaining Canadians' information.... Then, obviously we go to proposed paragraph 24(1)(a), which says “acquiring, using, analysing, retaining or disclosing”. The word “disclosing” is important, because the information-sharing regime, which has changed names from C-51 in the last Parliament, but which still remains in place, uses the word “disclosing”. When the minister appeared before our committee, he specifically said that disclosing was meant to narrow the amount of information that would be shared, under the previous wording, between departments.

I'm wondering, if you say “acquiring, using, analysing, retaining, or disclosing publicly available information”.... We've been down this rabbit hole a few times with this committee, and I'm understanding that I will no doubt lose my fight—I apologize for my cynicism—to fix that part of the bill.

In the meantime, I think the least we can do to protect Canadians' privacy is to have the most robust definition possible. I know, at least in my experience as part of this committee process—and I of course say that with all due respect to officials who come—the tendency is to be averse to change and robust definitions. Again, I say that with all due respect.

I want to perhaps go back to officials, because we're talking about the charter statement. I don't think the charter statement, or even the charter itself I dare say, would take into account some of the new realities that we're dealing with as parliamentarians, in particular the information such as the information obtained by firms like Cambridge Analytica.

I'm wondering if I can direct my question to Mr. Millar. It's the same question that I asked you last time in committee. Would that type of information from Facebook fall under the current definition, unamended, as was drafted in the bill and be obtainable as publicly available information?

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Yes, and that's because those were the terms of the motion passed by this committee. Otherwise, I'd be able to bring this amendment forward before the House at report stage. That's just to clarify things for people who might have forgotten the terms of the motion.

I just want to briefly say I'm very pleased with the creation of a commissioner. It's my belief, and I hope the government will consider, as my amendment would do, giving the option of the person's being full-time.

In the course of Bill C-51 being examined in the 41st Parliament, we had the advantage of hearing from former Supreme Court justice Mr. Justice John Major, who chaired the Air India inquiry. His advice wasn't taken by the committee at that time, but I believe that a lot of what he said before the committee on Bill C-51 is reflected in the creation of an intelligence commissioner. Mr. Justice John Major, testifying then—and I participated as actively as I was allowed in those committee hearings—said that Bill C-51 was fatally flawed because there was no “pinnacle review”, that was his term, that you needed to have someone like an intelligence czar, someone in a security position, for direct oversight of all the disparate intelligence agencies that we have within Canada so that they do not trip over each other.

He spoke to an issue that Glen Motz mentioned earlier. He said it was human nature to keep information from other agencies. He said that his experience in the Air India inquiry was that the RCMP didn't want to share their information with CSIS, and that CSIS didn't want to share their information with the RCMP. He was very clear on that.

Given the importance of this position—and I certainly support its creation in Bill C-59—I would urge the government, given the extraordinary position of studying this now, before second reading, to seriously consider bringing forward a motion before the bill reaches third reading to allow the intelligence commissioner to be full-time as well, or part-time, at the option of the government.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

I want to say how deeply grateful I am to see this amendment. This was one of the weakest parts—well, there's another part that I'll get to in my amendments—of Bill C-51, in trying to remedy the damage. We could call this the “Maher Arar act”.

I'm deeply grateful to see this amendment and I hope it passes.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I appreciate that, Chair. I hear the roaring train coming my way.

Once again, these are just consequential amendments related to the full repeal of all the information-sharing provisions in Bill C-59, which are just cosmetic changes to what was in Conservative Bill C-51.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Chair.

As you know, one of the most controversial aspects of former Bill C-51 was the information-sharing regime that was put in place, known as SCISA, and Bill C-59 brings essentially a cosmetic change alone to that regime. As far as we're concerned, this remains a problematic system to have in place. NDP-9.1 and the consequential amendments seek to fully repeal the elements of the bill that allow for this information sharing to take place.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Once again, when I hear words like “likely” and things like that, I would say this amendment is not exhaustive. It prescribes certain things that should be published but certainly leaves discretion for the agency to publish more. Once again, I don't see why we continue to reject things by saying they will “likely” happen, the “odds are”, etc., when we should be codifying these things as much as possible.

Moreover, as I said, this will be debated in later amendments, but at the end of the day, as far as we're concerned, threat reduction powers should not be part of CSIS's mandate. That's been an ongoing debate since former Bill C-51. In the meantime, in the same way that there would be accountability for other forms of law enforcement if these powers are going to exist, I do think it's appropriate that they be reported on, as the Canadian Civil Liberties Association said in its testimony to this committee.

[Harjit S. Sajjan, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

I can assure you that when it comes to the actions that are taken by our government, we are given the appropriate authorities. This gives the Canadian Armed Forces and CSE the authority to act.

The other aspect of what our government has done is to make sure that we have fully funded our Canadian Armed Forces to be able to meet those needs.

More importantly, it gives CSE, within Bill C-59, the legislation to now be able to actively protect Canadians, whereas it couldn't before. Your previous government, at the time of Bill C-51, neglected to do that.

[Harjit S. Sajjan, Liberal, Vancouver South, BC]

I'm sorry. My policing experience of listening to how people talk and question is coming in here.

I see where you're trying to go with this, and I can assure you, when it comes to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and me, we have a very good relationship when it comes to looking at threats. That's what Bill C-59 is focused on, making sure that we keep Canadians safe but at the same time give Canadians the confidence that their privacy is going to be looked after. More importantly, finally we have CSE being given the ability to leverage their expertise. That wasn't there before, especially when it came to Bill C-51.

Access to Information

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am here today to talk about a question I asked last year on Bill C-58.

Just so the citizens of North Island—Powell River, who I am proud to represent, know what we are talking about, I am going to repeat the question. The minister keeps repeating that his government is the first in 30 years to make improvements to access to information. However, the Information Commissioner was very clear when she said that the Liberals' Bill C-58 is regressive and that the status quo would be better than what they are proposing, meaning that Stephen Harper's government was more open and accountable than the current government. Canadians were promised more accountability and transparency. Will the government work with us to help it actually keep that election promise?

This is a very important question. The constituents I talked to across my riding spoke passionately about their concerns around Bill C-51 from the last government, and about wanting to make sure things were transparent. The President of the Treasury Board said that we are reaching a new bar, and this is absolutely not the truth. It is important we remember who the expert is in this, and that is the Information Commissioner, who said, “I would much prefer to keep the status quo.”

This is incredibly important to my constituents. This is about the transparency of government. It is about making sure information is accessible. We know so many issues have come to light because Canadians, journalists, and NGOs use access to information to ask important questions that deserve answers. I do not understand why the government created a bill that really just blocks this.

Let us look at the facts. Residential school survivors fighting the government for decades for acknowledgement of the terrible and horrific abuse they faced, the reality that type 1 diabetes in Canada is now being rejected, the under-reporting of sexual assaults in Canada, Afghan detainees and those horrendous stories we heard, these were all discovered by the access to information that this bill totally erases. That is horrendous in this day and age.

One of the most concerning things for me is the fact that the bill talks about people who may be vexatious. What may appear to the government as vexatious may be of the utmost interest for Canadians. Who gets to decide what that is? How do Canadians appeal the decision by a department? This is really important. I know the people of North Island—Powell River are very concerned. They want to know we have information and have access to it, and that journalists have access to it, so that we can learn what is happening in this country. This completely bars the way. We really need to take a moment to reflect on that.

At this point, the bill has passed through the House, but this is leading to something that will be an ever-growing concern. When the government talks about increased transparency and when it says that the PM's office can be talked to now and people can ask for information, that is simply not true. When the Information Commissioner is saying that what we have now, which was in much need of change, is better than what is being proposed, all Canadians need to stand up and take notice of what is happening.

That is why I am here today, and I think we all must focus on this. Whoever is in government has tremendous power. It must be held in check. That is what democracy is all about.

[Joanne Gibb]

We don't have any public complaints of that nature, but I'll add that our ongoing national security review into Justice O'Connor's recommendations is looking at domestic information sharing as it is currently done by the RCMP.

When that's complete, we should have a better answer for you on whether or not Bill C-51 affected how they share information, but I'm not aware of any public complaints regarding information sharing in that regard.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I'm sorry, perhaps my question was not clear.

Let's say you receive a complaint related to an action by the RCMP involving the sharing of information as set out in the former Bill C-51 and as amended, in a sense, by the current bill.

What do you do if you follow the trail from the complaint and arrive at the information forwarded by CSIS, for instance, and you find that it is the actions by CSIS that are the object of the complaint?

[Blaine Calkins, Conservative, Red Deer—Lacombe, AB]

Mr. Newark, just to reiterate what you said earlier about the current provisions that Bill C-51 put in place where it is an offence to broadly counsel someone to propagate terrorist propaganda. This means that in a particular case somebody who is propagating terrorist propaganda could unknowingly influence somebody to commit a terrorist act without that person who is propagating the propaganda even knowing that somebody was going to commit the offence.

Let me get to my point. Bill C-59 is proposing that somebody would only be charged if they had counselled somebody, which means that somebody would have to commit the act, and we would have to trace that back to whoever counselled them, whereas the legislation as it currently exists could stop the person from propagating the terrorist activity in the first place, thereby preventing the activity from happening.

Is that a fair assessment?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to both our guests for being here.

CBSA is not mentioned a lot in this particular bill, and as mentioned, there's nothing at all of substance about our borders in Bill C-51.

We know we've had issues with illegal border crossers, significantly, over the last year. These individuals who cross the border are given hearing dates. The processing time has been cut by 80%. They disappear, and many of them don't show up for their secondary hearings. When you put all these things together, it leaves the impression that our borders are porous and that there are national security issues that exist.

In the context of our border and CBSA, can you offer us any insights on what amendments we should be looking at within this legislation, keeping in mind Mr. Day's comments about a practicality component as well?

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

I don't mean to cut you off.

You alluded in your remarks to your concern about the speech crime provision in Bill C-51 being modified under Bill C-59. I was reading a piece that you wrote—it might have been for iPolitics as a matter of fact, back in the fall—where you pointed to your opposition to this.

Just for the record, under Bill C-51, it was a crime for one to “knowingly advocate or promote the commission of terrorism offences in general”. Under Bill C-59, this has been replaced with something much more common in criminal law: “counselling another person to commit a terrorism” act.

I have read your criticism, so I want to jump immediately to ask you a question about how the offence was phrased in Bill C-51. Take the example of a journalist or a group of protestors who were supporting a group—now the times don't align here but I think you'll appreciate the example—of anti-apartheid activists, under the ANC and under Mandela. You know very well that, particularly in the early history of their activism against apartheid, they advocated for non-lethal attacks on public infrastructure.

Now if a journalist here in Canada were writing in favour of that kind of an approach—again, the anti-apartheid movement was one of the most important struggles of the 20th century—it's entirely conceivable, and I'm not the only one to use this example, that they could have been charged under the wording in Bill C-51.

To shift now, to pivot to a counselling offence, doesn't this clarify and bring greater understanding to what is permissible and what is not permissible?

[Scott Newark, Policy Analyst, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. It's good to see you again.

I'd like to thank the committee for the invitation to appear before you with respect to this very important Bill C-59. I've had the opportunity to follow some of the proceedings and to read some of the transcripts, and it's very encouraging to see the depth and substance of the questions asked of the individual witnesses who are appearing, including with different perspectives.

I've had a long history, and I was thinking about it before I came here today. It's been almost 30 years, I guess, since I first testified before a parliamentary committee. I was a crown prosecutor from Alberta, and as I put it, I got tired of tripping over the mistakes of the parole system in my courtroom, and realized that the only way to try to change it was to change the laws. That meant coming to Ottawa, because we were dealing with federal correctional legislation. I was appearing before parliamentary committees where I exposed what had happened in a couple of cases.

The important work of the legislative branch struck me then, and it has remained with me throughout. That sometimes gets overlooked, and depending on how things are being handled at the executive branch of government, the really important and critical analysis that committees can do is quite significant. A bill like this is a very good example of that, because you can have different opinions about things on different subjects, but you have the ability to ask questions and to try to elicit information to analyze whether or not the intended results are going to be achieved by the legislation in the way that it's drafted or if other things need to be done. That is particularly true, I think, in relation to legislation like Bill C-59, which is obviously pretty complex legislation and deals with a whole lot of subjects.

In fairness, the discussion itself has raised issues that are not contained in Bill C-59. I think a very encouraging sign was the way that the government sent the bill here in advance of second reading so that you could have input and suggestions on other subjects. I have some suggestions to make on things like that. I must admit, though, that I would suggest that it probably is a better idea, simply from a procedural perspective, to confine your recommendations to the specifics of the bill, and perhaps, in an ancillary report, make suggestions on other subjects rather than adding huge new amendments to sections and opening up different issues that are not specifically contained in Bill C-59. There's so much of value in Bill C-59 that it's a good idea to move it forward.

My presentation today will touch on essentially three aspects. The first is just to take some examples of things that I think are notable and quite important in Bill C-59. I also have a couple of comments on things, and one in particular I have a problem with, but I suppose, to put it in a larger sense, they're just ones where I would suggest you may want to ask some questions and make sure you understand that what you are anticipating is the case is, in fact, the case. Then, because the minister has invited suggestions on other issues, if we have time—and probably not in the opening statement, but during questions and answers—I have some suggestions on other issues that I think might be of interest.

Let me just give you a little bit of background as well on my personal experience in this, because it impacts on the insights. As I mentioned, I was a crown prosecutor in Alberta. Ultimately, because of one of the cases I was involved in, in 1992 I became the executive officer of the Canadian Police Association. This is the rank-and-file police officers, the unions. We were involved very heavily from 1992 to 1998 in criminal justice reform, policy advocacy. It was from that, in particular, and my work as a crown prosecutor, that I got the sense of the importance of learning from front-line operational insights how you can then shape legislative or policy tools so as to achieve desired outcomes.

Also, not everything needs to be done by legislation. There are frequently instances—and I was struck by this as I was watching some of the evidence from some of the witnesses that you've had—where we don't necessarily need new laws. We need to enforce the ones we already have, and we need to make sure that the tools are in place to use them appropriately. There are some examples of that, I think, in Bill C-59 specifically.

I ended up working with the Ontario government in 1998 as an order in council appointment. That government had intended to achieve some criminal justice reforms, and they weren't getting it done, so they wanted some people with some understanding of the justice system.

After 9/11, I was appointed as the special security adviser on counterterrorism because of some work I had previously been involved in. I had significant interactions with Americans in relation to that. In the old days, it was the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit, which became INSET. I had a role, essentially, in being the provincial representative in some of the discussions, and I saw the inter-agency interactions, or lack thereof, and the impact that potentially had.

Since then, I'm actually one of the guys who did the review that led to the arming of the border officers. I still do work with the union on policy stuff. I also do some stuff with security technology committees. The value of that is that you get an understanding of some of the operational insights and what is necessary to achieve the intended outcomes.

I should add, I suppose, the final thing. Last year, I accepted a position at Simon Fraser University as an adjunct professor. I know you'll be shocked to hear that. It's for a course they offer, a master's program, the Terrorism, Risk, and Security Studies program. The course I teach is balancing civil liberties and public safety and security. To go on from a point that the general made, I think the case is that these are not either-or situations. We are fully capable of doing both, and there is a balance involved in this. As a general principle, it is a very good idea, when you're looking at what is proposed in legislation, especially in legislation like this which has national security implications, to keep in mind the general principles of protecting civil rights.

There are two points about that. You'll notice that in “civil rights”, “rights” is modified by “civil”. In other words, they are rights that exist in the context of a civil society. That has ramifications in the sense, I think, of what citizens are entitled to expect of their government. I don't want government intruding on my privacy, but, at the same time, if government has the capability of accessing relevant information and acting on someone who is a threat to me and my family, I expect, under my civil right, that, in fact, government will do what it needs to do to extend that protection.

The other side of that—and I know, Monsieur Dubé asked many questions about this, as did other members of the committee—is the importance of looking at it generally, at what is proposed, to see that there is, in effect, oversight initially and, as well, appropriate review so that the balancing can take place. In my opinion, and more accurately in my experience, having the executive branch reporting to itself for authorization is something that should raise a red flag. There are provisions within the act that ultimately address that, although there are some that raise some questions about it.

In the very brief time left, let me just say that I think that among the important things in the legislation are the extensive use of preambles and definitions about the importance of privacy and what we would generally call civil rights in consideration of why we're doing things. That, I think, was a deficiency in Bill C-51. I can tell you that it is critically important in today's charter world to make sure that is included so that the courts can consider whether or not what was being done by legislative authority in fact took into account the charter issues. A rule of statutory interpretation is “thou shalt consider the preamble in a statute when actually drafting it”.

With one minute left, I think probably the most important operational aspect of this bill is the proactive cyber-activity authorized to CSE. That is a reality of the world in which we live. We are totally cyber-dependent, which also means we have enormous cyber-vulnerabilities. Cybersecurity, in effect, has been an afterthought. This is a step; it is not the complete answer. I do some work in the cyber field as well, and that is something that I think is extremely important.

The one issue I would raise, in closing, which I have a concern about specifically, is in relation to the change in what I think is the evidentiary threshold in the terrorism propaganda offence. I can get into that in more detail, but my concern is, essentially, that it may be making it, for no good reason, no justifiable reason that I can see, harder to use that section, which has extreme relevance now in the changing domestic terrorism environment in which we are living.

I look forward to answering any questions and, hopefully, touching on the other subjects.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Yes. It's in a different form in Bill C-59 than it was in C-51, if I am correct.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much to both of you for that.

I want to pick up on something that was mentioned toward the end of your comments. That's the critique of the change in Bill C-51, the speech crime provision, and the change to a counselling offence. It's interesting, because one of the criticisms of Bill C-51 was that under the speech crime provision as written, it was conceivable, for example, for a Canadian journalist to be convicted under that bill for writing in favour of some of the actions taken by anti-apartheid activists against the infrastructure of the racist South African state in the 1980s. That's if Bill C-51 had been in place, obviously, during that time.

With the counselling offence, this is much more common in existing criminal law. It still would allow for individuals who are involved in encouraging terrorism to face legal consequences. I wonder if you could comment from this perspective. I mean, do you see that point about the dangers of Bill C-51 and how that might impact upon freedom of expression?

[Michael Mostyn, Chief Executive Officer, National Office, B'nai Brith Canada]

Thank you. I will be sharing my time with Mr. Matas.

We thank the committee for inviting us to appear. I will provide some introductory remarks. My colleague David Matas, our senior legal counsel, will elaborate on some of our key points on the proposed legislation.

B'nai Brith Canada is this country's oldest national Jewish organization, founded in 1875, with a long history of defending the human rights of Canadian Jewry and others across the country. We advocate for the interests of the grassroots Jewish community in Canada and for their rights such as freedom of conscience and religion.

B'nai Brith Canada testified before this committee in 2015 and, most recently, in February 2017, on what was then Bill C-51. Our testimony today will develop the same points we had previously expressed, and we will focus on specific areas that touch on our work, particularly part 7.

Our latest audit of anti-Semitic incidents in Canada contains a key truth: Jews are consistently targeted by hate and bias-related crimes in Canada at a rate higher than that of any other identifiable group. Statistics Canada recently released its report on 2016 police-reported hate crimes, and once again Jews were targeted more than any other group in the country. But police-reported hate crimes are only the tip of the iceberg. We require better tools—data and analysis—to gain greater insights into all hate crimes and to do a better job of countering them.

Bill C-59 includes proposals to change the Criminal Code aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the terrorist entity listing regime. We endorse those proposals providing for a staggered ministerial review of listed entities and granting the minister the authority to amend the names, including aliases, of listed entities.

In the past, B'nai Brith has been supportive of measures to empower security officials to criminalize advocacy and promotion of terrorism, and seize terrorist propaganda. We supported these measures to deny those intent on inspiring, radicalizing, or recruiting Canadians to commit acts of terror and who exploit the legal leeway to be clever but dangerous with their words. Bill C-59 seeks to change the law's articulation of this offence from “advocates or promotes” to “counselling” the commission of a terrorism offence. This is a weakening of the law that we believe is unhelpful. We have noted the assurances provided by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, but we are still uncertain that such a change, which in our view weakens the law, is needed.

The change of advocacy and promotion to “counselling” also impacts on the definition of “terrorism propaganda”. Bill C-59 would remove the advocacy and promotion of terrorism offences in general from the definition. This is also a weakening of the law.

We accept that the right to freedom of expression is an important consideration, but the right of potential victims to be free from terrorism and the threat of terrorism must be a greater priority.

The importance of a clear articulation of the penalties for advocacy and promotion of terrorism should include the glorification of terrorism, something that should be of concern to all of us.

These are specific points I wanted to raise. There are others that, while not specifically part of the proposed amendments to Bill C-59, are intimately associated and are of interest and concern to B'nai Brith Canada. There are further points here. I'd like to highlight some.

The continuing manifestation of anti-Semitism, hate crimes, and hate speech in Canada affects not only the Jewish community. B'nai Brith Canada sees these worrying trends as national security issues. Organizations such as ours working with law enforcement agencies at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels must address these issues collaboratively.

The government's framework to counter youth radicalization is also extremely important. We endorse the work of the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence. We look forward to a stronger dialogue with them.

How can we collaborate in the more effective monitoring of groups engaged in hate speech or incitement directed at children, including those using coded messages that are nonetheless threatening, even where these might fall short of actual crimes? This is very much the focus in countering radicalization at an early stage, where civil society can have better dialogue with law enforcement.

How can we ensure that government agencies shun questionable organizations and groups, particularly those that receive government grants and nonetheless are operating in ways inimical to the fundamental rights and freedoms of Canadian society? We would welcome a channel of dialogue for this purpose.

Lastly, how can we better engage in dialogue with the Canada Revenue Agency to ensure diligent follow-up to complaints regarding organizations engaged in or supporting those expressing hate speech at odds with their charitable status?

There are other points, as I mentioned, in our paper. I'm sure we can answer those in questions.

I'd like to cede the floor to my colleague David Matas.

[Laura Tribe]

We definitely have big concerns about the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act that was enabled by Bill C-51 not really being revised or overhauled in the way we had hoped. One of the big changes that we would look for is limiting the information requested to those who request it, and not allowing it to continue being shared between departments after the fact. Another change we would look for is limiting who can access information within other government agencies.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you very much.

When it comes to information sharing, how concerned should be about what are essentially cosmetic changes in this bill from what was brought in by the former Bill C-51? You mentioned it in your comments, and I don't really have time to get into some of the details I was going to ask about, but perhaps you could reiterate those concerns in the 30 seconds that are probably left.

[Timothy McSorley, National Coordinator, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group]

Thank you. I'm very glad to be able to present today on behalf of the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group and our 45 member organizations. I'd like to thank OpenMedia for inviting us to join them today.

I'd like to touch on three main points: first, review and oversight; second, some of the changes to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act; and third, the no-fly list.

Regarding oversight and review, the ICLMG greatly welcomes the creation of the national security and intelligence review agency, as well as the intelligence commissioner. However, we believe there are important ways in which both bodies could be strengthened. We hope the committee and government take this opportunity to ensure that both the NSIRA and the intelligence commissioner have the powers and resources they need to carry out their important work. Others have given feedback, which we largely support, regarding the intelligence commissioner, so I will focus on the NSIRA.

The ICLMG has long supported an overarching review mechanism as a way to ensure Canadians' rights are not violated, and to monitor the effectiveness of Canada's national security activities. Bill C-59 does away with the silos that have restricted the various review agencies' work, which alone is a major improvement.

I would highlight three issues, though, that we think the committee should examine regarding strengthening the NSIRA. First, to ensure independence we suggest that the NSIRA members be appointed via vote in Parliament and not through Governor in Council. Second, the complaints mechanism in the NSIRA act should apply not just to the RCMP, CSIS, the CSE, and security clearances, but be expanded to include, at a minimum, the national security activities of the CBSA as well as Global Affairs Canada, although ideally the complaints mechanism would actually include all federal national security related activities.

Third, SIRC has faced important criticism over the lack of transparency in its complaints system. There is, in fact, an ongoing lawsuit over this issue. We have also raised concerns about SIRC's inability to make binding recommendations. The NSIRA act would transpose these problems onto the new agency. We urge the committee to take this opportunity to improve on the SIRC model and ensure we have a strong, effective, overarching review body.

Next, regarding changes to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, CSIS's threat-reduction powers were introduced with Bill C-51 and were heavily criticized at the time. Bill C-59 attempts to solve some of these issues by restricting the powers to a set list of activities. However, we must reiterate in the strongest possible terms our opposition to granting an intelligence agency, which operates in secret, powers akin to those of law enforcement.

My time does not allow me to go into all our specific concerns, but at the heart of this is that CSIS's creation was meant to separate intelligence activities from law enforcement, and today we continue to have the same concerns we had at that time. Even in cases that require a warrant, we believe that a non-adversarial system will not ensure the protection of a target's civil liberties. We do not believe that this is an issue of “if” the system will violate an individual's rights, but “when”.

We are also concerned about new powers granting CSIS agents immunity for acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute an offence. The Canadian Bar Association, among others, raised serious concerns when these powers were granted to law enforcement officers, calling it antithetical to the rule of law. We believe this even more so when such powers are granted to intelligence agents operating in secret, and we think this section should be removed from Bill C-59.

Finally, regarding the Secure Air Travel Act and the no-fly list, we support the tremendous efforts by the No Fly List Kids and other groups to bring about a redress system. However, we believe the government must go further and address the more fundamental problems with the no-fly list regime. Bill C-59 does not address the due process issues that have been raised since 2007. We cannot condone a system that is used to restrict individuals' travel and to place them on what amounts to a terrorist watch list but does not allow them full access to the information against them, in order to mount a full and adequate defence. We have also yet to be shown that it improves upon Criminal Code provisions already in place that can be used to restrict the activities of an individual suspected of planning a crime. While we appreciate potential solutions put forward by others, such as introducing a special advocate system into the appeals process, we do not believe it is sufficient to restore due process. We maintain our fundamental opposition and call for the repeal of the no-fly list regime.

For more on our positions, we sent a brief to the committee, which I believe was circulated yesterday. I'd also be happy to take any questions, or follow up with any members, following the meeting.

Thank you.

[Laura Tribe, Executive Director, OpenMedia]

Good morning. My name is Laura Tribe, and I am the executive director of OpenMedia, a community-based organization committed to keeping the Internet open, affordable, and surveillance-free.

I'm here today with Tim McSorley of the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, who were unfortunately not invited by the committee to testify in these proceedings, but whose contributions OpenMedia believes to be critical for an informed discussion of Bill C-59.

OpenMedia's work on privacy and digital security dates back to Bills C-13 and C-30, but has focused more recently on the serious security violations introduced by the previous government's Bill C-51. The OpenMedia community's lengthy efforts on these issues include producing “Canada's Privacy Plan”, a positive vision for the future of privacy in Canada that was crowdsourced from over 125,000 contributors; over 300,000 people speaking up against Bill C-51; two national days of action against Bill C-51, organized in partnership with organizations across the country; over 15,000 citizen comments submitted to the government's national security consultation; and over 6,000 submissions to this committee's written consultation on Bill C-59.

Public Safety Canada's report summarizing the national security consultation results showed that Canadians are overwhelmingly in favour of increased protections for personal privacy. More than four in five responses indicated that their expectation of privacy in the digital world is the same as or higher than in the physical world.

As a result, when Bill C-59 was introduced, we were relieved; it was a sign that change was coming. However, the more we analyzed the bill, the more our worries returned. The changes are less substantive than we had hoped, and invasive new powers were even introduced.

Bill C-59 fails to adequately address the information disclosure provisions and terrorist speech offences brought in by Bill C-51, but also brings in new data collection, cybersecurity, and information-sharing powers that further threaten our privacy and security.

Today this committee has a chance to make this right. Over 6,000 Canadians submitted their concerns about Bill C-59 via OpenMedia's written submission to this consultation. Since then, in the past two weeks, we've had almost 10,000 more Canadians sign a new petition concerning the expanded cyber-operations powers proposed in the CSE act included within Bill C-59. It's addressed to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security and reads:

“As a concerned Canadian, I am urging you to address the dangerous new powers being proposed for CSE in Bill C-59. Throughout the process of reforming Bill C-51, Canadians have been very clear on the need to scale back the drastic and invasive national security measures in the bill.

“Public Safety Canada's own 'What We Learned' report, which formed the basis of Bill C-59, confirmed that a majority of stakeholders and experts called for existing measures to be scaled back or repealed completely, and that most participants in the consultations 'opted to err on the side of protecting individual rights and freedoms rather than granting additional powers to national security agencies and law enforcement...'.

“The new active and defensive cyber-operations powers proposed in Bill C-59 for CSE are directly opposed to the wishes of the majority of Canadians. We asked for privacy, but instead we got an out-of-control spy agency with even more extreme powers than before.

“Security and privacy experts throughout Canada have expressed in great detail the issues with the proposed bill and the changes that need to be made to protect the privacy and security of Canadians. Experts have warned of the consequences of granting powers like these, powers that will be all the more dangerous given the lack of adequate oversight included in the bill.

“I would like to point you to the 'Analysis of the Communications Security Establishment Act and Related Provisions in Bill C-59' report, produced by the Citizen Lab and the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, CIPPIC. The recommendations laid out in this report should be adopted by the SECU committee.

“In a world and time where digital technologies are being used by so many to threaten our digital safety, we need our government to be helping make the world better, not actively undermining our security.”

As of this morning, our petition has been signed by 9,633 Canadians. On behalf of these signatories, plus the over 300,000 against Conservative Bill C-51, and the other concerned civil society groups who have been unable to join these proceedings themselves, we respectfully ask that you make things right. We are asking you, our elected representatives, to stand up for our privacy and continue the work of repealing Bill C-51. Digital security is critical to Canada's infrastructure, economy, and future. Please do not compromise this in the name of fear or following other countries' bad practices to lead us in a race to the bottom. We need to be stronger than that.

Thank you.

Opposition Motion—Conflict of Interest

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Madam Speaker, that speech had such passion and conviction, and that is what the people from St. Catharines would expect.

The member started his comments by talking about the fact that the opposition was using this as its first opposition motion for 2018. It is another opportunity, like it continually does, to keep smearing the Prime Minister, throwing it against the wall, hoping it will stick. When the Liberal Party was in opposition, it talked about the bad policy the Conservatives brought forward, such as Bill C-51 and its attack on scientists.

Could the member expand a little more on why he thinks the Conservative Party continually hammers away at the Prime Minister instead of talking about some of the policies that can help the people they so often purport to represent?

[Peter Edelmann]

What I would suggest is that there be one clear definition of national security and threats to national security. The definition in the CSIS Act has been used for a long time, and it's only with Bill C-51 that we ended up with another definition that created a lack of clarity with the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act. If the information sharing act is going to be that broad, there's no question that there does need to be oversight, and so it may be that the broader definition from the information sharing act is the one that ought to be used with respect to NSIRA.

Our view is that definition is overly broad and vague.

[Dr. Christina Szurlej, Endowed Chair, Atlantic Human Rights Centre, St. Thomas University, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair, Mr. Clerk, and honourable committee members, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you regarding Canada's national security framework.

Following a set of national consultations regarding the Anti-terrorism Act, formerly Bill C-51, the Liberal government drafted Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters to replace the Anti-terrorism Act.

I have reviewed the bill and will comment on it through a human rights lens. Securing the safety of its populace is a fundamental function of government. It is without question that government and its agencies must be equipped with the means necessary to prevent, counter, and address evolving threats in the digital age. In that same vein, a balance must be struck between securing public safety and respecting rights, ensuring any limitations placed on rights are necessary, proportionate, and reasonable.

As a human rights professor, I am pleased to see language recognizing the need to maintain respect for the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the rule of law, accountability, and transparency within Bill C-59. The establishment of a national security and intelligence review agency with a mandate to review national security activities, consider complaints, and advance investigations is arguably the most significant advancement.

The bill also establishes an intelligence commissioner to review the reasonableness of Canadian Security Intelligence Service and Canadian Security Establishment authorizations regarding, inter alia, intelligence gathering and cybersecurity. Though Bill C-59 has addressed some shortcomings found in the Anti-terrorism Act of 2015, concerns remain regarding its impact on human rights, particularly the rights to privacy, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of expression, liberty and security, democratic rights, due process rights, and anti-discrimination protections.

Due to time constraints, this testimony focuses on concerns with amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act regarding the collection, querying, exploitation, and retention of datasets. The act defines a “dataset” as the collection of information stored as an electronic record and characterized by common subject matter. A dataset could thus encompass any thematic electronic documentation, provided it is a publicly available dataset, relates primarily to non-Canadians living outside of Canada, or constitutes an approved class.

Though it is reassuring that a newly established intelligence commissioner would review classes of datasets to safeguard against abuse, the remainder of section 11.05(2) is read with caution. Use of the term “publicly available dataset” is misleading, as it can include information that is considered private under the Privacy Act, but is available in the public arena, potentially without the consent or knowledge of the person concerned. In other words, publicly available data can extend to private information made public on request, by subscription or by purchase. Rather than exploit this vulnerability by legitimizing and encouraging the commodification and exploitation of the public's data, the Government of Canada has a positive obligation to protect its populace against infringements by third parties that may compromise individual privacy in exchange for profit.

Granting government authority to collect publicly available data appears innocuous, but can reveal highly personal information in violation of the right to privacy. I also caution Canadians against blindly accepting mass government surveillance of foreigners. Though targeted surveillance may be necessary to thwart legitimate threats to peace and security, mass surveillance opens the door for foreign nations not accountable to Canadian voters to collect information about Canadians and share it with our governments, other nations, or corporations.

Under these circumstances, the Government of Canada could also place foreigners in danger by revealing compromising information to governments with poor human rights records. Differential respect for the privacy of Canadians versus non-Canadians outside the country also constitutes a violation of non-discrimination under the international covenant on civil and political rights.

The United Nations special rapporteur on the right to privacy has maintained that the distinction between one's own citizens and foreigners is not in compliance with the principles of the universal right to privacy.

Failing to properly restrain invasions of privacy could prompt charter violations of section 8 protecting against reasonable search or seizure or the promotion of presumption of innocence under section 11(d). In order to satisfy that such limitations are “demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society”, the onus is on the Government of Canada to prove these limitations are of sufficient importance, rationally connected to the objective, minimally impair rights, and produce an outcome that outweighs the gravity of the problem it seeks to address.

Though protecting public safety and national security is of sufficient importance to warrant a well-defined, targeted invasion of privacy, the mass collection of data that could lead to results that are relevant to the performance of CSIS's duties and functions is not sufficiently important to encroach on constitutionally protected rights.

Similarly, blanket collection of datasets merely “relevant” to the duties and functions of the service fails to demonstrate a direct rational connection to protecting public safety. If there is no direct connection to maintaining public safety and national security, why does the Government of Canada consider these proposed powers to be a necessary component of the national security framework?

The United Nations special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism has warned that “restrictions falling short of being necessary...constitute 'arbitrary' interference” with the right to privacy. The special rapporteur further stressed that, “for a restriction to be permissible, it is not enough that it serves one of the enumerated legislative aims; it must also be necessary for reaching the legislative aim.” Given that the aim of Bill C-59 is to protect national security, the blanket collection of any data relevant to the work of CSIS does not satisfy this test.

Information respecting the protection of public safety and national security in Canada should be narrowly defined and collected only “to the extent that is strictly necessary” and when there are reasonable grounds to suspect a threat to the security of Canada. If we allow the bulk collection and storage of personal data without a person's knowledge, consent, or ability to challenge the nature and authenticity of information collected, the next step could be to misuse, alter, deliberately conceal, or manipulate information.

Indeed, the Canadian Security Intelligence Agency Act allows a CSIS director to authorize designated employees to commit direct “acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences” in carrying out their duties and responsibilities. Theoretically, the minister could authorize the collection of datasets intended to assist CSIS employees with carrying out otherwise criminal activity. Are these powers consistent with the preamble of Bill C-59, which claims to respect the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the rule of law, as well as accountability and transparency, while championing national security?

Amendments to the act do advance safeguards, but the nature of these safeguards raises concerns. The bill includes provisions calling for this service to delete information and datasets regarding the physical or mental health of an individual, information subject to solicitor-client privilege, and material in foreign datasets regarding Canadian citizens. This suggests some datasets will encapsulate information that should be accorded the highest degree of privacy.

The question is, why would the minister and intelligence commissioner approve a dataset that could potentially reveal this type of information about someone who has done nothing wrong? Further, the amendments should expressly state that accidental collection of such data will result in its total destruction, which clarifies the desired outcome more precisely than using the term “delete”.

The Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized that “the protection of privacy is a prerequisite to individual security, self-fulfilment and autonomy as well as the maintenance of a thriving democratic society.” Though not constitutionally protected itself, the right to privacy is essential for the maximum expression of most rights found under the charter, including freedom of expression; freedom of peaceful assembly; freedom of association; the right to vote; the right to life, liberty, and security; fair trial rights, including prevention of unreasonable search and seizure, protecting the presumption of innocence, and maintaining solicitor-client privilege as part of satisfying the right to a fair trial, particularly, the provision against self-incrimination.

Acknowledging the impact on constitutionally protected rights, any limitation of privacy rights should be justified under section 1 of the charter by applying the Oakes test. If the courts identify—

[Peter Edelmann, Member-at-Large, Immigration Law Section, Canadian Bar Association]

Thank you very much for inviting me to appear before you today.

Bill C-59 proposes complex and major updates to national security law. It would address several decisions of the Federal Court of Canada, and widespread concerns expressed about Bill C-51 in 2015.

The Canadian Bar Association generally supports the goals and structure of Bill C-59 as a positive change, modernizing the legal framework for Canada’s national security infrastructure and increasing transparency, oversight and review, features that have previously been lacking. Our comments and analysis of the proposals in Bill C-59 are offered in hopes of further improving the bill.

Our written submissions provide a number of specific recommendations and I would refer you to those for the more technical amendments we propose. I will use my time today to focus on two or three areas of broader concern.

First of all, we support the creation of the national security and intelligence review agency, the NSIRA. I just have a couple of comments with respect to it but in particular with respect to the mandate. While we commend the decision to avoid language that would unnecessarily restrict the agency's mandate, an overly broad mandate could hinder the agency's ability to focus and assess its performance against its mandate.

In the way that it's drafted now, the NSIRA has responsibility for broad review of any activity of “a department that relates to national security or intelligence”. “Intelligence” is a very broad term. It could include things that are done by anything from the Canada Revenue Agency to Fisheries and Oceans, police departments, etc.

“National security” is also problematic given the multiple definitions that we see in different pieces of legislation. In particular, we remain concerned about the SCISA, the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, or with the amendments that we have today. The breadth of the definition of an “activity that undermines the security of Canada” in section 2 is still very broad and notably it's different from the definition in the CSIS Act of “threats to the security of Canada”. Having two definitions is not helpful. It's confusing and it doesn't provide a clear mandate for national security agencies and in particular for an oversight or review agency.

I would also note in passing that the amendment to the exception in section 2(2) of the SCISA is troubling as it actually substantially reduces the protection under the current version. Several legitimate political activities might be seen on their face as undermining the sovereignty or territorial integrity of Canada.

In the past, we've recommended that there be one coherent, clear definition of “national security” and we continue to be of that view. It's also unclear whether certain other activities fall under the definition of “national security” at all. For example, the Secure Air Travel Act, SATA, does not refer to national security and it's unclear whether the review of SATA activities would fall under the NSIRA or not. In other words, is this national security legislation? Does it fall under NSIRA?

The coordination of the work of the NSIRA with other review agencies is obviously key although we would note that there remain significant gaps in the review framework. The problem is particularly stark with the Canada Border Services Agency, and we've expressed concerns about this lack of independent review of the CBSA in several past submissions.

CBSA remains one of the largest law enforcement agencies in the country and has no independent oversight or review at all. This is not a role that NSIRA should take on although it does highlight the problem of having a vague definition of “national security” because arguably everything that Canada Border Services Agency does could fall into a broad understanding of national security in a vague sense.

Everyday complaints about problems at the border should not be burdening NSIRA and its resources. A specialized review agency is required.

We also have concerns, in particular, with respect to NSIRA's access to information, and in particular that NSIRA would have access to any information other than a cabinet confidence that it deems necessary to conduct its work. This would extend explicitly to information subject to solicitor-client privilege, professional secrecy of advocates and notaries, or litigation privilege, creating an open-ended mechanism to review legal advice given to the government. This is of significant concern to the CBA.

The role of solicitor-client privilege is fundamental to the functioning of our justice system and this is as true for government actors as it is for private actors. It has been argued that privileged information must be made available because the practices of security agencies often depend on the legal advice they receive.

However, without assurances of privilege, legal advice will be sought less often, based on less candid disclosure by client agencies, or worse, sought and received but not documented.

The other problem with respect to the disclosure of solicitor-client privileged information is how the NSIRA then deals with it in its reports. It's not helpful for the NSIRA to have solicitor-client privileged information. What they need is information about how this is actually deployed in the agency, not the advice that was given behind those decisions.

Concerning the intelligence commissioner, the CBA supports the creation of an independent specialized office for the oversight and authorization of activities by the CSE and CSIS. We have generally called for judicial oversight, but we recognize the advantages of a dedicated commissioner with staff and resources to allow effective ongoing oversight.

The nature of the review mandated by sections 14 to 21 of the proposed intelligence commissioner act does create some concerns for us because there's a system of nested reasonableness findings. Instead of the normal process in front of a judge for a warrant where a judge would find whether there are reasonable grounds to issue a warrant, what the legislation currently foresees is that the minister would make a finding on reasonable grounds, and then the intelligence commissioner would review that on a reasonableness standard.

This creates two problems from our perspective. First, it's unclear how much deference that implies. There's an extensive debate in the courts right now around the application of the reasonableness standard at all and how that plays out in terms of deference.

There's no need to bring that confusion into this area, and there is not that confusion around the reasonable grounds standard, so there's no reason for this nested reasonableness finding other than creating a level of confusion as to how much oversight is actually being provided, in particular because it's going to be provided behind closed doors. It's important for Canadians to understand what the intelligence commissioner is doing and that it be clear.

With respect to the CSE, the CBA generally supports the more detailed mandate of the CSE, and we support the structure as it's being proposed. There are several elements of the proposed mandates that are in tension with one another, in particular, the offence and defence in cyber-operations.

We would recommend that there be an explicit vulnerabilities equities process as part of the mandate of the CSE, so that the balancing can happen in a transparent way. The U.S. has a process in place that might work as a model, or at least give ideas with respect to that.

With respect to CSIS, we continue to have concerns around the disruption powers. In particular, giving kinetic powers to CSIS comes away from the mandate of creating CSIS in the first place, after the McDonald Commission.

I'll refer you to our written submissions with respect to our concerns around section 12.1(3.2). We continue to have concerns similar to those we've had in the past with respect to these warrants limiting charter rights in that context.

Finally, I would note with respect to the Criminal Code provision of counselling of terrorism offence, in my view, following the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in Hamilton, the counselling offences in the Criminal Code already cover everything this offence covers. There is no need to further complicate the Criminal Code. It's already too complex. It ought to be simplified, and the counselling offence covers everything you're hoping to cover here.

Thank you very much for your time, and I apologize if I went a little bit over.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

A higher threshold was indeed put in place in Bill C-59. That responded to a long-standing concern among civil rights advocates who were of the view, and I think it's a reasonable position to hold, that to detain someone without a warrant for up to seven days, without applying a criminal charge, as the preventative arrest measure allows for, is questionable. In a democracy, you can at least have that debate.

The government has looked at Bill C-51 and introduced a change. Under Bill C-51, as we heard, an arrest could happen when it was “likely to prevent” a terrorist act. Now, in Bill C-59, an arrest can be made when, on reasonable grounds, there is suspicion to believe a terrorist act might be taking place. You still have that ability to lay an arrest, and in emergency situations it's there. This isn't preventing you from acting as police, correct?

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Turning to the legislation itself, we have had testimony on this, as well as an open letter that was talking about the new offence that was in Bill C-51 on advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general and the broad definition of “terrorist propaganda”. When we had the minister here, he talked about how, in Bill C-59, we've amended that wording because it was actually too vague and no charges had been laid because they weren't enforceable in court.

Do you feel these changes will assist you in actually being able to lay charges that can be enforced in court?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you both for being here today.

When we debated C-51 in the previous parliament, one of the issues that came up was that a lot of talk is given to legislation for keeping Canadians safe, but often one of the pieces that's forgotten is actually providing proper resources for police. One of the things that comes to mind is the police officer recruitment fund from the federal government that existed to help provinces and municipalities, as you obviously well know, and provide additional funding. This is a fund that was cut that's never been brought back that we wish would be there and be permanent. How important is it to actually have resources, beyond all the talk of legislation and all the procedures, so you know that you have the ability to properly equip and train those men and women on the front lines in order to keep Canadians safe?

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

We have the peace bonds, but the other aspect now of Bill C-59 is the preventative arrests. We understand the language in the new legislation limits it to an arrest that “is necessary” to prevent a terrorist activity. Under the old Bill C-51, the threshold was “is likely to prevent”, which was the language that was used. In fact, the committee heard from the justice department earlier in this study, and they confirmed that the threshold to make a preventative arrest was being raised. They said that, “It would require the police to present evidence of a greater link between the conditions to be imposed on the person or the arrest of the person and the prevention of terrorist activity.”

Again, similar to peace bonds, do you believe that this higher threshold will make it more difficult for law enforcement to make preventative terrorism-related arrests?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you both for being here. It's interesting, given the comment that was just made about incidental information, because there's incidental information, there's the publicly available information, and there's this notion that there's clearly an intent in the legislation to expand the powers for this new threat that's being described, but when we ask the chief of CSE to explain why those powers would be used, there's no example that's able to be provided.

This question is for you, Ms. Vonn. I want to understand, because there's a link here. One of the answers that was given to me when these officials were before the committee was, “Don't worry. If you look at part 3 of the bill, in proposed section 25, they have to ensure measures are in place to protect the privacy of Canadians", but that's a very vague notion, because it then goes on to say, “of Canadians and persons in Canada in the use, analysis, retention and disclosure of...” and then goes on to describe the information.

The use of the word “disclosure” is particularly troubling, because that's how the government has rebranded the information sharing that was created under former Bill C-51. I'm wondering if there's some concern about that information. It's seemingly for research and other innocuous purposes by CSE, but it can nonetheless be shared, and I'm wondering if there's some concern about what consequences there might be, in particular if it's being shared with Five Eyes allies, when we see examples like what was reported in La Presse at the end of last week about the RCMP acquiring information on Canadians from the DEA without the proper judicial oversight that would normally be involved if they were doing it here in Canada.

With that very broad portrait I've painted, I just want to understand, because I think a lot of people don't quite understand how maintaining, even with a cosmetic change, information sharing as was brought in by the former Bill C-51has an impact on how these new powers of CSE are going to potentially play out.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

The current government had some critical comments to make about Bill C-51. We then proposed Bill C-59 to change certain things. We are often reminded that we must not violate the rights and freedoms of Canadians; we all agree on that. However, in a defensive context, we have to have the means to protect ourselves.

In your opinion, will Bill C-59 excessively constrain or weaken the government's safeguards?

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Thank you.

I have about a minute left, and Mr. Boisvert, I don't want to leave you out, so this will be a fairly quick question.

Some of the testimony we heard earlier about Bill C-51 was that the new offence of advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general was so general that it was impossible to prosecute under. When the minister was here, he talked about changes to it so that charges actually could be laid. I'm wondering if, in probably 30 seconds, you can give some brief comments on that.

[Prof. Kent Roach]

I think the important thing is to get rid of terrorism offences in general, which was a very problematic part of C-51. I think Mr. Fogel may have a point that perhaps it should read, “every person who counsels any terrorism offence is guilty of an indictable offence”.

I also think we should make clear that “terrorism offence” meets the definition in section 2 of the Criminal Code in order to avoid the problem that we have in C-51 of undefined offences. Again, the benefit of “counselling” is that there's literally 100 years of experience in the jurisprudence about what counselling is. I think that traditional criminal law has a lot of resources for us to reach for in dealing with these new and real threats of terrorism.

[Prof. Kent Roach]

I agree with my colleague that I would favour putting that in legislation.

I would just add that part of our concerns about Bill C-51 is that there is a need not only to be fair but to be seen to be fair so that very important and legitimate national security activities are not delegitimized by, perhaps, erroneous claims of involvement with complicity of torture.

I think the transparency with the new ministerial directive, if that was taken as the next step into legislation, would actually be good. With the review agency here and measures like that, Canada can start becoming an international leader on these issues.

I think we, frankly, have to realize that perceptions—rightly or wrongly—of unfairness, of profiling, of false positives, are some of the things that seem to be motivating people who are regrettably turning to violence.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Great, thank you.

Mr. Fogel, we were talking about the rise in hate crimes and anti-Semitism in particular, which top some of these sad lists and rankings. When we look at the issue of radicalization, which while not necessarily part of the bill in a substantive way is a related issue in terms of how we tackle some of these issues, it was part of the debate on Bill C-51 as well.

Given that radicalization is not just one group, it's obviously many hate groups, and many of these groups are sadly targeting your community and others, I want to get your thoughts on the direction in which the government is going with its counter-radicalization efforts and just hear more generally your thoughts on that issue.

[Shimon Fogel]

I'm not entirely familiar with that particular aspect of the case. It is good practice, and I believe, frankly, that Canada already undertakes consultation with all its like-minded allies on a routine and regular basis looking for best practices, those that we can share with others, and those where we can benefit from the experience of other nation-states.

I'm encouraged when I look at the process of Bills C-51 and C-59 and the commitment to periodically review, both to refine on the basis of experience but also to be able to be responsive to changing circumstances on the ground. That's exactly the right approach that we should be taking. I'm encouraged that we do consult with our allies in order to benefit from their experience in areas where we have less.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

Thank you, Chair, and thank you to the panel members for being here today.

Mr. Fogel, I found it interesting that you should mention that the Jewish community has been the major focus of terrorists or actions against your group. I believe, if I'm not mistaken, perhaps the Catholic Church was fairly high in that whole hierarchy.

In terms of one of the ironies, I was here for the introduction of Bill C-51, and both the Conservatives and the Liberals supported that bill. It was a first step, obviously, and I see this as perhaps being the next step of a living document. There are good suggestions that we should review this document before too many years pass. However, what I did note too, and my colleague mentioned the apologies and the compensation paid to four individuals, is that it all occurred way before Bill C-51 was brought in, so maybe it did have some things in there that brought the intelligence agencies and the security agencies a bit to heel, although much later in the whole process. Those were incidents that all occurred before 2004, so I see this as the next step.

When we talk about the no-fly list, for instance, and we look at the American list as being a far better system, would you also say that we should look at some of the other American rules with respect to terrorism and anti-terrorism? Particularly, I noticed yesterday in the incident in the New York City subway, the commentators talked about not allowing him his Miranda rights. That seems foreign to Canadians, but the Americans obviously have some view on that.

Mr. Fogel, do you have any comments on that?

[Professor Kent Roach, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, As an Individual]

Thank you very much for inviting me to appear before the committee.

My colleague Craig Forcese has already addressed you and has focused on parts 2, 3, and 4 of the bill. I will focus on the other parts of Bill C-59.

Part 1 providing for a government-wide super-SIRC has been widely praised. In my view, it implements the important principle, if not the precise details, that animated the Arar commission's report; namely, that review should expand with the state's national security activities and that review strengthens rather than weakens security.

Improvements can still be made. I recommend that the new and very much welcome super-SIRC be somewhat supersized. In my view, it should contain a minimum of five members and up to eight members. Amnesty International has endorsed this recommendation, and you've heard some very interesting proposals about strengthening the new super-SIRC both from Professor Wark and Mr. Fogel.

We should think about having more diversity in appointments and not simply focusing on the consultation with leaders of political parties, which is very much a holdover from the original 1984 Cold War era CSIS Act. We could also include people with expertise in privacy, as you heard from the Privacy Commissioner. I think it is also important that there be representation where possible from communities that may be disproportionately affected by national security activities.

The mandate of the new review agency needs to be better defined. On my reading, the reference to “department” or “corporation”, which is incorporated in the new act, does not include the RCMP. This should be very clearly spelled out. It should be clear that the new committee can review the national security activities of the RCMP, hear complaints about the national security activities of the RCMP, and have full access to classified information that the RCMP has on the same basis that it will have access to classified information that CSIS, CSE, and other agencies involved in national security have.

Moving to part 5, I remain of the view that the SCISA part of Bill C-59 remains the weakest part of the bill. I would advocate that the definition of threats to national security in section 2 of the CSIS Act be the default trigger for information sharing, subject to carefully tailored and justified additions in cases where that may be inadequate. The novel Bill C-51 definition of activities that undermine the security of Canada was grossly overbroad. Even after the amendments in this bill, it would remain overbroad.

When I talk about overbreadth, and I know that some members of this committee have read the Air India commission report, I refer to overbreadth not only from a civil liberties perspective but frankly from a security perspective. If everything is a security threat, effectively nothing is a security threat. I think we really should tighten the definition with respect to information sharing.

On the subject of Air India—and here I'm going just a touch beyond Bill C-59—I must again reiterate my objections to the CSIS human source privilege that was enacted in the Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act. If it is not repealed, at least I would recommend that, as an urgent matter, there be a study of whether CSIS's practice of granting anonymity to witnesses is hindering terrorism prosecutions.

The Privacy Commissioner has made a strong case to you that the standard for receiving agencies under SCISA should be raised to “necessity”. I agree. I would also not be troubled by having that same standard with respect to sending agencies. The Privacy Commissioner raised the issue that sending agencies may not have experience with security, but they also maybe don't have the same incentive that receiving agencies may have to keep, perhaps unnecessarily, the information that they receive.

In this regard, a critical feature of the new review agency is that it will be able to examine the legally privileged material that is the basis on which receiving agencies will make decisions, perhaps wrongly, to retain any information.

Moving to part 6, the committee is well aware of the problems of a no-fly list. The reforms in C-59 strike me as minimal. Four months is a long time to be a wrongfully listed person, even if the default has been changed. Special advocates should have a role in appeals, and Bill C-51's restriction on the information that these security-cleared advocates can see in security certificate cases should also be repealed. More fundamentally, however, perhaps the new committee that has access to classified information should review whether the costs of the no-fly list, both financial and human—in terms of false positives—are actually worth its benefits.

Moving to part 7 of the bill, I note that the CCLA submitted to you that the reference to terrorism offences in the counselling offence is not defined. That's not my reading. I would read the reference to terrorism offences as referring to the definition of terrorism offences contained in section 2 of the Criminal Code, but this is a matter that needs to be clarified.

The changes to the preventive arrest provisions are difficult to evaluate, but I would favour further amendments to clarify limits on questioning of people who may be detained for up to seven days. I would also advocate that there be some response to the Driver case in Manitoba, which held that at least one part of the peace bond provisions relating to treatment programs violated the charter. I would also recommend that we look at something like section 10 of the U.K. Terrorism Act, 2000, which would allow people to challenge listing as terrorist groups without that very act of challenge being the basis for a terrorism offence.

I applaud the government for repealing investigative hearings, a technique that has never been successfully used and, if used, could hinder terrorism prosecutions.

Finally, this is important and complex legislation that was made necessary by Bill C-51. I would propose that given the comprehensive, if not radical, nature of C-51 and the important proactives of this bill, that the review of this bill be commenced within the fourth year of its enactment, not the sixth year as contemplated in part 9. I would also propose that the review be undertaken by a special joint committee of the Commons and the Senate, which could include one to two members of the new National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.

In addition to my previously submitted brief, which I hope you have and has been translated, those are my submissions.

Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

[Shimon Fogel, Chief Executive Officer, Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs]

Thank you, Chair, for the opportunity to present to the members of this committee on behalf of the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, the advocacy agent for the Jewish Federations of Canada.

We are a national, non-partisan, non-profit organization representing more than 150,000 Jewish Canadians affiliated through local federations across the country. We believe in Canada's foundational values of freedom, democracy, and equality, and are committed to working with government, Parliament, and all like-minded groups to ensure that Canada remains a country where we all enjoy equal protections and opportunities.

In March 2015, I appeared as a witness before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security as it studied Bill C-51. Our testimony began with a statement of fact, “Jews are consistently targeted by hate and bias-related crimes in Canada at a rate higher than any other identifiable group.” Those words are, unfortunately, as true today as they were then.

Statistics Canada recently released its report on 2016 hate crimes, and once again Jews were targeted more than any other religious minority, with 221 incidents. We must, however, keep this in perspective. Canada is a very safe place for identifiable groups and one of the greatest places in the world in which to live as a minority. However, we must also remain vigilant. A single hate crime is one too many.

Whether considering the attack on a synagogue in Jerusalem, a gay nightclub in Orlando, an African American church in Charleston, or a mosque in Quebec City, extreme hate continues to precipitate extreme violence. Jews are often primary targets for terrorist attacks throughout the world: Belgium, Argentina, France, India, Bulgaria, Israel, Denmark, the United States. Understandably, Jewish Canadians are not just concerned about what threats might meet them abroad, but what could happen here at home.

Public Safety Canada's “2016 Public Report on the Terrorist Threat to Canada” notes that Hezbollah, the listed terrorist entity widely believed to have carried out the bombing of a Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, has networks operating here in Canada. The notorious 2004 firebombing of a Jewish school in Montreal still looms large in our collective memory.

Our community, therefore, takes a keen interest in the government's approach to counterterrorism. We appreciate the opportunity we were afforded to engage in the consultations on Canada's national security framework, both before this committee and with the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. I hope that our recommendations will prove helpful and constructive for the committee.

We'll speak on the expanded oversight for CSIS, but before going there let me just address a couple of considerations with respect to advocacy or promotion of terrorism offences in general.

In the context of the former Bill C-51, CIJA was supportive of measures to empower security officials to criminalize the advocacy and promotion of terrorism and seize terrorist propaganda. CIJA supported these measures as a means of denying those intent on inspiring, radicalizing, or recruiting Canadians to commit acts of terror the legal leeway to be clever but dangerous with their words.

Bill C-59 seeks to change the law's articulation of this offence from “advocating or promoting” to “counselling” a terrorism offence. This doesn't necessarily undermine the intended function of the provision. Justice Canada's background information on the advocacy and promotion offence states, “The offence is modelled on existing offences of counselling and the relevant jurisprudence. It extended the concept of counselling to cases where no specific terrorism offence is being counselled, but it is evident nonetheless that terrorism offences are being counselled.”

The same intended outcome seems to be achieved in Bill C-59, which adds the caveat that the counselling offence “may be committed...whether or not...the person counsels the commission of a specific terrorism offence.” If, as Minister Goodale indicated in his recent testimony before this committee, this change empowers authorities to enforce the law with greater impact, it would seem a reasonable shift. However, we believe there is an oversight in the proposed new language that could narrow the scope of the provision, weakening it substantially.

The existing offence applies to “Every person who, by communicating statements, knowingly advocates or promotes the commission of terrorism offences in general”. Swapping out the advocacy and promotion language, this should become something like “Every person who counsels the commission of a terrorism offence”, but it doesn't. Instead, Bill C-59 reads, “Every person who counsels another person to commit a terrorism offence”. With this wording, it appears that the offence could apply only to a specific individual counselling another specific individual.

When it comes to the offence of instructing a terrorist activity, the Criminal Code is explicit. The offence is committed whether or not the accused instructs a particular person to carry out the activity or even knows the identity of the person instructed to carry out the activity. The same standard should apply to the counselling offence. The change of “advocacy and promotion” to “counselling” also impacts on the definition of terrorism propaganda.

Bill C-59 would remove “advocacy and promotion of terrorism offences in general” from the definition, consistent with the change proposed for the counselling offence I've just discussed. However, the all-important caveat that a specific terrorism offence need not be counselled, which is included in the new counselling offence, is lacking here. This should be adjusted for the sake of consistency.

I'll turn to expanded oversight for CSIS.

In our testimony on Bill C-51, CIJA supported the expansion of CSIS's role and responsibilities to include disruption of potential terrorist attacks. While we believed the new mandate was justified, we maintained that enhanced oversight was required to prevent abuse. Just as Canadians stand to benefit from a more robust approach to counterterrorism that emphasizes prevention, we argued that a concurrent increase in the review of CSIS's activities would be beneficial.

Measures to enhance SIRC's ability to provide adequate review are long overdue and are all the more imperative with CSIS's expanded mandate. We supported the refinements to CSIS's expanded mandate that Bill C-59 would put in place and the establishment of a national security and intelligence review agency. Both should help to ensure greater balance in protecting the security and civil rights of Canadians.

In the context of Bill C-51, we proposed several concrete reforms to enhance oversight and accountability for CSIS. The new oversight agency will fulfill our first and perhaps most important recommendation's objective of enabling a review of security and intelligence activities across all government agencies and departments. However, we believe the following three recommendations regarding the structure and composition of the new agency would help ensure it is set up to be as impactful as possible.

First, the chair of the new agency should be someone with experience in intelligence and national security, and should occupy the position on a full-time basis to ensure consistent, professional leadership.

Unfortunately, Bill C-59 states, “The Chair and Vice-chair may be designated to hold office on a full-time or part-time basis”. The bill also states, “Every member of the Review Agency who is not designated as the Chair or Vice-chair holds office on a part-time basis”.

We suggest this be changed to provide the option of other members being brought on full time without requiring a legislative amendment. Given that the workload of the new agency is likely to be significantly greater than that of SIRC, this could conceivably require full-time engagement from all members.

Second, we recommend that the chair of the new agency be designated an officer of Parliament required to provide regular reports directly to Parliament. This mirrors the recommendation we made in the context of Bill C-51 with regard to the chair of SIRC.

The requirement enshrined in Bill C-59 that public reports from the new agency be tabled in Parliament is beneficial, but this reporting is still mediated through the Prime Minister and other ministers. Designating the chair of SIRC an officer of Parliament with a mandate for regular reporting directly to Parliament would send a clear signal that the work of the new agency is independent from the government of the day.

Third, we believe Parliament should have a greater voice in the appointment of members of the new agency.

We welcome the consultation provisions included in Bill C-59 but believe the appointments should also be subject to approval by resolution of the Senate and the House of Commons. This small addition, which is already standard practice in the appointment of officers of Parliament, would further enhance the credibility of the appointments process.

Although this may be more appropriate for your colleagues at the finance committee, it's also important to stress that the national security and intelligence review agency will require the allocation of significant resources, both professional and financial, if it is to be given a chance to succeed in fulfilling its important mandate.

CIJA's testimony in 2015 concluded with a plea for committee members to support a private member's bill that sought to extend hate crime penalties beyond houses of worship to schools and community centres. That initiative failed but was revived in this Parliament in Bill C-305, which passed third reading in the Senate in October.

I am pleased to conclude my remarks today, Mr. Chair, with sincere thanks to each of you for coming together in unanimous support for Bill C-305, a clear example of how elected officials can work together and make a practical difference to protect Canadians.

I hope committee members will consider my remarks today in that same constructive spirit, and I'm grateful for the opportunity to join with you.

Thank you.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the witnesses for being here today.

I appreciate the comments that were made earlier, with respect to the concern that you have about all forms of violent extremism. Given the attack that happened in New York, I'm sure your organization has already or will be condemning the actions that occurred in that circumstance.

You indicate that there has been an historical lack of accountability within CSIS. It goes back many years. In 2015, Bill C-51 was brought in to address this and now Bill C-59 takes that review and accountability even further. However, from your testimony today, I'm hearing that there remains a lack of confidence in addressing the concerns within CSIS.

What do you propose is the solution?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Gardee and Professor Bhabha, I think this is what my colleague was getting at concerning what was said with regard to Bill C-51, and we heard this during the national security framework review that this committee undertook.

One of the concerns that were raised with the changes to the Criminal Code, the offences related to the promotion of terrorism.... Some families, for example, in terms of reporting to the proper authorities certain actions in hopes of rehabilitating a member of their family or their community, because those offences were so wide and general and vague, remained silent in order to not implicate a member of their family or their community.

Are the changes proposed to the Criminal Code in Bill C-59 related to that specific issue sufficient as far as you and your organization are concerned?

[Ihsaan Gardee]

In terms of our testimony on Bill C-51, obviously there is a concern regarding the stigma that is associated with being identified as somebody who has been connected in any way to violent extremism or the ideology that supports and underpins it. There is a concern that exists there in terms of that stigma being applied to not just the individual but more broadly to the community at large when looking at national security and ensuring our shared security.

To be clear, Canadian Muslims are as concerned about violent extremism and the ideologies that underpin it, and we are equally concerned about all forms of violent extremism.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

That answers my question, thank you. As I do not have a lot of time, I would like to continue with my questions to you.

When you testified about Bill C-51, you mentioned that members of the community want to help with deradicalization, but they are afraid of being accused of being extremists.

Do you think that Bill C-59 solves that problem?

[Ihsaan Gardee, Executive Director, National Council of Canadian Muslims]

Good morning, members.

Thank you very much for your attention and time today.

My name is Ihsaan Gardee, as mentioned, and I serve as executive director of the National Council of Canadian Muslims. I am joined today by my colleague, Professor Faisal Bhabha, NCCM's legal counsel and the chair of our national security policy committee.

The NCCM was founded in 2000 as an independent, non-partisan, and non-profit grassroots organization that for over 17 years has been a leading voice for Muslim civic engagement and the promotion of human rights. The NCCM's mandate is to protect the human rights and civil liberties of Canadian Muslims, advocate for their public interests, build mutual understanding, and challenge discrimination and Islamophobia.

We work to achieve this mission through our work in four primary areas: community education and outreach, media engagement, anti-discrimination action, and public advocacy. The NCCM has a long-standing and robust public record of participating in major public inquiries, intervening in landmark cases before the Supreme Court of Canada, and providing advice to security agencies on engaging communities and promoting public safety.

In terms of our position, the NCCM has always supported the government's responsibility to ensure national security. We commend the current government for fulfilling its election promise to review Bill C-51 as its condition for supporting the bill in the first place, and to consult with Canadians. While we welcome, for instance, that Bill C-59 proposes to create a national security review agency with more oversight and review than we currently have, our general objection remains constant. This law goes too far. It virtually guarantees constitutional breach, and it offers inadequate justification. It strengthens the security establishment when the evidence available gives every indication that the institutions carrying out national security intelligence gathering and enforcement mandates are in disarray, rife with bias and bullying from the top down. Oversight of those agencies is not sufficient. Real reform is necessary.

While we share the concerns of others you have heard from, including Amnesty International and others, for the purposes of our opening statement today I'll be focusing our testimony on two major substantive concerns we have with Bill C-59. Number one is the powers given to CSIS, and number two, the failure to address systemic problems with the no-fly list.

In terms of our reasons, Canadian Muslims are just as concerned about security as other Canadians. We face the same risk of untimely death or injury at the hands of terrorists as any Canadian. In fact, globally the overwhelming majority of victims of political violence, including ideological extremist violence, have been Muslims. Being a population with global connections, Canadian Muslims are threatened and impacted by global terrorism as much, if not more, than other Canadians. We thus have a high interest in Canada developing a strong and sound national security policy with robust oversight, accountability, and redress mechanisms to guard against abuses and mistakes.

At the same time, members of Canadian Muslim communities have been victims of Canadian national security policy. Over the last 15 years we have seen three separate judicial inquiries, numerous court rulings, out-of-court settlements, and apologies that acknowledged the constitutional violations committed against innocent Muslims by national security intelligence and enforcement. Canadian Muslims are not only disproportionately affected by these errors and abuses, but we also bear the brunt of social impact when xenophobic and anti-Muslim sentiment surges.

NCCM agrees with the plurality of experts who state that more power to security agencies does not necessarily mean more security for Canadians. National security mistakes not only put innocent people at risk of suspicion and stigma, but also divert attention away from actual threats and obstruct effective action to promote safety and security. At the same time that Alexandre Bissonnette was dreaming up his murderous plot to attack a Quebec City mosque, the RCMP were “manufacturing crime”, according to the B.C. Superior Court judge in the case against John Nuttall and Amanda Korody. They were Muslim converts and recovering heroin addicts living on social assistance, whose terrorism charges were stayed last year after a court found they had been entrapped by police.

Bill C-59 strengthens the security establishment but does not address the security needs of Canadian Muslims. While the idea of prevention is laudable, any potential benefit from this approach will be negated by the incursions on charter rights that disproportionately affect members of our community, and which will continue to happen under the guise of threat reduction, information sharing, and no-fly listing.

If the government wishes to collaborate with communities on prevention, it needs to build trust and confidence first. For many young Canadian Muslims, the documented and admitted involvement of intelligence and enforcement agencies in rendition and other human rights abuses, and the complete lack of accountability and perceived impunity that have been created as a result, have bred a lack of confidence in the Canadian security establishment.

This past summer, a group of CSIS employees filed a civil claim against the service, alleging discrimination, harassment, bullying, and abuse of authority. They described a workplace environment within the service that is racist, Islamophobic, sexist, and homophobic, where the culture is like an old boys' club and where minority representation in management is abysmally low. The day after the claim was filed, two senior former CSIS employees were quoted in the media saying they were not surprised by the allegations.

In October 2017, CSIS released the report of an independent, third-party investigation into allegations of harassment in the Toronto region office. The findings noted an “old boys' culture”, demeaning treatment, swearing and discriminatory statements, distrust among employees towards management, and a lack of diversity among the staff.

If these kinds of reports are indicative of the overall culture that exists within these organizations toward their own employees, it does little to assuage concerns within Canadian Muslim communities about unfair profiling and error.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission conducted employment equity audits of CSIS in 2011 and 2014, and the findings are shocking for a powerful public institution operating in a 21st-century, multicultural, democratic society.

There were zero per cent visible minorities in senior management positions at a time when visible minorities were about 20% of the Canadian population. We have to infer from that not just a glass ceiling but an actual bar. The CHRC also noted an institutional culture that undervalued minorities and reproduced attitudinal barriers, which resulted in fewer hiring and advancement opportunities for minorities.

The security agency's loss of trust within Canadian Muslim communities has been exacerbated by the lack of accountability for past wrongs committed against innocent Muslims. While the government has concluded significant settlements and made apologies, no one from within those agencies has been held to account.

To the best of our knowledge, there has been no disciplinary action and no public acknowledgements. Instead of accountability, some of those involved in the well-known torture case of Maher Arar have even been promoted within the agencies.

At best, there was individual and institutional incompetence in the security agencies. At worst, it was gross negligence or bad faith. Neither is acceptable and the taxpaying Canadians who fund these agencies deserve better.

The lack of accountability projects a culture of impunity within the Canadian security agencies that reinforces the insecurity Canadian Muslims experience. The problems with CSIS will not be mitigated by Bill C-59. No amount of administrative oversight can cure the systemic ills. These agencies need reform.

We do not see any attention given in this proposed legislation to the real impact that bias in national security has in producing insecurity and harm within our communities. Without a clear statutory mandate and direction from our government, we do not believe that civil society alone can change the culture within CSIS and other security agencies.

We are willing to help, but that burden cannot fall only upon us.

I'll now pass it over to my colleague, Professor Bhabha, to conclude with our recommendations.

Criminal Code

[Ted Falk, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague, the member for Peace River—Westlock, who I think did a great job of expanding on this bill. It is indeed a real privilege for me to stand and speak about Bill C-51.

I think the last time I spoke about Bill C-51 was about two years ago when the Minister of Public Safety introduced it as an anti-terrorism measure. I was very happy to work on the public safety committee at that time and to be part of the committee work that brought that bill forward. It was indeed a wonderful piece of legislation, which I may remind the Liberals they wholeheartedly supported.

Today, Bill C-51 is an omnibus bill, as was previously mentioned. I Googled it just for the sake of understanding maybe what an omnibus is. It could be a four-wheeled bus. That is not the case here. It says “items previously published separately” is what constitutes a bill as being omnibus. Certainly this is an omnibus piece of legislation, something that the Liberals railed against during their time as the third party in this House.

From that perspective, we are going to talk about it a little more. It means that we are going to have to cover a bunch of unrelated items, but they are all stuck in this bill. The first part of the bill I would like to speak about is found in clause 14 of Bill C-51. It was introduced to remove section 176 of the Criminal Code.

For the benefit of the folks watching these proceedings, I would like to read the section as it is being presented. Subsection 176 (1) of the Criminal Code says:

(a) by threats or force, unlawfully obstructs or prevents or endeavours to obstruct or prevent a clergyman or minister from celebrating divine service or performing any other function in connection with his calling, or

(b) knowing that a clergyman or minister is about to perform, is on his way to perform or is returning from the performance of any of the duties or functions mentioned in paragraph (a)

(i) assaults or offers any violence to him, or

(ii) arrests him on a civil process, or under the pretence of executing a civil process,

Section 176 provides explicit protection in the Criminal Code. It makes it a crime to unlawfully obstruct, threaten, or harm a religious official, before, during, or after they perform a religious service. It also makes interrupting or disturbing a religious service a crime.

In a time when there is an increasing amount of violence directed against religious groups and religious gatherings, removing this section made little sense. Yet, for some reason, the Liberal government wanted to get rid of the only protection for Canadians performing and participating in a religious service.

The Liberals said that attending a religious service was no different than attending a lecture. However, the many and varied religious groups which exist in Canada came forward in one collective voice, speaking one collective message. The message was simple: religious services and members of the clergy require protection under the law because they are different in kind from other sorts of public gatherings.

Removing section 176 would treat the disruption of a religious service as a mere mischief charge. To religious Canadians, a religious service is more than just an event to attend; it is a formative experience to their individual and community identities. Disrupting such a ceremony is not a small matter, but an act which offends their most fundamental right to gather in a peaceful assembly while sharing their most cherished beliefs.

A mere mischief charge in a time of growing intolerance would not have been sufficient. Indeed, repealing section 176 seems to show an intellectual disconnect on the part of the Liberals.

I am wondering what they were thinking by removing section 176, at a time when we see religious persecution all over our globe. We have seen attacks on religious institutions here in Canada, and the Liberals want to remove the only explicit protection that members of faith institutions have while they are conducting a worship service.

I want to talk a little about my own personal experience, because I grew up as the son of a clergyman. I have a pretty good idea, at least in the Christian faith, of what a clergyman does, and what part of his duties are. I am sure it is similar in all faiths.

That is the beauty of section 176. It is not explicit to the Christian faith. This is protection for clergy and for worship services that applies to all faiths. Whether they are Christian, Jewish, Sikh or Hindu or Muslim, this provides protection for members of the clergy. It provides protection in the Criminal Code for all forms of worship services.

I remember clearly as a young person, growing up and into my early adulthood, the time when my father was a pastor. My father died at the age of 51 from the same rare throat cancer that one of our colleagues passed away from earlier this year. He too had a son by the name of Theodore, as did my father. My father passed away at an early age, but I do remember the work that my father was engaged in and some of the things he did. One of the things he was obviously called upon to do as a pastor was to conduct worship services on a Sunday morning for his congregation, and that is something that section 176 of the Criminal Code clearly identifies will be protected.

Some of the other things were that when he had parishioners or members in the community who had experienced tragedy in their lives, who maybe had encountered some personal difficulties, found themselves in the hospital with a debilitating or life-threatening disease or facing death, often the clergy are called to administer comfort to those individuals. In my father's case, he was able to share the saving grace and power of the knowledge of knowing Jesus Christ with the individuals who were facing imminent death. It gave them reassurance and comfort to know they could put their faith in Jesus and have security and eternal life. These were functions that my father performed on a regular basis. I remember hospital visitation was very important to my father. Section 176 is something that would provide protection for clergy as they go to visit their parishioners, or members in their community who may be suffering from illness, or the illness of a family member.

Something else my father did was to conduct marriage ceremonies. It is an important part of everyday life when a man and woman decide they are in love and want to commit to spend the rest of their lives with each other. They call a member of their clergy and say that they would like to get married.

It is an exciting part of life, a new part of life, so the clergy are called upon to perform marriage counselling, which is part of the work that clergy do. They give marriage counselling, and it is a very important part of the work of the clergy. In the coming and going of their particular duties in performing marriage counselling, but also in performing the actual ceremony, the Criminal Code, through section 176, would provide protection.

One could ask how often that protection is required. People have been successfully prosecuted under section 176 for interfering in a religious or worship service, or also interfering with or obstructing clergymen in the dispatch of their duties. It is kind of like an insurance policy. The comfort of knowing it is there to provide protection for people and their loved ones is very reassuring, even though they obviously hope they do not need it. Certainly our hope, as Conservatives, would be that we would never have to experience a situation where section 176 of the Criminal Code is used. However, it certainly provides a deterrent for individuals from seeking to disrupt clergymen in the dispatch of their duties, disrupting a worship service, or disrupting worshippers and parishioners as they are in a gathering where they are encouraging one another and expressing their deeply held faith convictions, and worshipping the creator they serve.

There are lots of good reasons to support Bill C-51. Through many efforts of Canadians right across our country, who made their voices heard and their opinions known to the committee, to the justice minister, and to the Prime Minister, the Liberals listened. and they amended the bill. They are going to keep section 176 in Bill C-51. I am happy, as a Conservative, to support that bill.

Public Safety

[Scott Duvall, NDP, Hamilton Mountain, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the Liberals are claiming it is not possible to repeal the Conservative Bill C-51. My colleague from Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke is proposing just that with his Bill C-303 to fully protect Canadians' rights.

Under the 138-page Liberal Bill C-59, CSIS still has extensive and invasive powers. The privacy of Canadians is still under threat and oversight of government agencies is insufficient.

Will the government divide Bill C-59 into separate bills so they can be properly studied? Canadians' rights are at stake.

[Lex Gill, Advocate, National Security Program, Canadian Civil Liberties Association]

Mr. Chair, another deeply problematic aspect of Bill C-51 that has not been touched are changes to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that undid important protections for named persons in security certificate proceedings. Bill C-51 limited the requirement for disclosure of relevant information to special advocates and introduced a series of procedural barriers which further disadvantaged the rights of the named person.

In our legal challenge, CCLA has argued that these amendments are an unconstitutional violation of the section 7 guarantee to a hearing before an independent and impartial tribunal. Our Supreme Court has affirmed that the individual named in the security certificate “must be given an opportunity to know the case to meet, and an opportunity to meet the case”, an impossible exercise in the absence of a coherent legal framework for full disclosure.

This committee recognized as much in May 2017 when it recommended amending IRPA in order to give special advocates full access to complete security certificate files. We urge that Bill C-59 be amended to correct this issue.

We move now to the new elements of the new national security landscape that Bill C-59 has introduced. Our written submission will address a much wider range of issues in relation to the CSE Act, but we would like to highlight two parts today.

First, the proposed active and defensive cyber-operations aspects of the CSE's mandate essentially allow the establishment to engage in secret and largely unconstrained state-sponsored hacking and disruption. The limitation of not directing these activities at Canadian infrastructure is clearly inadequate given the inherently interconnected nature of the digital ecosystem. Such activities are also bound to impact the privacy expression and security interests of Canadians and persons in Canada, and may threaten the integrity of communications tools such as encryption and anonymity software that are vital for the protection of human rights in the digital age.

In the case of CSIS's disruption powers, which are in some ways analogous to these new aspects of CSE's mandate, the government has set out a complex framework for prior judicial authorization and a longer list of prohibited activities. While we do not concede the adequacy of that framework, it is notable that, in contrast, CSE's cyber-operations activities involve no meaningful privacy protections, require only secret ministerial authorization, and involve only after-the-fact review.

Second, while the majority of CSE's activities cannot be directed at Canadians or persons in Canada, this is an inadequate safeguard against CSE's overreach in the face of unselected bulk collection. Bill C-59 exacerbates this privacy risk by creating a series of exceptions for the collection of Canadian data, including one which allows its acquisition, use, analysis, retention, and disclosure, so long as it is publicly available.

This definition is so broad that it plausibly includes information in which individuals have a strong privacy interest, and potentially allows for the collection of private data obtained by hacks, leaks, or other illicit means. Furthermore, it may encourage the creation of grey markets for data that would otherwise never have been available to government—a client with deep pockets.

The government has failed to demonstrate why this exception, as worded, is necessary or proportionate, or what risk it is meant to mitigate in the first place.

[Cara Zwibel, Acting General Counsel, Canadian Civil Liberties Association]

Yes, my apologies to the committee for coming in late.

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and members of the committee. The Canadian Civil Liberties Association appreciates the opportunity to make submissions with respect to Bill C-59.

CCLA was a vocal critic of the Anti-terrorism Act passed in the last Parliament and initiated a constitutional challenge to a number of aspects of that law, which remains in abeyance pending consideration of Bill C-59. While this new bill has partially addressed some of Bill C-51's constitutional deficits, it has certainly not resolved all of them. The bill also grants our national security agencies a number of extraordinary new powers that have not been adequately justified and that do give rise to very real civil liberties concerns. The government has framed this bill as being about protecting both national security and rights, and CCLA supports both of these goals, and our comments and recommendations are made in that spirit.

We will begin by identifying the positive changes Bill C-59 makes to former Bill C-51, outline the issues that remain unaddressed, and finally, set out the new problems created by Bill C-59.

Since we certainly can't cover everything in 10 minutes, we'll also be filing a more detailed written submission. Beginning with the items that Bill C-59 has improved, we are reassured by the government's amendments to the terrorist speech offences. Without these amendments, the provisions violate sections 2 and 7 of the charter and may also undermine community-based deradicalization efforts. While the amended offence is arguably unnecessary, given the large number of pre-existing terrorism offences in the Criminal Code, counselling offences are a known quantity in the criminal law and follow a clear legal framework. However, the language of “terrorism offence” in the amendment would be better changed to “terrorist activity”, which is a defined term in the code.

On information sharing, Bill C-59 adds new proportionality and reporting requirements, which is a distinct improvement over the largely unaccountable system introduced in Bill C-51. However, the definition of “threats to the security of Canada” that triggers information disclosure remains unduly broad and circular. It is not clear why this definition is so much broader than the one included in the CSIS Act, and we remain concerned that constitutionally protected acts of advocacy, protest, dissent, or artistic expression, particularly by environmental and indigenous activists, will continue to be swept up in the process.

One of the most controversial aspects of Bill C-51 was the threat reduction powers granted to CSIS and the accompanying warrant provisions that appeared to allow for judicially sanctioned charter breaches. We do not doubt that there are times when CSIS may see an opportunity to take action to reduce the threat to the security of Canada. What is unclear is why this goal cannot be achieved through better communication and co-operation between CSIS, the RCMP, and other law enforcement bodies. This is a very significant shift in mandate that appears to ignore the historical reasons for separating law enforcement and intelligence in the first place, and there has been no convincing case made for why this shift is necessary.

Moreover, the legal framework for the exercise of these powers established in Bill C-51 was deeply problematic and clearly unconstitutional in our view. The scheme as modified by Bill C-59 is an improvement. It establishes clearer contours around what actions are permitted and what is prohibited, and the warrant scheme appears to be intended to ensure that the charter rights of individuals are respected. If CSIS is to continue to have these powers there are a number of ways in which we believe the scheme should be improved.

First, the requirement for CSIS to consult with other federal departments or agencies to see if they can reduce the threat should be amended to clarify that if a law enforcement body is better placed to do so, CSIS should not pursue threat reduction. Second, the list of measures set out in proposed section 21.1(1.1) only require a warrant where CSIS determines that they may violate the law or limit a charter right. A warrant should be required in any case where these measures will be pursued by CSIS. It is vital that the determination of whether a law is being violated or a charter right limited not be left solely to CSIS.

Finally, the new national security and intelligence review agency should be required to report on the number of warrants issued under proposed section 21.1, and the number of requests that were refused. SIRC does so now, and reducing reporting requirements is not consistent with Bill C-59's stated goal of enhancing accountability.

Some of the most problematic aspects of Bill C-51 received only cosmetic improvement or none at all. As this committee is aware, the passenger protect program continues to raise serious constitutional problems. The process by which individuals are placed on the list remains opaque, and proposed redress mechanisms are inadequate. Bill C-59 also fails to correct the flawed appeals procedure, which parallels the system in place for security certificates prior to the Supreme Court's Charkaoui decision in 2007.

While the no-fly list is undoubtedly different from being named in a security certificate, both have the ability to substantially interfere with the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of an individual and to seriously impact their lives and families. The current process allows the use of hearsay and secret evidence, without access to a special advocate able to test that evidence or to represent the interests of the listed person.

This committee recognized these profound issues in May when it recommended the use of special advocates in no-fly list proceedings, among other safeguards, and yet Bill C-59 does not address these concerns. It should do so by adopting this committee's initial recommendation. We would note that the terrorist entities list raised similar issues.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

I have one final question. You wrote an overview of C-51 in The Globe and Mail shortly after the bill was released. You said, “In a country governed by the rule of law, it should not be left for national security and other government agencies to determine the limits of their own powers.”

On balance, are you satisfied that Bill C-59 has addressed this concern?

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thank you for being here today, Mr. Therrien.

I have a question about the connection between speech and privacy. I think you would agree that free speech and the right to it and to privacy enjoy a very intimate and indeed interdependent connection. Bill C-59 would replace one of the most controversial features of Bill C-51, the advocating of terrorism offences in general, with a more traditional offence, that of counselling specific terrorism offences.

We heard just the other day from Professor Stephanie Carvin, who in a piece for The Globe and Mail, wrote:

This better respects freedom of expression while still recognizing that much speech — including terrorist recruitment and instruction — is a reasonable target for criminalization.

Can you comment on this change in Bill C-59 and what you make of it from a privacy perspective?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

I want to come back to the collection of information. When Bill C-51 was introduced, people were worried about intelligence agencies being able to spy on their computer activities. They wondered just how much agencies would be able to invade their privacy.

Do you currently see that as a problem? Do you think Canadians are subject to an excessive invasion of their privacy?

Do you think our intelligence agencies are likely to spy on our computer activities?

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

You were actually very critical of Bill C-51 at the time. Now, you are not satisfied with Bill C-59. You consider the collection of information to be acceptable and see it as normal. However, you have concerns about Bill C-59's purpose. That's what you said this morning.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, Mr. Therrien.

We agree that, when it comes to the threat posed by terrorism, 9/11 was the tipping point for the public.

Last year, I visited NORAD headquarters. Although it concerned a military issue, you will see the connection. The people at NORAD, in Colorado Springs, told us that, prior to 9/11, they dealt with threats originating outside the U.S. and that the federal aviation agency was responsible for domestic threats. According to the commander in charge, after 9/11, the two organizations never hung up the phone. The communication and connection remained constant.

That leads me to the following question. In March 2015, you said that Bill C-51 would allow too many federal government agencies—up to 17—to share information. Do you still think the information sharing involving those organizations is too broad?

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

This is my last question. We promised Canadians to improve the accountability of national security agencies. We promised to fix the overreaching and in some cases unconstitutional nature of Bill C-51, and then Bill C-51 overall with Bill C-22 and Bill C-59.

Do you think we've done that?

[Prof. Wesley Wark]

Mr. Motz, I greatly appreciate the opportunity. I'll be very brief on this. I think these are very important issues and of course no piece of legislation, as sweeping as it might be, is going to capture them all, but there's lots of work to be done to truly modernize Canadian intelligence.

I'll give you my short list—there's a longer list—and Professor Carvin referred to these things in a different kind of dimension. I think Canada needs a comprehensive national security strategy. We've only issued such a thing once back in 2004, and we need a commitment to updating it. I think that we need, crucially, because Bill C-59 in terms of new powers is all about collection, an integrated, properly resourced, centralized intelligence assessment function. This is one of the great gaps in the system.

I think—this is a subject for another debate—we need a dedicated foreign intelligence agency distinct from CSIS. We need to move forward, as I said, with the proposed national security transparency charter. We need a revision and an updating of the Security of Information Act, which was part of the old Bill C-51 and is now I think completely out of date. We need modernized access legislation, particularly to resolve issues around access to basic subscriber information. There's more but that's my short list.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Wark, I want to quote a couple of things here.

This is a sentence from an article you wrote in The Globe and Mail shortly after Bill C-51 was introduced. You say, “Strengthened accountability may well be our best bet to ensure that new security powers are balanced against rights protections.”

After Bill C-59 was released, you wrote, “Canada may have restored its place in the world as it pertains to national security review and democratic controls, a place we gave up after 1984.”

This is a general question. I think it shows that Bill C-59 has made an important advance, but I wonder whether you could give us your thoughts on where we were and where we are now as a result of Bill C-59.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

I wasn't party to the drafting of Bill C-51 so I can't comment on the circumstances that drove its manner of drafting. Certainly, Bill C-51 opened the door to the service doing threat reduction of any sort, which before was a disputed issue. We know from what the director has said approximately 30 times now that, I believe, the service is engaged in threat reduction, albeit never crossing the line to threat reduction that might violate a Canadian law or transgress a charter right. Bill C-59 opens the door to a more assertive use of threat reduction where it could violate a Canadian law, which would require a warrant, but sets up a warrant system that I think would survive an inevitable Constitutional challenge. It broadens the ambit of useful powers for the service.

I can give you an example where this may come up. In the course of an investigation, the service is engaged in an intelligence investigation, and it decides for a public safety reason it needs to swap out an explosive materiel in the possession of a target with an inert material so that it no longer poses a security risk as the service continues its security intelligence operation. Now it's possible for the service to get with warrant authorization to do threat reduction to break and enter for the purpose of swapping out that material, and Bill C-59 makes it more likely that confronted with that request the court would think this regime was plausible.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

In her remarks, my colleague Ms. Dabrusin drew a comparison between Bill C-51 and Bill C-59. That is important for the committee. It is my understanding that Bill C-51 was enacted in response to an emergency at that time. It was very important for national security. Today, Bill C-59 is simply a refined version of Bill C-51. The latter was useful when it was adopted, but we want to clarify certain things.

Is that also your understanding?

[Prof. Wesley Wark]

Just briefly, I would say something very similar but expressed slightly differently, which is that in my view, Bill C-51 had good elements and bad elements. I think that was also the Liberal Party's position, frankly, when it was the third party in opposition, that there were some elements they could support and some elements that they were committed to overturning, if they ever came into office.

Bill C-59 represents some effort to fix the so-called problematic elements of Bill C-51, but it also provides space to add what I think are important new dimensions that were not addressed in Bill C-51. I would think it would be a time-wasting exercise, frankly, to go back and just repeal and simply eliminate all of Bill C-51 from the law books. Better is the approach that's been taken here.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

My response would be that, certainly from my perspective, Kent Roach and I did not dispute the policy objectives that Bill C-51 was trying to accomplish, with one exception, and that is the new speech crime. We thought it was unnecessary. If one were to repeal those provisions that Bill C-51 introduced, one would be left still with the policy issues that would have to be addressed. I see Bill C-59 is dealing with those same policy issues but putting each of the powers on a more sustainable footing.

I would agree with what my colleague Professor Carvin said earlier, that not only is this just a question of constitutional niceties. It's also a question of certainty. Many of the powers that were introduced by Bill C-51 were clothed with such vagueness that the services might be disinclined to try to test them for fear they would run afoul of a court or a commission of inquiry subsequently.

Again, the policy objectives were real. The drafting, in my view, was insufficient.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

No, that's great. Thank you.

First, this is quite lengthy legislation that we've been discussing. One question that comes to me when I speak to people in my community—and we do have a private member's bill in the House that's proposing it right now—is to just repeal Bill C-51 and leave us where we were pre-Bill C-51. On that broad question, if I can ask either one of you, why not just repeal Bill C-51 and leave us where we were?

[Professor Wesley Wark, Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair and members of the committee, I thank you for this opportunity to testify on Bill C-59, the national security framework legislation.

I'd like to begin with a look backwards. I had the privilege 16 years ago of testifying before a House committee on the original Anti-terrorism Act. I think it might have been, in fact, in this beautiful room. One of the lessons I drew from that experience was that Parliament, if given the chance, could have a significant impact on improving draft legislation and on enabling a strong, if inevitably contentious, public debate. Given the professed openness of the Minister of Public Safety to constructive suggestions, I am optimistic that a similar result will occur from deliberations on Bill C-59.

Bill C-59 represents a very ambitious and sweeping effort to modernize the Canadian national security framework. It should not be seen as just a form of tinkering with the previous government's Bill C-51. There are so many elements in Bill C-59, and as you will have appreciated from testimony by my colleagues, I, like them, am going to focus on only a few elements of this.

The ones I want to focus on are what I call the key forward-looking elements of Bill C-59. By “forward-looking” I mean the genuinely new elements in this legislation, which pose particular challenges for a committee like this in terms of trying to understand their precise potential impact and efficacy. Those three brand new elements, I think, are particularly visible in parts 1 to 3 of the legislation, so that's what I am going to concentrate on, but I'd be happy to take questions on other aspects of the bill.

Part 1 of the act creates a national security and intelligence review agency. I fully support this concept and its rationale, and it is exciting to me to see it embraced by the government. The challenge will be ensuring that the architecture can be made to work. To bring the legislation to light, it will be important to ensure that NSIRA, as I'll call it, has the right fiscal and logistic resources, a high-quality talent pool in its secretariat, excellent working relationships with the security and intelligence agencies, and a viable work plan. It will also be important to ensure that the bodies that are to be reviewed have the resources and proper approach to the enhanced scrutiny they will undergo.

NSIRA part 1 needs, in my view, a few fixes. One has to do with the mandate, in proposed section 8. I believe that the national security and intelligence activities of the RCMP should be specifically listed at proposed paragraph 8(1)(a). It is important to be clear in the legislation that NSIRA will take over some of the current review activities of the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP as it is doing for SIRC and for the Office of the CSE Commissioner. This should not be left simply to coordinating amendments buried in the back of the legislation.

The committee will also note that NSIRA enacts only a partial solution to the problem of dealing with national security complaints, at proposed section 16 and following. Its complaints remit is restricted to CSIS, CSE, and complaints regarding the RCMP that have a nexus in national security, and I would urge the committee to hear from the commissioner of the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP about how well they think the legislation enables the NSIRA complaints mandate when it comes to the RCMP.

Finally, there's an important issue of membership, as you've already heard, in NSIRA. This is at proposed section 4 of the bill. The procedures proposed are, disappointingly to me, an automatic carry-over from SIRC, but SIRC membership has had a sometimes deeply troubled history. Membership size and profile need, I think, to be rethought. In my view, the SIRC membership should be enlarged to allow for more diverse and expert representation and to reduce the burdens on members hearing complaints.

NSIRA membership should also reflect, in my view, a wider range of expertise in security and intelligence issues, including expertise in security threats, on intelligence practices, on international relations, on governance and decision-making, on civil liberties, on community impacts, and on privacy. Those are seven sets of expertise right there.

The ability of NSIRA to get up and running once legislation is passed will be vitally dependent on the continued strength, capacity, and forward planning of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, which will be NSIRA's core. It would be very unfortunate if anything occurred to weaken SIRC in the transition.

Part 2 of the bill is on the intelligence commissioner. Legislation to establish an intelligence commissioner to engage in proactive oversight of aspects of the work of CSE and CSIS is a novel concept that has no counterpart that I'm aware of among our Five Eyes partners. We are being truly innovative here. The concept that's been adopted, I believe, is a made-in-Canada solution to ensuring the legality and charter compliance of some of the most sensitive and important operations conducted by our main intelligence collection agencies, CSE and CSIS.

With regard to the function of the intelligence commissioner, I would like to offer two thoughts and one recommendation.

One thought is that it would be important that the system is and is seen to be a way of ultimately strengthening rather than diluting ministerial accountability, even while it gives some oversight powers to the intelligence commissioner. The second thought is that the ability of the minister to retain traditional powers of accountability while ceding some decision-making authority to the intelligence commissioner is linked in turn to the working of new reporting mechanisms proposed in part 1 of the act.

NSIRA will produce a much stronger stream of reporting to the minister on the activities of the key intelligence agencies, which, if that stream of reporting can be properly digested by the minister and his office, should ensure that the minister can issue authorizations that will pass muster with the intelligence commissioner. In this way part 1 and part 2 of Bill C-59 are intimately linked.

The recommendation I have to offer is that the intelligence commissioner function must not go dark. The Office of the CSE Commissioner, on which the function will partly be based, produced an annual report to the minister that was tabled in Parliament. This has been the practice since the commissioner's office was established in 1996. There is no such requirement at present for the intelligence commissioner. I believe the intelligence commissioner should be required to table an annual report that would review the commissioner's activities and findings.

Then there is part 3, the CSE act. I fully support the importance of creating separate, modernized legislation for CSE, distinct from the National Defence Act. CSE is one of Canada's most important, if not the most important, intelligence collection agency. It provides our principal contribution to the Five Eyes intelligence partnership. Getting the CSE act right is vital to Canada's interests and deserves close attention by the committee.

CSE received its first enabling legislation with the passage of the Anti-terrorism Act back in 2001. It is that legislation that is being modernized with Bill C-59. There were no changes to CSE legislation proposed in the previous Bill C-51.

The CSE act expands the current three-part mandate of CSE by adding two additional powers for what are called active cyber-operations and defensive cyber-operations. Let there be no mistaking that these are major new powers for CSE.

Both kinds of operations require ministerial authorization. Active cyber-operations engaging overseas targets require the consent of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. There have been some concerns raised in Parliament about the need for such consent. I think it is absolutely essential, given the volatile nature of such operations and their potential for blowback against Canadian international interests.

Active cyber-operations are what I call a digital form of covert operations, somewhat akin to classical Cold War covert operations designed to destabilize the capacities of a foreign adversary. In addition to blowback effects, they can also engage an escalatory spiral, as we saw, for example, in the aftermath of the cyber-operation known as Stuxnet, which targeted the Iranian centrifuge cascade that was central to their uranium enrichment program and nuclear weapons development. Active cyber-operations require high degrees of intelligence knowledge and technical skills, but they also require high degrees of political oversight and strong agency command and control.

It is also important to understand that many, if not all, of the operations that CSE might conduct in the future under its active cyber-operations mandate will be mounted within a Five Eyes context. I don’t think we’re going to be going it alone on these ones. This is all the more reason for there to be what has been called “a dual-key approach”. Neither active nor defensive cyber-operations require the consent of the intelligence commissioner, which is something the committee might want to look into, but such operations will be subject to review by the new national security and intelligence review agency.

The CSE act is a very complex piece of legislation. It might be a lawyer's dream, but it would be a layman's nightmare to read. It contains some very important provisions that are sprinkled throughout the bill with little connecting narrative thread. My recommendation with regard to part 3 is that there should be a values principle built into the legislation, perhaps at the proposed mandate section, to draw together some of these different component parts, and I will provide a brief on that.

I was going to add a brief set of remarks about what isn’t in the legislation, but I’m happy to address that in questions.

Thank you.

[Professor Craig Forcese, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Wesley has pointed at me, so I will go first.

I wish to extend my sincere thanks to the committee for inviting me here to speak on Bill C-59. It's always an honour to be asked to share my observations before this committee.

My colleague Kent Roach is appearing before you next week. He and I have divided up Bill C-59. Today I shall be addressing the new Communications Security Establishment act and the amendments to the CSIS Act.

I support most of the changes Bill C-59 makes in these areas. I recognize the policy objectives they seek to address. I believe the statutory language is usually carefully considered and robust, but I do have one serious concern.

I'll begin with the CSE act and make my single recommendation for today. I respectfully submit that this committee should amend proposed subsections 23(3) and 23(4) to indicate CSE may not, without ministerial authorization, contravene the reasonable expectation of privacy of any Canadian or person in Canada. Those two provisions are found on page 62 of the PDF of the bill.

I have provided a brief to this committee describing the rationale for this change, and I should disclose I've been an affiant in the current constitutional lawsuit brought by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association challenging CSE activities, but today I appear on my own behalf.

To summarize my concern, while engaged in foreign intelligence in cybersecurity activities, CSE incidentally collects information in which Canadians or persons in Canada have a reasonable expectation of privacy. This is done without advance authorization by an independent judicial officer, and thus likely violates section 8 of the charter.

Bill C-59 attempts to cure this constitutional issue through a ministerial authorization process, one that involves vetting for reasonableness by an intelligence commissioner, a retired superior court judge. This is a creative and novel solution. It preserves a considerable swath of ministerial discretion and responsibility. It is not a full warrant system. Still, given the unique nature of CSE activities, I believe it is constitutionally defensible.

The new system will only resolve the constitutional problem if it steers all collection activities implicating constitutionally protected information into the new authorization process. The problem is this. Bill C-59's present drafting only triggers this authorization process where an act of Parliament would otherwise be contravened. This is a constitutionally under-inclusive trigger.

Some collection of information in which a Canadian has a constitutional interest does not violate an act of Parliament, for example, some sorts of metadata. The solution is simple. Expand the trigger to read as follows: “Activities carried out by the Establishment in furtherance of the foreign intelligence” or cybersecurity “aspect of its mandate must not contravene any other act of Parliament or involve the acquisition of information in which a Canadian or person in Canada has a reasonable expectation of privacy”, unless they are authorized under one of these ministerial authorizations that are subject to vetting by the intelligence commissioner.

This may seem a lawyerly tweak, but if we fail to cure the existing problem with CSE's collection authorization process, a court may ultimately determine that CSE has been collecting massive quantities of data in violation of the Constitution. Such a finding would decimate relations with civil society actors, placing CSE squarely in the crosshairs of a renewed controversy, and making it very difficult for private sector enterprises to partner with CSE on cybersecurity without risking reputational fallout themselves. With Bill C-59, we have a chance to minimize this kind of problem.

I turn to the CSIS Act changes. Bill C-59 does three things. First, it permits CSIS new authority to collect and potentially retain so-called datasets. Here the tension lies in balancing the operational need for CSIS to be able to query and exploit information against the privacy imperative. Rather than prescribe hard standards for what may be included in datasets, Bill C-59 opts for a system of in-advance oversight.

The intelligence commissioner is charged with approving the classes of Canadian datasets that the minister has deemed may be initially collected, and the Federal Court authorizes any subsequent retention of actual datasets. While I am wary of the idea of datasets, I cannot dispute the rationale for them and I can find no fault with the system of checks and balances. I have one concern with the retention of information that's queried in exigent circumstances. I don't know that the bill has the same checks and balances there, but I'm happy to address that further in questions.

The second change to the CSIS Act relates to revisions to CSIS's threat-reduction powers introduced in Bill C-51 in 2015. These provisions were rightly controversial. For our part, Kent Roach and I did not dispute the idea of threat reduction, but we worried that CSIS threat reduction done as a continuation of our awkward, siloed police and intelligence operations runs the risk of derailing later criminal investigations and prosecutions. This would be tragic from a security perspective.

From a rights perspective, Bill C-51 lacked nuance. It opened the door to a violation of any charter right subject to an unappealable, secret Federal Court warrant. The regime was radical, and in my view, almost certainly unconstitutional. It was, therefore, unworkable, whatever the strength of the policy objectives that propelled it.

Bill C-59 places the system on a much more credible constitutional foundation. It ratchets tighter the outer limit on CSIS threat reduction powers. By barring detention—a power I sincerely doubt the service ever wished—it eliminates concerns about the many charter violations for which detention is a necessary predicate. By legislating a closed list of activities that could be done where a warrant is authorized, Parliament tells us what charter interests are plausibly in play—essentially, free speech and mobility rights. I believe that if threat reduction is to be retained, this new system reasonably reconciles policy and constitutional issues.

Lastly, Bill C-59's CSIS Act changes create new immunities for CSIS officers and sources engaged in intelligence functions that may violate law during those activities. The breadth of Canada's terrorism offences makes it certain that a confidential source or undercover officer will commit a terrorism offence simply by participating with the terror group that they infiltrate. An immunity is necessary. The issue is whether there are sufficient checks and balances guarding against abuse of this immunity. Again, I think Bill C-59 does a good job of festooning the immunity provisions with such checks.

I will end, though, with a caution. Our conventional manner of siloed police and CSIS parallel investigations lags best practices in other jurisdictions that employ more blended investigations. As the Air India bombing inquiry observed, we struggle with what is known as intelligence to evidence. The government is working on this matter. We should be conscious, however, that what CSIS does in its investigations, whether in terms of immunized criminal conduct in intelligence investigations or authorized threat reduction, could derail prosecutions if not done with a close eye to downstream impacts. This issue might usefully be a topic of inquiry for the new security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to any questions.

[Prof. Stephanie Carvin]

If anything, I actually thought the definition was probably widened in the current legislation as it stands. There was actually a limitation in C-51. I know I keep referring to Craig, but we podcast a lot, so we're kind of melding into one. First it was the chapeau piece, and that actually was taken away, so if anything, actually the ability to share information is technically broader under this legislation, which I think some people have concerns with.

But I agree that we absolutely, fundamentally have to protect information sharing, so if reforms are made, we have to bear this in mind. It's not just important for terrorism. Usually the classic example of passports is used—trying to stop someone with a passport from leaving the country—but also the Investment Canada Act, the ability to share information under that, is absolutely essential to our national security.

As it stands, I don't see major changes in this bill, but if reforms are coming from this committee, I think that should be kept in mind.

[Alex Neve]

No, we're still concerned. We think it is still overly broad and it stands in contrast to definitions that are used in the CSIS Act, for instance. There is a number of ways in which that definition and how it interplays with other provisions leaves open the possibility that people will be subject to information-sharing processes simply because they've been involved in protest and advocacy in a context where it perhaps connects up with opposition to critical infrastructure like pipelines, etc. That area of concern, which was of course a very serious problem in Bill C-51, in our view, has not been wholly addressed.

[Prof. Stephanie Carvin]

Thank you for your question.

I will respond in English. Thank you.

I think one of the issues is that, without guidance, the security services do not know where to step. There is concern, for example, that with the broad scope of Bill C-51, knowing where the limits were was a challenge. One of the things that the service always worries about is another commission of inquiry. This is the number one thing you want to avoid because of the drain on manpower, resources, and these kinds of things. Without adequate oversight, without clear guidance as to where the lines are, the service becomes very scared about where it can actually proceed.

We've seen that, of course. Michel Coulombe and the new director have stated that they haven't really gone for the warranted powers in Bill C-51 that allow it to violate the charter, as far as I'm aware. You want powers that are clearly defined in law and that you know have the backing of the government and the backing of the courts, or else a kind of paralysis develops, in the sense that you don't want to do anything that could eventually end up with a commission of inquiry again. This is why I strongly support clearly defined disruption powers.

I believe disruption is important. One of the things I saw during my time was just the speed at which terrorism investigations sped up. They could go from being over two years to being a couple of weeks, when people saw the propaganda and would make the decision to leave.

These disruption powers are important, but I think grounding them in the charter and in interpretations of the law is absolutely vital to the actual operations of the agency.

[Pierre Paul-Hus, Conservative, Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Hello, Ms. Carvin.

In your presentation, you said that Bill C-59 would change the powers of CSIS officers. It is often said that Bill C-51 gave CSIS too many powers. There have been many calls to change that, and I would like to better understand the reason for those requests. Since you worked for that organization, you are familiar with the field. I would like to know more about that.

[Alex Neve, Secretary General, Amnesty International Canada]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Good morning, committee members. Amnesty International certainly welcomes this opportunity to appear before you in the course of your review of Bill C-59. I'd like you to know at the outset that I'm here on behalf of both the English and francophone branch of Amnesty International Canada, and thus on behalf of our 400,000 supporters across the country.

Amnesty International has a long history of frequent appearances before parliamentary committees dealing with national security matters, be that studies of proposed legislation or reviews of existing legislation. That's not because we're national security experts. Our expertise, of course, lies in human rights. Our interest in Bill C-59, therefore, comes directly from our mandate to press governments to uphold their international human rights obligations. Documenting and responding to human rights violations arising in a national security context and pressing governments to amend national security laws, policies, and practices to conform to international human rights obligations have long featured prominently in Amnesty International's research and campaigning around the world, long predating September 11.

National security is often blatantly used as an excuse for human rights violations, clearly intended simply to punish and persecute political opponents or members of religious and ethnic minorities. National security operations have frequently proceeded with total disregard for obvious human rights consequences, leading to such serious human rights violations as torture, disappearances, and unlawful detention. Without adequate safeguards and restrictions, overly broad national security activities harm individuals and communities who pose no security threat at all. In all of these instances, the impact is frequently felt in a disproportionate and discriminatory manner by particular religious, ethnic, and racial communities, adding yet another human rights concern.

These concerns are by no means limited to other parts of the world. Over the past 15 years, Amnesty International has taken up numerous cases involving national security-related human rights violations related to the actions of Canadian law enforcement and national security agencies. These concerns have been so serious as to be the subject of two separate judicial inquiries, numerous Supreme Court and Federal Court rulings, and several significant apologies and financial settlements totalling well over $50 million to a number of Canadian citizens and other individuals whose rights were gravely violated because of the actions of Canadian agencies. I think of Maher Arar, Benamar Benatta, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad El Maati, Muayyed Nureddin, and Omar Khadr. This is why we bring our human rights analysis to legislation such as Bill C-59—to ensure that provisions provide the greatest possible safeguards against human rights violations of this nature.

In commenting on the bill, I will touch briefly on five areas: first, the need for a stronger human rights anchor in the bill; second, the bill's national security review provisions; third, positive changes in Bill C-59; fourth, concerns that remain; and fifth, issues of concern that have not been addressed in the bill.

The first area is the need for a national security approach anchored in a commitment to human rights. In the review that preceded Bill C-59, we urged the government to use the opportunity of the present reform to adopt a clear human rights basis for Canada's national security framework. That is an approach that is not only of benefit, evidently, for human rights, but truly lays the ground for more inclusive, durable, and sustainable security as well. Currently, other than the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, none of Canada's national security legislation specifically refers to or incorporates Canada's binding international human rights obligations.

We recommended that those laws be amended to include provisions requiring legislation to be interpreted and applied in a manner that complies with international human rights norms. That was not taken up in Bill C-59 except for one very limited reference to the convention against torture. This is important in that it sends a strong message of the centrality of human rights in Canada's approach to national security. It is also of real benefit when it comes to upholding human rights in national security-related court proceedings.

Our first recommendation, therefore, remains to amend Bill C-59 to include a provision requiring all national security-related laws to be interpreted in conformity with Canada's international human rights obligations.

Second, we strongly welcome and support the provisions in part 1 of Bill C-59 creating the national security and intelligence review agency. Amnesty International has been calling for the creation of a comprehensive and integrated review agency of this nature since the time of our submissions to the Arar inquiry in 2005. This has been one of the longest-standing and most serious gaps in Canada's national security architecture. We do have three associated recommendations.

First, in keeping with the earlier recommendation I just made, the mandate of the review agency should be amended to ensure that the activities of security and intelligence agencies will be reviewed specifically to ensure conformity to Canada's international human rights obligations.

Second, the review agency must have personnel and resources commensurate with what will be a significant workload. We endorse the recommendation made by Professor Kent Roach that the provision allowing for a chair and additional commissioners numbering between three and six is inadequate, and would suggest that the number of additional commissioners be raised to between five and eight.

Third, we continue to be concerned about the review specifically of the Canada Border Services Agency. Unlike many of the agencies that will be reviewed by the new agency, the CBSA does not have its own stand-alone independent review body. The new review agency will have the power to review CBSA's national security and intelligence-related activities, but there still is no other independent agency reviewing the entirety of CBSA's activities, despite the growing number of cases where the need for such review is urgently evident, including deaths in immigration custody. This imbalance will inevitably pose awkwardness for the review agency's review of CBSA, and it underscores how crucial it is for the government to move rapidly to institute full, independent review of CBSA.

We'd like to highlight improvements. First, our concerns about the overly broad criminal offence in Bill C-51 of advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general have been addressed by the proposed revisions to section 83.221 of the Criminal Code, which would instead criminalize the act of counselling another person to commit a terrorism offence, which was already a criminal offence essentially.

Second, the threat reduction powers in Bill C-51, which anticipated action by CSIS that could have violated a range of human rights guaranteed under the Charter of Rights and under international law have been significantly improved. However, we think it needs to go further, and there needs to be specific prohibition of the fact that CSIS will not involve threat reduction of any kind that will violate the charter or violate international human rights obligations. We also welcome the changes made to preventive detention, but have some recommendations as to how that can be improved.

We remain concerned about the Secure Air Travel Act provisions, which we do not think address the many serious challenges that people face with the application of the no-fly list. Much more fundamental reforms are needed, including a commitment to establishing a robust redress system that will eliminate false positives, and significant enhancements to listing and appeal provisions to meet standards of fairness.

Because I know my time is limited, let me end with some provisions that remain unaddressed in the legislation.

One of the most explicit contraventions of international human rights in Canadian national security law, going back over 20 decades now, is the provision in immigration legislation allowing individuals in undefined exceptional circumstances to be deported to a country where they would face a serious risk of torture. It's a direct violation of the UN convention against torture. UN human rights bodies have repeatedly called for this to be addressed. Bill C-59 passed on the opportunity to do so. We would recommend that be taken up.

Finally, Bill C-59 also fails to make needed reforms to the approach taken to national security in immigration proceedings. There were very serious concerns about Bill C-51's deepening unfairness of the immigration security certificate process, for instance, withholding certain categories of evidence from special advocates.

There needs to be a significant rethinking and reconsideration of immigration security certificate proceedings, rolling back those changes that were made in Bill C-51, and addressing still the other areas of concern with respect to the fairness of that process.

Thank you.

[Professor Stephanie Carvin, Assistant Professor, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual]

I'd like to thank the committee for inviting me to speak on Bill C-59, the most comprehensive and far-reaching reform to national security in Canada since 1984. I would like emphasize that I am not a lawyer. However, I do have experience working in national security and intelligence, and I study this area for a living. Indeed, in the interest of transparency, I would like to state that from 2012 to 2015, I worked at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service as a strategic analyst.

My comments are, of course, my own, but they're informed by my research and experience as the national security landscape in Canada has evolved in a relatively short period of time. All of this is to say that today my comments will be focused on the scope of this bill and will address some of the areas that I believe this committee needs to, at the very least, consider as it makes recommendations.

First and foremost, I wish to express my support for this bill. I believe it contains four important steps that are essential for Canadian national security and the functions of our national security agencies.

First, it provides clarity as to the powers of our national security agencies. There's no better example of this than part 3, the CSE act, which gives our national signals intelligence agency statutory standing and spells out its mandate and procedures to a reasonable extent. Given that the first mention of this agency in law was the 2001 Anti-terrorism Act, this bill takes us a long way towards transparency.

Second, Bill C-59 outlines the limits on the power of our national security agencies in a way that will provide certainty to the public and also to our national security agencies. In particular, the bill clarifies one of the most controversial parts of the current legislation formerly known as Bill C-51, that is, CSIS' disruption powers.

While it might be argued that this is taking away CSIS' ability to fight threats to Canada's national security, I disagree. Having found themselves embroiled in scandals in recent years, it is little appreciated how conservative our national security agencies actually are. While they do not want political interference in their activities, they no doubt welcome the clarity that Bill C-59 provides as to these measures.

Let there be no doubt that the ability to disrupt is an important one, particularly given the increasingly fast pace of terror investigations, especially those related to the threat of foreign fighters. In this sense, I believe that Bill C-59 hits the right balance, grounding these measures squarely within the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Third, Bill C-59 addresses long-standing problems related to review, and in some cases oversight, in Canadian national security. I will not go over the problems of our current system, which has been described as “stove-piped” by experts and commissions of inquiries. I will, however, state that the proposed national security and intelligence review agency, NSIRA, and intelligence commissioner—in combination with the new National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, NSICOP—create a review architecture that is robust and that I believe Canadians can have confidence in.

Fourth, in its totality, Bill C-59 is a forward-looking bill in at least three respects. First, the issue of datasets is not narrowly defined in law. While this has been a cause of concern for some, I believe this is the right approach to take. It allows flexibility of the term, but at the same time it subjects any interpretation to the oversight of the intelligence commissioner and the minister. It subjects the use of datasets to the internal procedures of the national security agencies themselves—and limits who may have access—and the review of the NSIRA and NSICOP.

Second, it takes steps to enhance Canada's ability to protect and defend its critical infrastructure. Increasingly, we are seeing the abilities of states and state-sponsored actors to create chaos through the attacks on electrical grids, oil and gas facilities, dams, and hospital and health care facilities. Much of this critical infrastructure is in the hands of the private sector. This bill takes steps to ensure that there is a process in place to address these threats in the future.

Third, Bill C-59 puts us on the same footing as our allies by mandating an active cyber-role for our national signals intelligence agency. I appreciate the legal and ethical challenges this raises, especially should CSE be asked to support a DND operation. However, the idea that Canada would not have this capability is, I think, unacceptable to most Canadians, and would be seen as unfortunate in the eyes of our allies, many of whom have been quietly encouraging Canada to enhance its cyber-presence in the wake of cyber-threats from North Korea, China, and Russia.

To reiterate, I believe this is a good bill, but there's room for improvement. I'm aware that some of my legal colleagues, especially Craig Forcese, Kent Roach, and Alex, of course, will be speaking to certain specific legal issues that should be addressed to make the law more operationalizable and compliant with our Constitution.

I encourage the committee to seriously consider their suggestions. However, I'm going to focus on four areas that may be problematic in a broader sense, which I believe the committee should at least be aware of or consider when it makes recommendations.

First, I think it's important to consider the role of the Minister of Public Safety. To be clear, I believe our current minister does a good job in his current position. However, the mandate of the Minister of Public Safety is already very large, and this bill would give him or her more responsibilities in terms of review and, in some cases, oversight. At some future date, the scope of this ministry may be worth considering.

Having said this, I acknowledge a paradox. Requiring the intelligence commissioner's approval for certain operations, as is clear in proposed subsections 28(1) and 28(2) of the proposed CSE Act, and potentially denying the approval of a minister is, in my view, at odds with the principle of ministerial responsibility in our Westminster system of government.

To be sure, I understand why this authority of the intelligence commissioner is there. Section 8 of the charter insists on the right to be protected from unreasonable search and seizure. The intelligence commissioner's role ensures that this standard is met.

Why is this a problem? Canada has an unfortunate history of ministers and prime ministers trying to shirk responsibility for the actions of our security services, which dates back decades. Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau used the principle of police independence to state that his government could not possibly engage in review or oversight of the activities of the RCMP even though the national security roles of the RCMP are a ministerial responsibility. There is simply a tension here with our constitutional requirements and with what has been the practice of our system for decades. If this bill is to pass through, it will be up to members of Parliament to hold the minister to account, even if he or she tries to blame the intelligence commissioner for actions not taken.

Second, despite the creation of no less than three major review agencies, there's still no formal mechanism for efficacy review of our security services. We will receive many reports as to whether or not our security services are compliant with the law, but we still will not have any idea of how well they are doing it. I'm not suggesting we need to number-crunch how many terrorism plots are disrupted. Such a crude measure would be counterproductive. However, inquiring as to whether the analysis produced supports government decisions in a timely manner is a worthwhile question to ask. Efficacy review is still a gap in our national security review architecture.

Third, while I praise the transparency of Bill C-59, I'm also concerned about what I'm calling “report fatigue”. I note that between last year's Bill C-22 and now Bill C-59, there will have been at least 10 new reports generated, not including special reports as required. It is my understanding that some of these reports are very technical and can be automatically generated when certain tasks such as, hypothetically, the search of a dataset is done. However, others are going to be more complex. More briefings will also be required. Having spent considerable time working on reports for the government in my former work, I know how difficult and time-consuming this can be.

Finally, and related to this last point, it is my understanding that the security services will not be receiving any extra resources to comply with the reporting and briefing requirements of either Bill C-22 or Bill C-59. This concerns me, because I believe that enhanced communication between our national security services with the government and review bodies is important. As the former's powers expand, this should be well resourced.

In summary, the ability to investigate threats to the national security of Canada is vital. I believe that for the most part, Bill C-59 takes Canada a great step towards meeting that elusive balance between liberty and security. In my view, where Bill C-59 defines powers and process, it should enable our security services to carry out their important work with confidence knowing exactly where they stand. Further, the transparency in the bill will hopefully go some way towards building trust between the Canadian public, Parliament, and our security services.

Thank you for your time. I look forward to your questions.

Opposition Motion—ISIS fighters returning to Canada

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada]

Madam Speaker, at the outset, I will be sharing my time with the hon. member for Scarborough Southwest.

Today, I am rising to speak against the motion brought forward by the Conservative opposition, and my reasons for doing so are straightforward.

Contrary to what this motion suggests, our government has already unequivocally condemned Daesh for committing acts of terrorism and genocide, as they should be. In addition, the Canadian Forces, law enforcement, and intelligent communities are fully engaged in combatting and preventing terrorism in all its forms, both abroad and at home. This is work of which we should all be proud.

Finally, Canadians can be confident that we have enacted a robust set of criminal laws, offences and preventative tools for law enforcement, to address terrorism, which are prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law, wherever and whenever appropriate.

In a moment, I will expand on how these measures are collectively working to keep Canadians safe, but first I need to express how regrettable it is to hear the opposition politicize national security time and again.

Far too often, we see the Conservatives wagging their fingers, lecturing Canadians, and pandering fear on this subject. However, one need only look at their record to see it is heavy on rhetoric and light on substance.

I hear hon. members heckling from the other side, and that will not change the facts. Let me tell everyone what some of those facts are.

During their 10 years in government, the Conservatives imposed dramatic cuts to national security. Indeed, in their last four years in power, they slashed close to $1 billion in resources to the RCMP, CBSA, CSIS, CATSA, and CSE. The opposition would do well to remember these figures, as I know Canadians will in sizing up the validity of this motion and the credibility of the Conservatives on the whole of national security.

Let me now say a few words about a number of the terrorism provisions within the Criminal Code that specifically apply to terrorist travel.

I would like to begin by acknowledging that thousands from around the world have indeed travelled to join terrorist groups and that this is indeed an important issue, which our government is grappling with domestically, internationally, and abroad with all our partners in the combat against terrorism.

Within the law as it exists in Canada, there are four specific offences of leaving Canada, or attempting to leave Canada, for the purpose of committing specific terrorism offences. In this way, the criminal law addresses the terrorist traveller phenomenon by having the substantive offence crystallize before the person leaves Canada and by applying the same maximum punishment to attempting to leave Canada, as well as leaving Canada, to commit these offences.

Over and above these targeted offences, the Criminal Code includes terrorism provisions designed to prevent the carrying out of terrorist activity and have a preventive focus. They are in large part designed to permit law enforcement to intervene and charge someone with a terrorism offence before a terrorist attack can take place. Such offences include knowingly facilitating terrorist activity and knowingly instructing someone to carry out a terrorist activity.

A particular example of this can be found in the participation offence, which is under section 83.18 of the Criminal Code. Terrorist travellers could be, and have in fact been, prosecuted under the offence of knowingly participating in any activity of a terrorist group for the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to carry out a terrorist activity.

I will pause for a moment to say that in my former career as a federal prosecutor, I have first-hand experience dealing with these provisions. Again, I would draw the attention to Canadians that they can take great satisfaction and confidence in knowing we have a rigorous criminal law enforcement provision. I was honoured to serve with many prosecutors and members of the RCMP and CSIS, who continue to do a good job today in keeping our country safe.

As well, it is notable, in the current threat environment, individuals are often radicalized to violence and encouraged through online interactions and messaging. In Bill C-59, the national security act, 2017, the government proposes to revise the offence of advocating or promoting the commission of terrorism offences in general to be one of counselling the commission of a terrorism offence, whether a terrorism offence is committed and whether a specific terrorism offence is counselled. The advocacy or promotion offence has been much criticized since its enactment in 2015 for being vague or overbroad. Bill C-59 proposes to revise this offence to use well-known criminal law concepts and facilitate its prosecution.

The bill continues to support the view that the active encouragement of others to commit terrorism offences, even without being specific as to which terrorism offence is being encouraged, should be an offence in the same way as it is an offence to counsel a specific terrorism offence.

Some of these criminal offence provisions have already been successfully used in court. To date, there have been 26 terrorism convictions in Canada and three trials are currently in progress.

I will now speak about preventive enforcement tools.

Certainly one of the most fundamental tools police and prosecutors have to keep Canadians safe from individuals who may have associated with terrorism groups abroad is the terrorism peace bond. This is a powerful preventive tool that can help to protect Canadians from terrorism offences.

In situations where police may not have enough evidence to justify charging a person with a terrorism offence, the terrorism peace bond is available to bring the individual before a judge rather than wait until it is too late. In such cases, the court has the power to impose “any reasonable conditions” to counter the threat posed by the individual concerned.

The Criminal Code also sets out that the provincial court judge shall consider whether it is desirable, to prevent a terrorist activity from being committed, to include in the recognizance a condition that the defendant deposit, in the specified manner, any passport or other travel document issued in their name that is in their possession or control. If the judge decides that it is desirable, the judge shall add the condition to the recognizance and specify the period during which it applies.

Furthermore, the provincial court judge shall consider whether it is desirable, to prevent a terrorist activity from being committed, to include in the recognizance a condition that the defendant remain within a specified geographic area unless written permission to leave that area is obtained from the judge or any individual designated by the judge. If the judge decides that it is desirable, the judge shall add the condition to the recognizance and specify the period during which it applies. Furthermore, If the provincial court judge does not add a condition, the judge shall include in the record a statement of the reasons for not adding it.

With respect to the recognizance to keep the peace related to terrorism, this tool has been used by law enforcement agencies and by Crown prosecutors. The use of this tool has been on the rise since 2015. Specifically, there have been 19 applications for this recognizance in the past two years, compared to six between 2001 and 2014.

I would note that during the 2016 national security consultation, some called into question the threshold for a terrorism peace bond that was enacted in 2015 by former Bill C-51. That act lowered the threshold of the terrorism peace bond from “will commit” to “may commit”. After careful consideration, the government has determined that the lowered threshold is a balanced approach between the constitutional rights of Canadians and the need to protect the security of Canadians. This threshold has also been upheld as constitutional in the recent Manitoba case of Regina v. Driver in 2016.

Another preventive tool is the recognizance with conditions, which is available for law enforcement in the appropriate case to disrupt nascent terrorist activity.

The Canadian Passport Order contemplates that passports can be denied or revoked in certain instances of criminality and where necessary to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence or for the national security of Canada or a foreign country or state.

As can be seen, Canada already has a broad range of offences and tools to assist in the fight against terrorism. As the hon. Minister of Public Safety has said, we need them all and we use them all.

Opposition members have spent the last week criticizing national security, national defence, and deriding effective counter-radicalization measures that go a long way toward both combatting and preventing terrorism. Instead of that kind of partisanship we need a thoughtful debate that will strike the right balance between protecting Canadians as well as their charter rights.

I encourage all hon. members in the House to reject the opposition motion and to support the important measures this government is taking on this file.

Opposition Motion—ISIS Fighters Returning to Canada

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, as I mentioned in my questions to the parliamentary secretary, it goes without saying that we condemn the terrorist and violent acts committed by ISIS as well as by neo-Nazi groups, for example; we are disgusted by them.

Not only should all forms of terrorism be condemned, but we also find that our measures provide sufficient evidence to lay criminal charges. The parties all agree on that.

Mr. Speaker, with all due respect to the fantastic interpreters here in the House, it is worth repeating in both official languages that we find any violence committed by any terrorist group, whether it is ISIS or neo-Nazis, to be abhorrent and something we denounce. Insofar as we have the evidence required to go ahead with criminal proceedings and press charges, it should absolutely be done. That is not something up for debate, no matter which party is in power. On that, I certainly agree with the parliamentary secretary.

The sad part about trying to politicize a situation that is obviously very worrisome for all Canadians, as it pertains to their safety and security, is that when it comes to radicalization we have to ask ourselves what is the best way to address it. I heard the Conservatives say that this is not about people who are in the process of being radicalized, but about those who already were and have now returned.

With that in mind, it is very important to remember that the problem does not lie with our legislation or political will; in fact, we are talking about the justice system and not a political decision. It is about adapting to the standards of proof.

The way evidence is admitted in court is extremely important when we look at this particular issue of foreign fighters returning to Canada, in particular in what way intelligence gathered can be admissible as evidence in court. Even experts have had a hard time grappling with how we can lay charges with that evidence. That is something we acknowledge the government needs to look at and work on. It is certainly something that could help law enforcement press charges when they may be required.

When we are looking at pressing charges, it is not just what evidence is admissible. It is also the question of even laying terrorism charges, which is something we did not see in the previous Parliament under the previous government and that we have now seen twice under the current government. It is complicated, because as experts have said, often terrorism charges do not relate to the violence in and of itself, which usually falls under another part of the Criminal Code. Terrorism charges usually relate to the planning of said violence, which makes it very difficult, especially when we fall into the trap, as with this motion, of targeting specific groups.

I will explain why. Members will recall the horrible massacre in Moncton. By all accounts, this man committed a terrorist act. In fact, he confirmed that he wanted to attack the RCMP because it supported a government he thought was corrupt. I do not think this can be described as anything other than a terrorist act, and yet no one calls it that.

The attack at the Métropolis against a newly elected Quebec premier could also be considered a terrorist act.

However, in both of these cases, no terrorism-related criminal charges were laid. Criminal charges were obviously laid, but these charges fell under other parts of the Criminal Code.

This is a very important point, because it shows how difficult it is to judge motives and to define terrorism. This is unfortunately extremely complicated, and we need to work on that.

I also think it is important to trust the men and women who work for our national security agencies and police forces—in the case, the RCMP. It goes without saying that if they collect enough evidence, we can, and should, be confident that they will file criminal charges. The problem is how to obtain this evidence and whether the evidence is admissible. There is no point laying criminal charges if the person ends up being released because of a lack of evidence. This may be annoying, but this is the reality of our legal system, and we must respect that. This is exactly what terrorists want to attack. If we cannot respect this pillar of our democracy, we are doomed. This is very important here.

The other point is the question of resources, which is extremely important and which we raised over the course of the debate on what was Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament.

We can change the law. We can make the strictest laws possible. We can say we are going to throw everyone in jail and throw away the key, but if the men and women in uniform do not have the human and financial resources to do the work, the law is useless. That is a key issue here.

The commissioner of the RCMP has said that the focus on radical Islam has taken away from other investigations at a time when we are seeing a rise in hate crimes, a rise in anti-Semitism, which are also forms of radical violence and are, in some cases, forms of radical terrorism.

It is important to keep in mind that it is not always a legal issue. It is sometimes the political will to provide the appropriate resources to the national security agencies and police bodies, something that, unfortunately, certainly was not done in the last Parliament, and there is more work to be done in the current Parliament. That is important to keep in mind if we actually want the RCMP, among others, to have the resources to do the work they need to do to keep Canadians safe.

Getting back to the subject of radicalization, which is at the heart of today's motion, I asked the sponsor why the Conservatives have been so intent on disparaging anti-radicalization efforts. I was told that this is not about being for or against radicalization, but right after his speech, his colleague spent at least five minutes sneering at anti-radicalization efforts. That makes absolutely no sense.

During the last Parliament, nothing of substance was done to fight radicalization. Although I frequently disagree with the public safety minister's stance on issues, I am pleased to see that something is finally being done at the community level to fight radicalization through a centre set up to fund local projects. The Conservatives scoffed at those projects in their motion, as did their critics in their speeches on the subject. That is a shame.

If we really want to keep our communities safe, we have to fight radicalization and make sure people do not leave in the first place. Extremist groups such as Islamic State and far-right groups such as neo-Nazis often exploit young people with mental health problems. We need to help those young people not because they should be treated as victims but to ensure public safety, which requires a concerted, community-wide approach.

I asked the parliamentary secretary a question about what is being done in prisons.

I overheard a comments from a Conservative that we are saying to not put them in jail, because they are going to be radicalized there. That is not what we are saying. We are saying that we cannot do one without the other. The experts all say that one of the worst places for being radicalized is in prison. If there are criminal charges brought and people are found guilty, certainly no one is debating whether they should be in prison. The issue is that when they are in prison, we need to make sure that the programs are there to get to the root of that radicalization that is taking hold and leading them to be a threat to national security and public safety. That is what is at stake here. If we just want to incarcerate and forget about it, to see no evil and hear no evil, those people, if they ever get out, will have slipped through the cracks and will not only be people society has not come in aid of but will be people who will pose a threat to public safety. If the objective here is to protect public safety, then let us make sure we are cutting the evil that is radicalization off at the root, and that means providing the proper programs.

As I said, I recognize the efforts the government has made to begin working with and funding best practices in some of those efforts, but more needs to be done. Again, prisons are one example. I appreciate the openness the parliamentary secretary has shown to recognizing that this is an issue and to working on it, but more needs to be done.

Let us move on to the matter of counter-radicalization, which is something else that is of great concern to me. What are we talking about? Some people go abroad and are labelled as “fighters”. In some cases, they do not commit any acts of violence, which is why it is so important to have evidence. In fact, sometimes these people are victims. Some of them are taken over there by their families. They are vulnerable people who quickly realize after arriving that they have made a mistake, and who then come back to Canada without committing any acts of violence.

Will some of these individuals be criminally prosecuted? Of course, but evidence is needed. Rather than heckling and shouting “yes”, we must understand the nuances of the situation. We have to understand that our system is a system of law. I am not talking about rights and freedoms. I am talking about a system of law, the rule of law. It is important to understand that simply making a list of people and sending them all to prison is not an effective approach to public safety. We have to have evidence, and we have to understand the challenges associated with that evidence, challenges that experts have told us about.

The Conservative member is heckling me by shouting “yes, we have to do it”. If we move forward with these criminal charges, we need to make sure that they will result in prison sentences. Rather than blaming the government and engaging in a senseless dialogue by claiming that some people in the House are seeking to jeopardize the safety of Canadians, we need to understand that there is work to do to ensure that the national security agencies and police forces that have the evidence they need to successfully prosecute will do so. Everyone would be pleased if that happened, because it would help keep Canadians safe.

Let us engage in a positive dialogue. That is the approach that we are advocating today. It is no secret that I disagree with the approach of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, but one thing is certain and leaves no room for debate: we want keep to Canadians safe and ensure public safety.

In that context, when we are looking at such an important issue as this one, to engage in dog-whistle politics and use expressions like “welcomed with open arms” and to throw things out about reading poetry, to denigrate counter-radicalization efforts, does a disservice to the men and women doing the serious work of making sure Canadians are safe, does a disservice to this House where we all believe in the importance of ensuring Canadians' safety, and does a disservice to the real efforts and debate that need to happen over the proper way of dealing with the situation.

As part of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security's review of Canada's national security framework, we travelled for one week, stopping in five cities in five days. We stopped in Montreal, where we had the opportunity to visit the Centre for the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violence. This centre is one of a kind in North America. It is so unique that it receives calls from families in New York who are worried about the possible radicalization of a friend, a family member, or even a child in some cases.

We sat down with the team at the centre and had a nuanced discussion. It was clear that these people fully understood that in many cases, the RCMP and our national security agencies have a role to play and a job to do if they are to catch those who pose a threat to public safety and security.

The collaboration between our police forces and national security agencies has been outstanding. They have also made an effort to reach out to the community and to concerned families and individuals. This work did not focus on any community more than another. An attack like the one committed at the Islamic cultural centre in Quebec City is just as troubling as an attack like the one that took place in Edmonton. Both are equally troubling, and the centre acknowledges that.

The people who fight against radicalization fully understand what we are saying today in the House. Yes, we need to consider prosecution. Yes, we need to make sure that anyone we can press charges against is actually prosecuted. However, we must also recognize that simply acknowledging one facet of an extremely complicated and important issue does not diminish the need to hold this debate and offer concrete solutions. Not only would concrete solutions help us ensure public safety, but they would also keep youth from falling through the cracks and possibly save them from the scourge of radicalization.

In closing I want to say, as I have said several times in my speech, that the minister and I certainly have our differences, and it is no secret in this place, but there is one thing to which we will always commit, and that is working together to ensure the safety of Canadians, no matter what the partisan issue is.

To do that, there is a lot that needs to be done. I have mentioned some of it: getting terrorism charges right, getting the peace bond process right, getting the evidentiary process right with regard to intelligence gathering. These are all challenges that we have in getting the counter-radicalization efforts right.

The government has taken some good steps. We think we can do more, including doing it in federal prisons, and making sure that, in some instances where there are best practices, there is more robust federal leadership despite the importance of supporting those grassroots efforts.

Those are all things on which we are ready to work with the government. It is part of the reason why it is so disappointing to hear the kind of hyperbole we hear today. When it comes to ensuring public safety, there are important measures that need to be taken. It is not about stoking and fanning the flames of fear, but rather about standing in this place and having the courage to take on these important challenges that we face, and that all experts agree are challenging but are at the core of the mandate we have as parliamentarians.

I am very happy to say that the NDP is committed to working with the government on all the points that I mentioned.

No proposal, whether Bill C-51, introduced during the last Parliament, or Bill C-59, should ever implement more draconian public safety legislation at the expense of rights and freedoms. However, that does not preclude concrete efforts from being made, for instance, providing more resources to the RCMP and other national security agencies and strengthening our counter-radicalization efforts. We have to do what we can to truly put an end to this scourge instead of simply focusing on one aspect of the issue and moving on.

There is still a lot of work to be done. Let us set aside this kind of rhetoric and ensure that we are doing our job properly because that is what Canadians expect from us.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to the panel for being here.

I'm pleased that we're updating the existing Bill C-51, and I think there are some updates in here. I'm sure we all agree that in three or five years from now we'll be looking for more updates.

One of the things that has always been of interest to me and I think to Canadians is that, if we can disrupt and prevent things, it's always better to do that than it is to deal with the fallout afterwards. I wonder if Bill C-59 has changed the scope of the non-warrant disruption activities that could be designed to reduce threats and if so, how and why?

Does Bill C-59 require a CSIS officer to obtain a warrant to go to speak to a suspected person's parents about their child's radicalization or terrorist intent? I recognize that, when you go to a judge to get a warrant, there's a lot of work, a lot of time involved, and sometimes time is of essence. Would this then enter into that whole process?

[David Vigneault]

I will provide some comments, if the committee is comfortable with that.

First and foremost, it's important to say that all CSIS activities must comply with the charter. The minister explained the way the previous bill—Bill C-51, which became law—was constructed. There may have been an issue with the way it was constructed.

Bill C-59 essentially confirms that the law cannot create an opportunity to deviate from the charter. What it does in terms of threat reduction is to ensure that if ever we were to contemplate a threat reduction measure that would limit the freedom of someone protected by the charter, we would have to go to the Federal Court to apply for such an authorization. The Federal Court would then determine if the limit on that freedom is reasonable and proportionate, which the charter itself allows for. That is how the proposed Bill C-59 addresses the charter issue for the threat reduction mandate.

Also, the law will specify the types of activities that are contemplated, so that will be transparent in the law. I would then be able to interpret that, as the director of CSIS, to determine.... If it limits people's freedom, I have to go to the Federal Court for a test. If it's something that does not limit people's freedom, it's an activity I can do. The committee supervises our activities. The new agency would be informed and able to review the activity to make sure we have complied with the act.

[Douglas Breithaupt]

It's important to realize that the counselling offence, as proposed in Bill C-59, is an offence that would be subject to prosecution. The “terrorist propaganda” definition applies to a system within the Criminal Code.

Former Bill C-51 created two new warrants in the Criminal Code, one allowing for the seizure and forfeiture of terrorist propaganda in a tangible form, according to the definition, and the other allowing a peace officer to come before a judge to seek a warrant for the deletion of terrorist propaganda from a website that's available to the public through a Canadian Internet service provider. The terrorist propaganda definition applies to these warrants, as well as under the Customs Act, because it allows terrorist propaganda or prohibited goods under the Customs Act.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

What we've done has in effect made it more difficult to have an impact on national security by going back to even before Bill C-51. Is that what you're saying?

[Douglas Breithaupt, Director and General Counsel, Criminal Law Policy Section, Department of Justice]

Thank you very much for the question.

Yes, Bill C-59 would propose to revert one of the thresholds to what it was before former Bill C-51. There are two thresholds: that the peace officer have, first, reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorist activity may be carried out, and second, reasonable grounds to suspect that the imposition of a recognizance with conditions or the arrest of the person is, as it currently reads, “likely to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity”.

This bill proposes to change that phrasing to “be necessary to prevent the carrying out of the terrorist activity”. This would restore that particular branch of the test to what it was originally, with the Anti-terrorism Act of 2001, and that's attached to the branch of the test that's “reasonable grounds” to suspect. It would require the police to present evidence of a greater link between the conditions to be imposed on the person or the arrest of the person and the prevention of terrorist activity.

[Peter Fragiskatos, Liberal, London North Centre, ON]

If I've understood you correctly, Minister, on the definition of “terrorist propaganda”, in Bill C-51 it was so particular that it made it restrictive. Is it fair to say that it was ineffective and relatively unusable? Is that a fair criticism?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

The most prominent issue that emerged from Bill C-51 was the original wording of what became section 12.1 of the CSIS Act, which implied, by the way the section was structured, that CSIS could go to a court and get the authority of the court to violate the charter. Every legal scholar I've ever heard opine on this topic has said that is a legal nullity. An ordinary piece of legislation such as the CSIS Act cannot override the charter. The charter is paramount. However, the language in the way section 12.1 was structured left the impression that you could go to the court and get authority to violate the charter.

In the language change that we have put into Bill C-59, first of all, we have specified a list of disruption activities that CSIS may undertake with the proper court authorization, but when they go to the court to ask for authority, the ruling they're asking for from the court is not that it violate the charter, but that it fits within the charter, that in fact it is consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including clause 1 of the charter.

That's the difference between the structure of the old section and how we've tried to make it clear that the charter prevails.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

That's always difficult to predict, Mr. MacKenzie, as you know.

In the example I used in my remarks, I think my answer to your question would be, yes, in the tools that are available to deal with terrorist propaganda. The problem with the language in Bill C-51 was that it was very broad, and in the language of lawyers in court, it was so broad that it was vague and unenforceable.

If you recall, there was some discussion during the election campaign in 2015 that the language in that particular section might have been used to capture certain election campaign ads, which obviously wasn't the intention of the legislation.

We've made it more precise without affecting its efficacy, and I think we made it more likely that charges can be laid and successfully prosecuted, because we have paralleled an existing legal structure that courts, lawyers, and prosecutors are familiar with, and that is the offence of counselling. Clearly, it doesn't have to be a specific individual counselling another specific individual to do a specific thing. If they are generally advising people to go out and commit terror, that's an offence of counselling under the the act they way we've written it.

[Dave MacKenzie, Conservative, Oxford, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thanks to the panel for being here.

With all due respect, Minister, Bill C-51 was passed a few years ago, and I think that it received widespread support in the House. I believe you voted in favour of it. I think that it did make some changes that at the time were appropriate. Now in review three years later, we're looking at essentially a review. This is not a total rewrite, I think you would agree, of the original bill, but it does add some ingredients that are probably important.

When you mention the law expressly prohibiting protest and advocacy and so on, will the changes in the new bill result in charges that were not allowed for in Bill C-51? Have we enhanced the probabilities of prosecution in Bill C-59 over Bill C-51?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Minister, thank you for being here.

I want to point out a couple of things for the record before we get going.

A lot has been made about our ability to study the bill more thoroughly by doing this before second reading, but at the end of the day, we still only get you for one hour on a 138-page bill. Certainly, I want to express some disappointment about that. At the end of the day, beyond the question of scope of amendments, it doesn't necessarily allow us more space to study quite an extensive bill, as you can see from the size of our binders.

The other thing I want to mention in this notion of unscrambling eggs is that certainly I have no doubt of the ability of the justice department to do what my colleague Randall Garrison did in his Bill C-303, which is on the order paper right now and which repeals in its entirety all of the provisions that were brought in by former Bill C-51. I would argue the notion that it is unfeasible is incorrect, because we have been able to develop such a bill.

Those things being said, I do have questions.

The first one I want to get to is the changes to CSE in part 3 of the bill, in proposed subsection 24(1), in paragraphs (a) and (b) specifically, where we talk about “acquiring, using, analysing, retaining or disclosing publicly available information”. That section specifically mentions “Despite subsections 23(1) and (2)”, which are the subsections that are specifically protecting those actions from being done to Canadians and in Canada. Therefore, my understanding is that it obviously means that, for any of this data being acquired in this way, these actions can be done to Canadians and in Canada.

I just want to understand here, because certainly the argument can be made that it's publicly available information and that's too bad for people who maybe don't manage their social media very well. However, a few things are of concern, specifically language like “disclosing...information”, and who that—

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Minister Goodale, for being here this morning, and to your team.

I want to compliment you and the ministry on bringing this to committee before second reading. I suppose I'm naive in my newness about the intent behind that, and I hope to understand that better, appreciating the fact that it will give us, as a committee, an opportunity to look at the bill in its entirety without being locked into the scope, as you mentioned before.

One of the things I find encouraging is that the bill looks at a number of factors that I guess were not considered fully in Bill C-51. This is a complement to that, which is very good. When you decided to bring this back to committee before second reading, it made me feel as if there were some things you recognized as a ministry that we can make better. We can maybe do some tweaks to it that hadn't been done when it was first drafted.

Is there anything that comes to mind that you would ask us, as a committee, to pay particular attention to that hasn't already been dealt with?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

The short answer, of course, is that Bill C-51 as a single piece of legislation no longer exists. It is now embedded in other pieces of law and legislation that affect four or five different statutes and a number of different agencies and operations of the Government of Canada. It's now a little bit like trying to unscramble eggs rather than simply repealing what was there before.

Based on the consultation that you referred to, we meticulously went through the security laws of Canada, whether they were in Bill C-51 or not, and asked ourselves this key question. Is this the best provision, the right provision, in the public interest of Canadians to achieve two objectives—to keep Canadians safe and safeguard their rights and freedoms—and to accomplish those two objectives simultaneously?

We honoured our election commitment of dealing with five or six specific things in Bill C-51 that we found particularly problematic. Each one of those has been dealt with, as per our promise, but in this legislation we covered a lot of other ground that came forward not during the election campaign but as a part of our consultation.

[Julie Dabrusin, Liberal, Toronto—Danforth, ON]

Thank you, Minister, for coming today.

The security framework is something that is very important to my constituents. As part of the consultations that took place, I held a meeting in my riding to which many people came. It was well attended. What came through were some very strong concerns about ensuring privacy rights and charter rights. That frames a bit of what I'm getting at with some of the questions I'm asking today.

The first is one you touched on briefly. Many people have come and asked me why do we not simply repeal the former Bill C-51 from the prior government, the prior Parliament. Why is any new legislation required? Why not just repeal it and leave it as it is?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

I will, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much to the members of the committee for their work as they are about to begin clause-by-clause study of Bill C-59, the national security act.

I am pleased today to be accompanied by a range of distinguished officials in the field of public safety and national security. David Vigneault, as you know, is the director of CSIS. Greta Bossenmaier, to my right, is the chief of the Communications Security Establishment, and the CSE is involved in Bill C-59 in a very major way.

To my left is Vincent Rigby, associate deputy minister at Public Safety. I think this is his first committee hearing in his new role as associate deputy minister. Kevin Brosseau is deputy commissioner of the RCMP, and Doug Breithaupt is from the Department of Justice.

Everything that our government does in terms of national security has two inseparable objectives: to protect Canadians and to defend our rights and freedoms. To do so, we have already taken a number of major steps, such as the new parliamentary committee established by Bill C-22 and the new ministerial direction on avoiding complicity in mistreatment. That said, Bill C-59 is certainly central to our efforts.

As I said last week in the House, this bill has three core themes: enhancing accountability and transparency, correcting certain problematic elements in the former Bill C-51, and ensuring that our national security and intelligence agencies can keep pace with the evolving nature of security threats.

Bill C-59 is the product of the most inclusive and extensive consultations Canada has ever undertaken on the subject of national security. We received more than 75,000 submissions from a variety of stakeholders and experts as well as the general public, and of course this committee also made a very significant contribution, which I hope members will see reflected in the content of Bill C-59.

All of that input guided our work and led to the legislation that's before us today, and we're only getting started. When it comes to matters as fundamental as our safety and our rights, the process must be as open and thorough as it can possibly be. That is why we chose to have this committee study the bill not after second reading but before second reading. As you know, once a bill has passed second reading in the House, its scope is locked in. With our reversal of the usual order, you will have the chance to analyze Bill C-59 in detail at an earlier stage in the process, which is beginning now, and to propose amendments that might otherwise be deemed to be beyond the scope of the legislation.

We have, however, already had several hours of debate, and I'd like to use the remainder of my time to address some of the points that were raised during that debate. To begin with, there were concerns raised about CSIS's threat reduction powers. I know there are some who would like to see these authorities eliminated entirely and others who think they should be limitless. We have taken the approach, for those measures that require a judicial warrant, of enumerating what they are in a specific list.

CSIS needs clear authorities, and Canadians need CSIS to have clear authorities without ambiguity so that they can do their job of keeping us safe. This legislation provides that clarity. Greater clarity benefits CSIS officers, because it enables them to go about their difficult work with the full confidence that they are operating within the parameters of the law and the Constitution.

Importantly, this bill will ensure that any measure CSIS takes is consistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Bill C-51 implied the contrary, but CSIS has been very clear that they have not used that particular option in Bill C-51, and Bill C-59 will end any ambiguity.

Mr. Paul-Hus, during his remarks in the debate in the House, discussed the changes we're proposing to the definition of “terrorist propaganda” and the criminal offence of promoting terrorism. Now, there can be absolutely no doubt of our conviction—I think this crosses all party lines—that spreading the odious ideologies of terrorist organizations is behaviour that cannot be tolerated. We know that terrorist groups use the Internet and social media to reach and radicalize people and to further their vile and murderous ends. We must do everything we can to stop that.

The problem with the way the law is written at the moment, as per Bill C-51 is that it is so broad and so vague that it is virtually unuseable, and it hasn't been used. Bill C-59 proposes terminology that is clear and familiar in Canadian law. It would prohibit counselling another person to commit a terrorism offence. This does not require that a particular person be counselled to commit a particular offence. Simply encouraging others to engage in non-specific acts of terrorism will qualify and will trigger that section of the Criminal Code.

Because the law will be more clearly drafted, it will be easier to enforce. Perhaps we will actually see a prosecution under this new provision. There has been no prosecution of this particular offence as currently drafted.

There were also questions raised during debate about whether the new accountability mechanisms will constitute too many hoops for security and intelligence agencies to jump through as they go about their work. The answer, in my view, is clearly, no. When the bill was introduced, two of the country's leading national security experts, Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, said the bill represents “solid gains—measured both from a rule of law and civil liberties perspective—and come at no credible cost to security.”

Accountability mechanisms for Canadian security and intelligence agencies have been insufficient for quite some time. Bill C-22 took one major step to remedy that weakness by creating the new National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. Bill C-59 will now add the new comprehensive national security and intelligence review agency, which some people, for shorthand, refer to as a super-SIRC, as well as the position of intelligence commissioner, which is another innovation in Bill C-59.

These steps have been broadly applauded. Some of the scrutiny that we are providing for in the new law will be after the fact, and where there is oversight in real time we've included provisions to deal with exigent circumstances when expedience and speed are necessary.

It is important to underscore that accountability is, of course, about ensuring that the rights and freedoms of Canadians are protected, but it is also about ensuring that our agencies are operating as effectively as they possibly can to keep Canadians safe. Both of these vital goals must be achieved simultaneously—safety and rights together, not one or the other.

Debate also included issues raised by the New Democratic Party about what is currently known as SCISA, the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act. There was a suggestion made that the act should be repealed entirely, but, with respect, that would jeopardize the security of Canadians. If one government agency or department has genuine information about a security threat, they have to be able to disclose it to the appropriate partner agencies within government in order to deal with that threat, and you may recall that this has been the subject of a number of judicial enquiries in the history of our country over the last number of years.

That disclosure must be governed by clear rules, which is why Bill C-59 establishes the following three requirements. First, the information being disclosed must contribute to the recipient organization's national security responsibilities. Second, the disclosure must not affect any person's privacy more than is reasonably necessary. Third, a statement must be provided to the recipient attesting to the information's accuracy. Furthermore, we make it clear that no new information collection powers are being created or implied, and records must be kept of what information is actually being shared.

Mr. Chair, I see you're giving me a rude gesture, which could be misinterpreted in another context.

Prevention of Radicalization through Foreign Funding Act

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Madam Speaker, I have some thoughts I would like to share with members, and I will start with one of the criticisms from across the way, which is that this government is not concerned about a very important issue to Canadians. We have not only talked about the issue of safety, but very tangible actions have been taken, whether it is budgetary or legislative measures.

My colleague made reference to the Magnitsky legislation that was passed by the House. It received all-party support. There were many strong advocates within the Liberal caucus for that legislation. In fact, Irwin Cotler, the former member for Mount Royal in Montreal, is a very strong human rights advocate. He is very well known and respected in the world. In fact, he is one of the most able-minded individuals dealing with that. He contributed immensely in the House with respect to that act, which was discussed not only over the last couple of years but for a few years. Even under Stephen Harper, there was discussion about the Magnitsky Act.

Many of the comments we are hearing, even this evening, have been dealt with in part through the Magnitsky legislation. I have had the opportunity, not only in Ottawa but in other places, particularly in Winnipeg, to talk about the importance of the issue.

This was one piece of legislation that passed with the support of all members of the House.

However, we also introduced government legislation. Members will recall Bill C-51 and the impact that legislation had in the chamber. When the member across the way is critical of the government and says that it is not doing enough, I remind the member that two substantial pieces of legislation have been brought forward to the House.

Bill C-22 dealt with the establishment of the parliamentary oversight committee. This might even be an issue the oversight committee could discuss, once it is up and running, but I suspect it will have a fairly busy agenda. That was put in place to ensure rights and freedoms were being addressed, which is very important.

When we talk about the safety of Canadians and the radicalization of individuals who call Canada their home, we take it very seriously. At the same time, we also want to ensure that the rights and freedoms of Canadians are being protected. Therefore, that legislation was put in place.

Today, we are having a great deal of discussion about Bill C-59. Many measures within that legislation deal with safety. I do not know how many times I have heard the Prime Minister talk about the importance of ensuring that Canadians feel safe. Aside from governance, it is most important to ensure there is an element of safety. Many measures have been put in place by this government. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, the minister responsible for global affairs, and members as a whole recognize what is being talked about and the concerns that Canadians have.

This is the reason I asked the questions of the sponsor of the motion. What is the motivation behind this legislation? We all want to ensure we have safe communities and there is proper legislation in place to prevent radicalization whenever we can do that. There is already a litany of measures in the Criminal Code.

I emphasize that we have proactive law enforcement agencies, security agencies, and even the Canada Border Services Agency for border control. There are many different departments in place today to protect Canadians.

One of my colleagues across the way made reference to education. We have invested, through budgets, millions of dollars for education or outreach. In fact, we launched the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence to support local initiatives. To cite a few examples, we looked at pushing back against violent extremism, addressing online terrorist propaganda and recruitment, intervening early to turn young Canadians away from the path of extremism, and supporting families and communities affected by radicalization.

I was involved with the youth justice committee for many years, and we had a wonderful RCMP officer who participated in it. I know first-hand the commitment of our women and men in the RCMP. It is about making connections and connecting the dots to promote more harmony and tolerance in our communities.

I did not like the debate that took place here regarding Islamophobia. I believe it did more damage than good inside this chamber. I still do not quite understand why we have some people in the House who do not recognize Islamophobia as something that is real.

We have to go out of our way to ensure that there is more communication among the many different groups out there. We even have a group in our caucus that meets on occasion with two different faith groups to try to bring faith communities together. This is something I believe is really important.

When I think of radicalization, one of the areas of concern I have is not necessarily what takes place in communities as much as what takes place on the Internet. The Internet is one of those areas we could spend time evaluating. Some of the problems being generated in society are because of the Internet, and we should consider ways we can address that issue.

We have seen radicalization that has stemmed from the Internet. I am concerned about the attraction it has. It is universal. It does not apply to one group of people or one faith group. Youth look at it far too often as something that might be an attractive thing to do. At times, it even crosses gender.

Many of my colleagues reach out to the community on this issue. At the end of the day, I believe we should be promoting education. It think education is the best way to combat radicalization. Whatever we can do to support that—

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank my colleague from Parry Sound—Muskoka for introducing this bill. I also liked his anecdote. Indeed, cabinet members do not get to introduce private member's bills. That is something we tend to forget.

Unfortunately, I am opposed to this bill for a number of reasons. The first was aptly explained by the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety . The objectives sought by the member in this bill are already enshrined in legislation. They were even improved on by the Magnitsky act, which was passed unanimously by the House. In Canada, it is already illegal to receive funds from a criminal or terrorist organization.

Another one of my concerns stems from the Senate report that my colleague was talking about, one of whose recommendations led to the creation of this bill. The Senate's study, if I am not mistaken, focused entirely on the Muslim community. I find that deeply concerning because I fear that these measures target specific groups and countries. With all due respect, if we look at the stakeholders my colleague mentioned as supporters of this bill, a dangerous theme emerges.

My colleague quoted Mr. Richard Fadden, the former head of CSIS and a national security adviser to former Prime Minister Harper. I want to read what came after that quote in the same testimony before the Senate.

Mr. Richard Fadden said, “In fact, in my previous job, I actually raised with representatives from some of the countries who might be involved in this and suggested to them this was not helpful.” He is of course talking about funding of terrorist activities. He continued with “The difficulty in most cases is that the monies are not coming from governments. They're coming from fairly wealthy institutions or individuals within some of these countries.” That is fair enough. The member has included those measures in his bill to deal with people who are associated with the government of the country that would be on this black list. However, he went on to say, ”It makes it doubly difficult to track. It doesn't mean you're not right in raising it. I just don't have an easy solution.”

When I read that, it caused me great concern that the head of CSIS and a national security adviser to a prime minister felt there was no easy solution and that it was difficult to get to the root of the cause. I have a difficult time imagining a list such as this, which could potentially become arbitrary, being managed by the Minister of Public Safety in consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

That brings me to my other concern, and that is Canada's track record on public safety related lists. Take, for example, the no-fly list, the list of terrorist entities, or even the list of criminal organizations proposed by my colleague from Rivière-du-Nord. He proposed a bill in that regard in this Parliament. We know the risks associated with those sorts of lists.

First, there is a risk for the court system, since these lists could result in countless charter challenges. Second, there is a risk that these lists may be arbitrary, since they are established by the government of the day. Of course, the member sponsoring the bill may say that there are oversight mechanisms and criteria to prevent that from happening, but the problem is that depending on how we view certain acts, trying to interpret the definition of torture or cruel treatment of citizens is a slippery slope.

The United States prison in Guantanamo is a good example, since cruel and inhuman acts have been committed there that should be considered torture. Are we going to put the United States on the list?

We cannot, because the United States is excluded under the provisions of that same bill. That example may seem a bit extreme, but I am using it to illustrate one of the shortcomings of the bill.

The other issue is on what we want to tackle here, and that is radicalization leading to violence and ensuring public safety. As the member who sponsored the bill rightly pointed out, it certainly is not a partisan issue, even when we may have disagreements on how to obtain that objective. For that reason, I want to raise the following points.

First, more and more studies are showing, even anecdotal evidence of what we see in the news and also hear more and more from expert testimony, that the methods being employed by certain groups conducting terrorist activities are cheaper. We are not talking about sophisticated organizations that are being funded. The member would probably want me to raise the distinction between the act being committed and the money being used to radicalize. However, it is becoming clearer and clearer that it is less about money and more about the issues of which we need to tackle the root causes, and I will get to in a moment. The parliamentary secretary has also raised this.

Second, I read a study out of Great Britain. It says that 40% of the money being used to finance terrorist acts committed in Europe, and certainly the example can apply to us as well, comes from what we could call petty crime. We are talking about money laundering, robberies, drug trafficking. These things remind us of the importance of not looking to legislative change, as we have so often on these issues, but ensuring the men and women who ensure our safety have the proper resources. That is consistent with what the New Democrats have always stood for. It is exactly what we said during the debate, for example, on Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament. Why look to a legislative change to do something that can be done by providing proper resources?

Another point to consider is whether this is the right way to fight radicalization. I do not think that money is the root of this particular problem.

To go back to what the parliamentary secretary said earlier, there is a government initiative receiving some funding. I hope that the government continues to step up its efforts and maintains this funding. If we want to fight radicalization and violence properly, it will take a community effort like the one the centre in Montreal is making, for example. It will also take federal involvement in other initiatives, to encourage all orders of government, stakeholders, and community organizations to contribute to these efforts. It is very important to add that these efforts must not focus on any one group in particular.

Hon. members will recall last week's awful far-right rallies in Quebec City. Some of the groups involved either were American or had been infiltrated by or were affiliated with American far-right groups. In that context, we need to look at the whole range of factors weighing on youth, youth who often struggle with addiction or mental health issues that we have a responsibility to address.

By properly addressing those factors and making sure that a young individual in the process of being radicalized does not take the bait, not only do we help someone who really needs it, but we also ensure public safety. By making the right kind of efforts, we will be able to ensure that this individual never goes on commit the kinds of atrocities we see all too often on the news.

For these reasons, unfortunately, I will be opposing the bill. I am always open to working with my colleague on public safety initiatives, but I do not feel that this bill serves the intended objectives, and unfortunately it could end up targeting a specific community, which I think is totally inappropriate.

Indian Act

[Lloyd Longfield, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

Mr. Speaker, listening to the debate reminds me of when Bill C-51 was being passed by the previous government. It was a bill with flawed security legislation, tied into a bundle of legislation, that would take away some rights from Canadians. The NDP and Green parties felt that we should get rid of the legislation altogether, versus determining how we could surgically fix the legislation.

I wonder if the member for Scarborough—Rouge Park could comment on the parallel situation we face here, where throwing out the legislation is not the right answer, but surgically fixing it is.

National Security Act, 2017

[Peter Julian, NDP, New Westminster—Burnaby, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is unfortunate that I have only five minutes left to contribute, because the government essentially brought in closure. Instead of submitting a problematic bill to the House of Commons for debate and improvement, the government decided to resort to a form of closure that would prevent us from exploring every aspect of this bill.

The NDP is against referring Bill C-59 to committee in part because it does not achieve what the Liberals promised to Canadians. During the last campaign, the Liberals said that they were wrong to vote in favour of the former Harper government's Bill C-51, which encroached on Canadians' civil rights, including the right to privacy. The Liberals said they would right that wrong when they were in power.

What they did was introduce Bill C-59, which also raises some serious concerns around privacy protection and does nothing to fix the Bill C-51's mistakes. The Liberals introduced a bill that does not fix any of the Harper government's flaws or mistakes on this issue. They are continuing along the same path, and as such, Bill C-59 will not address the gaps in Bill C-51. That is why we, the NDP, oppose this bill.

However, what the Liberals have done is put in place a procedural trick, and it is a procedural trick that is a type of closure. What this does is twofold.

As you know, Mr. Speaker, when we look at rules for the House of Commons around omnibus legislation, Standing Order 69.1 would give you the power to divide this legislation, because it is omnibus legislation with negative impacts on Canadians. However, because of this procedural trick from the Liberal government, you, Mr. Speaker, are not permitted, under the very strict framework of Standing Order 69.1, to divide this legislation. Therefore, we are forced to vote on a motion of the government that does not allow each and every one of us as parliamentarians to actually vote on the rare but still occurring positive aspects of the bill, and vote against the negative aspects of the bill. It is the heart and soul of parliamentary democracy to know why we are voting and to vote in the interests of our constituents, to stand up in this House and vote. The Standing Order 69.1 provisions were put into place so that we do not have this bulldozing of parliamentary democracy by the government, because the Speaker has the power to divide the bill. That is, except in the case of this particular procedural motion that the government has put into place, which stops your ability, Mr. Speaker, to divide this, so that, as parliamentarians, we can vote in the interests of our citizens, the constituents.

The current government has done even worse than the former Harper government. When we look at the number of times proportional to the number of non-appropriation bills passed, the new Liberal government is 25% worse than the old Harper government in its invoking of closure. I am not even including this procedural trick. What we have is a Liberal government that made many promises back in 2015, and one of the Liberals' promises was to respect parliamentary democracy. What the government is doing today is symbolic of what it has done over the last two years. It is 25% worse than the Harper government on closure, and now it is putting this procedural trick into place so that Canadians cannot have members of Parliament voting on each aspect of this omnibus legislation. It is for that reason that we say no to the motion and no to the bill.

[Garnett Genuis, Conservative, Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I am sorry I have a shortened time today. I know my friend from Winnipeg North in particular was looking forward to hearing the fulness of my remarks, but he will have to wait.

This is an important bill and an important time to be discussing it. The issue of security and terrorism is very much on the minds of Canadians, in particular in the context where we know that people from Canada have gone to fight for organizations whose values and objectives are totally at odds with those of Canadians. Now some of them may be coming back.

We heard very weak answers from the government to real and legitimate security concerns put forward by the opposition. We in the official opposition take the view that the first job of any government is to keep its citizens safe. In the Canadian context, Canadians expect the government to have their safety and security top of mind, yet we have not heard a response at all to legitimate and serious questions we have presented on that subject.

Bill C-59 seeks to repeal and change portions of the previous Bill C-51. The government's response to the bill in the previous Parliament was anything but clear or consistent. We in the Conservative caucus, then in government, now in the official opposition, took a principled approach to give our security agencies reasonable powers, subject to oversight, in order to keep Canadians safe and to disrupt and stop terrorist activity. That was the Conservative position.

The New Democrats took a different position. They opposed the bill. They were consistent in that. We were consistent in our position.

The Liberals though were trying, as they often do, to see which way the wind was blowing on this. At first, they said they were going to fully support the legislation. Then, as the public debate progressed, they continued to say they supported the legislation, but kept modifying the context of that support. Eventually, their justification for supporting it was that they did not want people accusing them of not supporting the bill. Then they said not to worry, they would repeal the problematic aspects of it from their perspective. However, they still voted for the previous legislation and were anything but clear about what they would change.

Now we are a couple of years into the Liberals' mandate as they try to figure out what they actually had a problem with. They wanted to be in between on the issue but could not figure out where they were going. That was the reality of the government's position. Now, finally, they have brought us legislation that makes some changes. Now they want to have it proceed to committee for study before it is even voted on in the House at second reading. It is interesting they have put forward a bill but are already putting it in a direction that allows them to make very substantial amendments to it.

We see this continuing lack of direction and general indecisiveness on security matters from the Liberal government. The Liberals, it seems, still do not really know where they actually stand and where they want to go when it comes to the particular provisions of the bill. The Prime Minister and the minister who moved the bill both voted in favour of the original Bill C-51.

As we look at the bill, which makes changes in a variety of different areas, we are concerned about some of the provisions because it shows the government does not properly take the need to defend the security of Canadians and the need to have provisions in place enabling the protection of that security at the level with which it should be dealt.

A number of provisions jump out at me. For instance, in part 5 with respect to information sharing, we see them undoing the information provisions that allowed the different departments within government to work together, risking us moving back to a silo mentality, where government departments are not working effectively together.

[Karine Trudel, NDP, Jonquière, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for her question.

Earlier my colleague from Beloeil—Chambly suggested splitting up Bill C-59, so that we could study each act and vote on each of them separately. We do support some of the provisions of the bill, but there are others that we oppose because they are no different than the provisions of Bill C-51.

I hope this comes back to the House so that we can debate it again, split the bill up, and study each bill separately to voice an opinion. I also hope we have a viable bill, because in its current form, Bill C-59 does not at all meet our expectations. On top of that, it is no different than Bill C-51.

As one of my colleagues said earlier in his speech, this appears to be improvised, and a lot of information seems to be missing.

To answer my colleague's question, it would be great if we could split the bill up, debate it, and have separate votes.

[Karine Trudel, NDP, Jonquière, QC]

Mr. Speaker, first of all, I want to say that the NDP opposes the motion to refer Bill C-59 to committee before second reading.

Bill C-59 makes a lot of changes, but it does not chart a bold new course for Canada and make civil liberties and human rights central to Canadian security laws. The Liberals waited almost two years to hold a public consultation, promising to correct Bill C-51. They heard countless testimonies and received briefs from experts, and yet they failed to deliver.

Sadly, Bill C-59 does not seek to correct Bill C-51. The NDP opposed Bill C-51 from the outset back in 2015. Now we are faced with legislation that violates civil liberties and privacy rights, and Bill C-59 follows the dangerous path trodden by the Harper government.

The new, limited review and oversight mechanism set out in this bill does not make up for the disclosure of information and the almost limitless power given to our security agencies. The document that came out of the consultations, entitled “Our Security, Our Rights: National Security Green Paper, 2016”, was criticized by civil liberties advocates for being biased. It placed an inordinate amount of weight on safety and security at the expense of protecting Canadians' constitutional values.

The scenarios presented in this document seemed to favour the implementation of the most controversial provisions of Bill C-51. Although the green paper did not provide a balanced view that would allow Canadians to properly assess the potential negative impacts that giving the government too much power could have on individual rights and freedoms, the results of the consultations showed that Canadians still wanted Bill C-51 to be completely repealed and that they would not be satisfied with half measures.

The NDP has consistently called on the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to repeal and replace the 2010 ministerial directive on torture to make sure Canada abides by the total ban on torture, and more specifically to forbid the use, under any circumstances, of information that other countries may have obtained through torture and the sharing of information that could lead to torture.

Canada must not forget the shameful part it played in the torture of Canadian citizens like Maher Arar. Even though the directive was not part of Bill C-51, it is a deplorable component of our national security framework and should have been addressed during the Liberals' study of the framework. Unfortunately, the new directive issued in October 2017 does not forbid the RCMP, CSIS, or CBSA from using information that may have been obtained through torture in other countries.

The new instructions are nothing more than semantic changes, since they authorize the use of information obtained by torture in certain cases, with a very low accountability threshold. This does nothing for public safety and security, since information obtained through torture is not reliable. The new directive, just like the old one, tarnishes Canada's reputation and goes against Canadian values.

Furthermore, if the bill passes, Canada will remain a police state, and Bill C-59 will even make things worse in some specific circumstances.

It will allow the Communications Security Establishment to launch cyberattacks against foreign targets.

The agents involved will thus become terrorists in the eyes of those countries. Ordinary citizens of those countries will have no other means than their own of protecting themselves from potential injustices caused by Canadian secret agents.

This new bill has very few measures that will reduce the broader powers granted to security agencies involved in information sharing under Bill C-51. The fact remains that the definition of national security is still too broad. The legislation still allows departments to share far too much information in their quest to achieve rather questionable security objectives. However, despite the fact that a government has taken steps to create more solid frameworks for the Canada Information Sharing Act and the Secure Air Travel Act, the no-fly list, the concerns raised by the introduction of C-51 remain unaddressed.

The government has not yet demonstrated why this intrusive bill is necessary. I am also concerned about the fact that Bill C-59 seems to create a legal framework that allows CSIS to keep data about citizens that used to be off limits and that there is no reasonable justification for expanding these powers. It also allows CSIS to keep its controversial disruption powers.

I will now turn to other elements of the bill that I have a problem with. Bill C-59 amends the definition of “activity that undermines the security of Canada” to include any activity that threatens the lives or the security of people in Canada or of any individual who has a connection to Canada and who is outside Canada. The definition includes activities that cause “significant or widespread interference with critical infrastructure”. We are concerned that this could be used against peaceful demonstrators protesting things like pipelines.

CSIS will maintain its threat-reduction powers. Bill C-59 just adds torture, detention, and serious damage to property that endangers the life of an individual to the list of things CSIS cannot do when disrupting a terrorist plot. CSIS must also check with other departments and organizations to see if they have other ways to reduce threats.

CSIS can prevent a person from travelling but cannot detain anyone. There is no clear distinction between the two, which creates dangerous legal uncertainty. The bill does not prevent CSIS from collecting related data from Canadians who are not considered a threat.

Finally, the bill fails to address two worrisome aspects of Canadian national security laws, namely security certificates and the ministerial directives on torture, which must be done away with.

In summary, the Liberals were elected on a promise to repeal the problematic provisions of Bill C-51, and they made us wait two years. Their current proposal does not even come close to solving the problems created by the former government's Bill C-51 regarding the violation of Canadians' privacy and the criminalization of dissent. What is more, the Liberal government is using this omnibus bill to create a legal framework that would allow CSIS to store sensitive metadata on completely innocent Canadians, a practice that the Federal Court deemed to be illegal last fall.

[Jim Eglinski, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Mr. Speaker, the member is absolutely correct. Bill C-59 is full of flaws. As the Liberals stated earlier today in one of their statements, it the result of an election promise by them. I do not think there is any room or place in Canada's security to be worrying about an election promise versus the security of Canadians. I believe the bill should have gone back for a lot more debate. The bill should never have been presented in the format it has been. It is wrong in many cases, and it is hurting a very good bill, Bill C-51, which may have had possible flaws, but not very many, and things could be reviewed and corrected.

[François Choquette, NDP, Drummond, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I know my colleague and I do not agree on Bill C-59, not on the very essence of the bill, nor on Bill C-51. Bill C-59 was supposed to correct Bill C-51. As my colleague knows, I voted against Bill C-51.

Despite the fact that the Liberals have been working on this for two years now, they have introduced a bill that is full of flaws. Everyone realized that immediately. It must be sent to committee right away, because we cannot even debate this bill at second reading.

With all that being said, would my colleague not agree that this reeks of improvisation on the Liberal's part once again, and that if they were not ready to introduce Bill C-59, they should withdraw it and work on it with the opposition for once, so that we can come up with a more balanced and better prepared solution?

[Jim Eglinski, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise in the House to speak to Bill C-59, an act respecting national security matters. This is a very large bill that seeks to make some major changes to our national security. It affects Bill C-51 that was brought in by our previous government. It replaces the Security Intelligence Review Committee and the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment with a new national security and intelligence review agency. It creates the position of an intelligence commissioner to provide day-to-day oversight of national security activities. It limits the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's ability to reduce terrorist threats. It limits the ability of government departments to share data among themselves to protect national security. It removes the offence of advocating and promoting terrorist offences in general. It raises the threshold for obtaining a terrorism peace bond and recognizance with conditions.

Obviously, there is a lot in this bill, and I will not have time to speak to all of it. Therefore, I will focus on a few key areas that I have concerns with.

As most people know, extremist travellers are those who have left Canada or other countries to join terrorist groups abroad. As ISIS continues to lose ground in Syria and Iraq, supporters of this militant group and other terrorist organizations have returned to their home countries, Canada included, with almost 60 of them now returned.

According to a recent report that was released in October from the Soufan Center, a U.S.-based non-profit organization, 33 countries have reported the arrival of at least 5,600 extremist travellers. That is 5,600 of them now returning home. The report states that those returns represent, “a huge challenge for security and law enforcement entities.”

Now is not the time to relax the laws that protect our national security. Canadians are at risk. Canada is not immune to the threats of terrorism. We have seen an attack on Parliament Hill, the terrorist attack that killed Warrant Officer Patrice Vincent, and the recent attack of a police officer and members of the public in the city of Edmonton, just next to my riding. We need strong legislation in place to protect our national security and our citizens. This is why our Conservative government introduced Bill C-51, which has been used to disrupt terrorist activities nearly two dozen times that we know of. This includes when law enforcement and intelligence officers intervened last year to stop ISIS supporter Aaron Driver, who had planned to commit a terror attack in Canada. These attacks, and attempted attacks, demonstrate that Canada needs strong security and intelligence legislation that enables public safety agencies to do their job.

Prior to our previous Conservative government's Bill C-51, the mandate of CSIS prevented it from engaging in any disruption activities. It could not approach the parents of a radicalized youth and encourage them to dissuade their child from travelling to a war zone or conducting attacks here in Canada. After Bill C-51, CSIS was able to engage in threat disruption. Warrants were not required for activities that were not contrary to Canadian law, such as approaching the parents of a radicalized youth. This was very reasonable, in my opinion. However, Bill C-59 will now limit the threat disruption activities of CSIS to very specific actions. It will require a warrant for simple and necessary activities, such as impersonating a local citizen to give a suspect the wrong directions in order to disrupt a threat. This bill unnecessarily limits and restricts the ability of CSIS to disrupt threats to national security. Bill C-59 also makes it more difficult to obtain a peace bond for terrorism cases. We should be going forward. We should be strengthening the laws in Canada, not reducing them in favour of terrorism.

Under Bill C-51, a peace bond can be issued if there are reasonable grounds to fear that a person may commit a terrorism offence and a peace bond is likely to prevent terrorism activities. That is the same as a peace bond under the Criminal Code of Canada, which I applied for on a number of occasions over the years as a police officer. When I knew someone might pose a threat to an individual, I went to a judge and had a peace warrant issued to protect the possible victim.

Bill C-59 would increase the threshold from “is likely” to “is necessary” to prevent a terrorist activity. If we have evidence that someone is planning an attack and we cannot act on good sound information, it is going to be a sad day for this country. This means that the amount of evidence that would go into proving the peace bond is necessary is nearly the same as the evidence one would need to lay a criminal charge. If we look at those set of circumstances, why would one go for a peace bond? One might as well lay the criminal charge. It is a little late.

The point of peace bonds is that there is not enough evidence to arrest and charge that suspect, but there are reasonable grounds to believe that a person is involved in terrorist activities. That is reasonable. It is reasonable under the Criminal Code to believe that if somebody threatens numerous times to kill a person, that maybe a peace bond should be issued for that person to stay away from the possible victim.

If the government raises the threshold to obtain a peace bond, people who are a risk to national security will slip through the cracks. We now have 60 of them in this country. How are our police forces supposed to keep us safe if they cannot request that special safety conditions be put on someone who is likely to engage in an attack?

I also find this legislation problematic in addressing the issue of advocating and recruiting for terrorist groups. General and broad threats against Canada or all infidels is not a crime under the Criminal Code. Hate speech and threats need to be directed at an identifiable group. Bill C-51's definition of advocating or promoting terrorism enabled law officers to more effectively pursue those distributing radicalizing propaganda and advocating violence, and it should. However, the bill before us today would delete this offence. Without the ability to target the advocacy and/or promotion of terrorism, law enforcement will be handicapped from effectively addressing the various ways that individuals are radicalized. This includes removing terrorist propaganda from the Internet.

Another concerning change is in part 8 of the bill, which would amend the Youth Criminal Justice Act. If we afford more protections to young offenders who are guilty of terrorism offences, youth will become a target for radical recruiters. Instead of cracking down on radicalization, the Liberals are creating loopholes that those who seek to radicalize youth can exploit.

One last problematic area that I want to highlight is in part 5 of the bill. This section would amend the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which was established by Bill C-51. The changes proposed in today's bill would make it more difficult for government departments to share information with each other. As a former police officer, I know how necessary it is to be able to share intelligence when conducting a large investigation. It can make or break a case. We have problems when it is easier for our own agencies to share information internationally than with each other. While our Five Eyes allies are all taking measures to strengthen national security, this legislation would remove the ability of our intelligence services to reduce terrorist threats.

In the last year, horrendous attacks in the United States, Europe, and our own country, have shown that no country is immune from the risks associated with terrorism and radicalization. The Anti-terrorism Act, brought forward by our previous government, struck a careful balance between protecting the civil liberties of Canadians while adequately providing law enforcement with the necessary tools to keep Canadians safe. It is the responsibility of the government to ensure that all of Canada's security and intelligence services have the tools they need to do their jobs.

[Wayne Stetski, NDP, Kootenay—Columbia, BC]

Mr. Speaker, as I said in my speech, it was one of the very serious concerns for my constituents, and Canadians in general, related to Bill C-51, that they felt the bill would be used to stop legal protests against government projects like pipelines.

We need to make sure that any legislation moving forward enshrines the right of Canadians for public protest without fear of being considered a terrorist.

[Wayne Stetski, NDP, Kootenay—Columbia, BC]

Mr. Speaker, the important point with respect to the debate is whether Bill C-59 will actually contribute anything to the ISIS question and the number of people coming back into Canada. I really do not think it will. Bill C-51 and now Bill C-59 potentially create concerns for everyday Canadians about the security of information around them and how it gets used.

The government needs to figure out what to do with returning ISIS individuals and deal with them appropriately to ensure our safety. However, I do not think that is relevant to this bill. Bill C-59 would do nothing to help that situation one way or the other.

[Wayne Stetski, NDP, Kootenay—Columbia, BC]

Mr. Speaker, going back to 2015, it really was one of the most contentious issues that came forward during the election. People in my riding were concerned about too much unnecessary information being collected, and that the information and the act would be used to stop legal demonstrations. There was a great deal of concern about Bill C-51, which led to protests in a number of communities, not only in my riding but across Canada.

Constituents would like to see Bill C-51 completely withdrawn, not necessarily amended through Bill C-59 but repealed and, certainly, if not repealed entirely, then at least specific sections repealed that Canadians found to be most repugnant.

[Wayne Stetski, NDP, Kootenay—Columbia, BC]

Mr. Speaker, thinking back to the 2015 general federal election, there were certainly few issues as contentious as Bill C-51, the so-called Anti-Terrorism Act. In my riding of Kootenay—Columbia, citizens came out en mass to protest in many communities, including Invermere, Revelstoke, Nelson, and in my home town of Cranbrook. I attended some of those rallies and found that the opposition cut across partisan and generational lines.

As I said at the time, the more people knew about Bill C-51, the more they disliked it. Letting Canadians know the details of the bill was not part of the former government's playbook. I remember my predecessor inviting the Attorney General to the riding. He was one of the co-authors of the bill, but rather than invite members of the public to ask questions or provide input, they held some private meetings and then left. Not even the local media were allowed to speak to the Attorney General at the time.

This is the kind of anti-democratic behaviour that helped Canadians decide to retire the Conservative government and elect a new one. Why did Canadians and the people in my riding of Kootenay—Columbia hate and fear the Anti-Terrorism Act so much? It was because it potentially criminalized activities like peaceful protests and picket lines, by giving police broad powers to breach Canadians' privacy. Many of my constituents believed it was clearly aimed not at terrorists, but at stopping democratic resistance to the Conservatives' priority projects such as pipelines. It helped to end 21 years of Conservative MPs in my riding in the corner of British Columbia.

The Liberal Party, which fully supported Bill C-51 when it was being debated and voted on, promised during the election to do better. The Liberals said they would repeal the worst parts of the bill. Here we are two years after the election and the government is just now getting around to addressing that terrible piece of legislation. Its response is insufficient.

The new legislation, Bill C-59, still allows the widespread sharing of Canadians' personal information on a national security list. It maintains a very broad definition of activities that the government claims will undermine the security of Canada, an issue that the Privacy Commissioner has flagged, and it does not ensure real-time oversight of the bulk collection of Canadians' private data.

What is worse is that the government is dealing with this legislation in an entirely undemocratic fashion, forcing the bill to committee, without second reading debate.

Despite their support for Bill C-51, the Liberals were elected on a promise to fix this terrible legislation. So far, they have fallen far short of doing so.

This goes on the lengthening list of broken promises. Let us look at the bill in detail.

In November 2016, the Federal Court issued a ruling on CSIS bulk data collection. CSIS illegally kept potentially revealing electronic data about people over a 10-year period. In a hard-hitting ruling, Justice Simon Noel said that the Canadian Security Intelligence Service breached its duty to inform the court of its data collection program, since the information was gathered using judicial warrants. CSIS should not have retained the information since it was not directly related to threats to the security of Canada.

Bill C-59 responds to the Federal Court ruling in the most concerning way for our privacy, enshrining bulk collection by CSIS of metadata containing private information of Canadians not relevant to investigations. That is right: rather than ordering CSIS to obey the law and stop storing Canadians' data illegally, the bill makes it legal for it to do so. The new bill does relatively little to roll back the extensive information-sharing powers Bill C-51 gave security agencies. The fact remains there is still too broad a definition as to what constitutes national security. The newly renamed security of Canada information disclosure act still permits departments to disclose far too much information in their pursuit of questionable security objectives.

Bill C-51 gave CSIS broad powers to reduce threats through conduct that threatens freedom of expression, public safety, and freedom of association, and it was ripe for abuse. The new legislation still provides CSIS with those powers, but limits them from including torture, detention, and serious destruction of property that would endanger a life.

It is good that the government would no longer have the right to torture its citizens, but the power CSIS maintains would be more appropriate to a totalitarian police state than to Canada. Bill C-59, like Bill C-51 before it, would make Canada a comfortable place for Big Brother.

The government will tell us that none of this is likely and that no powers would ever be abused, yet we already have examples where over-zealousness in the name of anti-terrorism has harmed Canadians. We have seen just this month taxpayers having to pay out settlements worth tens of millions of dollars to Canadians who were tortured overseas due to the complicit actions of the Canadian security services. We see hundreds of young children whose names are on the no-fly list, unable to accompany their families from one city to another because they have been banned, and the government has been unable to find a mechanism to review and correct the list. Apparently, the government is considering a new computer system to manage the no-fly list. Let us hope it works better than the Phoenix payroll system has.

Bill C-59 will not undo the damage that Bill C-51 created. It is a Band-Aid for a gaping wound. With my NDP colleagues, I will be opposing the motion to ram Bill C-59 through the democratic process, and I will join the chorus of Canadians calling for Bill C-51 to be repealed, not just tinkered with. Let me close with a quotation from Daniel Therrien, the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, when he spoke before the access to information, privacy and ethics committee a year ago, November 22, 2016. He said:

Do we want a country where the security service has a lot of information about most citizens with a view to detecting national security threats? Is that the country we want to live in?

We have seen real cases in which CSIS had in its bank of information the information about many people who did not represent a threat. Is that the country we want?

The answer from Canadians clearly is no. That is most certainly not a country we want, and we cannot and will not support Bill C-59.

[Jim Eglinski, Conservative, Yellowhead, AB]

Mr. Speaker, when the Conservative government brought in Bill C-51, it was designed to assist law enforcement and security agencies to prevent attacks on Canada's soil.

Does the hon. member feel that Bill C-59 would distract from that?

[Luc Berthold, Conservative, Mégantic—L'Érable, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I agree in part with what my colleague said, especially regarding Bill C-51. I would remind members that the Liberals were the second opposition party at the time. They supported Bill C-51. Today, they are trying to come up with a new version of Bill C-51, because they made promises in order to try to win votes. However, they are coming to the realization that Bill C-51 was not that bad after all. That is what is happening. That is why they are referring Bill C-59 to committee and trying all sorts of tricks to perhaps revert to Bill C-51, which was quite a good bill that guaranteed one thing that we all agree on: the security of Canadians against this wave of terrorists attacks around the world.

The Liberals supported Bill C-51 at the time. Today, they realize that they cannot do better. They are trying all kinds of tricks to revert to Bill C-51 without making it seem that way.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank and commend the hon. member for Windsor West for his thoughtful speech. I certainly thank the New Democratic Party caucus for joining me in the 41st Parliament in opposing Bill C-51.

I think there have been substantial improvements made in Bill C-59. I think we would all agree with that, but I remain very concerned that the powers are overreaching for CSIS agents to seek a court order from a single judge that would allow a warrant for a constitutional breach. I have raised this in briefings we have had with officials. Officials claim that the language in Bill C-59 would mean that they could not get a warrant that violated the Constitution and the charter, but the language in the bill itself appears to negative that proposition. It appears that it would still allow CSIS agents to receive a warrant that would allow them to violate our Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

I know that I am diving into the details of the bill, but it would take a lot of study. Many sections are very much improved, and the government deserves commendation for those sections, but these are the ones that chill me to the bone in terms of how our democracy functions and whether we allow security agents to obtain a warrant to violate our Constitution.

I wonder if my friend for Windsor West has any comments.

[Brian Masse, NDP, Windsor West, ON]

Mr. Speaker, one cannot help but look to the past to see how we got here today with this bill, Bill C-59, because it really comes from the framework of Bill C-51. It is one of the reasons New Democrats will be opposing this bill, just as we opposed Bill C-51. At least we had an honest debate with the Conservatives about our position on Bill C-51, whereas the Liberals said they had concerns but then voted for Bill C-51, then later ran on a platform to get rid of Bill C-51.

Now we are stuck with Bill C-59. Their objective is clearly to muddy the waters so much that nobody will be able to follow this outside of the House of Commons, aside from experts in security intelligence. People are having to follow House of Commons debates on a regular basis, which is very difficult to do when there are so many things happening.

There still is interest out there. The bottom line is whether the privacy of Canadians will become unhinged by national security issues that undermine our civil liberties. When I look at some of the perspectives of Conservative members on civil liberties, I am, quite frankly, surprised that in this case, with Bill C-59, they do not have more backbone to raise issues about that balance, especially given the fact that one of their members, who very much has a strong civil libertarian background, nearly became leader of their party.

I can say this much about Bill C-51. Civil liberties and privacy are essential for a modern and functioning democracy. One of the continuing concerns with Bill C-59 is the assembly and distribution of personal data. It is real. There are people, such as Maher Arar and others, whose lives have been turned upside down because their personal information was used in a way that exposed them, their families, their business and personal contacts, and the people in their lives. It was an organized decision by our government agencies, the RCMP and CSIS, to exchange information with foreign powers related to that personal, private information. As Bill C-59 goes to committee, the Privacy Commissioner has expressed those concerns.

There are several cases in Canadian history where this has been germane to the concern people have about their privacy. I would argue that it has become even more difficult for individuals because of the use of electronic information for everything from taxes, to banking, to social exchanges, to employment. It is not as if this information is captured and stored in a vault somewhere that has very little exposure to third parties. The reality is that there are breaches. Other governments are actively attempting to break through Canadian databases on a regular basis, even countries we supposedly have decent relationships with in terms of trade, commerce, and discourse. There are attempts to abuse Canadian privacy.

Numerous mistakes have been made, over decades, when Canadians' personal information has been released by accident. I point to one of the more interesting cases we have been successful in. It showed the malaise in government. It was when the Paul Martin administration of the Liberals outsourced data collection for our census to Lockheed Martin through a public-private partnership. Basically, the Canadian census data collection component was outsourced to an arms manufacturer, which was compiling our data at public expense, because we were paying for it. When we did the investigation, we found that the information was going to be compiled in the United States. That would have made that information susceptible to the USA Patriot Act, back in 2004 or 2006. That would have exposed all our Canadian data, if it was going to be leaving the country.

Thankfully, a lot of Canadians spoke out against that. First, they had personal issues related to an arms manufacturing company collecting their personal information, especially when that company was producing the Hellfire missile and landmine munitions, when Canada had signed international agreements on restricting the distribution of those things. They also felt that the privacy component became a practical element with it moving out of the country. Thankfully, that stopped, and we amended it at that time.

The Government of Canada had to pay more money to assemble that data and information in Canada, so it cost us more. What the Liberals were trying to do was export the jobs, ironically, outside the country. The vulnerability of the Canadian data we were paying for was out of the country, then we had to pay a premium to bring it back and keep it in the country. That practice has ceased. We recently had the innovation committee confirm that, when the census committee came before us.

With Bill C-59, I still have grave concerns about the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act. It appears that most of the changes are going to be cosmetic. The Privacy Commissioner has alluded to that as well. When CSIS and other government agencies have that information, when is it scrubbed when it is provided? When is it no longer used? When is it no longer stored? When can it potentially be exposed by accident or for a reason?

Bill C-59 would put several laws in place. I want to note that there was extensive public consultation on it. The reality is that Bill C-51 was criticized by civil liberty advocates in “Our Security, Our Rights: National Security Green Paper, 2016”. The public feedback we had from that review was related to people's personal privacy and how it would be used.

I want to make sure we are clear that this is not a mythological issue. It has actually been noted. On November 26, the Federal Court issued a ruling on CSIS bulk data collection. The electronic data of people over a 10-year period was clearly something that concerned Canadians.

Unfortunately, we have not come to the realization that Bill C-51 was a flawed bill from the get-go. It was not a bill New Democrats could support, and Bill C-59 would just put a mask over that bill.

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, while I thank my colleague for her question, I think it should more appropriately be asked to the current Liberal government. This Parliament is not debating nor considering Bill C-51, which was passed with the enthusiastic support of the Liberal Party when it was the third party. The Liberals, en masse, as the third party, stood in support of Bill C-51. I would suggest to my hon. colleague that she should more appropriately question the shortcomings of this act, not look back to past Parliaments.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I certainly appreciate concerns about omnibus bills. However, I recall very clearly in the 41st Parliament when we received Bill C-51, getting it on a Friday, taking it home to my riding, reading it with increasing levels of panic and concern throughout the weekend, and being the first member of Parliament to oppose it in this place.

Therefore, putting aside for the moment that we know we disagree on Bill C-51, I ask my hon. colleague if it was not also an omnibus bill. It had five parts. Each part of Bill C-51 dealt with a different aspect of security. Part 1, with respect to information sharing, was unfortunately not about information sharing where we need it, which is between and among security agencies, but sharing information with others about Canadians. Part 2 dealt with aspects of the no-fly list. Part 3 was about this bizarre, undefined notion that we could ban the promotion of “terrorism” in general. Part 4 was the massively expanded powers for CSIS. Part 5 amended the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Within each of those five parts, numerous acts were amended and changed. I would have preferred to see Bill C-51 split up into the five parts that were presented to us as one bill, but I do not recall my hon. colleague agreeing that it should have been split up. Where does he see the difference between this omnibus bill and Bill C-51, that omnibus bill in the 41st Parliament?

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my hon. colleague for attempting to put the government spin on the treatment of Bill C-51 and what it considers to be reasonable changes, which we, as I said, feel weaken crime-fighting and intelligence agencies in protecting national security. At the same time, we would have preferred to see the changes to Bill C-51 in stand-alone legislation, not folded into or buried in this omnibus bill, which creates three new agencies, changes a number of other acts, and across the board has some serious issues that we in the official opposition simply cannot support. There are good elements. The preamble to the act does lay out very clearly some protections against a judicial finding of error with respect to decisions by security agencies. However, we consider it to be a deeply flawed bill.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I am sure my colleague across the way would recognize, or at the very least would acknowledge, that when we dealt with Bill C-51, a significant amount of concern was shown by Canadians. When we were in opposition, we pointed out to the government that there were certain areas that needed to be addressed. What we have before us today is, in good part, a response to some of those issues that were raised when we passed Bill C-51. The present Prime Minister made some commitments to Canadians leading up to the last federal election, and this legislation deals with some of those commitments.

Why does the Conservative Party not recognize that what we are witnessing today with respect to this legislation, which hopefully will go to committee at the end of the day, is the fulfillment of some significant commitments made by the Prime Minister during the last election. We then incorporated additional aspects into the legislation to deal with the concerns related to independent rights and freedoms, while dealing with the issue of security at the same time. Would the member not agree that we can do both at the same time?

[Peter Kent, Conservative, Thornhill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the legislation before us, Bill C-59, is a huge piece of legislation. It goes far beyond the Liberal campaign promise to unwisely roll back a number of elements of Bill C-51, a bill that the Liberals supported when they were the third party in the House. I will say more about that in a moment. Bill C-59 is a multi-faceted attempt at the largest, broadest, and deepest redrawing, remodelling, overhauling, and consolidation—call it what they may—of Canada's national security laws in three and a half decades. It is, by any definition and any measure, an omnibus bill. Bill C-59 would create three new acts and would make significant changes to five existing acts. As my colleague from Barrie—Innisfil noted, the official opposition reserves the right to comment after the Speaker's decision on the NDP motion to separate.

In its complexity, Bill C-59 can only be described as an imperfect bill. There are good elements, which we in the official opposition support, but other elements that we strongly oppose. Similarly, Bill C-59 has been characterized by experts, at least by lawyers, academics, and others who have long studied and opined on national security issues, in a variety of ways, that it would resolve some problems and would ignore others. It would create some entirely new ones. Its elements are a combination of roses and thorns, and a firmly held criticism by the official opposition that two sections would actually weaken Canada's national security agencies and their ability to keep Canadians safe. The current Liberal government would make it more difficult for law enforcement and security agencies to prevent terrorist attacks on Canadian soil. Instead of combatting radicalization and cracking down on those who promote terrorism, Bill C-59 would create loopholes that advocates of terrorism could easily exploit.

With regard to the details, part one of Bill C-59 would create what is described as the centrepiece of the legislation, what others more colloquially describe as a super intelligence agency. It would be called the national security and intelligence review agency. Under its acronym, NSIRA, it would be assigned to review and report on the lawfulness of all national security and intelligence agencies across government. It would investigate complaints against the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, known by its acronym CSIS, complaints against the Communications Security Establishment, CSE, and complaints against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. NSIRA would be intended, the Liberals tell us, to work with the new committee of Parliament, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. The new agency, like the parliamentary committee, would report annually to the Prime Minister. This last point, for me, is another point of concern. On this side of the House, we would have preferred to have had these reports made directly to the Houses of Parliament rather than being filtered through the Prime Minister's Office.

Part 2 of Bill C-59 would establish what is described as an independent, quasi-judicial intelligence commissioner, who would assess and review ministerial decisions regarding intelligence gathering and cybersecurity activities. Our concerns here flow from the procrastination and delays by the Liberals, more directly by the Prime Minister's Office, to fill vacancies across a range of close to a dozen existing commissioner positions, the last time I looked. These are delays that have more to do with the PMO's misguided intent to socially engineer with partisan overtones these arm's-length positions rather than to appoint by talent and qualifications.

Moving on, parts 3 and 4 of the bill are said to respond to concerns about charter consistency of the mandates and the powers of CSE and CSIS. However, part 4 would strip an important element of Bill C-51, passed by our previous Conservative government in 2015, an element that gave CSIS new authority to disrupt terrorist threats. The Liberals supported Bill C-51 in 2015, though they vaguely committed to roll back what they called problematic parts. They certainly have, caving in now in Bill C-59, to seriously restricting the ability of CSIS to conduct disruption actions to certain specific actions, and only unless and until officers and operatives follow a burdensome process to obtain a judicial warrant ahead of time.

This list would include many of the routine elements of undercover intelligence work, such as impersonating a criminal; fabricating documents, for example, to support such a character impersonation; or misdirecting an identified threat individual to a meeting with co-conspirators. Forcing judicial warrant conditions into suspect terror or intelligence investigations imposes serious new burdens on law enforcement and could very well compromise time-critical efforts to thwart terrorist attacks.

Part 5 of the proposed act is an important part that commits to clarifying disclosure and accountability provisions in the newly renamed security of Canada information disclosure act. This should see the end of departmental and agency intelligence silos, and a more effective sharing of information that is critical to threats to national security. We will see.

Part 6 attempts to bring greater coherence to the no-fly list, where children and adults get red-flagged as false positives because of names shared with threat-identified individuals. However, these improvements are very slight and imperfect. Thousands of Canadian families are still stuck in limbo because their names appear, or the name of a family member appears, on the no-fly list.

Part 7 is another section which we firmly believe seriously weakens public safety by minimizing certain terrorist activities. It removes the advocacy and promotion of terror as a criminal offence. It replaces it with what is characterized as a more targeted general counselling offence for terrorism offences, whether or not a specific terrorism offence is committed or a specific terrorism offence is counselled. As well, part 7 would make it harder for police to pre-emptively detain people without a criminal charge.

The power of making preventive arrests, a sometimes life-and-death tool for officers and operatives, is now limited to situations where such an arrest would be necessary to prevent terrorist activity. Under our previous Bill C-51, the threshold was that such an arrest would be likely to prevent terrorist activity.

The Conservative Party has always taken very seriously the safety of Canadians, as threats to this country's security have evolved and deepened in this age of international terror. We recognize the importance of updating our national security infrastructure and practices. We support the preamble of Bill C-59 as a worthy rationale to reducing the ability of courts to strike down convictions on improperly applied charter grounds.

We also strongly oppose, and I cannot say this too often, parts 4 and 7 as an unacceptable weakening of public safety, and the watering down of provisions in Bill C-51 that helped law enforcement officers and agencies to keep Canadians safe.

In conclusion, Bill C-59 is a complex bill, and it is certainly, by any measure, an omnibus bill. It would create three new acts, and it would make changes to five other existing acts.

As I said earlier, we in the official opposition reserve comment on your ruling, Mr. Speaker, in the fullness of time, and we hope it is a relatively short period of time, to make a decision on the NDP motion to separate.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast—Sea to Sky Country, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very happy to be reminded of the reason why many of us put our names forward in the last election, and that was to stand up for Canadians. Certainly, Bill C-51 was a big part of that. I did not vote for that. It is a priority for our government. I am very much in support of Bill C-59.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast—Sea to Sky Country, BC]

Mr. Speaker, what Canadians do not have confidence in is Bill C-51. This has been an exhaustive consultative process, and we are very grateful to those who have spoken up for how Canadian legislation can balance safety and security with rights and privacy.

The fact that this is being considered in an unusual way is a reflection of our deep commitment to open accountable, transparent, and, above all, consultative government. I certainly hope this will go to second reading, and then of course it will return to the House for debate.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Trade]

Mr. Speaker, I am delighted to have this opportunity to speak in support of sending Bill C-59, legislation that would bring Canada's national security framework into the 21st century, to committee before second reading. The bill is the result of extensive consultation, and it is in this spirit that it continues through the legislative process.

I would like to thank the numerous agencies and individuals who have offered their expertise and advice in order to ensure that Bill C-59 balances the security of Canadians with the privacy and rights of Canadians, and particularly for their participation through an open and transparent process.

Bill C-59 takes significant steps in three key areas: first, it repeals problematic elements of the former Bill C-51; second, it updates and improves national security law commensurate with and in order to keep pace with evolving threats; and third, it enhances accountability and transparency. Taken together, the proposed measures in Bill C-59 represent comprehensive and much-needed improvements to Canada's national security framework. These improvements would make Canada more secure, our agencies more accountable, and our laws more transparent and up to date.

It is important to understand, and perhaps self-evident, that much of Canada's national security law was written in the 1980s and well before the standard of information technology today, which has transformed the national security and intelligence landscape. Today, smartphones and wireless connectivity is a natural extension of our lives and maybe even ourselves. Therefore, it should be obvious and deeply concerning that technology today in the hands of criminals and terrorists can be used to plan and carry out horrific terror attacks against innocent people. It can also be used to influence and recruit individuals.

Cyber-threats, espionage, and foreign interference are complex and active threats, and yet rapidly-evolving technology is not the only national security challenge we face. The emergence of non-traditional threat actors, outdated legal authorities, and resource shortfalls reveal further gaps in our national security framework, compounded by an unstable international political environment marked by violence and repression, civil war, and failed and failing states throughout the world. It is a very different world from the one that existed in 1984, which is when the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act came into force.

Canada's national security law has not kept pace with the transformative changes of the past few decades. According to Justice Noël of the Federal Court in a judgment last fall, he said that the CSIS Act was showing its age with regard to new technology and developments over the past quarter century.

The safety and security of Canada and Canadians depend on having laws in place that accurately reflect today's realities. The proposed legislation before the House is the right way forward in that regard. It modernizes the CSIS Act in a responsible, accountable, and transparent way. If passed, Bill C-59 will allow our security and intelligence agencies to keep us safe by staying ahead of new and emerging threats and technologies in full respect of our rights.

First and foremost, a modernized CSIS Act would serve to address the agency's outdated legal authorities. It would also update and improve the transparency and accountability regime under which CSIS would operate, a consideration that was noted time and time again during last year's consultation process.

Bill C-59 proposes to bolster the authorities underpinning the technical capabilities of CSIS in order to modernize the collection of digital intelligence. The legislation also proposes to establish a list of distinct measures that can be authorized under warrant to reduce threats in the current environment. It would also clarify that a warrant would be required for any threat reduction measure that would limit a right or freedom protected by the charter, and that a warrant could only be issued if a judge would be satisfied that the measure would be consistent with the charter.

A strong framework would also be created within the act for data analytics that would involve data sets and that would put the rights of Canadians first. For example, once the bill is passed, CSIS will require authorization from the intelligence commissioner to acquire any Canadian data sets and Federal Court approval to retain them. This will ensure that the personal information of Canadians is subject to strict safeguards.

Under Bill C-59, foreign data sets containing information on non-Canadians would also require authorization from the commissioner.

These are only a few of the important new measures being proposed under Bill C-59 and were shaped by the tens of thousands of views that the government heard in its extensive public consultations on national security.

I am very proud to stand with the government in supporting Bill C-59. I look forward to its consideration by the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security before second reading, so the committee will have greater latitude in how it conducts its study.

Standing Order 69.1—Omnibus Bills

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to ask that you consider Standing Order 69.1 and divide certain parts of Bill C-59 before us today into separate pieces. As mentioned during today's debate, I believe that Bill C-59 is an omnibus bill as described in that standing order.

Standing Order 69.1 now says, in part:

(1) In the case where a government bill seeks to repeal, amend or enact more than one act, and where there is not a common element connecting the various provisions or where unrelated matters are linked, the Speaker shall have the power to divide the questions, for the purposes of voting.

I submit that Bill C-59 fits that description.

We are thinking of this analysis at this time, because in your ruling of November 7 on Standing Order 69.1, you said:

Where members believe that the Standing Order should apply, I would encourage them to raise their arguments as early as possible in the process, especially given that the length of debate at a particular stage can be unpredictable.

That is what we believe we are doing today.

Here is how I see the various parts of the bill and why, I submit to you, Mr. Speaker, we believe they should be divided into different parts to be voted on separately.

Let us take a look at part 1 and part 2. Part 1 enacts the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency Act, and part 2 enacts the Intelligence Commissioner Act. These two parts enact two new acts and amend up to 12 existing acts.

These parts obviously create watchdogs to oversee the national security agencies.

The activities of the new agencies created under this bill would affect up to 14 federal departments. Since these parts create new agencies and enact two brand-new acts with a very specific mandate, we believe they should be voted on separately.

We believe that part 3 should be separated because it makes a significant change. It too would enact a new act, the Communications Security Establishment Act, yet another act that will amend existing acts.

That proposed act would also amend the National Defence Act. We know that the minister responsible for CSE is the Minister of National Defence. Again, we feel that puts certain optics around this debate, given that the Minister of Public Safety is tabling this bill, and the purpose for changing that particular piece.

Still on part 3, I do want to mention that many of these components are being painted as dealing with specific aspects of national security, more specifically terrorism, but if we look the part dealing with CSE, we see that a large part of the mandate goes beyond just terrorism. It could be individuals and, to use the colloquial term, hackers or even states that would be engaging in certain forms of cyber-activity. The proposed act would give CSE the ability to interfere and even counter certain things that might be done, which is very separate from reforming elements of the previous Bill C-51.

Parts 4 and 5 deal with metadata collection and the threat disruption powers being given to CSIS. In the case of the metadata collection, that of course is something new. In the case of threat disruption, we are obviously looking at what the specific intent of the bill was, which is to repeal and amend, in this case to amend certain things brought in under Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament.

We are also looking at changes to SCISA, the information-sharing regime brought in by former Bill C-51. That again leads us to argue that parts 4 and 5, given their nature and the connection they have with previous legislation that is being changed, should be looked at together.

Part 6 has to do with the Secure Air Travel Act and the no-fly list. We definitely think this needs to be separated. There are a number of important elements to consider, not to mention the issue of funding and the different work that will be done by the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of Transport in co-operation with airlines.

Part 7 deals with specific changes to the Criminal Code, certain offences that were brought in under Bill C-51, and other aspects that needed to be cleaned up based on the reforms the government wishes to propose to the Criminal Code, specifically to what the previous government did in that respect. We are looking here specifically at how terrorism charges are laid and prosecuted in Canada, which is fair to argue is very distinct from dealing with cybersecurity threats or even the no-fly list. We are looking here at the way the justice system is treating these matters.

Part 8 is in the same vein because it proposes changes to the Youth Criminal Justice Act. It looks at those offences, but from the perspective of young offenders and, more specifically, at how to deal with those particular cases.

Parts 9 and 10 are the more procedural elements, dealing with statutory review and coming into force provisions. We believe that we can group together parts 7, 8, 9, and 10.

As you obviously know, the Standing Order currently gives you the power to divide a bill, but is limited to “the motion for second reading and reference to a committee and the motion for third reading and passage of the bill.” I am sure that could be read to mean that you do not have the power to divide the bill for a vote on a motion like the one before us to immediately refer a bill to a committee forthwith.

The government, by presenting this motion in a way that, on the surface, is well intentioned and indicates its wish to significantly amend the bill and hear experts at committee, I submit is actually attempting to circumvent Standing Order 69.1, knowing full well that this is omnibus legislation. It is trying to do so by sending this bill to committee before second reading, and therefore preventing us from going forward with the way the Standing Order is now drafted, which would mean second reading and then referral to committee. That is not how the process would take place given the motion that is before the House today.

This bill has so many components and, as the government has said, is perhaps one of the most significant changes to the various components of national security, whether oversight, CSE, or CSIS. It includes some significant changes to how national security cases are charged and prosecuted in the judicial system. It is telling that the government seems to recognize the omnibus nature of the bill in debate here today. It seems the only procedural way to hide the omnibus nature of the bill is for the government to present the motion today to provide it with a legislative pathway that would allow it to circumvent its own new rules in the Standing Orders on omnibus provisions.

We are concerned that the Liberal government is hiding the omnibus nature of this bill from the public. From a communications point of view, we know it sounds nice to only talk about the oversight elements when experts have agreed there are very significant concerns over how cyber-weapons, as described in part 3 of the bill, would operate. We have even heard experts say it is not possible for them to fully analyze all of the elements or the entire scope of the bill, even with their own expertise. To me, that is very telling of the omnibus nature of the bill and the difficulties of undertaking a legislative process in the way proposed by the government.

While wanting to give the benefit of the doubt to the government and its good intentions to have a robust study, the feeling we get from our reading of the Standing Order seems to be that this is an attempt to do through the back door what it is forbidden from doing through the front door, thereby preventing you and the powers conferred on you in this place to separate the different aspects of the bill.

I assert that under Standing Order 69.1, the role of the Speaker is to apply the rules of the House to deal with different concepts and themes in a bill with a different vote, which is obviously what I am raising today, so that MPs can represent their constituents' views differently on each part of a bill if they believe they should and are able to vote appropriately based on the different complexities and nature of different points. As my colleague from Victoria just pointed out in his speech, the fact that we might agree with the government on going forward with certain elements of oversight is distinct from a debate on cybersecurity or one on the no-fly list, which are very different matters. Pardon my choice of words, but I believe comparing oversight to cybersecurity, the Criminal Code, and the no-fly list seems a little ludicrous, and makes it very challenging as members of Parliament to properly vote and express ourselves.

By having the bill go through before second reading, the government is arguing that it should be treated as one whole question. It is all about security. However, anything can essentially be qualified as national security. That is obviously not enough of a common element.

When we look at what these different parts would do, the new acts that would be created and the acts that would be amended, forcing MPs to vote on the creation of two new acts and the amendments of dozens of other acts, such significant acts as the National Defence Act, the CSIS Act, and others, it certainly causes problems for members of Parliament who wish to vote on these different distinct components. I also submit that it circumvents these very same omnibus rules that have been put in place by a government that said this would no longer be a practice, as we saw under the previous government.

Mr. Speaker, you stated in your November 8 ruling about the uses of Standing Order 69.1, “In my view, the spirit of the Standing Order was to provide for a separate vote when new or unrelated matters were introduced in the budget implementation bill.” I agree with the logic you expressed at the time and believe that in this case, the same logic could apply. We are, of course, dealing with new and unrelated matters that were not part of the debate leading up to the tabling of the legislation and the arguments the government made for the need to reform certain elements of legislation tabled in the previous Parliament. I hope you will agree with our assessment and arrive at the same finding here today.

Finally, I submit that Standing Order 69.1 should apply at all stages of the process, including sending the bill to committee before second reading. Again, the motion is before us today. This way, a bill that contains very different ideas would be divided in such a way at every stage that members could continue to express their views, the views of their constituents and the views of Canadians more broadly in dealing with these very distinct and complicated matters when it comes to these important reforms and not simply having to say yes or no to these sweeping reforms and then be accused of being on one side or the other when clearly there are some very distinct components.

I thank my colleagues for their indulgence. New Democrats fundamentally believe that these important and unique changes to such cornerstones of our democracy as national security and the protection of Canadians' rights and freedoms and privacy deserve to be separated in order for members to express Canadians' concerns and views through a vote. That is why I thought it was extremely important to bring all of this to the attention of the House.

National Security Act, 2017

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address the motion that proposes to send Bill C-59 to committee before second reading, something that has not been done thus far in this Parliament. Debate, of course, is crucial when we are discussing something as significant to Canadians as their safety insofar as national security is concerned, as well as their rights as citizens in this country. I want to use my time to ask my colleagues and Canadians who may be watching, with respect to national security, what kind of country do we want to be? How can we strike the appropriate balance, giving our national security agencies the powers they need to do the job to protect us and at the same time protecting Canadian values? The first question is a little broad for a 10-minute speech, but my answer to the second one is very simple. We have to approach this task with great caution and open debate.

Bill C-51 was brought in by the Harper Conservatives, the former government. It was nothing short of disastrous. Bill C-51 provoked the largest demonstrations in my riding of Victoria in recent history. There were town halls with people spilling out into the streets, and anxiety on behalf of people from all walks of life in our community. The consensus was clear that the legislation was open to abuse and was far too wide. The language was vague and permissive. People were unsure where they stood as Canadians and what their rights would mean under that new legislation. The Liberals did nothing, except to say that they liked part of it, they did not like other parts. They refused to go along with the NDP's request that the bill be repealed in its entirety, and promised to repeal the problematic elements. Therefore, what we have before us is a 138-page statute with nine parts, which is a comprehensive attempt, after two years of consultation, to get it right. The question is on whether they have.

It is our contention that this poorly conceived bill should not be supported in the first place and needs to be repealed. That is not a new position. My colleague from Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke introduced Bill C-303, which simply asked that Bill C-51 be repealed. That continues to be our view on what should occur in this situation. We think that the bill is not in the interests of Canadians and should be rejected outright.

Since the Liberals voted in favour of Bill C-51, instead of scrapping it and beginning anew, they created Bill C-59, which was supposed to correct the numerous deficiencies of the former legislation. They brought in a green paper and consulted for two years. That green paper was criticized for its lack of neutrality and for favouring the national security side as a preoccupation over civil liberties concerns and the right for peaceful protest, freedom of speech, lawful assembly, and dissent. The Liberals assured Canadians that the most problematic areas would be repealed. I am afraid that the resulting bill has not done that, and several problematic elements remain.

However, there is much in the bill that I wish to say is right. For example, the creation of the super SIRC, the expanded oversight committee, is an excellent step. There are many other things, however, that are deeply problematic, and which, if time permits, I would like to talk about.

There are some elements, in particular involving the Communications Security Establishment, the shadowy agency that Canadians know from U.S. TV to be our counterpart to the National Security Agency in that country, the NSA. There are problems, for example, with its new cyber-ability to modify, disrupt, and delete “anything on or through the global...structure”, which sounds a little Orwellian. It would seem that the mandate blurs the line between intelligence gathering and active cyber-activities, as has been pointed out by Professors Forcese and Roach as well. It is under the national defence department, as it has been for many years, and the bill would deal with national defence matters such as CSE, and other areas as well.

The bill would do nothing to address the ministerial directive on torture. The directive needs to be acknowledged. It is not part of the bill, it is merely a directive. A new directive was introduced only last year, and it failed to forbid the RCMP, CBSA, or CSIS from using information that was largely extracted through overseas torture. The new instruction amounts to only semantic changes and would not do anything to ensure our public safety, because it is notorious that information obtained through torture is unreliable. The government did nothing to address that in a meaningful way in this legislation. It could have, and chose not to. This legislation does not go far enough in addressing the glaring omissions and problems of Bill C-51.

Michael Vonn, who is with the BC Civil Liberties Association, has also spoken about the misguided process of amending this flawed legislation. She said, “The bill does several things to try to reign in the unprecedented surveillance powers created by [the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act]...”. That is one of the parts of this new legislation. She went on to say that as there was “no credible justification for [that act] that was ever made, it would have been much better to repeal it and introduce any clarifying amendments required in the federal Privacy Act.” Again, that was another opportunity lost. Her comments highlight that measures and policies were brought into effect without any demonstrated justification that they were needed to keep Canadians safe.

We are in the strange position of rushing through the appropriate steps of amending practices that may not be necessary in the first place. After Canadians have waited two years for badly needed action on national security, why has the government not used its time appropriately to ensure that we had legislation that, in the words of the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, “gets it right”. I implore my colleagues in government to think differently than the government before it. If there is truly a commitment for openness, transparency, and accountability, let us debate the bill at second reading and work together to fix the half measures that are in it.

A procedural issue is before us as a result of this unusual move by the government to move the bill to committee before second reading. As I understand it, the motion before us would send the bill to committee before the usual debate at second reading. Therefore, the Standing Orders will not necessarily apply to enable the Speaker to break out the nine parts of this lengthy legislation so we could vote in favour of some and oppose others. Surely, the Liberals are better than this.

Rather than resorting to the Stephen Harper trick of saying we voted against this omnibus legislation to keep Canadians safe, which generally was done in all the other Conservative omnibus bills, why would the government not allow this to be broken out the way that the Speaker has the authority to do? There are some parts of the bill that are worthy of support. However, the Liberals' trick, following in the footsteps of Mr. Harper, would require those of us who are opposed to some of the very contentious issues to vote against it all. That is a trick that is unworthy of the minister and his government. Measures that compromise our charter rights and our privacy rights do our country harm, and those are the reasons we called for the repeal of Bill C-51 more than two years ago.

In speaking about privacy, in the fall of 2016, a Federal Court ruling took CSIS to task for storing sensitive metadata on Canadians who were not suspected of anything. The court found that for 10 years, CSIS had been illegally storing information derived from some of its wiretaps. The data involved metadata such as source information, emails, phone numbers, and the like. This legislation would not change that. It would allow it to continue.

By way of conclusion, we have to ask ourselves whether we want a country where our security services have a lot of information about many citizens, with a view to detecting national security threats, but for which there is no demonstrable harm caused by any of those citizens. The powers with respect to the charter are extremely complicated. I would invite people to look at clause 98 and figure out whether or not the courts would be able to limit our charter rights in a warrant. It is very problematic. We must do it better, and we need to have that opportunity as quickly as possible.

[Glen Motz, Conservative, Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I am reviewing the bill to find some good points. I am challenged by the fact that there seems to be a slippery slope toward defending those who would do us harm in this country, that we are going to limit the authorities for recognizance and such orders, and that we would limit the ability of security agencies to do what Bill C-51 allowed them to do without the time restraints that could be in effect.

However, I am optimistic that the move by the current government to bring this bill to committee before second reading will allow an opportunity for all parties to look at the bill, to review it clause by clause, and to ensure that a non-partisan approach to public safety and national security is evident and available to all Canadians once this bill comes back to the House.

[Robert-Falcon Ouellette, Liberal, Winnipeg Centre, MB]

Mr. Speaker, the former Stephen Harper government was largely repudiated for its work on Bill C-51, its national security bill. Our government's bill really tries to fix the issues in Bill C-51 by striking a balance. Our bill would see the tightening of the definition of terrorist propaganda and would protect the right to advocate and protest. It would also upgrade the no-fly list and would ensure the paramountcy of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

I wonder if the member from Medicine Hat could explain some ways that he sees that this bill would actually be an improvement over Bill C-51.

[François Choquette, NDP, Drummond, QC]

Mr. Speaker, that was precisely our criticism of Bill C-51. I remember hearing about people who were spied on or investigated for no reason. Birdwatchers, for example. The authorities would not leave birdwatchers in peace. That is a perfect example of how this kind of bill can get out of hand.

People in Drummond are very concerned about shale gas and fracking. This is still a concern even though there is kind of a moratorium on it at the moment. If a government announced plans to develop shale gas in Quebec, my constituents would be the first to speak out against that because there is a lot of opposition to that kind of development in Quebec. This bill is flawed. A lot of my constituents could end up on a list or be spied on with no oversight. This bill has never made sense. The government even said so itself. We need to scrap it and go back to square one.

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague from Drummond for his speech.

Bill C-59 is supposed to correct Bill C-51, which was condemned by pretty much everyone in Canada at the time. However, Bill C-59 does not make all the necessary changes. It misses the mark and is incomplete. For example, the definition of national security still contains some aspects of the Conservative definition. The Liberals did not change it. National security still encompasses interference with infrastructure deemed critical or important.

Does that mean that the secret service could use its resources to stop peaceful protestors, for example, environmentalists or indigenous groups that seek to oppose the building of a new pipeline?

[François Choquette, NDP, Drummond, QC]

Mr. Speaker, it is not always a pleasure, but it is definitely an honour for me to rise in the House today to speak to Bill C-59, an act respecting national security matters .

This is a strange second reading debate. To provide some context for the people listening at home, we are supposed to be at second reading. We would normally debate the bill at second reading and eventually vote to refer it to committee if we agreed with the general principles of the bill. What is happening here, which is highly unusual, is that we are not at second reading; rather we are debating whether to refer it to committee before second reading. What this means, essentially, is that the Liberals brought forward a bill but have since realized that they are not satisfied with their own bill. They want to send it to committee so it can be fixed up a bit before sending it back to the House for second reading. I have never seen this before. It is highly unusual to proceed in this manner, and it is inappropriate. This government appears to be improvising and making things up as it goes along.

If the bill is no good, the government should scrap it and come back with a better bill. What is happening here today is ridiculous. We are talking about sending a bill directly to committee rather than debating it at second reading. This is absolutely unbelievable.

Where did this Bill C-59 come from? Members will recall that its predecessor was the Conservatives' infamous Bill C-51. This is a despicable bill that utterly fails to protect human rights. I will spend the next few minutes examining the bill in greater detail.

First of all, during the election campaign, the Liberals said they would repeal Bill C-51, which, as I said, was Mr. Harper's atrocious security bill. The government made us wait two years before coming up with something, and what it finally came up with does not even come close to solving the problem. In fact, this bill will allow the government to continue violating Canadians' privacy and will criminalize dissent, just as the Harper government's Bill C-51 did. This is an important issue I would like to take a closer look at.

There are some serious problems in the bill with respect to protecting privacy, especially in terms of sharing out-of-control information. The amendments to the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act are mostly superficial. In no way does this fulfill the promise we expected the Liberals to keep.

This is an omnibus bill that seeks to provide a legal framework allowing the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, to store sensitive metadata on totally innocent Canadians, a practice that the Federal Court ruled to be illegal. This bill does not really solve any problems. It creates new ones. There is currently a crisis of confidence in our national security agencies, especially CSIS, not because of the agencies, but because of the existing legislation. These agencies push the boundaries of the the law and they are not transparent about it, unfortunately. As far as security and intelligence are concerned, Canadians have to be sure that every Government of Canada department and agency is working effectively to ensure Canadians' safety, but also to preserve our rights and freedoms. That is the problem with Bill C-51. The government wanted to make Canadians safer, but there was nothing in that bill that provided greater safety or security.

However, a lot of the bill's provisions took away some of the rights enjoyed by Canadians. They actively undermined the privacy of Canadians and could potentially result in the criminalization of vulnerable groups, for example, environmentalists or advocates of other causes. I will explain later why I am mentioning this.

First, Bill C-51, known as the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, was passed with little debate. It was not really necessary. That is why we stated several times that this law weakened our security and diminished our right to the protection of privacy, freedom of expression and freedom of association.

This clearly shows that Bill C-51 was ill-conceived. For that reason, we did not support it. We believe that Bill C-51 must be repealed in full and that we must start over; it was Stephen Harper's bill, it did not work, and we have to scrap it right quick.

I would remind the House that, in 2016, the Federal Court ruled on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's mass data collection. It found that CSIS illegally kept sensitive, personal electronic information for over 10 years. In this landmark ruling, Justice Simon Noël said that the CSIS had failed in its duty to inform the court of its data collection program and ruled that what it had done was illegal. What did the Liberals do in response? They decided that since such activity was illegal, they would draft a bill to make it legal.

Come on. The Federal Court said that what CSIS was doing did not make any sense, that it was illegal, and that it violated privacy rights, and so the Liberal government decided to make those illegal activities legal. That does not make any sense. I can see why the Liberals would want to send this to committee to make amendments and gut this bill. That is shameful.

The other problem that is not mentioned in this bill but that is important to talk about is all of the ministerial directives related to torture. That is very serious. It is something that I care a lot about, and I am convinced that everyone in the greater Drummond area sent me here to talk about this. It is extremely important.

We are calling on the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to repeal and replace the 2010 ministerial directive on torture to ensure that Canada stands for an absolute prohibition on torture. Specifically, we want to ensure that in no circumstances will Canada use information from foreign countries that could have been obtained using torture or share information that is likely to result in torture.

Canada says that it will not torture, but other countries will torture for us. The government would then take this information and impose sanctions.

This makes no sense. Torture must be denounced everywhere. We must never use information obtained under torture. Everyone knows that people will say anything when they are being tortured. Torture does not work and is immoral.

I hope that this government will wake up, because this goes back a long time. The Liberals have been in power for two years and they still have not improved the situation. We must show integrity, we must be strong, and we must say no to torture everywhere in the world. We must not use information obtained through torture or that may lead to torture.

In closing, since the government itself does not think that this is a good bill and wants to send it directly to committee, without going through second reading, I propose that, instead, the government withdraw the bill and introduce new, common sense legislation with the help of the other parties.

[Gérard Deltell, Conservative, Louis-Saint-Laurent, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am pleased to rise at this stage of our study of Bill C-59.

Nine days ago, on Remembrance Day, November 11, all Canadians, including MPs, were united in our thoughts. Hundreds of commemorative events took place on that day. Personally, in my riding, I commemorated Remembrance Day in the indigenous community of Wendake with my 94-year-old father, a World War II veteran.

I am mentioning this because Remembrance Day unites all Canadians, and especially because it reminds us that Canada has always been on the right side of history. Canada has always fought the enemies of freedom and defended the values that it holds dear and that unite us. In World War I and World War II, the enemy was a nation, a country. It had a uniform and a flag. It displayed its colours. Today, the enemy is everywhere and nowhere all at once. The enemy is terrorism.

That is why we must fight this enemy with all our energy and necessary tools. That is why I wanted to draw a parallel between the hundreds of thousands of Canadians and soldiers around the world who made the ultimate sacrifice by laying down their young lives to fight the enemies of freedom and those who, today, in the 21st century, fight the enemies of our core principles, the terrorists.

The world changed on September 11, 2001. When terrorism reared its ugly head and attacked our neighbour and ally, the United States, the world took drastic action to combat terrorism. Since terrorism is cowardly and hypocritical, and since the enemy has no pride or honour and does not follow rules, terrorists are always everywhere, insidious, masked, hiding in the shadows and waiting in ambush, because they have no honour or even the courage to defend their beliefs honourably. We must therefore fight the enemy with information and, here in Canada, with CSIS.

The enemy has struck south of the border, and it has struck here as well. Thirty-seven months ago, almost to the day, the enemy came right up to the door of the House of Commons in Ottawa, and we lived through a tragic and horrible act of terrorism. That is why the Conservative government at the time, with the help of several individuals, took the necessary measures to combat terrorism in Canada by introducing Bill C-51, which was sponsored by the hon. member for Bellechasse—Les Etchemins—Lévis, then minister of public safety, and by the hon. Peter MacKay, then minister of justice.

Some were in agreement with the bill, while others opposed it. I would like once again to point out the cohesiveness of the NDP, as the hon. member for Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie was saying. We do not agree, but they, like us, are consistent. Curiously, the people who now make up the government voted in favour of the bill. We were happy, but a few months later, during the election campaign, those same people got all worked up about Bill C-51, saying that it made no sense. They said that, if they were elected, they would properly restore order and discipline. It took them 18 months to come up with Bill C-59, which they introduced at the very end of the session last June. If I remember correctly, it was June 17, just before we returned to our ridings to work with our constituents.

This bill is nothing short of massive. It proposes to amend nine acts over as many chapters, for a total of some 140 pages. It is what we might call a mammoth bill or an omnibus bill, but let us set political rhetoric aside and get to the meat of the matter.

Why, in our opinion, should this bill be studied?

On this side of the House, we believe that CSIS agents should be given all the tools they need to detect and eradicate terrorism. It is the best course of action.

If I spoke of Remembrance Day at the top of my speech, that was to remind the House that, today, our enemy hides in the shadows. The enemy is a hypocrite, a coward. It knows no religion or law. It has no flag. It is everywhere and nowhere all at once. We must therefore allocate the resources needed to root it out. We must provide all necessary tools to law enforcement working to eradicate terrorism should it ever rear its ugly head in Canada.

We believe that the bill will make the work of CSIS agents more difficult, because they will have to work harder to convince judges to give them the authority they need to take action. This is true for several measures, whether for “altering, removing, replacing, destroying, disrupting or degrading a [terrorist] communication or means of communication”, or for “altering, removing, replacing, destroying, degrading or providing—or interfering with the use or delivery of—any thing or part of a thing, including records, documents, goods, components and equipment”. Wars hinge on such things.

If we want to eradicate terrorism, we must allow our police officers to address terrorist activity directly, by intercepting the transmission of communications and documents.

The same applies when it comes to “fabricating or disseminating any information, record or document”.

The same also applies when it comes to “making or attempting to make, directly or indirectly, any financial transaction that involves or purports to involve currency or a monetary instrument”.

These people are not living hand to mouth. They are extremely well paid, in fact. We must locate the source of their funding.

It is the same when it comes to “interrupting or redirecting, directly or indirectly, any financial transaction...interfering with the movement of any person; and personating a person, other than a police officer, in order to take a measure referred to in [the previous act]”.

What that means is that, with Bill C-59 and its proposed new measures, the current government is making the work of police officers who risk their lives every time they try to flush out terrorists. That is our concern.

It is the same thing with cyber-attacks. Bill C-59 sets out the government's plan to protect Canadians from the terrorist enemy's attacks via Internet, or what are known as cyber-attacks. The government needs to take measures that can directly thwart the enemy and cause it to back down when it comes to cyber-attacks.

Oddly enough, the government is giving the Minister of Foreign Affairs veto power in this regard. Why? Why give veto power to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and not the Minister of Public Safety, the Minister of Justice, or the Minister of Transport?

If, God forbid, the enemy wanted to undermine our air travel security, for example, why would the foreign affairs minister have veto over whether we launch a cyber-attack against the terrorists? We do not understand the reasoning behind this measure.

That is why we have serious concerns about this bill, which will also affect our foreign relations with our main partners, friends, and allies in the battle all democracies are waging against terrorism. Three weeks ago, the member for Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles talked about a sad reality, and that is the fact that 60 members of the Taliban who fought against our troops in Afghanistan have come back to Canada. That is like Canada welcoming 60 members of the SS immediately following the Second World War. That would have been unspeakable. For all of those reasons, we have reservations regarding this bill.

[Majid Jowhari, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is with great pleasure that I rise today to speak in support of the national security act, 2017, Bill C-59. Two years ago, our government came to Ottawa with the promise that it would address the numerous problematic elements of Bill C-51, which was enacted by the previous government. Canadians agreed that in attempting to safeguard the security of Canada, Bill C-51 failed to strike a balance between security and freedom.

Today I am proud to be able to rise in this House and say that we have wholeheartedly delivered our commitment to addressing those problem areas. Our government began its commitment to achieving this goal by first reaching out to Canadians in an unprecedented consultation process, where all agreed that accountability, transparency, and effectiveness are needed from their security agencies.

Secondly, Bill C-22 was passed earlier this year, which created the multi-party National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians. It is tasked with reviewing national security and intelligence activities through unprecedented access, with the goal of promoting government-wide accountability. On November 6, our Prime Minister followed through on this commitment by announcing the members of the committee. Today we are debating the national security act, 2017, Bill C-59, the last step in achieving our commitment to improving those problematic elements of Bill C-51. This package consists of three acts, five sets of amendments, and a comprehensive review process.

In creating the national security and intelligence review agency, the office of the intelligence commissioner, and the Communications Security Establishment, we have created the robust and effective national security establishment that Canadians have asked for. In addition, we are amending the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, and the Secure Air Travel Act to strengthen the role of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, limit the collection of personal information, safeguard Canadian rights to peaceful assembly, and fix problems with the no-fly list.

Finally, our amendments to the Youth Criminal Justice Act would ensure young persons would be provided with all appropriate child protection, mental health, and other social measures needed when faced with a terrorism-related offence. Through my work on the mental health caucus, I know how important it is for all Canadians, especially those of marginalized groups, to have access to all available safeguards, services, and measures when navigating the criminal justice system. Therefore, I am pleased to speak today specifically about these proposed amendments to the Youth Criminal Justice Act included in part 8 of the national security act, 2017.

My riding of Richmond Hill is an incredibly diverse and vibrant riding, where over half of my constituents are Canadians from an immigrant background. Of these, the majority are youths and young families under the age of 30. For this reason, I am proud to say that through this set of amendments, our government is taking action to ensure that all youth involved in the criminal justice system are afforded the enhanced protections provided by Canada's Youth Criminal Justice Act, while also holding them accountable for their actions.

The Youth Criminal Justice Act, or YCJA, is the federal law that governs Canada's youth aged 12 to 17 who commit criminal offences, including terrorism offences. The YCJA recognizes that the youth justice system should be separate from the adult system, and based on the principle of diminished moral blameworthiness of youth. It emphasizes rehabilitation and reintegration, just and proportionate responses to offending, and enhanced procedural protections for youth. The act also recognizes the importance of involving families, victims, and communities in the youth criminal justice system. The YCJA contains a number of significant legal safeguards to ensure that young people are treated fairly and that their rights are fully protected, for example, the identity publication ban, and significant restrictions on access to youth records.

Young people also have enhanced right to counsel, including state-provided counsel, and the right to have parents or other guardians present throughout key stages of the investigation and judicial processes. If a young person is charged, all proceedings take place in youth court. In addition, the YCJA would establish clear restrictions on access to youth records, setting out who may access youth records, the purpose for which youth records may be used, and the time periods during which access to records is permitted. Generally speaking, although the offences set out in the Criminal Code apply to youth, the sentences do not. Instead, the YCJA sets out specific youth sentencing principles, options, and durations. There is a broad range of community-based youth sentencing options, and clear restrictions on the use of custodial sentences.

Turning now to Bill C-59, it is important to recognize that there have been very few cases in Canada in which a young person has been involved in the youth criminal justice system due to terrorism offences. In total, we have had six young people charged since 2002. Two were found guilty, three were put under a peace bond, and one had the charges dropped. Nonetheless, it is important to ensure that when this occurs, the young people are held to account, but also that they are afforded all of the enhanced protection under the YCJA. It is perhaps even more important in terrorism-related offences that we do everything in our power to reform young offenders so that future harm is prevented.

Part 8 of Bill C-59 would amend the provision of the YCJA to ensure that youth protections apply in relation to anti-terrorism and other recognizance orders. It also provides for access to youth records for the purpose of administering the Canadian Passport Order, subject to the special privacy protections set out in the YCJA. The bill would also make important clarifications with respect to recognizance orders. Although the YCJA already provides youth justice courts with the authority to impose these orders, several sections of the YCJA would be amended to state more clearly that youth justice courts have exclusive jurisdiction to impose recognizance on youth. This would eliminate any uncertainty about the applicability of certain rights of protection, including the youths' right to counsel. In addition, there is currently no access period identified for records relating to recognizance. Therefore, the YCJA would be amended to provide that the access period for these records would be six months after the order expires.

With respect to the Canadian Passport Order, Bill C-59 would amend the YCJA to specifically permit access to youth records for the purpose of administering Canada's passport program. The Canadian Passport Order contemplates that passports can be denied or revoked as a result of certain criminal acts, or in relation to national security concerns. For example, section 10.1 of the Canadian Passport Order stipulates that the minister of public safety may decide to deny or revoke a passport if there are reasonable grounds, including that revocation is necessary to prevent the commission of a terrorism offence, or for the national security of Canada or a foreign country or state.

The current YCJA provisions governing access to youth records do not speak to access for passport matters. As noted, Bill C-59 would allow access in appropriate circumstances. However, it is important to note that the sharing of youth information on this provision would still be subject to the special privacy protection of the YCJA. Canadians can be assured that our government is addressing the national security threat while continuing to protect democratic values, rights, and freedoms for Canadians. Those two goals must be pursued with equal dedication.

I encourage all my colleagues to vote in support of the bill.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Madam Speaker, it is indeed a pleasure to rise to address Bill C-59, an act respecting national security matters.

This is an omnibus bill that is making some significant changes to the way national security is going to be dealt with in this country. It is a huge bill. It is over 140 pages long. It has a great deal of information, some that is quite concerning to us as the official opposition.

I have taken the time to read through the bill, and I am quite concerned about some of the things in here. As I just mentioned to the Minister of National Defence, one of the concerns is around CSE, which has traditionally been an organization that is under the National Defence Act. It has worked alongside our Canadian Armed Forces to ensure that our guys who are deployed are safe. That, in itself, is something that has to be paramount in what CSE continues to do.

The Communications Security Establishment is a great organization and one we support wholeheartedly. It has always respected the laws of Canada. It has worked very closely with our Five Eyes partners—the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—in collecting intelligence and sharing that where possible. At the same time, it respects Canadians' privacy rights and charter rights to ensure that they are not being unjustly spied on, unless, of course, they are acting in a manner that concerns national security and may be committing some sort of criminal act.

This bill, overall, would weaken our national security in this country. It would change the way CSIS and CSE operate, as well as the RCMP and other police agencies. It proves again that the Liberals are not serious when it comes to public safety. They prefer to water things down rather than do what is right.

It is interesting to watch. We have members on the other side who, when the Liberals were the third party, voted in favour of Bill C-51. Today they are watering down that very act. I have real concerns about how our allies, particularly our Five Eyes partners, are going to feel about the trustworthiness and interoperability of CSIS, the RCMP, and CSE and their security intelligence-gathering mechanisms.

To highlight this and show that the Liberals are not serious about protecting Canadians and how we deal with terrorism, just this past week, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness said, when talking about Canadians who joined ISIS and became ISIS terrorists and ISIS fighters, that he wants to reintegrate them back into Canada, not charge them under the Criminal Code as terrorists and not charge them under the Criminal Code for committing treason because they are fighting against Canada and our allies in Iraq and Syria. He wants to reintegrate them. That is disgusting.

I have heard over and over again this past week in the riding that Canadians are concerned that the Liberals are putting their lives at risk, because they are going to allow these ISIS fighters to return to Canada. These terrorists who have been radicalized will come back here, and rather than being incarcerated, will have the opportunity to return to their communities and radicalize their families, their friends, and the people they interact with. That is completely unacceptable. That just proves the fact that the Minister of Public Safety and the Liberal government are not taking security seriously.

We can compare that to what the U.S. government is doing, what the government of France is doing, and what the government of the United Kingdom is doing. They have put out kill orders for all their fighters fighting in Syria and Iraq right now. They have been told to shoot to kill anyone who came from Great Britain, the United States, or France who was radicalized and joined ISIS and is in Syria and Iraq fighting their forces. This is to ensure that their public safety is respected.

That is not happening here in Canada. We are going to reintegrate them. We should at least incarcerate them, but no, we are going to reintegrate them.

In the time I have left, I will speak about the Communications Security Establishment. This is an organization that has done yeoman's service over many decades ensuring that our troops stay safe and ensuring that Canada stays safe. Whenever the commissioner for the Communications Security Establishment has looked at ministerial authorizations that have been given, the rights of Canadians have been respected, whether it has been in collecting metadata, in intelligence-sharing, or when there has been a need to issue warrants for the monitoring of Canadians who are directly or indirectly involved in fundraising for, or the activity of, terrorism or other attacks on Canadians on our soil or that of our allies. They have been able to do that and respect our charter rights, respect the Privacy Act, and ensure that Canadians' rights have been respected on a legal level. I think that is clear.

In the new section on the proposed Communications Security Establishment act in Bill C-59, I applaud the government for bringing forward some clear definitions on cyber-defence and cyber-offence. Times have changed. We need to have the ability not only to defend against cyber-attacks but to take out those cyber-attacks and be pre-emptive, if necessary. If they collect the proper intelligence, we would have the ability to go out and destroy that potential threat. It could be an attack on our infrastructure, an attack on the Government of Canada, an attack on our troops serving overseas, or an attack that would wipe out our financial sector. That capability has to be there, because our cyber-infrastructure, such as power, financial institutions, and government institutions, is critical to the everyday lives of Canadians. We have to be able to pre-emptively remove a threat.

The amazing part of everything we are doing is that under this new cyberwarfare process, under “Cyber Operations Authorizations”, in the proposed Communications Security Establishment act, subclause 30(2) would give a veto to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Always the CSE and CSIS have operated in close collaboration with the Minister of Public Safety, the Minister of National Defence, and to some degree, the Minister of Justice. Now the Minister of Foreign Affairs would have a veto over whether we spy on individuals or organizations. The minister would have a veto over whether we launch a cyber-attack or defend ourselves from a cyber-attack by individuals and organizations, whether they were criminal organizations, terrorist organizations, drug cartels, or just hackers. This is something we just do not understand.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs does not have the same intelligence mechanisms within the department that the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of National Defence have access to. Why we would give an authorization to the Minister of Foreign Affairs is beyond me. All we have to do is look at the former minister of foreign affairs, Stéphane Dion, who was acting in a role of appeasing Russia, which is definitely the greatest threat to Canada and the Five Eyes allies. If members look at our partners in the Five Eyes, we are always making sure that we have robust cybersecurity and cyber-intelligence-gathering on the Russian Federation, especially those kleptocrats in the Kremlin and those who want to do harm to our alliance through NATO.

We know that Russia is spying on us. We know that China is spying on us, yet when Stéphane Dion was still the minister of foreign affairs, he had the idea that we would appease the Russians, and he would not authorize those types of spying activities. That cannot be allowed to happen.

The current government is trying to do a trade deal with China. Would the government authorize spying and cyber-defence activities against the Government of China? Is the government so caught up in the idea that it wants to do trade with China, despite China's terrible environmental record and the atrocities it is committing against its own citizens, such as the Falun Gong? I am sure the government would appease China.

We need to make sure we get this right. That is why the bill has to get to committee right away. We have to make these changes so the bill is actually in the best interest of Canada and is not about playing political games, through the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to try to appease some of the greatest threats to our national security. It is to put our safety first, rather than the government's political aspirations.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, certainly those elements that I touched on are what I support in this bill. I cannot give much more for the member because there are so many things that we find wrong with the approach that is being taken here.

To get to the question of information sharing, to my knowledge there is no evidence that the information-sharing regime has prevented any attempted terrorist attack from taking place. I will say again what we said in the last Parliament when we opposed Bill C-51. We certainly take the safety of Canadians very seriously. That is why, for example, one of the ways to tackle these issues is to provide proper resources to the RCMP. The RCMP members have long said that they do not have the resources to do their work. Let law enforcement services have the resources to be able to apprehend the people whom they have sufficient evidence against to be able to stop them from committing these kinds of atrocities.

The other thing that is not in the bill and that is fundamental to tackling this issue is a counter-radicalization strategy, something that is grassroots, something that deals with all forms of radicalization leading to violence. I have heard the minister talk at length about it and about different proposals that the Liberals have, but it seems to have stalled and we have not seen very much about that. If they really want a solution to protect Canadian safety, those are the solutions, not legislative solutions that threaten Canadians' rights.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, instead of citing people out of context and using glowing words like “endorsement”, the member could perhaps do more reading and listen to what those same academics said. Mr. Forcese also said that it would require more study because there is a lot in there. He specifically said he has not had time to study the magnitude of some of the important changes being brought to, for example, the National Defence Act with regard to cyber–weapons. I do not understand what that has to do with fixing the no-fly list, but I will let the member justify that.

I want to go back to the fact that the member was in the last Parliament voting with the Conservatives for a bill that threatened Canadians' rights, for a bill that threatened their privacy. We were proud to stand up with his constituents and people in his city who protested that very same bill. The member asked how it was possible that we can complain about it being omnibus but that there is not enough. There is not enough in this bill because it would not repeal the dangerous elements brought in by Bill C-51, the bill from the previous Conservative government that the member voted in favour of. Until we see those things in this kind of legislation, we cannot support it.

[Adam Vaughan, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Families]

Madam Speaker, I always like to listen to my colleagues from the New Democratic Party complain that there is not enough in the bill, and that it is simultaneously an omnibus bill. They want more, but if we did more it would be more of an omnibus bill and therefore they would have to be opposed to it. I do not understand that contradiction, but I will let the New Democrats explain it to themselves.

All of the eight chapters are specifically tied to national security. It is not unrelated. It is not like when the Conservatives moved an amendment to the Canadian Marine Act, and then talked about child welfare, then INAC, and then global affairs. These are eight complete chapters integrated with one another and they deal with distinctive measures such as splitting out the youth justice part from the adult justice part and doing it in two separate ways so it can be studied in an important way.

All that aside, in light of the fact that the bill has received the endorsement of Mr. Forcese and Mr. Roach, two of the most distinguished critics of Bill C-51 and in light of the fact that, in particular, Craig Forcese said that this is a real cleanup of the CSIS powers, a reform of the damage done by Bill C-51 to the independence and the investigative powers of CSIS, would the New Democrats not agree with those leading academics, the very ones they cited in their criticisms of Bill C-51, to support this bill in its entirety and stop complaining about its omnibus nature?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, today, we begin debating Bill C-59. In fact, we are debating a motion to send the bill to committee before second reading. I will come back to that.

Bill C-59 is the result of a process that began more than two years ago, even before the current government was elected. We know that we can trace this bill to Bill C-51, which was introduced by the Conservatives and then passed by the Conservative majority, with the support of the Liberals, of course, including the current Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Prime Minister.

When I think about the Liberals' approach to national security in the last parliament, an certain expression comes to mind.

They want to have their cake and eat it too.

That is the problem. It is extremely worrying to see that someone can be so cavalier about an issue as fundamental as the rights of Canadians, their freedom, and their right to privacy. This is what was jeopardized, on several fronts, by the system introduced by the previous Bill C-51. Unfortunately, 10 minutes is not enough for me to review all the problematic elements, so I will instead focus on the Liberal government's effort, which is unfortunately a failure.

Of course, there are some elements that we could support in the current bill. The creation of what some are calling this new body of super SIRC is something we could support. The changes that are being brought forward are long overdue for the no-fly list, although much more needs to be done.

I would be remiss to not mention the importance of the fight we have been waging with groups like the no-fly list kids, fighting the false positives, and making sure the proper funding is there for a proper redress system, which is not something specifically addressed in the bill. It is an element that, at the very least, things have started to move, although not quickly enough for the needs of these families who pay the price in dignity and travel logistics every time they attempt to travel.

There are several elements that we are extremely worried about. There is the part about the information sharing system's name change, as the minister even admitted. This change was brought about with the previous Bill C-51. A new name was given and there was a cosmetic change, but the concerns remain the same. That is what we are hearing from groups like the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association. This group explained to us that, despite the good intentions, keeping a system that should have never existed in the first place is problematic. This is why the NDP is asking that the provisions brought about by Bill C-51 be outright repealed. That is what my colleague from Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke proposed with his Bill C-303, which was put on the Order Paper and was introduced. It proposes to eliminate all these problematic elements.

That is why New Democrats have always called for the full repeal of all elements that were brought in by former Bill C-51. These cosmetic changes that are being proposed by the Liberals are not enough. The concerns still exist about sharing information between government departments. The minister can use the word “disclosure” and say it is already existing information, but the fact of the matter is, if we are considering, for example, a Canadian detained abroad and some of the horrific and tragic situations that have led to many of these national inquiries, which have led to some of the recommendations the government is attempting to act on, part of the problem has always been information sharing. For example, we can look at consular services and foreign affairs, that might be obtaining information about a Canadian detained abroad in a country with a horrible human rights record. That information is being shared with CSIS, that then might share it with the Five Eyes allies, like the U.S., that in the past has not been up to snuff on some cases of the way Canadians have been treated in some of these situations, where they have been stuck in countries with horrible human rights records. None of that would actually be fixed by what is being proposed in the bill.

We have other serious concerns about the bill. One has to do with the changes regarding cybersecurity and, in particular, the idea of creating cyber-weapons. Experts and civil society are very concerned, because the Liberals have not properly explained how these weapons will be protected. We are not talking about traditional weapons that can be stockpiled in a particular location to protect a physical place. We are talking about creating situations in which weapons can easily be moved around the digital world. This point was raised and it is worrisome.

I want to get back to the motion before us. The government is acting as though sending the motion to committee before second reading is a good thing. It claims that the process will allow us to have a more in-depth study. On the surface, it is hard to blame them. We would be happy to have an in-depth discussion on this in committee. It is extremely important.

Consider this. This motion would put us in a position, and the Liberals have attempted to find this loophole, where we can no longer fall back on a standing order specifically to prevent this kind of omnibus legislation from being put forward, once again something the government promised not to do. This is omnibus legislation, the creation of something like three new acts, and many acts being substantially changed. The National Defence Act would change. Different elements of acts under the purview of the public safety minister would change. These disparate elements require separate votes.

The fact is that at 150 pages long, with so many elements being tackled, it is of grave concern that we would have to go through it in such an expedited process. It deserves to be properly separated and considered. That is particularly concerning because that is exactly the approach that the government said it would not take. That was part of the problem with Bill C-51. It changed so many elements of how we would deal with national security and protecting Canadians' rights in this country that it became almost impossible for the committee to give it proper study, despite the valiant attempts that were certainly made by the New Democrat opposition and with little help from the Liberals at the time.

I unfortunately have just 10 minutes, so I want to take this opportunity to say that we will be raising a point of order to try to convince the Chair that we must separate the different elements of this bill. We want to show our support for some of these elements, but we want to call the government to order by opposing the elements that were meant to repair the damage caused by the former Bill C-51. These elements make up the bulk of the bill, but they do not repair that damage.

Let me go back to some of the other problematic elements in this bill that were supposed to be fixed from Bill C-51. Let us look at the threat-reduction powers that were given to CSIS. The very existence of CSIS was specifically to separate the powers of intelligence gathering and law enforcement. Too many times, history pointed to occasions where the RCMP failed to juggle the dual responsibilities of intelligence gathering and law enforcement. Different recommendations led to the creation of CSIS.

The minister is obviously fully aware of this because, as he mentioned in his comments, the CSIS Act was adopted over 30 years ago, with very little overhaul, until Bill C-51 and this legislation being proposed. We have to understand that CSIS does not have threat reduction powers. That responsibility belongs to law enforcement, as well as the information-sharing regime brought in by Bill C-51. Once again, the changes being proposed by New Democrats are certainly an improvement, but when the bar is as low as it was with Bill C-51, it does not go far enough. These are the types of elements of the previous legislation under the previous government that need to be fully repealed. Unfortunately, CSIS was given this responsibility, which is not part of its mandate and should never have been, to begin with. It is exactly the opposite of why CSIS was created.

I see that my time is unfortunately running out. Since we are debating a motion, we have just 10 minutes to debate a 150-page bill. This is obviously one of the reasons why the elements should have been separated.

We are opposed to this motion. The only solution is to repeal all of the elements in the former Bill C-51.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, I would like to remind my colleague that this bill has its roots in Bill C-51. I have been an MP for nearly seven years, and never have I seen a bill meet with such opposition from people who disagree with its purpose and take issue with what it brings to the table.

Polling results released as people became aware of the bill spoke volumes. At one point during the debate, before the bill even got to committee, experts and lawyers savaged it, telling us exactly how it set out to supposedly protect so-called honest Canadians, as my colleague refers to them, and 50% of the people who were aware of the bill opposed it.

If my colleague is so keen to protect those honest, law-abiding Canadians, perhaps he can explain to me why we should pass a bill and bring in measures that put those very Canadians at risk by collecting information about them and taking away their right to protest, which is something all citizens of a democratic country should be free to do.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, I thank for minister for his speech, but as he said at the end of it, there is a lot more he wishes he could get to, which is exactly part of the problem here.

On this proposed piece of omnibus legislation, the minister can correct me if I am mistaken, but he did not mention any of the changes to CSEC, or the creation of cyber weapons, and the concerns these are causing and what exactly they will mean. To me, when I see these proposed changes to that mandate and to the cybersecurity aspect, we know that a big component of this has to do with the National Defence Act.

We have this motion before us today, which is not the actual bill but rather a motion to refer the bill to committee before second reading. Does the minister not find it problematic that, because of this motion, there will essentially be a loophole not allowing us to refer to Standing Order 69(1), under which we could ask the Speaker to vote on the different elements of this huge bill, which go far beyond simply reforming Bill C-51, as the government promised. We are really dealing with a bunch of different elements that require, at the very least, parliamentarians being able to vote on certain individual elements. I gave one example of this.

Could the minister comment on that, and does he agree that we should be able to vote on the different elements of the bill separately, as has been the case in the past?

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

moved that Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters, be referred forthwith to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security.

Madam Speaker, the Government of Canada has no greater responsibility than keeping Canadians safe. We must fulfill that essential and solemn obligation while at the same time safeguarding Canadian rights and freedoms.

This double objective of protecting Canadians while defending their rights and freedoms was the basis of our commitments regarding national security during the last election, and it informed everything we have done in the area since we have been in government.

We have, for example, created a committee of parliamentarians with unprecedented access to classified information to scrutinize the activities of all national security and intelligence agencies. We have launched the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence to help Canada become a world leader in counter-radicalization.

We have issued new ministerial directions that more clearly prohibit conduct that would result in a substantial risk of torture. Our starting point was the most extensive and inclusive consultations about national security ever undertaken by the Government of Canada. Beginning in the spring of 2016, that effort involved individual stakeholders, round tables, town halls, various renowned experts, studies by parliamentary committees, and a broad solicitation of views online. More than 75,000 submissions were received.

All of this fresh input was supplemented by earlier judicial inquires by Iacobucci, O'Connor, and Major, as well as several parliamentary proposals, certain court judgments, and reports from existing national security review bodies. It all helped to shape the legislation before us today, Bill C-59, the national security act of 2017.

The measures in this bill cover three core themes, enhancing accountability and transparency, correcting problematic elements from the former Bill C-51, and updating our national security laws to ensure that our agencies can keep pace with evolving threats.

One of the major advances in this legislation is the creation of the national security and intelligence review agency. This new body, which has been dubbed by some as a "super SIRC", will be mandated to review any activity carried out by any government department that relates to national security and intelligence, as well as any matters referred to it by the government. It will be able to investigate public complaints. It will specifically replace the existing review bodies for CSIS and the Communications Security Establishment, but it will also be authorized to examine security and intelligence activities throughout the government, including the Canada Border Services Agency.

In this day and age, security operations regularly involve multiple departments and agencies. Therefore, effective accountability must not be limited to the silo of one particular institution. Rather, it must follow the trail wherever it leads. It must provide for comprehensive analysis and integrated findings and recommendations. That is exactly what Canadians will get from this new review agency.

Bill C-59 also creates the brand new position of the intelligence commissioner, whose role will be to oversee and approve, or not approve, certain intelligence activities by CSIS and the CSE in advance. The intelligence commissioner will be a retired or supernumerary superior court judge whose decisions will be binding. In other words, if he or she says that a particular proposed operation is unreasonable or inappropriate, it will simply not proceed.

Taken together, the new comprehensive review agency, the intelligence commissioner, and the new committee of parliamentarians will give Canada accountability mechanisms of unprecedented scope and depth. This is something that Canadians have been calling for, and those calls intensified when the former Bill C-51 was introduced. We heard them loud and clear during our consultations, and we are now putting these accountability measures into place.

BillC-59 also brings clarity and rigour to internal government information sharing under the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, or SCISA. This is the law that allows government institutions to share information with each other in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada. Among other things, Bill C-59 would change the name of the law, in English, to the security of Canada information disclosure act, to be clear that we are talking only about the disclosure of existing information, not the collection of anything new. Government institutions will now be required to keep specific records of all disclosures made under the act, and to provide these records to the new review agency.

Importantly, Bill C-59 clarifies the definition of activities “that undermine the security of Canada”. For example, it is explicit in stating that advocacy, protest, dissent, and artistic expression are not included. The new legislation would also provide more precision in the definition of “terrorist propaganda”, in line with the well-known criminal offence of counselling.

The paramountcy of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms is an overriding principle in Bill C-59. That is perhaps most evident in the updates that we are proposing to the CSIS Act. This is the law that created CSIS back in 1984, and it has not been modernized in any meaningful way since then.

The former Bill C-51 empowered CSIS to engage in measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada without clearly defining what those measures could and could not include. We are now creating a specific closed list of measures that CSIS will have the authority to take to deal with threats. If any such activity might limit a charter right, CSIS will have to go before a judge. The activity can only be allowed if the judge is satisfied that it is compliant with the charter.

Another concern we heard during the consultations and more generally has been about the no-fly list, especially the problem of false positives, which affects people whose names are similar to listed individuals. This is due to long-standing design flaws in the way that the no-fly list was first created many years ago. Those flaws require legislative, regulatory, and technological changes to fix them.

Bill C-59 includes the necessary legislative changes and paves the way for the others that will be necessary. In essence, Canada's no-fly list currently piggybacks onto the airlines' computer systems, which means that the government does not control the fields to be included nor the way that the whole system works. This bill would give us the authority we need to allow the government, instead of airlines, to screen passenger information against the no-fly list. The people who have been affected by this, especially those with children, feel frustrated and stigmatized by their no-fly problems. That is entirely understandable, and that is why we are working so hard to get this fixed. Passing Bill C-59 is a necessary step toward that end.

There is much more in Bill C-59 than I could possibly deal with in these 10 minutes, but in keeping with the open and inclusive approach that we have taken with this legislation since before it was even drafted, we are sending it to committee before second reading to ensure that the examination of the bill is as thorough as possible.

Professor Craig Forcese, a respected expert in national security law from the University of Ottawa, said Bill C-59 “appears to be more carefully crafted than anything we've seen in this area in a long time..”. I appreciate that, but there is still more work to be done.

I certainly hope to hear ideas and advice from colleagues in the House. We are open to constructive suggestions as we work together to ensure that Canada's national security framework is as strong and effective as it can possibly be.

[Larry Rousseau, Executive Vice-President, Canadian Labour Congress]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to the standing committee for your invitation.

The Canadian Labour Congress is the largest labour organization in Canada, with 56 affiliated Canadian and international unions, provincial federations of labour, and regional labour councils. The CLC represents 3.3 million workers across all private and public sectors. Indigenous workers, racialized workers, and workers of all faiths are a growing and important part of our labour movement, and any attack on them is an attack on us all. As trade unionists, the CLC and its affiliates continue to stand strong in solidarity to eradicate the forces of hate, racism, and discrimination that divide us.

Systemic racism and discrimination in Canada is well and alive. In 2015, 48% of police reports showed that hate crimes were motivated by hatred of a race or ethnicity, and 35% were motivated by hatred of a religion. Between 2014 and 2015, police reported hate crimes rose by 5%, mainly attributable to the increase of racial and religious hate-related crimes.

The unprecedented rise of Islamophobia and religious discrimination in Canada is very disturbing. There have been attacks on Muslim women wearing hijabs, vandalism of mosques, threats and verbal abuse, numerous anti-Islam and anti-Muslim protests, and anti-racist, anti-fascist counter-protests across Canada.

Most horrifying of all was the terrorist gun attack on the Centre culturel islamique de Québec during evening prayers on January 29, 2017, that left six Muslim worshippers dead and 19 injured. The labour movement condemns in the strongest possible terms any acts of violence against Muslims.

Religious hate crimes against women rose between 2014 and 2015 due to the increase in victimization of Muslim as well as Jewish women.

The very recent Bill 62 in Quebec will likely worsen matters. Bill 62 ostensibly ensures religious neutrality, but de facto it's an attack on the rights of Muslim women who cover their face from receiving or delivering public services. The particularly gendered exclusionary impact of this bill is discriminatory. It is also wrong to ask workers providing public services to participate in the violation of rights that are promised to every Canadian under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as well as provincial human rights codes. We must stand up against Islamophobia and categorically reject policies that discriminate against people of the Muslim faith.

Racism and discrimination have no place in our unions, in our communities, or in our country. Today indigenous people, as well as black and racialized Canadians, are still more likely to be carded, under surveillance, and incarcerated. There have been anti-immigrant flyers and protests targeting Chinese and Sikh communities, police violence and shootings of black Canadians and indigenous people, and racist epithets hurled at racialized Canadians in public.

Muslim and racialized Canadians, as well as indigenous people, continue to experience employment discrimination, wage disparities, and lack of opportunities, in particular if they are women, live with a disability, and/or are LGBTQ. They continue to be the most impoverished in Canada.

Lastly, even Canada's low-wage streams of the temporary foreign worker program systemically discriminate against racialized workers from poorer countries in the south by weakening their rights through tied employer work permits and offering little hope of Canadian citizenship. These developments project urgency and compel us to act with even more fortitude.

At the CLC convention in May, 3,500 union delegates affirmed our commitment to pursue public policies that respect the dignity and rights of all working people regardless of race, religion, immigration status, or country of origin. With our affiliates, we are committed to educating the rank and file to inoculate them against right-wing populism, and we are ready to assist the government to better make diversity our country's strength.

We also have seven recommendations for the standing committee.

First, the government has to immediately implement the 94 recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. This also includes government actions to support the ongoing work of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls and develop a strategy and prioritize the implementation of the inquiry's findings and recommendations.

Second, reinstate Canada's action plan against racism to activate a whole-of-government approach to reducing or eliminating systemic racism and religious discrimination. This would help Canada comply with the requirements of the UN World Conference Against Racism.

Third, the government must repeal the effects of legislation that characterizes or insinuates racist stereotypes and propagates fear in Canada, specifically the Conservatives' Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act, and Bill S-7, the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act. These should be repealed.

Fourth, the government must strengthen the federal Employment Equity Act and program, reinstate the $200,000 government contract threshold for the federal contractors program, and restore mandatory compliance requirements equivalent to the Employment Equity Act itself.

Fifth, immediately introduce proactive pay equity legislation that will close the wage disparity, in particular for racialized Muslim, black, and indigenous women.

Sixth, the government should increase funding to support anti-racism and anti-oppression programs.

Seventh, the government should collect disaggregated data by ethno-racial and religious background across all departments, crown corporations, and other relevant institutions for better analysis and evidence-based policy-making, to eradicate systemic racism and discrimination.

I thank you for the opportunity to present, and I look forward to your questions.

Whichever language you would like to ask them in is fine with me.

Thank you.

[Daniel Therrien]

As you know, I have commented on Bill C-51 as to the standard under which information-sharing is permitted. In my opinion, the standard established under Bill C-51 is too permissive when it comes to information sharing. I stand by those comments.

You are asking if there is a risk that the sharing is too broad. That's why I insist on the purposes for which the information is collected and shared. In this case, it's a matter of national security. It's quite possible that the sharing is reasonable for an individual who presents a national security risk. However, when it comes to sharing information on all travellers who leave Canada to go to the United States, there is obviously a question of sharing information about law-abiding citizens, in order to target individuals who may be problematic from a national security perspective. This is a reasonable step. However, as soon as this mass of information shared with CSIS, for example, indicates that people are not posing a risk, it is important that the information be destroyed and not used. That's why I'm talking about a period of data retention.

The gathering of information and the initial sharing of information for national security purposes may be reasonable, but it is important to have retention rules that require the destruction of documents as soon as a person is considered a traveller and not a national security risk.

[Daniel Therrien]

Yes, the information collected under Bill C-21 on people leaving Canada could very possibly be shared through the measures established under Bill C-51.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. Therrien, based on your interpretation of Bill C-21, does the information-sharing program that was implemented under the former Bill C-51 apply to the data collected at the border?

[Steven Blaney, Conservative, Bellechasse—Les Etchemins—Lévis, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Welcome, everyone.

For the record, I'd like to say that I'm very proud to have introduced Bill C-51, the anti-terrorism act, and I sure sleep better at night. This being said, I also want to acknowledge that the Liberals tabled Bill C-21, the entry/exit initiative, and I'm glad to see the Canadian Bar Association is recommending that the government implement it. We agree on that.

In light of my former capacity, one thing I'd really like to hear you make recommendations on to this committee—and I will begin with you, Madam Cherniak—is the oversight of CBSA. It is my understanding that currently there is a recourse within CBSA. I'd like to hear more on that. You seem to have some ideas on the oversight of CBSA, and also on the review mechanism and the way people who feel they have not been dealt with properly could exert their rights.

Customs Act

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for the question.

Despite what the Liberals and the Conservatives might say, just because the NDP stands up for Canadians' rights and privacy does not mean that we do not take the government's responsibility for ensuring public safety seriously.

Let us look at the current state of affairs. Take CSIS or the RCMP for example. They already have legal mechanisms and agreements in place with their U.S. counterparts for sharing information in the context of a criminal investigation, for example. The same problem comes up every time. We saw that in the debate on Bill C-51. We are told that these changes need to be made in order to ensure Canadians' safety. However, existing legislation does that already. In the meantime, the government proposes signing agreements that would make the border more seamless and allow more information to be shared, which threatens the rights and privacy of Canadians.

This creates a situation where information is exchanged with the American government, which does not seem to take seriously its responsibility to store and use that information appropriately. This is taking place within a context of profiling regarding people's country of origin or religious beliefs, despite the fact that legal provisions are already in place.

We in the NDP might be open to another proposal. However, the fact remains that, for us, any exchange of information that happens with no accountability and no mechanism to protect the rights of Canadians is unacceptable.

The time has come for the accountability, review and oversight mechanisms used by our national security agencies to take into account any and all exchanges of information that happen freely, not only here in Canada, between government agencies, but also with other governments, including the American government.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, first, I would like to join the minister in expressing my condolences to the family of our esteemed colleague Arnold Chan. His death was a great loss to everyone in the House, regardless of their party. We stand in solidarity with the Liberal caucus and Mr. Chan's constituents, family, and friends at this difficult time.

We are here today to talk about Bill C-21, which the government introduced in June 2016. The government is very enthusiastic about this bill. It is now September, and we are finally talking about it, so we can see how enthusiastic the government is about this bill. Perhaps the purpose of the bill is to pander to the Americans during the NAFTA negotiations. Who knows.

It is important to understand the context here. The minister, in answer to my question, and the member for Laurentides—Labelle in his comments talked about the bill as though it was a piece of stand-alone legislation, when in actual fact it is part of an information-sharing agreement between the Canadian and American governments. We can look at the measures set out in the bill, but they are part of a broader agreement and broader operational practices that are beginning to be implemented for our services at the border.

Things are very different now, and if we take a big-picture view of border issues, Canadians are clearly concerned. The same issues come up over and over. Take cellphones, for example. There is a glaring lack of protection when it comes to cellphone searches and what we call the briefcase law. People surrender a certain degree of privacy at the border. That interpretation of the law is fine if we are talking about someone seeing our unmentionables in a suitcase, but a cellphone that contains vast amounts of information about an individual is something else entirely. That is just one of the concerns we have about the border.

Things have changed now that Donald Trump is in office. In recent months, there has been discrimination at the border. Everyone knows that. The minister says that, statistically, fewer Canadians are being turned away at the border than in previous years. That is not an acceptable answer when people are being subjected to degrading treatment by U.S. border officers who ask them questions about their religious beliefs, their country of origin, and the colour of their skin.

This context is extremely important for understanding where our concerns for this bill are coming from. The minister tells us not to worry, that it is basic information that will be shared, information that is found on page 2 of one's passport. In reality, subclause 92(1) of the bill states that:

the Agency may collect, from a prescribed source, in the prescribed circumstances, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner...

It goes on to describe what the Agency is authorized to do. The key phrase I want to draw to the attention of the House is “the Agency may”. It is left to the discretion of border services whether to keep the information or not. At a place like customs, where discrimination is on the rise because people are judged by their destination and their origins, this is quite problematic. This could lead to increased profiling. God knows that there is too much of that already at the border.

Let me go back to the agreement that led to this bill.

The entry/exit program is only just beginning and will grow. Despite the enthusiasm that Liberals and Conservatives might have for it, we are going down a very slippery slope here. Before we continue, someone needs to put on the brakes because what we are seeing here is further integration at the border. That might seem great if all that we are considering is efficiencies, but we want to consider people's rights at the border, but that is lacking in the conversations that are happening.

Where does it end? When we talk about the context that I described with regard to cellphones and the lack of legislation as to what people's rights are when they are asked to unlock their cellphones and provide that information, and when it comes to the profiling that is happening at the border, that also applies to what new tools we have brought into place. The current U.S. President has floated the idea of using biometrics at the border. Will that end up becoming part of this kind of entry/exit agreement on top of the biographical information that would be provided? We do not have answers to these questions.

The fact of the matter is that any information that is being collected and shared will lead us down a path that we have seen before, because, quite frankly, as I said in my question to the minister, some of the most egregious human rights violations that Canada has been a part of, even if by proxy, have happened because of the sharing of information. That is something we are doing more and more in a post-Bill C-51 world, which, by the way, was a bill that the Liberals supported. That is the reality that we have to take into account when we consider increasing the amount of information we are sharing. It is not only biographical information, but also about where people are going to and coming from. While that might seem fine for someone who is not being profiled at the border, there are certainly many law-abiding Canadians who know what the experience is like, who because of where they are going to or where they are originally from; because they might be dual citizens and because of the country from where other citizenship is from; because of the colour of their skin and their religious beliefs, suddenly that basic biographical information being collected and shared with the U.S. government takes on a whole different context despite the fact they are law-abiding Canadians. That is very troubling, and even more so when I hear the minister talk about the fight against radicalization.

Certainly it goes without saying that we all agree that radicalization is an issue that needs to be tackled. Here, I would add that we are still waiting to hear more about what the government is going to do with its grassroots approach to taking on the fight against radicalization. We have not heard much about that in a little while, but that is a sidebar.

The reality is that when I hear things like that and the Conservative member who just spoke, and this bogeyman that is raised of how we are going to go after terrorism, there is a code there and we know what that leads to at the border and the treatment that people go through afterward. That is not something we want to see happen. Sure, we can have faith in our CBSA officers, the men and women who do extraordinary work despite limited resources because of successive Liberal and Conservative governments, but we are also looking at what the U.S. is going to do with that information. That is where the danger lies.

President Trump has signed an executive order explicitly stating that persons who are not U.S. citizens are now excluded from the protections offered by United States privacy legislation.

That is extremely dangerous, considering that the Canadian government is rushing to partner with the U.S. government to increase the amount of information it shares with the Americans.

Given that the President of the United States says he may consider torture acceptable and given that Canada has a ministerial directive in place allowing for information to be shared with countries that engage in torture, we are facing a big problem. I am not saying that this is exactly what the bill says, but the upshot of this bill is that we will be sharing more and more information.

It is a very slippery slope, since we keep sharing more and more information with other countries, including the United States. Even though the U.S. is an ally, the statements coming from the current administration are cause for concern and make the idea of sharing information about public safety and national security extremely troubling.

In a post-C-51 world, the accountability procedures are wholly inadequate. Let us look at the facts. An article published by the Toronto Star in August said the following:

CBSA has quietly started receiving and sharing some information with the U.S. government.

That means some information sharing was already allowed even without this bill being passed. The bill will just settle things for good.

The risk is that this may be done more covertly, without proactive transparency. At the end of the article, it says that Canada Border Services Agency plans to update the privacy assessment once the bill comes into force.

It is far from reassuring that we are talking about doing another privacy impact assessment after the bill is adopted. In that spirit, the role we have as parliamentarians is to protect Canadian safety, but also their rights, and their right to privacy more specifically. As far as this bill is concerned, we should look at how much is left up to regulation in the bill. For example, under “Regulations”, the bill states:

The Governor in Council may make regulations for the purposes of this section, including regulations

(a) prescribing the information that must be given under paragraph (1)(a);

(b) respecting the conveyances in relation to which information must be given under subsection (1);

(c) prescribing the persons or classes of persons who must give the information under subsection (1);

(d) respecting the circumstances in which the information must be given under subsection (1); and

(e) respecting the time within which and the manner in which the information must be given under subsection (1).

Those are all things that the Governor in Council can do through regulations. That essentially means, for the people listening at home, that those are things that the minister can decide to do all on his own, without a proper vote in the House of Commons on a piece of legislation. That is extremely troubling. If we go back to the debate on Bill C-23, which is the sister legislation in the context of this more integrated border with the U.S., in committee, I asked public safety officials which regulations would be changed, as that bill also opened the door to all of the regulatory changes that could potentially change the scope of the bill. That certainly concerned New Democrats. I will give the Liberals credit. They got back to us and provided a list of regulations that may change, but the list was not exhaustive.

As parliamentarians voting on a bill and trying to protect Canadians' rights in the context of sharing more of their information with the American government, especially under the current circumstances or regime, if I can use that term, it is extremely troubling that there is so much latitude allowed for regulatory changes. We certainly understand that there is a place for regulatory changes in the way that our government functions, but when it comes time to prescribe what information is shared, who is sharing it, and how they are sharing it, which is the core of the issue with this bill, that cannot be left out of the accountability process, which obviously includes debate in the House and study at committee.

When I was in Washington with the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, I learned about some new tools, such as digital fingerprinting and facial recognition, that the U.S. may begin using at its border. Those things are still in development, but they are getting to the point that the U.S. government will be looking to deploy them.

The minister is trying to reassure us by saying that he is in constant contact with his American counterpart, but people at Homeland Security envision using exactly those kinds of tools in the context of this information sharing agreement. We could very well see a higher level of integration. In the statement on greater integration of border operations that came out of the meeting between the Prime Minister and President Trump in Washington, they talked about the possibility of our border officials hosting American border officials.

Forget about all of the problems that co-locating two agencies from two different countries could cause, if only in terms of collective agreements and working conditions. Let us just talk about training. The minister took the time to point out that officials would be trained to protect Canadians' privacy and would always act in accordance with the law. I am not questioning the work that is going to be done, but when we debated Bill C-23, which would allow American officials on Canadian soil, we asked Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness officials what the plan was for delivering that training while ensuring respect for the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, privacy laws, and even Bill C-23 itself, and we were not remotely satisfied with the answers.

The minister can be as reassuring as he wants, but it takes more than that. We need something tangible that truly outlines the process that will be put in place for protecting people's privacy. Even if the process is clearly spelled out to us, in an agreement like this with a bill like this, given the way in which Canadians' information will be shared with the U.S. government the minister must admit that the information will not enjoy the same protection in American hands, even if we have the best men and women working as Canadian border officers and the best legislation in place and if we are making every effort to protect people's privacy.

The minister can reassure us all he wants, but, as he so often says, the Americans can do what they want. That is reason alone to not only oppose the bill, but, as I said, to also rethink the agreement.

As I have said time and again, we are seeing a troubling tendency with the new information related to the public safety file globally, whether it is the Justice Noël decision related to illegal collection of metadata by CSIS; the Privacy Commissioner reporting last week that the RCMP has illegally obtained information from cellular phones six times in the last year; racial profiling at the Canada-U.S. border; people being asked to unlock their cell phones and provide social media passwords at the border, without clear legislation in that sense; or whether it is the fact that two years in we still have not seen any changes to Bill C-51. We finally tabled a bill in the dying days of the last sitting of the House, which does not go nearly far enough.

It is a troubling tendency we are seeing that is undermining the confidence and trust that Canadians have in their national security agencies and in the approach that successive Conservative/Liberal governments have had. There is a lack of understanding that rights and security are not a zero-sum game, and that the word “balance” implies that there is sacrificing of part of one or the other. We need to do both. Unfortunately, that is not the report card that the government can have.

We look at a bill like this, at these kinds of agreements more broadly, as we decide to share more and more information with a U.S. government that is being led by a president who has opened the door to the use of torture, and has removed privacy protections on information, not only for his own citizens but even more importantly for non-Americans. For Canadians, in that specific context the government cannot ignore it. Whether it is trying to fast-track this bill that was tabled in the House in June 2016, maybe to make nice for NAFTA negotiations, the fact is, it is about time that the government started to hit the brakes on this willy-nilly sharing of information.

I want to end on one piece. If the government is so proud of this agreement, if it really thinks it is doing the right thing, I have one question to ask. Unfortunately, I will not get to ask it, so I will ask it rhetorically. Why is it that on the first day back in the House of Commons, after a great summer of work that we all spent in our constituencies, that we are hardly going to hear any Liberal speakers? The minister has spoken, and there will maybe be a handful more speakers. However, it is mostly New Democrats and Conservatives who will be carrying the debate.

Maybe my Conservative friends can tell me what is so great about this bill, because, sadly, I do not think I am going to hear about it from the Liberals. They have certainly not made the case for it. The “just trust me” approach by the minister is not good enough when it comes to protecting Canadians' rights and privacy.

[John Oliver, Liberal, Oakville, ON]

Thank you very much for sharing your time.

Thank you for your comments and testimony today. I just wanted to say, in the last few minutes of our week-long session on this, thank you to the clerk and his staff. I was doing some research to see how many witnesses have come to speak to an act before. The Fair Elections Act had 74. Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act, had 75. Bill C-2 , an act to amend the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act had 20. After that, it's lower numbers. I think we might have hit the benchmark with over 100 witnesses on this topic, which speaks to the importance of it to Canadians and the social change that's coming with it.

My comment, for the Emerys and for others who have been part of this very strong culture in trying to create change, is that the purpose of the act is to prevent young persons from accessing cannabis, to protect public health and public safety by establishing stricter product safety and product quality requirements, and to deter criminal activity by imposing serious criminal penalties.

If you read the bill, the goal is not about recreational marijuana users, by optimizing their experience and optimizing their choices. It's a very different lens. I think that's the social difference or maybe the philosophical difference. I understand and hear your frustration. I hear the background that you're coming from, but the act would address different social agendas than the one you've been speaking to.

Public Safety

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, having voted in favour of the Harper government's Bill C-51, the minister is finally presenting the promised reforms, but they are unfortunately incomplete.

The security of Canada information sharing act can have its name changed, but that is only a cosmetic change that does not protect the information shared by national security agencies.

Why has the minister not addressed one of the most controversial aspects of the former Bill C-51?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I don't mean to cut you off, but I only have so much time. I get just one turn.

I wanted to discuss clause 2, which seeks to add paragraph 39.1(2), known as an override provision, to the Canada Evidence Act. The provision reads as follows:

(2) This section applies despite any other provision of this Act or any other Act of Parliament.

I'd actually like to hear your thoughts on the importance of the provision. When an act of terrorism, some form of violence, or another crisis occurs in any country, people feel the need for heightened security measures. I'm a bit biased, but that's what I observed during the debate on Bill C-51. The October crisis, in Quebec, comes to mind as well.

Do you think this provision is important to make sure that, in such situations, national security cannot be used as an excuse to undermine freedom of the press?

I'd like to hear all of your opinions on that, if possible.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I do not think that this is the kind of assurance that Canadians expect to hear. Let us look at the government's actual record. The Liberals voted for Bill C-51 under the previous government. They then claimed, right after they won the election, that they were preparing legislation to undo many of the bill's provisions, yet here we are, two years later, and Bill C-51 is completely untouched.

How can the Liberals be trusted with protecting the privacy and civil liberties of Canadians?

Criminal Code

[Wayne Stetski, NDP, Kootenay—Columbia, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to start by clarifying for the people of Kootenay—Columbia and those watching across Canada that this Bill C-51 is not Bill C-51 from the 41st Parliament, which was called the anti-terrorism bill. That bill led to widespread protests across my riding of Kootenay—Columbia. People were concerned about the potential to make peaceful protests illegal and the potential impact on their personal privacy rights. Because the NDP is going to support this Bill C-51, in the 42nd Parliament, I did not want there to be any confusion back home.

Regarding the bill before us, we are pleased to support this legislation. We believe that it would provide many overdue protections, particularly for victims of sexual assault. One of the most important provisions in this legislation would clarify the definition of consent. Some of this should be obvious. It should be common sense. In fact, I am appalled that we need to entrench this in law, but here it is. With this amendment, an unconscious person could not be considered to have given consent. There it would be now, spelled out in black and white in the Criminal Code of Canada: someone who was passed out from intoxication, from a blow to the head, or for whatever reason would not be able to consent to sexual activity. Good. While it is outrageous that any other interpretation was ever understood, at least we, as lawmakers, are now making it perfectly clear.

The bill also takes another important step on the issue of consent. A person who is passive during sexual assault, that is, does not scream, “no”, or fight or otherwise resist, cannot be considered to be automatically giving consent. This is necessary and it is overdue. Too often, an individual, unduly pressured or even physically overcome during a sexual assault, will feel fear, confusion, or even peer pressure and will be unable to enunciate his or her refusal. This amendment shifts the burden to the other person to get clear and active consent. To quote University of Ottawa associate professor of law Carissima Mathen, “Passivity is not consent. Consent has to be communicated to you in some meaningful way, not from being quiet.”

That statement is borne out by statistics in a Global News/Ipsos Reid poll. The most recent common reason women gave for not reporting a sexual assault to the police was feeling young and powerless; 56% of victims said so. Forty per cent of respondents said they stayed silent because of the shame they felt, and 29% said they blamed themselves for the assault. Others worried that reporting would bring dishonour to their families, feared retaliation from their attacker, or said they did not have faith in the criminal justice system. New definitions will help clarify the term for the courts, but they do not do enough.

Too often, victims of sexual assault find themselves isolated by the courts. They have no one to protect them from aggressive questioning by a defence attorney and no one to be their advocate. Sometimes there are poorly trained judges, as we learned last year when a judge demanded of a victim why she could not just keep her knees together while she was sexually assaulted. That horrific and shocking statement led to condemnation across the country and the resignation, rightfully, of the judge who made that statement.

Rather than treating victims with care and compassion, our justice system sometimes victimizes them all over again. The solution would be to ensure that victims have access to legal aid as they go through the court process. The current Liberal government must not choose to ignore that essential element in protecting victims.

This legislation also includes the removal of some so-called zombie laws. Those laws, which have become redundant because of other laws that cover the same subject or because they have been overturned by the courts, are an interesting collection. As a former mayor, I know that there are many municipalities with zombie bylaws that need cleaning up as well. Federally, we now no longer have to worry about the detrimental effect of crime comics on our youth. We have many other negative influences to worry about. Similarly, a law banning Canadians from offering a reward for the return of stolen property, no questions asked, seems unnecessary and even detrimental in its own right. I know I personally used that approach to get back my son's stolen mountain bike once, without even knowing it was against the law, as is the case, I am sure, for many Canadians.

One must wonder about the existing laws regarding the practice of witchcraft, sorcery, enchantment, or conjuration. In addition to the fact that it impinges on the rights of some religions, and would confuse the U.S. President who is certain that he is the target of a witch hunt, this might also hurt Harry Potter cosplayers; Dungeons and Dragons "larpers", which I do not know much about but which my staff assure me is a thing; and others for whom sorcery is an entertainment. This is a good law to be rid of.

My favourite among this group of zombie laws is the prohibition on duelling. After all, we stand in a place where the two sides of the House are separated by two sword lengths to ensure we fence only with words and not with rapiers. Still, the last public duelling in Canada took place not far from here in Perth, Ontario, in June 1833, when 23-year-old law student John Wilson shot and killed his friend Robert Lyon, age 20, during a duel over the honour of Elizabeth Hughes, a young school teacher.

Wilson successfully pleaded his case in court, had a lengthy law career, married Miss Hughes, and eventually became a member of the legislative assembly of the Province Of Canada, the precursor of the House of Commons. In case some members of the House or the public believe that duelling will now be legal, it is worth noting that our homicide laws still apply.

The bill offers some good amendments to the Criminal Code. My biggest concern with the bill is not with its content, but with what is missing.

Across Canada, the Supreme Court decision known as the Jordan ruling has allowed many indicted suspects to go free because of the length of time it has taken to bring them to trial.

Just this week, a judge in Quebec City freed a man accused of sexually assaulting his adolescent stepdaughter. Last November, an Ottawa judge freed a murder suspect under the same terms. In fact, across Canada dozens of suspects, people who have been charged with crimes ranging from first degree homicide to sexual assault, have been freed because our courts do not have the capacity or the will to ensure a speedy trial.

While eliminating zombie laws is important, the government's first priority should be to ensure that our existing criminal laws are upheld by the courts. This means more federal and provincial resources and it may mean new laws to reverse the Jordan ruling.

Another item missing from the bill is a long-promised review of damaging and disingenuous amendments introduced by the previous government. The Conservatives' belief that mandatory minimum sentences will somehow reduce crime has been ridiculed by members of the justice system, from lawyers to judges. We have seen over and over the mandatory minimums getting tossed by judges as unworkable and unconstitutional, just as the New Democratic Party's justice critic warned them would happen during debates over those amendments.

Let us look at recent news.

In 2013, a Manitoba judge heard the case of a young man who lashed out at his bullies. The judge refused to apply the mandatory minimum sentence, saying:

A four-year term would clearly place the accused in the heart of the federal penitentiary system normally reserved for hardened criminals. To say that the conditions of a federal penitentiary would be harsh for someone of the accused’s background is an understatement.

(Court of Queen's Bench, Justice John Menzies, October 2013)

In 2016, the Supreme Court of Canada threw out mandatory sentences for repeat drug dealers, concerned that the harsh penalties applied to:

the addict who is charged for sharing a small amount of drugs with a friend or spouse, and finds herself sentenced to a year in prison because of a single conviction for sharing marihuana in a social occasion nine years before.

Just this week, in British Columbia, a judge refused to apply mandatory minimum sentences in the case of a young man who was found employed at a small marijuana farm.

All these decisions took the view that judges must have the flexibility to apply their experience, their knowledge, and, their judgment on a case-by-case basis.

We are glad the government intends to review these unconstitutional sentences, and we look forward to the day that the justice minister keeps her promise. If only the Liberal justice minister would, at the same time, expunge the criminal records of those who had been convicted of carrying small amounts of marijuana in the past, we could see true justice done.

I mentioned the other Bill C-51 when I began speaking. As soon as the election was over, the Prime Minister became silent on Bill C-51 after saying his government would make changes to it. Canadians truly hope the Liberal government keeps its word and does revoke sections of that act soon. Thousands of Canadians, including many of my constituents in Kootenay—Columbia, demanded change and they expect this promised on the former Bill C-51 to be kept.

Public Safety

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, after almost two years, the Liberals have not made a single change to former Bill C-51, despite their promises and serious constitutional concerns. The no-fly list is still in effect, intelligence agencies still enjoy enormous powers, and the list goes on.

By maintaining this legislation, which they supported when it was introduced, the Liberals are allowing gross violations of Canadians’ privacy to continue.

My question is clear: will they finally repeal Bill C-51 with the bill they intend to introduce next week?

Journalistic Sources Protection Act

[Gord Johns, NDP, Courtenay—Alberni, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to rise today on Bill S-231, an act to amend the Canada Evidence Act and the Criminal Code. I would first like to thank the member for Louis-Saint-Laurent for bringing forward this bill. He was an esteemed journalist in his past life and knows this very well.

As I was preparing my thoughts on this bill today, I was hoping to talk about a friend of mine, a local reporter on Vancouver Island, Keven Drews. Keven has been a pillar of journalism on Vancouver Island and the west coast for over 20 years. He has shown me what strong, unflinching journalism looks like. Unfortunately, Keven is fighting a brutal 10-year battle with cancer. He is in the hospital today and watching us talk about this very important bill. I am certain he would be happy to know that we are here fighting for freedom of speech and journalists.

The first time I met Keven, and it is hard to believe, I met him surfing. I was in Tofino and he was a cadet, a real, true Canadian committed to Canada and to becoming a journalist who could tell very important stories for coastal people.

As a journalist, he started the local paper, telling our stories, and moved up to become the Alberni Valley Times reporter and editor. Then he went down to Peninsula Daily News, and then over to Port Angeles, Washington, before he got sick. Then he started his own paper, the westcoaster.ca, and started telling a very important story, the west coast story, to make sure that people across our country heard our story. When Keven got sick, he was on the way up in his career, and he went to work for The Canadian Press so he could be close to the hospitals in Vancouver.

Wherever Keven was, he would stop to hear what was happening in our communities. His late father or his mother, Louise, would be with him, who are very proud of Keven, or his wife Yvette and kids Tristan and Elleree. Keven always made time to hear our important stories. His priorities were to ensure that in the stories of coastal people, stories about economic justice and social justice and environmental justice and indigenous people's rights were included. Some of the stories were difficult and painful.

Keven interviewed me many times, and I always respected his sources. I respected that he had to protect his sources so that he could get the story right. He covered really bad accidents, suicides, corruption, and scandals, really difficult stories to cover. It was the confidentiality that earned Keven the respect that he deserved, and he could cover all of these difficult issues. I acknowledge journalists across our country for the passion and caring that they have to make sure they get it right and build trust within communities.

Before I dive into the rest of my speech, I want to thank Keven. I know a lot of people have gone back to their ridings and I appreciate that, but I would ask members to join me in acknowledging this great man, who fought for journalism, people in our communities, and our country.

One of the biggest challenges for journalists and the journalism profession in general is trust, as I touched on. In a changing media landscape where clicks and views have become its currency, the public's trust in journalism has eroded. In this environment, probing investigative journalism has become all that much more important. This is the kind of journalism that we not only need to celebrate but also rigorously protect.

Along with developing trust with the public through their hard work, it is also vital for journalists to develop trust with their sources. Many of these sources need to speak with anonymity. If sources feel their communication with the journalist could compromise them, those sources will dry up. Bill S-231 aims to protect these journalists and the sources they rely upon to create the powerful, well-founded journalism we deserve here in Canada. If we want to sustain our free and independent press, the protections that this bill provides are necessary.

This bill was introduced in the House on May 3, which was fitting, as it was World Press Freedom Day. On that day, the Prime Minister released a statement, which stated:

Today, we recognize the many journalists who seek out the truth, challenge assumptions and expose injustices, often at great personal risk. They are the cornerstones of any strong and healthy democracy, informing and challenging us all to think more critically about the world around us.

I cannot agree more with the sentiment of the Prime Minister's statement last month. The government needs to move past well-meaning platitudes, though, and pass legislation that grants journalists and their sources the protections they need to pursue difficult stories.

The government needs to clear the way on these reforms. I cannot understand why it remains silent while reporters are prosecuted. If the Prime Minister wants to continue to label himself a champion of the free press, now is the time to prove that claim. The Liberals have yet to act upon Bill C-51 and the threat to free speech it poses for journalists, but support for this bill would be a great step in the right direction. To this point, it is worth noting that in 2015, Canada ranked 10th in the World Press Freedom Index, and this year we have slid to 22nd in the world. We can and need to do better.

The World Press Freedom Index cited four items that caused our rank to drop. One was the revelation that Montreal police tailed a La Presse journalist in an attempt to uncover a leak from their own source. Second, the RCMP is prosecuting a Vice media journalist who has been charged with refusing to give up his direct documents to RCMP officers and could be sentenced to up to 10 years for withholding these documents. Third, a journalist for TheIndependent.ca is being charged by the RCMP for his reporting on a protest at the Muskrat Falls hydroelectric project in Labrador. He followed protestors to bear witness to the protest, and he was prosecuted for this action. Finally, there is our lack of a shield law for journalists and their sources.

The first three examples are offensive, overreaching actions, and these cases need to be resolved. The importance of a shield law for Canada falls to us to accomplish and would help to stop injustices such as these from occurring in the future. We need to follow the examples of countries such as Australia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in developing a shield law.

I would like to take a moment to speak to some of these cases. In the cases of the Vice reporter and TheIndependent.ca's journalist, both filed stories that will be vital evidence for police in other cases, so it baffles me that journalists acting in the public interest and assisting the public in an invaluable way are then being prosecuted for doing that work. This is a short-sighted approach by police, as it will make journalists consider what stories they pursue in the future. It pushes directly against the rights of these individuals and their protection from self-incrimination. Journalists and the media are not accountable to the government. Strong-arm tactics such as these are the sorts of measures that break down free speech.

I am glad to stand with my colleagues from other parties to advocate for this legislation. This is not a partisan issue. This is an issue of freedom of speech and our democracy, and I think we can all see that. I hope that the government comes to see this as well and supports this bill.

Bill S-231 is a well-meaning piece of legislation. However, I still have reservations about its scope in the bill's current form. I am particularly concerned that small news outlets and freelance writers may still be forced to self-censor or risk entering into an extended legal battle, which remains something few can afford. In 2009-10, The Globe and Mail spent almost a million dollars in legal fees to protect one of its sources, and this kind of expense cannot be expected of local media outlets.

Another concern I have is the limited definition of journalist in the bill's current form. I hope that as this bill reaches the House committee, this language is scrutinized. There is a serious problem if size rather than substance limits the inclusion of publications in the scope of this bill. Bill S-231 is a strong first step, but it is clear that more can be done to reflect the enormity of the media landscape in this day and age.

One of the strongest parts of this legislation is the paradigm shift the bill would provide at the beginning of a police investigation. From the beginning of an investigation, it sets out checks and balances in the judicial process to weigh journalistic integrity against public safety. Journalist advocates provided during warrant requests could lend their expert knowledge and mediate between police forces and judges. This would make sure the onus was on the agencies to prove the need to investigate these journalists.

The bill would also amend the Criminal Code to no longer give a justice of the peace the authority to issue a search warrant relating to a journalist. Only a judge in a superior court would be able to issue a search warrant, under certain conditions that would provide maximum protection to journalists' right to the confidentiality of their sources. This is a wise change. The journalists I have mentioned have been charged with serious crimes, with the potential for significant jail time if they are convicted. Going forward, we need the experience and knowledge of our most seasoned judges in these cases from the very beginning.

This bill needs to be a true shield and not a hurdle to be navigated around. We have a duty to support journalists and freedom of speech in this country. Democracy is at its best when journalists are free to do their job without fear of reverberation. My New Democrat colleagues and I will stand by those who make our country strong with an independent free press.

Criminal Code

[Luc Thériault, Bloc, Montcalm, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am not a lawyer or an expert, and I have to say that after what I have heard from my Liberal and Conservative colleagues in this debate, I am glad that I am neither of those things.

However, one thing I am very familiar with is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Oakes decision. When my friend from the Conservative Party talks about copyright and tattoos, frankly, it leaves a bit of a bad taste in my mouth. She cannot be serious. This gives the public the impression that the legislators have given up.

For years now, front-line workers have been challenging the scope of sections 2 and 7 of the charter, and my colleagues are telling us that freedom of expression could be unreasonably breached in a free and democratic society, and that this would not survive a court challenge.

I hope the voters were listening to my colleague from Rivière-du-Nord's brilliant speech. To hear my other colleagues say it, bills have to be perfect from the get-go. How many bills have been introduced here and have gone on to be improved in committee? On what grounds can my colleagues justify opposing the principle of fighting organized crime? If making a list of terrorist groups is a good idea, why is it not a good idea for organized crime too? They go on and on about the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Quite a few constitutional experts have said it is time to overhaul the charter because of its unintended consequences. We should talk to police officers, to people on the front lines, to people who put together the evidence needed for an open-and-shut case. We should talk to them about the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and see what they have to say about it. People have been talking about freedom of expression and freedom of association in connection with criminal organizations. Can anyone here stand up and tell me that section 1 of the charter does not support the bill my colleague from Rivière-du-Nord introduced? Can anyone seriously say that, here and now, at 6:20 in the evening? Come on.

The bill must pass the Oakes test, which is cited in many Supreme Court rulings. What is it? The Oakes test determines whether the purpose of the law is demonstrably justified “in a free and democratic society”. The test applies when the applicant has proven that a provision of the charter has been violated. It is incumbent upon the crown to establish that its limitation satisfies the requirements of the Oakes test. There must be a real and pressing purpose.

In the House, everyone has said that it is urgent that we fight criminal organizations. Everyone agrees that we must improve the Criminal Code in order to better combat organized crime and criminal associations. However, some members have said that what is being proposed is not what is needed. In my opinion, this should be referred to a committee, so the committee could study how it could be improved and evaluate the claims of those who, all too often, call on the experts.

I was a philosophy professor in another life. Appealing to the authority of experts or science amounts to sophistry. When we call on another authority too often and make it our main argument, we do not have a solid argument.

This happens too often in the House. My colleague’s bill absolutely deserves to be debated in committee, in accordance with respectable parliamentary tradition.

The Bloc Québécois’ organized crime roadmap seems to bother my colleagues. However, it was not the Liberal Party that put its imprimatur on the fight against organized crime. The Liberals instead put their imprimatur on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Their interpretation of freedom of expression and freedom of association is outrageous. They ask everyday men and women if they find it unreasonable to infringe on the right of association of criminal organizations by creating a list and fighting intimidation.

For the last year and a half, I have heard some of my colleagues give impassioned speeches decrying the bullying our young people are exposed to at school, and yet, they are ready to accept that members of organized crime walk around with their patch and intimidate people in their communities. Could we be a bit more consistent?

In light of the Jordan ruling and the fact that we release people because proceedings are constantly delayed, my colleague from Rivière-du-Nord claims to believe, after reviewing the matter and consulting experts, who are not the same ones consulted by the members across the floor, that we need to save time. Why kill the bill now instead of talking about it and calling witnesses in committee to tell us what they think about it?

My colleagues’ partisan position is not in keeping with the spirit of parliamentary debate. This is not what the people of Quebec and voters want. They do not want partisan debates in which we seek to defeat bills by claiming in a 10-minute speech that they do not pass legal muster, while my colleague’s arguments are worth at least as much as the arguments by my colleagues across the floor.

I will calm down, since I am speaking on behalf of my constituents. When the Conservatives, who tabled Bill C-51, talk to me about copyright and tell me that the bill before us will unreasonably violate freedom of expression and association, they are expressing a partisan position.

Incidentally, I am happy that my colleague has been able to introduce legislation; we have only had occasion to table two in the last year and a half. This is how Bloc Québécois MPs are treated in Parliament, treatment that no Western parliament reserves for representatives of the people.

Sometimes I hear people question the usefulness of the Bloc Québécois. Well, contrary to what some might think, if it were not for the Bloc Québécois, its roadmap and its efforts to fight organized crime, we would not have been able to improve the Criminal Code's provisions on fighting organized crime.

In all honesty, I think my colleague’s bill deserves to be studied in committee and deserves to be reviewed in the same way as we review all other bills that have received our support in principle, even if they are flawed.

[Ralph Goodale, Liberal, Regina—Wascana, SK]

We obviously want to have the capacity, the very effective capacity, to deal with terrorism threats and to make sure we're keeping Canadians safe. At the same time, we need to ensure that we're safeguarding the rights and freedoms of Canadians. We want to achieve both of those things simultaneously, not one at the expense of the other or with some kind of trade-off. Both of them need to be accomplished.

We will be presenting specific amendments with respect to Bill C-51. They're in the process of being prepared. I would be more than happy to have a full discussion on them when they're in the public domain.

[Tony Clement, Conservative, Parry Sound—Muskoka, ON]

I'd appreciate that.

The next question relates to the Anti-terrorism Act, Bill C-51. This was obviously a subject that the committee did look into. We heard from the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, who made it clear that the offence of advocating for terrorism offences in general was important to crack down on radicalization and propaganda.

I know that there were also some contrary opinions, to be fair, but I'm asking you whether you would keep that provision in place. It's important to have the ability to disrupt terrorism networks and have those laws in place on our books.

Journalistic Sources Protection Act

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, despite the Liberals' obsession with living in the past, we need to remember that, last week, on World Press Freedom Day, Reporters Without Borders reminded us that Canada dropped 14 points in the World Press Freedom Index. I would like to remind members that this happened in the past two years. Those who do the math will figure out that we are coming up on this government's two year anniversary. Before resorting to petty partisanship, the government needs to realize that the status quo is unacceptable for democracy and journalism.

It goes without saying that Bill S-231 is a response to high profile cases, in particular, the surveillance of journalist Patrick Lagacé by the Montreal police. Contrary to what we heard in the government member's speech, the federal government is not safe, here in Ottawa, from these same traps and actions that threaten the freedom of the press and, consequently, our democracy.

Take for example, Vice reporter Ben Makuch who is currently in court trying to protect a source within the RCMP. He could go to prison for it.

He is facing prison because the RCMP is tyring to obtain information that will not help it at all in its investigation. On the contrary, all the information the RCMP needs is already in the public domain, in articles published by the journalist in question. I think this is a very striking example.

It does not stop there. The response provided by the RCMP and CSIS over the past weeks, months, and even years on the various incidents that have taken place are rather unconvincing. Consider the example of Joël-Denis Bellavance of La Presse, who was followed and spied on by the RCMP. I reiterate that the status quo is no longer working, and that is why we are pleased to support this bill. Indeed, we must move this forward.

Although the member for Louis-Saint-Laurent is sponsoring this bill in the House of Commons, I am sure he would agree that it is nice to have a private member's bill, but it is high time that this government introduced something even more robust. Much bigger reforms are needed. I am not criticizing what this bill does; on the contrary, it is a first step in the right direction. However, I think a lot of work remains to be done to bring our legislation in line with the 21st century.

As the member for Louis-Saint-Laurent pointed out, social networks and ubiquitous cell phones have changed how journalists and police officers operate, and are still changing things almost every day. We have a lot of catching up to do if we want a system that works the way we want it to.

People have explained what the bill will do, but I just want to go over that again. In a situation like what happened with the VICE reporter, that means reverse onus for protecting sources. This is very important because it does provide a way to ensure public safety if the police can prove, say, that this is the only way it can get information that would save lives. We know that option exists.

I think it is appropriate for the bill to place the onus on the police, not on journalists, who would have to prove that their sources need to be protected. I think this is essential. In addition, warrants are issued by Superior Court judges, not justices of the peace. That is a very important element that strengthens and tightens up the system a lot to make sure that journalistic sources are properly protected.

I am going to read some quotes that I found that illustrate my point. I am not sure if it is against the rules to comment on one's own absence in the House. Unfortunately, I arrived a bit late because I had other commitments. I apologize if I am repeating what my colleague from Louis-Saint-Laurent said.

I am going to read a few comments, which are quite interesting to me and illustrate the culture that is unfortunately starting to grip journalists and their desire to do their job. Being afraid to do one's job obviously has an adverse effect on the result and, accordingly, democracy.

I will start with a quote by Tom Henheffer from Canadian Journalists for Free Expression. Speaking about the case of the Vice journalist, he said:

He said, “Every civil society organization with ties to free expression in the country are supporting him and condemning the fact that the government is violating press freedom in such an aggressive way. We feel this is a serious blight on Canada's international reputation, and a major mistake on behalf of the RCMP.”

I have another interesting quote, this one from Denis Lessard, parliamentary bureau chief for La Presse in Quebec City. He may have since changed positions. I do not always follow what is happening in Quebec City because I have enough on my plate. He was talking about the police surveillance scandal in Montreal and the SQ. He said:

I have covered politics for almost 40 years, [I am not going to state my age, but let us just say that we are talking about a seasoned professional] and have often reported on politically sensitive topics. You tell yourself that it is always possible that you are being spied on by police, but you are also convinced that they would never dare go that far. Well, it seems we were wrong.

This illustrates the point I was making to show that a journalist starts to change his attitude toward police work even after 40 years of experience with sensitive topics. Let us just say that it has a dampening effect on the work that is done.

I have another quote, this one from Marie-Maude Denis from Radio-Canada:

I have always been extremely careful with regard to my confidential sources, but of course when ‘fighting’ against the police you are always outgunned, as they have access to this kind of investigative tool. The future will tell us or maybe we will never know everything they have discovered about me.

Once again, this perfectly illustrates the change in culture. Journalists would indeed like to know, but they remain in the dark. They wonder what information police departments or other national security agencies, such as CSIS, have on them. That is very worrisome.

I will deviate a little from the matter before us, specifically the bill. I just want to make a general comment. Earlier, I said that there is much work to be done. For the NDP, it goes without saying that the reforms are a good example of that. Our position is that Bill C-51 should be rescinded. We heard groups of journalists express concerns about certain provisions on criminalization and terrorist propaganda. These are very important concerns for the journalists covering these stories or those that infiltrate terrorist cells in order to report facts of public interest. Mainly, we are talking about journalists working for smaller media outlets that have neither the financial nor the legal resources that larger organizations have to give their employees greater and more robust legal protection during court proceedings. That is a very important consideration to bear in mind.

I want to end with a problem that we have with the bill and that we hope to fix in committee. We do not agree with the amendment adopted by the Senate regarding the definition of a journalist. After talking to some journalist groups working in the field and on this issue, we believe that the definition is too narrow and could cause problems for bloggers or journalists who work in non-traditional media.

The member for Louis-Saint-Laurent acknowledged it once again in his remarks. Social media and the Internet, among other things, are changing the field of journalism significantly. We therefore believe that judges should be given the discretion to decide whether someone is a journalist and works in the field of journalism. That would give judges enough discretion to ensure the integrity of what the bill is proposing, while also making sure that journalists working in new media or non-traditional media are not unfairly punished.

That is what we are going to propose in committee. That being said, this bill is an excellent step in the right direction. As the public safety critic, I am very pleased to recommend that my colleagues support the bill, just as I intend to do.

Of course, I would like to thank Senator Carignan and the member for Louis-Saint-Laurent for their efforts. The bill could not have been introduced at a better time, as May 3 was World Press Freedom Day. This is an issue that we should all be concerned about.

As politicians, we have all had our run-ins with journalists, but I believe that our democracy will always be better served by freedom of expression and freedom of the press, and the NDP will join all those who are working toward those goals.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

With respect to harmonization and a question from my colleague Mr. Saini, with respect to the adequacy review, you listed a number of considerations: PIPEDA, the Privacy Act, Bill C-51, provincial privacy laws. Has your department identified any areas of concern?

[Krista Campbell]

It think it's one of the most important things that businesses are focusing on right now, and there's interest in knowing exactly what will be coming.

The EU has indicated that they will be looking to review Canada. They have not launched any kind of formal process at this point. We have begun reaching out at my level, at the working level, with European Commission officials to start a discussion around timing and scope of the review. We've had discussions with them about how they've gone about their recent reviews with other countries; what did and didn't work well in terms of providing information; and where there are best practices or good standards they thought were very useful.

We have face-to-face meetings with European officials next week. Then we hope to exchange some preliminary information on what Canada's privacy regime looks like. It'll be broader than just PIPEDA, but we'll give them a good primer on PIPEDA; the Privacy Act; changes that would have been made under Bill C-51; and Security Of Canada Information Sharing Act, SCISA; as well as some information about the fact that, because we're a federation, we have a unique set of requirements that include both provincial privacy laws as well as federal laws. Then we'll work from there on what they think they want to discuss with us more formally once they trigger the review. As I said, it hasn't been formally triggered yet. We definitely are starting the work on planning for what the scope and timing would look like.

[Daniel Therrien]

The Minister of Public Safety has announced that there will be a bill—before the summer, if I'm not mistaken—to amend Bill C-51. We will obviously have things to say about that. In our annual report, we will report on how Bill C-51, SCISA in particular, has been used. We have a number of investigations, such as the use of StingRay technology. The border will be an important theme. I've mentioned the executive order of President Trump, but also in Canada there is the extent of CBSA's practices in terms of border searches, the searches of technological equipment such as cellphones, etc. Issues related to the border will also be an important theme of activity.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

With respect to future activities, do you foresee further advocacy or work on Bill C-51 as the government undertakes its review? Perhaps you could speak to other initiatives that you see taking up your time—I know I spoke at the outset about StingRay—and to areas that this committee could work together with you on as you pursue these initiatives going forward.

[Daniel Therrien, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the 2017-18 Main Estimates.

In the time allocated, I will first discuss the sustained demands on our office and the management of our financial resources. Secondly, I will talk about our policy agenda for this coming year.

In recent years, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has maintained its efforts to find efficiencies and make optimal use of existing resources of slightly more than $24 million to be as effective as possible in addressing the privacy risks of an increasingly technological world.

Fiscal year 2017-18 will be no exception. Amidst competing demands, we will not lose sight of our mandate: ensuring that the privacy rights of Canadians are respected and that their personal information is protected.

In 2017-18, we will continue to fulfill our core mandate, which includes conducting investigations, examining breach reports, undertaking audits, reviewing privacy impact assessments or PIAs, providing guidance to individuals and organizations, and offering advice to parliamentarians.

On the investigations side, we have become more efficient in part through increased use of early resolution to find appropriate solutions. In 2015-16, 38% of complaints were resolved in this manner under the Privacy Act and 50% under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act or PIPEDA. As a result, our response time on average was seven months for both public-sector and private-sector complaints.

However, the number of complex files is growing, which is creating a backlog of complaints that are not resolved after 12 months. In the coming year, I intend to devote temporary resources to address this situation.

In 2015-16, we received 88 new PIAs and completed 73 PIA reviews, in addition to opening 13 new consultation files. As you know, we would like to receive more PIAs and draft information sharing agreements, as we believe reviewing programs upstream is a good way to mitigate privacy risks.

In addition, we are taking steps to prepare for the coming into force of the breach provisions of Bill S-4. These new provisions will require private-sector organizations to report certain breaches to my office.

Public education and outreach are important activities to ensure Canadians are empowered to exercise their privacy rights and organizations are able to comply with their obligations. Last year, we revamped our website both in its structure and content to make it more user-friendly. This year, we will continue to update its content to provide helpful advice to Canadians.

We will continue to offer guidance to specific industry sectors deemed to be in need of greater privacy awareness, as well as vulnerable groups such as youth and seniors. We will also provide new guidance for individuals, and we will continue to advance our privacy priorities on issues such as online reputation, the body as personal information, the economics of personal information, and government surveillance.

Despite these efforts, we need to do much more to ensure that privacy rights are truly respected, a key condition for consumer trust and growth in the digital economy. Our goal is to complete all investigations within a reasonable time, to engage in some proactive enforcement, to give proactive advice to government, and to issue research-based guidance on most current and upcoming privacy issues.

In my annual report to be tabled in September, which will include our conclusions on improvements to the consent model and recommendations to amend PIPEDA, I will be able to bring more specificity to our compliance and proactive strategies. This, in turn, will inform a discussion on what might be an appropriate level of investment in OPC activities for the next few years.

I will now turn to some of the policy issues that we're seized with.

First is consent. Last May, my office released a discussion paper on issues related to privacy and consent. We then, through an extensive consultation process, sought input from industry, privacy experts, and Canadians. As mentioned, our final report will be released in September, and we will then work to implement the chosen solutions.

Second is online reputation. My office has also launched a consultation and call for submissions on the issue of online reputation as part of our efforts to address one of our strategic privacy priorities: reputation and privacy. We will share our policy position on online reputation before the end of the calendar year.

Third is legislative reform. My office has long stressed the need to modernize Canada's legal and regulatory frameworks. While the introduction of Bill S-4 was a positive development, Canada's federal private sector privacy law is now more than 15 years old. Technology and business models have changed. Our work on both consent and reputation will help inform the recommendations we will make to Parliament on reforming the law.

On the public sector side, I would like to express my gratitude to members of this committee for supporting my office's recommendations for modernizing the Privacy Act. My office now looks forward to participating in the government's review of the act to ensure that it meets the needs and expectations of Canadians, and in our view this work should proceed without delay.

On government surveillance, issues related to government surveillance will also form an important part of our policy agenda in the coming year. We note your recent report on SCISA, and we thank you for it. We also note the report just made public by SECU, the committee on national security, which also touched on information sharing under SCISA. We now await the measures the government will put forward to modify Bill C-51 to ensure that Canada's national security framework protects Canadians and their privacy.

We also have a number of investigations related to national security and government surveillance, and we are seeing heightened concerns from Canadians about privacy protections at the border and in the United States. Further to the adoption by President Trump of executive order 13768 of January 25, which deals with security in the interior of the United States, I had written to ministers to ask for confirmation that administrative agreements previously reached between Canada and the U.S. will continue to offer privacy protection to Canadians in the United States. Upon receipt of the government's response, which I expect shortly, I will inform Canadians of my conclusions.

In closing, to face the sustained volume but increased complexity of our work, we will continue this year to make the most efficient use of our resources as we have tried to do in the past.

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I look forward to questions from the committee.

Freedom of the Press

[Justin Trudeau, Liberal, Prime Minister]

Mr. Speaker, as we often said during the election campaign and as we continue to say now, it is very important for any government to do two things right: protect Canadians and defend our rights and freedoms.

That is exactly what we are doing by creating a parliamentary committee that will be responsible for overseeing all of our security services and police forces, by defending our rights and freedoms and making the necessary corrections to former Bill C-51, as we promised. That is what we are going to do in the coming months.

[Thomas Mulcair, NDP, Outremont, QC]

Mr. Speaker, given that answer, is the Prime Minister willing to tell the RCMP to drop its court case against a Vice journalist that it is now pursuing? The Prime Minister should be protecting the privacy of reporters and all Canadians, but instead, he has refused to amend Bill C-51.

The Prime Minister voted for Bill C-51 because he was afraid of Stephen Harper, but the Liberals have been in office for 18 months. What are they afraid of now?

Will the Prime Minister tell Canadians when his government is going to make the promised changes to Bill C-51?

Reference to Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs

[Pierre Nantel, NDP, Longueuil—Saint-Hubert, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with my colleague from North Island—Powell River.

I have been listening to the debate and find this quite appalling. I am disappointed at how sterile our deliberations have become, simply because this government seems to need some intense psychotherapy. It has an acute superiority complex.

Clearly, this does not seem to stop my colleague opposite from talking over me and believing that what he has to say is relevant. That is what is funny. He talks non-stop, like a machine. It is like a car alarm that will not stop ringing. Still, no matter what we are talking about, he always has the same perspective. That is typical of this government, which got elected by saying just about anything.

The young members who are in government for the first time cannot believe how badly they have been taken for a ride. They are simply clinging on to that old ideal of the “natural governing party”. Come on. It is appalling that the Liberals pulled such a fast one on Canadian voters. This government came along with an approach based on communications and spin, promising the moon and the stars, and sugar-coating everything.

I would really like to hear the conversation between the communications people and public servants, who have to ask why they said such things during the election campaign, because now they are forced to follow through on them. There are a lot of broken promises.

As the critic for cultural industries, I can tell you that the government is doing nothing. It is fine for the minister to be ambitious and hold big consultations, but it is very clear that there is no movement on the other side. She can say whatever she wants, but right now we do not have the crucial measures needed to protect our entrepreneurs in the cultural industries and in other areas threatened by what is being offered online. Although we cannot be against progress, we nevertheless have to recognize that entrepreneurs have a challenge. However, absolutely nothing is happening. It is really pathetic.

This government comes into power with its blue blood complex and thinks it is the natural governing party and that it is royalty. It may seem that members of this government are blue bloods because they are friends with the Bay Street kings, who have their own agenda. No matter what the little candidate said during the election campaign, they are going to tell him that this is not how things go.

It is sad because regular people expect solid social measures in health or social housing. Regular people who watch television are steadily turning to Netflix. In other words, fewer and fewer people are purchasing ads on network television and in our newspapers. In other words, we have smaller budgets for our productions and our own culture, of which we are so proud. The money is drying up. Our media are suffering and we all know it.

Everyone has a weekly paper that is losing ground because it is no longer able to sell ad space, since everyone is sending our advertisement dollars over the Internet. That money is going to California, Mountain View for Google and Palo Alto for Apple.

These are urgent matters, but there is far too much concern over whether the Crown looks good. It is pathetic. It is crazy because it is runs completely counter to what was presented during the election campaign. They presented themselves as a government of and for the people and the middle class. I am here to tell you that their agenda does not reflect that.

It is quite clear that this government is more interested in listening to its cronies. We have a government that is fuelling cynicism, when it promised there would be none.

When I was here from 2011 to 2015, when the Conservative government was not interested in a word anyone had to say, we knew what we were dealing with. It said it was going to follow its agenda and if we did not like it, then too bad.

However, the Liberals set certain expectations. They say that things could be better, but they are getting worse because issues that are being pushed aside are far more important than what we are seeing here right now.

What a sad situation we are in this week. We are extremely far from the issues that matter to Canadians and Quebeckers.

Those who work short-term, temporary jobs just want to make ends meet. Ultimately, they would like to be able to do more than that. They would like to have ambitions for their children and themselves. They would like to be able to envision a happy retirement. They would like their children to have a better standard of living than they did, and they would like progress to continue. That is not what is happening.

Instead, we now have a government that refuses to listen and is putting on blinders so that it does not have to deal with any issues it does not consider to be a priority. For example, it would be a good idea to ensure that online merchants do not cannibalize the sales of local retailers and entrepreneurs, whether they have an online presence or not. I sometimes get the impression that this government firmly believes that it does not have to listen to us. That is why I was talking about the government's superiority complex, and that is why the entire opposition is united in saying that this does not make sense. We represent the Quebeckers and Canadians who elected us, whether the government likes it or not or believes it or not. There is an alternative to this government. Oh yes, your royal highnesses, there is.

The electors have placed their trust in us, whether we be New Democrats, Bloc members, Greens or Conservatives. It is our duty to speak not only on behalf of our party, but above all on behalf of the citizens who elected us, and even those who did not.

I heard someone mention the magic number of 100,000 constituents. That is a lot of pressure! We have our work cut out for us, as we must represent them all. That is why we are joining together to tell the government that its way of moving its agenda forward is unacceptable. It is elegant in its way of forcing its agenda on us, and its communications are very skilfully put together.

I met with some friends, and there was a seven-year-old girl who asked me what I did for a living. I told her I was a politician. She asked me what a politician was. I told her that my job was to represent the people who chose us in an election, so we could represent their values, their needs and their aspirations. She asked me if it was enjoyable. I told her that usually it was enjoyable, but that for a while now it had started becoming not so much fun. She asked me why. I told her that we were used to expressing ourselves in a parliament that truly respected democracy, but that at the moment, we had the feeling that we had fallen under the influence of certain, let us say, unsavoury countries. She told me that she liked the prime minister a lot. I will not tell him she said so, naturally. She said she thought he was handsome. I told her that was great, that he is very handsome, very nice, which is what we were sold during the election campaign. Behind all that, however, you might say there are some older gentlemen who are not so nice, people who have some very specific priorities and are responsible for this government saying one thing and doing the opposite.

The government talks about its election promises; it is always harping on about them. It says it is doing what it promised in its platform. Come on! The government never once mentioned this sort of change. If we have succeeded today in getting this government to listen to reason a little, it is because we, in the opposition, stood firm. We are still a long way from all the promises it made. Funnily enough, what comes to mind is Bill C-51. What is the government going to do with that?

I am looking at my colleagues who were with me in the last parliament, who were ranting and raving, saying that the bill was scary, that they were going to vote in favour of it but then amend it later on. The Liberals have been in power for a year and a half. Let them get on with it, then, let them do something. One might say the government is suffering from acute “consult-itis”: it consults and then consults again on the consultation.

We need to get going. There are important subjects to address. I understand that most of them are deserving of wise reflection, but what is certain is that we need action. When we look at the situation of the portfolio I am responsible for, culture and the news media, it is a wholesale massacre. The government must hurry up and do something, and must take advice from the people who are there to express the views of their fellow citizens.

[Prof. Sébastien Grammond, Professor, Civil Law Section, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I will speak in both languages.

I wish to speak to you today about a problem related to the national security exception, particularly the fact that the government seems to interpret this exception as excluding the jurisdiction of courts.

I'm not an expert in national security like Mr. Cox, nor in computer science. I am a lawyer, and that is why I'm addressing you.

Perhaps I could start with a personal example. I was a young lawyer in the 1990s, and I had to work on several bidding cases. Our office represented bidders who had been excluded from a process or were denied a contract.

At that time, the decisions of the courts made it very difficult to challenge decisions, such as those concerning contracts awarded by municipalities. I remember a case where the City of Montreal had awarded a contract to our competitor, despite the fact that there were irregularities in his bid, which had not been a problem. In another case, my client was accused of similar irregularities, and his bid was found to be invalid. I did not understand why the City did one thing in one case and something else in another.

A few years later, the Charbonneau Commission—as you may recall—allowed us to learn a lot about the integrity of the bidding process. The lesson I took away from this was that court oversight is essential to ensure that bidding processes work, that processes are followed, and that people make decisions based on criteria and not on arbitrary considerations or favouritism. As the saying goes, “when the cat's away, the mice do play”. Obviously, the cat is the courts.

I'd like to make an important point. I read the transcript of your last meeting—in February, I think—and the point was made that, well, the national security exception was invoked in a number of cases, but still, it was a competitive process. However, what I've learned shows you that, if you don't have an external control, you can never be sure that it's actually competitive. In the cases I talked about, yes, it was supposed to be competitive. There was a call for tenders and there were criteria, but the City of Montreal, in those cases, was doing what it wanted, essentially.

I want to go beyond that. Beyond protecting competitiveness, I think it's an issue about the rule of law. There's nothing in the act respecting the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, nor in the Agreement on Internal Trade, that ousts the jurisdiction of the tribunal when the national security exemption is invoked.

What the government is essentially asserting is a right to exempt itself from the law as it sees fit, without any statutory basis. That's called a dispensation power, and that was abolished by the Bill of Rights—not Diefenbaker's Bill of Rights, but the Bill of Rights that ended the Glorious Revolution in England in 1689. That's been with us for a long time, the principle that a government cannot exempt itself from the law. That is so, even when national security is at stake.

I don't want to minimize in any way the importance of national security, but the fact that national security is at stake does not mean that we oust the jurisdiction of courts and tribunals. What we do is design processes that reconcile the needs of national security and the need for judicial review, the requirements of the rule of law.

Let me give you a few examples. In the last Parliament there was Bill C-51. There was an important debate about this piece of legislation. Let me just give you an example from it. There were provisions with respect to the no-fly list. What you see is that the bill gave a statutory basis for the no-fly list, but it put into place a process for people to appeal or to contest before a court of justice their possible inclusion on the no-fly list. Even if there is a concern for national security, Parliament found a way to address it in a way that would preserve the individual's right to present his or her case before a court, and the needs of national security, especially with respect to confidentiality.

It's the same thing with respect to the famous security certificates. When you want to deport someone who's a threat to national security, there is a process for that person to challenge the designation in court, and there is a process for keeping information confidential when it relates to issues of national security, so it's possible to combine the two.

It's never done in a blanket way. It's never done in a way that prevents a court from looking at a particular case and asking itself if it is satisfied that there is really a national security concern. If there is one, it will address it; but if there are none, then it'll go public and deal with the case.

I think that gives us an idea of how the courts deal with these issues. The courts are sensitive to national security issues and have all the tools necessary to ensure the confidentiality of information that may pose a risk in this regard. In my view, nothing in the Agreement on Internal Trade that was mentioned earlier allows the government to say that the courts lose jurisdiction when it invokes a national security exception.

Thank you.

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Borys Wrzesnewskyj, Liberal, Etobicoke Centre, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak at the third reading of Bill C-22, which will create a committee of parliamentarians to oversee Canada's security bodies.

In Canada, our security apparatus and oversight must be constructed in ways that protect our freedoms and rights. Our Canada, strong and free, is the best country on the planet, and these are mutually reinforcing qualities that make our country. The recent terror attacks in Quebec, Strathroy, and indeed here on Parliament Hill in 2014, remind us that no country is immune to actions by those who would seek to challenge that freedom and security. While our strong global relationships, solid crisis response plans, and interconnected law enforcement networks are among the world's finest and meet rapidly changing global threats, we must guarantee independent parliamentary oversight to stand on guard of Canadians' individual rights and freedoms.

Canada is behind our international allies in this regard, and has been for far too long. Bill C-22 will help us catch up, better inform the public on crucial national security issues, and eliminate a weak link in the national security chain of accountability. In fact, the version of this bill introduced last June would already have put us far ahead of many other countries in terms of parliamentary oversight of national security. With the amendments adopted by the House earlier this week, Canada is poised to become a world leader in the area of national security and accountability.

It is worth remembering the history that accompanies the inception of this new committee of parliamentarians and the spirit of debate that has brought us to this point in its creation. We have certainly come a long way. Thirty years ago, the McDonald commission proposed an independent security review committee, in part as a result of public demands to make sure that mechanisms were in place to enforce the enforcers. There was widespread and growing concern that law enforcement operations carried out in secret but left unchecked could result in an above-the-law mentality and illegal activities by our paramilitary policing and security agencies. However, neither did the public want any parliamentary or government body with powers that were too broadly defined.

Fast-forwarding to 2005, only a few years after the tragedy of 9/11, an uncertain and changing environment meant growing demands for increased protection and stronger security measures. Prime Minister Paul Martin's government introduced legislation to create a parliamentary committee on national security and intelligence, reflecting renewed public demand for stronger oversight. That bill, as we know, died on the Order Paper.

In the last decade, the public and parliamentary debate in this area has intensified, and the issue of how to protect our security and our rights has become a major point of interest and now a driver of public policy. In recent years, we have discussed and debated stronger accountability for national security and intelligence agencies, following internal judicial inquiries and events surrounding the Maher Arar case.

Various bills have come and gone, including one introduced by the hon. member for Vancouver Quadra, which was rejected by the Conservative government of the day mere months before Bill C-51 was introduced.

[Majid Jowhari, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, the most important thing is that the bill would provide a closure to a gap that existed. That gap existed because of what the previous government proposed in Bill C-51.

What the government, through the committee, will be able to accomplish is to provide a balance between security and rights in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

[Majid Jowhari, Liberal, Richmond Hill, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the hon. member for Etobicoke Centre.

I am very pleased to stand in the House today in support of Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts. Bill C-22 fulfills the commitment made by our government to Canadians that it will bring forward legislation to create a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, otherwise known as NSICOP.

Throughout this speech, I will highlight three key points that outline the importance of the creation of NSICOP, namely: first, strengthening the accountability and transparency of our government; second, providing a comprehensive and reactive security framework through a wide-ranging mandate; and third, having extraordinary access to classified information in order to closely examine intelligence and security operations.

Bill C-22 is an essential component in the Government of Canada's efforts to ensure our country's national security is not beyond parliamentary oversight while simultaneously respecting the rights and freedoms of Canadians. This, I believe, is one of the most important fundamental duties our government can perform.

Many western democracies, including our Five Eyes allies—the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand—have parliamentary oversight bodies on national security similar to what is being proposed in the bill. Just like those parliamentary bodies, Bill C-22 permits an examination of the national security work of federal departments and agencies, and holds them accountable as concerns their actions and responsibilities.

Canada currently has several oversight bodies that examine the activities of government organizations and agencies involved in national security operations. While each body does important work, they are organization specific and do not engage parliamentarians directly with their reviews.

The creation of NSICOP would strengthen transparency, accountability, ensure the possibility for government-wide reviews, and warrant greater effectiveness and efficiency throughout the larger review framework. In addition, it would allow for the complete independence of a parliamentary body in reviewing matters while not impeding on national security.

I would also like to point out that our government remains committed to addressing the problematic features and concerns of Canadians surrounding Bill C-51, which was introduced by the former government, and present new legislation that better balances our collective security with our rights and freedoms. Bill C-22 is one step towards addressing that.

The first key message that highlights the importance of the creation of this committee is that it would fill the accountability gap that has been outlined for more than 10 years by private sector experts, commissions of inquiry, and the Auditor General regarding the lack of an independent parliamentary body to scrutinize security and intelligence operations.

To give the committee the time and opportunity to learn the serious task it is undertaking and to get to know and understand the security and intelligence context on both a national and international level, our government has built an automatic review of NSICOP after five years to ensure it can accurately instill all the lessons it has learned in a timely and appropriate manner. This shows that our government understands the ever evolving nature of security threats and shows that we are remaining vigilant, responsive, and accountable to our security framework.

The government put forward the bill. The bill was studied at committee and amendments were proposed. The government, after careful consideration, has agreed to accept a majority of what the standing committee has requested.

One of these amendments is to add a whistle-blower clause, clause 31.1, which requires the committee to inform the appropriate minister, as well as the Attorney General, if it uncovers any activity that may not be in compliance with the law. I believe that this amendment adds to Bill C-22's already strong legislation, as it ensures Canadians that we are remaining vigilant to further enhance our capacity to keep Canadians safe through increased responsibility and accountability.

Second, the committee itself would have a broad government-wide mandate to scrutinize any national security matter.

The committee would also have the power to perform reviews on national security and intelligence activities, including ongoing operations, and the ability to conduct strategic and systemic reviews of legislative, regulatory, policy, expenditure, and administrative frameworks under which such activities are conducted.

Additionally, the committee would conduct reviews of matters specifically referred to it by a minister.

Given its broad mandate to review any operation, including an ongoing operation, the minister would have the authority to stop a review if it was deemed to be detrimental to national security.

It is important to note that the minister would have discretionary authority to withhold special operational information on a case-by-case basis should it also be believed that disclosure would be injurious to national security.

While these ministerial powers are within reason, I want to stress that ministers would not be able to withhold just any information. They are only permitted to do so in special and specific circumstances involving legally defined categories involving the most sensitive national security information where disclosure would have harmful national security implications for Canada.

Our government has recently agreed to adopt the amendment put forth by the public safety committee regarding the narrowing of the minister's authority to determine that a study of the committee is injurious to national security, which applies only to ongoing operations. The minister would have to explain that decision to the committee and would need to alert the committee as soon as the decision changed or as soon as the operation was no longer ongoing.

Third, our government is also supporting amendments to clause 14, which is the section that lists the type of information to which the NSICOP would not have access. This amendment expands the level of access to the different types of information available to the committee. We have removed from this exclusions list information about ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations, privileged information under the Investment Canada Act, and information collected by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada.

I believe the bill is stronger as a result, and I thank the members of the public safety committee for suggesting this amendment.

The committee will also decide on which national security and intelligence matters it will review. Additionally, the government may also refer matters for discussion at the committee.

The government is committed to protecting Canadians from national security threats. Bill C-22 would ensure that our national security framework will be working effectively to keep Canadians safe while not overriding the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Such an accountability mechanism is crucial to Canada, and it represents what Canadians asked for. That is exactly what our government is delivering. Canada is taking a step forward so that Canadians can see real and positive results on the serious issue of national security.

Bill C-22 would provide parliamentarians with extraordinary access to classified information and bring Canada in line with similar parliamentary oversight bodies that are already in place in the countries of our national security allies.

Bill C-22 represents a promise made and a promise kept.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to rise to address Bill C-22 at third reading stage. Unfortunately, this is the final day of debate on an issue of national security that has divided the government from every opposition party.

Government members have remarked on the extraordinary nature of the proposed committee. They note that it would end our laggard status among the so-called Five Eyes, that it would allow some parliamentarians extraordinary access to classified information, and that it would enjoy a whole-of-government mandate. These claims are all true, but they are also the bare minimum requirements. They are simply the essential features of an oversight committee.

I hope government members are unsettled when they notice that every opposition party, and respected experts from across the political spectrum, are all pointing to the same flaws in the government's bill. I have spoken about these flaws in detail in the public safety committee and in this chamber. My colleagues and I have consulted with non-partisan experts to craft more than one dozen amendments to resolve them.

Let me summarize these flaws as succinctly as I can for Canadians.

This committee's job is to oversee the functioning and classified operations of every government agency linked to intelligence and national security. This 11 member committee will face a multi-billion dollar array of some 20 government departments and agencies, some of which have never yet been subject to any oversight. When these 11 members sit down together for the first time, all they will have to rely on is a dedicated staff, a limited budget, and the powers laid out in black and white in the bill. That is where they will begin to hit roadblocks.

Despite their top secret security clearances, this bill would bar those parliamentarians from accessing certain operational information. They would find themselves unable to summon witnesses or order documents. Instead they could only request information from cabinet ministers, who are permitted to withhold it.

While it clips the committee's wings at every turn, the bill bestows sweeping powers on cabinet and on the Prime Minister. Ministers can shut down investigations. The Prime Minister can appoint every member of oversight committees and censor its reports.

Canadians might well ask this. With such little power for Parliament and so much power for the cabinet, can this oversight body actually do its job? It is precisely in that context that the government has now shut down debate, after barely one-tenth of Canadians' elected representatives have been permitted to participate. That is the context for today.

I want to focus on what I see as the essential question for each member now, and that is this. Are the powers granted by this bill sufficient to create the degree of rigorous operational oversight that Canadians expect in the era of Bill C-51, and the extraordinary powers now granted to our security services? That is the important question because the test for this committee is not whether it can monitor uncontroversial activities. The true test is whether it can stand up to a government that is violating the law in certain circumstances, failing to protect Canadians, or encroaching on their hard-earned rights and liberties.

Let me be clear. I cannot support this bill in that context, in its current form. I believe it would fail that test and it would fail Canadians. At the very moment when they need it to be strong, independent, and effective, it would fail the test because it chooses to sacrifice transparency for secrecy, and favour executive authority over accountability.

In the wake of an intelligence failure that cost thousands of innocent lives, the American 9/11 commission report warned as follows: “Secrecy stifles oversight...current organizational incentives encourage overclassification. This balance should change...”. It also warned, “So long as oversight is undermined...we believe the American people will not get the security they want and need.”

That is what this is all about: giving Canadians not just empty assurances but hard proof that their security is protected and their rights upheld. Does this bill meet that standard when it comes to operational oversight?

In arguing against strengthening the committee, the public safety minister compared it to counterpart committees in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. He correctly noted that each of those allies allows the government to withhold sensitive information from the oversight committee, but he left out an important fact, and that is that none of them is an operational oversight committee. Canada's would be, and it would be only second among the Five Eyes.

How would its powers compare to those American congressional committees? What do the Americans require for the same kind of job we are asking our committee to do? In the United States, special committees of the House and Senate are kept informed in real time of all intelligence operations. They can cut funding and even overrule the White House to order the release of previously classified information, if it serves the national interest. This goes far beyond even what the opposition parties have proposed for Canada.

If we passed this bill without fixing it, we would be giving the committee a mandate but not the tools required to get the job done. Yet, the government resists all calls by the opposition and non-partisan experts to grant these tools to the oversight committee. This gets to the central question of trust.

To justify cabinet's sweeping powers to obstruct oversight, the government has hidden behind a straw man, the one limit to which nobody has ever objected, and that is the safeguard to protect individuals in the witness protection program. We heard all about that earlier today. One government member referred to the need to segregate especially sensitive information. With respect, this misses the point. Everything this committee would work on is, by definition, especially sensitive. Nothing should leak, and I am confident that nothing will leak, just as it has not in Britain in the 22 years that it has had a similar committee under way.

If the identities of protected witnesses were this committee's only blind spot, I would welcome it, but alongside the others, it has begun to serve as a litmus test for the government's trust in this committee. I say that because there is no meaningful distinction between that information and anything else within the committee's unique mandate. All of it is potentially damaging to national security and individuals' safety. It makes us wonder, if the government cannot trust the committee with the names of witnesses, why would it hand over operational details? The answer, I fear, is that it will not. If we passed the current bill, we would give the government the power to withhold that information at every turn. We would give the government the power to deny Canadians the operational oversight they were promised, and we would fatally undermine Canadians' faith in this new institution, because if cabinet does not trust the committee, why should Canadians?

Of course, the government insists that it would use these powers sparingly and only with the best intentions. The Liberals' faith in their own good intentions I believe is sincere, but it blinds them to the actual wording of the bill. Take clause 21 as an example. Several amendments have targeted cabinet's power to filter the flow of information from this committee to Canadians. No fewer than six government members have repeated the claim that the sole purpose of that power is to screen out classified information. Again, if that were true, I would support it, but it is simply not true. In fact, the relevant clause does not even use the word “classified”. In fact, it empowers the Prime Minister to censor any information he believes may be injurious to national security or defence, or even international relations. All he has to do is believe it and it is so, and it is not available.

A similar claim, repeated by five government members, is that this revision power could not be applied to the committee's findings. Again, I would support that clause, but it is not in the bill.

This has become a theme. Too often, government members assure us of the good intentions of this bill's authors and simply forget that legislation must be built to outlast the authors of the bill. We are making law not just for this regime but for the future.

The current Prime Minister may not intend to use his powers to suppress embarrassing committee findings, but another one may. The current cabinet may not intend to use its power to quash investigations or to hide mismanagement or scandal, but another one may. The current government may not intend to ban the official opposition from the committee or use appointments to control the agenda or hide illegal surveillance by withholding operational details on security grounds, but another government may.

Consider, for instance, the investigations taking place right now south of the border into President Trump's ties to Russia and his wiretapping claims. If Bill C-22 were the law there, President Trump could revise the reports of congressional intelligence oversight committees to remove information he felt could harm foreign relations. His cabinet could obstruct, and even shut down, investigations simply by asserting security privilege.

That is why Canadians are demanding that this committee be built to a higher standard of strength and independence, so that when the time comes, it can stand as a genuine check on the executive overreach and end operations that violate Canadians' rights or mismanagement that undermines their security. As it stands, it is simply not built to that standard.

However, I do want to recognize the progress that has been made and acknowledge the good work done by the members of the public safety committee. Because of an amendment from the NDP, the new oversight committee would now have a legal duty to alert the Attorney General to any potentially illegal activity within the entire national security apparatus.

While future prime ministers would still be able to censor reports on broad grounds, Canadians could now see exactly how much text had been revised in a particular report and the reasons the revision occurred. While cabinet ministers unfortunately retain the power to withhold information and even shut down investigations, Canadians could now monitor the use of those powers each year.

I want to personally recognize the hard work of every member of the public safety committee. They showed that progress is possible when the government is willing to work with opposition parties. However, before the government congratulates itself for accepting a handful of ideas from other parties, let us be clear about what it rejected.

The plan we proposed gave the oversight committee full access to information and the power to summon witnesses and order documents. It offered freedom to investigate any issue without interference by cabinet ministers. It let the committee choose its own chairperson from among the membership that would actually match the partisan balance of the House. It allowed the free flow of insights back and forth within the existing expert review bodies. Every last one of those proposals was rejected by the government.

While progress was made at the margins, the government is now asking Parliament to approve an oversight committee with only partial access to the information it needs to do the job for Canadians: a committee that can only request information from cabinet, not order it directly; a committee whose entire membership is selected by the Prime Minister, with no requirement that it even include members from the biggest opposition parties. This committee would not be out of place in Australia, New Zealand, or France, where there is no expectation of operational oversight, but it is entirely inappropriate in Canada.

I cannot accept the design set by the government for two fundamental reasons: first, it tilts the balance too far toward executive power at the expense of parliamentary accountability; and, second, it fails to meet the high standard of operational oversight that the Liberals made necessary when they joined with the Conservatives to dramatically expand security powers through Bill C-51.

It is against these two standards that the government's attitude toward this bill is so very disappointing. The government has adopted an approach which says that something is better than nothing insofar as parliamentary oversight is concerned, and that we should just be happy we got a little bit. It suggests to me the belief that national security is the exclusive domain of the executive branch and that Parliament is somehow an ungrateful guest on the government's turf. That is dead wrong.

Members will remember this question was addressed and answered by Speaker Milliken in 2010 when he ruled on the government's attempt to deny Parliament documents relating to the Afghan detainee affair. In denying Parliament's role as a watchdog for Canadians, the executive claimed that Parliament's general right of inquiry was limited by the executive's countervailing interest in protecting national security. Parliament, the government argued, was overreaching by demanding information on security matters and threatening the constitutional separation of powers. The parallels to our current debate are clear.

What was the outcome? After an exhaustive analysis, Speaker Milliken ruled that Parliament's right to access information, to do its job, to perform its duties is “absolute”. In fact it was the executive that jeopardized the proper separation of powers by attempting to censor information provided to Parliament.

The Canadians' elected representatives in Parliament must be named the ultimate watchdog in our system. That should be a point of unanimous agreement for everyone in this place. We all recognize, as Speaker Milliken did, that special safeguards must be put in place to allow Parliament to exercise that oversight role in sensitive domains like national security and intelligence.

That is why New Democrats supported many safeguards to protect sensitive information. For example, we supported security vetting for every member. That was a step that was rejected by the British Parliament. We agreed. Similarly, we think it is reasonable that members waive parliamentary immunity from prosecution should they leak information. We think that is entirely reasonable. That step, however, was rejected by another of our Five Eyes allies, namely, New Zealand.

These additional safeguards should be used to facilitate the greater flow of classified information required for operational oversight, but the bill turns those safeguards into shackles. It asks Parliament to accept that oversight cannot be exercised through a parliamentary committee, but only through an adjunct to the executive, the Prime Minister's Office. It asks Parliament to grant the executive veto power over its access to information against the advice of experts and the Speaker's analysis of parliamentary procedure as well. It asks Parliament to legislate limits on its own authority to investigate how well the government of the day serves the security interests of Canadians and defends their civil liberties.

Because we believe in upholding Parliament's place as the final watchdog, and because we cannot accept inadequate operational oversight of the powers that Liberals and Conservatives granted to our security agencies in Bill C-51 over the protests of so many Canadians, the New Democratic Party cannot support Bill C-22 as it stands.

However, we have everything we need to fix the bill. We have consensus among the opposition parties. We have the willingness to work together to compromise. We have all the tools we need. We just need the time.

I am asking all members to do what the members of this committee will soon be asked to do, and that is to set partisanship aside and consider whether this bill, with all the flaws agreed upon by so many security experts, meets the standards of operational oversight that Canadians rightfully demand in the context of Bill C-51, and if they have any doubt that it might fail to meet that test for Canadians, I would ask them to support the following amendment. I move:

That the motion be amended by deleting all the words after the word “That” and substituting the following:

“Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain Acts, be not now read a third time but be referred back to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for the purpose of reconsidering Clauses 8, 14, and 16 with a view to assessing whether the investigatory powers and limits defined in these clauses allow for sufficiently robust oversight of ongoing intelligence and national security activities.”

[Wayne Stetski, NDP, Kootenay—Columbia, BC]

Mr. Speaker, during the 2015 election, the Conservative bill, Bill C-51, was of major concern to constituents in my riding of Kootenay—Columbia. Rallies were held across the riding, and a lot of concern was expressed, particularly on its impact on personal privacy, and the lack of parliamentary oversight. Therefore, it seems to me that a very small band-aid is being put on a very large wound.

My question for the member is this. Clause 8 of the bill would let a cabinet minister halt an investigation into his or her own department for security reasons, but offers no way to test whether in fact he or she would be merely covering up sloppy management or even a scandal. In the member's view, is this adequate to ensure Canadians get the facts on the government's handling of security?

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Winnipeg North, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I think it is important to emphasize that when the Conservative Party was on the government benches and we had that great debate on Bill C-51, we knew where the NDP were standing on that and we knew where the Liberal Party stood. We supported the legislation and indicated that if we became government, we would ensure there would be parliamentary oversight. We are fulfilling that commitment.

On the other hand, the Conservative Party, while it was in government, opposed having a parliamentary oversight committee. When I say that there are members of this chamber who oppose having an oversight committee, it is based on past voting records. I sit inside the chamber and I have heard a number of members across the way express concerns in regard to it. Hopefully I am wrong. Hopefully we do see that unanimous support. I would love to see it, because it would send a nice positive message. However, I am inclined to believe that the Conservatives are still out of touch with what Canadians really think on this particular issue. We will find out when it ultimately comes to a vote.

[Lloyd Longfield, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I thank the member for Winnipeg North for outlining and bringing back some of the thoughts we had during the campaign around Bill C-51. I can remember knocking on doors myself, making phone calls, and explaining why the Liberals wanted to adjust that legislation rather than remove it, the way the New Democrats were recommending.

Now with having an oversight committee, the New Democrats are also making comments that we do not need this. In fact, this committee would include members from the Senate, and New Democrats would like to get rid of the Senate.

I think the Senate brings some value to this. Maybe the hon. member for Winnipeg North could talk to us a bit about why we would like to engage the Senate in this discussion, as well as changing legislation, rather than removing all security legislation, the way the New Democrats are suggesting.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I listened with astonishment and exasperation to the member's speech on Bill C-22. It included everything from reminding us that this is the only thing the Liberals have to say about Bill C-51, which I have a bill before the House to repeal—they have not presented anything other than this bill—to him saying that if we have objections to stand up and speak about them, when this is under time allocation and the NDP gets exactly one speaker at third reading. I am a bit exasperated.

The final thing I would say is that the member is somehow proud of a bill that, when the committee provided teeth, as the Liberal Prime Minister said he would allow committees to do, then the government proceeded to take the teeth out of this bill and put them in a glass by the Prime Minister's bed. We have a bill here that has absolutely no ability to do what it is supposed to do.

I am exasperated and astonished to hear a speech like this, which would revise history and tries to recast this in a way that is completely false. What we have here is the government taking control of a committee, overruling what was done, and producing a committee that is very important to this country, without any support from the opposition parties. What does the member have to say about that?

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, it is a privilege to stand today to talk about what I believe is a very important piece of legislation. Many members of the chamber will recall the debate on Bill C-51. That is where I would like to start this morning, to give a bit of perspective on why we have this bill before us today.

It is important to note that the former prime minister, Stephen Harper, brought in Bill C-51, a bill that had some fundamental flaws. At the time, the Liberal Party was the third party in the chamber, and we felt strongly, based on the feedback we were receiving and the research we were doing on the bill, that it was important to vote in favour of it. As the debate continued, many hours of debate in the House on that issue, I, for one, must have talked about the need for a parliamentary oversight committee at least a dozen times, possibly 15 or 20 times. That was when I was on the other side of the House.

The point is that it was a very important issue a couple of years ago. It raised quite a commotion outside the House. Many members, I suspect all 338 of us, can relate to Bill C-51, because it was an issue that was constantly being raised at the time. I even knocked on a few doors where people talked to me about the bill and how, if the Liberal Party leader was elected prime minister, he would respond to Bill C-51.

There was a commitment made by all members of the Liberal team, in particular the Prime Minister, that we would bring in a parliamentary oversight committee. Whether it was during the debates when Bill C-51 was in the House, in the lead-up to the campaign, through the media, in public meetings, or when we were going door to door throughout the last federal election campaign, Liberals were advocating how important it was to have an oversight committee made up of parliamentarians.

Therefore, it should come as no surprise to parliamentarians across the way that we are debating a bill that, in essence, captures the commitment the Prime Minister and every member of the Liberal caucus made as part of our election platform. No one should be surprised in the House of Commons, and I suspect that Canadians will look at this piece of legislation and see it as fulfilling an election promise.

I said yesterday that the Prime Minister says how important it is to him personally that when members of Parliament come to Ottawa they represent their constituents here. I can tell the Prime Minister and my caucus colleagues that this is something I believe the residents of Winnipeg North are behind 100%. I am convinced that this is good, solid legislation.

I would like to commend the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the government House leader for doing a phenomenal job in ensuring that this commitment is being fulfilled in such a timely fashion.

That is how I wanted to start my comments today. I know there has been concern among opposition members about how the bill would ultimately be passed. Maybe I could attempt to answer some of the questions they might have.

For example, we know that more than 40 members have been afforded the opportunity to give a 10- or 20-minute speech. Well over 100 have been afforded the opportunity to be engaged in one way or another on the floor of the House of Commons.

I also want to compliment the excellent standing committee that dealt with Bill C-22. I would argue that this was a fulfillment of one of the other aspects the Prime Minister has talked about. As a government, we want to bring more life to our standing committees. We want members on all sides of the House to be more engaged in a positive way in terms of trying to improve legislation. That is exactly what we have done here. After second reading, the bill went to committee, and in that committee, what did we see? A number of witnesses came before the committee, from different regions of the country, and made recommendations on how the legislation could be improved. A good number of those expert witnesses were very complimentary to the government about the legislation as it was presented to committee. They were very supportive of that legislation.

They recognized, as many of us have, that there is always room for improvement. We have encouraged that, and what we saw was a series of amendments brought forward. The ideas were talked about. The standing committee did its job in terms of setting the agenda and inviting witnesses.

I look at the standing committees as the backbone of the fine work parliamentarians do. All we need to do is focus some attention on that standing committee. There was a great list developed for witnesses who presented their reports and came up with ideas. The committee took a number of those thoughts and presented amendments. It was not just amendments from the government side of the House. There were amendments suggested, and some were accepted, from the opposition side of the House. That demonstrates the changes we are seeing at the committee level. I bring that to people's attention, because it is worthy of note.

The legislation has come back to the House. The government has the opportunity to review some of the work that was done at committee. Yes, there was a need to make some changes to it. I will give an example of one of the changes.

The witness protection program is of critical importance. Canadians appreciate the importance of informants or individuals who might be testifying before a court of law, when their life or their family's lives may be put at risk. Because there is risk, we need to have a system that protects those witnesses. That is why we have a witness protection program.

The committee, for a number of reasons, felt that we should talk about the names of witnesses and drawing too much information from that. A caveat was put in, in the form an amendment, and the government, at this point, felt that we might have been going too far on that particular issue. That is one of the amendments and why it is that some amendments were made at third reading.

I raise that because I believe that is really what Parliament should be doing on its legislation. We had the opportunity to see the legislation through first reading. Members were able to be engaged. No one would have been surprised by the introduction of the bill, given the fact that it was something that was talked about. It was brought in for second reading. Dozens of members were able to speak to it. Even more were able to be engaged in that debate. It then went to committee. In committee, it received wonderful support, and a number of ideas that would improve it were incorporated into amendments. Ultimately it went to report stage, at which point there were a few modifications. Now we are into third reading and we are debating it again in anticipation of the legislation being ready to pass.

We have a government that has made a commitment to Canadians. It brought in the legislation. The legislation has been improved through the process, and ultimately, we are getting into a position where we will be seeing it pass. I see that as a very strong positive. We should all take some pride in the manner in which it has actually gone through.

I know there have been some concerns among the opposition members with respect to the legislation, specifically dealing with what sorts of exemptions there will be. They are indicating that we could have done better in terms of not allowing as many exemptions.

I would like to address that point. It is important to recognize that this is somewhat historical in the sense that Canada will have a parliamentary oversight committee, among many other things. I like to think of it as an oversight committee that will protect the rights and freedoms of all Canadians in a very respectful fashion. That is one reason I am such a strong advocate for Bill C-22, because I believe in the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

It is the first time Canada is going to have a parliamentary oversight committee that is going to be looking at all of our security agencies and ensuring that there is a higher sense of accountability, whether it is border controls, corporations, or the RCMP. This is good news.

I want to be sensitive in terms of what the opposition is saying, but I want to assure members that it is very robust legislation. In fact, even though we might be the last of the Five Eyes countries, countries that move together in dealing with issues of this nature, immigration and so forth, I would suggest that we could be very proud of how robust our legislation is in comparison with the other countries' legislation.

Let me give an example. When we talk about the exemptions of what cannot be talked about, or what can be withdrawn from the committee, this is something that comes from the New Zealand act, which is one of the Five Eyes countries. In New Zealand, the act allows for the government to inform the committee that the documents or information cannot be disclosed because, in the opinion of the chief executive of the relevant intelligence and security agency, the documents or information are sensitive. In all fairness, I suspect that if we were to ask even the members of the opposition, one would think that our legislation is more robust than that. I would challenge the members across the way, who are concerned about that aspect, to indicate to this House whether they believe that the New Zealand legislation is more robust than ours. I do not believe it is, but that is an issue that is raised.

That is not the only country that we can draw a comparison to, but before I leave the subject of New Zealand, there is another point related to this. I want to talk about the Prime Minister, because a number of members across the way have talked about the influence of the Prime Minister. I will get to that right away, because there is another good example with respect to New Zealand.

On the same thought, let us look at what is being done in the U.K. act. The government is able to inform the intelligence and security committee, which is the equivalent of what we are establishing, that the information cannot be disclosed because the secretary of state has decided that it should not be disclosed. Again, I would suggest that our legislation is more robust than that, yet this is a big issue that is being raised, in particular by the New Democrats, and other opposition members also. That is not to say that our legislation is 100% perfect. There is always room for improvement. That is one of the reasons we are saying that we will take another look at it in the years ahead, and that is within the legislation itself.

I made reference to the Prime Minister. The members across the way talk about the Prime Minister and the control from the PMO. I would encourage them not to be paranoid about that particular issue. In New Zealand, the prime minister actually sits on the security committee. In Canada, we have a parliamentary oversight committee where the government members of Parliament make up the minority of the committee. That is a fairly significant piece in the legislation. In fairness, the opposition should recognize that it reinforces that we have excellent legislation in comparison to other Five Eyes countries.

Not only that, but the good news continues. Within the framework, we have a Prime Minister who is obligated to work with the opposition to fill the opposition member spots on the committee. Let me suggest to members that if we were to talk to Canadians to get a better sense of what Canadians believe, I would like to think that our Minister of Public Safety has done a phenomenal job with respect to this legislation, in bringing it forward and defending it. If there is any doubt in the minds of members as to why or how they should be voting, if they read what the Minister of Public Safety has put on the record here, I am sure that their concerns will be addressed.

I would argue that this is one of those pieces of legislation that should be passed unanimously by this House, because I believe that all Canadians want to see a parliamentary oversight committee. Even under Stephen Harper, where there was some reluctance—actually there was a lot of reluctance—I know there are now many members across the way who understand the value of a parliamentary oversight committee. I hope that they will come on side and support this good legislation.

[Cheryl Hardcastle, NDP, Windsor—Tecumseh, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is very interesting to hear all of the comments with regard to the bill coming forward.

I want to stress for Canadians what is actually happening here. I would like to have the member explain for Canadians why it does not pose a risk to have information withheld from a committee that has the mandate of oversight and why it is not a risk to deny information with regard to financing and books to an auditor.

Could the member explain how this committee can actually move forward and be a bona fide oversight committee with these glaring shortcomings? We expected this to address some of the concerns that came forward with Bill C-51. Now we have something that is toothless.

I am very concerned. Perhaps the member could explain why these risks are acceptable for Canadians to take on, when we are creating this new committee that is supposed to have oversight but actually has no weight whatsoever.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the comments from the member, but I disagree with a number of the points. I was there when there was a great deal of opposition to Bill C-51. The Liberal Party was different from the NDP back then. We believed there was a need to see Bill C-51 passed because of a wide variety of reasons. The security of Canadians was the predominant reason. We also made the commitment back then that we would bring in the parliamentary oversight. This bill would do just that.

My question for the member is this. I have been a parliamentarian now for about 25 years. I know how committees work. At the end of the day, I believe in the integrity of the members who would make up that committee. A majority of that committee would not be held by government members of Parliament. The government members of Parliament would be in a minority. It would take others to be onside in order to get something passed. Does that not provide any reassurances whatsoever for members across the way?

[Alistair MacGregor, NDP, Cowichan—Malahat—Langford, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is a great honour to rise today to take part in this very important debate on Bill C-22.

I feel honoured to give voice to the serious concerns that many of my constituents have in the great riding of Cowichan—Malahat—Langford. I also want to note that this debate is taking place under the yoke of time allocation. In other words, the ability of parliamentarians to provide oversight on a bill dealing with oversight has now been curtailed by the government.

Bill C-22 cannot be debated without being properly placed in the context of Bill C-51 from the 41st Parliament. Bill C-51 was one of the most draconian pieces of security legislation to emanate from the previous Conservative government. Indeed, more than 100 of Canada's brightest legal experts from institutions across the country sent an open letter to all members of Parliament at the time, expressing their deep concern about Bill C-51. They called that bill a dangerous piece of legislation, in terms of the potential impacts on the rule of law, on constitutionally and internationally protected rights, and on the health of Canada's democracy.

We had former prime ministers, former justices of the Supreme Court of Canada, and all sorts of experts who gave close scrutiny to Bill C-51 and were convinced it was unconstitutional. Many of my constituents were very vocally opposed to Bill C-51, and indeed many of them took part in the protests that erupted across Canada during that time.

It was a sad day in Parliament when the Liberals joined with the Conservatives to pass that bill. I think, and many of my colleagues will agree with me, that on Bill C-51, the Liberals were indecisive, unreliable, and plain wrong to support it at the time. I do not think they realized how much of a serious misjudgement they had made with the Canadian public on the mood of Canadians.

Then, when we edged closer to the 2015 election, we suddenly saw a commitment in the Liberal campaign platform to introduce new legislation that would balance collective security with our rights and freedoms. Part of that promise was to establish an all-party national oversight committee, which we see today in Bill C-22.

In our system today, we have a history of having opposition chairs in oversight committees. Committees on ethics, public accounts, status of women, and government operations all have elected opposition chairs to ensure proper accountability and oversight. It is most unfortunate that the government, through clause 6 of the bill, has provided for the Governor in Council to designate the chair of the committee. In fact, the government has not even bothered to wait for the passage of this bill, because, as we all know, it has been widely reported that the member for Ottawa South is to be the chair. The government has also rejected attempts at the committee stage to allow for the committee to elect its chair, something which I think is unfortunate.

If I could deliver one message today, it is that Canadians expect to have a watchdog and oversight committee that has real teeth. I think this committee must have full access to classified information, have adequate resources, and, most importantly, it must have independence subject only to justifiable limits and the power to share its findings with Canadians in an informative and transparent manner.

Without adequate access to information, the committee will not be able to do its job effectively. I think this work is far too important to do half-heartedly or ineffectively. I will not support creating a committee that cannot properly provide oversight in accordance with what Canadians expect.

One of the government's proposals is to allow cabinet ministers to withhold information from the oversight committee. This is evident in Motion No. 5, which the government has presented, which seeks to reinstate clause 16. It is worded in a way that allows a minister to withhold information if he or she feels that it is special operational information or that the provision of the information would be injurious to national security.

If injurious to national security is not a blanket statement to cover any kind of reason, I do not know what is. I have heard Liberal MPs say that there is a proper accountability in oversight because the minister simply has to inform the committee of his or her decision and the reasons for it, as if that somehow makes everything okay.

I cannot support such a reinstatement of that clause. The public safety committee and the experts who were heard made it very clear that the the executive branch having this kind of power over an oversight committee simply will not fly. It would make the committee completely ineffective anytime that a minister wanted to withhold information. With regard to the way that the government wants to write the bill, the minister could claim that a confidential inquiry somehow jeopardizes the country's national security. I think that giving the government the ability to shut down any kind of investigation into its actions is too dangerous for a functioning and accountable democracy.

The other thing is that we need to build Canadians' trust in our security and intelligence community, and the way to do that is to create meaningful parliamentary oversight. We need to have a fully briefed parliamentary oversight committee that can issue authoritative reports to Canadians. Without full access and full trust from the agencies, the oversight committee cannot help those agencies earn the trust of Canadians. It is very disappointing and frustrating that the Liberals are not living up to the commitments they made trying to fix Bill C-51. To rebuild this trust, the committee must be strong, independent, and effective. The Liberals must fulfill their promise to “repeal the problematic elements of Bill C-51”.

I find it very troubling that the government cannot seem to place its trust in a select group of parliamentarians who will be security cleared, sworn to secrecy, and who will have waived all immunity based on parliamentary privilege. To underline how ridiculous this premise is, I would like to point out that there are members of the Conservative Party in opposition who were once members of cabinet in the previous Parliament. At that time, they had access to all kinds of sensitive information and are still bound by secrecy. Why the government will not now trust this committee to have full access and provide proper oversight remains an elusive mystery.

All parties worked hard during the committee process to improve Bill C-22. The final product, as was reported back to this House, was praised by four of Canada's leading authorities on intelligence and oversight issues. They wrote a joint op-ed in The Globe and Mail, calling on the government to accept the improvements and pass the bill. The last-minute changes that the government is now trying to make are unsupported by evidence heard at the committee, and they would undermine the effectiveness of the committee and the trust of Canadians. The Information Commissioner and the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Kent Roach and Craig Forcese, the first chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, and a representative of the Canadian Bar Association, all testified that the oversight committee should not be restricted in its access to necessary information. I do not understand why the government is attempting to reject that expert evidence.

There are three core agencies responsible for security and intelligence work in Canada: CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP. They have a combined budget of approaching $4 billion, and they employ close to 34,000 people. Clearly such a vast network needs to have the accountability and oversight of Parliament in order to regain Canadians' trust. The role of Parliament is to scrutinize the government, represent the Canadian people, and bring forth good laws to govern our people.

I call on the Liberal MPs sitting in the back rows to go back to that special day on March 8 during the vote on Bill S-201, when they had the courage to stand up and assert their power as legislators in the face of the opposition from cabinet. As they did then, those Liberal MPs should reject the government's 11th-hour amendments to this bill, and instead listen to the evidence that was so clearly presented to the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. I ask all MPs in this House to remember that the government is accountable to Parliament, not the other way around.

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I want to mention again about the great integrity I felt as a candidate in my riding when people would come to talk to me about the real concerns they had about Bill C-51. It opened up the doors for people to have their ability to protest, their ability to speak out, vastly limited. A lot of indigenous leaders came to me and talked about their very serious concerns around what their rights would mean and how they were going to fight for their indigenous rights in their province and in their country. I think it is important that we remember that sometimes we have to stand up and speak up against these things, because they really silence people. We could do better. That is what we stood on.

As for this issue, I think it is important to remember that if this committee does not have the tools it needs to get the job done, it will be a waste of time and money for the taxpayer. Canadians in this country want to see something that works well. When we have a committee that works together, that comes together and has good discussions, and comes with amendments, and then suddenly it is changed again by the governing party, we have to ask these questions. That is why we are here. We are here to ask those questions and make sure that when a parliamentary committee is put together around a very important issue, that it is done well, that it is done meaningfully, and that it is done in a way that there are actual teeth to it. I think Canadians want to know that they are being protected and that the oversight is there. It is very unfortunate that the government has seen fit to water down this important bill.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I was here during the debate on Bill C-51. The Liberal Party, in opposition to Bill C-51, raised a number of concerns. Ultimately, we saw fit to support Bill C-51. The NDP opposed it straight through. However, we understood the importance of rights and freedoms. We also understood the importance of security.

We made a commitment to Canadians to bring back parliamentary oversight. We have had professionals and scholars indicate that this was good, sound legislation, even before it was amended. I would suggest that the NDP critique of the legislation could be applied to other pieces of legislation that other Five Eyes countries have. Canada does not have a parliamentary oversight committee. Other countries do. We will find that in many ways, our legislation is more robust than those other countries', and this is our first time with it.

Will the NDP be voting yes for parliamentary oversight?

[Rachel Blaney, NDP, North Island—Powell River, BC]

Mr. Speaker, today I rise to speak to Bill C-22, an act to establish parliamentary oversight of our security and intelligence services. Bill C-22 aims to plug a gap by giving a unique committee of nine security-cleared and secrecy-sworn MPs and senators substantial but not complete access to classified information and a whole-of-government mandate to review security and intelligence operations, policy, legislation, and administration.

Canada has not seen any progress toward security accountability in decades. In 1977, the government created the McDonald Commission to investigate the security services activities of the RCMP. The commission resulted in two key recommendations in its final report in 1981. The first was to separate security services from the RCMP, a recommendation that was fully implemented in 1984 with the establishment of CSIS. The other key recommendation, to create a special oversight committee of parliamentarians, was ignored and has gone ignored for decades.

Time after time, governments have resisted the call to create a body for parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence services. They have ignored experts in this country and around the world who have insisted that parliamentary oversight is crucial to bridging the gap between ordinary Canadians and the women and men of our intelligence services.

In 2005, a Liberal government bill was introduced that was almost a carbon copy of Bill C-22 in its original form. An interim committee of parliamentarians on national security, when studying that bill, actually toured allied nations and met with their oversight bodies. It too came to the conclusion that an oversight committee must be provided with complete access to classified information. Unsurprisingly, the Liberals rejected that provision.

Without oversight, Canada has been left behind. All of our closest allies, including those with parliamentary governments similar to ours, have adopted legislative oversight to ensure that national security efforts are being executed in the best interests of all citizens. In fact, Canada is the only member of the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance with the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand that does not have any parliamentary oversight of its security and intelligence services.

It is not good enough to simply look at past mistakes and attempt to evaluate where we went wrong. We need proactive, ongoing parliamentary oversight to ensure not only that everything is operating properly but to stop activities that we believe are not in the best interests of Canadians.

Canadians expect a watchdog with teeth. This committee must have full access to classified information, adequate resources, independence, and, subject only to justifiable limits, the power to share its findings with Canadians in an informative and transparent manner.

Without adequate access to information, the committee would not be able to do its job. This work is far too important to do half-heartedly or ineffectively. We will not support creating a committee that simply wastes time and erodes Canadians' trust.

While the Liberals insisted on watering down Bill C-22 to strip parliamentarians' access to crucial information, we believe that committee members must have full access in order to provide full and thorough oversight. When law professor Craig Forcese, from the University of Ottawa, testified at committee, he remarked that "Unless the committee can access information allowing it to follow trails, it will give the appearance of accountability without the substance''.

This is exactly what the Liberal government has become known for: all talk and very little action, no real commitment, just smoke and mirrors, just as we have seen with Bill C-51.

If the government truly believes that there should be a committee of parliamentary oversight of security and intelligence issues, it must stop trying to strip the committee of the ability to do its job effectively.

Since Bill C-51 was introduced in 2015, there has been a true awakening about the balance we expect the government to uphold between our privacy rights and national security objectives. This awakening did not happen overnight. In February 2015, 82% of Canadians supported Bill C-51, but by April, the level of support was down to 33%. The more Canadians learned about the bill, the less they liked it, and for good reason.

It is the New Democrats who fought against a very strong current to make sure that Canadians knew the rights we were all signing off and losing forever. It was politically risky, but we knew it was the right thing to do.

Still, to this day, Bill C-51's broad interpretation allows the government to cast a wide net, with the potential to scoop up union members, environmentalists, and aboriginal rights activists. The language in this bill is so broad that the definition of terrorist was watered down to individuals who practise their legal right to dissent. Under this legislation, police forces have the power to detain people they suspect of planning to break the law. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service will have new powers to arrest. These are only some of the examples of what the NDP stood against, whereas the Liberals in opposition were decidedly unreliable. They flip-flopped, ultimately deciding to amend the bill when they got into power. The problem is that they have not. The government is still playing lip service to its campaign promise. It is disappointing and frustrating that the Liberals are not living up to their commitments on Bill C-51.

To rebuild trust, the committee must be strong, independent, and effective. The current government must fulfill its promise to repeal the problematic elements of Bill C-51. Even the Canadian Civil Liberties Association agrees that legislation is needed to undo the damage done by Bill C-51.

While we agree that oversight of our national security and intelligence apparatus is badly needed, we cannot use such a bill as this one to cover up the inaction on Bill C-51.

The former auditor general has stated that review powers must be proportionate to the intrusiveness of powers wielded by security agencies and that anything less falls short of true oversight. In light of Bill C-51's expansion of security powers, should this committee's oversight powers not also be greater than what was envisioned a decade ago in a previous government's bill?

The original version of Bill C-22 gave committee members substantial access to classified information, but not complete access. Based on expert testimony and study, the public safety committee presented evidence-based amendments to the bill. These amendments aimed to give the committee the powers and access to information it would need to do its job effectively.

Furthermore, the bill aimed to limit the power of the Prime Minister to censor committee reports. Other efforts to amend the bill, like including a provision to elect the chair of the committee, were rejected by the government, even though it had the support of all opposition parties. Despite this, we were happy with Bill C-22 when it was amended. The amended bill fulfilled a crucial campaign promise by both the NDP and the Liberals and ensured that the committee would be both independent and well informed. However, it is clear that the government intends to neglect the evidence-based decisions of the committee and to bring Bill C-22 back to its original, watered-down form.

In The Globe and Mail op-ed on January 27, four national security and legal experts stated this point clearly:

Should the government choose to force a return to the restrictive original bill, it risks potentially undermining a new and historic Parliamentary ability that it has enthusiastically championed.

I strongly urge the government to keep the amendments as made by the committee. These amendments were made after hearing from 25 expert witnesses and with the united support of all opposition parties.

This country needs strong parliamentary oversight of our security and intelligence services that is transparent and accountable and serves the best interests of Canadians. I hope this government will live up to its election promises, respect the work of the committee, and pass this legislation as amended.

[Anthony Housefather, Liberal, Mount Royal, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am sure the member knows this, and just misstated it. When Bill C-51 was adopted, the Liberal Party was not in government. We were in opposition. It was a Conservative bill.

With respect to why subpoena powers are not being granted to the committee today, I can see pros and cons in both directions. It is always a balance between achieving national security and fundamental transparency and balancing fundamental freedoms.

This is the first time in Canadian experience that we will have such a parliamentary committee, and we should all support it. It is a step forward. There will be a review within five years and we will can learn from the committee's experience during those five years. Perhaps subpoena power will be something that in the future, in that five year review, may indeed be introduced. I do not believe it is critical at this juncture.

[Scott Duvall, NDP, Hamilton Mountain, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my friend's reasoning in trying to justify the bill to convince us to vote for it. However, we have some problems, and I think Canadians want some answers.

When it was Bill C-51, the Liberals at the time said that they would make amendments. Canadians expected an oversight committee that had teeth. This bill handcuffs the committee to do its job properly.

The Prime Minister, the Minister of Public Safety, and nine other cabinet members voted for Bill C-622 in 2014. That bill would have created an oversight committee with full access and subpoena power. Therefore, why is the government now trying to pry these tools out of the hands of this committee when they thought it was better to have it for the committee then?

[Peter Fonseca, Liberal, Mississauga East—Cooksville, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I have a lot of respect for the member, but it was his party that forced closure on legislation over 100 times. It was the way the Conservatives operated.

That is not the case with Liberals. We made a commitment to the people of Canada to address poor legislation that the previous Conservative government put forward, Bill C-51. We made a commitment to Canadians to bring a balance of freedom and liberty with security. Bill C-22 addresses that. It is imperative on the government to move forward with that agenda, because Canadians have asked for that.

The member should look at his party's record on closure.

[Cheryl Hardcastle, NDP, Windsor—Tecumseh, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is loud and clear that my hon. colleague is very confident in how this committee is going to proceed. However, Canadians watching are very disappointed in how the government supported Bill C-51. They were promised during the election campaign that the amendments were going to be addressed. However, the bill that has come forward to address this has such shortcomings.

It was mentioned that some experts validated this committee. I want to point out that the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Canada, the Security and Intelligence Review Committee, and the Canadian Bar Association all testified that the oversight committee must not be restricted in its ability to access necessary information. It is really confounding that this committee will move forward and that has been rejected up until now.

Could the hon. member shed some light on why the government rejects expert evidence that access to information is absolutely necessary for this committee to function the way that is envisioned by the government?

[Mark Holland, Liberal, Ajax, ON]

Mr. Speaker, I share my hon. colleague's concerns. Before I address the concerns as they relate to Bill C-51, I will speak to the bill that is in front of us, Bill C-22. It is important to note that there would be a five-year mandatory review. While we are ahead of the Commonwealth and while we think, after the committee's recommendations and the listening that we did across the country, that we have a very good bill, there is a mandatory review process to make sure we could look at how effective this committee is being and how we could improve it. We do not hold this out as perfection, but we do feel that this is the right place to start.

On the issue of changes and when we can expect them, the committee at this very moment is considering a report on the security and intelligence framework. We want to hear from that committee. It has done incredibly important work. It has heard from witnesses across the country. That committee report is going to be a very important input into the minister's overall process on responding. We have very clear platform commitments on what we feel needs to be changed and improved to get right that simultaneous work that needs to be done to protect Canadians and also to ensure that their rights are also protected.

The committee report is coming out. I would expect action by the government very shortly thereafter, informed by that process.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I congratulate my friend and hon. colleague, who is now the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety. I certainly hope that his experience as parliamentary secretary for public safety will not be as frustrating as it was to be parliamentary secretary for democratic institutions. I highly doubt that the government plans to pull the plug on this legislation in the next 24 hours, so it is bound to be a bit more rewarding.

All levity aside, I support this bill. It is an important piece of legislation. It is absolutely the case that when Mr. Justice O'Connor and others testified in hearings on Bill C-51 in the 41st Parliament, the failure of Canadian governments over time to have parliamentary oversight of security operations and security entities was drawn to our attention numerous times. He quoted Craig Forcese, who is one of Canada's leading experts, as is Kent Roach. They would prefer to see additional improvements to this bill, as would I, but I appreciate that important amendments were accepted at committee.

Would the parliamentary secretary be able to give us an update on what is being done to remedy the egregious multiple affronts to security and safety in Canada that came forward in Bill C-51? I opposed Bill C-51, not primarily because it offended Canadian civil liberties, although it does, but because it created silos in the views of people like Mr. Justice O'Connor, where CSIS would have information and have no obligation to share it with the RCMP and no obligation to share it with CSEC. Really, Bill C-51 makes us less safe, and the faster we can get rid of all of its various elements, potentially other than part 2, the better off we will all be.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, this is one piece of legislation where the Conservative Party has clearly demonstrated that once again it is out of touch with reality or, more important, it is out of touch with Canadians.

I have listened to the debate. We have had ministers, parliamentary secretaries to those ministers, the critics of both the NDP and the official opposition, and the leader of the Green Party engage in this debate. There has been opportunity for well over 100 people to get engaged in this debate to date. In fact, 40-plus members have had speeches of 10 minutes or more on the issue.

The Conservatives have made it very clear. Contrary to what Canadians want, they do not support parliamentary oversight. They are voting against the legislation, which is no surprise. When they brought in Bill C-51, they refused to bring in parliamentary oversight. Now, in opposition, they are asking why the Prime Minister has this kind of control.

I would ask the member this. First, could he explain for Canadians why the Conservatives do not support a parliamentary oversight committee? Second, why do they not recognize that this is one of the most robust pieces of legislation of the Five Eyes countries to ensure a strong independence for a parliamentary oversight committee? For example, when we compare New Zealand, the prime minister is the chair of the committee, and there are many other examples I could give.

[Ali Ehsassi, Liberal, Willowdale, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to once again rise in the House to discuss Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts.

We on this side of the House pride ourselves in avoiding easy absolutes and rejecting simple binaries and false dichotomies. The question before us today is not, as some would have us believe, whether we need to prioritize our security on the one hand, or our cherished values on the other hand. Rather, the question before us is quite simple: Is our national security regime working effectively and in a manner that is consistent with Canadian law and values?

Simultaneously balancing these twin objectives, keeping Canadians safe while also respecting and safeguarding our rights and freedoms, are among the most fundamental duties that a government can perform. However, currently that duty does not contain an element of committee oversight, a glaring weakness which puts Canada at odds with accepted international best practices. To that end, in this legislation, we are confident that we have developed a model for robust and comprehensive parliamentary reviews, one that will help build the trust of Canadians in our national security and intelligence activities.

The establishment of the national security and intelligence committee represents the realization of a key 2015 campaign promise. However, I want to stress that it is by no means the only action we are taking to strengthen Canada's national security framework.

First and foremost, we recognize that when it comes to an issue that is fundamental to who we are as a country, it is important that the will of Canadians is reflected as much as possible. As a result, our government has engaged in an unprecedented series of consultations with experts, stakeholders, parliamentarians of all parties, and individual Canadians on issues of national security and civil liberties. These consultations remain ongoing, and as such ensure that our approach to national security remains rooted in meaningful conversation and dialogue.

Second, our government remains committed to addressing the more problematic elements of Bill C-51, as introduced by the former government. Specifically, and largely as a result of the aforementioned public consultations, we remain committed to amending Bill C-51 so as to better protect the right to advocate and protest, and to better define rules regarding terrorist propaganda.

Third, the ever-evolving nature of security threats, as well as the clear need to remain vigilant in defending civil liberties, require that any national security framework not be set in stone. As such, our government has committed to mandating statutory review of national security legislation.

Fourth, our government remains committed to fighting violent extremism in all forms. The recent rise in domestic hate speech and hate crimes, for example, has served as a poignant reminder of the need for vigilance and community outreach to combat domestic violence. The goal here is to coordinate the efforts being undertaken at multiple levels to further enhance our capacity to prevent radicalization and violence, and ultimately make Canada a global leader in this field.

Bill C-22 fits within this pattern of strengthening and modernizing our national security laws and policies. As members have already heard, this bill would establish the national security and intelligence committee, a body comprised of parliamentarians from across parties, to scrutinize all of the national security and intelligence operations of the Government of Canada. Given that there are more than 20 departments and agencies within the Government of Canada that carry out national security-related functions, it cannot be overstated how important this initiative actually is.

The current system of security oversight, such as it currently exists, remains highly fragmented, with non-partisan review bodies, judicial oversight, and ministerial discretion all playing vital oversight roles. While these existing mechanisms will remain independent, untouched, and in place, the creation of a permanent committee will allow for a more comprehensive and reactive security oversight framework. As such, the committee's mandate will be necessarily wide ranging. It will look at not only the legislative, regulatory, administrative, and financial aspects of national security and intelligence, but also the operations and activities that departments and agencies of the federal government undertake in the name of national security.

To carry out this vital role, committee members would be given broad access to classified information with appropriate safeguards and exceptions, as well as leeway to examine matters they deem worthy of examination. Importantly, Bill C-22 would allow the committee to analyze and study laws, policies, and operations in real time, increasing the discipline, responsiveness, and accountability of our security framework. With the establishment of this committee, we would close what has amounted to an important accountability gap, one that has existed in Canada for far too long. It would also allow Canada to at long last count itself among its Five Eyes partners and other western countries that have long had parliamentary review of national security and intelligence activities. Clearly, this represents an extraordinary responsibility, and as a result would require checks and balances. I believe that the safeguards embedded in Bill C-22 strike this balance.

Furthermore, I believe that an already strong piece of legislation has been generally strengthened by the exemplary work done at the committee stage. It is important to reiterate that the government has accepted the vast majority of amendments put forward by the public safety committee. In particular, members will recall that the second reading version of the bill said that the new committee could not have access to information about ongoing defence intelligence activities, privileged information under the Investment Canada Act, and certain information collected by the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada. The public safety committee, wisely in my opinion, recommended amendments giving the new committee access to this information. The bill is stronger as a result, and I would like to thank the committee members and expert witnesses for all their hard work.

I also believe that this legislation has been strengthened by the additional report stage amendments introduced by the government House leader. In particular, by further amending clause 14 of the bill, the government has reinstalled important safeguards designed to protect vulnerable intelligence sources and reduce the risk of political interference in security operations. Finally, the restoration of clause 16 of Bill C-22 would realign Canada's security framework with similar provisions in place among our Five Eyes allies.

Let me end my remarks by getting back to where I started. It is vital that this esteemed institution has a clearer view into the national security and intelligence functions of the federal government. By establishing the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, we would finally open that window, and we would do it responsibly. This initiative would serve Canadians and our democracy well. I therefore call on all members for their support tonight.

Report Stage

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Madam Speaker, normally I would say that I am pleased to rise in the House to take part in the debate on Bill C-22, a bill that the NDP supported at second reading. However, under the circumstances, with the rejection of most of the changes that were made in committee, contrary to what the minister claims, and only one hour after the adoption of a time allocation motion, I am far from pleased to take part in the debate on this matter.

Bill C-22 is important, especially for the Liberals, considering it is central to the intellectual backflips they have been doing for three years now to justify their support for Bill C-51, passed in the last Parliament under the Stephen Harper government. The Liberal government has been in power for almost a year and a half now and we have barely completed this stage. It is worth mentioning, even if this is an issue for another debate on another day, that there is still no legislative measure on the table to right the wrongs created by Bill C-51 regarding rights and freedoms.

That said, this is still a very important matter. Since Bill C-51 was passed and, I would venture to say, even before, many commissions of inquiry have been formed after various incidents in connection with the work of national security agencies. There is one very clear finding: Canadians have lost a great deal of confidence in our national security agencies. This issue obviously affects our rights and freedoms, as well as our privacy, given the rapid advances in technology. However, this is also a matter of national security because, after all, if the public has no confidence in its agencies, it is difficult for them to do their work effectively and appropriately.

In principle, Bill C-22 is a good first step, and I can say that the minister is right about that. It is something that we should have had for a very long time. That said, very serious problems with the bill were raised in committee. A number of amendments would have gone a long way—even though they would not have made the bill perfect—to at least allowing parliamentarians to do their work better and to start off on the right foot.

We can see that, and we have often heard the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons come back to one point. They say that this is new for Canada, that other countries have had more time to learn, and that we have to give ourselves some time. We are already some way ahead compared to other countries, but there is a problem. For example, look at how the chair of the committee is elected. In Great Britain, the committee chair is not only elected, but he is also an opposition member. As justification for not electing the committee chair, we are told that, in Great Britain, the committee has existed for a number of years now and that they decided to make changes only after a certain period of learning and becoming used to it. Here, clearly, as we have just heard, the minister is relying on a legislative review that will take place in five years.

However, why not apply now what we learned from our allies? Why relearn the lessons of the past? I have a theory, without wanting to spread conspiracy theories. When this nice job, which comes with a salary on top of an MP's salary, is announced a year in advance, it is difficult for the Prime Minister to break his promise to the Liberal member who had the good fortune to secure this great position. Therefore, I would say that this is why we were not listening to the opposition amendments or the testimony of the chair of the British committee who offered this extremely important point for the credibility of the committee. All the technical issues on the form could be addressed, but credibility is also very important, to get back to the point I made at the outset, which is the public trust in our national security agencies.

It is not just me saying this. I want to come back to the column in The Globe and Mail, co-written by professors Wesley Wark, Kent Roach and Craig Forcese, professors the minister likes to quote to talk about the importance of this first step that has been completed. In speaking of the amendments passed in committee, they said:

Should the government choose to force a return to the restrictive original bill, it risks potentially undermining a new and historic Parliamentary ability that it has enthusiastically championed. Failure to reach agreement with Parliament

—not the Liberal caucus, but Parliament—

on this issue also imperils non-partisan support for future national-security reforms and changes to other elements of the review system for national security.

When we hear that and with the majority of the amendments having been thrown out and a time allocation motion having been thrown in to boot, it is difficult to see a path forward that would allow the committee to have that credibility and non-partisan environment it so desperately needs. The committee needs that not only to do its work, but also, as I said and it is worth repeating, in order to gain the public's trust so the public can begin trusting the work that is being done by the national security agencies. This is a key element and the government is clearly failing on that front.

I want to come back to the two examples I mentioned in the questions I have asked the government since the debate began this morning, specifically regarding the time allocation motion and the bill itself. The issue of ongoing investigations has often been raised. That is one of the restrictions we tried to lift through our amendments.

Indeed, the two most striking examples of investigations into human rights violations that are worthy of examination by a body such as the one this bill proposes are the Air India inquiry and the Afghan detainees investigation.

These are still open investigations, so technically, they are still ongoing. Under this bill, however, the committee of parliamentarians will not have the authority or the power to gather intelligence or conduct investigations. Thus, various pieces of information revealed in the media recently and many questions raised in the House for many years now could never have been raised. That is problematic, because it undermines the committee's mandate.

Once again, this brings us to the public's confidence in the committee and its work, and by extension, in the work of our national security agencies. That is the theme of my speech, as members will soon see.

When the government talks about some of the other issues that we raised in committee, it is important to note that for us, one point that has been clear is the restriction on access to information and the obvious solution is to limit it to cabinet confidence. With respect to everything else, we have to trust these parliamentarians, and the minister alluded to that issue. These parliamentarians will be sworn to secrecy and could potentially face jail time if any of this information is leaked.

The government's approach seems to be one of not trusting the parliamentarians who will sit on this committee and who will literally never be able to talk about any national security issues in the public space. When the government House leader or the Minister of Public Safety stand and tell us not to worry because the committee can use the bully pulpit if ever it feels it is unable to do its work behind closed doors, that is just not true. It is critical for Canadians to understand that.

Moreover, we talk about compromise and the importance of this being a non-partisan process. We hear the government say, “Well, the NDP proposed 13 amendments. The Liberals proposed 16. The Bloc proposed nine. The Green Party proposed two. We adopted two of those amendments so we are in the clear and everything is all right.” It is critical that the government look at the broader picture and the public trust.

I move, seconded by the member for Jonquière:

That Motion No. 3 be amended by deleting paragraph (a).

Bill C-22--Time Allocation Motion

[Marjolaine Boutin-Sweet, NDP, Hochelaga, QC]

Madam Speaker, first I hear that there had been no impasse in committee. Then I learn the all of the committee's recommendations were rejected. The report was not accepted as my colleague said.

The Liberals promised during the election campaign that they would lessen the negative effects of Bill C-51. They had also promised more transparency. However, in addition to gutting the bill, they are imposing time allocation. They are trying to sweep everything under the rug and make the issue disappear as quickly as possible. Twice, the people were let down. We call that a double whammy. It is very disappointing to Canadians.

How can Canadians trust a government that breaks so many promises? It is no surprise that people are so cynical about politicians.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Madam Speaker, I join with my colleague from the Conservative Party, the official opposition, in registering serious concern about the government's actions today.

The experts we have talked to on security and intelligence issues are frustrated by the fact that these amendments, done at the last moment at report stage, weaken the oversight that is available. That we would proceed with only government support for such a critical initiative on national security and intelligence is a matter that should disappoint all Canadians. This is the government's sole response to the controversial Bill C-51, which the Liberal government, while in opposition, supported. They agree that these amendments would weaken the job parliamentarians would be asked to do.

Why is the government not willing to allow time for all parties to try to seek consensus on this bill? My colleagues and I are standing ready to work with the hon. House leader and with these experts. Why is the government refusing to work with us?

National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act

[Adam Vaughan, Liberal, Spadina—Fort York, ON]

Mr. Speaker, this is not the first time that I have faced this line of questioning from the New Democrats, so I have a prepared answer for this.

First of all, Bill C-51 did a few things right. The modifications to the no-fly list to prevent people from getting on airplanes, as opposed to simply stopping hijacking situations, was a very important transition that needed to be understood. We no longer had a no-fly list that dealt with what might happen on an airplane, but what might happen when the airplane landed and people deployed into other countries. We should not be exporting fighters into foreign wars where national interests and national security are quite clearly at stake. We need to manage that differently, and that is what some of the changes in Bill C-51 did.

There were a number of small changes like that. Expanding preventative detention by a number of days was prudent in light of the complexity of the way that attacks were materializing. It required a different thinking and approach to how we use preventative detention. That is not unlike the way in which some Criminal Code provisions in this country already operate. It simply was extended to areas of terrorism and national security. Those were some of the fine points that we found needed to be strengthened as we started to embark upon changes to Bill C-51. We thought they were quite clearly important.

This is the third time that this Parliament has tried to deal with civilian oversight of our security agencies. The NDP has never once supported civilian oversight when it has been on the floor for a vote.

My question to the NDP is this. How do you protect democracy without civilian oversight? Why has that party historically voted against every single proposition put forward by this party in this House when the opportunity has arisen? Why will the New Democrats not strengthen it incrementally? Why do they leave it in the hands of experts instead of the public, where it should be if we are to have true civilian oversight?

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his contribution to the debate.

Bill C-22 is meant to be a direct response to Bill C-51. In fact, when we were debating Bill C-51, my Liberal colleagues often brought up this issue. They said that we needed to ensure some kind of parliamentary oversight of Canada's intelligence organizations. However, they went ahead and supported Bill C-51 anyway, even though the Conservative bill included no such measures.

Why did the Liberals support that bill in the first place, and why did they trust the Conservatives or the next government to fix the part of the legislation that deals with parliamentary oversight?

[Adam Vaughan, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Families]

Mr. Speaker, it is an honour to be able to speak to this extraordinarily important piece of legislation. Before I reference parts of the bill, I would like to provide a bit of background as to where my perspective emanates from. I was a member of Toronto City Council on the Police Services Board, and in particular on the Police Services Board during the G20 summit when elected officials were presented with information that they could not share with their constituents, despite the fact that they were on the board precisely because they represented constituents. It was a very trying period to provide oversight to an important police body and an important security operation. They had no capacity to talk to those in charge of the operation because it was nestled in the Ontario Provincial Police at the time, not at the City of Toronto as many think it was. At the same time they could not relate back to their constituents the steps they were taking to protect their civil rights and make sure that their rights to political protest as well as access even to their homes were going to be guaranteed.

Therefore, civilian oversight is at the heart of any democracy and is at the heart of any responsible approach to public safety, let alone intelligence and security measures that we are now embarking upon, which when Parliament was conceived were not really perceived as being part of the responsibility of Parliament but rather the executive branch and others in society. As Parliament has evolved over the last few centuries, we have been evolving the practice of stronger and stronger civilian oversight, in particular around public accountability for the way in which our police and security agencies operate. We have also developed, expanded, and layered our security and our police bodies as we have taken on more and more complex matters. Society has changed and we have become more cognizant of the realities that we have to encounter. As a result, there is not a single police operation that Parliament oversees but rather close to 17, 18, or 19. We could even include border security now in that, which we need to explore as dynamics change in an ever-evolving world.

Into this mix, we have had over the last decade, even the last 20 years I would argue, significant powers invested into our security agencies. What has not kept pace is an oversight body that is as complex and as far reaching as those agencies now are. When the RCMP was originally looked at as a security force way back when, 100-plus years ago, there was no need to think of it as a spy agency dealing with foreign interventions coming into this country. It was a completely different colonial period of time when it was conceived.

CSIS flew straight out of the inadequacies both in the regulation and the oversight of the RCMP, when that was discovered in the 1970s. When CSIS was established, a whole new chapter of security agencies was brought to bear in terms of the way in which this country and this Parliament prosecuted public safety. However, the rules and regulations that were brought in for CSIS were not applied to other elements of the government. We get into electronic surveillance, intelligence sharing with our allies, and the complexities that technology has brought to this issue. It is clear that it is time for a revisit as to how we provide civilian oversight, as I said the corner of democracy, to make sure that we are protecting both people's public safety and their private safety as well as their civil liberties and society's civil liberties. That is the challenge that we are trying to address with the bill in front of us.

Over the last decade in particular, the powers invested in our security agencies have been strengthened, but the powers of oversight have not. What this Bill C-22 seeks to do is strengthen those oversights. One of the most important components of this bill is that the committee would be struck in a way that it would report directly to Parliament. I know the opposition has talked about it going through the executive branch because the Privy Council Office and the Prime Minister's Office, in particular, have the ability to screen it to make sure that the reports that have been tabled in public do not compromise public safety. That is a prudent measure, it is not a political measure. It is a measure that has been put in place in particular to keep sensitive information away from public eyes, not to stop the work of the committee or the advice that the committee would give Parliament as it relates to public safety. That is a critical distinction to make. All redactions and all screenings would have to be justified in writing both to the committee and to Parliament and would have to be understood as such, as being filters that do not preclude activity or preclude areas of examination but rather make sure that the reporting of those activities is done in the safest way possible to protect our public safety environment.

The other thing that is critically important here is there has been criticism that it would not be a parliamentary committee but rather a committee of parliamentarians. The language there might sound very familiar, just a set of words reordered, but a committee of parliamentarians means that it would include the Senate.

Again, I think this is a critical piece of evolution. It would allow us to sit down with both chambers, both of which have carriage of public safety in this country, to make sure that real information and sensitive information are delivered in real time to both bodies, so that both bodies can make quick decisions when quick decisions are needed. What we know from the ever-evolving situation globally and internally in this country is that quick decisions are part of what of what we have to accommodate as we move through accountability practices in this country.

The other issue which I think is critically important is that the government would not have a majority on this committee. Let that be said again. It would be a committee of parliamentarians where government would not have a majority. This means that the activities, the advice, the description, and the publication of what is being done is constituted by a majority of parliamentarians who are outside of government, let alone outside of the executive branch. In other words, if the belief of some members of Parliaments is that civil liberties or public safety in the areas of inquiry are being frustrated by the government, they would have the ability, as a majority committee, to make a committee report to that effect and bring public pressure. That is the best form of accountability to bring to bear on the activities of this committee.

The other thing which I think is critically important to understand, as well, is that currently there are silos in which the different security agencies operate, and with the accountability officers for those different security agencies, all 17 to 19, depending on one's view of the configuration of the list, that is not shared in real time. The information among those organizations is shared in real time, but the accountability is not conducted in a coordinated, overreaching, and overarching method. What this committee would achieve is to bring that together under one accountability model. It would measure the relationships between these two organizations, or several different organizations, and make sure that the information that is being shared, the practices that are being pursued, the behaviour of these agencies, are consistent across all of government as we move to protect both civil liberties and the public's right to public safety.

These issues allow us to broaden the access of parliamentarians to security, and sensitive information and sensitive operations. Instead of just being housed inside the executive branch now, it is housed inside the Parliament of Canada. That, again, is a critically important development. It is one that fulfills our mandate and our promise to the electorate that sent us here to make sure that we strengthen, broaden, and engage all of Parliament as we try to make sure that public safety in this country is done with the most accurate, up-to-date, and effective civilian oversight possible. That is a principle that this party will not step back on.

I would like to also reference a couple of other components of the bill which I think are critically important. The notion that this is somehow not fulfilling our mandate, I think is just wrong. In fact, if we listen to the experts who were critical of the previous government's approaches to public safety, what we hear is that they are in accordance with us.

Craig Forcese said, “this will be a stronger body than the UK and Australian equivalents. [It will be] a dramatic change for Canadian national security accountability. [It's] a good bill.” He gives it a high pass.

The criticism of Bill C-51 largely emanated from this individual, and now the support is coming from this individual. Clearly, we have moved the yardsticks.

I am going to leave members with one last thought. I think this is a critical thought, as well.

There is a notion somehow, and I certainly saw it in Bill C-51 when I was here in the previous term, that governments can land on public safety issues or civil rights issues perfectly, every time that they present legislation. That is a fallacy. In fact, I would say that is an arrogance.

Public safety and civil rights in particular are iterative processes. We move forward carefully. We move forward prudently. We expand rights. We protect rights simultaneously as best we can. However, we never get it right. Circumstances change. The behaviour of institutions changes. Individual officers within these organizations behave in particular ways.

It is a constant moving target that we are trying to deal with here, both the need to protect Canada's public safety and the need to protect charter rights. This process, as we establish this committee, I can guarantee members will evolve over time. It must evolve over time, because the circumstances we are dealing with are evolving over time. To do it in a way that is responsible is to do it in a way that is open and parliamentary and accountable to this body, and not to the executive branch.

That is exactly what this legislation would achieve. It would allow us to make significant steps forward at this time. I assure members that as long as I am sitting in this House, the conversation around good legislation, strong ideas, and intelligent criticism that emerges around how we balance the complexities of the security environment which we live in, how we make sure that civil liberties are protected as we protect public safety, needs to be sustained.

I take the ideas that frame that endeavour and that work of this Parliament very seriously. I think members have seen over the last couple of days that when strong ideas and intelligent criticism are presented on the floor of this Parliament, all parliamentarians have the ability to say, “That's a good idea. Let's support that, and let's move that into law and move that forward to protect Canadians or develop Canadians rights.”

That is what this bill would do. It is in the spirit of that kind of thinking, that kind of discipline around public safety and civil rights. That is the hallmark of the Liberal Party and this government. I am proud to support this bill because it continues that reputation.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast—Sea to Sky Country, BC]

Mr. Speaker, on the contrary, I was elected in October 2015. I was not part of the former deliberations or government. I can assure the member opposite and all members of the House that Bill C-51 caused a grave amount of concern with respect to excessive use of powers that really belong to members of Parliament and Canadians. I am very pleased to support Bill C-22 today.

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I have a very simple question for my colleague, who seemed to be quite worried about Bill C-51 that passed in the previous Parliament.

She talked about some serious concerns regarding the excessive powers given to this country's security agencies; at the time, however, her party did not share those concerns. Instead, it voted in favour of Bill C-51—enthusiastically, I might add.

How can she reconcile her comments today to the effect that serious concerns remain about excessive powers with the fact that her party voted in favour of Bill C-51 at the time?

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, West Vancouver—Sunshine Coast—Sea to Sky Country, BC]

Mr. Speaker, as the member knows, this whole process is much more than a campaign commitment. This process is about engaging parliamentarians and the country in order to address what was broadly perceived as excessive use of power under Bill C-51. Bill C-22 takes a significant step forward by providing that kind of oversight. Our country was in the minority really, one of the only countries in the G20 not to provide this kind of oversight. I believe we will see a much more robust, engaged assessment as we move forward, because it is intended to say that we are open and transparent about providing and balancing our freedoms with our security and safety.

[Pam Goldsmith-Jones, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of International Trade]

Mr. Speaker, I rise to address the House with respect to the second reading of Bill C-22 establishing the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians.

Bill C-22 is about rebuilding trust with Canadians. It is about providing assurance that our national security and intelligence communities' activities are being conducted responsibly. Parliamentarians can and should play a major role in reviewing these activities. To that effect, our government made a commitment to an approach that protects our rights and freedoms and provides for the security of Canadians.

For many, Bill C-51 was cause for grave concern. Today, as our consultation analysis and improved legislation comes forward, it is a pleasure to demonstrate that we are being proactive and fair in our commitment to protecting Canada's national security and Canadians' rights and freedoms.

Democracy and freedom should never be taken for granted. Upholding democracy and freedom requires constant vigilance. Bill C-22 is a significant step forward. It stands against excessive powers of the state, something that I and many in the House believe in strongly.

Bill C-22 would provide a well-designed and sensible framework for the government to share highly classified information with selected members of Parliament from various parties, as well as senators, so that national security and intelligence activities in Canada would be subject to their scrutiny.

It is my pleasure to continue debate on this important bill that would help to protect both Canada's national security and Canadians' rights and freedoms. The amendments proposed by the government would strengthen the bill. The bill and an amendment brought forward by the committee would enable the national security and intelligence committee to review any federal department or agency, and now, because of a recent amendment, any crown corporation that performs national security or intelligence activities. This could be the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment, the Canada Border Services Agency, or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, for example.

The national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would have a government-wide mandate that would set it apart from other oversight bodies established to review a specific agency, such as the Security Intelligence Review Committee, the commissioner of the Communications Security Establishment, or the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP.

To ensure transparency, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would provide an annual report of its findings and recommendations to Parliament. It would also issue special reports at any time it considered it necessary. Because these reports would be available to the public, they would need to be submitted to the prime minister before tabling to ensure that they did not contain any classified information. However, I wish to emphasize the fact that the prime minister would not have any power to change the committee's findings and recommendations.

Bill C-22 would also enable the committee to provide classified reports to ministers at its own discretion. To ensure transparency about its reviews, the committee would be required to include a summary of these special reports in its annual report.

While it is vital to involve more parliamentarians in examining how federal agencies carry out their national security responsibilities, there must be some boundaries to ensure that ministers remain fully responsible and accountable for the activity of their departments.

Every department and agency of the security and intelligence community reports to a minister. That minister is ultimately responsible for the conduct of these departments and agencies. The minister is accountable to Parliament, and Canadians, for ensuring that the organization under her or his charge carries out its duties to keep Canadians safe while respecting our fundamental rights and freedoms. A minister may need to stop a review of a security or intelligence operation or may have to withhold sensitive operational information if the minister believes the review or the disclosure of the information could be harmful to national security.

I believe that such checks and balances are appropriate when we consider, for example, that the integrity of an active operation could be at stake. This is the reason our government has put forward amendments relating to access to information. Under the amendments proposed, ministers would not be able to use their power arbitrarily when it came to disclosing or not disclosing the information. Any request to withhold information would have to be explained to the committee, and if the committee was not happy with a minister's decision, it could report back to Parliament. The committee would have a legitimate platform to challenge a minister in public, in Parliament, before all Canadians.

Thanks to Bill C-22, the committee of parliamentarians would be able to hold the government to account. It would play a key role in ensuring that ministers took the necessary actions to address problems and fix deficiencies. It is clear that the bill would give the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians significant powers. It would also back it up with the necessary support through the creation of a secretariat.

It is also very important to stress the fact that the proposed national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians' mandate and powers could only be changed through amendments to the legislation, that is to say, only through the will of Parliament. Nevertheless, the proposed legislation includes an obligation for a review of all of its provisions and operations after five years to make sure it is meeting its objective.

Bill C-22 demonstrates how the government is setting the bar higher when it comes to transparency and accountability concerning national security. Canadians can be confident that Parliament can and will hold the government to account.

[Pierre Nantel, NDP, Longueuil—Saint-Hubert, QC]

Mr. Speaker, this is an extremely sensitive topic. Bill C-51 came up a lot during the election campaign. People talked about a great darkness, as my colleague opposite said. However, the Liberals supported Bill C-51, saying they would figure it all out later on, and that member was part of the team in charge in another capacity then.

Canadians have not forgotten. They remember. They remember that Bill C-51 was outrageous, regardless of what my colleagues over here think, and that the Liberals said they would figure it all out. The PMO has some nerve thinking it can appoint the committee chair.

Would my colleague care to comment on that? It makes no sense.

[Kelly McCauley, Conservative, Edmonton West, AB]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to rise today to speak to Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians and to make consequential amendments to certain acts, or, as I call it, another piece of bad legislation to cover for a campaign promise the Liberals made without really thinking it through.

There are some points I want to address in discussing this bill, as I mentioned: using bad legislation to cover for bad campaign promises, the problem with creating legislation that relies on putting blind trust in the government, a redundancy of some of the legislation, and what stakeholders are saying about the bill.

We start with a campaign talking point that turned out to be a poorly phrased policy platform: how to reconcile the Prime Minister's support of Bill C-51 when he was a third party leader and his current compulsion to oppose everything the previous government did. My colleague from Parry Sound—Muskoka said it perfectly when he said, “the devil is not only in the details; the devil is in the fundamental misappropriation of the bill to promise something to the electorate and then not deliver.”

Today's legislation is just another in a string of poor attempts to cover up politically popular, but operationally difficult, campaign promises. This bill gives broad discretion over intelligence and national security discussions to the government, with “strong” oversight from the PMO, but not from Parliament. MPs are told to just trust the Liberals and they will figure it all out later. We know from their actions, though, they cannot be so easily trusted. They find ways to bend, break, and skirt the rules.

Therefore, we use the mechanisms within the House to hold the government to account and make sure that Canadians are aware of what the Liberal government is up to. Bill C-22 creates a committee with broad oversight, heavy Liberal influence, and public disclosure solely at the discretion of the PMO. It is a system designed to operate on blind trust in the government of the day, but we know that a strong and secure democratic system of government will ensure our security and liberty no matter who is in charge. Bill C-22, demanding that Canadians blindly trust the Liberals, does not accomplish this.

With their already lengthy track record of abuse of privileges, ethical lapses, and skirting responsibility for their mistakes, as well as their general contempt for the opposition when it opposes flawed legislation, I just cannot trust the government to act in the best interests of Canadians. Bill C-22 simply does not provide reasonable, meaningful mechanisms for parliamentary oversight.

Let us look at the track record of this bill. The special committee is appointed by, and reports to, the PMO. It should, instead, be appointed by, and report to, Parliament. The Prime Minister campaigned on a reduced role for the PMO, but his actions do not follow his words. Similarly, the Prime Minister, independent of any discussion with the other parties, appointed the committee chair in January before the legislation was even created. He refused to consult with the opposition parties, despite the public willingness of my party and the NDP to discuss this important committee. We were at the table, willing and ready to talk, but they stood us up.

The purpose of this committee is not to encourage and ensure transparency for the security agencies that are already as transparent as they can be while still protecting Canada and Canada's interests, rather it is a knee-jerk policy decision to shore up public support the Liberals lost when they voted in favour of Bill C-51 previously. Bill C-22 is a roundabout way for the Prime Minister's Office to direct the way our national security agencies function, effectively politicizing institutions that should always operate at arm's length from political sources. If the bill achieved some balance between oversight for parliamentarians and effective oversight for the committee while enhancing our national security, perhaps Conservatives could support it, but the bill, as it is, is purposeless.

Oversight agencies, including the Office of the Communications Security Establishment Commissioner, Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, the RCMP External Review Committee, National Defence and Canadian Forces ombudsman, and the Security Intelligence Review Committee are already mandated to provide oversight for each department or agency. This includes providing annual reports to Parliament.

Let us look at the membership process of the committee. Subclause 4(2) of the bill states:

The Committee is to consist of not more than two members who are members of the Senate and not more than seven members who are members of the House of Commons. Not more than four Committee members who are members of the House of Commons may be members of the government party.

There are two members of the Senate, seven members of this House, and not more than four government members, so we could easily be looking at four parliamentary secretaries from the government, notably members who are accountable first to their cabinet ministers, two so-called independent senators, and three members of the opposition.

I have heard government members state that they only get up to, but not necessarily, four members. Let us be honest here. No one expects the government to appoint a majority made up of opposition members and Conservative senators.

We have seen all too often that the Prime Minister and his office truly believe that their unilateral decisions are the best courses of action for Canadians. They dictate the issues of the day and the alleged solutions to those issues.

The government House leader has offered amendments so that subclause 4(2) would instead read: “The Committee is to consist of not more than three members who are members of the Senate and not more than eight members who are members of the House of Commons. Not more than five committee members who are members of the House of Commons may be members of the government party”.

Even with this, we could have five government members, three so-called independent senators, and three opposition members. We would still be faced with a Liberal majority on the committee that could unilaterally direct our intelligence and security agencies.

We always talk about how important it is to consult with the relevant stakeholders on legislation, so I will read what a couple of stakeholders are saying about Bill C-22. Here is a spoiler alert. It is not praise.

The Canadian Civil Liberties Association said:

we are concerned by the government’s power to halt a Committee investigation, or refuse to provide information, when it is deemed “injurious to national security.” While we recognize that the utmost secrecy is sometimes required, this is particularly worrisome because these decisions are final, and are not subject to judicial review or any other dispute resolution process. Also concerning is the prime minister’s power to redact Committee reports (without any evidence that redactions were made), as well as the numerous categories of information the committee cannot access. Furthermore, it should be the Committee members themselves—not the prime minister—that chooses the Committee chair.

The Civil Liberties Association seems to broadly agree with our concerns, that Bill C-22 would leave most of the discretionary decisions and oversight resolution mechanisms to the Prime Minister.

I am really not sure how the government can genuinely argue that it is increasing oversight by increasing the discretionary power of the PMO to censor information that claims to be injurious to national security but may actually just be injurious to the Liberal government.

The government seems to hide things it does not like. Just two weeks ago, members of the House debated a motion calling on the government to release the finance department's redacted data on a federal carbon tax. The information was unfavourable to the government, so it refused to disclose the information and voted it down.

The government has muzzled more than 100 public servants for life on the purchase of the politically motivated, sole-sourced Super Hornet purchase. We have heard testimony in committee that the government did not even bother to make these muzzled public servants aware of their rights under the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, but it sure went out of its way to muzzle them for life.

The Canadian Bar Association, which I understand might be versed on the impacts of laws, waded in on Bill C-22 by saying:

While we have made suggestions and expressed concerns about various aspects of the Bill, our concerns about section 16 of the Bill are greater by several orders of magnitude. That section would provide broad discretion for Ministers and departments to refuse to provide information on vague national security grounds and on the basis of the expansive definition of ‘special operational information’ in the Security of Information Act.

Just recently, in the government operations and estimates committee, we heard how the government is making extensive use of national security exemptions to skirt rules on the procurement of such items as jackets for Syrian refugees, under the guise of national security, yet we are supposed to trust that government ministers are not going to opt out of the disclosure regime under Bill C-22 when they see fit.

However, it is okay, just trust that the Liberal government will always act in everyone's best interest, and shame on us for again questioning its so-called commitment to act openly and honestly.

I do not like legislation that relies solely on trusting the government to act properly. We have seen too many examples of the government hiding from responsibility for political gain, and this legislation will only make that easier, without tangibly increasing Canada's national security oversight.

As such, I cannot in good conscience support the bill.

[Lloyd Longfield, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

Mr. Speaker, yes, we do have a system of government that involves input from committees. Committees, such as the public safety committee, are able to have experts and hear testimony so the members can debate among themselves and come up with some recommendations that come forward to the government. Not all recommendations are adopted, but they are all taken into consideration. I know that some of the hon. committee members from the NDP had some of their suggestions come forward, which was unusual when compared with what the previous government was doing. Bill C-51 came through with no amendments, no amendments required, no amendments taken. In this case, we did have a very good discussion at committee. The discussion came forward to the government. The government makes its recommendations, which then go to the upper House and then come back for debate in Parliament, which is what we are doing right now.

I think the process is working. Not all committee members will get their amendments through, but it adds value to our conversation and in fact to our parliamentary democracy.

[Lloyd Longfield, Liberal, Guelph, ON]

Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure today to rise in support of Bill C-22. This bill would create a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. First, I would like to thank the members of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security for its hard work on this file, and for what I understand was a great discussion at committee level.

Our government is committed to protecting both the national security of Canadians as well as Canadians' rights and freedoms. By establishing the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, this government is fulfilling the promise that we made to Canadians in 2015. The role of the committee will be to ensure that the national security framework is working effectively to keep Canadians safe, and that the rights and freedoms of Canadians are also safeguarded.

It was 17 months ago that Canadians elected this government to produce real change in Canadian society. Bill C-22 is part of our plan to address the deficit of public trust between Canadians and the intelligence agencies that protect them. Restoring public trust will be no easy task. What it requires is a return to the basics of public service. We do not need to look hard to find these foundational principles. They are enshrined in our Constitution, now 150 years old. The phrase, “peace, order, and good government” has come to symbolize Canadian constitutional principles. These words hold truth today and are in fact fundamental to the mandate of this new committee.

Peace is a universally recognized Canadian value. This committee would have a hand in overseeing our military and intelligence agencies. Canadians have empowered their security agencies with the tools they need to keep Canada safe and to maintain public peace and security, yet there must be measures in place to ensure that these tools are not abused. This is why the committee will have a broad government-wide mandate, in fact, broader than other partners in the Five Eyes. This will allow the committee members to review any national security matter in all government departments and agencies, and, if security allows, present their findings to the House. Assuring citizens that their privacy is respected is a challenge that persists for democracies around the world. This next step would help to provide the transparency that Canadians overwhelmingly voted for in 2015.

“Order”, the second foundational virtue of our Constitution, is a crucial element to the bill. Every democracy struggles to strike the appropriate balance between collective security and individual liberty. MPs and senators on the committee will have access to classified information and a robust mandate to review and to complete the scope of our national security framework throughout the federal government. All of our Five Eyes allies have similar committees, and the broad scope of this committee's mandate will make it a stronger body, as I mentioned earlier.

Here too, the government has struck a reasonable balance between peace and order. MPs and senators on the committee will have access to classified information, as well as the mandate to review the complete scope of Canada's national security framework.

However, there are provisions in the bill that limit access to certain information, such as ongoing military operations, cabinet confidences, and information related to ongoing law enforcement investigations. This balance ensures the security of classified information and the operational effectiveness of the DND, CSIS, and the RCMP, while also providing MPs and senators with adequate oversight to properly protect our Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

“Good government” is the final value reflected in this phrase. It is best embodied when we here and those in the upper house collaborate for the good of our country. With government amendments, the committee will be comprised of up to 11 members, eight from the House of Commons and three from the Senate. Up to five members of Parliament will be from the governing party.

This bill is an essential part of our national security strategy, which includes specific measures outlined in our platform, as well as consultations, so that Canadians can have their say about what other measures are needed.

Restoring public trust in Canada's security institutions is of critical importance. This is by no means the only measure the government will take to rebuild the public's confidence. The hon. Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness is currently reviewing Bill C-51, to make much-needed reforms.

There are many lessons that history has to teach. Perhaps the most important is the government's role in society. Government is an instrument for good, where people can come together and work toward common goals. As MPs, we cannot forget this simple truth. We are tasked with protecting the rights of the people we serve, as well as future generations. We must not become complacent and rely upon false comfort and assumptions. Constant vigilance by Canada's leaders to maintain these freedoms is included in the review recommendations of this bill.

This past summer, the former president of the United States, Mr. Obama, addressed this House and emphasized the truth of this. He quoted the late prime minister Pierre Trudeau when he said, “A country, after all, is not something you build as the pharaohs built the pyramids, and then leave standing to defy eternity. A country is something that is built every day”.

If we are to keep building Canada as a monument to the world, we must take these words to heart.

To conclude, I urge my fellow MPs to support Bill C-22. The bill is a thorough and comprehensive piece of legislation. It would equip MPs with the resources they need to responsibly exercise their due diligence. I urge my colleagues to support the bill as a common-sense move to promote government accountability.

I welcome any questions from my colleagues.

[Joyce Murray, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Treasury Board]

Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to join this debate on Bill C-22, an act to establish the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians. It is a bill that would at long last enable Canadian parliamentarians to scrutinize our national security framework and our national security agencies, as our Five Eyes partners have been doing for years.

The creation of this committee would be part of achieving the dual objectives of keeping Canadians safe while safeguarding our rights and freedoms. It would also stand us in great stead among our international partners. In fact, the new Canadian committee would raise the bar for national security accountability worldwide.

I will touch on a bit of the history behind Bill C-22.

For many years, a great many Canadians, including me as an MP, have called for the creation of such a committee. The government of Paul Martin put forward a proposal that, unfortunately, died on the order paper.

Issues pertaining to the need for better oversight of national security organizations were discussed in 2008 in Justice Frank Iacobucci's Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin, and in 2006 in Justice Dennis O'Connor's Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar.

While the Conservatives were in power, both the private member's bill, Bill C-551, from the member for Malpeque, and my own private member's bill, Bill C-622, were tabled, as was a bill with bipartisan support in the Senate, all of which would have seen this committee created years ago.

My bill, Bill C-622, which called for the creation of a parliamentary committee of oversight, built on the two previous bills and also included an additional set of measures to increase the transparency and accountability of the Communications Security Establishment. It would have put metadata under the law and created a framework of accountability for acquiring, storing, or sharing information inadvertently or advertently collected. However, the timing of my bill was very interesting, because the final discussion and vote took place one week after the attack on Parliament, which had been preceded by two deadly attacks on Canadian soldiers. At that time, there was a great deal of concern about the security of Canadians, due to radicalization and potential terrorism.

In the remarks following the attack on Parliament, it was remarkable that all party leaders confirmed their commitment to protect the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of Canadians, even as security measures were to be analyzed and strengthened. Indeed, Canadians expect these fundamental aspects of their very democracy being guarded to be respected. That kind of attention to security measures and privacy is the underlying intention of Bill C-22.

At the time, in 2014, I invited members of all parties to support sending my bill to committee for further examination and to signal the authenticity of their commitment to protecting privacy at the same time as strengthening security in Canada. Unfortunately, instead, the previous prime minister instructed his Conservative members to vote against Bill C-622, even though all members of the Liberal Party and all other parties in the House, including one brave Conservative member, voted for it. The bill failed. It was not passed.

However, I am now happy to see the government following through on the spirit of Bill C-22. I was proud to campaign on the promise of delivering stronger national security oversight by parliamentarians, and Bill C-22 delivers on that promise.

It is regrettable that it has taken so long, but we can be proud as the members of Parliament who will, I am confident, finally bring this essential parliamentary body into being. After all, as the federal and provincial privacy commissioners stated in the fall 2014 communiqué, “Canadians both expect and are entitled to equal protection for their privacy and access rights and for their security. We must uphold these fundamental rights that lie at the heart of Canada’s democracy.”

I followed with interest as the members of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security studied this piece of legislation, proposed and debated amendments, and amended the bill, frequently with the support of several parties.

I want to emphasize what a pleasant change this is from working under the previous government, whose members viewed government bills as sacrosanct.

That was especially the case with laws concerning security measures. As we know, Bill C-51 followed shortly after the tragedies of the attacks on soldiers and on Parliament and was pushed through, essentially with no amendments, despite the deep concerns of Canadians.

I feel that many of the committee's amendments improve the bill and the new committee it will establish.

For example, the committee amended clause 8 to expand the scope of the committee's mandate. When it comes to examining activities carried out by national security or intelligence agencies, the power of a minister to determine that the examination would be injurious to national security would now be time limited to the period during which the activity was actually happening. Once it was no longer ongoing, the minister would be required to inform the committee and the committee could then undertake its examination. I support this change.

I also support the amendment that gives the committee chair a vote only in the case of a tie as well as the NDP's addition of a clause requiring the committee to inform the appropriate minister of the discovery of any activity that may not be in compliance with the law.

I also support some of the changes to the exemptions that were in clause 14 initially, the information to which committee members were not entitled.

I agree with the public safety committee that the new committee of parliamentarians should be able to receive information about ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations. I support that it should have access to information considered privileged under the Investment Canada Act and that it should have access to information collected by FINTRAC, the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada.

There were certain changes made by the committee that were not accepted by the government, for a variety of reasons. For example, there is the amendment currently before the House to reintroduce clause 16, which would allow a minister to prevent the release of information that constitutes special operating information under the Security of Information Act, when disclosing it could be injurious to national security. This kind of authority exists in the case of other equivalent committees in similar parliamentary systems around the world. Moreover, Bill C-22 would still require the minister to give written reasons for preventing the release of information, and Parliament would be informed of each occasion on which this authority was used.

This legislation is a major leap forward for Canadian national security accountability. The new committee of parliamentarians would not only provide Canadians with the assurance that their elected representatives, the MPs in Parliament, were on watch to strengthen the protection of their essential civil rights but would also help identify opportunities to improve on current mechanisms for defending their security. In fact, effective protection of individual privacy and effective delivery of national security measures are not a balance, a dichotomy, or a trade-off. They are complementary, and both are necessary.

The United States Department of Homeland Security, for example, considers safeguarding civil rights and liberties to be critical to its work to protect its nation from the many threats it faces. This third-largest department of the U.S. government now explicitly embeds and enforces privacy protections and transparency in all the department's systems, programs, and activities.

In 2014, deputy secretary Mayorkas confirmed in a Department of Homeland Security speech that not only is this an integral part of the DHS mission and crucial to maintaining the public's trust but it has resulted in Homeland Security becoming a stronger and more effective department.

The original version of Bill C-22, as presented by the government at first reading, was already lauded by experts, and it has only become stronger with the amendments accepted from the public safety committee. Crucially, the bill requires that the act be reviewed by Parliament five years after coming into force, so all of the discussions we are having here in Parliament can be reviewed and the bill can be changed as appropriate.

I am proud to have contributed to the conversation leading to Bill C-22. I am pleased that our government has taken this essential step forward in protecting fundamental Canadian security and freedoms. Ultimately, the bill before us today would make Canadians safer and help ensure that our rights and freedoms are better protected. It has been a long time coming. I invite all hon. members to join me in making it happen.

Motions in amendment

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, before I get under way, I will comment on the last statement from my colleague across the way. Regarding New Zealand where the prime minister sits on the committee, is that something the Conservatives would want to see happen here on our parliamentary oversight committee?

It is important that we recognize that there has been a great deal of work on this. Let me start off my speech, though, by recognizing International Women's Day today, to applaud everyone who is participating in it, and to give a special call-out to my daughter, who is the youngest member of the Manitoba legislature. Her dad is very proud of all the wonderful work that she does.

I wanted to be able to put this thing into perspective. Let us put it into perspective in regard to a couple of points. One is that the Conservatives were out of touch with Canadians prior to the last election and today they demonstrated that they are still out of touch with Canadians. I say that because we know within the Liberal caucus that when the Conservatives introduced Bill C-51 there was a fundamental piece that was missing. We knew that. We understood that. We knew that because we were working and connecting with Canadians, listening to what Canadians actually had to say.

I understand that the prime minister at the time, Stephen Harper, had a bias. His bias was possibly that he did not trust; I do not know. All we know is that at the end of the day he did not want to have a parliamentary oversight committee and have parliamentarians take responsibility in terms of being able to ensure things such as rights and freedoms of Canadians were in fact being protected. We disagreed back then and I stood up across the way on many occasions and talked about how important it was that the government actually bring in parliamentary oversight. I believe the record will show that we pushed that consistently. The Prime Minister, during the last federal election, in addressing the issue of Bill C-51, made a commitment to Canadians, because we were listening, that if we were to form government we would bring in parliamentary oversight.

The concept is not new. As has been pointed out, there are other countries. Canada is part of a group of nations called the Five Eyes dealing with security and national security issues. We were the only country that did not have a parliamentary oversight committee. This Prime Minister recognized that, and even though our first priority was to deliver on that middle class tax cut and for those who are aspiring to be a part of Canada's middle class and the many other nice things that came out of the budget, I can say we did not lose sight of the parliamentary oversight committee. We recognized that this too was important to Canadians. We are a party that brought in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and we stand by that on all occasions.

I started by saying that the Conservatives were out of touch with Canadians, and we saw that in terms of not incorporating it into Bill C-51. I was amazed when the critic for the Conservatives said they accepted the results of the last federal election. If the Conservatives really did accept the results of the last federal election, they would be supporting this bill. However, we heard today that the Conservatives will not be supporting the bill. What did they base their arguments on? They said that we could have improved it here, we should have improved it there.

Let me read some of the things that were said at the committee stage, and this is Bill C-22 as it was in the committee room.

Noted academic Professor Wesley Wark credited the “government for seeing the importance of parliamentary scrutiny of security and intelligence and for making [the committee of parliamentarians] a centrepiece of its response to the previous government's anti-terrorism legislation”. He also told the standing committee that the new committee of parliamentarians “represents a necessary and timely experiment in parliamentary democracy and activism”. He is not alone. There are others. I made reference to Ronald Atkey, a former SIRC chair and former parliamentarian. He stated that the proposed review body “represents a major and welcome change” in Canada. He explained that he meant “welcome” in the sense that, in his view, “Canada in the last three decades [has fallen] behind our parliamentary cousins in the United Kingdom and Australia in terms of accountability to Parliament”.

He also noted, in the standing committee, that Bill C-22 will help to reassure Canadians that their elected representatives will play a key overview role in accountability regarding the serious powers granted to some of the 17 federal departments and agencies that contribute to Canadian national security measures.

The good news is that this is a commitment that was given by the Liberals when we were going through that last election, and that commitment is being materialized in a very tangible way.

Members, who are New Democrats, Conservatives, or even the Green Party, are saying that they did not listen to the committee and that the Prime Minister said we would be changing attitudes in the standing committee.

I was here for a good number of those years when Stephen Harper was the prime minister, and I participated in some of those committees. The opposition never gained anything.

If we look at this particular piece of legislation, amendments were brought forward, and even with these amendments that we have brought forward today, that are still in place. Let us take a look at it in terms of some of those things.

We have had a lot of discussion this afternoon about the exemptions. When the legislation was here, before it went to committee, that is during the same time in which we had professional experts saying how good the legislation was, the committee wanted some more exemptions. There were four exemptions that the government wants to keep, and we are doing that through the amendments.

At the committee stage, the exemptions were reduced down to one. We are putting three of them back in. In my books that means it is better legislation, because we actually accepted some of those exemptions that came from the standing committee. That means the government was listening to what the standing committee was saying. That is another promise that has been kept by this Prime Minister. When the committees and standing committees do good work and put in the effort, we recognize that.

What are the things that we are actually putting in? One of the things that we are putting back in that the committee took out, for example, was information described in the Witness Protection Program Act. I am not a security expert. I am not going to try to convince members that I am security expert. However, I do know that the witness protection program is an essential program here in Canada. We need to go all out in terms of protecting those individuals in that program.

I do not believe it is irresponsible of the government to bring that clause back in, because we need to protect the names of those individuals. Those individuals' lives are at risk. I believe that is a positive measure. This legislation is better today than when it was in second reading in part because of some of the work that was done in the standing committee.

The NDP members in particular are saying that we have too many exemptions. Let me talk about something that has come out in the New Zealand act, and maybe New Democrat members could respond to it. New Zealand is part of the Five Eyes. Its act allows the government to inform the committee that those documents or that information cannot be disclosed because, in the opinion of the chief executive or the relevant intelligence and security agents, those documents or that information is sensitive.

I would argue our legislation is far more effective at getting the badly needed information to our committee members. New Zealand is not alone. What about the U.K.? What is their exemption clause? Let us look at it. It says: inform the intelligence and security committee that the information cannot be disclosed because the secretary of state has decided it should not be disclosed.

I would argue that this is Canada's first, and this is somewhat historic. We have a great piece of legislation here. This is good news for Canadians. It is protecting rights and freedoms. We have gone further, in many ways, than other jurisdictions.

As opposed to trying to come up with excuses as to why members might not want to support it, I would suggest that members should get on board, listen to what Canadians are saying, and vote in favour of Bill C-22.

[Ted Falk, Conservative, Provencher, MB]

Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the hon. member for Victoria, my friend, for that question. It was a great honour and privilege to work with him the last year and a half on the public safety committee. I have a great deal of respect for his opinion and his insight into security matters and issues, although we did not always agree. One good example would have been Bill C-51. My NDP friend from Victoria did not agree Bill C-51 was a good balance between security and freedom. Of course, I think Bill C-51 struck a very good balance.

The government has the opportunity today to build on the good work that we did as Conservatives through Bill C-51, which provides assurance to Canadians that we will keep them safe and gives our law and security agencies the right tools to keep them safe. The government had the opportunity to build on that through Bill C-22 and through the committee establishing oversight of our security agencies. Contrary to what the Liberal member said before, the proposed committee is actually disproportionately represented by Liberal members. It is appointed by the Prime Minister. The prime minister would have full oversight of the committee, even through the access to information the committee has by the prime minister having control over the ministers. No, I do not think this is a good balance.

The Liberals keep comparing the bill to what our Five Eyes partner nations have struck, and many of them have experience with this. Instead of gaining from that valuable experience our partners have in establishing their oversight review committees, the Liberals have decided to go it alone and say it is their first opportunity, their first kick at the can, that they will come up with this and review it. That is absolutely not acceptable. When we have methods that are proven with our partner nations, we should be looking at those structures and taking seriously what they have done and what works.

[Kevin Lamoureux, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons]

Mr. Speaker, I am somewhat disappointed. The member across the way was in the House during the great debate on Bill C-51, which went beyond the House of Commons. It was debated in virtually every region of our country. What became very clear was that there was a fundamental need for what Bill C-51, Stephen Harper's bill, did not have, and that was a parliamentary oversight committee. If the Conservative government had been proposing that, there probably would have been a lot more buy-in by Canadians. The Liberals made a commitment to Canadians that if we formed government, we would bring in parliamentary oversight.

I listened to the member's comments. I was of the opinion, when I was in opposition, that it was more a personal thing with the former prime minister. I am somewhat disappointed, because it would seem that it is now, in fact, the position of the Conservative Party. That is what I would like a direct response to. Putting all the explanations to the side, I would ask the member to be very clear on this issue. Does the Conservative Party support a parliamentary oversight committee? Does it fundamentally support it?

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

Mr. Speaker, we promised Canadians that we would establish an all-party national oversight committee. Bill C-22 shows Canadians that important commitment has been kept.

As a reminder to the House, a committee of parliamentarians able to review classified security and intelligence documents has been a long time in coming. A special joint House/Senate committee was struck in mid-2004 to provide recommendations on how such a committee would function in a Canadian context. That report was followed by the tabling of Bill C-81 in 2005. That bill died on the Order Paper during the dissolution of the 38th Parliament.

Over the course of the next decade, two private members' bills were tabled that sought to create a committee of parliamentarians to review national security and intelligence matters, the second of which was defeated by the previous government at second reading shortly before it introduced Bill C-51.

As a member of the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security, I heard witnesses tell us that the formation of an all-party national oversight committee had been anticipated for a long time. Let me read some of their testimony.

Wesley Wark said:

I fully support Bill C-22. I think it represents a necessary and timely experiment in parliamentary democracy and activism. I give full credit to the Liberal government for seeing the importance of parliamentary scrutiny of security and intelligence and for making this a centrepiece of its response to the previous government's anti-terrorism legislation, Bill C-51, and for making it a promise in their election platform.

Suzanne Legault, the Information Commissioner of Canada, said:

First, I wish to commend the government on tabling legislation to create a parliamentary oversight body of our national security agencies. The recommendation to create such an oversight committee dates back many years. The Committee could, with a properly designed legal framework, do much to increase public trust in our national security agencies

The Hon. Ron Atkey said, “I believe this represents a major and welcome change within our Canadian parliamentary system.”

Alex Neve, Secretary General of Amnesty International Canada said that finally after the Arar inquiry and Justice O'Connor recommendations, we had Bill C-22, which was very welcomed.

Special advocate Anil Kapoor said of Bill C-22, “This piece of legislation is crucial to public trust in our security intelligence apparatus.”

One of the most important obligations of a government is the responsibility to protect the safety and security of its citizens both at home and abroad. Equally important, in a country such as Canada, is the obligation to uphold the Constitution and to ensure that all laws respect the rights and freedoms we enjoy as people living in a free and democratic society.

These two obligations do not necessarily have to compete with each other. It does not have to be a question of security or rights and freedoms.

Bill C-22, and the future national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians, will help to ensure that we achieve that balance. The committee will have a mandate to both confirm that our security and intelligence agencies have the resources and powers they need, as well as to ensure that those agencies do not exceed their authorities and respect the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

While supportive of the creation of an all-party national oversight committee, witnesses did share with our committee ways that we could make the legislation better. I am glad that we were able to reflect a number of these suggestions in our amendments.

Also, while the Conservatives were adamantly opposed to the creation of such a committee during their time in government, I am glad to see that during their time in opposition, they are much more supportive of the concept.

In fact, during clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-22 at the standing committee, many amendments received multi-party support. For instance, Liberals amended the bill to broaden the committee's mandate in clause 8. This was further subamended by the NDP and agreed to by all sides. The chair's double vote was removed from clause 19, ensuring that the chair would only cast a deciding vote in the event of a tie.

Clause 21 was also amended so that if something was redacted from one of the committee's reports, the revised version must be clearly identified as a revised version and it must indicate the extent of and the revision.

The NDP proposed a whistleblower clause that would require the committee to inform the appropriate minister of any activity it discovered that may not have been conducted in compliance with the law.

All of these are now a part of Bill C-22.

I will now turn to some of the report stage amendments, which are the focus of the debate before us today. The government has moved a motion to reintroduce some of the automatic exemptions that were originally in clause 14.

The original bill contained seven such exemptions, including: one, confidence of the Queen's Privy Council; two, information respecting ongoing defence intelligence activities supporting military operations; three, information, the disclosure of which is described in section 11(1) of the Witness Protection Program Act; four, the identity of individuals who are human intelligence sources for the government; five, information relating directly to an ongoing investigation carried out by a law enforcement agency; six, information that is considered privileged under the Investment Canada Act; and seven, certain information that was collected by FINTRAC and not reported to another department. This usually occurs when FINTRAC determines that the transaction has no flags.

One of today's report stage amendments put forward proposed to put three of those back into the bill.

Information relating to specific individuals protected under the witness protection program and the identities of confidential sources are not required for the committee to perform its mandate. The mandatory exceptions relating to this information are designed to avoid risks to the safety of individuals that may result from inadvertent disclosure.

The mandatory exception relating to active police investigations is also being reinserted. This exemption is designed to ensure that criminal investigations and prosecutions are not tainted by even the perceived influence of political actors.

This is a very important division of powers that has a very long tradition in Canada. The exemption is time limited to the period when the investigation is active, thus allowing the committee to review the information once the investigation is concluded.

The other three exemptions would not be reinserted by the amendment. This represents a responsible compromise that takes into account the spirit and intent of the standing committee's changes. It would allow the committee to be provided with access to as much information relevant to its mandate as possible, with restrictions applied only where necessary to prevent harm to individuals or police investigations. The amendment should be supported.

A second report stage amendment would see the reintroduction of clause 16, which provides a minister the discretionary authority to prevent the release of information that constitutes special operating information, as defined by the security of information act, when it could be injurious to national security. When a minister declines to provide such information, he must notify the committee as well as the relevant review body and provide reasons for not disclosing the information. The committee of parliamentarians annual report would also inform Parliament of all the times this discretionary power was used.

This is very comparable to how countries, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, operate in terms of providing information to their respective committees of parliamentarians. For instance, Australia's parliamentary joint committee on intelligence and security cannot compel the government to provide operationally sensitive information, including intelligence sources and operational methods of information about particular operations. The government can also withhold anything it deems injurious to national security or foreign relations.

In New Zealand, the prime minister actually sits on the security and intelligence committee, which has existed since 1996. The New Zealand act allows the heads of agencies to determine sensitive information that cannot be disclosed to the committee.

In the United Kingdom, the intelligence and security committee may consider any particular operational matter, but only so far as it and the prime minister are satisfied that the matter is not part of an ongoing intelligence or security operation and is of significant national interest.

In many respects, the future Canadian version of the committee would have far greater access to information than the equivalent committees of our Five Eyes allies from Commonwealth countries.

It is important to note that after five years of working experience, the House of Commons would have the opportunity to review the legislation and amend it at that time if we believed it were then necessary.

It will be a tremendous step forward for Canada, one that will help to ensure that while our security and intelligence agencies are working to protect the safety and security of Canadians, they are fully respecting the rights and freedoms of the Canadians they serve.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, this is the government's first and only response to date to Bill C-51, which it supported.

Ron Atkey was referenced just a moment ago by the member. However, on January 27, he, along with three other experts, wrote the following in The Globe and Mail:

Should the government choose to force a return to the restrictive original bill, it risks potentially undermining a new and historic Parliamentary ability that it has enthusiastically championed. Failure to reach agreement with Parliament on this issue also imperils non-partisan support for future national-security reforms and changes to other elements of the review system for national security.

It is a shame that for something so central as this, we cannot find common ground, that the government wants to revert to a time before the expert evidence was heard and before the committee did its good work to a time when we had an inadequate bill. The experts supported that. The NDP, for what it is worth, supported the bill as amended by committee. Now the government wants to roll it back and say that we should be happy with a half a loaf. This is not even 20% of a loaf, I am afraid.

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, it is my honour to rise today to speak to Bill C-22. I had not thought that we would see government amendments at report stage that undo a lot of the good work that has been done by the committee.

I approach this issue by first saying I support the creation of a national security committee of parliamentarians. I learned a great deal about the intelligence business, the security business, and where Canada stands within our Five Eyes partners, in the efforts to fight Bill C-51 in the last Parliament. I still hope that the review that is being undertaken right now by the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and the Minister of Justice will lead to massive changes in the five different bills, and others, that were amended through that omnibus bill known as Bill C-51, which set up CSIS, for the first time since its creation, as a body that can “disrupt” thoughts, act as having a kinetic function, as the experts call it.

There is nothing right now within our security agencies that ensures that there is any oversight, unlike our other Five Eyes partners, as the hon. government House leader mentioned. We do not have any oversight for a number of the bodies at all. We have no oversight for CSIS. There had been oversight of CSIS up until the moment of omnibus Bill C-38 in the spring of 2012, which eliminated an adviser to the Minister of Public Safety to warn him or her if CSIS was going amok. That position was eliminated, so there is no oversight of CSIS; rather, there is review of CSIS. There is no oversight of the RCMP; rather, there is review of the RCMP. There is neither oversight nor review of the Canada Border Services Agency. For the Communications Security Establishment Canada, which is a very strange body that collects and downloads massive amounts of metadata, there is neither oversight nor review.

We have all of these different intelligence agencies, therefore, it is of critical importance that we do two things. We must rein in and undo the damage and the potential chaos created for security agencies by Bill C-51. I say this parenthetically. I want to get to Bill C-22. However, I need to say that my opposition to what was done in the 41st Parliament in what was known as Bill C-51 was not exclusively with respect to concerns about civil liberties. Those are concerns, but I have heard from security experts in the course of a review of that bill. It is clear to me that, failing to ensure coordination between and among all of these agencies, while giving CSIS the right to be active in kinetic operations, to be able to have CSIS offer people they are surveilling basically a get-out-of-jail-free card, a prospective guarantee that they will never be arrested or put into the judicial system, without any alert to the RCMP that this has happened, the one hand will not know what the other is doing. The creation of the national security committee of parliamentarians will not address that threat, although we will have to address this concern. It has been one that has been well known since the inquiry into the Air India disaster where if there had been coordination enforced between the different security agencies, that disaster, the single largest terrorist act on Canadian soil ever, could have been avoided. That was certainly the opinion of the Air India inquiry.

Coming back to Bill C-22, I support the creation of a committee of parliamentarians. However, I am baffled by the changes that have just taken place. I turn to the leading Canadian experts in this, Kent Roach and Craig Forcese, professors of law, both of whom played a role in the Air India inquiry. They are the authoritative experts to whom I turn. Certainly, Professor Craig Forcese is baffled by the limitation on what parliamentarians will be allowed to know. I mentioned in my question earlier to the government House leader that these restrictions do not apply to the people who serve on the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, to which civilian non-elected people are appointed. For the purpose of pointing out that the appointment process can have gaps with respect to security, let us not forget that former Prime Minister Stephen Harper appointed the now late committed fraudster Arthur Porter as the chair of SIRC. Arthur Porter did not have the restrictions that Bill C-22 would now put on parliamentarians, who are elected, who take an oath, and who have an understanding of their responsibilities.

My amendment to the bill is to delete section 12, which is the section that limits the MPs' access to parliamentary privilege. It is what Craig Forcese has called the triple lock on what MPs and senators are allowed to know.

Parliamentarians sitting on this committee have already sworn allegiance to Canada. They will go through security checks. The way the bill is currently written, it is not as though there is no check on their access to information or risk of their revealing information. The Canada Evidence Act would apply, section 38. Even as these government amendments are rolling forward, Professor Forcese has noted that it would be probably better to rely on court and the Canada Evidence Act than on these very restrictive moves in terms of what parliamentarians can know, an overly generous discretion on the point of what ministers can withhold, as well as getting rid of what was a very good amendment achieved in committee of giving the committee subpoena powers.

I have to say that it is just simply baffling that the government has taken such a restrictive view on what parliamentarians can be allowed to know. I will just note that this is from an article by Professor Forcese titled, “Stronger Bill C-22 Goes Back to the House”. This was before the government amendments came forward. He noted that, “C-22 committee members will be surrendering parliamentary privileges and will be permanently bound by secrecy under the Security of Information Act (and therefore subject to criminal sanction for violating secrecy rules).”

I think the government, with all due respect, has overreacted to very good amendments that were passed by the committee, and this is a larger point as well. We are often told in this place that we should rush legislation through second reading so that it can go to committee where the committee will do the good work. We now have a fair litany of times where the Liberal government, with its majority, has decided to ignore the good work of committees.

The first was, of course, the committee that dealt with medically assisted death. That advice was completely overlooked in the drafting of Bill C-14. We have the committee work, on the committee on which I served, the Special Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reform, and that is a very sad story because we need to get back to that, but very good work was done.

For the first time since 1867, when the British North America Act said Canada will use the voting system from Westminster until such time as its Parliament chooses its own voting system, we had Parliament recommend a voting system and a way forward, and that was rejected. Now this committee's work has been rejected and, I think, hastily.

There is a way forward here. There is an appropriate balance. I do believe that the parliamentary committee struck that balance, and it is really important to remember that what the committee is looking at is already protected in many ways.

The U.K. parliamentary committee has never had a problem with breaching secrecy. One of the experts who testified in Bill C-51, Joe Fogarty from U.K. MI5, testified that there just simply were not problems. Parliamentarians instructed with the duty to maintain confidentiality have done so.

I also point out the precedent that the New Zealand Parliament has a very similar committee, and the New Zealand members of Parliament who serve on that committee do not have to surrender parliamentary privilege. It is explicitly preserved under the New Zealand model.

It leaves one wondering why the government has chosen to undo the good work of committee, further undermining the proper role of legislated deliberation in committee coming back to this place at report stage, doing serious damage to the work that was done by the committee, leaving, I fear, greater uncertainty as to how the committee will function and still wondering why is it that in taking measures to restrict the information that parliamentarians have, the independent expert national security review bodies, SIRC and the CSE commissioner, are not given the same set of handcuffs.

I do not think it makes sense. I urge the government to reconsider and accept my amendment.

Public Safety

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, ever since the Liberal government helped pass Bill C-51, Canadians are concerned about the oversight of our security services. The House public safety committee significantly improved the security oversight bill but now the government wants to muzzle this new watchdog by restricting its access.

Why is the government ignoring all-party agreement and expert evidence, and stripping away the very oversight tools that the Prime Minister and the public safety minister and nine other cabinet ministers voted for in November 2014?

Bill C-23—Time Allocation Motion

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I found it interesting to hear the minister say earlier that not a single question was asked. The reason for that, first of all, was that the bill was introduced just a few days before the summer recess, just before we returned to our ridings, so, of course, we did not really have an opportunity to ask any questions last spring.

When we returned in the fall, we were asking questions about Bill C-51 and we introduced a bill to repeal it. We were dealing with the consultations that the minister launched in order to take attention away from the issue. There is also Bill C-22. The government is trying to tell us that it is no big deal, and that, if we have concerns about Bill C-23, we will work on it in committee and everyone will have a chance to be heard.

I will use the example of Bill C-22. It is ironic to be talking about this on the very day that we arrived in the House to find that all of the amendments that were adopted by the committee and supported by experts have been rejected by the government.

I would therefore like the minister to explain to me why he has a problem with questions from the opposition. Why should we trust the committee process for a bill so vital to Canadians' rights and privacy? The last time, the government decided to backpedal and not listen to the witnesses or the committee members, even though we were dealing with an issue that should have been non-partisan.

Government Accountability

[Cheryl Hardcastle, NDP, Windsor—Tecumseh, ON]

Mr. Speaker, Canadians are tired of the current government's broken promises.

My riding of Windsor—Tecumseh hoped the Prime Minister would deliver on promises for mail delivery, first nations, Bill C-51, and climate change. They were not the only ones. Canada's foremost environmentalist, David Suzuki, said the Prime Minister is “an out-and-out”, but then he uses a word that is unparliamentary but it means “misleading Canadians”.

Will anyone on the Liberal benches stand up and demand that their government start practising what they used to preach?

Public Safety

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, today is the second anniversary of the first vote on Bill C-51. The Liberals and the Conservatives joined forces to pass a bill that violates our rights and freedoms.

History is repeating itself with Bill C-23, which is bad for human rights and Canadians' privacy.

The government has admitted that the current pre-clearance system works well, so why is it so determined to forge ahead with giving American officers more powers on Canadian soil?

Preclearance Act, 2016

[Bardish Chagger, Liberal, Waterloo, ON]

Madam Speaker, part of my role and responsibility as the government House leader is to ensure that we have meaningful debate in this place and that we advance legislation so we can serve in the best interests of Canadians.

In regard to the member's question on Bill C-51, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness has responded to this question many times. We have consulted with Canadians, and we continue to do so. The conversation is always welcome. This government has undertaken unprecedented levels of consultation, because we know the work we are doing is to respond to the very real challenges Canadians are facing.

Today we are discussing Bill C-23. I know the member has concerns. I encourage the member to get this legislation through the House so it can go to committee and we can let the committee do its important work. It can study this legislation and bring in witnesses, and we can ensure that any concerns the member or the party opposite have are resolved.

[Don Davies, NDP, Vancouver Kingsway, BC]

Madam Speaker, the member who is the House leader for the current Liberal government mentioned the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Bill C-23 engages fundamental questions about Canadians' rights and privacy rights, and of course, my party has expressed concerns about this.

During the election and in the House last session, the Liberals stated that they had serious concerns about Bill C-51. I am wondering if she can tell Canadians, in this 150th year, and when invoking the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, when Canadians can expect to see legislation to amend significantly, if not repeal, Bill C-51 to better protect Canadians' rights.

[Tony Clement, Conservative, Parry Sound—Muskoka, ON]

Madam Speaker, it is my honour to rise today to discuss Bill C-23, preclearance act, 2016.

The previous Conservative government supported pre-clearance agreements with the United States and took several steps to enter into agreements to facilitate travel by Canadians. In 2015, Canada and the United States signed the Agreement on Land, Rail, Marine and Air Transport Preclearance, which established a legal framework for new pre-clearance operations for all means of transportation.

In 2012, the government announced the creation of binational port operations committees at eight Canadian airports that provide a U.S. pre-clearance service. The Conservative Party's position is that transborder clearance agreements with the United States are important and help improve security and border integrity, and create jobs and growth in Canada by facilitating the movement of legitimate goods and travellers.

The bill does create a legal mechanism for border security officers in Canada and the United States to provide for the pre-clearance in each country of travellers and goods bound for the other country. Trade and travel between the United States and Canada are key to the economic success of both nations. More than $2 billion travels across the border every single day. We must take all necessary steps to facilitate this trade and travel while ensuring that our border is meaningful and secure.

Specifically, the bill before us today is the implementation legislation for the agreement on land, rail, marine, and air pre-clearance that was negotiated by the Conservative government. The bill is incredibly important for both our security and prosperity. It is important that legitimate travel and trade be able to occur as freely as possible while also leveraging the work done by the Canada Border Services Agency officers and Customs and Border Protection officers.

First, let us talk a little bit about pre-clearance, what it is and how it has been working, because contrary to what some would have us believe, this is not a new concept. As the hon. member just mentioned in the House, pre-clearance operations were implemented in Canada for the first time back in 1952 when the United States pre-clearance officers began screening travellers for United States-bound planes at the Toronto international airport. A formal pre-clearance agreement with the United States did not exist at that time. In fact, Canada and the United States reached their first air transport pre-clearance agreement in 1974.

Pre-clearance is designed, of course, to push the effective border out away from the homeland. What does that mean? It means in this instance that travellers are screened in their country of origin before boarding a flight rather than being screened when their flight lands. This is important, because threats are interdicted before they can enter a new country, and screening times become more uniform.

It may interest members to know that more than 12 million passengers at eight airports went through U.S. pre-clearance in 2016. In pre-clearance operations, border officers from the inspecting country, in other words, the United States or Canada, carry out customs and immigration inspections in the host country before allowing goods or people into the inspecting country.

The objective of pre-clearance is to improve and expedite the flow of legitimate trade and travel while continuing to ensure border security and integrity. If there was no pre-clearance, Canadians would not be able to take advantage of nearly half of the direct flights between Canadian and United States destinations. They instead would need to fly to an intermediary city in the U.S. and go through customs screening. This would increase of the costs of these trips, it would increase the amount of time these trips would take, and it would ultimately make travelling harder.

However, pre-clearance also has a security benefit. Potential threats to the other country can be stopped by law enforcement before they even cross the border. This type of action is important in the context of the broader beyond the border agreement. The United States and Canada have a long tradition of working together to ensure that the border remains open to legitimate trade and travel, and closed to terrorists, criminals, and illegal or unauthorized goods. Work done by the previous government has deepened and institutionalized this co-operation within, at, and away from the shared border. This is great work that was done by the previous government, and we are glad that it has been pushed across the goal line, but obviously there may be some imperfections.

Media have reported on concerns that U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers will be able to detain Canadians on Canadian soil. In my view, this criticism is overblown and is not matched by the legislation. The legislation is clear that CBP officers are not peace officers, and powers of arrest only lie in Canadian hands. However, individuals may be held for questioning at the discretion of the inspecting country officer. This, in turn, makes sense. Pre-clearance is effectively treating the customs checkpoint the same as if an individual approached a land border.

I look forward to hearing concerns from individuals and groups at committee stage about detention powers. If there are issues that need to be addressed, the committee can consider these. We all know that an important part of national security measures is maintaining the confidence of the Canadian people. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness needs to explain to Canadians how the legislation will work. I would be happy to help him in this regard. He has to continue to explain that rights will not be violated, and that security will be protected.

We have heard a lot about national security these days and years. We have heard a lot about the Liberal campaign promise to significantly alter the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, more commonly referred to as Bill C-51. I would put it to this House that it would be a manifestly irresponsible course of action. The CSIS director has confirmed that the new threat disruption tools have been used over two dozen times. Removing these tools, which permits CSIS to do things as simple as talk to the parents of radicalized individuals, is tantamount to tying its hands behind its back.

We have heard the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness make comments about reviewing the passenger protect program as well. In most if not all of these cases raised in the media of individuals not being able to fly, the issue at play has been the American no-fly list. There is little that the minister can do about a policy of a foreign country, other than lobbying for its change.

We have also heard suggestions that the newly created offence for the advocacy or promotion of terrorism in general is too broad and will impede on the right of free speech, yet in the context of our national security review at the public safety committee we have heard from groups such as the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, and B'nai Brith Canada. They have unequivocally stated that these measures provide necessary safety and security to their communities.

I would put to the House that we need to get serious about dealing with Canada's national security. We need to listen to the debate. We need to listen to the security experts. That brings me back to the legislation we are discussing today. Academic review after academic review found that pre-clearance allows border authorities to better utilize resources because screening is done away from the homeland.

A recent paper published by the Pacific NorthWest Economic Region has found:

The Preclearance agreement gives US Customs and Border Protection and Canada Border Services Agency officials the authority to conduct border security and inspections in the other country prior to departure. By taking a perimeter approach to security, each country will address potential threats early and improve efficiency of legitimate travel and trade at the border.

One often-overlooked component of this bill is that it is not only pre-clearance in the air mode, but it is by rail as well. We know that travellers often move between Montreal, Quebec, and Plattsburgh, New York. In the absence of pre-clearance, once the train crosses the border, it must stop and all passengers must clear customs. This process can take up to one hour. It is cumbersome, needless, and can dissuade further travel due to increasing demands on time. Pre-clearance would allow customs inspections to occur before a passenger even boards the train.

This type of security measure leverages the resources brought to bear in both countries. If there is a security risk, an irregular migrant, or otherwise inadmissible person and if they attempt to travel, they can be stopped and dealt with in their country of origin. Border officials from the inspecting country and law enforcement officials from the host country can work together to ensure that the appropriate outcome is determined.

This legislation is focused on passenger travel, which is very important, but there is more that needs to be done. As I said earlier, more than $2 billion travels across the border each and every day. The government must proceed with pre-clearance of cargo, as well.

Under the leadership of the previous Conservative government, a truck cargo pre-clearance pilot project was conducted at the Peace Bridge crossing between Fort Erie, Ontario, and Buffalo, New York. This project has resulted in important lessons learned that can now be implemented to improve the pre-clearance times for cargo. These include eliminating user fee cash collection at the primary inspection, updating technology connectivity, and mandating advanced electronic filing of manifests for all commercial entries.

When this legislation was tabled, the Liberal government did make reference to the fact that the issues around cargo had been referred to a working group on pre-clearance. It has been several months now. I understand the hon. public safety minister also referenced this issue in his remarks today, but we would like to see some results soon.

The recent joint statement following the meeting between the Prime Minister and President Trump did not make any reference to this issue, nor did it make any substantial reference to the efforts to thin the border for legitimate trade and travel while ensuring that terrorists and illegal migrants are stopped in their tracks. This is concerning, but unfortunately, we have to wait, and I hope not wait too long, to see how this relationship will move forward.

We do have a government that has made some provocative statements in the past, whether it is tipping its hands on NAFTA negotiations or eulogies for Fidel Castro, statements that will not gain favour with our largest trading partner, and this of course is not an effective way to get results for Canadians.

However, I see the bill here today and I see that we can make progress on these issues. Let me take the opportunity to summarize.

Bill C-23 is basically good legislation. I am proud to support it going to the public safety committee for further study. The reasons for this are very simple.

First, the legislation would allow air, rail, and marine travellers to proceed to their destination on the other side of the border more quickly. That means smoother travel, and smoother travel is more desirable travel, and more desirable travel means an increase in tourism dollars spent in Canada.

Second, this legislation would allow Canada and the United States to leverage our shared security resources. CBP and CBSA officers would work together, along with their law enforcement partners in the FBI, RCMP, and local police forces, to ensure that terrorists, criminals, and illegal migrants are stopped at the earliest opportunity. Pushing the border out is a common-sense principle that we need to continue to advance.

Third, this legislation is the result of hard work and negotiation by the previous Conservative government. Former prime minister Stephen Harper and former president Barack Obama had a great strategy for our shared border, and this is another piece that would make our shared border work better.

We absolutely must ask the Minister of Public Safety and his officials important questions about the balancing of liberty, security, and trade. We absolutely must hear from important stakeholders, such as civil liberties groups, the Customs and Immigration Union, the National Airlines Council of Canada, important groups that deal with the issues raised in this legislation each and every day. However, on its face, Conservatives can support measures to streamline our border and to make it simpler to travel to and from the United States.

Rouge National Urban Park Act

[David Christopherson, NDP, Hamilton Centre, ON]

Madam Speaker, I appreciate that latitude. I also appreciate that latitude can only go so far and that my remarks need to be germane to Bill C-18. I thank my friend across the way for his interjection because, at least superficially, it suggests he is listening and that is always nice. I appreciate that because it is not always easy to listen to my speeches, I grant him that. Stay tuned, and please, I urge the member to jump in again if he feels the need, if he is so moved by my remarks and by the arguments and things that I am presenting, if he is so wound up in that he has to leap to his feet and participate. I urge him to please continue to do that.

With regard to the issue that the member raises about why I am going on talking about electoral reform when we are actually here about Bill C-18, an act to amend the Rouge National Urban Park Act, the Parks Canada Agency Act and the Canada National Parks Act, this is about my feelings about Bill C-18. I am expressing for my friend that the biggest feeling is disappointment because it is not Bill C-18 that I really would like to debate. Parks are wonderful. We all love parks. I love parks, but I would rather talk about the broken promises. That is why I was saying it is germane to Bill C-18 because my emotions, how I feel about this, are directly related to the fact that it is Bill C-18 and it is not what I had hoped I would be able to debate here today.

That is not the only thing. I was further disappointed when Mr. Salloum handed me the bill and I looked at it, and I said, “It is not about door-to-door mail delivery either”, which is something else I feel passionately about and my constituents do, especially when it looks like we may be heading for another betrayal there. The government is starting to split hairs. It has studies and consultations, all the Liberals' usual delay tactics that are meant to look like anything except like a delay but that is what is going on. I worry, and I know that my colleagues worry, that the government is eventually getting to the point where it is going to do to its promise to return door-to-door mail delivery exactly what it did to its promise on electoral reform.

It matters to Bill C-18, and it is germane to this, because the debate on this park is important. There is no question that this park is important and all parks are important. That is why I found myself so conflicted as I was coming into the House.

I have a number of significant parks in my riding. We have Gore Park right downtown, which is kind of small but it is the centre of our city. It is uniquely shaped and the history of it is quite fascinating. Then there is Gage Park, which is another major urban park in my riding that I am very proud of. I can remember as a kid going there, riding on my bike and playing hide-and-seek with my friends in Gage Park. My question would be this as I am dealing with Bill C-18 and thinking about Gage Park: How do I go about making my park a national park? That would be a great idea.

I see my friend again who is just paying such wonderful attention, and I do appreciate that so much, and he is making mannerisms. Maybe he has an answer for that, about how we can go about it. Maybe there is an application form I missed somewhere along the line that we could get to fill out if someone would like a municipal urban park to become a national park. I want to check off the box that says yes. We will take that if we can.

If it is a little too small for that designation, although it is not in my riding, we have Confederation Park, which is much larger. Then of course we have Bayfront Park, which is as one might think, near the bay, near the harbour. We have a lot of parks but none of them are national yet. Again, that is why this is important. My understanding is this is the first national urban park and that is a great thing.

I heard the minister commenting earlier. I stand to be corrected, but I believe the minister said that it is the first national park that people can get to by public transportation, and that is a positive thing. That is a good thing that should happen. Therefore, we can appreciate those mixed emotions I had when I was coming in because what was really motivating me was to talk about why the Liberals have broken their promises on Bill C-51. It is good that we are doing Bill C-18 on the park. That is a great thing, but what is of much urgency right now to people and a top-of-mind issue is what seems again to be more broken promises around Bill C-51. For all the Liberals' talk during the campaign about how important it was and how they were going to act on it because it is about the security of Canadians and their privacy and their rights, and they were going to get right on it, here we are well over time and still nothing. On Bill C-18—

[Daniel Therrien]

Yes. There is no absolute certainty in these matters, but I will give you my sense of what the considerations are.

The bottom line is that I think the committee should give serious consideration to reviewing any gaps or differences that may exist between Canadian privacy law and European law, because ultimately, under the European regulation, Canada's laws will be assessed—at the latest in 2022, four years after the coming into force of the GDPR—as to whether our laws are adequate, i.e., essentially equivalent to European laws.

Now, I say that there is no certainty in this matter because this standard of “essential equivalency” has not been defined very precisely by Europe. We know that equivalency does not mean “sameness”, so Canada's laws will not be expected to be a carbon copy of European laws, but still the standard appears to be quite high. It's one of essential equivalency. There may be some differences, but ultimately the laws should be essentially similar.

There are two areas in which potential differences between Canadian law and European law will have to be looked at. The first area is any differences between PIPEDA and the European regulation, the GDPR. The GDPR adds a few new rights to European law, one being the right to data erasure, which is the child, so to speak, of the “right to be forgotten”. That's one right that does not exist, per se, in Canadian law but exists in European law, and we should give consideration to whether we should bring our law closer to European law, if not to the same place. There is a right to data portability in European law that I urge you to look at.

For Canadian law, as it pertains to private organizations, this is a bit of the landscape. An important development in Europe over the past few years has been a decision of the European Court of Justice, essentially the supreme court of the European Union, which held, in a case called Schrems, that adequacy decisions in Europe should relate not only to privacy laws in other countries that relate to private organizations but also to public sector laws, including laws that govern law enforcement and national security.

What the European Court of Justice said in that case was that U.S. laws, under the previous safe harbour agreement, were not essentially equivalent to European laws for a number of reasons, including the fact that they did not contain criteria of reasonableness and proportionality. I would urge you to have a look at our laws governing the public sector as well for equivalency.

One of the reasons why, in the context of Bill C-51, I recommended that the relevance standard be elevated to proportionality and necessity was the fact that in a few years our laws will be assessed against European laws, and European authorities will give consideration to necessity and proportionality as important factors.

Public Safety

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, yesterday the government released the data about its national security consultation. It comes as no surprise that most Canadians are still waiting for the government to deliver the Bill C-51 reform it promised during the last election campaign.

Canadians have reason to be concerned about their privacy and Bill C-51's evisceration of their rights.

Now that the consultations are over and the government no longer has an excuse to delay, will it do what it should have done 15 months ago and repeal Bill C-51?

[Ian Carter]

Yes, I can speak to that issue.

We have recommendations on that issue both in our original submissions on Bill C-51 and in the green paper. You'll notice, if you read them, that there's a slight change in tone. We've appeared before on this issue at the Senate, for instance, and the big concern that came out in particular was whether the threat disruption powers essentially were authorizing charter breaches, and is that how you read these provisions? There was debate about it, and certainly academics and the CBA felt that's how it could be read.

In response to that, we've repeatedly heard, “That's not our intention, and it's not what we intended to do.” When you look at our latest submission, I think you'll see that what we're suggesting is that if that's the case, make the language clearer. Part of the problem—and one that you've identified—is the positives versus the negatives. The way it's set out now, it's essentially saying they can't breach charter rights unless they go and get a warrant, but that's not the way the charter works.

For instance, warrants are typical for searching for items. It has to do with section 8 of the charter on protection against unreasonable search and seizure. The courts, when they issue a warrant, aren't issuing a charter breach. They issue the warrant so that there is no charter breach.

That's the problem with how it's drafted. I think the intent may very well be the same, in which case the CBA has no issue with it, but you should draft it so it's clear that you're not authorizing a charter breach. You're authorizing very specific activities to avoid a charter breach. That may be the intention. If you word it that way, those concerns are going to disappear.

On that note, this is another issue in regard to that. Making clear what you're issuing is also very helpful because academics, including Professor Forcese and others, are concerned right now that you're going to authorize, for instance, arbitrary detention. Again, we've been repeatedly told that's not the intention. Well, if it's not the intention, make it clear. Then the issue disappears.

Again, following up on that suggestion, the more that you make it clear what they need to go and get authorization for, the more it fits in with how the charter works within our legal system.

[Tony Clement, Conservative, Parry Sound—Muskoka, ON]

Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate it.

Maybe I'll start with the Canadian Bar Association. I want to delve a bit more deeply into the issue of information sharing that was part of Bill C-51 and is now part of our law. I just want to drill down into the CBA position on this. Are you not in favour of information sharing? If there is a specific threat and a piece of information is held by one agency, shouldn't we share that? How far would you go?

[Ihsaan Gardee, Executive Director, National Council of Canadian Muslims]

Thank you very much for the invitation to appear today. Like my colleague here, I will start with a brief overview of the NCCM and what we do.

The National Council of Canadian Muslims is Canada's only full-time, professional, independent, non-partisan, and non-profit grassroots Canadian Muslim advocacy organization. Its mandate is to protect human rights and civil liberties, challenge discrimination and Islamophobia, build mutual understanding between Canadians, and promote the public interests of Canadian Muslim communities. We strive to achieve this through our work in community education and outreach, media engagement, anti-discrimination action, public advocacy, and coalition building.

For over 16 years the NCCM has participated in major public inquiries, appeared before the Supreme Court of Canada on issues of national importance, and provided advice to security agencies on engaging communities and promoting safety.

Why does this debate matter? National security is important to all of us. Canadian Muslims are committed to national security because terrorism is harmful to everyone. In fact globally the overwhelming majority of victims of extremist violence have been Muslims. We support national security efforts to make our communities safer.

Canadian Muslims also expect their basic freedoms to be respected, a constitutional right. Our concern is that sometimes those freedoms are sacrificed at the expense of national security, and because of negative stereotypes, assumptions and overbroad powers, Muslim communities feel disproportionately affected, as if their rights and freedoms were lesser than those of other Canadians.

National security should not come at the expense of charter rights and freedoms; rather, they share a symbiotic relationship: the loss of one signals the loss of the other. We must acknowledge that some marginalized communities are stigmatized by overbroad laws and the rhetoric of fear and hate, making them feel less rather than more secure.

National security policy is particularly important for Muslim communities because of the current political climate. In recent years and months there has been a surge of hate crimes against Canadian Muslims and a growing climate of Islamophobia. Every time Islam or Muslims are associated with violence or threats to Canadian society, or the political discourse disparages or vilifies Muslims, the social impact of these negative associations is felt.

A devastating example of this is the hateful attack at the Islamic Cultural Centre of Quebec City that claimed the lives of six Canadian Muslims. Promoting security for all Canadians must include protecting Canadian Muslims and other targeted minorities against discrimination and hate crimes by some elements within society.

Canadian Muslims pay a higher cost for national security. Based on what is known in the last 15 years, it appears that the Canadian security establishment does not afford Canadian Muslims the same charter respect and protection as other Canadians. Through direct and indirect actions, Canadian security agencies have in many respects lost the trust and confidence of Canadian Muslim communities.

The disturbing and well-known cases of Canadians, such as Maher Arar, Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad El Maati, Muayyed Nureddin, Abousfian Abdelrazik, and Benamar Benatta, speak to the disproportionate cost and the extant pitfalls associated with administering a national security regime prone to error and abuse. The lack of effective oversight over security agencies failed to prevent or remedy the pain and suffering that these men and their families suffered unjustly.

Little has been done to address revelations about errors, lies, unreliability, and sloppiness in information gathering and information sharing within the security establishment. The principal recommendations of the Arar commission inquiry and others have been unheeded and are not adequately reflected in the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015, or addressed in the government's green paper.

The Arar commission concluded that the “potential for infringement on the human rights of innocent [Muslim and Arab] Canadians” is higher in national security enforcement because of the stricter scrutiny to which the members of these groups are subjected; thus, any deficiencies in the act or its enforcement will disproportionately affect Canadian Muslims.

It is our submission that Bill C-51, as it was known, will marginalize Muslim communities. In March 2015 the NCCM testified before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security on Bill C-51—the Anti-terrorism Act, as it is known. NCCM has taken a principled opposition to the act from the beginning. We echo the view of the overwhelming majority of experts in the field that the act represents a greater danger to Canadians than is justified in the name of fighting terrorism. We agree with other witnesses that more power to security agencies does not necessarily mean more security for Canadians.

Further, the government's green paper does little to assure Canadian Muslims that our participation in any national security strategy will result in our members and communities being made more secure.

The green paper calls for the strengthening of the security establishment without providing any evidence or reasons to show why this is either necessary or wise. Canadian Muslims are looking for assurances that the government will keep the powers of the security establishment in check through proper review and oversight mechanisms, as well as rigorously applying charter standards. The risks of abuse are too great and the record of past abuse too extensive. Canadian Muslims must be treated as citizens, not as suspects.

National security errors not only put innocent people at risk of suspicion and stigma, they also divert resources from focusing on actual threats or engaging in other activities to promote safety and security within Canadian society.

The NCCM believes the Anti-terrorism Act 2015 is unnecessary to ensure the safety and security of Canadians, while the threat it poses to civil liberties and the equality rights of Canadian Muslims is disproportionate to any purported benefit. Therefore, we are in favour of its repeal. In the alternative, the NCCM has specific recommendations on amendments to the act.

I'll address some of the ways in which Bill C-51 undermines Canadian Muslims' basic rights and freedoms, starting with the no-fly regime.

The NCCM continues to oppose the no-fly regime implemented by Bill C-51 and the Secure Air Travel Act. No-fly lists have a devastating impact on those who are wrongly named, and yet this legislation does nothing to ensure the freedom to fly for wrongly designated Canadians. At NCCM we regularly hear from Canadians who are wrongly designated on no-fly lists without any possibility of meaningful appeal. It is impossible to know if you are on the no-fly list, and there is little to no redress to appeal your name's inclusion on the list. Although the government has established the Passenger Protect Inquiries Office, this is not an appeal mechanism. The application for recourse remains murky and unclear. As such, the NCCM supports the proposal requiring the government to fully review all appeals by Canadians on the no-fly list.

The NCCM maintains that no-fly lists have also not been demonstrated to achieve a greater benefit for security than harm to personal liberty and, as such, should be re-evaluated. The use of no-fly lists should be reduced only to cases where there are very strong grounds to know that an individual poses a danger. Any alternative results in racial profiling and the imposition of discriminatory limits on constitutional mobility rights that are not justifiable. If the no-fly list is to be maintained, at minimum a listed person should have a meaningful opportunity to appeal and contest their designation.

Regarding information sharing, the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act authorizes government agencies and institutions to disclose information to other government institutions that have jurisdictional responsibilities with respect to “activities that undermine the security of Canada”. This is broad and difficult to define and could result in constitutional violations against innocent Canadians, including innocent Canadian Muslims. We believe that the information sharing act should be repealed. The information sharing must be based on policies that respect personal information and human rights. We cannot normalize extraordinary powers without evidence of effective security enhancement and mitigation of harm to civil liberties. The NCCM urges the government to implement the recommendations made in the Arar commission report with respect to information sharing by the RCMP, which could also be adapted by other government departments.

With regard to strengthening review and oversight of CSIS, the NCCM is particularly concerned with the broad-reaching powers given to CSIS through vague language, for example, to take actions that are “reasonable and proportional”. While the act purports to enhance national security by strengthening the powers of national security agencies, it does so with minimal oversight and at a high cost to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This is of particular concern to Canadian Muslims, who are more likely than others to find themselves targeted by national security investigations. It is also problematic that CSIS gets to decide if it needs to apply for a warrant. Such overbroad powers are not demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. We need meaningful accountability.

The NCCM welcomes the proposal for SIRC to review all, as opposed to some, of the operations performed by CSIS. To better coordinate national security agencies, the NCCM would also recommend that the government form a unified whole-of-government committee, or super SIRC, similar to the Five Eyes intelligence partners. A super SIRC could be mandated to review all national security activities in government, including information sharing.

Regarding mandatory legislative review, the act creates extraordinary powers that should be viewed, at best, as a necessary evil in a liberal democracy. The revelations from the Arar commission demonstrate the terrible impact of errors in the use of extraordinary powers. The risks are known; what is needed is robust oversight and review. The NCCM supports the government's proposal for a full statutory review of the act every three years, as well as instituting a sunset clause on certain provisions.

Regarding repeal of overbroad speech and thought crimes, the new crimes associated with terrorist propaganda are imprecise and overbroad. They create too much enforcement discretion, which puts perfectly lawful and non-violent conduct within the purview of the Criminal Code. This risks criminalizing dissent by chilling or punishing legitimate political and other speech, which attract high levels of charter protection. It is unclear why new crimes are necessary, given existing provisions regarding terrorism in the Criminal Code.

The NCCM also urges the government to repeal the over-broad crimes, including, “activities that undermine the security of Canada” in the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, as well as the new offence in the Criminal Code, section 83.221. The language of this offence, as well as the definitions in the act, does not create new tools for enforcement. Rather, they create new risks for chilling legitimate speech and political activism. These provisions directly undermine the democratic goals that justify counterterrorism law and policy in the first place.

In conclusion, in the current climate, merely strengthening law enforcement powers is unlikely to yield effective community engagement. Genuine engagement with Canadian Muslims as partners in national security is a necessary prerequisite to any other aspect of counterterrorism or counter-radicalization activity.

To that end, the NCCM supports the green paper's acknowledgement of the utility of community outreach and counter-radicalization efforts, including the creation of an office of community outreach and a counter-radicalization coordinator.. By far the most effective and least costly approach to combatting radicalization to criminal violence is delivered at the grassroots level within communities.

We respectfully urge this committee to seriously reconsider policies that may in fact be counterproductive to and undermine the efforts of those working on the front lines to address this phenomenon of radicalization to criminal violence.

The NCCM is willing to partake in public consultations and work with the federal government at the grassroots partnership level to develop and implement a national coordinated strategy for community-based initiatives.

Subject to your questions, those are my submissions.

Thank you.

[Peter Edelmann, Executive Member, Immigration Law Section, Canadian Bar Association]

Thank you.

Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today.

The discussion focuses on many appropriate aspects of national security, including a number that have been raised in the government's Green Paper.

Three aspects are of specific concern to us.

The first, the most basic of the three, is the effective examination of Canada's national security and intelligence agencies. Like the Arar and Air India inquiries, the CBA agrees with the need to create specialized review bodies and to provide them with the resources and the mandate they need to examine all activities in the realm of national security.

As the CBA has set out in various submissions over the years, including our recent submission on the green paper and on Bill C-22, rigorous, independent oversight plays a crucial role in maintaining confidence in the national security apparatus.

I will emphasize three aspects of review that are of particular importance. First, each national security agency must have rigorous, independent review of its core activities. Some agencies like CSIS and the RCMP have these review mechanisms in place. Although there are criticisms of the functioning of these mechanisms in certain circumstances, at least the means for review exist. Other agencies, in particular the Canada Border Services Agency, have no review mechanism whatsoever outside of the agency and the minister in charge. This must be remedied and addressed.

Second, there must be effective review of the national security apparatus as a whole. This is all the more crucial as we see greater levels of information sharing and co-operation between the agencies. The reviewing agencies, if there are any at all, are siloed and not able to follow their investigations all the way through to where the information or the investigation is heading.

Of this aspect, there are two parts. One has to do with the proposal for a national security committee of parliamentarians. We expressed our support for this and made some suggestions for changes in the way this has been set out. We discussed these with you before in respect of Bill C-22. That's one aspect of it.

The second aspect would be the creation of what's being colloquially referred to a “super SIRC”, or an organization more independent of Parliament. Such an organization would be able to develop not only the required resources but also the institutional memory and the ability to engage in investigations beyond the scope and ability of parliamentarians, who have a lot of other responsibilities. Both of these mechanisms are important, particularly as investigations become more integrated within the national security apparatus.

The next issue raised in the green paper that I would like to address is information sharing. We raised a number of concerns during the hearings and review of Bill C-51 with respect to the information-sharing regime. This was significantly expanded by the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act.

As we pointed out at the time of the passage of Bill C-51, this expansion raised a number of concerns. First, there were concerns around the scope—in particular, the definition given of “national security” within the act. It is different from the definition in the CSIS Act and from the way things are framed in Bill C-22.

We are concerned about having different definitions of national security for different purposes. This needs to be remedied. It would be beneficial to have one definition for oversight, information sharing, and activities of national security agencies. The oversight and review ought to be of the same expanse as the activities and information sharing themselves. Currently that is not the case.

The second issue is information sharing with foreign entities and the ability to review these activities. This issue is becoming of particular concern in light of recent developments on the global stage with respect to the partners with whom we share information. It was at the core of the concerns raised in the Arar commission and with regard to what happened to Mr. Arar. This is an ongoing issue in terms of what kind of information sharing happens, who the information is shared with, and it's a growing concern with respect to expanding information sharing within Canadian agencies.

This has a domino effect in the sense that if you have further, and broader unrestricted and unreviewed information sharing within Canadian agencies, and those agencies are then co-operating in an unreviewable or unreviewed way with foreign agencies, the problems that faced Mr. Arar are likely to arise again in the future. This needs to be addressed in the information-sharing regime that we have.

Finally, the green paper raises once again the issue of lawful access, which was discussed in great detail under the previous government. At that time, it was framed by the previous government in the context of child pornography. I believe it was Minister Toews at the time who made comments in Parliament to the effect that you're either with us or with the child pornographers in regard to how the debate ought to happen with respect to lawful access. That's been reframed in the green paper in terms of terrorism. These are not helpful ways to engage in what are complex public policy discussions in balancing liberties against the interests of national security, or other interests of the community.

These are important issues that need to be addressed coherently and consistently across the board, and ought to be addressed in a way that's consistent, whether it's within the national security framework or outside of it.

We are happy to engage further in those discussions. I see that my time is up. I'm happy to address any questions. Thank you very much.

[Ian Carter, Treasurer, Criminal Justice Section, Canadian Bar Association]

Thank you very much, and thank you for the invitation to come as witnesses today.

I'll begin with a very quick blurb about the Canadian Bar Association. We're a national association of over 36,000 members, including lawyers, law students, notaries, and academics, with a mandate that includes seeking improvements in the law and the administration of justice. Our work on national security and anti-terrorism issues has been a joint effort involving several CBA groups, and in particular the immigration law, criminal law, charities and not-for-profit law, and privacy law sections.

I'll pause to note that with respect to the criminal justice section, of which I'm a member, we're made up of equal parts, crown prosecutors and defence lawyers.

With me today is Peter Edelmann from Vancouver. He's an executive member of the immigration law section and a lawyer specializing in immigration law. I'm the vice-chair of the criminal justice section. I practice as criminal defence counsel here in Ottawa.

We're going to focus our comments with respect to those two areas in particular because they are our areas of expertise. I'm going to outline in broad strokes the CBA's position, and Peter will deal with the specific areas that we'll cover, and then we'll take questions afterwards if you have any.

We've included our response on the green paper, and we've made previous submissions on Bill C-51. The primary focus of our section in looking at this issue is to strike a balance between protecting the security and safety of Canadians, while at the same time stressing individual liberties and rights. That's our overarching concern, and when we look at the proposed legislation and potential changes, we look at it with a view to that particular issue, i.e., maintaining protection but at the same time looking for areas where perhaps the protection has gone too far and liberty interests may be infringed.

As a general comment about the green paper—and we made this comment in our submission as well—we found that the general approach was very laudable in the sense that it was looking at and asking the right kinds of questions. The one overall comment we would make with respect to the illustrations that were used is that they did tend to be a bit one-sided.

You had a scenario where all of the situations, or the potential scenarios that were described, tended to tilt toward an answer that would involve more protection and less liberty. In other words, there weren't scenarios put forward where there was a potential infringement on liberties, with the public being asked to comment on that. Rather you had a neat scenario: a potential terrorist threat, and what the proper response to that should be in terms of protections.

That said, there was a lot that we liked in the green paper, and we have a few suggestions. With those general comments in mind, I'll turn it over to Peter who will talk about some specific areas we'd like to address.

[Alex Neve]

I think it's very timely to be pointing to concerns about what the rapidly changing, and we would say deteriorating, human rights situation in the United States means potentially for our intelligence relationships.

One is the concerns around torture, obviously. I think it's going to be incumbent upon the Canadian government, and all of our agencies, to pay very careful attention to what is or is not the emerging U.S. policy with respect to the use of certain forms of torture by intelligence agencies, such as waterboarding, and what safeguards we're going to need to absolutely ensure we are not in any way complicit with that in our relationship with the United States,.

More widely, there's a lot of uncertainty right now, but I think there are a lot of reasons to be concerned. What we're highlighting is that the government needs to keep a very watchful eye on what is happening in the United States. Our own approach to information sharing was, of course, broadened expansively in ways that we've never seen before through Bill C-51, in terms of the breadth and nature of information that gets shared right across government. I think that highlights once again why it's so important that we ensure we have proper safeguards in place to ensure relevancy and accuracy and that inflammatory information isn't being shared, because with all of those risks we want to make sure that none of that information would then subsequently find its way into the hands of U.S. agencies.

[Alex Neve]

Absolutely. Our concerns are about the fairness, openness, and transparency of the appeal process.

We welcome the fact that in Bill C-51 the whole system has finally been legislated and that there are now clearer standards and there is an established appeal process and people know what they can access.

However, at the time that Bill C-51 was being debated, we and many others highlighted that while it was good to see an appeal procedure in the legislation, we were concerned that it fell short. We recognize that there are some balances and trade-offs, but it fell far short of what would truly give an individual a meaningful opportunity to defend themselves.

Yes, it's not a criminal trial, and perhaps the full-fledged set of due process guarantees that must be protected in a criminal trial aren't in play, but nonetheless I think everyone recognizes that what's at stake is very serious. It's just about being able to go on vacations. It's about families being able to visit each other. It's essential to livelihoods. Also, I think we heard this from earlier witnesses regarding how the refusal of flight can itself be very degrading and dehumanizing.

That's why it's so important that the appeal procedure be reformed to provide greater access to information that is being used against people and provide more of an opportunity to respond to those allegations.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to all of you for being here today.

Ms. Bullock, in your opening remarks, you spent quite a bit of time on Bill C-51, and I presume you realize that today is about the national security framework discussion. I just wanted to point that out.

Ms. Chowdhury, my time is limited, so I have a lot of yes-and-no questions. Can I ask you and your group whether you believe in sharia law?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you.

I want to focus as well on the question of “will” versus “may” in the language of Bill C-51.

When we visited the counter-radicalization centre in Montreal, one of the people who work there brought up a point about how using “will” versus “may” and the way that's defined can actually be problematic, in the sense that if you have a youth who's a member of any community and who is seen as someone who is becoming radicalized, when the community is trying to reach out and counter that radicalization—and this point was also made by our friends from B'nai Brith—the community wants to look after its own, if I can express it that way.

The point he was making was that when you use “may”, you're losing that person, because they have to report it to the RCMP, and it sort of leads that young person down a different path.

Do you feel that is a tangible consequence, and do you have any further comments on that?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

To the representatives of ISNA, if I'm not mistaken, not only was Bill C-51 brought up, but also Bill C-21 and Bill C-23.

I'm wondering if you could perhaps expand on that, because we are continuing this push towards a more integrated border with our American neighbours. I'm wondering what concerns you have with those pieces of legislation and with the whole plan in general.

[Tony Clement, Conservative, Parry Sound—Muskoka, ON]

We've had Bill C-51 in place for over a year and a half now. Is there anything that has happened that in your view derogates from that point of view of the balance that has been struck?

[Tony Clement, Conservative, Parry Sound—Muskoka, ON]

Thank you to both groups for being here.

I wanted to start with Mr. Mostyn. I have a quote from previous testimony by your group, B'nai Brith, before the hearings pertaining to Bill C-51 in the previous Parliament, where Marvin Kurtz of your organization said:

Canadian law in the form of a series of Supreme Court of Canada decisions has frequently confirmed the propriety of legal limitations on hate speech, recognizing the tie between hate speech and hate crimes. We say that the tie between speech and action or crime is even greater in the case of the promotion of terror, which is why we support the provisions of Bill C-51....

Do you still agree with that assessment and agree that Bill C-51 is an effective way to assist in this issue?

[Katherine Bullock]

To sum up, as representatives of a Canadian Muslim association we have talked about the impact of Bill C-51. The narrative about it is harming the Muslim community, first by leading to an increase in Islamophobia and then by having a negative impact on freedom of speech.

No religion condones the killing of innocent civilians. Canadian Muslims are committed to Canada's national security. We just do not want it to be at our expense.

Thank you for listening.

[Katherine Bullock, Representative, Islamic Society of North America]

Hello. I'm Katherine Bullock. When I start my lectures at my university, I usually explain why my name is Katherine Bullock and I'm dressed like this. I converted to Islam in 1994 and I started wearing the head scarf in the same year. I decided not to change my name when I converted.

What I teach as a professor is that one of the key problems of Bill C-51—indeed, of the Canadian counterterrorism approach in general—has been the move from what's called criminal space to prevention space. This is the move from “will” commit an offence to “may” committee an offence. In the move from “will” to “may”, we enter the realm of interpretation.

In an environment of increasing Islamophobia, the “may” space becomes a space of problematizing and criminalizing Muslim faith communities for their everyday practices. Growing a beard or putting on a head scarf becomes a potential security threat rather than a spiritual expression. We have indeed seen this through the recent travel limitations to the United States that were imposed on visibly Muslim individuals simply for who they are.

As a professor in the university system, I am deeply committed to the importance of freedom of expression, freedom of thought, and freedom of conscience. I am especially worried about how Bill C-51 can lead to the curtailment of these core liberal values.

A recent round table with Muslim youth found that while most of them saw political and civic engagement as a key, core aspect of Canadian identity, most of them also felt that there was not enough of it in their community. One reason they gave was the fear amongst the youth of being attacked for voicing their opinions on controversial topics.

A similar finding is in the data collected by the last Environics survey of Canadian Muslim opinion, conducted in 2016, which found that “One in six (17%) says he or she has felt inhibited about doing so because of [race], ethnicity or religion. This impact is...to be expressed [most] by Canadian-born Muslims (32%), those under 35 years of age (24%), and those who have experienced difficulties crossing borders (27%).”

This finding is troubling for three reasons at least. The first, of course, is the signal that a segment of a democratic society feels less than equal to their fellow citizens in expressing their points of view, without which a democracy cannot properly function. The second problem is that the feelings of inhibition, of not feeling free to speak out, are higher amongst Canadian-born and the youth, who are the future of our community, the very segment of the Muslim community who should feel most embraced for their Canadianness. Finally, those who feel inhibited in expressing their political or social opinions also express a weakening sense of belonging to Canada, 13%. I'm sure we don't have to tell you that the best defence Canada has is a population that feels a strong sense of belonging to Canada.

Candice Malcolm, a journalist for TheRebel, in her praise for Bill C-51, argued that “while our rights and freedoms [are sacred and] should never be needlessly sacrificed, freedom means nothing if we are not safe.” In fact, this is not true. Over the centuries, people have sacrificed their lives to bring freedom to their country. Safety without freedom is Pinochet's Chile, Stalin's USSR, Mao's China, Castro's Cuba.

We do not want to turn Canadian Muslims into the canary in the mine, making them into scapegoats, political prisoners, or prisoners of conscience. The terrain for what constitutes support for terrorism currently represents a slippery slope whereby core Muslim traditions and concepts—noble concepts, like sharia, hijab, and even the much-maligned jihad, which is a concept that means “to struggle for justice”, wrongly slandered as “holy war”—are refracted through an Islamophobic lens into prohibited speech in a liberal democracy.

The youths, the converts, the uninformed among the Muslims as well as the wider community need to be able to hold seminars and lectures and round tables and private conversations about these religious verses and traditions and concepts, the very ones the Muslim extremists call upon when trying to justify their turn to violence: what remains of jihad, what are the proper rules of engagement in war, what about participating in secular democracies, what is extremism from an Islamic point of view, what is the sharia, and what is the caliphate?

Bill C-51, Bill C-23, the preceding Anti-terrorism Act and the narrative swirling around it in the mainstream, especially in the right-wing media, do not give us this space to investigate these questions. A thought that cannot be debated in the open, in the cleansing light of day, will go underground and grow up twisted in the swamps of darkness.

[Safiah Chowdhury, Representative, Islamic Society of North America]

Thank you for your invitation to address the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. Muslims have felt under siege since 9/11 and generally excluded from public discourse about us, so we appreciate the opportunity to be part of the process re-examining Canada's national security framework.

The Islamic Society of North America of Canada, or ISNA Canada, was incorporated in 1982 and is an outgrowth of the Muslim Students Association of the United States and Canada, founded in the early 1960s. We have around 1,000 members across the country, from Vancouver to Prince Edward Island.

My name is Safiah Chowdhury. I hold an M.Phil. in Islamic studies and history from the University of Oxford and I am a member of ISNA Canada's executive committee.

With me is Dr. Katherine Bullock. She holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Toronto and teaches Islamic politics at the Mississauga campus of the University of Toronto. She was elected to the ISNA Canada board in 2015.

ISNA Canada is a grassroots community organization that serves the spiritual, psychological, educational, and social needs of the Muslim community. It operates mosques and Islamic schools; assists the poor through disbursement of charitable donations; operates food banks; provides pastoral care to congregants; organizes religious festivals, conferences and lectures, matrimonial services, and family events; and conducts funerals.

ISNA Canada promotes living in peace and with good relations with neighbours. It is part of the Canadian interfaith community. It is thus grounded in the everyday experiences of Muslims in Canada. Our imams, our religious leaders, face an overwhelmingly constant stream of people turning to them for assistance on all matters to do with life, often in crisis situations.

As Canadians working very closely with communities and families, we understand and share the need to protect against violence. We recognize that we live in an increasingly globalized and digitized world and that threats to our safety can thus come from anywhere and are more complicated than ever to track. This violence and these threats compromise not only our safety but the very quality of life that we cherish so dearly that ultimately allows us to thrive.

We know that you will be hearing or have already heard from a number of organizations, Muslim and non-Muslim, such as the National Council of Canadian Muslims, the Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association, and other civil liberty organizations, that the Anti-terrorism Act, the even more frightening Bill C-51, and now Bill C-23 privilege fear of threat over real rights. This bill compromises the very Charter of Rights and Freedoms upon which we purport to exist. The people whose rights it compromises, who now feel targeted and, ironically, unsafe, are the country's almost 1.1 million Muslims.

We are not here to repeat those arguments, most of which we endorse. We are, as you've heard, not legal experts. As representatives from a large community-based organization, we are here to tell you about the very human impact anti-terror legislation has on our communities, our dignity, and our ability to thrive. We will refer to two points in particular. The first is how the narrative around terrorism leads to a rise in fear of Muslims. The second is about the impact on freedom of speech.

On Islamophobia, since 9/11 there has been a sharp rise in hate crimes against Muslims in Canada. As the “war on terror” centralized Muslims as the primary source of terrorism, Muslim communities—everyday average individuals who are at home or going to work, school, the grocery store, or the community centre—came under scrutiny.

Statistics Canada data tells us that crimes against Muslims are increasing despite the overall drop in identity-based attacks on other communities. Despite these accounts, as Canadian Muslims ourselves, we know that these are under-reported numbers. People in our community don't report hate crimes. We typically tend to brush them off as isolated, perpetrated by “lone wolves”, because historically this is what we have always been told.

That is despite the rise of right-wing extremism in Canada, which has been thriving and growing at alarming rates. Internal documents from CSIS, a body from this committee, suggest that extreme right-wing and white supremacist ideology has been the main ideological source for 17% of attacks in Canada. This is more than Islamic extremism. We know so acutely that this extreme right-wing hatred is often directed toward the Muslim community, from street harassment to the firebombing of a mosque in Peterborough, to the most recent example, on January 29, when six Muslims were ruthlessly killed in a Quebec mosque that had previously been targeted by these “lone wolf” white supremacists. These acts of violence by hatred-filled individuals are yet to be tried as terrorism, a term that seems to apply only to Muslims.

From what we know of the perpetrators of anti-Muslim attacks, they are propelled by dangerous rhetoric that positions Muslims as problems, as threats to the security of the state. The discourse around the Anti-terrorism Act and Bill C-51 speaks to this. In fact, in your very own green paper on national security, the only threats identified come from organizations or countries associated with Islam.

It is a strange situation, honestly, to navigate. Rhetoric on national security targets and typecasts Muslims, who then are increasingly becoming the victim of terrorism-related offences due to this very same rhetoric.

It places us in the perilous position of needing to protect ourselves against threats of violence because the world and our country position us as the threat.

[Michael Mostyn]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

B'nai Brith is Canada's oldest membership-based Jewish organization. Through its League for Human Rights, which maintains an anti-hate hotline and prepares an annual audit of anti-Semitic incidents, it is the premier advocate of human rights for Canada's Jewish community.

B'nai Brith testified before this committee in 2015, focusing on our support for one particular aspect of Bill C-51 relating to the creation of an offence for the promotion of terrorism, seizure of terrorist propaganda, and deletion of terrorist propaganda from computer systems. We offered several recommendations for amendments. My colleague David Matas, who serves as the senior legal counsel for B'nai Brith in Canada, will update our position in that regard in his statement.

We know the Jewish community is particularly vulnerable to hate propaganda throughout the world, and many of the most powerful terrorist organizations in existence today, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Daesh, rely upon the promotion of hatred with a particular focus on anti-Semitism to inspire acts of terror.

There are many examples of this internationally, such as the Hyper Cacher supermarket attack aimed at French Jewry, which was tied to the Charlie Hebdo attacks, and the horrendous attack on a Jewish religious centre in Mumbai that was specifically targeted as part of a larger Islamist-inspired terrorist attack in 2008.

In fact, terror attacks against Jews have taken place right across the globe. The Jewish community is quite cognizant of the threat it faces and knows that based on history, our community will continue to be the subject of terror attacks so long as incitement to hatred and radicalization continue around the world.

There is a tendency to think of terror as a foreign problem, but it is a Canadian problem too. In Canada the Jewish-owned West Edmonton Mall, as well as Jewish businesses worldwide, were the subject of a terror threat by al Shabaab, to the exclusion of non-Jewish-owned malls. We are not immune here in Canada.

The 2016 report on the terrorist threat to Canada cites Hezbollah, a listed terror group supported by the Iranian regime, as using its worldwide and Canadian networks for recruitment, fundraising, and procurement. Hezbollah remains a terror threat not only to the Jewish community but also to all Canadians, and it is believed to have a history of international terror operations, including the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community centre in Argentina. This is one of the reasons that B'nai Brith was supportive of the closing of the Iranian embassy in 2012 and believes it should not be reopened until the Iranian regime ends it support for terror and anti-Semitism.

B'nai Brith's annual audit of anti-Semitic incidents shows that anti-Semitism in Canada has remained relatively constant since 2011. With no active conflict occurring in Israel in 2015, 1,277 incidents were reported in that year. Harassment, including online harassment, has shown a general increase over five years. Vandalism declined to a 15-year low that year, while violence decreased slightly to 10 incidents. Our 2016 numbers will be released this spring.

Our Prime Minister is in Washington today, meeting for the first time with President Donald Trump. Canadians wish to maintain a positive relationship with the United States to enable efficient and speedy border crossings and trade. This requires taking our national security very seriously. Canada's counterterrorism and anti-radicalization efforts must acknowledge that specific identifiable groups—including Jewish, LGBTQ, Muslim, women, and others—are often the target for violence, and we must create a balanced framework to protect vulnerable societal groups from terrorism while maintaining important principles of freedom of speech within society.

Many often forget that minority Muslim groups are also targets of radical Islamist terror groups. Our community appreciates and supports the federal security infrastructure program, which supports the security needs of at-risk communities. It's unfortunate that children growing up in Canada today are made to realize that a police presence is required at Jewish synagogues during high holidays because of the ongoing threat of hate and violence.

Hatred is taught, and may prove the inspiration towards a violent pathway to radicalization. In this regard we should not forget that hate speech in Canada might play a role in sensitizing individuals to future radicalization efforts, whether in person or via the Internet, by desensitizing them to the humanity of their fellow human beings. Recently B'nai Brith exposed an Arabic-language local television show in Toronto, AskMirna, that had promoted holocaust denial. Rogers Television was not aware of any problems with the content, since they rely on the honour system and a complaint process. There is much work to be done in removing channels of hate from Canadian society, even from television and newspapers.

Those are my opening remarks, and Mr. Matas will now provide his update.

Opposition Motion—Commitments Regarding Electoral Reform

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I was kind of dumbfounded by the minister's speech. I sincerely hope that she never expected to find herself in this position as Minister of Democratic Institutions when she decided to get into politics and offer her services to the Canadian people. Seriously, this is a real shame.

The Liberals campaigned on a promise of new environmental assessments. They did not deliver. They promised to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions, but they are keeping the previous government's targets. They promised to defend our rights and freedoms by repealing Bill C-51. They did not deliver. They promised to restore home mail delivery. They have not delivered. They promised to change our voting system. They broke that promise.

Is that how they plan to regain the people's trust? Are they really trying to fight cynicism, or are they just doing politics the way it has always been done?

[Alexandre Boulerice, NDP, Rosemont—La Petite-Patrie, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague for his question.

With respect to the attack by the Prime Minister's chief of staff, I would simply say that it is sometimes an honour to be a target. I do not have a problem with that because it means that we have done a good job.

I would also like to point out that my colleague is quite right about the government's broken promises piling up, whether it is home mail delivery, or Bill C-51, or the small deficit promised by the Liberals during the election campaign.

However, when it comes to our democratic institutions and how people vote, these are fundamental elements of our identity as a society that expects promises to be kept.

Today, people realize that they can no longer take the Liberals at their word. They are saying that if the Liberals can break this promise, they are capable of breaking the next promises they make.

[Noah Shack]

The online-to-attack phenomenon is something that we all need to take stock of. I think there's a perception, and I don't know how prevalent it is anymore, but you have.... I mean, there are different models. You have highly organized terrorist groups, in which you will have centralized planning of an attack, training of people to carry out that attack, and orders that come through to carry out the attack. It's very systematic. Those attacks are a lot easier to disrupt, because there are a lot of points along the way from A to D.

That's why the measures that were put in place in Bill C-51, as I mentioned previously, are so important. They give some tools to be able to mitigate or disrupt those organic attacks that are inspired by messages but aren't necessarily directed from a headquarters. I think it's important that as we look at counter-radicalization writ large, yes, it's about bringing communities together and focusing on dispelling notions of hate within communities, and for sure a lot of the work has to be done internally within communities. There's certainly utility in bringing different communities together, but ultimately, for communities that are affected by radicalization, that's a problem they have to deal with internally as well.

But it's not just that. It also requires tools for our security apparatus and for law enforcement to be able to put some roadblocks in the way of those attacks that are inspired by the messages rather than directed by an organization.

[Noah Shack]

The German pilot program has been going on for one year, and it's a five-year program. I'm hopeful that, at the end of that, we'll see tremendous results. Teachers, who have a relationship with students who are with them day in and day out, can help to guide them and to nip this type of thing in the bud.

In the previous hearings on Bill C-51, we recommended convening a national counter-radicalization effort that would do essentially one of the things you were talking about before, which is to bring communities together so that there's a humanized face, and it would create a platform for face-to-face dialogue and interaction. Whether it's between the Jewish community and the Muslim community and the Christian community, whether it's faith communities or otherwise, it's important that we don't have people living in silos where the only interaction they have with this other group is hate messaging.

Public Safety

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, Canadians are right to be worried about the protection of their privacy. The government still has not repealed Bill C-51, which breaches our rights, and now, one of President Trump's orders would hand over Canadian data to the United States without any legal protections.

Groups such as OpenMedia and the BC Civil Liberties Association are asking the government to stand up to Trump and protect Canadians' rights.

When will the minister take seriously the consequences of this order for Canadian citizens?

Opposition Motion—Taxes on Health and Dental Care Plans

[Guy Caron, NDP, Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques, QC]

Madam Speaker, I am very pleased to rise in the House to speak to this motion.

I can say that we will be voting in favour of this motion even though we disagree with the wording, especially in the preamble and the amended preamble. I think we can have a discussion to determine whether this is a high level of taxation or not. We think it is not that high in comparison to what see in other OECD countries.

As far as the last part of the motion is concerned, we agree that health and dental plans should not be taxed—at least not before the government presents a real context for the comprehensive analysis of the tax system that it is supposedly conducting.

It is very important to look at the tax system as a whole. I will quote from John Ivison of the National Post, who, after learning that the government was contemplating taxing health and dental benefits, wrote on December 2, “Dan Lauzon, a spokesman for [the] Finance Minister...said no decisions have been taken and that any moves would not be made in isolation.” However, what he wrote next was actually more interesting. It states, “The employee-sponsored health care tax exemption is being scrutinized as part of a sweeping review of 150 tax credits worth about $100 billion a year in foregone federal revenue.”

The government has said the tax system does not work. We agree. It has said that the tax system needs to be reviewed. We agree. However, reviewing tax expenditures, tax exemptions, tax deductions, and tax credits is not a review of the tax system. What the government is doing is once again raising the expectations of the population that it will address the real problem, the problem of fairness and equity in the tax system. People do not feel that it is a fair system. They do not feel that everyone is treated equally. By examining the whole range of tax credits and tax deductions, the government is saying that it has done its part and that we have a brand new tax system in this country. This is not the first time a government has taken us in that direction.

The Carter commission conducted the last real review of the existing tax system in the 1960s. I will not get into the details of that commission because many people have already done so. The review was very comprehensive and took a good five years.

The report was one of the most well-received reports in the entire world. Serious work was done to determine how the tax system could be adapted to the reality of the day. It is important to remember that income tax has been around since 1917. In 1960 or 1965, we still had a system that was designed during the Second World War. This was serious work. It was commissioned by John Diefenbaker, the Progressive Conservative prime minister at the time, and continued by Liberal minister Lester B. Pearson.

Prime minister Trudeau was the one who got it across the finish line. He took all of the work that was done and condensed it into a handful of recommendations, which were accepted. The very essence of the report, which was that every dollar of income should be taxed the same, got swept under the rug. In the end, a few changes were made, but we ended up with a system that falls somewhat short of the objectives originally set out for this exhaustive study.

I am reminding members of this little bit of history because we are now witnessing a similar attempt to pull the wool over the eyes of Canadians. The government is telling Canadians that it understands them and that it will do what it takes to make the system fairer.

However, the proposal to tax private health and dental benefits is a trial balloon. It is not meant to make the system fairer. Rather, it is a way for the government to take money out of one pocket while trying to convince taxpayers that it is putting money in the other.

It is a very important question because it is going to be a defining question for the following years not only for this government but for any government in this country.

The last comprehensive review of the tax system took place back in the 1960s. There have not been any significant changes since, except maybe some brought by the finance minister back in the 1980s, Michael Wilson, who made some changes that did not, in our view, bring any more equity or fairness.

In terms of a comprehensive tax review, right now there are 3,000 pages of complex, unintelligible legal text, which even tax experts, who spend their lives studying this, cannot understand. We are facing a situation, a system, that is actually counterproductive for our economy. It is counterproductive for our level of economic growth. It is counterproductive for our productivity.

I am not the only one saying this. Mainstream economists are saying that the complexity of our tax system gives anyone, any tax expert, the ability to actually build an industry based on finding loopholes, which makes the system less and less equitable, less and less fair, and it is actually a drain on our economy. One of the top priorities of any government at this time should be really simplifying the tax system.

Simplifying the tax system does not mean just bringing forth some gimmicks, like a single-tax rate, or a flat tax, as it is called. We should not just be saying that we will be revising those tax credits and will try to find some savings, savings meaning expenditures lost to the pockets of the taxpayer, the citizen. That is not it. That is smoke and mirrors.

In terms of the commitments made during the last election, the Liberals are showing that they are masters of the smoke-and-mirror strategy.

We saw this yesterday, in the much discussed announcement about electoral reform, a lofty promise. They went after NDP and Liberal voters by promising electoral reform that would make every vote count. Today, a year and a half later, voters know that they were duped by this government.

Let us take a look at the Liberals' promises, especially those concerning first nations. This government said that it would cease the previous government's legal actions appealing rulings in favour of indigenous children and various first nations communities. These rulings force the government to honour its traditional commitments towards first nations.

My colleagues from Abitibi—Baie-James—Nunavik—Eeyou, Timmins—James Bay, and my colleague from northern Saskatchewan, whose riding has a very long name, are doing an absolutely incredible job of ensuring that this government honours its promises made to first nations, which they believed.

All the broken promises and unfulfilled commitments are beginning to pile up. Bill C-51 is another example. The government was going to change it, abolish it, or transform it, but nothing is being done.

Nothing is being done. Time and time again, the Liberal government campaigned on real change, but compared to the previous Conservative government, its real change involves keeping the decisions and attitude of the previous government.

The Liberals are saying that they are doing it in a progressive fashion. They are keeping the Conservative target for climate change, but those are progressive targets now. They are keeping the agreement with the European Union, but now it is a progressive agreement. Everything the Conservatives did, they are keeping, and they call it progressive. That is what real change means for the current government.

Now we are facing a situation where the Liberals have promised to simplify the tax system and make it fairer. They were right to make that promise and we are making it also.

Why? It is because the system is actually leaking like a sieve, because the system is actually so complex that, as I said, there is a whole industry built on creating tax loopholes and trying to take advantage of any poor writing in one of the 3,000 pages of the Income Tax Act.

We also know that the system is so complex that the compliance costs for businesses and for citizens are becoming higher and higher. They are increasing. It is becoming more and more costly just to face the obligation as citizens, as people of this country, to actually contribute to the well-being of this country. We have to do it, and it is a good thing that we do it, but we are asking people to actually pay more and more, because the system is more and more difficult to understand.

Even worse is that the complexity of the system is actually increasing. One of the main problems we have for our revenue situation is the problem of tax havens and tax evasion. Because of that industry that actually tries to find loopholes, some of them cross the line, where a loophole is no longer a legal loophole but becomes a mechanism, a strategy, for tax evasion.

It is extremely difficult for the Canada Revenue Agency, which actually I have been very hard on, and I will continue to be very demanding. They do not have the proper resources to actually ensure compliance with the very complex legislation.

Those are all problems that we are now aware of. They are problems that we need to deal with and which require a structured response from the government. It was proposed to the Standing Committee on Finance that it carry out an in-depth study of the tax system. That is what the motion says. It does not provide any details or direction. It does not give the Standing Committee on Finance a mandate. Work will begin next Wednesday. What are we going to do? We will listen to various witnesses, including accountants, as well as representatives, I am sure, of the Canadian Federation of Independent Business and other organizations. I already know what they will say. They will say that the system is too complex, that it has to be changed and simplified.

We will spend three, four, five, or six meetings getting all those witnesses, who will be saying the same things. How do I know they will be saying the same things? It is because I have heard them in the past saying those things. We would be wasting our time in the finance committee, which might be the intention of the motion, actually. We know that the finance department, and we know that from the Minister of Finance's spokesperson, is actually working right now on the same study. However, what they are claiming is a comprehensive tax review is nothing but a review of tax expenditures.

How many pages do tax expenditures take in the whole Income Tax Act? It is maybe a few dozen out of 3,000 pages. We have a system right now that is so complex, as I said, that nobody can really claim to master it all.

I think if the government really had guts and really had the intention of making sure that its commitment to simplify the tax system would be right, it would actually go many steps further. It might actually go, maybe not toward a royal commission, like the Carter commission, back in the sixties, but perhaps toward a blue ribbon commission that hired experts from various fields, including labour, business, and academia, and gave them the task of reviewing the system, because I have very limited faith in the finance department doing it.

I have very limited faith, not because I do not like the people who are part of it but because of the complexity of the task ahead of us, that the finance committee can actually do this work, because we do not have time to do it. We do not have the resources to do it, and we do not have the expertise to do it.

If the government was really serious, and it was not smoke and mirrors and was not just an empty promise that the Liberals will do little about, but claim they have respected, or simply break, because that is what we have witnessed since the government took power, they would look at the possibility of creating that blue ribbon commission, with members who are respected.

They might be divergent, in terms of belief or in terms of political leanings, but they will actually have the same objective, the same view, the same vision, which is to actually adapt an antiquated system, a system that was built in the mid-20th century, before computers, before the mobility of capital, and before globalization, and do what Carter did back in the sixties and adapt it for our times.

I dare the government to actually take that step. I dare the government to actually make us believe that it was not, once again, an empty promise to make Canadians feel comfortable about it but that it understands that we know the system is not fair.

Canadians have a decreasing trust toward the Canadian tax system. They do not believe it is fair anymore. They do not believe everyone is paying their fair share. Nobody likes paying taxes. We can all agree on this. It is always something difficult to accept. People will accept it if they know that their tax dollars are actually well spent, that they are spent for the common good, and that they are spent for the common projects we have in this country.

People will also accept it if they know that everybody is paying their fair share. When we talk to Canadians, one of the first things they say is that they feel they are being had, that there are two systems: one for the rich and one for them. The system for the rich, for the most affluent, is for those who can afford to pay some firms to tell them how to invest their money in the Bahamas, in Switzerland, in Luxembourg or in the Isle of Man, as we have seen, while they are required to pay.

Here is another example to illustrate how unfair the system is. Those people who hide their money away on the Isle of Man, in the Bahamas or elsewhere, knowing full well that they are hiding income from the taxman—if they get caught, they are told that it is no big deal, that they can simply return the money to Canada and pay the taxes that are owed and all will be forgiven. However, if a taxpayer who does not have the means to do that gets caught or even makes a technical mistake, it is a sure bet that the Canada Revenue Agency will not stop until that taxpayer has paid what he or she owes, in addition to interest and penalties.

We can therefore forgive taxpayers and Canadian citizens for thinking that there is a system for one class of people and another system for them.

The thing is that we tried to actually bring up this topic in the finance committee. We, the NDP. We did it in the past too with other NDP members of the committee. We are the ones who actually bring, constantly, motions to study the tax system and tax havens. The last was on the scheme involving KPMG and the Isle of Man.

The first meetings went fairly well, and I will say that all members were really into it. By the fourth meeting, basically all questions, except maybe from this side, were mainly softballs. That does not really help to increase the faith of Canadians in the system and the ability of this House to tackle this very important topic.

In brief, we need to remember that the issue currently being debated is one that the government itself brought forward, that is, the prospect of taxing benefits, such as health insurance and dental insurance, provided by employers. The justification for this was the need to conduct a systematic and thorough review of the tax system. When the pressure became too much, the Liberals rejected the idea. It was a trial balloon.

However, a systematic review of the tax system remains extremely important. It was promised by the government. What I am trying to say is that I am very afraid that this is just another promise like the one about electoral reform and all the others meant to persuade Canadians that the Liberal Party listens to their wants and needs. In the end, these promises were only meant to get people to vote for them so they could change sides and then manage expectations.

That is why I am hoping for real action from the government, either on the Standing Committee on Finance or through the department.

[Bob Bratina, Liberal, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

The government of the day was facing serious issues and created Bill C-51 and SCISA. Was it a rush draft in the fog of war? In evaluating the drafting of this legislation, I know we've heard many people say we should just get rid of the whole thing, but could it be worked on, from CBA's perspective?

[David Elder]

From the very beginning, back to Bill C-51, which initially proposed the SCISA framework, the CBA's approach has always been about making the necessary adjustments to that law to carry on. To the best of my knowledge, we've never addressed a question or pursued a position that would have favoured the outright removal of the legislation.

[Laura Tribe]

One of things I want to make clear is that I am speaking on behalf of the media community, not just myself.

One of the things that has been made really clear to the media throughout this entire process since Bill C-51 was first introduced with the information-sharing provisions within it is that it should be scrapped.

Any time we have talked to our community about what they would reform, we get quite a clear message that it is not worth fixing, that it is too big, that it is too broad, and that we are better off scrapping it and introducing smaller, more detailed provisions—

[David Elder, Executive Member, Privacy and Access Law Section, Canadian Bar Association]

Thanks very much, and good afternoon, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.

My name is David Elder. I am an executive committee member of the privacy and access law section of the Canadian Bar Association. I also co-lead the privacy and data protection practice at Stikeman Elliott LLP. I was formerly the chief privacy officer for a major Canadian telecommunications company, and I have been practising privacy law for over 20 years.

Thank you for the invitation to present the CBA's view on the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act.

The CBA is a national association of over 36,000 lawyers, law students, notaries, and academics. An important aspect of the CBA's mandate is seeking improvements in the law and the administration of justice, and it is that perspective that brings us to appear before you today.

Our submission to the committee on SCISA was prepared by a CBA national security working group, with contributions from the privacy and access law section as well as other sections. The section's membership represents lawyers with in-depth knowledge in the areas of privacy law and access to information from every part of the country, drawn from private practice, industry, and government sectors.

Our section also worked on the CBA submission this past fall in response to the government's national security green paper, and the year before that on the CBA submission to the public safety and national security committee respecting Bill C-51, part of which contains SCISA.

I'll now address the substance of our submission.

The CBA supports information sharing for the purpose of national security when that sharing is necessary, proportionate, and accompanied by adequate measures against potential abuse. However, sharing too much information or sharing information for unrestricted purposes can lead to harmful consequences. Moreover, such oversharing is contrary to the principles underlying privacy laws in Canada.

SCISA has significantly expanded intragovernmental information sharing for national security purposes in Canada, including the sharing of potentially sensitive personal information, without precise definitions, basic privacy protections, or clear limitations on the purposes for sharing. While some helpful changes were made to SCISA before its final passage into law in 2015, the statute still causes concern on several fronts.

The CBA has four main concerns with the law as enacted.

The first is independent oversight. SCISA includes a number of useful guiding principles for information sharing, including the principle that originators should retain control over shared information and the principle that information should be disclosed under the act only to institutions carrying out responsibilities in respect of activities that undermine the security of Canada.

However, to be meaningful, SCISA must include a robust oversight and accountability mechanism to enforce these principles. In the CBA's view, any oversight body should have independence from the government institutions that will be sharing information under the act in order to avoid any potential conflicts of interest.

There may be several oversight models that could work in this regard. The committee of parliamentarians that was proposed in Bill C-22 could be one such option. Existing institutions, such as the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, might also work.

Whatever oversight mechanism is pursued, in order to better facilitate the review of activities carried out under SCISA, the CBA submits that regulations should be introduced requiring disclosing institutions to keep a record of all disclosures made under SCISA and requiring receiving institutions to maintain records of subsequent use and disclosure of information received pursuant to SCISA. If such records do not exist, it will be nearly impossible for any oversight body to determine whether the guiding principles of the act are indeed being respected.

The second concern is balanced information sharing.

The CBA notes that subsection 5(1) of SCISA permits disclosure among the 17 government institutions listed in the schedules of the act if the information is relevant to the recipient institution's jurisdiction or responsibilities under an act of Parliament or another lawful authority respecting national security. In the CBA's view, mere relevance is a very low standard for what should be an exceptional sharing of information between government institutions, and this could allow for unnecessary and overbroad sharing of information, undermining the privacy rights of Canadians. The CBA agrees with the previous submissions of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada and others that a test of necessity would better balance the objectives of SCISA with privacy rights and principles. In other words, in order for information to be shared with another institution, such sharing must not only be relevant to the receiving institution's mandate respecting national security, but also have to be necessary in order to allow the receiving institution to fulfill that mandate.

The CBA is also of the view that the existing schedule 3 to SCISA, which lists the institutions with which information may be shared under the act, should be expanded to include references to the specific sections of the statute supervised or implemented by those institutions that might relate to national security concerns. Greater specificity would assist both disclosing and receiving institutions, as well as any oversight body, in assessing whether disclosure to another institution might be appropriate.

Our third concern with SCISA is the lack of restrictions around subsequent use and disclosure of information disclosed to an institution under section 5 of SCISA. More specifically, the current provision seems to allow for the subsequent disclosure by a recipient institution to other non-designated government institutions, to individuals, to foreign governments, or even to the private sector, and for purposes unrelated to national security.

In the CBA's view, the information sharing between government institutions contemplated by SCISA should be seen as an extraordinary measure designed to fulfill an explicit narrow purpose. Accordingly, SCISA must be designed to eliminate what is sometimes called “purpose creep”, including potential disclosure to third parties.

The CBA is particularly concerned about subsequent use and further disclosures by a receiving institution when the information has been obtained by the disclosing institution through the exercise of extraordinary powers, such as powers to compel production of information or enter premises. It would be inappropriate for a receiving institution to be able to leverage, for purposes unrelated to national security, any investigation and enforcement powers not conferred on the receiving institution by Parliament. SCISA should not allow receiving institutions to obtain indirectly that which they cannot obtain directly.

Fourth, the CBA is concerned about reliability of information.

The CBA is concerned that SCISA includes few effective checks and balances on information sharing or safeguards to ensure that shared information is reliable. The Arar commission stressed the importance of precautions to ensure that information is accurate and reliable before it is shared. Omitting safeguards in SCISA ignores lessons learned through the Arar saga and the recommendations of the Arar commission, and risks repeating the same mistakes.

In conclusion, once again the CBA appreciates the opportunity to share our views on SCISA. We support balanced information sharing for the purpose of national security when it is necessary and proportionate, and is accompanied by safeguards that are adequate to protect individual privacy rights and to ensure the reliability of any information shared pursuant to the act.

I'd be pleased to respond to any questions the committee members may have.

[Laura Tribe, Executive Director, OpenMedia]

Thank you.

Good afternoon. My name is Laura Tribe, and I am the executive director of OpenMedia. We are a digital rights organization that works to keep the Internet open, affordable, and surveillance-free. Given our work, it seems pretty fitting that I'm joining you by digital link from Vancouver this afternoon.

Since Bill C-51 was first announced, OpenMedia has been actively campaigning alongside many other groups against this reckless, dangerous, and ineffective legislation. We believe Bill C-51 should be repealed in its entirety, and that the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, or SCISA, is one of the most problematic components within Bill C-51.

OpenMedia and our community believe that when the previous federal government passed SCISA, it weakened the privacy rules that keep us all safe. SCISA contributes to an alarming privacy deficit that makes all Canadians less secure. This privacy deficit is dangerous and will have lasting consequences for the health of our democracy, for our liberty, and for our daily lives.

I want to begin by commending this committee's recently published recommendations on reforms to the Privacy Act. As you are all aware, the Privacy Act has not been meaningfully updated since its introduction in the 1980s, and OpenMedia agrees wholeheartedly with this committee and the federal Privacy Commissioner that the Privacy Act must be brought into the digital age with the addition of strong, meaningful, and modern protections.

Specifically, we support your recommendations that the Privacy Act be strengthened to require that government activities related to the collection and sharing of information be necessary and proportionate.

We also strongly support your call to impose overarching limitations on the retention of data and to strengthen transparency reporting requirements for government institutions.

We believe the recommendations set out in your December report will substantively improve privacy protection and have the potential to help mitigate at least some of the serious problems with SCISA.

As you know, the government recently concluded the public phase of its consultation into a range of national security issues, including Bill C-51 and SCISA. Unfortunately, the green paper that was published at the outset of the public consultation focused far more on the desires of police than on the privacy needs of Canadians, with many issues, including those around information sharing, being framed in a highly one-sided way that ignores the reasons the public is so concerned in the first place.

Despite the misleadingly benign portrait of SCISA painted by this green paper, from a privacy perspective there are very serious problems with this legislation. Today I will be speaking to the three main concerns brought forward by the OpenMedia community.

OpenMedia's first concern is that SCISA enables domestic dragnet information sharing that security experts warn is counterproductive. As you know, SCISA authorizes all federal institutions to disclose Canadians' private information to no fewer than 17 separate government agencies.

Anything that relates to the sweepingly broad definition of “activities that undermine the security of Canada” can be disclosed. I echo the concerns of the BCCLA's Micheal Vonn that not only does SCISA have, and I quote, “no requirement for individualized grounds for data collection”, but that it seems “likely it was enacted precisely for the purposes of bulk data acquisition.”

This is deeply problematic. To participate in modern life, citizens must share lots of information with our government. This information should not be repurposed into an open-ended intelligence dragnet.

Previous witnesses have raised specific examples that shed light on just how problematic the type of information sharing facilitated by SCISA can be: CIPPIC's Tamir Israel cited recent examples of government targeting journalists and peaceful indigenous activists and expressed concern that SCISA could be leveraged to share information about their activities in spite of the supposed exception for activities of “advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression”, and the BCCLA's Micheal Vonn pointed to the extraordinary data collection powers of FINTRAC and how its counterbalancing privacy protections have been “decidedly unsettled by SCISA to the point where its constitutionality may be at issue.”

OpenMedia believes the principles of necessity and proportionality are workable mechanisms for sharing or receiving threat data, and there is no need for SCISA's expanded definitions of security in this context.

To safeguard Canadians, information sharing of data entrusted to government agencies should only occur in narrow circumstances, and the Privacy Commissioner must be empowered to assess the overall necessity and proportionality of any and all information-sharing activities.

Additionally, all government institutions should be required to keep thorough records of when they disclose our private information, including to foreign governments, and information sharing in general should only occur subject to formalized agreements.

OpenMedia's second major concern with SCISA is that inappropriate information sharing with foreign governments can have a devastating impact on the lives of individual Canadians. In recent years, over 200 Canadians have publicly come forward to say their personal or professional lives have been ruined due to information disclosures with foreign governments, despite never having broken the law, and we'll never know how many others who have been impacted have chosen to stay silent.

Some have faced career limitations, while others have had to deal with travel restrictions. False charges that were subsequently dropped or dismissed, never resulting in criminal records, or even brief contact with the mental health system can create flags with life-changing consequences. These stories underline a very real threat regarding the government's handling of our sensitive data: that without safeguards in place, government bureaucrats will simply act recklessly and make life-impacting mistakes.

Canada's security agencies, the designated recipients of information under SCISA, routinely and on a large scale share information with their counterparts in the U.S. When mistakes are made, the impact on individual Canadians can be profoundly damaging. We need look no further than the case of Maher Arar to see that. These long-standing problems have been exacerbated by the Trump administration's recent decision to eliminate all U.S. Privacy Act protections for foreigners, including Canadians. As Professor Michael Geist points out,

the order should raise significant concerns about government data shared with U.S. authorities as well as the collection of Canadian personal information by U.S. agencies. Given the close integration between U.S. and Canadian agencies—as well as the fact that Canadian Internet traffic frequently traverses into the U.S.—there are serious implications for Canadian privacy.

These concerns are compounded by the Trump administration's expressed openness to returning to torture policies that were largely discontinued by the previous administration. Sadly, should SCISA remain in place, more examples like that of Maher Arar are not unlikely.

OpenMedia's third concern is the way that reckless information sharing harms our digital economy. Leading Canadian business figures, including the heads of Hootsuite, Slack, Shopify, and OpenText, have warned that the information-sharing provisions of SCISA will harm the Canadian economy by undermining trust in our commerce and trade. In an open letter published shortly after Bill C-51 was first proposed, these business leaders had this warning:

The data disclosures on innocent Canadians and those travelling to Canada for business or recreation could make our clients leave us for European shores, where privacy is valued. Duplicated data flowing between multiple unsecured federal government and foreign government databases leaves Canadians and Canadian businesses even more open to being victimized by data breaches, cyber criminals and identity theft.

A second letter from the business community, published last month in response to the government's national security consultation, reiterated these concerns and called for the legislation to be fully scrapped, saying:

We hope your government will listen to Canadians, the business community and experts by starting over with new legislation that respects our collective desire for security overall. Privacy and data integrity safeguards represent security in its most clear and basic sense. Let’s start with this understanding and work from there.

For all these reasons, OpenMedia believes that the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act should be completely repealed, alongside the rest of Bill C-51. As one of our community members told us recently:

Repeal it completely and do it now. If the Liberal government believes some sort of bill is needed, then write a new bill from scratch only after thorough consultations with legal experts and citizens to ensure Canadian rights and freedom are preserved.

Strong privacy rights need to be at the heart of any healthy democracy because they are the foundation of many other democratic rights we hold dear. We all deserve effective legal measures to protect the privacy of every resident of Canada against intrusion by government entities or malicious actors and abuse by law enforcement. Canadians deserve at least the same high level of privacy safeguards for our digital homes as we do for our brick-and-mortar homes, if not higher, given the highly sensitive data stores and interactions that are increasingly housed online.

For many Canadians, security is privacy, in the most human sense of that word. Repeated revelations of intrusive government surveillance, whether that be spying by CSE, the new powers in SCISA, or other elements of Bill C-51, have left Canadians fearful for their personal security. This committee's work can play a significant role in ensuring that Canada can address those fears and become a global leader in reining in excessive digital surveillance practices. Let's lead by example and help set a new global standard for privacy protection in a digital age.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Conservative, Blaine Calkins]

I call the meeting to order. For those of you who believe in the motto “better late than never”, I am certainly glad to get this committee meeting number 42 going.

I want to welcome everybody back. I hope everybody had a great Christmas and holiday break, and I wish everyone a healthy and happy new year. It's great to see familiar faces, not only those around this table but of course those of all the folks who sit in the wings and support us as well. It's great to see all of you.

We have a continuation of our study on the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, more affectionately known as SCISA. Today we have with us witnesses who have been waiting very patiently. On behalf of my colleagues, I just want to say that it's very understandable why there's a bit of delay today. A couple of seasoned colleagues in the House of Commons are doing their farewell speeches. I think members were sticking around for that. We can't fault them for that. There are a lot of friendships and good relations across party lines for those kinds of things here.

Without further ado, I will introduce our three witnesses. I'd ask you to give your testimony in the order in which I introduce you. You have up to 10 minutes for your opening remarks. Then we'll immediately proceed to questions and answers.

From OpenMedia, we are joined by video conference by Ms. Laura Tribe, who is the executive director. Welcome.

From the Canadian Bar Association, we have Mr. David Elder, executive member of the privacy and access law section. Also, of course, as an individual, we have Mr. David Fraser, who is a partner at McInnes Cooper.

Ms. Tribe, the floor is yours for up to 10 minutes please.

[Prof. Lisa Austin]

I don't have any insight into why the government chose to do as many things as it did within Bill C-51, but I would say there's a very delicate balancing act in which there are legitimate needs, as Mr. Kelly has been pointing out in his questions too, for the national security agencies to have the right powers to do the job we all want them to do. When these tragedies happen, that's the emphasis in the mind of Canadians.

If you go too far in overbreadth of new powers, then you're going to hit the other end, which is undermining trust in government. I think Bill C-51 goes too far in that direction. Specifically, obviously my comments today are on the information-sharing act, and I do think there's a delicate balance, but I think this isn't the right balance.

[Micheal Vonn]

I think that certainly, along with many Canadians, we saw the initial polling on what was then Bill C-51 as something with great emotional sympathy for the crisis, the tragedy that had occurred. Overwhelming numbers of people said yes, we must have a response. Then you will recall that very shortly afterward—I can't remember if it was weeks or some very short months—when people had had an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the bill, the majority of people who did so and were polled said that they did not support it and that the point was not that we must do something but that we must do the right thing. It must be proportionate, necessary, and effective, and this was not found to meet the measure.

We certainly understand the need for responsiveness, and we don't slight that in the least. The question is whether, with sober hindsight now, when we apply our rationality to this, we have effected an improvement.

As Professor Austin was indicating, we have no indication of efficacy. As the community of privacy commissioners of Canada has said, we have actually achieved no reasonable justification for these extraordinary powers. Do we know that they are making us any safer? We do not. Instead, as I hope I made clear in my submission, we actually serve to harm some of the federal institutions that are part of the architecture of our government by imposing this information-sharing scheme on them.

We should consider very carefully not whether we have tools but whether they are the right ones.

[Micheal Vonn]

May I say that when I did education on what was actually in Bill C-51, there were often audible gasps in the audience when people found out that those who might be rendered to torture, Canadians, would have no civil recourse under SCISA because of the liability waiver that is part of it—and this is, of course, something that has happened.

Citizens of Canada who know this about this portion of the act are appalled.

Public Safety

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

Mr. Speaker, CSIS has been storing sensitive data on totally innocent Canadians, a policy that the government defended, but the courts have now said is illegal. This metadata can reveal our medical conditions, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, and much more. While many are calling for new safeguards, the minister has left the door open to double down and make it easier for CSIS to mine data from ordinary Canadians.

With Bill C-51 still the law, does the government now want to add the power to store the sensitive data of innocent Canadians, yes or no?

[Pam Damoff, Liberal, Oakville North—Burlington, ON]

It's just not being accessed.

You've had the ability to share that information under Bill C-51. Was any of that information shared with other departments?

[Ziyaad Mia]

I will echo my colleague here. We've called for it for a long time. A committee of parliamentarians is fine. I think Bill C-22 needs some reform, but it's a step in the right direction to give some political accountability and public accountability linked to all of you who are elected.

The first thing is to have a national security review agency that unifies all the agencies, but it would not be separate agencies working together, which I think is too convoluted. You want one counterweight to the security agencies. It makes security better, makes them work better, and gives public confidence.

Second, we need well-resourced experts in the field who can build relationships with the agencies and have access to all information.

Third is that independent review of national security law and policy as they have in the U.K. That person would, in the case of Bill C-51, come and testify on that and give independent advice on it. That person would be able to have access to secret jurisprudence and legal opinions in government and be able to comment to the public and experts with some feedback on what the national security landscape looks like.

[Joël Lightbound, Liberal, Louis-Hébert, QC]

Thank you very much. This is very interesting testimony.

I only have five minutes, so I'll ask you to try to keep your answers as short as possible.

My first question is in regard to the institutions that can send or receive information. In terms of your interest in Bill C-51, in regard to having so many institutions that can send information—from the Yukon Surface Rights Board to the federal Consumer Agency of Canada, which I didn't even know existed—has the case ever been made that they actually have information that is somewhat relevant to national security? Has there ever been a case made for the 17 agencies that are listed in schedule 3 that they have anything to do with it?

For instance, we have the Department of Finance, which deals with national security. It's on the recipient end. Has there ever been a case made for them to be on the recipient end of SCISA?

[Matt Jeneroux, Conservative, Edmonton Riverbend, AB]

Perfect. Thank you, guys, very much for being here today. It's important. We have limited time, so I want to make sure we're staying on the topic. We can then make this part of our report for SCISA. I appreciate your doing that.

I'd also remind my colleagues on the other side of the room that in fact Bill C-51 was supported by the Liberals at the time. Granted, I don't think any of you were there at the time, but it was certainly supported on your side.

[Ziyaad Mia]

I'm happy to do that. I understood that Mr. Long asked me about scrapping Bill C-51, but I can stick to SCISA.

In SCISA, as I said, information sharing needs to happen. We see the extremes. We see Air India and Arar. We see both sides of it not working.

It needs to work, but as Mr. Kapoor said, it speaks of activities that undermine the security of Canada, and then it lists a number of things in the act, which I'm sure you've all seen, and that is not the list. It is an open-ended list, given content by bureaucrats across government. Those are just suggestions about what undermines the security of Canada; it could include other things.

Essentially, the definition is the heart of the bill. You start with a fundamentally flawed definition and then you start to share information. There are no controls on how that information is shared. The door is open for sharing with foreigners, and that could include Saudi Arabia, and now, with the Trump administration talking about torture, it could be there.

Then I'll point out to you section 9. Section 9 says that when someone shares information and it harms a Canadian or some person—but let's say a Canadian, as in the Arar case—they're immune from paying out compensation or being sued for it.

It's essentially a busted bill. What we need to do is say that information needs to be shared, that it needs to be reliable, that it needs to be in compliance with the charter and the rule of law, and we need to make sure that CSIS actually works with the RCMP to move intelligence into evidence and get real terrorists off the street. The CSIS amendments actually are counterproductive to that.

[Matt Jeneroux, Conservative, Edmonton Riverbend, AB]

Yes. I just want to make sure that we're sticking to the information-sharing aspect of it. We're going down a long list of Bill C-51. I would like to think that we could focus on just the scope of what the committee's looking at right now.

[Ziyaad Mia]

Thank you for the question.

I think the bill itself—or rather, the law now—was so fundamentally flawed that whatever redeeming qualities it might have had were outweighed by the flaws. I usually use this example. If I bought a house that had a crumbling foundation, I wouldn't throw a few coats of paint on and say, “Let's keep this.” I'd say, “Let's start again.”

Let's go through some of the essential elements of Bill C-51.

The CSIS provisions give CSIS secret disruption powers to essentially disrupt people's lives and take actions that could result in disasters, as Mr. Kapoor said. They are a non-starter in a democracy. Things could happen to people, and they would never have legal recourse. They happen in secret. They would never see the light of day.

In a criminal context, police get warrants and they do have secret wiretaps, but ultimately it sees the light of day. You have a day in court. That's essentially our system. When the state acts against you, you have the right to defend yourself. When CSIS acts against you under these disruption warrants, you will never know and you will never have the right to defend yourself. Whether you're guilty or innocent, you won't have a shot to defend yourself.

Let's talk about promoting and advocating terrorism. First of all, the definitions in there are loose to begin with. The Criminal Code already has always had counselling offences, so when you're involved in criminal activity and encouraging it, you can be caught.

The Anti-terrorism Act, 2001 introduced criminalized actions that were removed from action, such as facilitating terrorism or encouraging someone to start committing a terrorist act. I had critiques about that, but it was still close enough to the act. In criminal law, what you want is to criminalize the act. Terrorism is essentially violent acts. They want to kill someone, so let's say it's killing someone. If I facilitate you to do that by encouraging you, giving you money, talking to you, I can be caught there. As a democratic society, we want to capture the act or something close to the act. If we get far from the act, we're starting to stray from our criminal law and democratic principles and we're starting to criminalize speech. What I learned in law school is that you don't pass redundant laws.

In the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015 we already had facilitating, which is close to the act. Then this must be something further removed from that, so now we're getting very close to criminalizing speech. I'm not saying I support people who say things that encourage terrorism. Of course, we all condemn that, but we live in a society where we tolerate some of that offensive speech.

The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act amendments in Bill C-51 essentially rolled it back, and Mr. Kapoor can speak to this in more detail because he is a special advocate. The Charkaoui decision said that in the security certificate process, secret proceedings where a judge sat alone with a CSIS lawyer were essentially unconstitutional. They introduced special advocates to represent the interests of the named party on the security certificate. Bill C-51 essentially rolls that back. IRPA was amended to say that the special advocates don't have access to all the information. It kind of undoes what the Supreme Court has told us.

Those are three pieces of it.

Let's talk about the no-fly list. We can debate till the cows come home whether no-fly lists—

[Wayne Long, Liberal, Saint John—Rothesay, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for coming today. It is a very interesting topic.

Mr. Mia, I want to start, I think, in a wide-ranging way.

I've done some reading of some of your articles in the paper and some other things. In one article I read, you felt or you suggested that Bill C-51 is so flawed that it should be scrapped. Personally, I question whether something like that should be scrapped, so I just want an initial comment. Do you feel that we should just throw that out and start again, or do you feel that we are able to tweak it and make adjustments?

[Ziyaad Mia, Member, Legal Advocacy Committee, Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association]

Thank you.

Good morning, everyone, and thanks for the invitation to be here today. It's a pleasure.

We're studying the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which, as you all know, was introduced as part of Bill C-51, Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, and it is now law.

My general concern with the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, or SCISA, and the Anti-terrorism Act 2015 is that it was essentially it was broad and unnecessary legislation in essence. The entire piece of legislation, including SCISA, was unnecessary, and the justification for it was not there.

Our national security sector is in need of significant change and reform, and we do need to share information. Those things need to happen in Canada, but Bill C-51 and SCISA were not the correct responses to address those very real concerns that have been festering away. Mr. Kapoor can talk about some of the commissions of inquiry. We can talk about that, but some of our commissions of inquiry have made excellent recommendations identifying the problems in our national security sector, and for various reasons those recommendations have gathered dust now for 10 or more years, even the O'Connor inquiry.

That's the context in which I put my comments forward.

The other piece is that the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, which, as you see, is called the “anti-terrorism” act, was styled as an anti-terrorism law and sold as an anti-terrorism law, and that's not what it was. It was and is a broad national security bill, and it's quite far-ranging. We can talk about some of that today in this piece of legislation, and I'm happy to talk about the other elements as well, if you like.

Again, it was not necessary, because what we needed to do was reform a number of things in national security. There were specific and focused items that we needed to deal with, and we still have not dealt with those. The Anti-terrorism Act, 2015 does not address those concerns. In some cases, it actually makes those problems worse and actually diminishes the capacity of our national security services to find threats and neutralize them.

In general, I think Bill C-51 and SCISA fail on three essential elements that I like to talk about: legality, accountability, and effectiveness. These are the cornerstone principles that I look at when I'm assessing law.

In terms of legality, that would be a sense of the rule of law, that law and policy need to be compliant with the rule of law and the charter, need to be necessary, and need to be proportional. There needs to be a public justification and an explanation of why we need law, because we don't just make laws that are not required, and we need to be compliant with our international human rights obligations as well. I think ATA 2015 and SCISA fail on legality.

Let's talk about accountability. You're all parliamentarians. All of us went to school here, I assume, and learned about responsible government. To me, that's the nub of accountability: that we have a government that's responsible. Public justification comes into it, so that citizens know why we are doing things. You as legislators explain that and are transparent in that.

Bill C-51 lacks that. Public justification is not sound. It doesn't introduce transparency into the national security sector or into the law itself. The public justification in that process itself was a little broken. Again, in terms of a culture of accountability across government and in the notion of responsible government, that culture of accountability also needs to be in the national security sector. That is clearly lacking in Canada.

What we ought to have is an evergreen process of accountability in Canada, in national security but in government generally. I think that would make our national security system work better, be more accountable, and have public confidence, and at the end of the day, I think we'd be safer.

The last piece in my principles assessment, the lens I look at things through in terms of law and policy, is effectiveness. Is it effective? Does it work? I actually think ATA 2015 and SCISA are not effective in getting to what we want. We want a national security system that identifies threats, keeps Canadians safe, and complies with the rule of law and the charter, and so on. They actually don't make things better. They make things worse.

We spend a lot of money on national security. I put it to you that some of that money is not money well spent, because when we talk about SCISA, we'll talk about how we may be chasing red herrings, collecting too much information, and missing the point. That might make people feel safer, but I don't think it actually makes us safer.

We do need to share information and national security—don't get me wrong—and we do need to investigate threats and get at them, but we need to do it in the right way.

Bill C-51 and SCISA are not the right way to do this. Again, part of effectiveness is necessity. Did you need this law? I'm still scratching my head as to why Bill C-51 was needed. Purportedly, it was in response to the acts committed, one of which was in Ottawa—the killing of Corporal Cirillo—and the other of which pertained to a gentleman in Quebec. Those were terrorist attacks, criminal attacks, but although Bill C-51 was sold in that context, there's really no link to how it addresses those issues.

Those are operational problems. We can talk about that, and those need to be fixed, but Bill C-51 does not address those incidents of 2014.

Again, I come back to evergreen accountability. When it comes to national security, the first thing we need to do is prevent. The second thing we need to do is investigate. You prevent as much as you can, and that's front-end work. Not a lot of people know that. That's either community relations or working to move people off the road to violence.

If that doesn't work—in some cases, obviously some actors are committed—you want to investigate and interdict. That's where police come in. I have some serious concerns about the CSIS disruption powers, but the police need to be involved in interdiction and prosecution. Then we need to review—that's an important part—and reform, to improve the system.

That loop is the evergreen process that I'm talking about. We do not have that working well in Canada, and that's what we need to think about.

I have three minutes, so let me talk a little about SCISA itself.

As I said, information sharing is needed in Canada. We need to do that in policing and in national security, but it needs to be done right.

Mr. Kapoor is here and Mr. Cavalluzzo was supposed to be here. Mr. Kapoor was involved in the Air India inquiry and Mr. Cavalluzzo in the Arar inquiry. Those are two ends of the spectrum.

As a Canadian of Indian extraction, I can tell you first of all that it was not acknowledged for a long time that Air India was a Canadian tragedy. There was a failure of information sharing and institutional egos. That's one part of the problem.

The flip side is Arar, where reckless information sharing led to disasters.

What we need to do is learn from those lessons and get to the middle. Again, I'm not against information sharing, but it needs to be done right. SCISA is the wrong way to do this. It's overly broad, unbounded information sharing.

I usually use the analogy that if we're trying to catch terrorists, it's like finding a needle in a haystack. SCISA is adding a couple of trailer loads of hay to that pile. God forbid there's a disaster, a terrorist attack or something to that effect, and we find out that we had too much information and that what we needed to look at snuck through. What we really need to be focusing on are the real threats.

I have about a minute and a half left, and I know you're going to keep me to the 10 minutes. I'm happy to talk about the details and I'm sure we will, but I'll close with the broader context.

What we really need to do is reform national security, as I said. One piece of that, as you've heard from others, is review, proper review. I know some of our agencies don't have any reviews. Some do. They're siloed. You've heard all of that.

You've heard Kent Roach, Craig Forcese, and others echo those concerns. I really am an advocate. I believe you have my submissions from Bill C-51 previously. I'm an advocate of a unified, independent, national security review agency, the Canada national security review agency.

If there's integration in national security intelligence and operations, you need that counterweight. We can talk in detail about that, but that's one piece that needs to happen, and there are other pieces.

I'll be idealistic and tell you, “Let's repeal the ATA 2015. Let's start again and find those fixed pieces.” If you're willing to do that, I'm happy to work with you on that. If you're not willing to do that, then SCISA really needs significant reform, as do other pieces of Bill C-51. The biggest piece for me is the CSIS disruption power. CSIS should not have those powers, full stop. Those powers should be repealed.

I'll stop there. I'm happy to talk about the rest of it. Thank you for the opportunity.

Opposition Motion—Cuba

[Charlie Angus, NDP, Timmins—James Bay, ON]

Mr. Speaker, as always, it is a great honour to rise in this august institution and speak. For the folks back home who are wondering just what the heck is going on in Parliament today, it is Thursday afternoon and it is the time of the month when the Conservatives have to release the pressure valve, let all of the backbenchers off the chain, let them run around, howl at the moon, pound their chests, light the big bonfire, and throw red meat to their base.

Today, for people watching, we are now back in the cold war. The cold war is a place the Conservatives love to be. Those were glory days for the Conservatives. The fact that the world has moved on means they are a little lost. They need something. This is their day to bring an issue of great importance to Canadians. For folks back home, all Parliament stops today so the Conservatives can bring forward a motion. It is the right of the opposition—New Democrats do it—to have a debate on an issue of substance.

The folks back home whom I represent would probably want us to talk about the pension crisis. That would be a good debate here. There is the fact that many families that I represent do not have doctors. A lot of that is provincial, but with the health accord and the transfers, that is a debate we could have here. People are deeply concerned about the brutal bombing in Aleppo and the role Canada could play. That would be a matter for debate in the House. However, the Conservatives figure they have a gotcha moment on the Prime Minister, so they will have a special debate to re-fight the cold war in order to try to embarrass the Prime Minister of this country.

I will be sharing my time with the member for Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, by the way.

It is not my job to defend the Prime Minister on any given day, although people on the other side probably know I am always more than fair, more than reasonable, and more than willing to bend myself into a pretzel to understand some of the inane comments I have heard. However, I am not going to lose any sleep over his comments on Mr. Castro.

I listened to the Conservatives invoking Marco Rubio, of all people, saying we should be outraged. I do not know; I may classify myself as one of the few Canadians who has actually never visited Cuba. Everybody else I know goes to Cuba all the time. They tell me about the Havana nightlife and the great people, but the Conservatives make it seem as though they are flying into some kind of death camp. The only reason I have not visited Cuba is that I do not deal with a warm climate very well, being a northern boy.

I was listening to the Conservatives invoking Marco Rubio, of all people: if Marco Rubio is upset, Canadian people should be upset. One of the statements that was made on the day of Castro's death was, “Upon receiving the sad news of the death,...I express my sentiments of sorrow to...family members of [Mr. Castro]”. The Pope said that. Pope Francis did not mind saying something nice about the guy, so if Pope Francis said something nice about the guy, let him rest in peace.

We have more important things to talk about here than the legacy of Castro and the Bay of Pigs and the legacy of the cold war. We have issues that have to be dealt with. If we are going to get to whether the Prime Minister should have said a little more this way or a little more that way, I am not the kind of guy who loses too much sleep over prime ministers or politicians speaking off the top of their head. If they are in front of a microphone 24 hours a day, they are going to say some stuff and get called out. That is fair play.

I am more interested when people make statements that are supposed to mean something and they do not actually live up to them. That is when I think debate should happen. For example, I remember the Prime Minister, when he was in the third party, saying 2015 will be the last election using the first-past-the-post system. He was not equivocating; he was as clear as could be.

Now Liberals are saying that all of the work of the all-party committee, which was told by the Prime Minister to go across the country, was too rushed, too radical, unnecessarily hasty. Then we had the disgrace in the House this afternoon when the Minister of Democratic Institutions insulted the work of politicians and Canadians who participated in those hearings, saying they did not work hard enough. That is what I would hold the Prime Minister to account on.

We have a tradition in the House. It is this old gentlemen's club and, now that there are women in the House, there are gentlewomen. It is very unparliamentary to ever accuse someone of lying. We can never do that, but it seems perfectly parliamentary to lie, because someone could say that maybe the member misunderstood.

We need to call the Prime Minister out on promises that he made, that he told people he would keep, and that he had no intention of keeping; for example, on democratic reform, and on cash for access.

The Prime Minister's mandate letters to his ministers said not just to follow the law but to go above it, and they were under the Conflict of Interest Act. Now they are saying that every other party has done it.

For all the years I have been in Parliament, no one on the Conservative side ever once said that I took their side. However, when Bev Oda tried a cash for access scheme, she gave the money back. The Conservatives knew it was wrong and they gave the money back.

It might be the finance minister. Maybe he believes that actually being in a billionaire's living room and getting paid $1,500 might be democratic consulting. Maybe it is just the way he thinks.

God forbid I should say great things about Jim Flaherty. Jim Flaherty and I went at it like brass knuckles, but he was a democrat. He knew what meeting people was about. We disagreed on a lot of stuff, but Jim Flaherty did not need to raise his money sitting in a corporate boardroom with six or 12 friends paying $1,500. There is something wrong with that. That makes people cynical. When the Prime Minister promises to do better, he has to do better.

I am thinking mostly about what he said to the residential school survivors. I was there when he said:

Moving forward, one of our goals is to help lift this burden from your shoulders, from those of your families, and from your communities. It is to accept fully our responsibilities...as government....

Yet, this week, the justice minister was in court trying to overthrow a ruling of compensation to a child survivor of sexual abuse. The government, the feminist government, said that a residential school survivor had to prove intent of an adult. There is no legal standard in the world that accepts that, except when it is applied against Indian people.

Last month, the Minister of Justice tried to throw out a case. The Ontario Superior Court called it a perverse misapplication of justice on a child who was raped in a residential school but could not remember the date, and the justice department believes it can have that case thrown out.

We had the Department of Justice knowingly suppressing thousands of pages of police testimony. When it was forced to hand over the documents, it took out the names of the perpetrators, including a serial pedophile at St. Anne's Residential School who abused children for 40 years. The person who came forward for compensation had the case thrown out because the Department of Justice had that thrown out.

I go back to this again and again, because either we have one set of laws in our country or we do not. That the justice minister believes they can undermine and establish a second set of rights for Indian people in this country is absolutely appalling and is a breach of all legal duty.

I was there when the Prime Minister made that promise. I teared up. I believed him, Canadians believed him, and the residential school survivors believed him. There are many promises the Prime Minister made, and he made them with full heart, and people trusted him

I could talk about Bill C-51. The Liberals did not like it, then they were afraid not to vote for it, and then they said “Don't worry, elect us and we'll change it”. Nothing happened.

They talked about a nation-to-nation relationship, and the justice minister said Site C did not meet the standards and ran roughshod over aboriginal title, and they approved it anyway. A politician's word has to mean something.

We are having a lot of fun today debating something that I do not think most Canadians are going to care much about tomorrow, or the day after, or probably even after the debate is over, but we have issues that we need to debate in the House. The debate has to be about how we start talking in a way that Canadians can start to trust us.

With all due respect to my Conservative colleagues, they are having a lot of fun. They are taking the pressure off. They are feeding red meat to their backbenchers. They are howling at the moon, jumping up and down, beating their chests, and denouncing the reds and the commies. In fact, I have not been called a Bolshevik yet, but I am sure that is coming too. That is all right. Meanwhile, we will get back to work.

Yes, I will be taking numbers on that one.

Public Safety

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, while the RCMP is still trying to get enhanced surveillance powers, regular citizens have yet to see the changes to Bill C-51 that were promised during the election campaign.

The government seems to be listening more to the RCMP and CSIS than to citizens who have real concerns. The surveillance of journalists and indigenous activists and CSIS' illegal storage of data are hot topics these days.

When will the minister see the urgency of the situation and repeal Bill C-51?

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Yes, thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the members of the committee.

I'll just take a moment to say that on November 18, under your deadline, I submitted to this committee a brief on the substance of what was formerly known as Bill C-51, in which I made commentary on this piece and particularly on how Bill C-22 is a much-appreciated bill. However, in and of itself it is insufficient to remedy the damage done to our security system by Bill C-51. You may not have that in your inboxes yet because I didn't submit it in both official languages. I hope you will take the time to consider it.

This amendment is very straightforward, and as you noted, Mr. Chair, it's similar to that put forward by other committee members. It deals with the current version of Bill C-22, which says that the Governor in Council is to designate the chair of the committee. As you will know from evidence before this committee, the committee process of the Parliament of Westminster, upon which Bill C-22 is based, does not have the appointment of the chair by the government of the day. In fact, based on a revision of their committee in 2013, the chair of the committee is elected by members of the committee. That is entirely the purpose of amendment PV-1. It is to ensure that the chair is elected by the members of the committee, and of course, the members of the committee, as you've previously approved in clause 5, are appointed by the Governor in Council.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Report Stage

[Elizabeth May, Green, Saanich—Gulf Islands, BC]

Mr. Speaker, I know that many who are currently heckling me were not here in the 41st Parliament, but I can assure them that we had no time to turn around before there was yet another time allocation motion. The Conservatives broke through all historical records. However, this does not excuse the Liberals for doing the same thing.

I would urge members on both sides of the House to consider what we really want in terms of parliamentary decorum and in terms of being able to address bills and get them through the House in an expeditious way while also ensuring that we do not trample on the rights of each of us here as members of Parliament to do the work we were elected to do, which is to study the legislation, provide suggestions, work together, and produce what the people of Canada want. They want parliamentarians who see the big picture and are prepared to put their heads together to come up with better legislation by taking the time that is needed.

Tme allocation is in no one's interest here. I very much regret that the current government has brought it in now, for the ninth time. Again, for those who live in glass houses, I will remind them that it was 100 times that time allocation was brought in during the 41st Parliament.

I urge the Liberals in this place to consider what the threshold is against which they strive to achieve their goals. I would urge them not to think that their goal is to be better on any issue—the environment, climate, the treatment of veterans, criminal justice, Bill C-51, parliamentary decorum, the use of time allocation—than what Prime Minister Harper did. I want to set a really ambitious goal for them: Do better than what Prime Minister Mulroney did.

Obviously, I did not agree with everything done by the Progressive Conservative majority back in the 1980s, but I think if members go back and look at the use of time allocation, the number of whipped votes, and the treatment of issues and use that as a benchmark, they will find that they have to set their sights a good deal higher than trying to do better than the prime minister in the 41st Parliament.

Turning to the specifics of Bill C-26, I wish it did include—

[Wayne Stetski, NDP, Kootenay—Columbia, BC]

Thank you.

I have to start by saying I found it quite a strange concept that a Liberal member of Parliament would protect information on national security better than a Conservative or an NDP member of Parliament would.

I want to turn back to the thing that started a lot of this for us, and that was Bill C-51.

Right across my riding of Kootenay—Columbia, which is located in southeastern British Columbia, in the Rocky Mountain area, there were protest rallies in many communities around Bill C-51, and a lot of it was focused on the need for oversight. Canadians truly want to have complete confidence that the committee can provide meaningful oversight over national security and intelligence, and I really appreciate the depth of the information that you've provided us today on how we can better get there.

I do have a question for you. There are many grounds on which a government may withhold necessary information from the oversight committee. Some are automatic and others are discretionary, but in all cases, the way the government chooses to interpret the exclusions is key.

Let's take one example, which is actually the least controversial of all, cabinet confidences. In February you said the following to the ethics committee when you met with them:

Under the law right now, cabinet confidences are described very broadly.... For instance, any record that contains anything that's described in the whole definition of cabinet confidence can be excluded as a cabinet confidence. In our investigations at this time, we are not allowed to see the records. We see a schedule, a brief description of the records. Without seeing any records, in 14% of the cases of cabinet confidence investigations we find that it was improperly applied....

In other words, even the least controversial exemption, if interpreted too broadly, can lead to a significant amount of information being withheld inappropriately.

What advice can you give us about the general manner in which governments interpret these types of exemptions or tests, such as being injurious to national security? In your view, would it be preferable for the committee to simply have an all-access pass, as other existing review bodies do?

[Daniel Blaikie, NDP, Elmwood—Transcona, MB]

On a specific legislative issue, one thing we've heard here is that there's some ambiguity—a kind of systematic ambiguity—about whether the Privacy Act trumps other acts. There's a provision in the Privacy Act that says it applies subject to any other provisions of any other acts of Parliament or regulations thereof, and we're looking at that, especially in the context of our other study of the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act.

In your opinion, where there's a conflict between those two acts, do you believe that the Privacy Act should take primacy over SCISA, or do you see the interpretive burden cutting the other way?

[Richard Fadden]

I start from the premise that whatever you do, please don't add another definition of “terrorism”. From an operational perspective, that would be terrible.

I don't remember the details, but I do remember that when Bill C-51 was being worked on, the definition in the CSIS act wasn't adopted because there was a view at the time, by some, that it really didn't cover a couple of things that should be covered if you were worried about national security.

I guess I would support the view that you should pick one of the two and embed it in this legislation. I think Mr. Edelmann is absolutely right. If people don't understand what the committee is mandated to do and what its parameters are, I think it would be very difficult to gain its support in public. I think he is entirely correct in that matter.

[Peter Edelmann]

Especially when you have a committee that's going to be working in secret, it would be helpful to know what the committee is doing and what are the boundaries of what the committee is expected to be looking at.

With respect to our recommendation of which definition to use, we made submissions at the time of the passage of Bill C-51 about why the definition in the information sharing act was problematic, in the sense that it's extremely broad. It is not helpful in that respect, because that leads to an overreach and then a dilution of the resources you have with respect to looking at the relevant information. If you have a mandate that's extremely broad or amorphous, the committee may not have the focus, or there won't be the confidence that the committee is focused on the issues that actually matter.

The flip side is that if you have a definition that's too narrow, it may be siloed or not able to look at other issues. This is the problem that arises with respect to.... If the information sharing act is going to continue with its very broad definition, then it makes sense to have a committee that has a similarly broad mandate. Our ideal scenario, or what our suggestion would be, is to restrict the definition in the information sharing act to an appropriate scope that would then reflect that of the committee as to what actually are concerns around national security.

[Peter Edelmann]

I can say that this concern arose from both sides. As I said, many of the sections were involved in the drafting of this document. One of the concerns that was raised with this actually came from the military law section, and it had to do with whether or not you were going to get buy-in from the national security establishment itself. The concern is around both the public and the individuals, the people who are working under the agencies, having confidence in what the purpose is. What is this committee doing? Why are they doing what they're doing? Does it make sense? What is the definition that you're working on with national security? Why are you trying to undertake this study or asking for this information?

With an unclear mandate.... The reason that the mandate is unclear is that, after Bill C-51, we now have a multiplicity of definitions of national security floating around in our legislation. The question is, are we dealing with this extremely broad definition that is in the information sharing act, or are we dealing with a more restricted definition that is in the CSIS act or in other pieces of legislation that generally refer back to the CSIS act with respect to that definition?

It creates some concerns on both sides around understanding what this committee is doing, and why. In terms of the public, what is this committee doing and what is its mandate? Also, from the perspective of the agencies that are under review, there is concern in terms of understanding why the committee is engaging with them and having those working relationships with those agencies.

[Dianne Lynn Watts, Conservative, South Surrey—White Rock, BC]

Thank you.

It's interesting that this was brought up, because we heard other testimony that said most of the meetings should be done in public, and only through certain criteria should they be allowed to be in camera. I think there are opinions on both sides.

I want to drill down to my fellow Surreyite, who is there in Surrey, I understand. Hello.

In the report here, in terms of having no definition of national security, which is very broad, I know that in Bill C-51 there were a lot of elements that tried to identify what that would look like. In terms of having no definition, do you think that it is more problematic to leave it that broad, or should we be attempting to define it?

[Richard Fadden]

That, Mr. Chairman, is quite the question.

I start from the premise that, except for the three or four core national security entities, all of the others that are listed in the annex to the act do national security part time. I think that's an important thing to keep in mind. It means that the committee of parliamentarians will only be nipping in and nipping out of CBSA, because a large chunk of what they do has absolutely nothing to do with national security.

I think I said during my remarks that I believe that one of the shortcomings in the current bill is that it doesn't provide for a full exchange of information between the review bodies and the committee of parliamentarians. I think that if you, the House, and the Senate eventually put in a provision ensuring that, clauses 14 and 16 don't become so important. It means that the committee can utilize the existing review bodies, which have full access across the board. Someone I think made reference to Bill C-51 and the sharing of information. As long as information is being shared and originates from one of the core national security agencies, I think the review bodies and the committee of parliamentarians should have access.

That's sort of a roundabout answer, because I don't think there's a perfect answer to your question.

After the Bibeau incident on Parliament Hill a while ago, three or four police bodies did enquiries and investigations. None of them were really made public. A committee of Parliament didn't really look at them. The situation is somewhat analogous. A lot of this stuff can be looked at in camera—I think, anyway—not even in secret. I think there's an important distinction to be drawn. When something happens in public, a lot of what happens and the response by various agencies can be looked at without people being sworn to the level of top secret. I don't think it's as large a problem in the circumstances that you set out as it might be if you were talking about espionage or the proliferation of nuclear weapons, for example.

[Peter Edelmann]

Thank you very much.

The Canadian Bar Association is a national association that represents 36,000 lawyers, notaries, law professors and law students across Canada.

The association's main objectives are to improve the law and the administration of justice. The brief provided to the committee was prepared by the sections of immigration law, criminal law, consumption tax law, customs and trade law, military law, as well as the CBA national privacy and access law section.

As you can see, the large number of Canadian Bar Association sections involved in preparing this has to do in large part with the broad scope of the concerns around national security in the legal context. We are generally supportive of the creation of a committee of parliamentarians dealing with national security review and oversight; it is important to understand it in the context of the overall framework and the existing framework.

There are still some major holes or problems, and a lot of those discussions are happening in the context of the green paper. It's a bit difficult, in some ways, to comment on the current composition of the committee without being privy to the overall vision for the framework of the national security oversight mechanisms.

The role of the committee would be twofold, and what's important with respect to both these aspects [Technical difficulty—Editor] the representatives who are on the committee in terms of the parliamentarians themselves. The second aspect is with respect to the institutional framework. Given the fact that parliamentarians are neither long-term experts—or that not all members of the committee would be long-term experts—nor would they be full-time in dealing with review, the creation of the institutional aspects of the parliamentary review committee are obviously important. It will be important that it be properly funded as well in terms of being able to provide the institutional knowledge and ability going forward.

I'll have comments both with respect to the mandate and with respect to the tools that are available to the committee.

With respect to the role of the committee, the role of having the parliamentarians in place would be for the higher-level and broad issues within the national security infrastructure in terms of policy and law. It would be very difficult, in our view, for the committee to get involved in the minutiae of complaints or of specific items with respect to the individual agencies. Thus, it continues to be important that the individual agencies that currently do not have independent oversight.... The Canada Border Services Agency is a good example of that, in which we have a very large law enforcement agency that's very heavily involved in the national security context, with no oversight whatsoever outside of the ministerial chain of command.

Also, with respect to the co-operation amongst those agencies, we've seen a broad expansion of the sharing of information between agencies, in particular with the information sharing act that was brought into law with Bill C-51, which has increased the co-operation in information sharing between the agencies, but we continue to see the restrictions on the ability of those agencies to communicate with each other.

In this piece of legislation, we also see a continuing of that siloing effect, in the sense that the committee is not able to share information with the oversight agencies that they would not otherwise have access to. This again creates a problem, where the committee may be aware of things that might be relevant to SIRC, but if that wouldn't otherwise be available to SIRC, the committee is prohibited from telling them about it.

There are some concerns with respect to how the overall framework is going to work and how this fits into it. We are happy to continue to be involved in providing commentary and assistance in developing that framework, but with the information we currently have and the current framework we're working with, we have some concerns with the bill.

The first is with respect to the mandate. We have a reference to “national security” in the mandate, but it's not clear which definition of national security is being referred to or what the scope is. There are two in particular, the one that we see in the CSIS act, which is used quite broadly in other national security-related issues, and then the one in the information sharing act, which is significantly broader. It's unclear which scope of national security the legislature or the drafters have in mind as to whether or not it's the broader one. Presumably, it is, but some clarity on that aspect would be helpful, although you have our comments on the information sharing act where we had concerns about the overbreadth of that definition of national security and the reasons why that's problematic.

There's a second issue with respect to the mandate. Having a clear mandate in terms of having a committee of parliamentarians is a very important mechanism to provide confidence. When we're dealing with the national security context where a lot of things happen in secret and are not accessible to the public, it is important that the public have confidence that the committee actually can and will do its job. We have comments on the composition and functioning of the committee, but I won't belabour them. I'll refer you to our written materials on that basis.

With respect to the the ability of the committee to undertake studies, clause 8 provides some unnecessary restrictions and gives a great deal of control to the ministers in paragraphs 8(b) and 8(c). In other words, on the broad legislative policy issues that are set out in paragraph 8(a), there doesn't appear to be any restriction, but paragraphs 8(b) and 8(c) would appear to create significant control by the ministers over the topics or issues that the committee could look into. It's unclear to us why those would be necessary. In fact, they should be deleted.

The other aspect of the work of the committee that is of significant concern is the access to information that the committee will have. These problems arise in both clauses 14 and 16 of the act as currently drafted.

I won't go into the individual paragraphs of clause 14, but it's unclear why, on the one hand.... Either there's trust in the committee.... It's clear—there's no question—that there does need to be trust in the committee, both from the public side and from the national security establishment or the people who are involved in doing national security work. If there's no buy-in, for lack of a better term, from those agencies and from the people working for those agencies, obviously the committee will be hampered in its work. But with clarity in terms of its mandate, if there's trust in the committee and the structure itself, it's unclear why these types of limitations on access to information are necessary or even desirable, because either we have a committee that can be trusted or we don't. If it cannot be trusted, it shouldn't be doing this work at all, and if it can be trusted, then the restrictions only serve to undermine the confidence of the public in what the committee can and cannot do, as the ministers have a great deal of control both over the mandate and the topics, but also over the information that the committee might be able to have access to.

With that, I think I've used most of my 10 minutes. I'm more than happy to answer questions. I thank you for your invitation.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I will continue along the same lines. The question is for the two witnesses. I will start with you, Mr. Portelance, since you already have some momentum.

I don't want to misquote you. You talked about misalignment, to the effect that the committee of parliamentarians could practically delegate to the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC, some parts of the mandate, given the lack of access to information. With that in mind, we shouldn't forget about the Privacy Commissioner's report, which states that, as a result of Bill C-51, the majority of agencies involved in information sharing are not subject to review. One example is the Canada Border Services Agency, but there are others, provided they are open to the public, as you say. However, there is nowadays also an issue related to information sharing. The committee of parliamentarians should be looking into that, right?

[Wesley Wark]

Thank you.

I think the importance of maintaining a balance between need to know and need to share, which has been an ongoing tension in the entire western intelligence world since the 9/11 attacks, is of critical importance. The problem I see in SCISA is that the balance was never properly thought through, and certainly was not found in terms of the legislative language adopted.

In response to the particular question about whether SCISA was a kind of back door to authorizing new information-gathering and intelligence-gathering powers—and this is a concern that many people raised in the context of the original debate over Bill C-51—frankly, I don't see that in SCISA or even implicitly in its knock-on effects. It doesn't change, as I think you probably heard. Certainly other committees have heard from government officials that it doesn't change the actual mandates and lawful information-gathering activities of any of the agencies listed in SCISA. It is purely about information sharing. Information sharing may trigger—and this is my colleague Tamir's point—additional intelligence gathering and investigations by agencies that receive information, but that activity could occur only under their existing lawful mandates.

[Tamir Israel, Staff Lawyer, Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I will try to keep my comments brief so that we do have time for full questions.

Thank you, as well, to the members of the committee and to you, Mr. Chair, for having me back here again.

My name is Tamir Israel. I am the staff lawyer with CIPPIC, the Samuelson-Glushko Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic. CIPPIC is a public interest clinic based at the University of Ottawa's Centre for Law, Technology and Society in the Faculty of Law. Our mandate is to advance the public interest in policy debates arising at the intersection of law and technology.

We are pleased to have the opportunity to testify before you today on the study of the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, which I will refer to as SCISA.

As you are aware, SCISA was introduced last year as a central component of Bill C-51. In CIPPIC's view, SCISA constituted one of the more problematic elements of that legislative initiative, and it remains so.

Participation in modern life requires Canadians to entrust ever-growing amounts of data to their government, including sensitive financial, health, and other information. Providing such information to the government does not mean, however, that Canadians sacrifice privacy interests in this data, nor should it.

Core and long-standing privacy concepts such as necessity and proportionality, concepts intended to facilitate threat identification and prevention in a tailored manner, are wholly absent from SCISA, raising the legitimate concern that its mechanisms will be used in a manner that is disproportionate and that impacts heavily on the privacy of Canadians who have done nothing wrong.

SCISA's challenges arise in part from the regime it establishes, but also in part from gaps in the pre-existing framework that it expands and in which it was inserted. I will touch on a few of these problems, addressing specifically the relevance standard, the definition of security threats, and the lack of safeguards, which are issues you've heard of already. I will try to provide additional context and propose some solutions as I go along, some from within SCISA itself and some comprising amendments to additional regimes that come from without.

In particular, while I don't go into it in detail in my comments here, you've heard from many witnesses, as well as from Professor Wark here that the need for an external expert review body is paramount to maintaining the overall proportionality of Canada's national security framework, and that's no less the case with respect to the operation of SCISA in general.

I'll begin with a discussion of the relevance standard. It is one of the two core limiting principles within SCISA's information-sharing apparatus. It is an over-broad standard that's insufficient. Relevance requires the presence of a reasonable basis on which to believe that the information in question relates to, in this instance, the mandate of a SCISA recipient's organization, and to activities that undermine the security of Canada.

Relevance is perhaps the lowest and least-defined legal evidentiary standard. While CIPPIC would hope that a court ultimately interpreting the relevance standard in SCISA, and taking into account constitutional jurisprudence, would impart into it considerations of immediacy and imminence, we are concerned that the standard will be used to justify generalized information sharing.

This is indeed precisely what occurred in the United States with the National Security Agency. In powers newly granted to the NSA in 2006, the relevance standard was inserted as a key limiter intended to ensure the powers in question were employed only in the context of specific and immediate investigations of security threats. This relevance standard, however, was used to expand the powers in question rather than to limit them. Specifically, relevance had been defined to mean any piece of information that may one day be relevant to an investigation, facilitating a domestic dragnet program that involved the wholesale collection of everyday domestic and international call records in the United States on a regular basis.

The reaction of the USA PATRIOT Act co-author, Jim Sensenbrenner, who is a congressman, upon discovering the scope of application arising from this relevance standard, following disclosures by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, is telling. I quote:

“We had thought that the 2006 amendment, by putting the word 'relevant' in, was narrowing what the NSA could collect. Instead, the NSA convinced the Fisa court that the relevance clause was an expansive rather than contractive standard, and that's what brought about the metadata collection, which amounts to trillions of phone calls.”

While Canadian jurisprudence may well arrive at a different conclusion as to the definition of “relevance” in the context of SCISA, CIPPIC is concerned that there is insufficient guidance within the act as it is currently drafted to ensure it is applied in a proportionate and narrowly tailored manner.

On the other hand, we have yet to hear a compelling case for a general departure from the existing exceptions already embodied in the Privacy Act, which SCISA envisions. Under the Privacy Act, there are two existing operative exceptions that agencies can already rely upon when attempting to share threat-related information with other government agencies. Paragraph 8(2)(e) provides an upon-request exception permitting government agencies to share citizen information with investigative agencies, if asked to do so, for the purpose of carrying out a lawful investigation. In addition, paragraph 8(2)(m) allows proactive disclosure of personal information where the government institution believes the public interest in disclosure clearly outweighs any resulting invasion of privacy.

In the government consultation paper currently being discussed as well as in testimony before this committee, the argument is advanced that these exceptions are insufficient, primarily because agencies lacking a security mandate lack the expertise or incident-specific knowledge to fully utilize the information sharing permitted by these exceptions. This may be the case, but it is by no means clear how SCISA's adoption of a highly permissive and open-ended standard will remedy this.

On the one hand, non-security agencies receiving specific requests from security agencies for data under paragraph 8(2)(e) are able to rely on the requesting agency's guidance. On the other, agencies are no better placed to identify the relevance of specific items of information to unknown or unknowable security threats than they are to assess whether disclosure of such specific items will be in the public interest, as they are already permitted to do under paragraph 8(2)(m). In any non-generalized context, the information being shared will need some specific quality inherently indicating its relation to a known threat for the exceptions to apply. Assessments of necessity and proportionality can occur as readily in such contexts as can assessments of relevance.

CIPPIC would therefore encourage two amendments to correct the existing potential overbreadth in SCISA. First, we would replace the relevance standard within the act with one of proportionality and necessity. Second, we would encourage, as we have in our previous appearance before you, an amendment to the Privacy Act that would adopt an overarching proportionality and necessity requirement that would apply across all government sharing practices, regardless of the specific Privacy Act exception under which they are occurring. This would, as we indicated in our previous testimony, apply to information sharing done under SCISA, as well.

The addition of an explicit necessity and proportionality obligation would create a more precise framework for information sharing than that currently embodied in paragraph 8(2)(e) and paragraph 8(2)(m), employing the known standards of necessity and proportionality, which agencies have experience employing in a national security context. Overlapping protection in both the Privacy Act and SCISA would permit the Privacy Commissioner of Canada to oversee protection-related information-sharing practices while allowing other oversight and review agencies to assess necessity and proportionality within the context of their respective mandates. Supplementing these changes, we would encourage training units within different government agencies, potentially within the existing ATIP infrastructure that most government agencies have, to have expertise so that in-house capabilities can be developed to identify threat-related data.

A little bit more briefly, the “undermining the security of Canada” standard is the other key limiter adopted by SCISA, and you've heard some of this from other witnesses. We would concur with the testimony of these other witnesses in raising concerns that this standard is excessively broad. To assist the committee in its assessment of this overbreadth, we would like to provide two examples of how this overbreadth can lead to disproportionate or undesirable information sharing in a few definite contexts.

Specifically, SCISA's definition of security includes cybersecurity and a broad definition of cybersecurity. A single cybersecurity incident, however, can implicate the private information of hundreds of thousands of Canadians. All data affected incidentally by such a cybersecurity incident could be relevant, and the underlying security breach could be viewed as relevant to activities that undermine the security of Canada and, hence, could be subject to exceptions in SCISA. Given this potential for over-sharing, other jurisdictions have sought to address cybersecurity in an explicit manner that is distinct from other investigative contexts, and that specifically addresses these issues.

Additionally, while SCISA excludes advocacy, protest, dissent, and artistic expression from its definition of security, CIPPIC remains concerned that SCISA's security concept remains sufficiently ambiguous to undermine core democratic functions. We have seen government agencies recently targeting journalists, for example, in attempts to identify potential sources attempting to uncover police corruption. We have also seen the targeting of indigenous activists, not on the basis of their participation in protests per se but on the basis that such participation potentially poses a criminal threat to aboriginal public order events.

It is not clear to us that the prevailing exemption for advocacy and protest would exclude SCISA's being leveraged in these contexts for the purpose of preventing interference with public order. We are aware that the opposite conclusion is also possible and that the exception put in place is overbroad and doesn't allow for information sharing, even in contexts where violence may be the issue, but we feel it is sufficiently ambiguous to allow for either interpretation, and that is an ongoing concern for us.

Finally, CIPPIC is concerned that SCISA will be used as an avenue to feed domestic Canadian data into the Five Eyes integrated infrastructure in an unintended and unanticipated manner. CSE is Canada's lead Five Eyes agency and is a legitimate recipient of personal information under SCISA. While the framework under which CSE and its Five Eyes agency partners operate is presented as nominally excluding or limiting the impact on Five Eyes residents, and the permissive powers and activities granted to these agencies presume these underlying conditions to exist, SCISA could undermine those presumptions by allowing another direct avenue for Canadian information to flow into this apparatus.

Turning briefly to the lack of safeguards in SCISA, CIPPIC joins other experts in voicing our concern at the prospect of the nearly limitless post-collection retention that SCISA may facilitate. The Federal Court recently issued, as Professor Wark just mentioned, a decision heavily criticizing CSIS for its ongoing retention of large amounts of Canadian metadata that was not identified as necessary to any security threat and indeed was explicitly identified as not necessary to the resolution of any security threat.

In our analysis, SCISA could be perceived as providing CSIS with a justification for long-term retention of similar data, were that data disclosed to it through SCISA's information-sharing mechanisms. But we also note, more importantly, that other agencies such as the RCMP and CSE lack any form of retention obligations. We would suggest that the remedying of this lack of retention obligation would be best achieved through overarching amendments to the Privacy Act that would apply across all of government and impose an overarching retention obligation.

In addition, other overarching safeguards that could be adopted within the Privacy Act could provide additional safeguards and a better framework for legitimate information within a modified and reduced SCISA. These safeguards could include the adoption of privacy impact assessments and a more robust enforcement of the Privacy Act.

Those are my opening comments for today. I would be pleased to take your questions.

Thank you.

[Wesley Wark, Visiting Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thank you.

Chair and members of the committee, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you to provide some views on the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, or SCISA, which is now embedded in Canadian law following the passage of Bill C-51, the omnibus anti-terrorism legislation introduced by the previous government in 2015.

C-51 provisions came into force, as you know, in August 2015. The Liberal Party promised to repeal the problematic elements of Bill C-51 and is currently engaged in the process of public consultations on elements of Canada's national security, but the government's plans with respect to any possible amendments to SCISA, in particular, have not been revealed.

SCISA appeared as part 1 of Bill C-51 in 2015. I was invited to appear before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security on March 24, 2015 to testify on Bill C-51 as a whole. In my testimony, I divided the measures advanced in Bill C-51 into three baskets: first, those elements that can genuinely advance security capabilities in a reasonable and proportional way; second, those that do not advance our security capabilities or fail to maintain the vital security-rights balance; and third, those that, I think, deserve to be put on hold for deeper reflection.

In March 2015, I placed SCISA, or part 1 of C-51, in the first basket, of appropriate security enhancements. I also argued, and I quote myself, that SCISA “would greatly benefit from some detailed amendments...to bring greater clarity, heighten...efficacy, reduce...overbreadth, and bolster the security-rights balance.” Despite considerable public criticism of SCISA, no amendments were made to the act before it was passed into law. Nothing that has come to my attention since the passage of SCISA in unaltered form changes my essential view—that SCISA can and should be amended.

In terms of advancing security capabilities, the purpose of SCISA is, presumably, to try to ensure appropriate information sharing through exhortation, through a broadening of the information-sharing regime to encompass a large number of listed entities, and to allow for expanded information sharing under an altered definition of “threat”.

The committee has heard from eminent legal academics versed in national security matters, from a civil society actor, from the Canadian Civil Liberties Association, from government officials, and, earlier today, from the Privacy Commissioner of Canada. The perspective I offer is informed by my understanding of how intelligence and security systems regulate their information systems. I'm sorry if what follows sounds a little philosophical, but it has a practical point.

The specifics of SCISA need to be examined in the context of five guiding principles that should inform any effective information-sharing system for intelligence and security purposes within government. These principles have long been recognized and are as follows: the need to know, the need to share, the need to secure, the need to avoid information overload, and the need to be accountable. These needs shape an effective and reasonable information-sharing regime in a democratic system. They encompass lawful mandates as well as privacy and civil liberties protections. They are meant to interact to ensure balance between over-ingestion and under-ingestion of information. They are deceptively simple in the literal sense of their meaning, but not easy to operationalize as a package.

I want to just run through these five principles briefly.

The “need to know” principle refers to limits on information sharing that are shaped by the lawful mandates and operational needs of the agencies involved and by the requirements of information security. The more sensitive the information—the more that information might reveal details of intelligence sources and methods—the more intensively does the “need to know” principle come into play. “Need to know” can also be infected by non-operational imperatives, including bureaucratic politics, management styles, and personal proclivities on the part of officials working in the security and intelligence system. It is important that the “need to know” principle operate appropriately as a limiting factor, but it is equally important that the principle not be shaped by extraneous dynamics.

The “need to know” provisions in SCISA are generally weak and under-defined. Paragraph 4(e), under “Guiding principles”, sets out in a very general way the authorized actors in the revamped information-sharing regime. Subsection 5(1) of SCISA posits a need to know based on the notion of relevance, again a very general and potentially overbroad measure.

While it would never be possible to strictly operationalize a “need to know” function, because to do so might be to hamstring any information-sharing regime, SCISA errs, in my view, on the side of unhelpful generalizations, compounded by the implication of subsection 5(2) that, once information sharing is set in motion, it can continue down an undetermined path of further disclosure.

One remedy to consider would be to import a version of the limitation set out for CSIS in its act in section 2, through the use of a strictly necessary yardstick for information sharing.

Justice Noël, in a recent Federal Court ruling on CSIS warrants and the retention of metadata, has reminded us of the historical context of that CSIS-limiting clause. As Justice Noël indicated, it may be time to review the strictures of the CSIS Act, but if the strictly necessary provisions of the act are deemed worthy of maintaining, then their applicability to an information-sharing regime for national security purposes seems, to me, obvious.

Then there is the need-to-share principle.

The need-to-share principle rules SCISA. This might be regarded as an “Oh, duh” moment, but the problem is that the principle rules in a completely unbalanced way that, among other problems, might have an impact on the very objective it seeks: more effective information sharing in the interests of national security. There are three problems, I think, with SCISA in its adopted form.

The first is the large number of entities listed for participation in SCISA's schedule 3. This list stretches the meaning of the core security and intelligence community to include many entities with only a very marginal role in national security matters. The list can be further shaped by Governor in Council orders that would not necessarily be in the public domain.

Many of the listed entities will be only bit players, at best, in the scheme. The recent annual report of the Privacy Commissioner gives substance to this reality, as he found that in the first five months of SCISA, only five institutions utilized powers in the act. A bigger problem is that while agencies outside the core security and intelligence community might on occasion have valuable information in their possession, they lack the attributes of rigour, methods, and understanding of national security matters.

The SCISA entities listed in schedule 3 should, in my view, include only core elements of the Canadian security and intelligence community. These can be identified and, in keeping with this, the list should be considerably reduced from the 17 named organizations. Moreover, I think there should be a requirement that all listed entities have a common formal memorandum of understanding to guide their information-sharing practices internally.

A second problem is the expansive justification for information sharing provided in SCISA. As noted, the justification found at subsection 5(1) is relevance, which is not, in my view, a tight enough criterion as it does not provide any rigorous guidance and does not allow for any real accountability. Relevance needs to be replaced by some form of language about necessity and should include a measure of proportionality that is linked to mandates and to threats.

The third and arguably the mother of all these problems is the question of how SCISA defines the nature of the information to be shared. SCISA adopts a new definition at section 2 regarding “activity that undermines the security of Canada”, and I know you've heard a lot about that. This is a more expansive and open-ended definition than that provided in the CSIS Act, and I have heard no good argument for the change.

While I appreciate that the drafters of the legislation may have felt that a broader definition of the kinds of threats that now impact on Canada may have been required, on balance the definition they provided does not advance the public interest and has sown confusion and, in my view, many misplaced ideas about the powers provided for SCISA. A replacement use of the definition of threat in section 2 of the CSIS Act advances many of the same objectives, is an established criterion, and would provide greater clarity.

In particular, paragraph 2(i) of SCISA, as it currently stands, introduces a very dangerous dimension to government powers insofar as it opens the door to foreign interference in the domestic politics and sovereignty of Canada. It is also unclear to me how the SCISA definition of undermining the security of Canada operates for CSIS—one of the core agencies in the national security information-sharing regime—alongside its own mandate of threats to the security of Canada differently defined.

Fourth is the need to avoid information overload. Very briefly on this, one reason that it is important to find the right equilibrium between the competing demands of the need to know and the need to share involves the potential problem of information overload. If agencies and departments under SCISA are flooded with information that is ultimately not necessary to national security, not only does this information flood waste resources and personnel and impose additional burdens in terms of information security but it also hinders the overall operational effectiveness that is so important in a security and intelligence system that must constantly adjust its work according to its own calculations of threat and risk and that is always under immense resource constraints.

A too-expansive information system is not a precautionary measure; it can simply be an unnecessary burden. Too much information can be worse than too little.

The need to avoid the information-overload principle cannot be directly legislated. It has to be a product of the proper balance between need to know and need to share.

With regard to the need to secure, although SCISA contains an element of exhortation, particularly in sections 3 and 4, there is no exhortation regarding the related requirement in any information-sharing regime, and in particular in a more expansive system, for the careful protection of shared information. In an age of increased cyber-threats and in the face of the usual human proclivities for error and mishap, an expanded information-sharing regime must be accompanied by greater information-security practices. There is nothing of the sort in SCISA.

One way that such practices can be subject to internal self-examination in the departments and agencies involved in information-sharing is through mandated privacy impact assessments, but I note that in the 2015-16 annual report to Parliament by the Privacy Commissioner, only two of the 17 entities authorized to collect information under SCISA had deemed privacy impact assessments to be necessary. Even in those two cases, the privacy impact assessments, which under Treasury Board guidelines are meant to inform policies prior to their being fully implemented, were still being developed.

Another measure that could be considered in amendments to SCISA would be to provide an authorized role for departmental security officers in monitoring and reporting on information security measures.

[Daniel Therrien, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada]

Thank you, Mr. Chair and members of the committee, for inviting me to discuss the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, or SCISA, which was enacted under Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015.

When Bill C-51 was introduced in Parliament in early 2015, I expressed strong reservations, which remain true today. In my remarks this morning, I'll briefly summarize these reservations and will then encourage you to review national security information sharing issues more broadly. Finally, I'll explain the review we have undertaken of how SCISA has operated so far and how other legal authorities are used by federal institutions to share information for national security purposes.

My first point is that the justification for SCISA should be made clearer. I recognize at a general level that greater information sharing may sometimes lead to the detection and suppression of security threats, but we have yet to hear a clear explanation, with practical examples, of how the previous law prevented the sharing of information needed for national security purposes. A clearer articulation of the problems with the past law would help define a proportionate solution.

Second, I remain concerned that SCISA authorizes information to be shared where it's merely relevant to national security goals. Setting such a low standard is a key reason why the risks to law-abiding citizens are excessive. If the necessity or strictly necessary criteria is adequate for CSIS to collect, analyze and retain information, as has been the case since its inception, it's unclear to us why this standard can’t be adopted for all departments and agencies with a stake in national security. Necessity is the international privacy standard.

On a side note, the issue of standards leads me to the preamble of the act, which you discussed with government officials last week. This preamble indicates that information is to be shared among departments in a manner that is consistent with the charter and the protection of privacy. However, this is not a true legal standard, but rather a wish or a pious hope.

As we indicated in our submissions to Parliament last year, we believe that effective privacy protection requires more than guiding principles that don't have the force of law. It requires the adoption of real legal standards. The obligation to disclose information in a manner that is consistent with privacy protection should therefore become an enforceable legal standard, as is the case with the rules governing the disclosure of information. To that end, SCISA should adopt not only the principle of necessity, but also that of proportionality.

Third, independent review of information-sharing activities is incomplete, given that 14 of the 17 receiving institutions under SCISA don't have dedicated review bodies. A parliamentary review, such as the one suggested by Bill C-22, will help but is insufficient. All departments involved in national security also need to be reviewed by independent experts.

Fourth, retention rules should be clarified. If the government maintains that the sharing of information about ordinary citizens—such as travellers or taxpayers—is necessary to identify new threats, national security agencies should be required to dispose of that information after these analyses and when the vast majority of individuals have been cleared of any terrorist activities.

Fifth, the law should require written information agreements. Required elements to be addressed in these agreements should include the personal information being shared, the specific purposes for the sharing, and limitations on secondary use or onward transfer. Other measures should be prescribed by the regulations, such as safeguards, retention periods and accountability measures.

While SCISA was an important addition to the Canadian legal framework related to national security, it is intended to be one element of a much larger whole. Limiting your review to SCISA will give you a very incomplete picture of national security information-sharing activities. I would therefore encourage you to also examine information-sharing with international partners and domestic information-sharing under legal authorities other than SCISA. Knowing more about other authorities will give you a better insight into whether SCISA is really necessary.

When Bill C-51 was tabled, I committed to examining and reporting on how its implementation would ensure compliance with the Privacy Act and inform the public debate. Our findings following the first phase of our review of the first six months of SCISA implementation are tabled in the most recent annual report. We have identified a number of concerns and offered recommendations. The OPC has concluded that the privacy impact of the new authorities conferred by SCISA was not properly evaluated during implementation, and we recommended that formal privacy impact assessments be performed.

The OPC also found several weaknesses with a Public Safety Canada guidance document intended to help departments implement SCISA. Although Public Safety Canada agreed to improve the guidance, no changes have been made a year after the OPC provided recommendations aimed at minimizing privacy risks. During our review, the OPC sent a questionnaire to all federal institutions to determine how often SCISA was used and, more particularly, whether it had been used to share information about persons suspected of terrorist activities or about law-abiding citizens. Most institutions told us that they had not used SCISA during the review period, but that they relied, instead, on other authorities.

So, there is information sharing for national security purposes, but most institutions told us that they are relying on other sources of authority than SCISA.

Five institutions told us that they have used SCISA for a total of 58 disclosures and 52 receipts of information. Institutions also told us that all SCISA information-sharing activities in the first six months following implementation concerned persons suspected of terrorism.

During phase 2 of our audit, we will review departmental records to verify whether that information is accurate and whether information sharing under authorities other than SCISA concerned suspects or persons not suspected of terrorist activities.

The goal of this review is to provide as clear a picture as possible on the use of SCISA, and other laws, in order to inform public and parliamentary debate as we head toward the government's planned review of Bill C-51. We would like that review of Bill C-51 to occur with a clear, factual, evidentiary basis, as opposed to simply a discussion of principles, however important the principles are.

With that, I would be happy to take your questions.

Freedom of the Press

[Thomas Mulcair, NDP, Outremont, QC]

Mr. Speaker, those journalists were on the Hill today calling for a full public inquiry.

The government has no right to spy on journalists, period. The Liberals are all talk and no action. They refused to conduct a public inquiry. They refused to repeal Bill C-51 and they refused to fix Bill C-22.

What concrete measures are the Liberals going to take to protect freedom of the press in Canada?

[Prof. Stephanie Carvin]

These are some very interesting and challenging questions. With regard to data sharing, it's not.... I read an article yesterday which suggested that because the RCMP now has this operational centre they're sharing all their databases or bringing them all together. No, it doesn't work like that.

Services are bureaucracies, and they are very protective of their information and their people. They've been criticized in the past for not sharing information appropriately. I think there is a perception that it is a kind of free-for-all and that there is data sharing. I am supportive of putting more clarity on the process itself, such as, for example, in Bill C-51, even though that's not what we are talking about here specifically.

I also believe that there should be.... Perhaps this will get to some of your questions on defence. Craig Forcese, the professor at the University of Ottawa whose work I very much admire, talks about having a super-SIRC that would enable the organizations, or at least the committee or some body, to follow the information as it goes from one agency to another. I think there needs to be slightly more appreciation for the safeguards that are put in place within these organizations, as I understood them.

[Prof. Stephanie Carvin]

Thank you for your question.

One of the issues that I think illustrated this was the debate over Bill C-51. A lot in Bill C-51 could perhaps have been criticized, but debate over it often came between individuals who were accusing those who did not want to support the bill as being in favour of child molesters, and, on the other hand, individuals who were accusing those who did support the bill of trying to create a 1984 surveillance state.

My concern is that the security environment in Canada has evolved considerably since the Cold War and I'm not convinced Canadians' understanding of that issue has. That's not to discredit the fabulous people working on this area, but let's just take the example of espionage. It's no longer about states trying to break into safes to steal designs for submarines or trying to steal the crown jewels of secrets. It's now about trying to get the health records of individuals through cyber-intrusions in order to use that information to exploit these individuals or to find out information on them where they may be vulnerable.

It's that kind of transition in terms of the scope of activities that we see some of these states doing that I think needs to be raised up. I would like to see this committee talk about the evolution of national security issues that this country faces and then communicate to the country what our services are doing in order to respond.

Privacy

[Brian Masse, NDP, Windsor West, ON]

Madam Speaker, I am proud to stand here as a New Democrat. New Democrats have often brought truth to the powers that be, whether on climate change, on rights, or on a number of different things that have taken place in this chamber, and moved a number of causes. Cybersecurity, privacy rights, personal rights, and of course user rights are very important for our future.

I am not pleased to hear the response, in the sense that we know Bill C-51 has exposed so many Canadians to personal privacy data breach. Most recently, journalists have been spied on in our country, so we need this issue very sincerely looked at immediately. It needs to protect personal privacy and it needs to make sure there will be accountability to the government resources and those that expose or use the data.

Most important, it is part of our individual collective freedom in a civil society that we actually have the rights and our information protected at all times.

[Michel Picard, Liberal, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness]

Madam Speaker, I would like to thank the hon. member for his question regarding Canada’s privacy laws and the challenges faced by law enforcement in an era where communications technologies are changing rapidly. As the hon. member knows, these are important issues.

On the one hand, our law enforcement and national security agencies need to be able to collect information and evidence to investigate crimes and protect our national security. At the same time, we must ensure that the authorities that we give these agencies are consistent with our values and our rights and freedoms as set out in the charter.

As well, it is vitally important that the government work with the private sector to ensure that organizations take appropriate steps to protect the information that they receive from Canadians.

That is why the government has launched two sets of consultations. The first set of consultations on cybersecurity was launched on August 16. As hon. members know, the cybersecurity landscape is constantly evolving, and our government is committed to ensuring that Canada is an innovative leader in cybersecurity while also keeping Canadians safe online.

We heard from thousands of Canadians on the cyber security threat and how we can capitalize on the advantages of new technologies and the digital economy. That consultation wrapped up recently, and Public Safety is analyzing the many submissions.

The second set of consultations on national security was launched by both the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness on September 8. These consultations are an invaluable opportunity to engage Canadians on Canada's national security framework. They are an important step toward fulfilling this government's commitment to review Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act, 2015.

As part of the consultations on national security, we have invited Canadians to provide feedback on a number of different issues, including how best to ensure that our law enforcement and national security agencies have the tools they need to protect Canadians while simultaneously ensuring that Canadians' rights, including privacy rights, are protected.

We are also inviting Canadians to provide their thoughts on how we can ensure that our national security agencies are accountable to Canadians, and a range of other issues.

We have already begun to make important changes in this regard with the introduction of Bill C-22, the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians act. If passed, Bill C-22 would, for the first time, enable parliamentarians to meaningfully review the activities of our national security agencies.

The Government of Canada has two fundamental duties: to protect the safety and security of Canadians, and to uphold the Constitution to ensure that our laws respect the rights and personal freedoms we enjoy in this country.

I look forward to a diverse and vigorous debate on these issues. I hope that hon. members of this House will join Canadians in participating in these important consultations.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

Well, it's hard for me to comment, because the decision is 137 pages long and it was issued just as I was walking over here for this committee hearing. I've only read the summary.

I think it's going to be an important decision. I think it relates to a long-standing question as to how you construe section 12 in terms of the competency of CSIS to retain data. It is going to have important knock-on effects, it seems to me, in terms of the information sharing provisions in Bill C-51, because it says something about the capacity of CSIS to become a sort of data dump location, that is, to derive a huge database of accrued information from across government. These new retention standards that the court articulates will presumably stand, in part at least, as a barrier to that, although again I need to read the case more carefully.

[Murray Rankin, NDP, Victoria, BC]

I acknowledge my debt.

Mr. Forcese, The Globe and Mail just reported that a Federal Court ruling says CSIS has illegally retained sensitive data on Canadians over a 10-year period. This is the second time in three years the courts have found that CSIS has breached the duty of candour and hidden information from judges. Some of this stems from the powers in Bill C-51.

Professor Forcese, what does this ruling mean in terms of the need to repeal Bill C-51 and strengthen Bill C-22?

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you both for being here.

I want to take advantage of the remaining few minutes to take you a little bit away from the mechanics of effective review, which is most of what we heard this afternoon both in this panel and in its predecessor, to look at the social and political environment in which this committee is going to operate, with a specific focus on and interest in the creation of a public value of trust in government.

I sit on the defence committee as well. That committee has received evidence that I will put to you. The single biggest threat against Canadian society is domestic terrorism. In fact, it is domestic terrorism that really has brought some very specific concerns by particular communities in Canada with respect to the former Bill C-51. When we talk about the creation of trust in governments specifically through that lens of domestic terrorism, I think it's a very salient topic. Public Safety's “2016 Public Report On The Terrorist Threat To Canada” outlines that in some detail.

Assuming, then, that a good chunk of the committee's work is taken up by a review of action, intelligence gathering, and other activities with respect to domestic terrorism, what will that mean for this committee, both with respect to the mechanics of effective review, as we've discussed it, and equally important, with respect to its role, as has been described by Professor Wark, as an educator and as an outreach mechanism to the Canadian public?

My hunch is that the Canadian public isn't at par even with the parliamentarians who will be appointed to this committee with respect to an understanding of national security, and this committee will face some constraints in terms of bridging that gap.

I wanted to hear from you what levers are reflected in the bill and what levers are at our disposal administratively or in terms of resourcing this committee to make sure it can play that role well and enhance public trust in government.

[Prof. Kent Roach]

Yes, if there was only one amendment, it would probably be to clause 14, that is, to take out paragraph (g), just to argue that the new parliamentary committee needs the same access as SIRC has, but also needs to work as closely as possible with SIRC, the CSE commissioner, and the RCMP review body. Indeed, I think there is some potential that the secretariat of the new committee, which I think will be critical to its success, could work with those existing review bodies that have the confidence of the agencies. Although the idea of having to win trust from the agencies is not a particularly palatable one for an affected parliamentarian, I think that reforming clause 14, which, as my colleague has said, is a very broadly defined no-go area, will undermine public expectations about what a parliamentary committee could do, say, with respect to something like the Afghan detainees, while working closely with the existing review bodies.

I guess one of my greatest fears about Bill C-22 is that it could lead people to think that this is somehow duplicative of the work of the existing review bodies. The Arar commission found that the review structure was inadequate in 2006, and it could be seen to be much more inadequate today after Bill C-51. There needs to be a very close relationship between the new committee and the existing review bodies. I think this will benefit the executive watchdog review and will help the new parliamentary committee to gain credibility while being educated about where they should be placing their limited resources and time.

[Wesley Wark]

I'm an optimistic academic and I'm convinced that the government will, indeed, move to fulfill its election promises to amend the problematic aspects of Bill C-51 that are now embedded in different forms of legislation.

With regard to your best path forward, I've said that this isn't perfect legislation. I've suggested, as Mr. Atkey has done, that elements of it can change. What I would really see, and I agree fully with Ron on this, is this legislation passed in some form in this parliamentary session to allow us to get on with the work. It will be reviewed in five years.

I would be more encouraged to see a genuine all-party consensus on revised legislation. That would be a big achievement. I'd care less about the exact details of how you're going to revise it. I think there are certain elements of it that you should focus on. I wouldn't focus on the membership questions. I would do some fine-tuning of the powers of the committee in terms of access to information and the exclusionary elements that it can't get into. Elements of that can be fine-tuned, but I don't think you need to go through the whole thing with a fine-toothed comb. Large elements would stand.

If, at the end of the day, you're happiest in an all-party sense to just pass the legislation as it is, I would still, in a way, cheer to the heavens. I've been waiting for a very long time to see this kind of parliamentary activism on national security, and the biggest benefit it will have in the long run will be to better educate Canadians about the realities and challenges of national security and intelligence work in Canada, where I think we have a profound democratic deficit.

[Ron Atkey, Adjunct Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. I thank all of you for the invitation to appear to assist your study of Bill C-22.

Like my friend Wesley Wark, I believe this represents a major and welcome change within our Canadian parliamentary system. I say this having been both a parliamentarian for two short terms under Liberal and Progressive Conservative governments, as well as the first chair of the Security Intelligence Review Committee in 1984-89.

It's a major change because it accepts the recommendation, as Wesley pointed out, of not only the Macdonald commission in the seventies, but also the of the Mackenzie commission in the sixties. It goes back to there, where they recommended some form of parliamentary oversight committee.

I recall that at the time Canadian governments and their security agencies were a bit hesitant at allowing elected MPs into the national security tent, because there was no assurance that they could keep security information a secret in the red-hot political environment in Ottawa. There was some concern among our allies at the time that elected members of Parliament should have access to the most secretive of all secrets, let alone have the time and inclination to monitor closely the vast array of departments and agencies with various security issues.

I must admit that when I was the first chair of SIRC, in 1984, our committee of privy councillors, and we were from different political parties, all went along with the notion that expert review of security intelligence was something that should be done only by independent persons of experience who could talk to MPs to get their views without necessarily giving them the secret information they might otherwise be interested in.

Bill C-22 represents a welcome change to that way of thinking—welcome in the sense that we saw Canada in the last three decades fall behind our parliamentary cousins in the United Kingdom and Australia in terms of accountability to Parliament, and we have now the chance to get caught up. It's welcome also in the sense that the important parliamentary debates in this century, particularly after 9/11 on Bill C-36, and after the 2014 attacks in Ottawa and Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu on Bill C-51, were overly partisan, in my opinion, and not as well informed in the absence of a committee of parliamentarians such as the one being proposed.

I have some amendments. You asked me a couple of weeks ago what I would propose, and let me suggest just a couple. Let me say at the outset I emphasize that this is a good bill and it should be passed in this session of Parliament. It will help to ensure Canadians that their elected representatives will play a key overview role in accountability for the important but dangerous powers granted to some 17 departments and agencies that relate to national security.

Is it a perfect bill? No. Are there areas where amendments can be considered to improve the bill? Yes. Will this bill fix all the problems of BillC-51 and companion legislation that have concerned many Canadians over the last 18 months? Not at all. This bill is a first good step, but it should not be an excuse for government in action on fixing Bill C-51 during the remainder of this Parliament.

First of all, I suggest amendment on ministerial veto. Have a close look at this. The possibility of the proposed committee's work being frustrated by any minister determining that the review of his or her department would be injurious to national security is overly protected and should be removed or modified.

No such veto existed when I chaired SIRC between 1984 and 1989. And yes, there were tensions from time to time with CSIS, the body we were reviewing, but matters were worked out as they are in a reasonable context of being within the security tent. To my knowledge, no security operations were compromised at the time.

The language of BillC-22 in paragraph 8(b) reflects a reluctance to have the committee of parliamentarians act as a true watchdog.

Access to information is the second of my amendments. In order to do its work, the committee is rightly given access in clause 13 to any information that is under control of the department. This is a key for any watchdog to be effective, yet there are important exceptions in clause 14, which are well understood and accepted in the security intelligence community. I accept those for the most part.

However, then comes the discretionary refusal of information in clause 16, where the minister has decided that the provision of the information would be injurious to national security or would constitute special operational information. That's the nub. This is open-ended and dangerous in my opinion. Yes, the minister must tell the committee the reasons for the open-ended refusal, and this should be considered by way of amendment. But I think other investigative work of the committee may be frustrated if this is retained in its current form.

The third area of amendments relates to prime ministerial redactions.

A broad power is given in Bill C-22, in subclause 21(5), allowing the PM to direct the committee to submit a revised report to Parliament, one that has been censored for reasons of national security, national defence, or international relations.

This is a matter that was litigated between the Arar commission and the Harper government in 2007. Here I make full disclosure that I was participating in that case, as counsel on behalf of the Arar commission. The court had to consider, in that case, some 2,000 words in dispute in the commission's final report. Justice Noel found that a half of them should be disclosed in the public interest and a half of them should remain confidential.

The directed wording of Bill C-22 would preclude this court adjudication and would give full power to the PM and his officials to censor committee reports he doesn't like, with no explanation. At the very least, I think when he directs redactions, he should have to give the committee a detailed reason for his decision in camera, as in the case with ministerial refusals of information under subclause 16(2).

Finally, I recommend some form of dispute settlement system for some of these contentious matters, whether it's paragraph 8(b), or subclauses 16(1) or 21(5), the ones that I've just mentioned. They should be subject to in camera dispute settlement in the courts.

In my experience, the nine designated judges of the Federal Court have the proper structure and experience to adjudicate balancing the need for government secrecy against the public interest in disclosure in accordance with law.

In my concluding comments with respect to general structures and powers, let me offer three observations.

I do appreciate that Bill C-22, as it stands, is an initial step for Canada in letting parliamentarians into the national security tent, and that's good. But these observations of mine are not meant to deter Parliament from proceeding promptly in this parliamentary session.

First of all is the appointment of the chair. This was raised in the debate on second reading in the House. To ensure that the committee is truly a creature of Parliament, couldn't the chair be elected by Parliament, rather than appointed by the PM?

In a majority government situation, the PM's preference would likely proceed but, remember, this is permanent legislation and there may come a day when a minority Parliament might want to elect a member of the official opposition as chair. I think you might consider the long-term implications of that.

Second is the selection of members of the committee. Consultation on selections by the Prime Minister with leaders of the opposition parties, which is provided in Bill C-22, has worked in the past when there has been genuine consultation and not simply notification. But to ensure that the system is not abused for partisan purposes, there should be ratification of all members of the committee by Parliament itself. I think that would just be a good check that you might want to build into the system.

Finally, and I hesitate to sound like a lawyer on this, while you're not going to be establishing a committee that's a court of law or an administrative tribunal acting accordingly in the judicial context, the committee of parliamentarians, in carrying out its statutory review under clause 8 of Bill C-22, may require, and should require, subpoena power to summon witnesses, compel testimony on oath or affirmation, and require the production of all necessary documents.

This may be necessary where public servants are reluctant to respond to reasonable requests by the committee, or in situations where private sector individuals have particular knowledge about a security activity being carried out by a particular department. I think you might empower your committee of parliamentarians to have these particular powers.

In conclusion, Bill C-22, in its current or amended form, represents an historic opportunity for Canada to bring accountability for security intelligence into the 21st century.

My hope is that whatever form of bill emerges from these committee proceedings, it ultimately enjoys the complete support of Parliament as a whole, both here and in the other place.

Building trust, in my experience, is a two-way street. Parliamentarians have to be prepared to put in place a review system that has the respect and support of all members working co-operatively within the security tent to ensure there is a proper balance in the system that protects Canadians, yet respects rights and freedoms.

Similarly, government departments and agencies must recognize and respect that parliamentary security review operating within appropriate boundaries is not a nuisance, and that it means, ultimately, a stronger and more accountable form of government for the benefit of all Canadians.

I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.

[Wesley Wark, Visiting Professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Chairman, members of the committee, it's a great pleasure to have the chance to give testimony on Bill C-22, An Act to establish the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians .

I'd like to begin by making some brief contextual remarks about the legislation. Genuine parliamentary capacity to scrutinize intelligence and security has been a long-time coming in Canada. Having such a body was first proposed by the McDonald commission over 30 years ago, but was rejected by a special Senate committee established to review the commission's report and recommendations. Instead, we got a different accountability mechanism back then, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, established with the CSIS Act in 1984.

Despite various efforts to bring forward legislation in subsequent years, including several attempts in recent years, Bill C-22 marks the first time that a legislative proposal supported by the government has come to a standing committee for hearings.

Much wasted time has passed and much has changed in the intervening years. The necessity for a committee of parliamentarians of the kind envisaged by Bill C-22 is irrefutable, in my view. We have been left behind by the efforts of our allies in legislative branch scrutiny. The Canadian security and intelligence community, which will be the subject of the reviews conducted by the proposed committee, has undergone tremendous change, in particular since the 9/11 attacks, and now benefits from much greater resources, capacity, and power than it has ever experienced in Canadian history.

With that increase in power comes a corresponding increase in the need for strategic level scrutiny of the activities of the security and intelligence community as a whole and a crying need for real parliamentary capacity. In addition, the Canadian public is much more attuned to security and intelligence issues than in the past and there is a much higher expectation in the public domain for the delivery of accountability, transparency, and adequate public knowledge.

I fully support Bill C-22. I think it represents a necessary and timely experiment in parliamentary democracy and activism. I give full credit to the Liberal government for seeing the importance of parliamentary scrutiny of security and intelligence and for making this a centrepiece of its response to the previous government's anti-terrorism legislation, Bill C-51, and for making it a promise in their election platform.

I don't think Bill C-22 is perfect, but Parliament will have to decide how significant the gaps might be between a perfect scheme and something good enough for a start-up. If we are honest, this is what Bill C-22 represents, a start-up. It's the beginning of a delayed experiment in parliamentary scrutiny, which requires, of course, robust legislation, but which will also be dependent on many other factors and will require a period of maturation before it can become fully effective.

This has been the experience of the U.K.'s Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, on which the Canadian legislation is clearly based. The U.K. committee was created in 1994, has over 20 years of experience, and was granted revised powers and procedures in legislation in 2013.

The success of the proposed national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians will depend, beyond robust legislation, on many factors, including strong membership, reflecting the stature of the committee, which makes it a highly desirable place for MPs and senators to aspire to a seat around the table; a steep learning curve about the complex domestic and international dimensions of intelligence activities; the trust of key agencies in the security and intelligence community; earned legitimacy in Parliament; and last but not least, and perhaps most important of all, public legitimacy, twinned with an understanding that one of the key roles of the a national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians is to build and sustain public understanding of the role and challenges of intelligence and security endeavours in a democracy.

It seems to me that these are the challenges ahead for the committee, but to meet them the committee will need the right legislative tools.

In terms of having the right legislative tools, Bill C-22 has to find what I would call a “sweet spot” between committee access to secrets and the protection of secrets. Finding this sweet spot is the challenge before you in your study of this legislation. That sweet spot can be examined under five headings, all of which are core elements of Bill C-22: membership, mandate, powers, resources, and protection against leaks.

In the time remaining, I propose to make some short remarks about the strengths and weaknesses of Bill C-22, as it currently stands, under those five headings.

First of all, I will discuss membership. My plea to the committee would be not to too hung up on membership, though I imagine you might well do that. The key thing is having good members and instilling a culture of non-partisanship. How you arrive at those members is something that you'll have to determine. It's certainly the case that the Canadian proposal in Bill C-22 falls a little behind the revised procedures currently being used by the U.K. Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, but I hope this doesn't become the overweening focus of the committee's deliberations.

Mandate is the second issue.

The mandate proposed for Bill C-22 is very broad, and that's good, but it comes with challenges. There are core agencies of the security and intelligence community that will preoccupy the committee and take up almost all of its time. I would prefer to see these core agencies named, as is the case with the legislation for the U.K. intelligence and security committee.

You can of course maintain the broad mandate while still naming the key agencies that are going to be the subject of your work, by adding an additional clause indicating that other government departments and agencies would be under the purview of the committee as required and as it pursues its mandate. I think, however, that it's critical to name those core agencies, in part to assist the committee in coming up with a useful work plan and in part to help the public understand what its expectations around the reporting of this committee will be.

I would also add under mandate that it would be important to include something that does not currently fall under the mandate, which is a direct reference to operations. By operations I mean past operations. This area should be listed as part of the mandate of the committee, as is the current U.K. practice.

I'm going to skip over powers for a minute and turn to resources. The Bill C-22 provisions for a secretariat are, I believe, excellent. I had the opportunity to talk to the visiting intelligence and security committee delegation that travelled to Ottawa recently, and this was one of the things they commented on. They clearly felt some degree of jealousy about the explicit provisions for resources for a secretariat and for the leadership of that secretariat. This is one of the strongest pieces of the Bill C-22 legislation. I hope it will be supported and sustained.

Protection against leaks is a question of finding the sweet spot between access to secrets and protection against the inadvertent or deliberate revealing of secrets. The measures that are provided in Bill C-22 to protect against leaks are clearly overwrought; they go beyond the kinds of measures that were proposed in previous versions of draft legislation.

They're overwrought in imposing a security clearance requirement on members. I say “overwrought” in that regard because it is very likely that members of the national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians would not be cleared to the highest levels, in part because I can't quite imagine MPs and senators wishing to undergo polygraph examination.

I also think it's completely unnecessary. All it really needs is what was proposed in many versions of previous legislation, which is reliance on an oath of secrecy as the principal protection required, with an assumption of trust with regard to the behaviour of MPs and senators sitting on the committee. A properly administered oath of secrecy, surrounded by the kinds of protections you'll need with regard to documents and document handling that would be enforced by the secretariat is in my view sufficient. From my perspective, I think the government overplayed its hand here.

That leads me to the final point, which is about powers. I suspect this will be one of the most contentious issues you'll have to address in this committee. Again, I would urge you to think about these powers in the context of that sweet spot between access to secrets on the part of the committee and protecting legitimate secrets held by the government and provided to the government, possibly by many of our allied partners.

There are many complicated provisions contained in Bill C-22 with respect to access to records and in respect to reporting. I'm not going to run through these in detail. The point I would simply like to make is that in comparison with the U.K. legislation, which I think could usefully be our guide here, the legislation in Bill C-22 goes a little further than necessary. It's too complex and can be usefully simplified around the protection of intelligence sources and methods and around any kind of divulgence that might impact upon the proper working of intelligence and security agencies.

A lot of the other kinds of clauses and exemptions in terms of access to reports or the nature of reporting that could be done I think are frankly unnecessary. I think it could be very helpful in terms of the committee's work, Parliament's understanding of its work, the public's understanding of its work, and removing any suspicions about excessive executive control over this committee if all of those efforts to corral access and reporting could be vastly simplified.

One thing, in particular, that I want to draw the committee's attention to is to be careful about including in C-22 an exemption to access and reporting that refers directly to operational information. That is a reference to the Security of Information Act, and the definition of operational information in the Security of Information Act, which was passed as part of the Anti-terrorism Act in 2001, is extremely broad and, if it were read literally, could really bring the work of the committee to a halt. My main message is that this part of C-22 could be usefully and practically simplified.

Just by way of quick conclusion, there are two things I would encourage the committee to do as it scrutinizes C-22. First, seek genuine parliamentary consensus on an acceptable form of legislation, and practice bipartisanship as you do so. It seems there is a good amount of bipartisanship already, in terms of the sharing of ice cream going on, so this is a good sign.

I say this because consensus and bipartisanship are going to be the working ethic of the committee that is established. It would be a good place to start, to think about these things in this committee.

Second, keep in mind that the proposed national security and intelligence committee of parliamentarians is a start-up and will be reviewed after five years, and accept that there is no perfect formula for balancing secrecy requirements and access requirements. Pease don't spin your wheels too much on that.

I'll end with a quote. As General William “Wild Bill” Donovan was fond of saying during his leadership of the Office of Strategic Services in World War II, “Perfect is the enemy of the good.”

Thank you.

[Sukanya Pillay]

I admit that I may talk to people who tend to already be interested in this issue, but certainly I've talked to people who aren't.

However, I saw a coming together of Canadians on Bill C-51 and a concern about the scope of information sharing that I hadn't seen before in recent years. Based on that and based on the response that CCLA had to the application that we brought and the very specific grounds in our application that referred to SCISA in particular and also broadly to Bill C-51, my answer is that we had a swell of support among Canadians.

I would also point out that other colleagues among civil liberties organizations had petitions that were signed by hundreds of thousands of Canadians, so I think that Canadians are very concerned. We don't want an all-government all-knowing all-the-time society. We don't want an all-surveillance society.

We also recognize in this country that legitimate dissent and protest and disagreement and counter-speech are constitutionally protected rights in Canada, regardless of whether those opinions are directed at the Canadian government or a government anywhere else in the world. Provided that they don't engage in violence, these are activities that are protected. My view, based on the evidence of who signed up and who donated to the campaigns that we launched in this regard, is that Canadians are very much on board with protecting our privacy and making sure that any information shared is necessary and proportional.

[Pierre-Luc Dusseault, NDP, Sherbrooke, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

To respond to Mr. Massé, I would say that this was done during the previous Parliament, in Bill C-51.

The mistake too many governments make is to respond to unique, one-time situations by passing laws. Sometimes those laws are too radical and have unexpected consequences. Moreover, they are not necessarily adopted in the public interest, but rather in the political interest of a government. Unfortunately, many members in the previous Parliament fell into the C-51 trap.

That said, I would like to go back to the issue of the oversight of national security organizations and by the organization that will be created if Bill C-22 is adopted.

What do you think of the idea that existing oversight bodies, and the one that will be made up of parliamentarians, examine information in real time rather than information on past situations? Would it be appropriate that all of the oversight organizations, including the one made up of parliamentarians, have the information immediately, and not after the fact?

My question is addressed to you, Mr. Forcese.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

I'll start, and then Kent can jump in.

The Wakeling case involved information shared by the RCMP to American authorities under what's known as part VI of the Criminal Code, which is the wiretapping provision. It was a lawfully gathered wiretap that complied with the charter, and that information was then transmitted to the United States. The Supreme Court concluded that even though the information was lawfully collected, it was still subject to charter privacy protections that had to govern the manner of information sharing.

In that case the RCMP, under part VI of the Criminal Code, was successful in defending the constitutionality of that information sharing, because there was enough architecture in part VI that defined who was going to receive the information and it imposed safeguards on how that information would be transmitted. The court along the way, incidentally, made a point of noting the Arar case as an example of where things can go awry in information sharing.

Now transpose the holding in that case to the context for CSIS under the CSIS Act and for the Communications Security Establishment under the National Defence Act. There is none of the architecture that rendered the Criminal Code constitutional. None of that architecture is found in the CSIS Act or the National Defence Act, and yet those two agencies, CSIS and CSE, are elemental bodies in information sharing for the purposes of supporting Five Eyes activities and others.

I think Professor Roach and I were surprised that the government didn't take the opportunity in either Bill C-51, or before that in Bill C-44, to introduce that architecture to put this vital information sharing on sounder constitutional footing.

[Sukanya Pillay]

I suppose that I would have to provide the same answer that I gave a bit earlier, which is that we asked the question when Bill C-51 came out: why was this necessary? We had existing laws in place already. We have never received an appropriate answer, and I don't know why.

I do know that it is not a mere aspiration to say that we have to ensure that we have our constitutional safeguards in place and in mind. I would urge this committee to remember that it is not a choice necessarily between security and civil liberties; to the contrary, I think that we can only have effective security when we ensure that our civil liberties are there.

Civil liberties do not prevent, in the context of SCISA, for example, relevant, necessary, and proportional information from being shared; rather, they ensure that only relevant, necessary, and proportional information is being shared.

We have a wealth of information provided from three federal commissions of inquiry that speak directly to these issues of information. I would very much urge this honourable committee to consider that and to implement it in any recommendations that you make.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

I'm going to duck the first question, about why it happened, because that would require me to make a political judgment, and I'm no more qualified than anyone on the street to make that political judgment. The honest answer is that I don't know why it happened. There are probably a number of reasons.

Your second question is an important one. These are real issues. National security is an acute issue. How we grapple with it is an acute issue, both legally and operationally. One of the difficulties we have in Canada is that we're not sufficiently discursive on it; that is, the expertise in the area tends to be monopolized within government. Government tends to be close-lipped on national security issues. There is no diffusion of expertise, because we don't have a conversation, or at least up until this point we haven't had a conversation.

One of the things both Professor Roach and I said in the aftermath of Bill C-51 was that aside from whatever you think about the merits of Bill C-51, we can't have a process like this again. We need to have a more premeditated policy discussion. I think the idea of a consultation process in national security, which we've never had before, is a very valuable one.

Professor Roach and I have said that we have concerns about aspects of the green paper, and we do. We do not, however, have concerns about the existence of the green paper. We welcome the consultations that are under way across the country, which you mentioned. As private individuals trying to keep up, we welcome them, but we're finding them somewhat exhausting. That will help then encourage insight and expertise in this area and cultivate expertise outside of government.

[Rémi Massé, Liberal, Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, QC]

First of all, thank you for being here as a witness to participate in the work of our committee. I know that there is a lot of work needed to prepare for being here as a witness.

I'm not a lawyer; I'm just a new MP who used to run different organizations in the past. I'm not a specialist on the question either, but you used strong words throughout your presentation about Bill C-51. You said it was carelessly drafted, poorly drafted. You used an expression like trying to use wallpaper to cover a wall that is cracked.

It raises the question of why this happened. Was it a reaction to something that happened? Did we try to react quickly? Was it drafted quickly? Did the previous government provide poor direction?

The second question would be about what lessons we learned. If you tried to identify two or three lessons learned, could you say what those would be, so that we could avoid such situations?

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

I understand the government's view, which was taken during the Bill C-51 debates, that the new act doesn't authorize new collection, but it depends how you measure collection. Sufficiently broad information sharing allows for the pooling of information within the hands of one agency. The information that would not legally have been able to accrue in one agency is now available to it. Technically that's not collection in the sense that it's not been extracted from outside of government from an individual, but rather it's the amalgamation of information in a database in the hands of an agency.

Then the question becomes what the agency can do with that new amalgamated database. Are there controls on the searches it can run through that mother of all databases? Are there provisions that guard how it can then be combined with public-source information to paint an intimate portrait of an individual?

In the world of big data, the boundaries between collection and use are beginning to blur because of the amount of information that is currently in circulation and easily extractable from the public domain. In the absence of safeguards on how information is amalgamated by an agency and then what it can do with that information, I think that we run the risk that the net result is that the government knows more about people than it would otherwise know.

[Sukanya Pillay]

I think having a parliamentary committee would be a welcome move in Canada, but it is not a substitute for an independent reviewer of national security issues, so the two have to work together. Second, I think that Bill C-22 has ineffectual review, because at the end of the day there's discretion in terms of what can be withheld from the committee. That effectively undermines the whole objective, so that's problematic.

If I may add one thing, when I responded to Bill C-51, I stuck to the CSIS Act, but there are many other things with respect to CSIS, such as the references to the IRPA and the no-fly list, that I think need to be done, and they would also be very quick fixes.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

I would be more surgical in terms of the analogy to blowing up Bill C-51.

I think there are aspects of Bill C-51 that don't stand either a constitutional or a reasonableness test. The new speech crime of promotion and advocacy “of terrorism offences in general” is so sweeping that it encompasses speech that is potentially quite far removed from actual violence. There's no justification for it. Also, I think it underappreciates the extent to which speech that is closely affiliated with violence is already a terrorism crime under 15 or 14 existing terrorism crimes that existed before Bill C-51.

There are other aspects that are more complex, though. Take, for example, the CSIS threat reduction powers. You'll have different views on this. I am of the view that a case can be made that CSIS should have the capacity to act kinetically in limited circumstances—that is, to do more than be a watcher. How you craft that, though, is very different from the way it's been crafted in Bill C-51.

The other limit presently in Bill C-51 in terms of the circumstances in which CSIS can act is quite extreme. The prospect that CSIS, with a Federal Court warrant, could violate the charter is anathema to our constitutional tradition. More than that, it isn't actually responsive to the sorts of practices that one sees in other jurisdictions where they have deployed threat reduction successfully.

In the U.K. context, threat reduction by MI5 is generally spearheaded in a manner that facilitates criminal trials. Disruption in a U.K. context, based on what's in the public record, typically is that they make sure this person is arrested for not paying their local taxes. They may have a terrorism fear, but they can't act on it, so the police will bring a bona fide prosecution on some other grounds. Therefore, that's disruption. The criminal justice system is closely twinned there.

We haven't forced that twinning in the way that Bill C-51 has been crafted. The fear that Professor Roach and I have is that it could actually prove counterproductive. CSIS threat reduction could be counterproductive to a criminal law solution to terrorism.

[Sukanya Pillay]

I have an idealistic and a practical response to that. My idealistic response would be yes, that would have been great, and that's what we argued for when we had hearings on Bill C-51. My concern, though, is that we have an act in place now that's been operational for over a year, so how can we practically remove it?

I certainly do agree with the underpinning philosophy of Mr. Cavalluzzo, but I don't know where we are today. I think what we need to start with today are the serious problems that have been identified in our conversation this morning, including such things as a consolidated definition, such things as intelligence and evidence, and, very particularly, what I said in my opening statement with regard to the specific concerns in SCISA, where we have a definition that's overbroad, nothing in that act that ensures we have reliable information, no legally enforceable caveats, and two open potential charter land mines with respect to sections 7 and 8. If you're looking for practical fixes on this particular piece of legislation, I would say to please start there if you can't get rid of it altogether.

[Wayne Long, Liberal, Saint John—Rothesay, NB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our guests for coming in today.

Obviously, as Canadians, I think we do want to find that balance between security and civil liberties. We are in a new era in which we have to wait longer at airports and so on and so forth, and I think we're all prepared to do that.

I've done a lot of reading on this over the last couple of days. A constitutional lawyer, Paul Cavalluzzo, said in an article that Bill C-51 is so flawed that it should just basically be blown up or should have many, many amendments. Do you agree with the statement that Bill C-51 should just be blown up and we should start from scratch?

[Sukanya Pillay]

Thank you.

CCLA has always taken the position that we didn't know why Bill C-51 was needed. We knew that we had had these tragic events. We all agreed that they were tragic, but we did not know what the gaps were in the October 2014 existing laws that Bill C-51 was remedying. What we do know is that Bill C-51 introduced a whole new set of problems, and very serious problems, and that's what we're concerned about.

I guess my summation would be that the open-wound problems we see in Bill C-51 need to be addressed. I would also completely agree with Professors Forcese and Roach, as they've said at other times, that the problems we have with respect to intelligence and evidence have to be addressed. It comes full circle, in a way, to the question you asked two questions ago and to what I referred to in my opening statement, which is that nothing in SCISA ensures that we have reliable information. If our goal is to keep Canadians safe and to protect against threats of terrorism and terrorist activity, we must have reliable information, and we don't have that.

We've referred in our submissions elsewhere to William Binney, who was a whistle-blower in the U.S. You've all heard this analogy before, but it's worth repeating today: if you're looking for a needle in a haystack, don't create more hay. I'm afraid that's what we've done, but it's not as benign as just more hay. There are also other problems.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

I'll take a stab at that, because I know that Ms. Pillay is going to have a view as well.

I think Prof. Roach and I would be in the camp of those saying that Bill C-51 was trying to address real problems but, as I've suggested, overreacted in some respects and underreacted in others.

In terms of what should be done, we have prepared a 37-page paper responsive to the government's consultation document and proposing some very concrete measures that have the effect of doing their best to renovate what's in Bill C-51 but also push the agenda on things like intelligence to evidence, which again we see as an undergirding conundrum for Canadian law.

We say fix the regime, because it was trying to address some real problems. That's not the universal view, though.

[Bob Bratina, Liberal, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

We have a very high level of consultation right now on Bill C-51. What I am hearing is that there were already measures within the previous legislation that addressed issues of concern, so what should we do?

I'll ask you, if you were the king, how would you approach this? Can we set Bill C-51 aside and just work on filling the gaps, repairing the inappropriate definitions, and so on? What do you feel would be a good recommendation for us?

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

The honest answer to that is that we don't know. We have never had an accounting of the events of that day, other than some redacted reports from the police as to the security situation on the Hill. That can be juxtaposed with the Australian response to a similar incident in December 2014 and the British response to the murder of fusilier Lee Rigby in 2013, in which comprehensive reports were issued that looked at the landscape of security service actions and described where there were operational failures how they could improve.

In other words, we haven't done a “lessons learned”. That means it's next to impossible to look at the events of October 2014 and say definitively that if we had had this act at that time, things would have turned out differently.

My suspicion, based on what is on the public record, which is mostly journalistic accounts, is that the provisions of Bill C-51 were not responsive in any real way to the events of October 2014. I can't deny that in some of our work I've discussed how Bill C-51 not only overreacts in some of the ways we've discussed in terms of overbreadth, but also underreacts by not actually addressing the points that were raised in our last exchange about what caused the Air India disaster.

That is the awkward relationship between CSIS and the police, which means that we don't bring our A game to terrorism investigations. I like to call it “the tail wagging the national security dog in Canada”. The inability to reconcile those two agencies in terms of their information-sharing practices, I think, undergirds a lot of the workarounds that you see in various places in Canadian law, including Bill C-51.

The recommendation I would make to the current government is to fix that conundrum, much as the British have done between MI5 and the British police, which they did after the disasters of 7/7. Once we have fixed that, let's look and see whether there is a need for all these other measures that, on their face, seem so extreme.

[Bob Bratina, Liberal, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Thank you very much.

I've been going over the Chilcot report recently on the war in Iraq. In relation to information, it seems as if the old garbage-in, garbage-out regime existed and probably continues to exist. Is there anything in all the laws that we have, or in Bill C-51, that addresses the integrity of the information?

[Pat Kelly, Conservative, Calgary Rocky Ridge, AB]

Professor Forcese, in response to Mr. Dusseault's question about the necessity of the provisions of Bill C-51, were these necessary, or were existing laws in effect that were sufficient and allowed for sufficient sharing?

You mentioned the general override under privacy law, yet when a catastrophic crime such as Air India took place—and this was 30 years ago now—after the subsequent inquiries identified the failure in sharing between institutions, there was substantial outcry. In the event of a future crime of that scale, if it were discovered that law enforcement agencies had information in their possession but were unable or unwilling to share it, or feared to share it, I can only imagine the public outcry.

Sure, the public values privacy. We know that. We've heard that at this committee, and rightly so, yet the thought of law enforcement possessing information and failing to act on it would also be very upsetting to Canadians. If the override were good enough, I am not sure Canadians would agree with that. That act existed even 30 years ago.

[Nathaniel Erskine-Smith, Liberal, Beaches—East York, ON]

With regard to reviewing information sharing—all witnesses mentioned this—we don't have a particularly adequate review body to review information sharing between agencies.

Mr. Forcese, you mentioned the siloed nature of the three existing review bodies that we have.

In the previous Bill C-51 debate, my understanding is that an amendment had been put forward that would allow all information sharing to be submitted to the Privacy Commissioner for review. The Privacy Commissioner would issue an annual report to Parliament as to whether the information sharing was acceptable. I wonder if you'd comment on whether that proposal is adequate.

[Prof. Craig Forcese]

The only persuasive position I heard during the Bill C-51 debates was in relation, say, to weapons proliferation, weapons of mass destruction. Those sorts of matters could fall outside the scope of the threat to the security of Canada definition within the CSIS Act, so you would want to have a slightly broader definition to encompass those sorts of issues.

You could come up with something that's not as sweeping as the present definition in proposed section 2 that would address those sorts of bona fide concerns.

Opposition Motion—Preferential access to government

[Thomas Mulcair, NDP, Outremont, QC]

Mr. Speaker, seeing the Liberals tripping over themselves to avoid the real question, it makes me wonder if they even read the motion. Allow me to read it:

That, in the opinion of the House, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner should be granted the authority to oversee and enforce the directives to Ministers listed in Open and Accountable Government in order to end the current practice of “cash-for-access” by ensuring there is no preferential access to government, or appearance of preferential access, accorded to individuals or organizations because they have made financial contributions to politicians or political parties.

It is quite easy to understand why people want to make this real, because it is one of the things the government promised.

You might recall, Mr. Speaker, because I am sure you went through it like we did, that the Liberals promised real change. Unfortunately now, in their second year and listening to the answers today, we realize that there is nothing real and there has been no change.

Here is the reality. Yesterday I asked a simple question of the Prime Minister, quoting his own document. I will read it, word for word. The Prime Minister wrote in the mandate letter of every one of his ministers the following:

...you must uphold the highest standards of honesty and impartiality.... This is an obligation that is not fully discharged by simply acting within the law.

Now we have just heard the deputy House leader in his 20-minute speech and his 10-minute Q and A, say about 50 times that they are acting within the law, but that is not what the Prime Minister promised Canadians. The deputy House leader talked about openness, accountability, but he was evading the real issue. Are they respecting what the Prime Minister said was the higher standard that his government would be held to?

Those questions remain wholly unanswered. There are other sections in what the Prime Minister published that are worth repeating, such as, “Ministers and parliamentary secretaries must avoid conflict of interest”, which should go without saying, “the appearance of conflict of interest and situations that have the potential to involve conflicts of interest”, or favouritism.

He goes on, “Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries must ensure that political fundraising activities or considerations do not affect, or appear to affect, the exercise of their official duties or the access of individuals or organizations to government.” We are talking about big, rich companies like Apotex, and we know Apotex' sad history of being involved in fundraising for the Liberal Party, 1-800-Joe Volpe.

There should be no preferential access to government or appearance of preferential access accorded to individuals or organizations because they have made financial contributions to politicians and political parties.

To listened to the Liberals say today that these are things that anybody can pay $5 and just walk into. The problem is that it costs $1,500 and it is being held behind closed doors in an elite law office in downtown Toronto. That is the problem. When I asked the Prime Minister yesterday, when I quoted his own words to him that “you must uphold the highest standards of honesty and impartiality”, and “This is an obligation not fully discharged by simply acting within the law”, I asked a simple, one sentence question: what did he mean by that?

I feel like George Carlin, who used to read the tax act to get laughs. I will read the Prime Minister's answer, which is a masterwork of equivocation and has nothing whatsoever to do with the question I asked him, which was about what he meant by this higher standard. I will read it word for word, because we cannot make this stuff up.

He said, “Mr. Speaker, after 10 years of a government that did not do a good job of living up to Canadians' expectations”. What does that have to do with what he told Canadians? For somebody who said he had a higher standard, he seems to have a lot of trouble explaining it.

He went on,“we know people needed and wanted a government that was more open, transparent,” and this is my favourite part, “and mostly accessible. That is exactly what we have been in terms of pre-budget consultations that the minister has done”. Talk about obfuscation. He is trying to hint that a pay-for-play fundraiser at $1,500 a head in a private law office in downtown Toronto is actually a consultation.

That is amusing, because for the last budget, for the first time in memory, the government failed to include the opposition parties in its pre-budget consultations. I would dare say that if the Conservatives had ever dared exclude the opposition parties from a pre-budget consultation, they would have been up in arms in the Liberal Party, and they would have had half the press gallery piling on with them.

They got away with it. It was amazing. It was the first time in living memory that a government that says it is open and transparent held private consultations heading into the budget. Maybe it means it. Maybe it actually believes that we can have a consultation in an elite law firm behind closed doors. That is not my definition of consultation, and I suspect that it is also not the definition most Canadians have of consultation.

Let us continue with the Prime Minister's non-answer, shall we?

That is exactly what we have been in terms of pre-budget consultations that the minister has done, in terms of consultations that we have done right across the country, and been roundly criticized for for talking too much with Canadians, for listening too much to Canadians.

What does that have to do with anything we were discussing yesterday? We were discussing his own words, that their obligations are “not fully discharged by simply acting within the law”. They were going to be held to a higher standard.

He skated around it:

We have demonstrated a level of openness and accountability that no government up until ours has ever had, and we are proud of that.

I learned in law school that one of the best ways to win an argument is to make concessions. I will make a concession to the Liberal Party. In terms of PR, in terms of coming up with words the Liberals keep repeating that somehow sink in, they are quite good. It is when we spend a little bit of time peeling away—it is like peeling an onion, because we start to cry when we realize just how vapid it is, how vacuous it is—that we realize that this is all it is. It is sloganeering. It is words for the sake of words. It is totally empty.

That is what the Prime Minister showed when he could not answer in his own words yesterday. What did he mean when he said that it is not enough to obey the law? I just read his answer word for word. As I said, we cannot make this stuff up. That is exactly what the Prime Minister said.

This is what we have been seeing with the Liberal government since it got here.

I know that a lot of young people voted for the Liberals because they promised that they were going to legalize pot once they were elected.

We said that there was one thing they could do right away, which was decriminalize it, because nobody, given the fact that we are heading in that direction, should ever have a criminal record that will affect the rest of their lives for possession of a small amount of pot for personal use.

The Liberals are now in their second year. Do members know what the answer has been from the former chief of police of Toronto? No action. Thousands upon thousands of mostly young Canadians will have criminal records that will hobble them for the rest of their careers in terms of travel, in terms of job opportunities. That is a broken promise that is going to affect lives. Pigheadedly, they still will not say whether they will accept having a full pardon for people who were convicted for that alone.

It is the same sort of thing. On fundraising, they said they were going to do better.

The Liberals promised that they would be beyond reproach when it comes to political financing. They drafted stricter rules, which I just read. It is not enough to obey the law, they must uphold a higher standard. However, we heard the complete opposite from the Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons. In his speech, he said about 50 times that they were acting according to the letter of the law. That is not what the Prime Minister promised. This ambiguity is a way to dodge the promises they made to Canadians in this area. There are many more promises, however, and I think it is worth going over them.

On electoral reform, they promised that they would listen to Canadians. Ninety per cent of the Canadian experts they heard from said that they wanted a system based on proportional representation.

In an article by Hélène Buzzetti that appeared in Le Devoir, the Prime Minister said that he believed it was necessary to reform our electoral system because it had resulted in the Harper government. Now that “Mr. Sunshine” is in power, he thinks that it may no longer be necessary to reform our electoral system. If this system elected him, why on earth would we have to change a thing?

It is mind-boggling that a government has the gall to present itself as an agent of change and then, when elected, starts breaking such important promises.

On climate change, who would have thought it? I was there in Paris at the climate conference almost exactly a year ago. I saw our newly minted Prime Minister throw his arms wide open and say, “Canada is back”, to thundering silence in a room of people scratching their heads thinking they did not know we had ever left. He said that everything was going to be different from now on, different until the day he reappeared to say that now that he thought about it, Stephen Harper's climate change plan was all he had. It is the same plan, the same targets, the same timelines.

It is interesting, because yesterday, out of nowhere, the head of the Treasury Board stood up and said that we have a new target. It is 40% for 2030. Really? Can we see the economy-wide plan, which is precisely what article 4, paragraph 4 of the Paris Agreement says we have to have? Nothing.

I was there in Montreal in 2005 when the former Liberal minister, today the international affairs minister, said he had a plan. The plan was called the one-tonne challenge.

Why did the Liberals at the time have to say that it was up to individual Canadians to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by one tonne? The main poster for the whole thing was someone turning off the lights, as if that could eliminate one tonne per person in Canada. The Liberals were about 40 million tonnes off what they had promised to do, and that corresponded roughly to about a tonne per Canadian. Therefore, it was not the government's fault, the Liberals' fault, that they had done nothing on climate change. It had to be the fault of Canadians. It was extraordinary as an exercise in public relations.

After the Liberals were defeated, and I will never forget, Eddie Goldenberg, Jean Chrétien's former chief of staff, made an interesting admission, the best form of evidence. He admitted that the Liberals had no plan and no intention of respecting Kyoto. They had signed Kyoto “to galvanize public opinion”. What was he saying? It was an exercise in public relations to have signed Kyoto.

Now, I will never agree with the Conservatives for having made us the only country in the world to withdraw from Kyoto, but I will say that at least the Conservatives were telling Canadians that they did not believe in climate change and that they were going to withdraw from Kyoto. The Liberals, on the other hand, were going to fake it. When they could not do it, because they did not have a plan and did not do it, they were going to say it was the fault of Canadians and that it was up to Canadians to come up with a solution. This time it is the exact same thing.

We will increase our greenhouse gases every year of this first and last mandate of the current Liberal government. The reason we will do that is that they still have no plan. They promised a carbon tax for 2018 knowing full well that the statistics for greenhouse gas production for 2018 will only be published in 2020. It will never be measured at the time of the next election. Does this sound familiar? It is a little bit like our economic update this week. They will let us know in 11 years how we are doing. Really?

Some $15 billion is taken away from what was promised to municipalities and put into a privatization bank. I heard a lot of words from the Prime Minister during the election campaign. Funny, we actually did a scour of everything that was said, but we cannot find the word “privatization” in there anywhere. The Liberals said they were going to build public infrastructure. They never said they were going to sell public infrastructure.

On health care, it is the same thing. There is a reduction from a 6% escalator to 3%. That will gravely affect the provinces' ability to deliver health care. The Liberals pretend that they are going to dictate to the provinces precisely what areas they are going to concentrate in. However, the government delivers health care in three areas: in penitentiaries, to the Armed Forces, and on first nation reserves. With a track record like that, it should be a little bit more modest before it pretends that it can dictate to the provinces what they are doing right and wrong in health care.

On labour rights, my favourite part, the Liberals have new buddies in the labour movement. They stand there and emote with them. We saw last week some young people turning their backs, with good reason.

We presented anti-scab legislation. My colleague, the member of Parliament for Jonquière, stood up and presented anti-scab legislation, which is the basic underpinning of any real system of negotiation of collective agreements. The Liberals stood up and voted against it. That is the real Liberal track record on labour rights, and we have to debunk that one as well.

Oh, but can they emote. They can emote about human rights and Canada's role in the world. What we see them actually doing is selling thousands of armoured personnel carriers to one of the most gruesome, repressive regimes on the planet earth, Saudi Arabia. We have films of Saudi Arabia using exactly that type of equipment on civilian populations. We know that military equipment that came from Canada is being used against civilians. We know that Raif Badawi's family, his wife and three children, are in Sherbrooke at the same time the same Saudi government is going to recommence torturing that man, because he dares have an opinion on anything. That is Saudi Arabia. That is the best friend of the current government that claims to be all about human rights around the world.

It is the same government that is negotiating an extradition treaty with China, where there is no rule of law and no independent tribunal and where people are executed and tortured, according to the world's most credible groups, like Democracy Watch and Amnesty International. That is the reality of the Liberals with regard to human rights. Forget about the talking points. Forget about the public relations. That is who they are.

Regarding first nations, there is money missing from the budget, of course, for first nations education. This week, we put forth a motion calling on the Liberals to come up with the $155 million that was ordered by the courts. There are three compliance orders by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal. We are not talking about our opinion versus their opinion. This is the courts ordering them to spend it.

I will never forget the Liberal member of Parliament for Spadina—Fort York standing up here in the House of Commons and attacking us for coming up with that motion to put that money into those health and social services for first nations children, and then he voted for it. Go figure.

Maybe the House leader is actually going to stand up and vote for our motion. That would be a problem in and of itself, because that would mean that this motion is going to be like all the other things they have talked about. It is going to get flushed into this bottomless Liberal pit of broken promises.

With regard to gender equality, it is the same thing. They will get to it. It has only been 25 years since the courts ordered the government to provide real gender equity for women in this country, but the Liberals always have a talking point on that. They will talk about what they did when they named the government last year. That has nothing to do with how women who actually work in the federal government are treated. The Liberals voted with the Conservatives to impose penalties on any union that would defend gender equality in this country. That is the real track record of the Liberals.

Directly related to what we are living this week, with the police surveillance of journalists, is Bill C-51. During the campaign, the Liberal leader swore up and down that it would be a top priority to fix Bill C-51, which is an egregious, unprecedented assault on the individual privacy rights and freedoms of Canadians. So far, the Liberals have done sweet nothing.

Is it the most transparent government in the history of Canada? We asked the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness how many journalists are under surveillance by the RCMP or CSIS. He did not answer. In Quebec, there is a royal commission of inquiry, because it has been found out that not only did the Montreal police spy on journalists but the SQ did the same thing. The Quebec government immediately ordered a royal commission of inquiry.

There is preening, posing, pretending, and no action. However, the Liberals get the title. They say that the Prime Minister is thinking about it, hoping that this will go away like everything else. That is the reality of the Liberals. As for real change, that is malarky. It is the same old Liberals on fundraising, which is what we are discussing today, and on all these other issues we have talked about.

The Liberals talk about having reduced taxes for some Canadians and having increased them for the one per cent. In fact, the Liberals are taking the money from the one per cent and giving it to the Liberal Party, because every single one of those donations gets a tax return. Whenever Apotex and all those bigwigs stand behind closed doors in an elite law firm, know one thing. It is not just their money; it is taxpayers' money, and that is why the government has to respect its undertaking to be clear with the public.

[Professor Kent Roach, Professor, Faculty of Law and Munk School University of Toronto, As an Individual]

I'd like to thank the committee for inviting us and for allowing me to appear remotely. I realize this isn't ideal.

First of all, as someone who worked on both the Arar and Air India commissions, I want to underline what my colleague said. We need to get information sharing right, and this act, which was hastily and very poorly drafted, does not get information sharing right.

With the Arar saga we see the dangers of sharing information that is not reliable and is not strictly necessary for the mandate of a receiving institution. That underlines the extreme dangers that can come from too much or inappropriate information sharing.

Just as importantly, however, the Air India commission showed the dangers of not sharing enough information. Indeed, one of things that is absent from this act was a recommendation by Justice Major that there be mandatory information sharing by CSIS about specific information relevant to the prosecution of terrorism offences.

Rather than devising a system that focuses on a particular form of information sharing, what we see in the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act is section 2, which is a radical departure even from the broad definition of threats to the security of Canada under the CSIS Act, which has been with us since 1984. In terms of amendments, one of the first things that should be looked at is trimming the overly broad definition of section 2.

I would underline that for Canadians to have confidence in this information sharing, there need to be more limits in the legislation and also more transparency about the information sharing, because as my colleague has pointed out, if over 100 departments can potentially share information under this act with 17 or more recipient institutions, all of this is done through legal interpretations that the public has no access to. It's very difficult to ask civil society and the public not to have concerns, and indeed suspicions, about information sharing when we have such a radical, broad definition of “activities that undermine the security of Canada”, including not only legitimate topics like terrorism but also, for example, an activity that takes place in Canada and undermines the security of another state. In my view, it's very important to go back to section 2.

Section 4 of the act has a number of guiding principles, and these guiding principles are fine as far as they go, although I would like to see more emphasis put on the reliability of the information that is shared. Justice O'Connor in the Arar commission report stressed that there need to be assurances that the reliability of the information is discussed, and also the respect for caveats, which is mentioned in section 4.

The problem with section 4 right now is simply that principles are placed out there, but there are no teeth, unless there's a requirement for protocols through regulations or through amendments of the statutes. The Privacy Commissioner has also noted this.

As my colleague has noted, sections 5 and 6 are extremely poorly drafted. They need to be made precisely clear, because unfortunately the green paper reflects a fundamental ambiguity in how this act is going to be interpreted.

Certainly the interpretation that we thought was the viable one and the preferential one, which was that this act did not have an independent trumping force over the Privacy Act, is partly negated in the green paper. The green paper gives us some idea of how government lawyers are interpreting this legislation, and unfortunately the interpretation, like section 5 and section 6, is about as clear as mud, so it is very, very important to address those two very fundamental sections.

Also, we would support what the Privacy Commissioner has said, which was that the issue should not simply be sharing of all relevant information but that there should be some requirement of necessity. We would just add that Supreme Court jurisprudence, like the jurisprudence in Wakeling, suggests that information sharing—not simply information acquisition, but information sharing, such as is authorized by this legislation—is subject to the charter, and so a standard of necessity or proportionality would be much more likely to withstand charter scrutiny than one of mere relevance.

I would also underline again why this provision and the CSIS threat disruption are probably the two most controversial parts of Bill C-51 in their reference not only to detection, identification, and analysis but also to prevention or disruption, so I think it has to be made clearer that this does not expand the mandates of all of the recipient institutions.

In addition, again on the theme of why so many people in civil society are rightly suspicious about this act, section 9 provides a very broad immunity from civil consequences. Not only does this raise the spectre of allowing the sort of information sharing that harmed Maher Arar and many other people, but it also puts yet another barrier to getting civil compensation should information sharing—and in particular I would stress information sharing about security threats—impose harm on people who may very well want to seek compensation for it and who may very well want to restore their reputation.

Just because Mr. Arar's reputation, at least in Canada, has been restored, we should not forget that this was because of the extraordinary event of a public inquiry. Perhaps one of the most objectionable parts of Bill C-51 is that it allows a very broad, overly broad, permissive regime for information sharing. It does so in an unclear, poorly drafted manner, and it does not ensure that there be mandatory information sharing about that information that is most relevant to direct threats to the real security interests of people in Canada.

Thank you very much.

[Professor Craig Forcese, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, As an Individual]

Thanks for having me here today.

Let me begin by noting that the topic of our conversation today, information sharing for national security purposes, is an essential one. Information sharing is essential to national security. That truth was recognized in the 9/11 commission report in the United States and it was also recognized in Canada by the Arar commission report, which was, in fact, an inquiry on how poor information sharing can precipitate human rights abuses. It was also recognized by the Air India commission, which was an inquiry into the systemic failure of information sharing.

In the presentation that Kent Roach and I have prepared, we aim to do two things. First, I'll identify the key challenges in national security information sharing. Then my colleague Kent Roach will outline suggestions on refining one core component of the governing law, specifically the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, or the SCISA, an act that was part of Bill C-51 in 2015.

As a first point, Canadian information-sharing laws in the area of national security are a muddled patchwork. As an internal CSIS briefing note that predated Bill C-51 noted,

Currently, departments and agencies rely on a patchwork of legislative authorities to guide information sharing....Generally, enabling legislation of most departments and agencies does not unambiguously permit the effective sharing of information for national security purposes.

The question is, however, what to do about this. The CSIS briefing note goes on to state that:

Existing legislative authorities and information-sharing arrangements often allow for the sharing of information for national security purposes. With appropriate direction and framework in place, significant improvements are possible to encourage information sharing for national security purposes, on the basis [of] existing legislative authorities.

Instead, Bill C-51 responded to legitimate concerns about siloed information by throwing wide open the barn doors on information sharing, but in such a complex and unnuanced way that the only certain consequence will be less privacy for Canadians.

I'll enumerate now some of our concerns about the 2015 Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, the one enacted by Bill C-51.

First, the act allows those within the Government of Canada to share information about the new and vast concept of “activities that undermine the security of Canada”. It is difficult to overstate how broad this definition is, even as contrasted with the existing broad national security definitions such as “threats to the security of Canada” in the CSIS Act or the national security concept in the Security of Information Act, Canada's official secrets law.

The only exemption of the SCISA definition of “activities that undermine the security of Canada” is for “advocacy, protest, dissent and artistic expression”. This list was originally qualified by the word “lawful”, but under pressures from civil society groups, the last Parliament deleted the word “lawful”.

We were astonished by this change. We had proposed that “lawful” be dropped but then recommended the same compromise found in the definition of “terrorist activity” in the Criminal Code. We recommended excluding both lawful and unlawful protest and advocacy, but only so long as it was not tied to violence.

Violent protest or advocacy of a sufficient scale can be a national security issue, justifying information sharing. By simply dropping the word “lawful”, however, the new act seems to preclude new information-sharing powers in relation to any sort of protest, advocacy, or dissent, no matter how violent.

Government lawyers will find a way to work around this carelessly drafted exception. Indeed, the government's green paper has invented a solution. It says that the exception does not include “violent actions”. This is sensible, but it is not a standard set out in the actual law. It is a policy position, not something that is binding or in the least evident from the actual statute.

Second, the overbreadth of both the concept of security and the carve-out from it is then compounded by the operative provisions in the act.

In its key operative provision, the act contemplates that more than 100 government institutions may, unless other laws prohibit them from doing so, disclose information to 17, and potentially more, federal institutions if relevant to the receiving body's jurisdiction or responsibilities in relation to “activities that undermine the security of Canada, including in respect of their detection, identification, analysis, prevention, investigation or disruption”. All these terms are not defined, even though they are capable of definition. Without definition, whether by amending the act or through regulation, there is a danger that many terms in the new act will be inconsistently applied—a danger that the Privacy Commissioner has already raised.

Third, in the absence of more carefully articulated standards, the only safeguard is that the new information-sharing power is, in subsection 5(1) of the act, “Subject to any provision of any other Act of Parliament, or of any regulation...that prohibits or restricts the disclosure of information”.

What that means is a bit unclear, but we believe that the existing act, the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, must comply with, among other things, the Privacy Act. That is not an ideal safeguard, given the many exceptions in the Privacy Act. It is something, and yet we are not sure how to read the government's recent green paper documents. They say that because the new Security of Canada Information Sharing Act authorizes disclosure, it satisfies a lawful authority exception to the Privacy Act, effectively trumping it.

The bottom line is that the new act's entire architecture creates confusion and uncertainty, and this requires a remedy.

My colleague Kent Roach will discuss some of our proposals.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Minister, thanks for being here.

I want to quote what the Prime Minister said when we were debating Bill C-51:

An oversight body looks on a continual basis at what is taking place inside an intelligence service and has the mandate to evaluate and guide current actions in “real time.” That is crucial and must be amended, if we are giving CSIS the new powers proposed in Bill C-51.

That's not necessarily what this committee is doing, but I want to go back to Mr. Clement's point about the information that's available, because, Minister Goodale, you quoted Craig Forcese. Professors Atkey, Forcese, and Roach said in The Globe and Mail that they were very concerned about the Prime Minister's ability to redact reports, but also about how much information is shared.

You and Mr. Clement had an exchange over law enforcement investigations, but there is also defence intelligence and special operational information which, as defined by the law, is very broad and leads to a web of instances whereby you basically find yourself in a situation where anything that can even be inferred from the information being given to the committee could be considered off limits to the committee.

Without that information, how can the committee be expected to do its job? That's the first part of the question. Second, if we have a concrete amendment for you to allow that information to be shared, would you accept that?

Budget Implementation Act, 2016, No. 2

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to take the floor on the budget implementation bill, since it gives me the opportunity to speak to the shortcomings or errors that the government has made in its budget. There are many of them, and I would like to talk about those that are related to the issues I represent for the NDP, namely public safety and infrastructure. Naturally, I will also be talking about the repercussions of the Liberal government’s decisions on the lives of the people in our communities and in my riding.

First of all, I would like to talk about Bill C-51. This is not a budgetary measure in itself, but it grants budgets to the various committees that oversee the national security agencies. I am referring in particular to the SIRC, which reviews the activities of CSIS and, in certain circumstances, of the RCMP. But it primarily monitors those of CSIS, which has always experienced difficulties with its operating budget.

In the 2015-2016 budget, before the Liberals came to power and while the Conservatives were still in power, the budget of the committee that monitors the activities of CSIS was increased, after the population had expressed its opposition to the passage of Bill C-51.

However, in the last budget tabled by the Liberals, last spring, there was a decrease of $2.5 million per year in this budget, spread over the years ahead. Coming from a party that said it wanted to address the shortcomings in Bill C-51 and increase transparency and oversight, this is totally unacceptable.

Considering the size of the budget of a country such as Canada, that $2.5 million may not look like much, but I am going to demonstrate the consequences of this change for the committee that provides oversight of CSIS. It is the equivalent of 11 full-time positions that will be lost. And those are not receptionists or people who fetch coffee: they are high-level analysts who look into CSIS activities.

If the government really wanted to increase transparency and oversight, it would not confine itself to half measures, and it would not reverse course and cut the budget of a group of experts that already exists to provide oversight of those agencies.

Moreover, it is important to note that these budget cuts are taking place in a context where CSIS is using the powers it was granted by Bill C-51. Therefore, on one hand, those powers are being used, which is very worrisome—our colleagues are well aware of our position on that bill—and on the other hand, cuts are being made to the budget of the only committee that currently exists to oversee CSIS’s activities, pending the establishment of a committee of parliamentarians.

I am sure I can anticipate the government’s response on this issue. It is the response that the minister gave me in committee. He told us not to worry, because they were going to strike a committee of parliamentarians. That is fine, and that is why we supported the bill at second reading. We also plan to propose some amendments to address a few of its serious deficiencies.

However, let’s be clear: all the experts we heard in committee as part of our study on national security and the study of Bill C-22 that begins today have told us that the committee of parliamentarians could not exist in a vacuum.

Independent experts are needed to provide oversight and review in partnership with the committee of parliamentarians. However, the government is in the process of slashing the budget of an existing independent oversight agency. That is completely unacceptable.

Since we are talking about public safety, we also need to raise the issue of the ability of the police to do their job. For us, at the federal level, that means the RCMP. By focusing all of our efforts on preventing terrorism, we are ignoring a number of other areas.

In the last Parliament, budget cuts were made to the Eclipse squad, and we saw the impact that had on cities such as Montréal, with the proliferation of street gangs and the radicalization of youth. We have to be honest: radicalization is not just about religion. The aim is not to profile a single community. Radicalization takes many forms. It involves young people, sometimes street gangs, and sometimes extreme right-wing groups. We are well aware that our police services lack resources, and we are not taking these other factors seriously when we focus on a single threat. It is not me saying this, it is the RCMP commissioner.

In committee, we asked the RCMP commissioner whether we were neglecting other types of threats by focusing on the terrorist threat. He replied that that was quite true. For example, the RCMP no longer pays enough attention to organized crime. That is not the fault of the men and women who work for the RCMP; it is due to the lack of resources. It is a negative trend that started under the previous government and is continuing under the Liberal government.

I also want to talk about infrastructure, another topic that has raised some very serious concerns over the past few weeks. We are seeing this government's true colours when it comes to investing in infrastructure.

During the election campaign, the Liberals promised that they would take a progressive approach to infrastructure. They said that they would work with the provinces and municipalities by investing, spending, and running a deficit. That is nice, but we are starting to realize that the government is planning to privatize.

The most glaring example of that is the involvement of Crédit Suisse in the discussions with the Minister of Finance. We know that Crédit Suisse specializes in privatizing airports. I would therefore ask the government to explain to me how it fails to see a conflict in interest when a private company that earns a living privatizing airports is working in close collaboration with the Minister of Finance. We are told not to worry, that there will be no privatization.

As my colleague from Rimouski-Neigette—Témiscouata—Les Basques put it so well yesterday, this is letting a fox into the henhouse. This is troubling. We saw this tendency with CHUM in Montreal and with Highway 407 in Ontario. These seem to have inspired this government in the development of its infrastructure plan. It is completely unacceptable. We need to stand up and oppose this privatization. This problem is not just about foreign investment and the loss of control over our own infrastructure, which are public at this time, nor about the fact that taxpayers will then be accountable and assume all the risk while private corporations rake in all the profits. It is also about the user-pay principle. We will set up the toll booths, but the profits will go to private companies.

With regard to the Champlain Bridge, my former colleague from Brossard—La Prairie, Hoang Mai, the former members for Saint-Bruno—Saint-Hubert and Saint-Lambert, as well as my current colleague from Longueuil—Saint-Hubert and I all took a stand against the previous government. It is to the current government's credit that it respected that commitment. There will be no tolls on the Champlain Bridge.

However, if the government decides to sell the bridge to a private company tomorrow, and the company wants to introduce a toll system, that system will benefit only that private company, not Canadian taxpayers. It is completely unacceptable.

The clock is ticking, so I will wrap up with some comments on the local issues I mentioned. The most important issue for the City of Chambly is the dispute between the federal government and the municipalities over payments in lieu of taxes, an issue that has been festering for a very long time. As promised during the last election campaign, I introduced a bill about that as soon as possible after the election. Every year, the City of Chambly has to absorb a $500,000 shortfall because the Liberal government is not honouring its commitment to the municipality to pay its fair share of costs related to the Fort Chambly site. The timing is good because the Liberal candidate set herself up as the great champion of this issue, which I have been fighting for since I was elected in 2011. Of course, that is another broken promise because there is nothing in the budget for it.

That is another battle we still need to fight, and we could go on at length about it, but I see that my time is up, so I will take this opportunity to answer my colleagues' questions.

Freedom of the Press

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Mr. Speaker, this morning we learned that, once again, a La Presse reporter is under police surveillance.

This dredges up memories of a similar incident involving the federal government: a Vice reporter may go to jail for refusing to disclose his sources to the RCMP. With Bill C-51 measures still in effect, journalists and civil liberties groups are worried things could get worse.

Does the government see that there is an urgent need to order the RCMP to honour freedom of the press?

[Jerry Dias]

It would be my pleasure.

If we started to do everything by referendum, my guess is that Bill C-51 probably would not have been accepted by Canadians. If we had a referendum on omnibus Bill C-4—about this thick—I can only guess that it probably would have gone down.

The bottom line is that those who talk about referendums today usually are those who never held them when they were in power, so I find it somewhat hypocritical.

Here's how Canadians are looking at it. It depends on the question and how you ask the question. If you asked a Canadian—excuse me, let me finish—

[Jerry Dias]

Thank you very much.

If you listen to our members, if you're listening to Canadians, the reason we've had such poor voter turnouts over the last several elections, which is starting to finally turn around, is that people believe their vote doesn't count, doesn't mean anything. What I love is that when you take a look at the last two federal elections, we have had majority governments with 39.5% and 39.6%. More than 60% of Canadians didn't vote for either governing party.

So I'm fascinated when I listen to remarks about democracy and referendums. We know that in the last 10 years there was not a referendum. There was Bill C-4, Bill C-51, Bill C-377, Bill C-525, but not one referendum. I would argue, for those who are screaming for a referendum today, that we need to take a look at their history.

Now, I will argue that on October 19 there was a referendum, and it was a referendum of change. One issue was clearly the elimination of the first-past-the-post electoral system. On behalf of Unifor's 310,000 members, I am here to emphasize the importance of implementing electoral reform in time for the next election. I want to get straight to the point of the discussion, because it seems to us at Unifor that this process is quickly coming to a moment of truth.

According to remarks from the Prime Minister and also from Minister Monsef, broad-based support for change is a prerequisite for changing the system. The Chief Electoral Officer has said we need the broadest possible consensus. So let me be very direct with all of you: there is a broad base of support for electoral reform. You have the most recent Ekos survey from only a week ago: 60% want the government to fulfill its election pledge that we have had the last first-past-the-post election.

It's true that support for specific options is less decisive, but still, there is a clear broad base of support: support for PR, 46%; support for the current system, 29%; support for preferential ballots, 26%. In other words, there is one clear alternative to the present system: proportional representation.

Our members and most Canadians believe they have voted for change. They have voted for the principle of change, expecting that you will implement that decision with specific reforms that are understandable and explainable to our members in our communities.

This committee has the capacity, the mandate, and the information on voting systems needed to bring forward a majority position on electoral reform, and when you do so, the vast majority of Canadians will support you. In August our national convention affirmed that electoral reform must be addressed. Our members unanimously endorsed the proportional representation system for Canada. We did not get into the weeds of the particular kind of PR system; we say that is your job. We support the principle of proportionality to make sure that every vote counts and to make false majorities impossible. We want fewer reasons to vote strategically and more opportunity to vote for a hopeful, progressive future.

There's no question that our organization and one of my previous organizations, the CAW, talked a lot about strategic voting, but what was strategic voting really all about? We voted strategically because we didn't want a particular party. It thus wasn't about voting for the party you wanted; it was making sure that one party didn't get elected or have a majority with less than 40%.

We want fewer reasons to vote strategically. We want more reasons for young people and all those who have been alienated from politics to engage and participate in the democratic process. In our view, when Canadians think about electoral reform, they want the system to change so that all votes directly impact the composition of Parliament, instead of the situation in 2015, in which an estimated nine million votes are without real reflection in Parliament.

I want to comment also on the idea that has been floated that smaller reforms could be implemented with a smaller consensus. I don't think this makes a lot of sense.

First, support for the present system is pretty much limited to the core base of the previous government. Support for preferential ballots, which we assume is what is meant by “smaller reforms”, is even less. There is not more support for smaller reform. Frankly, there is not a single person in Unifor who has spoken out in favour of ranked ballots as the preferred option for reform, so I urge you not to go down that road. The way to get this done is for the majority of you to agree on the principles that represent Canadian opinions and values and then propose an electoral system that best implements those principles.

In our opinion, the core issue is that Canadians want a different system that eliminates false majorities. We have too much experience that these false majorities produce extremist, ideological governments that do more harm than good—I can argue the last 10 years any time. Canadians want less partisanship in politics and more co-operation that produces good public policy. It means that we all have to look forward to a different kind of government, with the knowledge that it is far less likely that any one party will dominate in the way we have become accustomed to, but we still have stable government. In our opinion, we'll have more stable government, and the incoming government will not spend the first year repealing the extremist agenda of the previous government. We will still have parties with distinct alternative policies. We will need more political leadership, not less, and it is that political leadership we need and expect now.

If the majority for electoral reform fails to take this opportunity, it will be a long time before these conditions come around again. Unifor members are ready for change now, and we are expecting you to lead that change to ensure that a new proportional voting system is in place for the next federal election.

Thank you very much.

[Rana Zaman, As an Individual]

I'm a little nervous. I'm not as learned as the other gentleman that was here. I'm here as one of the people, one of the immigrants. I'm not a political person. I just got a wake-up call with the last government when this bill was passed. It made me jump out of my complacency and my trust in the government was just eradicated because I thought you were all very wise, caring people who looked out for the benefit of everyone and I mean everyone. You passed a law that I couldn't imagine, it was like George Orwell's1984 kind of thing coming through for me, but it affected my children directly who are born and raised here and never have been back home, which I call home. I've only been back twice myself.

The whole idea under this law gives such unlimited power to a body that doesn't really have to answer or show proof really of anything except suspicion of intent. Please correct if I'm not as versed as I should be about this law, but I just have the basics, as I've said.

I couldn't believe that. I said these kids, how are they not as Canadian as anyone else who was born and raised here, who has never been anywhere else. If they, in their youth, in their stupidity, did something as a protest or anything that was somehow defined as a terrorist act by this body, what would happen to them? They'd be sent home where they have never been. I thought that's not possible and yet someone here, who was considered old-stock Canadian, would not be considered under the same law because they were considered Canadian.

I think that's where the second-class citizen idea came from. Bill C-24 and Bill C-51 were the two ones that really made me understand. As I said, I apologize, I'm not a politician yet, so I'm learning.

My whole point is that listening to that gentleman, I learned a lot right now. Basically we're giving power—according to the first gentlemen and the second—to an entity that really is not answerable in many ways and we know that “absolute power corrupts absolutely”. You just have to keep in mind that it affects you as well. I can't imagine how a government passed something that would interfere in your own personal information. I understand people are saying, "Well, I'm innocent, it doesn't matter". How many people in the past who have been innocent have been railroaded for a crime they didn't commit or for some reason they were on the wrong person's radar? We have to look at this very carefully.

Also simple things such as the fact that they can observe you at any time based on any comments that you can make. How do you know the person on the other end is absolutely of a moral fibre that they won't abuse that power for their own benefit, if they have a personal beef against somebody? “I'm going to go in and tune in on that person and see what they're doing.” How do you know that their children...? God forbid, if someone who's a pedophile or something is not zooming in using your cameras and things to just basically get information about you and your family. These people are human beings. They're connected to other human beings. The possibility of abuse of power exists at any level. So my whole thing about this whole bill is the fact that it really infringes on a person's right and their privacy. It's just too much power for one organization to have. They can go to that level and not be answerable or not have to go to a judge or somewhere to get one to say we need to look into this person because they made these comments, they've made this kind of background.

And we're really kind of monitoring now even simple comments that we're making by phone or trigger words. It's just a frightening concept in a frightening future and I think you can hear it in my voice. We look up to you as our leaders and this affects you as equally, so how are you not afraid of it?

That's all my questions.

[Philon Aloni, As an Individual]

Thank you.

I've had a long day. It started at 6:30 in the morning, and I just found out about this event at the last minute, so if I'm a bit tired, please forgive me. I didn't prepare anything ahead of time. I just made some notes while I was listening today.

Before I get to my notes, I want to have a little introduction, so you understand where I'm coming from in general. I am of the conviction or understanding that investing more in the people, investing more in healthy society and social justice on a national and international scale, and in peace—for example having a governmental department for peace—and things like this, will give us much greater bang for the buck in prevention of violence by terrorism than would more investment in securities.

Now, since it appears that Bill C-51 will pass regardless, I'd like to bring up some practical suggestions in order to mitigate the harm and maximize the potential good, although I'm not for the bill.

Again, investment in a more just and inclusive society will achieve much greater security dividends for society overall than Bill C-51-type bills could, and at far greater gross return for investment rates. Abuse of power by specially empowered entities is a basic human condition. We see it repeated throughout history. This is a very sensitive situation that we're dealing with, and we have to consider very carefully and methodically all possible means to mitigate such abuse.

For some suggestions in this regard, I'll go with something practical. For example, we can see examples of police brutality that were going under the radar in Canada or in the United States for many years. Only now, because of cellphones and the prevalence of cameras in people's pockets, the public has become more aware of this fact. I think entities that will have special privileges that keep them under the radar of the legal system, like CSIS, with extra powers that have been already allotted to it lately with Bill C-51, need to have extra vigilance of supervision. I think that records must be maintained of all activities of CSIS, not only of what they have observed, but the agents' activities. The agency's activities all have to be maintained for a supervising agency to continuously overlook....

Not too long ago, in countries that were highly civilized, where nobody believed democracy could be hijacked, democracy was hijacked by organizations with extra powers, like Nazi Germany, for example, and later on in some parts of Latin and South America.

[David Fraser]

There is a very interesting discussion to be had in terms of how that gets implemented in practice. Is it a mechanism by which a judge is going to decide, on a proportionality analysis, that this disruption activity is actually of sufficient benefit to society as a whole that it justifies overriding an otherwise constitutionally protected right or another kind of lawful right, an interest in property or otherwise?

I think it's also worth taking a step backwards and asking if there is a place for such disruption activity, and if there is, whether it properly belongs in CSIS. One of my concerns is that so much happens in the shadows that it's difficult to determine what path it's following. Some of the activities the RCMP was undertaking prior to the McDonald commission really do seem like disruption, which is why it was taken out of the RCMP and moved into CSIS in the first place.

If we are giving CSIS the ability to burn down barns—just to pull an example out of a hat—that does seem to undermine the significant way our national security apparatus was set up. I wouldn't want to have that happen in just one bill, like Bill C-51. If we are going to rejigger our entire national security apparatus and change the nature of CSIS, I think that needs to be the topic of a much broader discussion.

[Colin Fraser, Liberal, West Nova, NS]

That's right. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

It's great to be here. I'm not a usual member of this committee, so you'll forgive me if I ask any questions that are obvious to some of the other members of the committee, but thank you very much for being here.

I'd like to start with you, Mr. Fraser, because I like your last name, first of all, but also because I would like your thought on Bill C-51 in particular, which required CSIS to obtain a warrant from the Federal Court for certain disruptions of terrorism measures.

My understanding is that it had been stated by the Department of Justice that really it's reconciled on a section 1 analysis of the charter. Do you agree with that, or do you think it should be done in a different way whereby we don't look only at section 1 of the charter to save it, but at the charter rights themselves, and that whether to grant the warrant or not could fall down just based on the charter values themselves?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I know you acknowledged how difficult it is, particularly with the limited time, and I also understand that it's a complicated issue, but I have to say that I do find it a concern when there's always that possibility of profiling certain groups.

I'm from Quebec, and this to me sounds a lot like that slippery slope that leads to when the RCMP is stealing membership lists from a political party, which eventually then leads to the War Measures Act and people with any affiliation whatsoever with a certain community being detained. I know that's not what you're advocating for, and I don't mean to imply that at all, but I do have a concern when I hear that we want to make a link between legitimate groups and those who, for lack of a better word, fall off the wagon, because that's almost how I hear this narrative going.

This was part of the debate around Bill C-51. I know you're looking at it from a more sociological perspective, but I just want to hear from you on this point. When Bill C-51 was being debated, part of what I and folks in my party said is that while terrorism has a political element, political activity, even when it's civil disobedience, is not terrorism. I'm very concerned that when we look at it this way, when we start making links, even though they're stretched between the two, that's when we start getting lost as legislators, by putting these kinds of definitions—flawed definitions, in my opinion—in bills.

Again, I know it's complicated, but could I have your thoughts on some of those comments I've just made?

[David Fraser, Partner, McInnes Cooper, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much to this honourable committee for inviting me to provide my thoughts on this very broad consultation that the committee is undertaking, one that has obviously been influenced and affected by the green paper issued by the Department of Public Safety.

Though I have previously appeared before this committee on behalf of the Canadian Bar Association, particularly its national privacy and access law section, I am here today as an individual. I will not be speaking on behalf of my firm, any associations of which I'm a member, or any of my clients.

For some background, I am a lawyer in private practice with the firm McInnes Cooper, based in Atlantic Canada. I'm also a part-time instructor at Dalhousie law school, where I teach Internet and media law, and law and policy for e-commerce. I've also taught privacy law.

As you might be able to guess, my practice is exclusively devoted to privacy law and Internet law. In that capacity, I regularly provide advice to public sector and private sector clients from across Canada, and actually around the world, on their obligations under Canadian laws. That includes companies that are exclusively in the technology sector, the telecommunications sector, and other sectors. This means I'm often providing advice to my clients on interactions with law enforcement and national security agencies in Canada, where the police and national security authorities are seeking access to my client's customer information and information about others of their stakeholders. I have seen many things that inform the testimony I am about to give.

In my personal capacity, I am a strong proponent of a free and democratic Canada that is founded on the rule of law and rooted in our constitutional traditions. I am not associated with any political party, and I feel free to speak my mind on matters such as these from my heart, and hopefully informed by some serious, informed reflection.

I have some mixed feelings about where we are today. The current government campaigned and was elected on a platform that advanced scaling back Bill C-51, the Anti-terrorism Act. I would have hoped we'd be discussing a piece of legislation that would be doing that rather than continuing the long-standing discussion that I expect will extend into the next year.

The information-sharing and disruption powers that the act contains have now become the status quo. We've heard testimony from others, and you've certainly heard it reported in the media, that these powers are being used. We are told they are working, but since we're dealing with the RCMP, CSIS, and CSE, we're not being given any real information about how they are being used. We're being kept in the dark, as usual.

That brings me to my first point. Our national security apparatus in Canada needs effective, accountable oversight. I think Bill C-22 is critical. Our system of government is a parliamentary one, in which Parliament makes the laws that set the limits under which the national security agencies operate. Parliament cannot do this job if it has blinkers on or if it's only given access to unclassified information, and in that case even information that only those agencies deem to be appropriate for Parliament to see. A committee of parliamentarians should have unfettered access to all information it deems relevant to carry out this critical job.

I would, however, suggest that we may need an officer of Parliament to oversee all the national security agencies, something in the model of the Information Commissioner, the Privacy Commissioner, or the Auditor General, who reports to Parliament directly. It may look like a super-SIRC, Security Intelligence Review Committee, that would have oversight over all of the agencies, because the line between CSIS, the RCMP, CSE, and others only depends upon who signs your paycheque, perhaps, or what's written at the top of your paycheque. They collaborate hand in hand. This oversight agency needs to be fully independent of the agencies and has to have unfettered access to everything. It should have the power to report to Parliament on its own initiative and to take any questions before any of the designated justices of the Federal Court on any question about lawful activities.

Our national security agencies by necessity operate largely in the shadows. The only way that we as Canadians can have confidence that they're doing their jobs appropriately is if we have confidence in the organizations that oversee them. I'm not sure we yet have that.

We saw recently a case in which CSIS, with the approval of the Department of Justice, knowingly lied under oath to a Federal Court judge in order to get a warrant. We cannot allow that to happen. We saw a situation in which our federal police department was found to have created terrorists through entrapment. This can't be allowed to happen. Dozens of police officers every year are disciplined for inappropriate and unlawful access to CPIC, the Canadian police database. That shouldn't be allowed to happen. We need to be able to assume the good faith of the individuals who act on our behalf in our police departments and our national security authorities, but it's only through effective oversight and accountability that this can actually be done.

I read with great interest the green paper, and I read with great interest its backgrounder. I could tell who the author was. It was drawn directly from the wish lists of public safety bureaucrats, folks like Commissioner Paulson and the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police.

It advocates, in a one-sided manner, a whole bunch of police powers that have been debated back and forth over the years and ultimately have been dismissed.

You'll recall that Canadians roundly denounced the lawful-access provisions, the interception capabilities, and other things that were embedded in the Modernization of Investigative Techniques Act that was tabled by Vic Toews and ultimately left to die on the order paper.

I found that the green paper and its backgrounder on advocacy was disguised as consultation, and it's clear that somebody was looking to revive these lawful-access powers, notwithstanding that the Spencer decision was pretty clear about access to basic subscriber information and rights of privacy that individuals enjoy on the Internet. We're still hearing advocates of this sort of thing talking about phone book information—and I'm happy to talk about metadata as well—which was thoroughly debunked by the Supreme Court in that case. The fact that this discussion is taking place in terms that fly in the face of what in fact is the last word on the supreme law of the land from the Spencer decision further reinforces to me that strong oversight is required.

I'm happy to talk about the topic of warrantless access to subscriber information, a topic that I've done a lot of research into, as well as the topic of going dark through encryption.

Ultimately, to allow additional time for questions to make sure that everything the committee wants to hear is heard, we need to be careful that this wish list doesn't come at the expense of our rights. We need to be very cautious, and this committee has a very important job. The threat of terrorism is a threat to our democracy, but we cannot create a self-inflicted wound by marching towards a police state or undermining our democratic values.

I very much look forward to the discussion we're going to have.

[Michael Karanicolas]

I'm not sure that BillC-51 itself deals with encryption, but I can certainly answer that question.

Think of encryption as being like a safe. You can put material into it and you can lock it, or you can open it and have the material accessible. When you talk about strong encryption, you are minimizing the ways in and out of that safe, as opposed to allowing for a different way of access or multiple different combinations. Every change that you make other than that one single way in or out weakens it by necessity.

The reason this is so important is that it's the same encryption standards that are guarding Gmail messages or instant messages that are going back and forth, that are taking care of government's messages, that are taking care of your bank integrity when you're online banking, that are taking care of personal information when you're on the Internet. For that reason, it's very difficult to design a system where.... If you undermine a particular type of encryption, if you undermine the encryption standards that are widely available, that are widely enforced, if you require them to have a back door into them, then that will necessarily weaken the encryption that everybody's using.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to both Christina and Michael for being here.

To your second-last comment, Christina, I don't wake up every morning worried about dying in a terrorist attack either.

To carry on from something you said, Michael, you wondered if the terrorist threat was any worse than it was 20 years ago. I guess my comment would be that in 2006 we had the group of 18 in Toronto; two years ago we had Warrant Officer Vincent killed in the Montreal area and Corporal Cirillo in Ottawa; then just recently, not that far from where I live, a couple of hours to the south, there was a would-be terrorist, so I would say, respectfully, that the threat is probably there.

You were certainly correct that we can't compare it to Afghanistan, or even to some of the recent happenings in Europe—in Paris and what have you—but I think we do live in a different world today. You're nodding your head, so I presume you agree with me there.

Carrying that out, until we started these meetings earlier this week, I hadn't heard the term “metadata”. Of course, “encryption” is a word that we've heard lots of times, but not with the meaning that comes up here.

You made a comment earlier about strong encryption, which sounded like a good thing to a degree. Some of the criticism that comes out of Bill C-51 on some of the securities is about that encryption. Can you explain to me the difference between strong and good encryption, and how we deal with it, and the opposite?

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

Without wanting to lead you too much, does the provision under the former Bill C-51 that indicates that it is okay to infringe upon charter rights bother you?

[Rob Oliphant, Liberal, Don Valley West, ON]

I want to go broadly for a second to both of you, and after that I'll have more narrow questioning.

We are now in meeting number nine of this tour. Human rights groups, civil rights groups, and legal groups have been pretty clear and unified in their concern about the overextension in the form of Bill C-51 and our need to rebalance. We get that. Why are you not afraid of terrorists?

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

That was one of Justice O'Connor's recommendations for the integration of oversight.

As one last quick question, you spoke about the definitions of “promoting terrorism” and how broad in scope and vague some of these aspects of Bill C-51 are, since it has become law.

One point that has been raised is how increasing the criminalization of different aspects and lowering thresholds can become a challenge for counter-radicalization. People who might want to raise a red flag and intervene with a youth who is becoming radicalized in any form of political ideology, and not anything specific, might not want to do that for fear of criminalization, given how open these definitions now are. Is that something you would agree with? Perhaps you could expand on that in the short time we have left.

[Christina Szurlej]

I apologize.

The right to privacy is protected under article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Canada is a state party. Though there is no equivalent protection found under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the right to privacy is an enabling right to the fundamental freedoms set out under section 2, namely the “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression” and “freedom of association”. Privacy is likewise an enabling right for freedom of information and the “free unhindered development of one's personality”.

To exchange human rights, freedoms, liberties, and democratic safeguards for national security is not justifiable. “No law, no matter how well-crafted or comprehensive, can prevent all terrorist acts from occurring.” As such, the public must be mindful that the blind relinquishment of its civil liberties may not protect them from threats to national security.

A balanced approach is needed to ensure adequate measures are in place to prevent and address any such threats while protecting the fundamental human rights and freedoms of its populace. “When States fail to strike a balance between human rights and security in the context of countering terrorism, they risk impeding the very rights they purport to protect”, for what is national security without human security and what is human security without human rights?

According to the Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy, Professor Joe Cannataci, in limiting one's right to privacy in the name of national security, several factors must be considered, including the adequacy of oversight mechanisms, the distinction between targeted surveillance and mass surveillance, the proportionality of such measures in a democratic society, and the cost-effectiveness and the overall efficacy of such measures.

Introducing sweeping changes to the way in which personal data is shared among government agencies in Canada should be coupled with a commensurate review mechanism for ensuring the information shared is accurate, is done so within the limits prescribed by law, and is done so with minimal impairment to the rights and freedoms set out under the charter.

Distinguishing between targeted and mass surveillance is essential to preventing the net from being cast too wide and encasing innocent civilians undeserving of the erosion of their civil liberties. Failing to do so assumes in a sense that all are guilty until proven innocent, perverting a fundamental and long-standing principle of justice.

In terms of proportionality, there should be minimal impairment to the rights affected and the solution must not be worse than the problem. Has this test been met by the SCISA, wherein personal data can be shared across government agencies without any guarantee as to the accuracy of the information shared or express restrictions regarding the sharing of information with private actors and foreign governments? Much like a child's game of telephone, the original content of a message risks becoming distorted, potentially having significant consequences for the individual concerned.

In his first report to the Human Rights Council, Special Rapporteur Joe Cannataci expressed concern that:

the ordinary citizen may often get caught in the cross-fire [of mass surveillance] and his or her personal data and on-line activities may end up being monitored in the name of national security in a way which is unnecessary, disproportionate and excessive.

The final point regarding cost-effectiveness is not one on which I can comment as an expert, though from a common sense point of view, concentrating resources where they are most needed—i.e., on targeted surveillance—limits the risk of overlooking a potential threat due to an information overload. In other words, we must ask ourselves what utility is served by mass surveillance? Does it result in greater protection for national security, or does an information overload spread resources so thin that it renders government efforts less effective in responding to potential threats?

As mentioned, Canada has international obligations to respect the right to privacy under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. A corresponding treaty body, the Human Rights Committee, monitors the compliance of state parties with provisions within the covenant. In its concluding observations to Canada's periodic report, the Human Rights Committee expressed concerns that:

...Bill C-51's amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Act confer a broad mandate and powers on the Canadian Security Intelligence Service to act domestically and abroad, thus potentially resulting in mass surveillance and targeting activities that are protected under the Covenant without sufficient and clear legal safeguards...including under the Security of Canada Information Sharing Act, an increased sharing of information among federal government agencies on the basis of a very broad definition of activities that undermine the security of Canada, which does not fully prevent that inaccurate or irrelevant information is shared....

In its general comment number 16, the committee has also clarified that:

Effective measures have to be taken by States to ensure that information concerning a person's private life does not reach the hands of persons who are not authorized by law to receive, process and use it, and is never used for purposes incompatible with the Covenant.

Before Bill C-51 was passed, the improper sharing of information by the Government of Canada led to serious human rights abuses against Canadian citizens, including Almalki, El-Maati, Nureddin, and Arar.

The SCISA develops further authority for the government to share personal data without developing corresponding legal safeguards to prevent the repetition of similar gross injustices.

Now that we have identified some of the inconsistencies between the SCISA and Canada's international human rights obligations, let us look to potential solutions.

[Fernand Deschamps, As an Individual]

Good evening, members of the committee and members of the public.

I am an engineer by training and I am now working as a teacher. I am very concerned about what is currently going on in Quebec and will now be replicated everywhere in Canada. From now on, police, SQ and RCMP officers are going to be able to go into our places of learning, into the secondary schools and colleges, to spy on young people and look for informers, because, apparently, we have to seek out radicalized elements. Why is all this necessary? It is because the Couillard government decided, immediately after Bill C-51 was enacted, to enact Bill 59, which I urge you all to read.

Allow me to remind everyone of a brief essential point about Bill C-51. It says that any group or entity that there are reasonable grounds to believe is a threat to national security may be targeted. The same logic is now being applied in Bill 59.

My question to the committee is this. Who defines what is reasonable and what is not? Who defines what security is? Who defines who is a terrorist or who presents a threat to national security? Nowhere in that act does it say. For that reason alone, this act should be repealed.

In addition, allow me to make a proposal concerning what you should do at the end of your consultations. You should, after repealing the Anti-terrorism Act, form a commission of inquiry to shed light on everything done by the federal police forces in Canada, starting with the RCMP. A month ago, I was again surprised to learn that a judge in British Columbia had put together a case for two people to commit a terrorist act. There are huge numbers of similar cases.

I appeal to everyone: let us call for a commission of inquiry to examine the wrongdoing. There is too much impunity in our society.

Thank you.

[Julia Bugiel]

Of course.

I want to end with the fact that the Liberals were elected, not because we love the Liberals—I'm sorry—but they were elected because Canadians hated Stephen Harper and wanted a change.

I'm very sorry for Larry Miller. I know that's your party. I mean no disrespect.

Keeping Bill C-51 around just shows how little the Liberals want to lead and want to make real change or sunny ways. I can tell you that students are losing respect for our Prime Minister by the day. I'm going to Ottawa on Monday for a peaceful environmental protest, and that's what's going to get me a CSIS rap sheet and that is why I'm here today.

Thank you.

[Julia Bugiel, As an Individual]

Thank you so much for letting me be here to speak.

I'd like to echo the remarks of one of the earlier speakers who said that it's a shame that many people were unable to come to the expert testimony. Students like me were able to come, but unfortunately, it was in the middle of a workday so most people were unable to attend. In the future, I would take that into consideration.

A lot of people have talked about how inaccessible the consultations were. I think given such an important matter as personal and national security, that could be amended. Sadly, I go to school five minutes from here and not one other person from McGill, one of Canada's best institutions, came to these consultations. That just shows how poor the public engagement strategy was. I know that wasn't your call, because you guys are not the ones who are responsible for that, but that definitely should be communicated. We have one of the best political science departments in the country, and yet none of my peers are here. Not one of my professors is here. They're at a different event that's happening at McGill right now. I'm sure it's very well attended.

I'd like to speak about substantive matters about the consultations, and about Bill C-51 in general.

I'm not sure what would convince you that Bill C-51 is a bad idea. I was an undergraduate when it was first introduced years ago, and my human rights prof talked about what a dangerous road it was for Canada, and how he didn't know a single academic who is in favour of this bill. Maybe it's the fact that I'm from Toronto. I have parents in the business sector. I went to John Tory's high school, one of the best schools in the country. I'm at McGill. I'm on the dean's honour list, and in a few years I'm sure I will have a CSIS record because I go to peaceful protests. I'm sure that CSIS will be a presence in my life, and I'm one of the most privileged people in this country.

I don't see a single person of colour on this panel or who's representing indigenous people, Muslims, people who face so much more scrutiny. If I am scared to voice my own opinion because of Bill C-51, I can only think of the way those people must feel and the pressures they must come under. I would also urge you to consider that.

Potentially, most of the people here don't know this, but when I sat through the two hours of expert testimony experts were often asked questions such as this: “Do you have examples of countries that provided a better example than us? We do not want to hear negative examples, only positive inspiration.” I think that's very restricting, very limiting. It gives no place for Canada to be a leader, and that is what I'm sensing from this government.

[George Kaoumi, As an Individual]

Good evening, everyone.

My name is George Kaoumi. I was a doctor in my country of origin. Here, I work in health care, but I do not practise as a doctor.

First, I completely support the law that came out of Bill C-51. I immigrated to Canada to ensure the security of my family and my children. I have now been here for 11 years, and I think our security is in jeopardy, as is the case everywhere in the world. It is not just in Canada. Terrorism is on the rise and it is moving from the South to the North.

We need more preventive measures. That has advantages and disadvantages, as is the case for anything in the world. The advantages of the law that came out of Bill C-51 are very significant. Exaggerated stress has been placed on the disadvantages of the law, but I would like someone to give me an example where a Canadian citizen's privacy has been violated, or a citizen has filed a complaint because they were the victim of misconduct on the part of a Canadian intelligence officer. Canadian intelligence officers are credible and have our complete confidence.

[Robert Cox]

—and that dissent and commentary merges and ends up becoming dysentery. Well, anyway.

Maybe I just have bad things to say, but what happens? When it's moderation on the CBC, I try to put comments on the CBC, and I get moderated off. Bill C-51 is hardly working, and yet here we are already being censored into obedience. I'm not very cool with that.

Those are the four points that I wanted to say.

As far as economics is concerned, they've just announced a new committee in Ottawa, and some guys are going to study growth in Canada. I'm an ecologist from the 1970s, too, and what happened to ecology? It turned into climate change, and then it's all denied, and they're making arrangements for it.

[Rhoda Sollazzo]

As someone who is not an expert, but who is just a private citizen, I can say that, from an emotional standpoint, I would feel more comfortable if we threw it out and then the elements that you think are helpful and do not harm everyday citizens could be introduced in a new bill. When you take something like Bill C-51, which is a 60-page bill and say you're going to tweak it, I get scared about what's being left behind, what's getting slipped under the rug. That's how I feel about it.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

You asked a question. Why throw it out, or actually, why keep it rather than throw it out? Obviously, from comments from experts, some parts of it have worked, so why would you throw them out? That would be the thing.

We've heard from a lot of you here today saying to just get rid of Bill C-51, that you don't like it, but I have heard very few suggestions about what you want to see to fix it. We heard a few suggestions from the witnesses today.

[Rhoda Sollazzo]

That's fantastic. Thank you.

I would like to go back to what I believe Mr. Miller brought up, using a specific example of an incident to say, if there are things in Bill C-51 that could have prevented that, should we not then retain some elements of Bill C-51? I think that's a dangerous way to make decisions. I think we need to start from principles and values like protecting people's rights and freedoms instead of looking at specific scenarios and then adding in elements to our legal code accordingly. We can always come up with a more disastrous scenario that requires even more limitations on our rights. I just don't think that's a valid way to think about things.

Finally, my question for you is why try to keep Bill C-51 at all instead of starting from scratch? The optics are not good. It looks like you're saying that once you've been granted extra powers, you don't really want to relinquish them, so let's try to kind of pacify people without fully backing off on something that was decried by so many institutions a year ago. I would just like to know what the reason for that is.

[Rhoda Sollazzo, As an Individual]

Thank you.

My name is Rhoda Sollazzo, and I will be brief. Fortunately, a lot of the things I wanted to say have already been said.

The first thing I would like to talk about is actually the more meta issue of these consultations in general. I've been trying really hard to be engaged and to come to as many as I can. Even today while walking in, I learned from someone else about two that happened in Montreal that I didn't know about.

I did attend the electoral reform public consultation. I found out about that one because I asked my local MP to email me when it was happening. He did, but it was still very short notice. It was very hard to do.

I wonder why we couldn't maybe sign up for emails or something. I mean, this is the 21st century. That would be great.

I'm really curious to know how far in advance you know about the consultations, because I found out about this one, also quite luckily, a few days ago. I wonder if that's because they're hastily put together, which would be understandable, or if there's actually a possibility to get an email from the Government of Canada about it. That would be fantastic.

As for the actual topic at hand, I also am deeply troubled by Bill C-51, for a lot of the reasons that were given by William Ray and Mr. McSorley just now. I won't go into them again. Maybe I'll do my best to send a brief. When are those due?

[Edward Hudson, As an Individual]

Bonjour. Good evening.

First of all, thank you for having these hearings. I'd like to echo one of the previous speakers who noted that. I would encourage the committee and future committees of Parliament to publicize such things much more widely and much further in advance, but I'm grateful to be here, now that I am.

Unlike many of the previous speakers, I claim no special expertise in areas of law or government. I'm a run-of-the-mill citizen. That's why I think it's especially important that people like me are able to appear at places like this. My background is in the physical sciences. I'm a college teacher at the moment.

A number of speakers, including William Ray, Tim McSorley, and Holly Dressel, have already amply talked about the risk of criminalizing dissent and the fact that the provisions adopted when Bill C-51 was adopted are not only unnecessary in preventing acts that are already criminal but they also risk stifling dissent. There's never been a good time to stifle civil debate and dissent, but I think now would be an unprecedentedly bad time to do so. We're in a period when the issues have never been more important—issues of indigenous reconciliation and indigenous livelihood, issues of the need to decarbonize our energy supply and prevent dangerous climate change. There would be no worse way to respond to public engagement on these issues than to risk criminalizing the people who want to bring them to the fore.

I teach a course on energy and climate, among other things. When I teach this to 18- and 19-year-olds, and I'm implicitly encouraging them to engage on these issues, do I tell them that I myself am more afraid than I was 10 years ago to express myself on some of these issues because of the risk of dissent being criminalized? That's not a climate we want to create.

Last, on the implicit invitation of the committee, I'd like to explore this idea of security a bit more broadly. We have a bit of a paradox here. On the one hand, the provisions adopted define security very broadly and risk criminalizing people for impinging on economic interests that then may be construed as a threat to national security. At the same time, what about the security of livelihood for indigenous groups? What about the security of access to a water supply? What about the security of access to lands? Are some of these groups that risk being criminalized not also fighting for a different kind of security, which is also owed them? Do we take away some kinds of security in the name of national security? That's the question I leave you with.

Thank you.

[Jacques Bernier, As an Individual]

First, as a Canadian, I want to thank the members of the committee for holding consultations with the general public, and in particular with people from our region.

Mr. Chair, I put myself in the position of a Canadian Security Intelligence officer: a lot is asked of me to protect the security of Canadians, but sometimes I may not be given enough training. People have spoken today to talk about agents provocateurs, among other things. In our history, there have indeed been dubious practices, if I may say that.

Personally, as a psychoanalyst by training and a street worker, I see it all, these days. I see people selling crack and financing terrorist activities outside Canada. That is something that is being looked at.

That being said, one thing is clear: the Anti-terrorism Act absolutely has to be changed. When Mr. Harper wrote his bill, he copied the Americans. Now, the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau has to demonstrate some creativity.

Very certainly, Canadians want to live in security, and the RCMP and CSIS are here to provide us with that security. Personally, I have nothing to reiterate on that subject. However, if I put myself in the position of a communist or an activist, I think there is a point at which these officers should be given more training. There is the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that charter is based on certain fundamental principles. These officers need to be reminded that there are fundamental principles to be respected in Canada. In the United States, it is another matter. We have to innovate in Canada, we have to stop modelling what we do on what the CIA does, and our government has to do something that looks Canadian.

That is the essence of my thinking about the provisions of Bill C-51.

I think there is something else I wanted to say. Let me consult my notes for a moment.

[Aaron Gluck-Thaler, As an Individual]

Members of the committee, thank you for holding these public consultations.

My name is Aaron Thaler. I'm going to focus my remarks today on two main points.

The first concerns the disruption powers authorized by Bill C-51. Bill C-51 is still in its original form, and the disturbing powers it authorizes are becoming entrenched despite the current government's promises to repeal its problematic elements.

Bill C-51 violates the charter. It also ignores the McDonald commission's recommendations to separate policing and intelligence work.

Under Bill C-51, CSIS can do anything to reduce threats to the broadly defined security of Canada, including violating any and every charter right. The only things CSIS can't do are cause death or bodily harm, violate sexual integrity, or willfully obstruct justice. That's a very concerning threshold. CSIS has already used its disruption powers nearly two dozen times, and without any meaningful oversight or accountability.

I have a pretty basic expectation of my government. When the government limits my rights or the rights of any other Canadian, I expect it to justify why those limitations are necessary. The current government has not provided a single reason as to why the disruption powers authorized by Bill C-51 are necessary.

If the current government wants to regain the trust of Canadians, I urge it to repeal Bill C-51 in full. These consultations are cold comfort to the Canadians who are engaged right now in lawful dissent and face crippling surveillance by CSIS.

The second point I want to express today, and I'll deal with it very quickly, concerns the activities of CSE, the Communications Security Establishment, Canada's intelligence agency.

CSE operates in secret, so we have to rely on American whistle-blowers to help us learn about a Canadian intelligence agency and how that Canadian intelligence agency impacts our privacy and security.

What do we know? We know that CSE engages in mass, warrantless surveillance of Canadians, collects troves of Canadian metadata, and sometimes shares that data illegally. We know that CSE worked with the NSA to undermine an encryption algorithm, relied upon by millions of Canadians for online security. We know that CSE hoards and stockpiles computer vulnerabilities, and in doing so, prioritizes their foreign intelligence capabilities over the digital security of ordinary Canadians.

Moving forward, I urge you to ensure that the intelligence activities of CSE rely on judicial, not ministerial, authorization, just like Joyce Murray proposed in Bill C-622.

Metadata has to be afforded strong privacy protections, and any oversight of CSE must evaluate the impact of foreign intelligence gathering on Canadian cybersecurity.

We are all foreigners to someone. When CSE does not afford any privacy protections to foreigners, the government is complicit in setting a dangerous precedent for other governments to spy on Canadians. We all rely upon computers for security. When CSE stockpiles computer vulnerabilities, the government is complicit in undermining the security of ordinary Canadians and encourages other governments to do the same.

In these national security discussions, let's move beyond the paralyzing discussion of how to respond to terrorism only. The sooner we do this, the sooner we'll realize that Bill C-51 is fatally flawed and that the powers of CSE need to be reined in.

Thank you.

[Shane Johnston, As an Individual]

Good evening. I'm really glad this is happening. I'm very sorry that many more people, with this short notice, could not have been made aware that this is going on. I feel there's a problem with communication, that dispersion of information is not adequate. This refers to quite a lot of the public consultations that I've been involved in, helped to organize, and tried to get people out to. We really need to work on that. If this is to be really legitimate, and considered worthy of all the time and money you're spending, that part needs to be taken better care of, please.

I'm an ecologist. I'm retired now. I was a teacher for many years. I'm concerned by justice, whether it's social, economic, or environmental. I don't believe in a Canada run by multinationals or run for the one per cent.

I believe in a Canada working in the best interest of the majority of Canadians, but that doesn't mean destroying native land and ignoring their rights. I don't believe in a Canada where we protect our rights and freedoms by taking them away. That is what Bill C-51 does. It must be repealed. It must be removed.

Our rights and freedoms in some ways are removed already by the lack of media. The media are controlled. They don't tell the story. They don't report to the people what's going on, so we don't have information. We don't actually have the truth, only from one perspective.

I certainly don't want to be, as an ecologist, considered a terrorist, and that's one of the things that is part of this whole deal that is coming down. Let us just look at the surveillance oversights: checks and controls—you know the details better than I do—secret police powers, information sharing, Internet censorship, online privacy problems, having telecom providers and surveillance handing over information, and reducing our encryption possibilities to keep our personal information personal.

If we're looking at it, we need to start from scratch. It has to be canned. That pretty much summarizes it.

[Dorothy Henaut, As an Individual]

I'd like to step back a bit and talk about the attitude in the body politic that this bill encourages. It's a template that hangs over the population. It encourages the police—and all police forces are influenced by it—to consider Canadian citizens as their enemies, especially those citizens who believe Canada could be a better place if changes were made toward equality, peacefulness, respect for civil liberties, open, diverse and free communication, healthy agriculture and food, etc.

We want real policies to stop global climate change, an economy not based on selling arms to Saudi Arabia...I could go on. I'm an 81-year-old citizen who has belonged to the Voice of Women since 1963.

I am a member of the group Les artistes pour la paix. I am an activist for social, economic and environmental justice.

I am a citizen, and I am afraid of laws that jeopardize our democracy.

When a government pits its police force against its citizens, it's on a slippery slope toward fascism. When a government allows its police services to break the law with impunity, anything from the way the cops drive in Montreal to some of the undercover stuff they do, and trap the naive, and consider a conscientious citizen the enemy, we have a problem. Therefore, I think a new set of glasses needs to be placed over Bill C-51. Does it pass the democracy test?

When our police behave as if they have seen too many TV shows, and start taking entertainment for reality, we're in trouble. Remember the G20 in Toronto. When there's no civilian citizen oversight over our policing system that has any degree of credibility, how close does that make us to a police state, a fascist state?

As a citizen, I want to be respected by government and by my police force, even if I hold different views from theirs. I'm not saying our government should not be concerned by security issues. If they stopped playing TV games, they might even be more efficient at that task.

So throw out Bill C-51 and start over.

[Marco Mendicino, Liberal, Eglinton—Lawrence, ON]

—and those comments will be reflected in our report. Let me just begin by saying that.

I want to press you a bit on the freedom of expression, as it is balanced out in the law, and as it exists today with what was C-51, and what is now part of the Criminal Code, and the CSIS Act, and other statutes.

There are elements within the criminal offences whose purpose is to delineate some boundaries between what is free expression, lawful protest, and civil disobedience, which are part of the fabric of our democracy, and those comments that go beyond into a different realm. I think one of the other members of the audience very astutely pointed out that there is room or flexibility for interpretation. Is it possible that the need for that flexibility is driven by the facts and circumstances of any protest, where things could get out of hand? Do we risk not getting the balance right, if we become too narrow in our definitions?

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Very good.

You said that Bill C-51 won't help security and liberty, which were your exact words. On the security part of it, sir, there's been a number of so-called experts in the field—and I'm not going to profess to be one of them because I'm not—who've said that if they'd had some of the changes in Bill C-51 in place two years ago, Warrant Officer Vincent and Corporal Cirillo may still be alive. Also that would-be terrorist, Mr. Aaron Driver, in Strathroy, Ontario, wouldn't have been apprehended if this law hadn't been in place.

First of all, what are your comments on that? There are a number of people who said that helped. I'm not saying the whole Bill C-51 is good, but in that part of it, there are people out there saying that it did help. Could you respond to that, please?

[William Ray, As an Individual]

My name is William Ray. I served for 10 years in the Canadian Armed Forces. I hold the Governor General of Canada's decoration for bravery for halting ethnic cleansing in the Medak area of Croatia in 1993.

The first member of my family to get to Canada arrived here in 1759 and fought for General Wolfe on the Plains of Abraham. One of his descendants was a man named Sir Samuel Benfield Steele, known as Sam Steele to anybody from the west. He was the third member of the North-West Mounted Police, now the RCMP, and one of its leaders for about half of its existence.

All of that is to say that I and my family have been involved in the defence and security of Canada since before it was Canada.

As written, Bill C-51, or law Bill C-51, will provide for neither our security nor surely our liberty. Nothing in this bill would have prevented the occurrences we have had here in Canada: nothing. This bill, and the security services of Canada, unfortunately, for the last couple of years have been pursuing the unethical use of security service powers against social groups, against anti-resource activists. We've seen this by the Canadian Armed Forces, my former organization, whose sole purpose is to literally fix and destroy those who pose a threat to the security of Canada. Following around native activists: this is not acceptable. It is not acceptable in this country.

Bill C-51 needs to be revoked in toto. I would remind you all that the darkest periods in the history of our nation have occurred when we have traded the liberty of our citizens for what we perceived to be our security. I would include in that residential schools. I would include in that the forming of concentration camps for German, Italian, and Japanese citizens during World War II.

Anything that the security services need to do, as Mr. McSorley very ably pointed out, is covered by the Criminal Code of Canada. You may not destroy property. You may not threaten others. You may not injure others. There is no need for this bill. It is a massive overreach by the RCMP and CSIS. The RCMP does not have a good history with this sort of thing. We threw them out of the national security business for a good reason, most of which happened here in Quebec. I know their history very well, because part of it is my family history.

I would ask you all, as parliamentarians, to exercise your duty to the people of this country to protect not just their physical security but their liberty and the society that generations of people have fought to bring about and continue to improve.

Thank you.

[Suzanne Chabot]

I want to add one point, to conclude.

Where do you think the RCMP officer who got us fired is today? He is now in charge of security at VIA Rail, after being sworn by a judge of the Court of Québec.

I want to say that I am opposed to the provisions of Bill C-51. I would like it if such laws did not exist in Quebec.

[Timothy McSorley, As an Individual]

[Technical difficulty—Editor] that relates specifically to issues of free expression, dissent, and political activity in Canada that touches mostly on Bill C-51 but on some other aspects regarding Canada's national security laws as well.

We're very concerned that the broad definition of terrorist activity, which includes interference with critical infrastructure in Canada, leaves open the potential for the criminalization of dissent in our country. The provisions in this law do say that it would not be used in instances of dissent or political demonstration, but we're concerned that this isn't enough as they are terms that are open to interpretation, and we can see very realistically future governments saying that an act of dissent is really an act of terrorism, especially considering the way that acts of terrorism are defined currently in Canadian law. We're very concerned that, even though there's this provision, it doesn't go far enough, and there needs to be further action to ensure that and all political demonstrations and acts of dissent are protected in Canada.

We're also very concerned about the new provision regarding the promotion of terrorism in the Criminal Code. We're concerned that it's overly vague and broad and that it leaves a very real potential, as has been pointed out by several experts—not just us but many organizations and in the media on the debate around Bill C-51—that it could be used against people who are expressing dissent, including journalists, political analysts, politicians, and just everyday Canadians. We think that aspect needs to be reviewed by Parliament and by the committee.

We're also concerned that such laws, before they're put into place, are not necessarily properly vetted by the Department of Justice for charter compliance. That's something we're very concerned about, not just around national security laws, but when it comes to various Canadian laws. That was pointed out by Edgar Schmidt, a former Department of Justice employee who has spoken about his concerns and has been through the courts. He wasn't necessarily successful, but the points that he raised regarding the amount of resources that are given to the Department of Justice in order to vet such laws for charter compliance are very important to us and I think point to a concern that we should have that, when laws like Bill C-51 are brought forward, there is proper vetting and proper information given about charter compliance. We feel that wasn't the case for Bill C-51.

Finally, we're also concerned about the new powers granted to CSIS to intervene actively through threat disruption abroad. In light of the historical record of the RCMP, the Secret Service, the FBI, and other national security agencies, we're very concerned that there is a history of organizations using these kinds of powers to disrupt legitimate dissent and political dissent in different countries. We have the history of the RCMP's dirty tricks campaigns in Canada. While that has gone through commissions, and we may feel that it doesn't happen as much now, these types of powers given to an organization such as CSIS without proper oversight and without proper rethinking could lead, we think, to a repression of dissent here in Canada and also in their activities with other security agencies internationally.

[Johan Boyden, As an Individual]

Thank you and good evening.

My name is Johan Boyden, and I am speaking on behalf of the Communist Party of Canada. Our party will be submitting a brief on this review, and I would like to offer you the highlights, in particular, our view that Bill C-51 is unamendable and must be repealed in full, and the building case for dismantling CSIS altogether.

In our view, this bill is perhaps the most serious assault on democratic rights, labour rights, and civil liberties in recent times, and we are not alone in making this case. Mr. Oliphant, many of the people who voted for you in Thorncliffe Park, members of the Muslim community, share this view, as do experts, intellectuals, and people from labour. I could spend my entire three minutes going through the hundreds of organizations just from Quebec that signed a declaration against this legislation and its composite effects.

Why? Because it mandates more clearly a secret police force, with black operations, disruption, or dirty tricks that would shred the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, allowing it basically to scoop up people from the streets. This broad definition—economic and fiscal stability—could directly infringe labour's right to strike or, more broadly, any movement, indigenous, environmental, and so forth, that is resisting the agenda of the big corporations. It's a piece of legislation that would have made solidarity with Nelson Mandela illegal and also today's solidarity with Palestine or with Colombia, which is working its way through peace talks.

If you look at the question of government oversight that your discussion paper and green paper have suggested, I think it is either naive or deliberately deceptive. The presentation that SIRC could effectively regulate CSIS is in reality not true; it is a powerless body. Consider the scandals involving Chuck Strahl and other past chairs of this committee. It is totally complicit.

I would like to note that this legislation came forward in the context of an increasingly reckless aggressive foreign policy, wars and occupations, and destabilizing global impacts, and it is the call for peace and the foreign policy of disarmament that is the strongest case against the so-called radicalization that your background paper speaks of with great alarm.

I'd also draw your attention to the fact that the CIA is probably the most overseen by the Senate and Congress of any of the intelligence agencies in the world and, in fact, the CIA operates to extend U.S. foreign policy into the sphere of dirty operations. This claim that oversight and empowering SIRC will do the job is just not held up by the facts around the world. It's time to get rid of CSIS.

If I may, I'll conclude with a few points.

[Adrien Welsh]

Fine. We have a two-tier system.

I am offended that in a room bearing the name of Picasso, people are spouting words like “democracy”, at the same time as they are trying to adjust the provisions of a bill that is worthy of the regimes that caused the atrocities which prompted that artist to produce Guernica.

I want to say clearly that I am fundamentally opposed to Bill C-51, which became the Anti-terrorism Act. No adjustment to make it more acceptable is possible. It must be immediately rejected and repealed, just as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, CSIS, must be.

The real danger comes not from these young and not-so-young people who are supposedly being radicalized—in fact, I would like someone to explain to me what that concept refers to—but rather from the radicalization of a government that is constantly more liberticidal and that, by creating a climate of hostility, would arm the enemies of freedom and democracy, whoever they may be.

In fact, this is the spiral in which France has been engaged in recent months. This is how, in that country, that is the supposed homeland of human rights and liberty, eight-year-old children have been placed in detention, arbitrarily, teachers have been turned into informers, and demonstrations have been brutally repressed.

In fact, that climate of fear is very effective for neutralizing people who propose social change as a long-term solution. That climate of hostility is also very practical when it comes to justifying wars on terrorism, in Syria or elsewhere.

So I will conclude by coming back to Picasso, who did not simply paint Les Demoiselles d'Avignon. He also painted doves for peace, and took part in the 1962 world congress of peace activists, the target of a bomb attack perpetrated not by foreign terrorists, but by “good Frenchmen” who were denying the Algerians peace during that period.

Today, if our objective were truly to prevent any threat of radicalization, we would not be discussing Bill C-51 or so-called national security; rather, we would be planning the withdrawal of the Canadian troops in Syria and everywhere else outside our country. We would be discussing the steps to take so that the people of this country, whether they are Quebecers or aboriginal people, and of whatever religion, whether Muslim or Christian, would be represented by a government that reflects their values and not those of the corporations.

Thank you.

[Paul Cavalluzzo]

There are two key ones that I would recommend. First of all, as was stated before, to appeal the decision of the minister you have to establish that the minister was unreasonable. It shouldn't be unreasonableness. What it should be is he or she was correct. It's too important in terms of the intrusive power it has on the citizen. The second improvement I would recommend is that much of the hearing on the appeal will be heard in secret. You're going to have the government lawyer there and you're not going to have anybody representing the individual. In Bill C-51, if you're going to have a no-fly list, I would have a provision that says there is a special advocate who will be in the hearing representing the interests of the person whose name is on the no-fly list, so at least we have some kind of an adversarial debate within the secret hearings of the Federal Court. That's not there now. That should be there.

[Paul Cavalluzzo]

Let me respond in two ways. First of all, in respect of best practices relating to the sharing of information with foreign agencies such as the CIA and the FBI, I'd ask you to look at the Arar report. In 2006, Mr. Justice O'Connor made a number of recommendations in respect of the sharing of information, sharing of information with friendly nations such as the Americans or nations with poor human rights records such as Syria, Egypt, and so on. He talked about a number of restrictions that you should put on the sharing of information. There are two parts to the Arar report. If you look at volume I, it deals with a number of recommendations relating to the sharing of information.

Secondly, in respect of CSIS's powers and whether they need new powers, whether they need new powers they clearly don't need the powers that Bill C-51 gives them. Bill C-51 is unique in the history of this country, and indeed, in the history of any legal system similar to ours, in the sense that it attempts to empower a judge to authorize the violation of the Charter of Rights. That's what it does, and it's clearly unconstitutional. It gives CSIS that power. Certainly, CSIS doesn't need that power.

Whether it needs any new powers that are constitutional, I agree that what should happen is that we should be satisfied that the previous regime is inadequate. Did CSIS have adequate powers before Bill C-51? If it didn't, then those powers should be given to it under Bill C-51, but certainly not along the strain that Bill C-51 presently does, because as I said, it's just an unbelievable power that any constitutional lawyer will tell you is unconstitutional on its face.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you.

My next question is for all the witnesses. It's the same question I asked our first set of witnesses. In my view, CSIS, among others, must show that it needs the powers, and that there's really something lacking.

Once again, the question is for all of you. Do you think that proof has been made, and that the powers granted by Bill C-51were necessary to ensure public safety, considering what existed before?

[Sibel Ataogul]

I certainly have some comments on the subject.

It obviously ties in with what the Honourable Nicola Di Iorio said about best practices in this regard.

We must always bear in mind that although we can draw inspiration from these practices, there's not necessarily a Charter of Rights and Freedoms in other countries, even some very developed ones. So we must be careful when importing what we consider to be other countries' best practices. It poses a problem.

We saw with Mr. Arar, and with everything the commissions showed, that information can be obtained under torture. Such practices are prohibited in Canada. However, the information can be shared and used by CSIS against people. Moreover, with Bill C-51, a chain can be established. It can justify an arrest, because it's believed the person could commit a terrorist act. Charges can be based on information of dubious origin, using secret procedures.

In short, this is what happens.

If the threshold for the consequences is reduced, that means whatever information you get under torture or under conditions that aren't acceptable in Canada can lead to consequences that are much more grave for the person involved.

That, I think, is where the problem is. If information has been obtained through torture, we must be careful not to make the consequences even more grave. That's what Bill C-51 does.

Furthermore, Bill C-51 allows all agencies and all governments to transmit the information as well, even though we don't exactly know where the information is from. That's even more problematic.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for your remarks on this, Ms. Ataogul.

I'd like to know the following in relation to information-sharing, especially in the realm of human rights.

Some people say that Canadians have less protection when they're outside the country. The example that obviously comes to mind is the U.S., with its information collection under the Patriot Act. People who are not Americans don't have the same legal protections in this regard. They have no protection for their private data, for example.

I don't know if you have any comments about information-sharing with other countries, even our allies, and the problems this can cause by virtue of the powers granted by Bill C-51.

[Larry Miller, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Ms. Ataogul, when you talked earlier you touched on Bill C-51 and what have you. One of the concerns I have there is that no legislation, it doesn't matter what, is ever perfect. I believe it's put in with the best of intentions, and even Mr. Cavalluzzo pointed out some faults with Bill C-22. In order to give police or authorities the power to detain someone who they have a pretty good idea could commit terrorism, if the clauses in Bill C-51 aren't perfect in your belief, what could be there to still give police the powers to do what they have to do?

[Sibel Ataogul, President, Association des juristes progressistes]

I will be addressing you in French, but, as you can see, I can certainly answer your questions in English.

I am here on behalf of the Association des juristes progressistes, or AJP. It's an association of lawyers, law professors, law students and other women and men who work in the legal field. Founded in 2010, it has several hundred members, and intervenes on a number of issues of current interest, and on recent laws and regulations.

In my own practice, I do a lot of work in the realm of constitutional law, and on the constitutional validity of laws. For example, I challenged a provision of the Labour Code that limited farm workers' freedom of association, a provision of the Highway Safety Code that limited the right to demonstrate, and by-law P-6 enacted by the City of Montreal. At the moment, I am challenging the pit bull by-law—this always makes people smile—but I think that principles related to the validity of laws are of great concern, especially at the AJP.

Our association stated a position when Bill C-51was enacted. We came out against the measures in the bill for a number of reasons. One significant reason was that, in our humble opinion, most of the measures in the bill probably violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. That's why I'm here today to speak primarily about these measures. We intend to tell it like it is. A bill has been introduced to repeal certain provisions of Bill C-51, and consultations were promised during the election campaign. You will recall that the Liberal Party of Canada voted in favour of the bill, saying it would review the legislation later. We feel the time has truly come to do just that. Hence this presentation, which is the result of my colleagues' work. I won't spend much time on the subject being studied by the Committee; instead, I will focus on C-51.

I want to address two aspects. The first is the green paper, which was released to the public. The AJP has done a lot of legal education on the subject, and considerable public awareness work. What disappointed us about the green paper, and what disappoints us about these consultations, is that the green paper seems to present the current framework, including C-51, as something eminently necessary and/or positive. Naturally, we don't expect you to present the contrary view, but since this is a consultation, we believe the public should be able to comment with all the information in its possession.

It would have been interesting to note the controversies that the bill has sparked within the legal community, since most legal experts believe the law likely contains human rights violations. A constitutional challenge of these provisions, spearheaded by my distinguished colleague Mr. Cavalluzzo, is under way before the Ontario courts. We believe the public is entitled to this background.

As for the merits of the question, it's obvious we have a great deal to say, but I will limit myself to certain aspects of the provisions amending various acts, and will tell you why we think those provisions should be repealed.

The first consideration is the new crime of advocating or promoting terrorism. Specifically, anyone who knowingly communicates statements, while knowing that a terrorism offence will be committed or being reckless as to whether such an offence may be committed, is guilty of an indictable offence.

In our opinion, this provision serves no purpose, as there are already roughly 15 provisions governing all the terrorism offences, including terrorist or hate propaganda. The provision poses enormous problems with regard to freedom of expression. It is not just about people who have opinions different from that of the government of the day—we believe, of course, that this was the case at the time the law was enacted. It also applies to people with neutral positions, like journalists, professors and analysts. Such people might have an opinion about a conflict, but refrain from expressing it because that might cause someone, somewhere, to engage in some act. We believe the provision infringes freedom of expression, and that its usefulness has in no way been demonstrated.

On the contrary, this type of provision has an immense chilling effect.

Before my remarks, much was said about prevention initiatives, and about what is done to determine who is making such statements. You have created a provision for that purpose. I use the word "you", but I'm speaking in general terms, because I haven't heard anyone say they'd like to repeal this provision, other than something about a private member's bill.

You're ensuring that these discussions don't take place. Someone who might have thoughts of this kind, who needs support, and needs to talk with people from his community who would then ask him if he's really thought about what he's said, would refrain from talking about it, for fear of being charged under this provision. As a result, the discussions occur in somewhat more secret places. I think the provision is ineffective. In my view, it violates freedom of expression, and we will see what the court decides in that regard.

Furthermore, statements made in private benefit from no exception either, whereas other provisions do contain such an exception. I'm referring to discussions that take place in venues where one wants people to talk. One of the witnesses referred to a community where one wants people to discuss these ideas freely. Let me be very candid: as a lawyer, I would not advise my clients to have such discussions, due to the provision you've enacted.

Very briefly, I'd like to address the new powers granted to CSIS.

Mr. Cavalluzzo said that truly effective oversight power is needed, and I obviously agree, but first of all, we need to call on the Liberal government. It's the Liberal government that removed information-gathering powers from the RCMP, in the wake of the McDonald Commission.

You noted that granting these powers to CSIS was a step back. We're told that a judge can be seen beforehand. With respect, this does not account for our legal system, in which judges need to make decisions based on evidence. In this instance, a judge is being asked to guess whether a given measure could reduce a threat. So a judge who is not necessarily an expert in the field would have to determine whether a given measure would help prevent a threat, and after that, CSIS could act. Naturally, there is no way to present the judge with all the unforeseeable and spontaneous situations that can arise and justify granting a warrant. All kinds of things can happen in the course of a proceeding. Will it be necessary to go back before the judge each time?

We have a hard time understanding why this provision is needed, especially since, under the previous system, CSIS did not have these powers, and was already committing mistakes in good faith, according to my colleague Mr. Cavalluzzo.

I would now like to discuss a third point: preventive detention.

The Association des juristes progressistes believes the preventive detention scheme is already quite dubious under the Anti-terrorism Act, 2001. Indeed, the scheme permits preventive arrests if there are reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorist act will be committed. Even in such a case, a warrant must be obtained, whereas the provision proposed in Bill C-51 states that a peace officer can lay an information or arrest someone without a warrant, if he or she has reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorist act may be carried out.

I will cite the example given by the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, which others have spoken about. It's the example of young Muslim adults having a lively conversation in the street. We don't know what they're talking about because we don't understand their language, but we wonder whether they might commit a terrorist act and whether they can be arrested preventively.

We believe this kind of provision goes very far and constitutes a major lowering of the thresholds for arrest and detention. For these reasons, it will probably be found contrary to section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

In the current context, where terrorism is the major concern and connections are made with the Muslim community, we believe it could lead to political profiling.

I was hoping to address other elements, but I will conclude my remarks with some comments on the no-fly list.

In our view, this list was already very problematic. Essentially, Bill C-51 codified the power of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness to put Canadians on such a list. And in order to be removed from the list, one must apply to the Federal Court. I don't need to talk to you at length about access to justice, but I can certainly say a few words if you wish. It's not enough to show that the Minister was wrong; it must be shown that he acted unreasonably. It's a positively Kafkaesque scheme.

It's also interesting that people who are not entitled to fly can still go into schools and shopping centres, and to take the bus and the subway. When seen from this perspective, I think a no-fly list is absolutely useless. We have a lot of trouble understanding how it could be necessary.

I will conclude by telling you about certain reports on the subject from the United States. According to these reports, certain people's names were put on the no-fly list so they could be asked questions, and told that their name might be withdrawn if their answers were satisfactory. I am not saying that's the intention in Canada—far from it—but I think the risk is grave.

Obviously, we feel this violates the right to liberty. It's not the same thing as being arrested, but we believe it could violate the right to liberty, and section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Those are just a few examples of the problems caused by the provisions of Bill C-51; there is more.

Thank you very much.

[Paul Cavalluzzo, Representative, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group]

Thank you.

In the presentation I'm going to make today, I want to talk about the relationship between parliamentary review by the committee that will be created by Bill C-22, and independent review, which will be done, hopefully, by an expert body that is independent of government. I have prepared a presentation, which I understand will be given to you after it has been translated.

Now, having been commission counsel to the Arar inquiry and a special advocate for a number of years, I can attest to the fact that national security agencies and police agencies working in national security make mistakes. I don't say that they do it maliciously. They do it innocently, but they do make mistakes because they are human beings. Indeed, in Mr. Arar's case, what happened to him was that he was sent to Syria for a year of torture as a result of inaccurate information given to the FBI and the CIA by our Canadian agency, the RCMP.

His case is not an anomaly. Many Canadians have been caught up in the response of our agencies to terrorism.

One of the main problems that the agencies are facing is that they're dealing in intelligence. They're not dealing in evidence. Intelligence has been described as “glorified rumours”. Intelligence comes from human sources, foreign agencies, and whatever, and it is often not reliable.

The other problem we have with our agencies is that they're not totally forthcoming with our adjudicative bodies when they do make mistakes. Indeed, last year and in the last few years, the Federal Court of Canada has been severely critical of CSIS because it felt that CSIS had not been forthcoming in respect of its mistakes.

The other aspect, which is very important in terms of why we need effective oversight and review, is that most of the activities of these national security agencies, like CSIS, are conducted in secret. They are conducted in secret. Indeed, even the court proceedings respecting the activities of CSIS are conducted in secret.

At the same time as their activities are conducted in secret, both CSIS and other national security agencies have unbelievably intrusive powers, which can intrude upon the rights and freedoms of Canadians. When we look at that total package, we have to say to ourselves that obviously we want to protect ourselves in respect of national security, but at the same time, we want to protect our fundamental freedoms, which are guaranteed in the Charter of Rights. How do we do that?

These are very important questions. Probably one of the most difficult questions in our legal system today is about balancing national security along with our fundamental freedoms, and I think the answer to that is effective oversight by a parliamentary committee and independent review by an expert body. Let me take you through that.

First of all, at the outset, let me say that I'm very pleased that the government is intending to create a committee of parliamentarians to oversee the activities of our national security agencies. I have a number of problems with Bill C-22, which I will share with you at the end of my presentation. I understand you're going to be dealing with it next week, and I have some comments on Bill C-22, but certainly, parliamentary oversight by this committee is a step in the right direction to strengthen our national security system, both national security agencies and national security reviews.

The question is, is it enough? My firm answer, having dealt with national security issues for the last 10 years and in dealing with top secret evidence and national security agencies, is that we need something more, and this something more has to complement the parliamentary overview of this committee or whatever committee there will be in respect of dealing with our national security agencies. On the one hand, we have oversight, which is done by a parliamentary committee, and on the other hand, we have review, which is done by an independent expert body.

Let me tell you the differences between that, because Commissioner O'Connor in the Arar report dealt with those concepts dealing with oversight. It's a good step, as I said before, to have parliamentary oversight by a committee. Most liberal democracies have that, and it's good that we're going in that direction.

What is oversight? Oversight deals with efficacy issues, such as how the national agencies are running and what policy system should be applicable to our national security agencies. It's a blue-sky review or analysis. As parliamentarians, you don't have the time to get on the ground to deal with the review issues.

What is review? Review looks at the national security agency, after the fact, on the basis of propriety against standards of lawfulness, policies, and other kinds of standards. It's what SIRC does. As you know, SIRC is the review body of CSIS.

On the one hand, we have parliamentary oversight dealing with systemic issues and policy issues, and on the other hand, we have review.

You may ask yourself, now that we're going to have parliamentary oversight with this committee of parliamentarians, we have SIRC, and we have the CSC commissioner. don't we have the best of both worlds? The answer to that is clearly not.

Over 10 years ago, Commissioner O'Connor, in the Arar report, said that our review system is inadequate. Now, with Bill C-51, the problems with review are even more glaring.

I will give you three examples of why the review system is not sufficient and adequate today.

First, our review system is siloed. It only has jurisdiction over one agency. It doesn't have jurisdiction over all of the agencies. All of our national security agencies operate jointly. You just can't have a review body over CSIS when it's working with the CBSA, RCMP, and so on. That siloed jurisdiction is totally inadequate.

Second, national security agencies have been given more and broader powers by Bill C-51, and our review agencies have to be given more powers and resources that deal with these expanded powers.

The third example is about personal information. Bill C-51 gives over 100 Canadian agencies the power to send personal information to 17 Canadian agencies, such as CSIS. Of these 17, 14 of these agencies receiving this information do not even have a review mechanism. There's a number of reasons why the system is fraught with difficulty and why we need a broader review mechanism that has authority over all of the national security agencies.

In the last minute or so that I have, I'll deal with the problems with Bill C-22.

The main problem is that the government can interfere with the mandate of the committee. The committee is given authority to do a national security review, unless the minister says it would be injurious to national security.

It's the same thing with respect to access to information. The committee can ask for information from a minister or an agency, but it can be refused on the basis that it's injurious to national security. The problem with that, as the Supreme Court of Canada said in the Harkat case, is that governments constantly over-claim national security confidentiality assertions not only in this country, but in the United States, the U.K., and elsewhere.

The decisions made by the minister under Bill C-22 to refuse information and to refuse this committee to investigate is not reviewable by a court, which is a power I have never seen in this country.

You'll see in my paper a number of difficulties with Bill C-22, which is going in the right direction, but it's not quite there yet.

Thank you.

[Roch Tassé, Acting National Coordinator, International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group]

I'd like to begin by thanking the members of the committee for inviting us to share our perspectives on the national security framework.

The International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group is a coalition of 43 civil society organizations in Canada. Among other organizations, it includes the major unions, NGOs, human rights organizations and churches. Our coalition was created in 2002 specifically to monitor anti-terrorism laws and measures in order to determine their repercussions on the rights and freedoms of Canadians.

Since its creation in 2002, our coalition has appeared many times before the Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security. We were also heard by the O'Connor and Iacobucci commissions. Furthermore, we have intervened in numerous cases before the Supreme Court, on issues ranging from security certificates to no-fly lists.

I was going to speak about several challenges today, but given the time considerations, we will focus only on two aspects: a request to repeal the provisions introduced by Bill C-51, and agency oversight and complaint mechanisms.

We're fortunate to have Paul Cavalluzzo with us today to represent us. He was lead commission counsel with the O'Connor Commission, which, in 2006, tabled a report containing recommendations for a review mechanism.

I will immediately give the floor to Mr. Cavalluzzo, so we can delve into the heart of the subject.

Thank you.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you.

One last question, if I may.

You spoke about the importance of the network, but also a fear of criminalization, when a radicalization problem is reported. Some people say that increasingly broad and vague definitions in Bill C-51 risk undermining anti-radicalization efforts because of that very fear of criminalization.

Do you agree?

[Denis Barrette]

The state's surveillance and investigative agencies will always tell you their toolbox isn't full enough. That's normal. It's as old as the hills.

In my opinion, the proof has not been made, and it's up to those agencies to provide such proof. We must always ask—and this brings me back to the same question—whether an investigation would have been impossible without the anti-terrorism measures in Bill C-51, and in which respects these measures are helpful.

This is just one example among many. We must never forget that the context of Bill C-51 is terrorism and national security. National security is based on secrecy being maintained within surveillance agencies and the police. Consequently, the debates take place behind closed doors, because not only national security, but also, international relations, are involved. The information is from the outside. We're not arguing that it's improper for Canada to get information from other countries. We can't criticize that, since it's a normal procedure, and is bound to increase.

As we saw in the Maher Arar inquiry, the problem is that this information is often obtained through torture, or is erroneous. In fact, the two are often combined. Since the information is obtained through torture, it is often incorrect. This is why we often end up with investigations built on rotten foundations. It goes without saying that the results of those investigations are invalid. In short, the way investigations are conducted needs a thorough overhaul.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

I'd also like us to address these organizations' duty to prove they need such powers.

In your view, have these powers been proven necessary, or, on the contrary, were the provisions that existed before Bill C-51 sufficient to ensure public safety?

[Dominique Peschard]

The fact that CSIS can take preventive action, even unlawfully under the legislation resulting from Bill C-51, does indeed bring to mind the actions of the RCMP. In fact, it's exactly why intelligence work was separated from police action at the time. The problem is that CSIS does not seek to gather evidence that will lead to criminal charges in a context where the accused will be able to defend himself in a fair and impartial process. Instead, things are done clandestinely.

As a result, people are sometimes subject to these police actions, as they were in the 1960s or 1970s, without being aware of it, and are then unable to contest the actions. The data banks of certain organizations can be destroyed, activities can be sabotaged, etc. Action is taken against individuals in the dark, as part of a framework that doesn't keep them informed, even after the fact. The rights of these people are infringed, but they have no way to challenge it. That is not an acceptable way to protect our country.

[Matthew Dubé, NDP, Beloeil—Chambly, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlemen, thank you for being with us.

My question is for Mr. Peschard and Mr. Barrette.

Reference was made to the McDonald Commission. Following that commission, it was decided to split the powers. As a result, we have the RCMP on the one hand, and CSIS on the other. Many people, myself included, argue that because of the powers included in Bill C-51, that separation is being eliminated, despite having been conceived for a very specific reason. Since your organization has been around for a long time, you've probably seen things progress, or regress, in that regard. I'd like you to give us more details about this situation.